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PREFACE
J. o
The prior edition being exhausted, this one became necessary.
The scope of the book has been considerably changed by develop-
ing the law of jurisdiction and the estoppel by judgments. Room
for this has been obtained by dropping some of the less important
-cases on other topics. In several instances a case has been dis-
placed by another on the same point, because thought to cover
the matter better. _
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JURISDICTION DEPENDING ON THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE COURT.
The Government Creating the Court.
THE NUEVA ANNA and THE LIEBRE: THE SPANISH CONSUL,
CLAIMANT, in U. S. Sup. Ct., 1821-19 U. S. (6 Wheaten) 193.
APPEAL from the District Court of°Louisiana. These were
the cases of the cargoes of two Spanish ships, captured and con-
demned by a pretended court of admiralty at Galveston, con-
stituted by Commodore Aury, under the alleged authority of the
Mexican republic. The goods were, after this condemnation,
brought into the port of New Orleans, and there libelled by the
original Spanish owners, in the district court. Th'at court, de-
creed restitution to the original owners, and the captors appealed
to this court. '
February 26th, 1821. This cause was argued by Hopkinson,
for the respondents and libellants; no counsel appearing for the
appellant and captors.
The court stated, that it did not recognize the existence of
any court of admiralty, sitting at Galveston, with authority to
adjudicate on captures, nor had the government of the
United States hitherto acknowledged the existence of any Mexi-
can republic or state, at war with Spain; so that the court could
not consider as legal, any acts under the [*Ig4] flag and com-
mission of such republicor state. But, as the record, in this
case, stated the capture to have been made under the flag of
Buenos Ayres, it became necessary to send back the case, in order
to ascertain under what authority it was in fact made.
Sentence reversed, and cause remanded for further pro-
ceedings. -
TREVINO v. FERNANDEZ, in Texas Sup. Ct., r855—13 Texas 630.
Trespass to try title to land along the east bank of the Rio
Grande River. Plaintiffs appeal from judgment for defendants.
















































































































































2 cases on ]'UDGMIL‘NTS, ETC.
a land grant to Bartolome and Eugenio Fernandez, brothers, al-
leging that Bartolome had paid all the purchase money, and that
Eugenio had abandoned and I‘€llI1(]UlSll€(l.u8.ll his interest to Bar-
tolome. The defendants admitted the grant, denied that Eugenio
had relinquished his rights, claimed title as heirs of Eugenio, and
pleaded judgment of the tribunal of j1}tiee.1>f—t-hE‘STZIE’QT'TW‘
lipas, rendered in their favor in 1842 (during the time that the
land in question was claimed as conquered territory by the Re-
public of Texas, but while still in the actual occupation and con-
trol of the Mexican government) in pursuance' of which they
had been judicially put-in possession of one-half of the land in
question.
I-IEMPIIILL, C. J. * * '“-‘ [*662] * * It is, however, con-
tended by defendants that their title to ownership of the land
and the rights of the parties were determined by a decree of the
Court of the First Instance in Matamoras, some time in the year
1842, in which half of the tract was adjudged to the present
defendants, and that this was duly carried into effect by a survey
and division of the tract, and by placing the defendants in posses-
sion of the portion assigned to them.
One of the objections urged to this decree is, that it was
made by a foreign court having no jurisdiction over the person
or subject matter, and that this court is bound by the political
action of the authorities of the republic, which on the 19th Decem-
ber, 1836, defined its boundaries, extending them to the Rio
Grande, and that this excluded the jurisdiction or authority of
the courts of Tamaulipas over any lands lying within those
limits. On the other hand, it is insisted by defendants, that the
country lying between the Neuces and the Rio Grande. though
claimed by Texas, was not actually conquered until 1846, and
that until that time this territory, and especially the portion bor-
dering on and adjacent to the Rio Grande, remained in the posses-
sion of, and under the laws, control, and government, of the
Republic of Mexico, and that [*663] consequently all the acts
of that government or its authorities in the administration of its
laws, and in the regulation of its municipal affairs, so far as the
same affected the rights of individuals with each other, are as
valid and binding as if done in the exercise of competent au-
thority.
This is a subject of some difiiculty and of considerable in-
terest doubtless to the country adjacent to the Rio Grande. For
















































































































































2 CASES ON JUDGMEN TS, ETC. 
a land grant to Bartolome and Eugenio Fernandez, brothers, al­
leging that llartolome had paid all the purchase money, and that 
Eugenio had abandoned and relinquished.all his interest to Bar­
tolome. The defendants admitted the grant, denied that Eugenio 
had relinquished his rights, claimed title as heirs of Eugenio, and 
pleaded j udgment of the tribunal of � of the state of 'l'amau- -
Ii pas, rendered in their favor in 1842 (during the time that the 
land in question was claimed as conquered territory by the Re­
public of Texas, but while still in the actual occupation and con­
trol of the l\Iexican government )  in pursuance of which they 
had been j udicially put· in possession of one-hal f of the land in 
question. 
HEMI'IIILL, C. J. * * * [ *662 ] * * * It  is, however, con­
tended by defendants that their title to ownersh ip of the land 
and the rights of the parties were determined by a decree of the 
Court of the First Instance in Matamoras, some time in the year 
1842, in which half of the tract was adj udged to the present 
de fendants, and that this was duly carried into effect by a survey 
and d ivis ion of the tract, and by placing the defendants in posses­
sion of the port ion assigned to them. 
One of the object ions urged to this decree is, that it was 
made by a foreign court having no j urisdict ion over the person 
or  subject matter, and that this court is bound by the polit ical 
action of the authorities of the republ ic, which on the 19th Decem­
ber, 1836, defined its boundaries, extending them to the Rio 
Grande, and that this excluded the j ur isdiction or authority of 
the courts o f  Tamaulipas over any lands lying within those 
limits. On the other hand, it is insisted by defendants, that the 
country lying between the N'euces and the Rio Grande. though 
claimed hy Texas, was not actua lly conquered until 18-tG, and 
that until that t ime this terri tory , and especially the port ion bor­
dering on and adjacent to the Rio Grande, remained in the posses­
sion of, an<l under the laws, control, and govcrnmrnt, of  the 
Republic of Mexico, and that [ *663 l consequently all the acts 
of that government or its authorities in the administration of its 
laws, and in the regu lation of its municipal affairs, so far as the 
same affected the rights of individuals with each other, are as 
val id and binding as i f  done in the exerci se of comprtent au­
thority. 
This is a subject of  some difficul ty and of considerable in­
terest doubt less to the country adjacent to the Rio Gramle. For 
it is only in relation to this region that the operation of these 
ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION
principles will be considered, the actual possession and control
of the Mexican authorities being restricted, in fact, to limits at
no great distance from that river. * * *
Pena y Pena, the illustrious chief justice of the Supreme
Court of Mexico, in his “Practica Forense,” in treating of the
validity of judgments or acts of judicial officers who are reputed
to have competent authority, though in fact they had none,
[*665] applies the doctrines recognized in such cases to the acts
of judicial ofiicers during the period of revolutionary disturb-
ances, when such ofiicers are changed at every change of fortune,
and as the one party or the other may have the predominance,
says, that all judicial acts done or authorized by an illegitimate
authority (meaning a government de facto) might be regarded
as null, and of no validity or effect, if the strict principle of law
were alone considered; but the essential good of the nation, and
the peace and tranquillity of its citizens, in relation to a branch
so important as the judicial, demand that these should be legal-
ized, and be held as valid and subsisting, since if it were not so,
a door would be opened to an innumerable multitude of com-
plaints, reclamations, and atten1pts to undo all that had been
done, so that nothing would be solid and stable; the fortune and
the property of the citizens would be consumed in the renewed
expenses and damages which the multitude of suits would inflict:
and the people would be buried in a terrible chaos of judicial
anarchy, more transcendental and pernicious than the illegitimate
domination which it was designed to repudiate. (Vol. 2, p. 81.)
It appears that a number of treatises were written on this sub-
ject, with reference to the efi‘e'ct of the acts of the French author-
ities in Spain during the period of the French conquests; and
from the author of a work entitled an “Examination into the
Crimes of Infidelity to the Country, imputed to Spaniards who
submitted to the authority of the French Government,” a long
extract is taken by Pena y Pena, from which we cite the follow-
mg, viz:
“It is madness to suppose that a nation could exist (which
would not conflict with and destroy itself) without public admin-
istration, and without laws; and it is a dream to pretend that
it could be governed by laws distinct from those given by the
government that has the power. There is but one of two alterna-
tives; either that there should be no judicial proceedings among
a conquered people. and all actions. beneficial or mischievous, be
alike permitted, and all transgressions and crimes pass with im-
















































































































































ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION 
principles ,..,·ill be considered, the actual possession and control 
of the Mexican authorities being restricted, in fact, to limits at 
no great distance from that river. * * * 
Pena y Pena, the illustrious chief justice of the Supreme 
Court of Mexico, in his "Practica Forense," in treating of the 
validity of j udgments or acts of judicial officers who are reputed 
to have competent authority, though in fact they had none, 
[ *665] applies the doctrines recognized in such cases to the acts 
of j udicial offo;ers during the period of revolutionary disturb­
ances, when such officers are changed at every change of fortune, 
and as the one party or the other may have the predominance, 
says, that all judicial acts done or authorized by an illegitimate 
authority (meaning a government de facto) might be regarded 
as null, and of no validity or effect, if the strict principle of la\v 
were alone considered ; but the essential good of the nation, and 
the ·peace and tranquillity of its citizens, in relation to a branch 
so important as the j udicial, demand that these should be legal­
ized, and be held as valid and subsisting, since if it were not so, 
a door would be opened to an innumerable multitude of com­
plaints, reclamations, and attempts to undo all that had been 
done, so that nothing would be sol id and stable; the fortune and 
the property o f  the citizens would be consumed in the renewer{ 
expenses and damages which the multitude of suits would inflict: 
and the people would be buried in  a terrible chaos of  judicial ' 
anarchy, more transcendental and pernicious than the illegitimate 
domination ·which it was designed to repudiate. (Vol. 2. p. 8r.) 
It appears that a number of treatises were written on this sub­
j ect, with reference to the effeCt of the acts of the French author­
ities in Spain during the period of the French conquests ; and 
from the author of a work entitled an "Examination into the 
Crimes of Infideli ty to the Country, imputed to Spaniards who 
submitted to the authority of the French Government," a long 
extract is taken by Pena y Pena, from which we cite the follow­
ing, viz: 
"It is madness to suppose that a nat ion could exist (which 
would not conflict with and destroy itself) without publ ic admin­
istration, and without laws; and it is a dream to pretend that 
it could be governed by laws distinct from those given by the 
government that has the power. There is but one of two alterna­
tives; either that there should be no j udicial proceedings among 
a conquered people, and «tll actions . beneficial or mischievous. bl" 
alike permitted , and all transgressions and crimes pass with im­
ptmity; or judicial proceedings [*666] must be tried and deter-
4 CASES ON JUDGMENTS, ETC.
mined by the laws of the conqueror. The first proposition is
inadmissible, as by it society would be ruined, and the second
must not only be tolerated, but sanctioned, as the welfare of
society cannot be otherwise secured.” * * *
From these authorities it is manifest that the acts of the
government in actual possession, in the ordinary administration
of its laws, so far as they affect private rights, are valid, and
can be set up to support an action or defend a right. Those
atiecting public rights are void and cannot be enforced. The
objection to the judicial proceedings, then, under which it is
claimed that the rights of these parties to this land have been
adjudicated, on the supposed ground of the want of authority in
the court over the subject matter, is not tenable. * * *
Reversed and re-formed.
Accom: State v. County Court (1872), 50 M0. 317, 11 Am. Rep. 415, dictum.
Judicial Nature of Body.
STENBERG v. STATE ex rel. KELLER, in Ncb. Sup. Ct., May 6, 1896—
48 Neb. 299, 67 N. VV. I90.
VVrit of error to reverse an order of the district court of
Douglas county granting a peremptory mandamus to compel
Stenberg and others as the board of county commissioners to
cause a warrant to be issued on the county treasurer in favor of
Keller and another in payment of a judgment recovered in said
district court by them against said board for $4,832.62 and costs,
for moneys paid by Keller and the other to the county for part
of the county poor farm sold them by the county board of com-
missioners without authority. The proposition to sell had been
submitted to the voters of the county, and had been approved
by a majority of the electors voting on the proposition, but not
by a majority of the electors voting at that election, as required
by law. Stenbcrg and his companions claimed that the judgment
required to be paid is void for want of jurisdiction, because it
was rendered on appeal from the order of the board of county
commissioners denying the claim, and that the board in originally
approving the sale and afterwards in denying the claim for re-
payment of the money acted judicially, was bound by its original
action, and so was without power to allow the claim, and by the
appeal the district court acquired no greater power.
Norw.u,, ]. * * * [*307] If the county board has no power or

















































































































































4 CASES ON JUDGMENTS, F.TC. 
mined by the laws of the conqueror. The first proposition is 
inadmissible, as by it society would be ruined, and the second 
must not only be tolerated, but sanctioned, as the welfare of 
society cannot be otherwise secured." * * * 
From these authorities it is manifest that the acts of the 
government in actual possession, in the ordinary administration 
of its laws, so far as they affect private rights, are valid, and 
can be set up to support an action or def end a right. Those 
affecting public rights are void and cannot be enforced. The 
objection to the judicial proceedings, then, under which it is 
claimed that the rights of these parties to this land have been 
adjudicated, on the supposed ground of the want of authoritv in 
the court over the subject matter, is not tenable. * * * 
· 
Reversed and re-formed. 
AccoRD: State v. Count}' Court (1872), 50 �fo. 317, 11 Am. Rep. 415, dictum. 
Judicial Nature of Body. 
STENBERG v. STATE ex rel. KELLER, in Neb. Sup. Ct., May 6, 18¢-
48 Neb. 299, 67 N. W. 190. 
'vV rit of error to reverse an order of the district court of 
Douglas county granting a peremptory mandamus to compel 
Stenberg and others as the board of county commissioners to 
cause a warrant to be issued on the county treasurer in favor of 
Keller and another in payment of a judgment recovered in said 
district court by them against said board for $4,832.62 and costs, 
for moneys paid by Keller and the other to the county for part 
of the county poor farm sold them by the county board of com­
missioners without authority. The proposition to sell had been 
submitte"d to the voters of the county, and had been approved 
by a majority of the electors voting on the proposition, but not 
by a majority of the electors voting at that election, as required 
by law. Stenberg and his companions claimed that the judgment 
required to be paid is void for want of jurisdiction, because it 
was rendered on appeal from the order of the board of county 
commissioners denying the claim, and that the board in originally 
approving the sale and afterwards in denying the claim for re­
payment of the money acted judicially, was bound by its original 
action, and so was without power to allow the claim, and by the 
appeal the district court acquired no greater power. 
NoRVAL, J. * * * [*307] If the county board has no power or 
authority to act in the premises, it is very evident that the district 
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court obtained none; and so say the authoriies. Brondberg v.
Babbott, 14 Neb. 517, 16 N. W. 845; Railway Co. v. Ogilvy, 18
N eb. 638, 26 N. W. 464; M oise v. Powell, 40 Neb. 671, 59 N. W.
79; fohnson v. Parrolte, 46 Neb. 51, 64 N. W. 363; Keeshan v.
Stale, 46 Neb. 155, 64 N. VV. 695. This rule obtains in other
states. See authorities cited in brief of plaintiffs in error [String-
ham v. Board, 24 Wis. 594; Plunkett v. E2/am, 2 S. D. 434. 50
N. \-V. 961 ; F1'deh'ty Trust Co. v. Gill Car Co., 25 Fed. Rep. 737;
Plano Mfg. Co. v. Rasey, 69 Wis. 246, 39 N. W. 85; Town of
l'Vayne v. Caldwell, I S. D. 483, 47 N. W. 547; Fitzgerald v.
Beebe, 7 Ark. 305]. It is equally well settled that a county board
has exclusive original jurisdiction in the examination and allow-
ance of most claims against the county. No original action can
be maintained against a county upon a claim or demand properly
cognizable for audit and allowance before the county board. As
to all such the jurisdiction of the district court is appellate merely.
B-rown v. Otoe Co., 6 Neb. I11; * * * State v. Merrell, 43 Neb.
575, 61 N. W. 754. * * *
It has often been held in this state that a county board, in
examining and passing upon claims against the county, acts judi-
cially, and the allowance or rejection by it of a claim has the
force and effect of a judgment, unless reversed or set aside by
appellate proceedings. S tale v. Buffalo C 0., 6 Neb. 454; Brown
v. Otoe Co., Id. 111; State v. Churchill, 37 Neb. 702, 61 N. W.
754; * * * Shite v. Vincent, 46 Neb. 408, 65 N. VV. 50. But we
are unable to agree with counsel for respondents that county
boards are courts [*3I2] in a constitutional sense, or within the
general acceptation of that term. They are not created courts by
the constitution; nor does the present law establishing county
boards and defining their duties and powers constitute them courts.
They are merely legislative and administrative bodies, with limited
powers, created for the transaction of county business—exercis-
ing in some matters, it is true, functions judicial in their nature,
and appeals lie from their decisions, in certain matters, provided
for; but that does not make them courtsj So, too, officers not judi-
cial sometimes are clothed with judicial powers. A county super-
intendent of schools exercises quasi judicial functions in the
changing of the boundaries of school districts, and an appeal may
be taken from his decisions; yet there is no superintendent’s court.
The state auditor, in the audit and allowance of claims, acts judi-
cially, and the right to appeal is given; but that does not consti-
tute an auditor‘s court. Many other instances might be mentioned
















































































































































m,EMENTS OF JURISDICTION 5 
court obtained none ; and so say the authoriies. Brondberg v. 
Babbott, 14 Neb. 517, 16 N. W. 845; Railway Co. v. Ogilvy, 18  
Neb. 638, 26  N.  W. 464; 11,f oise v. Powell, 40 Neb. 671 ,  59 N. W. 
79; Johnson v. Parrotte, 46 Neb. 5 1 ,  64 N. vV. 363; Keeshau v. 
State, 46 Neb. 155, 64 N. \V. 695 . This rule obtains in other 
states. See authorities cited in brief of  plaintiffs in error [Strillg­
ham v. Board, 24 Wis. 594; Plunkett v. Evan.s, 2 S. D. 434, 50 
N. \V. ¢ 1 ;  Fidelity Trust Co. v. Gill Car Co., 25 Fed. Rep. 737; 
Plano Mfg. Co. v. Rasey, 69 \Vis. 246, 39 N. W. 85; Town of 
f-Va:me v. Caldwell, I S. D. 483, 47 N. W. 547; Fit::gerald v. 
Beebe, 7 Ark. 305]. It is  equally well settled that a county board 
has exclusive original jurisdiction in the examination and allow­
ance of most claims against the county. No original action can 
be maintained against a county upon a claim or demand properly 
cognizable for audit and allowance before the CO\lnty board. As 
to al l  such the jurisdiction of the district court is appellate merely. 
Bron•11 v. Otoe Co., 6 Neb. I 11; * * * State v. A!errell, 43 Neb. 
575, 61 N. \V. 754· * * * 
It has often been held in this state that a county board, in 
examining and passing upon claims against the county, acts j udi­
cially, and the allowance or rejection by it of a claim has the 
force and effect of a judgment, unless reversed or set aside by 
appellate proceedings. State v. Buffalo Co., 6 Neb. 454: Brown 
v. Otoe Co., Id. I I I; State v. Churchill, 37 Neb. 702, 6 1  N. vV. 
754; ***State v. Vincent, 46 Neb. 408, 65 N. W. 50. But we 
are unable to agree with counsel for respondents that county 
boards are courts [ *312] in a constitutional sense, or within the 
general acceptation of that term. They are not created courts by 
the constitution ; nor does the present law establishing county 
boards and defining their duties and powers constitute them courts. 
They are merely legislative and administrative bodies, with limited 
powers, created for the transaction of county business-exercis­
ing in some matters, it is true, functions j udicial in their nature, 
and appeals lie from their decisions, in certain matters, provided 
for; but that does not make them courts. So, too, officers not judi­
cial sometimes are clothed with judicial powers. A county super­
intendent of schools exercises quasi judicial functions in the 
changing of the boundaries of school districts, and an appeal may 
be taken from his decisions ; yet there is no superintendent'<; court. 
The state auditor, in the audit and allowance of claims, acts judi­
cially, and the right to appeal is given ; but that does not consti­
tute an auditor's court. Many other instances might be mentioned 
where j ucl icial power to a limited extent is lodged in the hands 
r 
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of different oflicers for specific purposes. “A court is a body
in the government organized for the public administration of
justice at the time and place prescribed by law.” 4 Am. & Eng.
Enc. Law 447. County boards do not fall within this definition.
They cannot issue subpoenas for witnesses. The rules of law
governing the admission of testimony in the courts are not usually
followed before county boards in passing upon claims. Such
boards often act without testimony, and receive, and consider
sufficient, evidence inadmissible in courts of justice. County
boards do not render judgments. The allowance or rejection of
a claim from which no appeal has been prosecuted has merely
the effect of one. The statute in no place refers to such boards
as courts. Nor does the fact that the law requires each county
board to procure a seal constitute it a court. Such seal is ex-
pressly made by the legislature the seal of the county, and not
that of the board, as a court or judicial tribunal. That it [*3I3]
is obligatory upon county commissioners to hold their sessions at
the court-house, for the transaction of the business of the county,
is not significant. The county treasurer and other county ofiicers
are required to hold their ofi-ices in the same building. * * * True,
this statute, as well as the prior ones upon the same subject,
authorized county boards to preserve order, and punish contempts
by fine and imprisonment; yet that did not have the effect to
create such boards judicial tribunals. Each house of the legisla-
ture possesses powers to punish for contempts in certain cases;
but this falls far short of constituting it a court. The authority to
punish for contempt is not conferred alone upon a judge or court.
A notary public may commit a witness for contempt who refuses
to give his deposition. Dogge v. State, 21 Neb. 272, 31 N. NV.
929_ * * * Y
The judgment is affirmed.
The Validity of the Law Creating the Court.
NORTON v. SHELBY COUNTY, in U. S. Sup. Ct., May 10, 1886—118
U. S. 425, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1121.
Action against Shelby county, Tenn., on bonds and the an-
nexed coupons issued March I, 1869, by the county board of
conunissioners, to the Mississippi River R. Co., by virtue of an
act of the legislature of Feb. 25, I867, authorizing such board
















































































































































6 CASES ON Jl'DGMENTS, ETC. 
of different officers for specific purposes. "A court is a body 
in the government organized for the public administration of 
j ustice at the time and place prescribed by law." 4 Am. & Eng. 
Enc. Law 447. County boards do not fall within this definition. 
They cannot issue subpoenas for witnesses. The rules of law 
governing the admission of testimony in the courts are not usually 
followed before county boards in passing upon claims. Such 
boards often act without. testimony, and receive, and consider 
sufficient, evidence inadmissible in courts of justice. County 
boards do not render j udgments. The allowance or rejection of 
a claim from which no appeal has been prosecuted has merely 
the effect of one. The statute in no place refers to such boards 
as courts. Nor does the fact that the law requires each county 
board to procure a seal constitute it a court. Such seal is ex­
pressly made by the legislature the seal of the county, and not 
that of the board, as a court or judicial tribunal. That it [*313] 
is obligatory upon county commissioners to hold their sessions at 
the court-house, for the transaction of  the business of the county, 
is not significant. The county treasurer and other county officers 
are required to hold their offices in the same building. * * * True, 
this statute, as well as the prior ones upon the same subject, 
authorized county boards to preserve order, and punish contempts 
by fine and imprisonment ; yet that did not have the effect to 
create such boards judicial tribunals. Each house of the legisla­
ture possesses powers to punish for contempts in certain cases ; 
but this falls far short of constituting it a court. The authority to 
punish for contempt is not conferred alone upon a judge or court. 
A notary public may commit a witness for contempt who refuses 
to give his deposition. Dogge v. State, 21 Neb. 272, 31 N. W. 
929. * * * 
The judgment is affirmed. 
The Validity of the Law Creating the Court. 
NORTON v. SHELBY COUNTY, in U. S. Sup. Ct., May 10, 1886-1 18 
U. S. 425, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. n2 1. 
Action against Shelby county, Tenn., on bonds and the an­
nexed coupons issued March I, 1869, by the county board of 
commissioners, to the Mississippi River R. Co., by virtue of an 
act of the legislature of Feb. 25, 1867, authorizing such board 
to make such bonds. From judgment for defendant in the Cir-
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cuit Court of the United States for the \/Vestern District of Ten-
nessee, the plaintitt brings error.
FIELD, J. * * * The defendant contends: (I) that the com-
missioners were not lawful officers of the- county, and that there
was no such ofiice in Tennessee as that of county commissioner;
(2) that there could not be any such de facto ofiicers, as there
was no such office known to the laws, and therefore that the
subscription was made, and the bonds were issued, without
authority and are void; and ( 3) that the action of the commis-
sioners was never ratified, and was incapable of ratification, by
the county. * * *
The decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee as
to the constitutional existence of the board of commissioners of
Shelby County is one of this class. That court has repeatedly
adjudged, after careful and full consideration, that no such board
ever had a lawful exisknce; that it was an unauthorized and
illegal body; that its members were usurpers of the functions
and powers of the justices of the peace of the county; and that
their action in holding the county court was utterly void. This
court could neither gainsay not deny the authoritative character
of that determination. It follows that in the disposition of the
case before us we must hold that there was no lawful authority
in the board to make the subscription to the Mississippi River
Railroad Company and to issue the bonds of which those in
suit are a part. '
But it is contended that if the act creating the board was
void, and the commissioners were not officers de jure, they were
nevertheless officers de facto, and that the acts of the board as
a de facto court are binding upon the county. This contention
is_met_by the fact that there can he ng ptiicerI either de fun: or
de_fgC_tg_._if__thex.e_.be_nn-nfiiee-ttL.fill. As the act attempting to
create the oflice of commissioner never became a law, the ofifice
never came into existence. Some persons pretended that they
held the office, but the law never recognized their pretensions,
nor did the supreme court of the state. Vl/henever such preten-
sions were considered in that court, they were declared to be
without any legal foundation, and the commissioners were held
to be usurpers.
The doctrine which gives validity to acts of ofiicers dc facto,
whatever defects there may be in the legality of their appoint-
ment or election, is founded upon considerations of policy and
















































































































































ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION 7 
cuit Court of the United States for the "\Vestern District of Ten­
nessee, the plaintiff brings error. 
FIELD, J. * * * The defendant contends : ( 1 )  that the com­
missioners were not lawful officers of the- county, and that there 
was no such office in Tennessee as that of county commissioner; 
( 2) that there could not be any such de facto officers, as there 
was no such office known to the laws, and therefore that the 
subscription was made, and the bonds were issued, without 
authority and are void; and (3) that the action of the commis­
sioners was never ratified , and was incapable of ratification, by 
the county. * * * 
C!4fl The decision of the Supreme Court of  Tennessee as 
to the constitutional existence of the board of commissioners of 
Shelby County is one of this class. That court has repeatedly 
adjudged, after careful and full consideration, that no such board 
ever had a lawful exi�nce ; that it was an unauthorized and 
illegal body ; that its members were usurpers of the functions 
and powers of the justices of the peace of the county ; and that 
their action in holding the county court was utterly void. This 
court could neither gainsay nor deny the authoritative character 
of that determination. It follows that in the disposition o f  the 
case before us we must hold that there was no lawful authority 
in the board to make the subscription to the Mississippi River 
Railroad Company and to issue the bonds of which those in 
suit are a part. 
· 
But it is contended that i f  the act creating the board was 
void, and the commissioners were not officers de jurc, they were 
nevertheless officers de facto, and that the acts of the board as 
a de facto court are binding upon the county. This contention 
is met_by tbe. fact that there can be no officer, either de iure or 
de facto. if there be no o��8 to .till. As the act attempting to 
create the office of commissioner never became a law, the office 
never came into existence. Some persons pretended that they 
held the office, but the law never recognized their pretensions, 
nor did the supreme court of the state. vVhenever such preten­
sions were considered in that court, they were declared to be 
without any legal foundation, and the commissioners were held 
to be usurpers. 
The doctrine which gives val idity to acts of officers de facto_. 
whatever defects there may be in the legality of their appoint­
ment or election , is founded upon considerations of pol icy amt 
necessity, for the protection of the public and individuals whose 
8 cnsns ON JUDGMENTS, ETC.
interests may be affected thereby. Ofiices are created for the
benefit of the public, and private parties are not permitted to
inquire into the title of persons clothed with the evidence of such
ofiices and in apparent possession of their powers and functions.
For the good order and peace of society their authority is to be
respected and obeyed until in some regular mode prescribed by
law their title is investigated and determined. [*442] It is mani-
fest that endless confusion would result if in every proceeding
before such officers their title could be called in question. But
the idea of an ofiicer implies the existence of an ofiice which he
holds. It would be a misapplication of terms to call one an oth-
cer who holds no otfice, and a public ofiice can exist only by force
of law. This seems to us so obvious that we should hardly feel
called upon to consider any adverse opinion on the subject but
for the earnest contention of plaintiff's counsel that such exist-
ence is not essential, and that it is sufficient if the office be pro-
vided for by any legislative enactment, however invalid. Their
position is, that a legislative act, though unconstitutional, may
in terms create an ofiice, and nothing further than its apparent
existence is necessary to give validity to the acts of its assumed
incumbent. That position, although not stated in this broad
for1n, amounts to nothing else. It is difficult to meet it by any
argument beyond this statement. An unconstitutional act is not
a law -, it confers no rights; it impgses no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation| as
mwmmmmmm
In Hildreth v. M’Intyre, I J. J. Marsh. 206, 19 Am. Dec. 61,
we have a decision from the Court of Appeals of Kentucky which
well illustrates this doctrine. The legislature of that state at-
tempted to abolish the court of appeals established by her con-
stitution and create in its stead a new court. Members of the
new court were appointed and undertook to exercise judicial
functions. They dismissed an appeal because the record was not
filed with the person acting as their clerk. A certificate of the
dismissal signed by him was received by the lower court, and
entered of record, and execution to carry into effect the original
decree was ordered to issue. To reverse this order an appeal
was taken to the constitutional court of appeals. The question
was whether the court below erred in obeying the mandate of
the members of the new court, and its solution depended upon
another, whether they were judges of the court of appeals and

















































































































































8 CASES ON JUDGMENTS, ETC. 
interests may be affected thereby. Offices are created for the 
benefit of the public, and private parties are not permitted to 
inquire into the title of persons clothed with the evidence of such 
offices and in apparent possession of their powers and functions. 
For the good order and peace of society their authority is to be 
respected and obeyed until in some regular mode prescribed by 
law their title is investigated and detennined. [ * 442] It is mani­
fest that endless confusion would result if in every proceeding 
before such officers their title could be called in question. But 
the idea of an officer implies the existence of an office which he 
holds. It would be a misapplication of terms to call one an offi­
cer who holds no office, and a public office can exist only by force 
of law. This seems to us so obvious that we should hardly feel 
called upon to consider any adverse opinion on the subject but 
for the earnest contention of plaintiff's counsel that such exist­
ence is not essential, and that it is sufficient if the office be pro­
vided for by any legislative enactment, however invalid. Their 
position is, that a legislative act, though unconstitutional, may 
in terms create an office, and nothing further than its apparent 
existence is necessary to give validity to the acts of its assumed 
incumbent. That position, although not stated in this broad 
form, amounts to nothing else. It is difficult to meet it hy any 
argument beyond this statement. An unconstitutional act is nQ.t 
a law j it confers no rights : it imposes no duties ; it affords no 
• 
protection ; it creates no office : it is. in legal contemplation, as 
liiOperative as thoue-h it bad neyer been passed, . 
In Hildreth v. M'lntyre, I J. J. Marsh. 2o6, 19 Am. Dec. 61, 
we have a decision from the Court of Appeals of Kentucky which 
well illustrates this doctrine. The legislature of that state at­
tempted to abolish the court of appeals established by her con­
stitution and create in its stead a new court. Members of the 
new court were appointed and undertook to exercise judicial 
functions. Th.ey dismissed an appeal because the record was not 
filed with the person acting as their clerk. A certificate of the 
dismissal signed by him was received by the lower court, and 
entered of record, and execution to carry into effect the original 
decree was ordered to issue. To reverse this order an appeal 
was taken to the constitutional court of appeals. The question 
was whether the court below erred in obeying the mandate of 
the members of the new court, and its solution dcpenclecl upon 
another, whether they were judges of the court of appeals and 
the person acting as their clerk was its clerk. The court said: 
"Although thnr__a§_?ttJn�d the functions oLjudges and clerk, and 
- ----
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N
attempted to act as suchI |*443] their acts in that character are
totall null and void unless the ' had been re ularly appointed
. under, and according toI the constitution. A de facto court of
‘ appeals cannot exist under a written constitution which ordains
one supreme court, and defines the qualifications and duties of
_, its judges, and prescribes the mode of appointing them. There
cannot be 1nore than one court of appeals in Kentucky as long
I as the constitution shall exist; and that must necessarily be a
court ‘do jnrc.’ \\-"hen the government is entirely revolutionized,
and all its departments usurped by force, or the voice of a major-
ity, then prudence recommends and necessity enforces obedience
, to the authority of those who may act as the public functionaries,
and in such a case the acts of a de facto executive, a de facto judi-
ciary, and a de facto legislature must be recognized as valid.
But this is required by political necessity. There is no govern-
ment in action except the government de facto, because all the I
attributes of sovereignty have, by usurpation, been transferred
from those who had been legally invested with them, to others
who, sustained by a power above the forms of law, claim to act,
and do act, in their stead. But when the constitution or form
of government remains unaltered and supreme, there can be no
do faclo department, or de facto office. The acts of the incum-
bents of such departments or ofiice cannot be enforced conforma-
bly to the constitution, and can be regarded as valid only when the
government is overturned. VVhen there is a constitutional execu-
tive and legislature, there cannot be any other than a constitu-
tional judiciary. VV itl1out a total revolution there can be no such
political solecism in Kentucky as a ‘de facto’ court of appeals.
There can be no such court whilst the constitution has life and
power. There has been none such. There might be under our
constitution, as there have been, ‘de faclo’ officers. But there
never was and never can be, under the present constitution, a ‘do
faclo’ office.” And the court held that the gentlemen who acted
as 'ud es ofthc2__l~lJTrEl"TsF1BE_mWTTtb‘e'1'111§'Ef"(?e
ces, and the order below was reversed.
In some respects the case at bar resembles this one from
Kentucky. [*444] Under the constitution of Tennessee there
was but one county court. That was composed of the justices
of the county elected i11 their respective districts. The“ commis-
sioners appointed under the act of March 9, 1867, by the governor
were not such justices, and could not hold such court. any more






















































































































































ELEMEN1'S OF JURISDICTION 9 
attempted to act as such, [*443] their acts in that character are 
totall n ull and void unless the had been re ularly appointed 
under, and according to, the constituti®. A de acto court of 
appeals cannot exist under a written constitution which ordains 
one supreme court, and defines the qualifications and duties o f  
i t s  j udges, and prescribes the mode o f  appointing them. There 
cannot be more than one court of appeals in Kentucky as long 
as the constitution shall exist ; and that must necessarily be a 
court 'de jurc.' When the government is entirely revolutionized, 
and all its departments ·usurped by force, or the voice of a major­
ity, then prudence recommends and necessity en forces obedience 
to the authority of those who may act as the public functionaries, 
and in such a case the acts of a de facto executive, a de facto j udi­
ciary, and a de facto legislature must be recognized as valid. 
But this is required by political necessity. There is no govern­
ment in action except the government de facto, because all the 
attributes of sovereignty have, by usurpation, been trans ferred 
from those who had been legally invested with them, to others 
who, sustained by a power above the forms of law, claim to act, 
and do act ,  in their stead. But when the constit ution or form 
s.f government remains u naltered and supreme, there can be no 
de facto department, or de facto office. The acts of the incum­
bents of such departments or office cannot be enforced conforma­
bly to the constitution, and can be regarded as valid only when the 
government is overturned. When there is a constitu tional exei:!..1-
t ive and legislature, there cannot be any other than a constitu­
tional judiciary. \i\Tithout a total revolution there can be no such 
political solecism in Kentucky as a 'de facto' court of appeals. 
There can be no such cour t  whilst the constitution has Ii fe and 
power. There has been none such. There might be under our 
constitution, as there have been, 'de facto' officers. But there 
neYer was and neYer can be, under the present constitution , a 'dt! 
facto' office." .. \nd the court held that the gen tlemen who acte<l 
as judges of the legislati\'e tribunal were not 111cun\1')elits of ac 
jurc or de facto offices, nor were they de facto officers of de 111re 
offices, and the order below was reversed. 
In some respects the case at bar resembles thic; one from 
Kentucky. (*444] Cnclcr the constit ution of Tennc"scc there 
was bu t one county court. That wa.; compmed of the justices 
o f  the county elected in their rcspccti\'c cJi.;trict.-. The commis­
sioners appointed under the act of �larch C). 1R67. hy the e«>\·ernor 
were not such justices, and could not hold �uch cnurt. any mnrc 
than the legislatiYe tribunal of Kentucky could hnld thL' cnurt of 
I 
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appeals of that state. In Shelby County v. Buterworth [unre-
ported], from the opinion in which we have already quoted, Chief
Justice Nicholson, speaking of the claim that Barbour Lewis, the
president of the board of county commissioners, was a de facto
officer, after referring to the decisions of the supreme court-of
the state holding that the board of commissioners was an illegal
and unconstitutional body, said: “This left the organization of
the county court in its former integrity, with its officers entitled
to their offices and creating no vacancy to be filled by the illegal
action under the act of 1867. It follows that Barbour Lewis
could not be a de facto officer, as there was no legal board of
which he could be president, and as there was no vacancy in the
legal organization. The warrants issued by him show the char-
acter in which he was acting, and repel the presumption that he
was a de facto officer. He could be under the circumstances, as
we can judicially know from the law and pleadings in the case,
nothing but a usurper. There must be a legal office in existence,
which is being improperly held, to give to the acts of such incum-
bent the validity of an oflicer de facto.”
Numerous cases are cited in which expressions are used
which, read apart from the facts of the cases, seemingly give
support to the position of counsel. But, when read in connection
with the facts, they will be seen to apply only to the invalidity,
irregularity, or unconstitutionality of the mode by which the
party was appointed or elected to a legally existing oflice. None
of them sanctions the doctrine that there can be a de facto oflice
under a constitutional government, and that the acts of the incum-
bent are entitled to consideration as valid acts of a de facto officer.
VVhere an office exists under the law, it matters not how the
appointment of the incumbent is made, so far as the validity of
his acts are concerned. It is [*445] enough that he is clothed
with the insignia of the office, and exercises its powers and func-
tions. As said by Mr. Justice Manning, of the Supreme Court
of Michigan, in Carleton v. the People; 10 Mich. 250, 259, “where
there is no office there can be no officer de fact0, for the reason
that there can be none de jure. The county ofiices existed by
virtue of the constitution the moment the new county was organ-
ized. No act of legislation was necessary for that purpose. And
all that is required when there is an ofiice to make an officer de
facto, is that the individual claiming the office is in possession
of it, performing its duties, and claiming to be such officer under
color of an election or appointment, as the case may be. It is
















































































































































I O  CA SES ON J UDGMl!;NTS, ETC. 
appeals of that state. In Shelby County v. Buterwortli [ unre­
ported] , from the opinion in which we have already quoted, Chief 
J ustice 1\ icholson, speaking of the claim that Barbour Lewis, the 
president of the board of county commissioners, was a de facto 
officer, after referring to the decisions of the supreme court - of 
the state holding that the board of commissioners was an illegal 
and unconstitutional body, said : "This left the organization of 
the county court in its former integrity, with its officers entitled 
to their offices and creating no vacancy to be filled by the il legal 
action under the act of 1 867. It follows that Barbour Lewi.5 
coul d  not be a de facto officer, as there was no legal board of 
which he could be president, and as there was no vacancy in the 
legal organization. The warrants issued by him show the char­
acter in which he was acting, and repel the presumption that he 
was a de facto officer. He could be under the circumstances, as 
we can judicially know from the law and pleadings in the case, 
nothing but a usurper. There must be a legal office in existence, 
which is being improperly held, to give to the acts of such incum­
bent the validity of an officer de facto." 
Numerous cases are cited in which expressions arc used 
which, read apart from the facts of the cases, seemingly give 
support to the position of counsel . But, when read in connection 
with the facts, they will be seen to apply only to the invalidity, 
irregularity, or unconstitutional ity of the mode by which the 
party was appointed or elected to a legally existing office. None 
of them sanctions the doctrine that there can be a de facto office 
under a constitutional government, and that the acts of the incum­
bent are e ntitled to consideration as valid acts of a de facto officer. 
\Vhere an office exists under the law, it matters not how the 
appointment of the incumbent is made, so far as the validity of 
his acts are concerned. It is [ *445 ] enough that he is clothed 
with the insignia of the office, and exercises its powers and func­
tions. As said by Mr.  Justice �fanning, of the Supreme Court 
of M ichigan, in Carleto n  v. tlze People; I O  l\I ich. 250, 259, "where 
there is no office there can be no officer de facto, for the reason 
that there can be none de jure. The county offices existed hy 
virtue of the constitution the moment the new county was organ­
ized . No act of legislation was necessary for that purpose. Amt 
all that is required when there is an office to make an officer de 
facto . is that the individual claiming the office is in possession 
of it, performing its duties, and claiming to be such officer under 
color of an election or appointment, as the case may be. It  is 
not necessary his elect ion or appointment should be valid ,  for 
l§L1-‘EM ENTS OF JURISDICTION I 1
that would make him an ofiicer de jure. The official acts of such
persons are recognized as valid on grounds of public policy, and
for the protection of those having ofiicial business to transact.”
The case of The State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 9 Am. Rep.
409, decided by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, upon which
special reliance is placed by counsel, and which is mentioned with
strong commendation as a landmark of the law, in no way mili-
tates against the doctrine we have declared, but is in harmony
with it. That case was this: The constitution of Connecticut
provided that all judges should be elected by its general assembly.
An act of the legislature authorized the clerk of a city court, in
case of the sickness or absence of its judge, to appoint a justice
of the peace to hold the court during his temporary sickness or
absence. A justice of the peace having thus been called in and
having acted, a question arose whether the judgments rendered
by him were valid. The court held that whether the law was
constitutional or not, he was an officer de faeto, and, as such, his
acts were valid. The opinion of Chief Justice Butler is an elabo-
rate and admirable statement of the law, with a review of the
English and American cases, on the validity of the acts of de
faeto ofiicers, however illegal the mode of their appointment. It
criticises the language of some cases that the othcer must act
under color of authority conferred by a person having power,
or prima faeie power, to appoint or elect in the particular case;
and it thus defines an ofiicer de facto:
[*446] “An officer de facto is one whose acts, though not
those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and
justice, will hold valid, so far as they involve the interests of the
public and third persons, where the duties of the oflice are exer-
cised:
“First. VVithout a known appointment or election, but under
such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calcu-
lated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke
his action, supposing him to be the officer he assumed to be.
“Second. Under color of a known and valid appointment or
election, but where the officer had failed to conform to some
precedent, requirement, or condition, as to take an oath, give a
bond, or the like.
“Third. Under color of a known election or appointment,
void because the oflicer was not eligible, or because there was
a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason
of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility,
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J�L�MENTS OF J UlUSDICTION 1 1  
that would make him an officer de jure. The official acts of such 
persons are recognized as valid on grounds of public policy, and 
for the protection of those having official business to transact." 
The case of The State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 9 Am. Rep. 
409, decided by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, upon which 
special reliance is placed by counsel, and which is mentioned with 
strong commendation as a landmark of the law, in no way mili­
tates against the doctrine we have declared, but is in harmony 
with it. That case was this : The constitution of Connecticut 
provided that all j udges should be elected by its general assembly. 
An act of the legislature authorized the clerk of a city court, in 
case of the sickness or absence of its j udge, to appoint a j ustice 
of the peace to hold the court during his temporary sickness or 
absence. A justice of the peace having thus been called in and 
having acted, a question �rose whether the judgments rendered 
by him were valid. The court held that whether the law was 
const itutional or not, he was an officer de facto) and, as such, his 
acts were valid. The opinion of Chief Justice Butler is an elabo­
rate and admirable statement of the law, with a review of the 
English and American cases, on the validity of the acts of de 
facto officers, however i llegal the mode of their appointment. It 
criticises the language of some cases that the officer must act 
under color of authority conferred by a person having power, 
or prima facic power, to appoint or elect in the particular case ; 
and it thus defines an officer de facto : 
[ *446] "An officer de facto i s  one whose acts, though not 
those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and 
j u stice, will hold val id, so far as they involve the interests of the 
public and third persons, where the duties of the office are exer­
c ised : 
"First. \Vithout a known appointment or election, but under 
such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calcu­
lated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke 
his action, supposing him to be the officer he assumed to be. 
"Second. Under color of a known and valid appointment or 
election, but where the officer had failed to con form to some 
precedent, requirement, or condition, as to take an oath, give a 
bond , or the l ike. 
' 'Third. Under color of  a known election or appointment, 
void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was 
a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason 
of some defect or i rregularity in its exercise, such inel igibi lity, 
want of power, or defect being unknown to the public. 
I2 CASES ON JUDGMENTS, ETC.
“Fourth. Under color of an election or an appointment by
or pursuant to a public, unconstitutional law, before the same is
adjudged to be such.”
Of the great number of cases cited by the chief justice none
recognizes such a thing as a de facto office, or speaks of a person
as a de facto oflicer, except when he is the incumbent of a de jure
ofiice. The fourth head refers not to the unconstitutionality of
the act creating the office, but to the unconstitutionality of the act
by which the oflicer is appointed to an ofiice legally existing.
That such was the meaning of the chief justice is apparent from
the cases cited by him in support of the last position, to some
of which reference will be made. * * *
[*454] * * * If they [the people of the county] obtain the
property of others without right, they must return it to the true
owners, or pay for is value. But questions of that nature do not
arise in this case. Here it is simply a question as to the validity
of the bonds in suit, and as that cannot be sustained, the judg-
ment below must be
Aflirmed‘
BURT v. \VINONA & ST. P. R. CO., in Minn. Sup. Ct., Jan. 28, 1884-
3: Minn. 472, 18 N. W. 285.
GILFILLAN, C. J. After the appeal in this case had
been argued and submitted, but before it was decided, the e-
fendant applied to the court asking it to “disaffirm” the judgment
appealed from, on the alleged ground that the court rendering
it is not a legal court, and its judgment therefore a nullity, be-
cause the act assuming to establish it, to wit, the act of Novem-
ber 22, 1881, entitled “An act to establish a municipal court in
the city of Mankato, Blue Earth county, Minnesota,” did not
receive a vote of two-thirds of the entire senate in its passage
through that body, and, consequently, did not pass according
to the requirements of the constitution as construed by the court
at this term in the case of State v. Gould, 31 Minn. 189.
(To establish the fact, it refers to the journal of the senate,
and claims that the courts take judicial notice of the journals
of the legislature in respect to the passage of bills. The plaintiff
answers that the court, if not a de jure, was at least a dc farto,
court, and its acts and judgments cannot be impeached collaterally
for want of legality in the court itself, nor its legal existence be
called in question, except in a direct proceeding on behalf of the
state for that purpose, as was the case in State v. Gould, su[>ra.\
















































































































































12 CASES O N  JUDGM ENTS, ETC. 
"Fcurth. 'C'nder color of an election or an appointment by 
or pu rsuant to a public, unconstitutional law, before the same is 
adj udged to be such." 
Of the great number of cases cited by the chief justice none 
recognizes such a thing as a de facto office, or speaks of a person 
as a de facto officer, except when he is the incumbent of a de jure 
office. The fourth head refers not to the unconstitutionality of 
the act creating the office, but to the unconstitutionality of the act 
by which the officer is appointed to an office legally existing. 
That such was the meaning of the chief justice is apparent from 
the cases cited by him in support of the last position, to some 
of which reference will be made. * * * 
[ * 454] * * * If they [the people of the county ] obtain the 
property of others without right, they must return it to the true 
owners, or pay for is value. But questions of that nature do not 
arise in this case. Here it is simply a question as to the val idity 
of the bonds in suit, and as that cannot be sustained, the judg­
ment below must be 
Affirmed, 
BURT v. WINONA & ST. P. R. CO., in Minn. Sup. Ct., Jan. 28, 1884-
31 Minn. 472, 18 N. W. 285. 
GILFILLAN, C. J. After the appeal in this case had 
been argued and submitted, but before it was decided, th.£.,Ae­
fendant applied to the court asking it to "disaffirm" the j udgment 
appealed from, on the alleged ground that the court rendering 
it is not a legal court, and its j udgment therefore a nullity, be­
cause the act assuming to establish it, to wit, the act of Novem­
ber 22, I881 ,  entitled "An act to establish a municipal court in 
the city of Mankato, Blue Earth county, Minnesota," did not 
receive a vote of two-thirds of the entire senate i n  its passage 
through that body, and, consequently, did not pass according 
to the requi rements of the constitution as construed by the court 
at this  term in the case of State v. Gould, 3 1  M inn. 189. 
l To establi sh the fact,  it refers to the j ournal of the senate, 
and claims that the courts take judicial notice of the j ournals 
of the legislature in respect to the passage of bills. The plaintiff 
answers that the court, if not a de jure, was at least a de facto, 
court, and its acts and judgments cannot be impeached colJaterall�· 
for want of legality in the court itself, nor its legal existence be 
called in question, except in a direct proceeding on behalf of the 
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[*475] The argument of the defendant is that a judgment
rendered without jurisdiction is void; that want of jurisdiction
may always be shown; that if the legislative act under which a
court assumes to act as such be void, {here is a want of jurisdic-
tion; and that, this act being void, there was no jurisdiction.
Ordinarily, if the record shows that a court has assumed juris-
diction over a matter not committed to it by the constitution or
some valid statute, it may be inquired into, and the excess of juris-
diction corrected or annulled on appeal from its judgment. The
defect here alleged is in the non-existence in the law of the court
it_s_e_Lf. That presents a somewhat different case from an excep-
tion to the right of a court, admitted to exist, to try a particular V
matter. The latter is permitted, while public policy may prohibit
the other.
{The rule that the acts of de facto ofiicers cannot be ques-
tioned collaterally includes the acts of judicial as fully as of other
officers.) In State v. Brown, 12 Minn. 448, (538,) the court held
that the judge who held the court below, at the trial of the de-
fendant, was at least a de facto officer, and that, until his right
to the office should be determined in a direct proceeding for that
purpose, it could not be questioned in a collateral proceeding.
Many of the definitions of a de facto oflicer in the text—books agd_
decided cases assume that there can be no de facto ofiicer, except
in a de [are ofiice; and Dillon on Mun. Corp. § 276, (214,; goes
so at as to say, “in order that there may be a de facto ofiicer, M
there must be a de jure office; and the notion that there can b ‘ ,
a de facto office has been characterized as a political solecism, W
without foundation in reason and without support in law; and
therefore a person cannot claim to be a de facto ofiicer of a
municipal corporation, when the corporation or people have in
law no power, in any event, to elect or appoint such an ofiicer.”
Whether there can be a de facto office—a de facto court—is
the portant question in the case, and it is one of no small diFfi-
culty; while there have been a great many cases in which it was
attempted to call in question, in a collateral proceeding, the legal
right of an officer to hold an office, there have been few where
the legal existence of the office itself was contested) The reason
given for the de facto doctrine applies as well to ofiices and
courts as to officers. Said the court in [*476] State v. Carroll,
38 Conn. 449, 467: “The de facto doctrine was introduced into
the law as a matter of policy and necessity, to protect the inter-
ests of the public and individuals where those interests were in-
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ELEMENTS OF J URISDICTION 1 3  
[*475] The argument of  the defendant i s  that a j udgment 
rendered without jurisdiction is void ; that want of jurisdiction 
may always be shown ; that if the legislative act under which a 
court assumes to act as such be void, lhere is a want of jurisdic­
tion ; and that, this act being void, there was no jurisdiction. 
Ordinarily, if the record shows that a court has assumed juris­
dict ion over a matter not committed to it by the constitution or 
some valid statute, it may be inquired into, and the excess of juris­
diction corrected or annulled on appeal from its j udgment. 'tl4e 
defect here alleged is in the non-existence in the law of the court 
i�. That presents a somewhat different case from an excep­
tion to the right of a court, admitted to exist, to try a particular .,, 
matter. The latter is permitted, while public policy may prohibit 
the other. 
(The rule that the acts of de facto officers cannot be ques­
tioned collaterally includes the acts o f  judicial as fully as of other 
officers. ) In State v. Broam, 12 J\finn. 448, ( 538,) the court held 
that the j udge who held the court below, at the trial of the de­
fendant, was at least a de facto officer, and that, until his right 
to the office should be determined in a direct proceeding for that 
purpose, it could not be questioned in a collateral proceeding. 
Many of the definitions of a de facto officer in the text-books an_Q_ 
decided cases assume that there can be no de facto officer, except 
in a de jure office ; and Dillon on Mun. Corp. § 276, (2 14,) goes 
so far as to say, "in order that there may be a de facto officer,,1Jt:i.J� 
there must be a de jure office ; and the notion that there can be!" /�-
a de facto office has been characterized as a political solecism, "'PF 
without foundation in reason and without support in law ; and 
therefore a person cannot claim to be a de facto officer of a 
municipal corporation, when the corporation or people have in 
law no power, in any event, to elect or appoint such an officer." 
l Whether there can be a de facto office-a de facto court-is 
the 1\-nportant question in the case, and it is one of no small diffi­
culty ; while there have been a great many cases in which it \Vas 
attempted to call in question, in a collateral proceed ing, the legal 
right of an officer to hold an office, there have been few where 
the legal existence of the office itsel f was contested) The reason 
given for the de facto doctrine appl ies as well to offices and 
courts as to officers. Said the court in [ *476 ] Stale v. Carroll,  
38 Conn. 449, 467 : "The de facto doctrine was introduced into 
the law as a matter of policy and necessity, to protect the inter­
ests of the publ ic and individuals where those interests were in­
volved in the official acts of persons exercising the dut ies of an 
14 _ cases ON JUDGMENTS, arc.
ofiice without being lawful ofiicers.” It would be a matter of
almost intolerable inconvenience, and be productive of many in-
stances of individual hardship and injustice, if third persons,
whose interests or necessities require them to rely upon the acts
of occupants of public offices, should be required to ascertain at
their peril the legal right to the oflices which such occupants are
permitted by the state to occupy. Taking even the narrowest
definition of an oflicer de facto, viz., that he is one who is exer-
cising the duties of an office under color of legal right to the
office, the reasons that justify the doctrine apply with equal force
to a court or ofiice where the same may be said to exist under
color of right; that is, under color of law. That there may be
a de facto municipal corporation, and consequently de facto offices
of the same, follows from the rule laid down in Cooley, Const.
Lim. *254: If a municipal corporation appears “to be acting
under color of law and recognized by the state as such, such a
question (that is of the legal existence of the corporation) should
be raised by the state itself by qua warranto, or other direct pro-
ceeding”—and it is sustained by many authorities, holding that
the question cannot be raised collaterally. State v. Carr, 5 N. H.
367; P001110 v. Maynar-d, I5 Mich. 463; Stuart v. School-a'ist., 30
Mich. 69; Bird v. Perkz'n.r, 33 Mich. 28; President, etc., v.
Tl10m[>s011, 20 Ill. 197; Kettering v. City of Jacksonville, 50 Ill.
39; '1‘0rc-11 of Geneva v. Cole, 61 Ill. 397; Kayscr v. Trustees of
Bremen, 16 Mo. 88: State v. IVcathcrby, 45 Mo. 17; City of S1‘.
Louis v. Shields, 62 M0. 247; I Dillon on Mun. Corp. § 43, (22.)
In Serornbe v. Kittelson, 29 Minn. 555, the court held, in
effect, that there might be a de facto state government.
In the line of these authorities are the only two cases we
have found in which an attempt was made to contest collaterally
the legal existence of a court. Fraser v. Frcclon, 53 Cal. 644.
was ccrfiorari to review the proceedings of the municipal court
of appeals of San Francisco in a private action. An attempt was
made to draw in [*477] question the legality of that court. The
supreme court, after referring to the rule in case of a dc facto
ofiiccr. said (647) : “It is manifest that the question whether the
office itself, which was attempted to be created by statute. has a
legal exisence, is of vastly more importance and of greater in-
terest to the public than the question of the right of the incum-
bent,” and held that the question could not be raised except in
an action or proceeding by the state. State v. Rich, 20 M0. 393,
307, was an appeal from a judgment of the Lawrence county
















































































































































14 . CASES ON JUDGMEN1"S, r:TC. 
office without being lawful officers." It  would be a matter of  
almost intolerable inconvenience, and be productive o f  many in­
stances of individual hardship and injustice, if third persons, 
whose interests or necessities require them to rely upon the acts 
of occupants of public offices, should be required to ascertain at 
their peril the legal right to the offices which such occupants are 
permitted by the state to occupy. Taking even the narrowest 
definition of an officer de facto, viz., that he is one who is exer­
cising the duties of an office under color of legal right to the 
office, the reasons that j ustify the doctrine apply with equal force 
to a court or office where the same may be said to exist under 
color of right ; that is, under color o f  law. That there may be 
a de facto municipal corporation, and consequently de facto offices 
of the same, fol lows from the rule laid down in Cooley , Const. 
Lim. *254 : I f a municipal corporat ion appears "to be act ing 
under color of law and recognized by the state as such, such a 
question ( that is of the legal existence o f  the corporation ) should 
be rai sed by the state itsel f by quo UHirra nto, or o ther direct pro­
ceeding"-and i t is susta ined by many authorities, .  holding that 
the question cannot be raised collateral ly . State v. Carr, 5 N. H. 
367 : People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 463 ; Stu.art v. Scho ol-dist., 30 
l\f ich. 6cJ ;  Bird v. Perkins, 33 Mich. 28 ; Prcside11t , etc. , v. 
Thompson, 20 I l l .  197 ; Kettering v. City of Jacksonville, 50 Ill .  
39 ; To't(m of Gcne'< ·a v .  Cole, 6 1  Ill .  397 ; Kayser v. Trustees of 
Brem en, 16  l\lo. 88 : State v. iv eathcrby, 45 Mo. 17 ; City of St. 
L ouis v. Slziclds, 62 l\lo. 247 ; I Dillon on Mun. Corp. § 4 3, ( 22. ) 
In Secombe v. Kit telson, 29 Minn. 555 ,  the court held ,  in 
effect, that there might be a de facto state government. 
In the l ine of these authorities are the on ly two cases we 
have found in wh ich an attempt was made to contest co11aterally 
the kg-al existence o f  a court. Fraser v. Frcclo 11, 53 Ca l . 6.t-t, 
was certiorari to rev iew the proceedings of the municipal court 
of appeal s of San Franc isco in a private action . An attempt was 
m ade to draw in [ *477 ] question the legality of that court. The 
supreme court, after referring to the rule in case of  a de facto 
officer. sai<l ( 647 ) : "It is manifest that the question whether the 
office itself, which was attempted to be created by statute . has a 
legal exisence, i s  of vastly more importance and of greater in­
terest to the public than the quest ion of the right of the incum­
bent," and held that the question could not be raised except in 
an action or proceed ing by the state. Sta te v. Rich, 20 Mo. 393, 
:1<J7, was an appeal from a judgment of the Lawrence county 
ci rcu it  court, quashing an indictment found in and removed into 
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it from the Stone county circuit court, on the ground that the
latter county had not been constitutionally established, and conse-
quently there could be, in point of law, no such court as the
Stone county circuit court where an indictment could lawfully
be found. The supreme court held (397) that “all such inquiries
must be excluded Whenever they come up collaterally, and the
county, its courts and oflicers, must be treated as things existing
in fact, the lawfulness of which cannot be questioned, unless in
a direct proceeding for that purpose.” In view of these author-
ities, and of the reason that underlies the rule applied to acts of
persons in the actual exercise, under certain circumstances, of
the duties of public officers, and of the great public mischiefs
that might sometimes arise but for the application of the rule
to courts, we arrive at the conclusion that there may be de facto
cgurts or offices, the lega it); Q whgse existence cannot be _(l1le_s-
tionecl exce t in a d' 1 1e state for that ur ose.
We need not in this case attempt a definition to cover all
instances of a court or oltice de farto. It is enough to determine
upon the particular facts of this case. But we ma 0 so far as
tc>_1_z§i_~t_u1l1.eze_a_co.uLt_Qz_cflisLlns_l)een
estab ished by an act of the legislature apparently validI and the
Cwwmflmewmed
under such act, it is to be regarded as a gig faetg court or oFfice—-
in other words, that the people shall not be made to suffgr be-
cause m1s e v 1e apparen ega itv 0 such ubli institutions.
In County of Ramsey v‘. Heona-n, 2 Minn. 281, (330,) it being
alleged that a certain law had not passed the two houses in the
manner prescribed [*478] by the constitution, the court decided
that it was to be tried by the court and not by a jury, and that
it might inspect the original bills on file with the secretary of
state. and have recourse to the journals of the legislature, to
ascertain whether or not the law had received all the constitutional
sanctions to its validity. And in State v. City of Hastings, 24
Minn. 78, upon a similar question, it was decided that the effect
of signing the enrolled bill by the presiding oflicers of the two
houses, as required by the constitution, is to authenticate the bill,
and that, being thus authenticated, it is to be presumed to have
passed in accordance with the requirements of the constitution;
that under the rule in County of Ramsey v. Heenan, snfrra, the
presumption is not conclusive, but may be overthrown by a refer-
ence to the journals. There could be no such presumption, and
















































































































































ELEME�1'S OF JURISDICTION 1 5 
it from the Stone county circuit court, on the ground that the 
latter county had not been constitutionally established, and conse­
quently there could be, in point of law, no such court as the 
Stone county circuit court where an indictment could lawfully 
be found. The supreme court held ( 3,7) that "all such inquiriesl 
must be excluded whenever they come up collaterally, and the 
county, its courts an<l officers, must be treated as things existing 
in fact, the lawfulness of which cannot be questioned, unless in 
a direct proceeding for that purpose." In view of these author­
ities, and of the reason that underlies the rule applied to acts of 
persons in the actual exercise, under certain circumsta nces, cf 
the duties of public officers, and of the great public mischiefs 
that might sometimes arise but for the application of the rule 
to courts, we arrive at the conclusion that there ma be de acto 
�Qurts or offices, the lega 1ty o whqse existence cannot oe SJ..!!..�­
tioned, except in a direct proc'eeding hy the state for that purpose. 
\V e need not in this case attempt a definition to cover all 
instances of a court or office de facto. It  is enough to determine 
upon the particular facts of this case. But we may go so far as 
to la · dovm this ro osition th · h e ""'ii 
estab 1shed b ' an act of the le islature a lparentlv val id an e 
court has gone into operation, or the o ce is lled and exercised 
under such act, it is to be regarded as a de facto court or offic£-­
in other words, that the people shall not be made to suff 
cause mis e v 1e apparen ega 1tv o such ubli i nstit utions . 
t remains only to app y t 1e principle to the case in hand. 
In Coun ty of Ramsey v·. Hee11a11, 2 Iviinn. 28 1 ,  ( 330, ) it being 
alleged that a certain law had not passed the two houses in the 
manner prescribed [ *478] by the constitution, the court decided 
that it  was to be tried by the court and not by a jury, and that 
it might inspect the original bills on file with the secretary of 
state. and have recourse to the journals of the legislature, to 
ascertai n whether or not the law had received all the const itutional 
sancti ons to its validity. And in State v. City of Ha.sti11gs, 24 
l\linn. 78, upon a s imilar question, it was decided that the effect 
of signing the enrolled bill by the presiding officers of the two 
houses, as required by the constitution, is to authenticate the bill, 
and that, being thus authenticated, it is to be presumed to have 
passed in accordance with the requirements of the constitution ; 
that under the rule in County of Ramsey v. Heenan, supra, the 
presumption is not conclusive, but may be overthrown by a refer­
ence to the journals. There could be no such presumption, and 
no necessit y  of reference to the journals to overthrow it, if the 
·' 
16 cases ON JUDGMENTS, arc.
courts took judicial notice of the con ents of the journals or of
the course of bills in the two houses. The act in question, having
been authenticated in the proper manner and approved by the
‘ governor, and tl1e subject of it being within the constitutional
power of the legislature, -was, under the presumption stated in
m State v. City of Hastings, supra, [trima fatie a valid law, and
the court it attempted to create, prima facie a legal court. It was
therefore, within the principle we have stated, a court dc fade.)
' Mitchell and Berry, 1]., dissented. -
T Application denied.
If the Judge is not Qualified.
\
- Q OAGLAND v. CREED, in Ill. Sup. Ct., 1876—8r 111. 506.
SCHOFIELD, The record before us by this writ shows a
rial, by agreement, before Edward P. Kirby, Esq., a member
f the bar, and what purports to be a judgment rendered by him
‘£5 judge of the circuit court of Morgan county. The bill of
N exceptions, or rather what purports to be the bill of exceptions,
s signed by him; and it is impossible for us to close our eyes
. $0 the fact, however strongly we might be inclined to do so, that
he record sought to be reviewed is one made by Edward P.
‘Kirby, Esq., a member of the bar, and not by any one commis-
‘ ioned to act as circuit judge. What we might hold, did it appear
l1at he was acting as circuit judge under color and claim of
uthority, we will not say—it is sufiicient that all pretense that
e was a judge dc facto is without foundation in the record. It
I pressly shows that he is a member of the bar, and that his
a hority for assuming to act as judge was the agreement of
Q the parties. Freeman on judgments, § I48; Case v. State, 5 Ind.
; State v. Anone, 2 Nott & McCord, (S. Car.) 27; State v.
Ailing, 12 Ohio 16; Blackburn v. State, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 690;
and Pepin v. Lackemneycr, 45 N. Y. 27, cited by the counsel for
the defendant in error, are, therefore, not in point.
Under our constitution, judges are elected by popular vote,
xcept to fill vacancies not to exceed one year, which shall be
filled by the appointment of the Governor. Const. I870, art. 6,
\ § 32. And all judges shall be commissioned by the Governor.
Same article, § 29. And, unlike the constitutions of some other
States, it contains no authority for temporarily filling the oflice

















































































































































16 CASES ON JUDGMENTS, nc. 
courts took judicial notice of the co�ents of the journals or of 
the course of bills in the two houses. �The act in question, having 
been authenticated in the proper manner and approved by the 
governor, and the subject of it being within the constitutional 
power of the legislature, ·was, under the presumption stated in 
State v. City of Hastings, supra, prima fade a valid law, and 
the court it attempted to create, prim.a f acie a legal court. It was 
therefore, within the principle we have stated, a court de facto.J 
Mitchell and Berry, J J ., dissented. • 
Applica-tion denied . 
• 
If the Judge is not Qualified. 
OAGLAND v. CREED, in Ill. Sup. Ct., 1876----81 111. 5o6. 
ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION I7
VVith regard to the doctrine that consent can not confer juris-
diction as to the subject matter, and that judicial power can not
be delegated, we deem it unnecessary to enter into any extended
discussion. All that need be said on these subjects is [*5o8] so
well said by Judge Cooley, in ‘his work on Constitutional Limita-
tions, 1st ed. p. 399, that we shall content ourselves with tran-
scribing it: “But the courts of a country can not have those
controversies referred to them by the parties which the law-
making power has seen fit to exclude from their cognizance. If
the judges should sit to hear such controversies, they would not
sit as a court; at the most, they would be arbitrators only, and
their action could not be sustained on that theory, unless it ap-
peared that the parties had designed to make the judges their
arbitrators, instead of expecting from them valid judicial action
as an organized court. Even then, the judgment could not be
binding as a judgment, but only as an award ; and a mere neglect
by either party to object to the want of jurisdiction, could not
make the decision binding upon him, either as a judgment or as
an award. * * *
“If the parties can not confer jurisdiction upon a court by
consent, neither can they by consent empower any individual
other than the judge of the court to exercise its powers. Judges
are chosen in such manner as shall be provided by law; and a
stipulation by parties that any other person than the judge shall
exercise his functions in their case would be nugatory, even
though the judge should vacate his seat for the purpose of the
hearing.”
That which, in the present record, purports to be a bill of
exceptions and judgment is, therefore, a nullity, and there is no
case before us upon which we are authorized to render final
judgment. It follows, the writ of error must be dismissed.
Writ dismissed.
The Clerk being Absent during a part of the trial was held, as it
seems to me properly. not even to make the judgment voidable on error
and exception, the judge having designated another to perform the duties
















































































































































ELE}I ENTS OF J URISDICTION 
With regard to the doctrine that consent can not confer j uris­
diction as to the subject matter, and that j udicial power can not 
be delegated, we deem it unnecessary to enter into any extended 
discussion . All that need be said on these subj ects is  [ *508 ) so 
well said by Judge Cooley, in "his work on Constitutional Limita­
tions, I st ed. p. 399, that 'we shall content ourselves with tran­
scribing i t : "But the courts of a country can not have those 
controversies rcferre<l to them by the part ies which the law­
making power has seen fit to exclude from their cognizance. I f  
the j udges should sit to hear such controversies, they would not 
sit as a court ; at the most, they would be arbitrators only, and 
their action could not be sustained on that theory, unless it  ap­
peared that the parties had designed to make the j udgd their 
arbitrators, instead of expecting from them valid j udicial action 
as an organized court. Even then, the j udgment could not be 
b inding as a judgment, but only as an award ; and a mere neglect 
by either party to obj ect to the want of j urisdiction, could not 
make the decision binding upon him, either as a j udgment or as 
an award. * * * 
"I f  the parties can not confer j urisdiction upon a court by 
consent, neither can they by consent empower any individual 
other than the j udge of the court to exercise its powers. Judges 
are chosen in such manner as shall be provided by law ; and a 
stipulation by parties that any other person than the j udge shall 
exercise his functions in their case would be nugatory, even 
though the judge should vacate his seat for the purpose of the 
hearing." 
That which, in the present record , purports to be a bill of 
exceptions and judgment is, therefore, a nullity, and there is  no 
case before us upon \\.'hich we are authorized to render final 
j udgment .  It follows, the writ of error must be dismissed. 
Writ dismissed. 
Tlie Clerk befog A bsent du ring a part of the trial was held , as it 
seems to me properly, not even to make the j udgment voidable on error 
and except ion, t h e  j udge having designated another to perform the <luties 
of  the clerk in his absence. M cal i11g v. Pace, 14 Ga. 627. 






The Place of Holding Court.
TENNY v. FILER, in N. Y. Sup. Ct., Jan., 1832-8 \Vend. 569.
Filer sued Tenny in trespass for taking wheat on the ground.
Plaintiff proved a justice judgment, execution thereon, and sale
of the wheat to him on the execution. Defendant requested the
court to charge the jury that the judgment relied on was void
because the defendant therein was not served with summons and
did not appear. Refusal to give the instruction is assigned as
' " " ‘ “hit the street Br ld him
hat note and he did so accordin y.
_ ourt, SAVAGE, C11. . he appearance and con es-
sion of judgment by Brooks shewn in this case was not appear-
ance [*57o] and confession, within the meaning of the statute.
By the act of 1824, § 12, a justice of the peace is authorized “to
enter a judgment by confession of the defendant.” The phrase-
ology of the act of 1818 is in the same terms, and under that
statute this court laid down the broad principle, “that a 'ustice
could not legally enter a judgment, unless the defenrlaT1t’z1_J-Etfet-l
in-’_-——'—F—"‘*i-r——s“"‘___‘mL_"Ber5<>n ,orvattorne judgment, or had been duly summoned, as in ordinary cases.
omag 1111 v. Tharp, 15 Johns. R. 476. f tiat (€ClSlOl'l e aw,
the court below erred. If there has been a loose practice as to
the entry of judgments by justices on confession, as in the present
case, it has been wrong, and the sooner it is corrected the better.
The entry of the judgment was a nullity. The judgment of the
common pleas must be reversed, and as the plaintiff cannot re-
cover on the title he set up, there is no necessity for a venirc de
nocuo.
Judgment reversed.
WHITE v. RIGGS, in Me. Sup. Judicial Ct., May Term, 1847-27 Me. 114.
Appeal from a decree of the probate court of Lincoln county
approving an instrument as the last will of B. Riggs, deceased.
SH!-2P1.1£Y, J. It was said that the case found, that no publ'k
notice was given of the holding of a probate court at Georgetown.
[*I17] and that was not a place where probate courts were to be
holden according to the provisions of the statute. The court.


















































































































































x ' ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION I9
pretended that the will was approved at any other place. The
decree is not in the usual form, and does not on its face show
4 that the court was legally holden; and if it did, it was competent
for the parties, as they have done, to agree upon the facts of the
case, which show that the court had no jurisdiction. The acts
of the defendant in appearing before the probate judge at George-
town, and entering an appeal to this court, could not give the
court jurisdiction.
As the supposed decree was void, because the probate court
> had no juris Iction, tie a ea mus
Blackstone, adopting Coke’s definition, says, “A court is a place‘
where justice is judicially administered.” 3 Com. 24.
' "The [>r0nn'n€flce of the word place in this definition, no doubt, arises
from the ancient idea that the king was the fountain and dispenser of
justice, and wherever he was domiciled was a court or place where jus-
, tice was dispensed. In modern times, and under our form of government,
the judicial power is exercised by means of courts. A court is an instru-
mentality of government. It is a creation of the law, and, in some
respects, it is an imaginary thing that exists only in legal contemplation,
X very similar to a corporation. A time when, a place where, and persons
the idea of a court. It ' in its organized as ect with all these const' -
ent ele ‘me _ at compe es e 1 ea 0
court In 1 le ation of the ter u a court many was
in egal contemplation, without any otficers charged with the duty of ad-
Q by whom judicial functions are to be exercised, are essential to complete
ministering justice. The officers might all die or resign, and still the
legal fiction would continue to exist.” Levy 2/. Bigelow, 6 Ind. App. 677,
682. In this case it was held that the record sufficiently showed that a
motion for a new trial was presented and demed by the trial court in term
time. and therefore that the denial by the judge was the action of the
court.
“ The Time of Holding Court. .
().\.\IBLE v. BUFFALO COUNTY, in Neb. Sup. Ct., Dec. 8, 1898—57
Neb. I63, 77 N. W. 341.
IRVINE, C. This was an action on two ofiicial bonds of
‘ a former treasurer of Buffalo county. The principal did not
answer. There was a trial of issues joined on the answer of
the sureties and a judgment in form entered for the plaintiff.
The sureties bring the case here for review.
It appears from the record, and is conceded in the briefs,
‘hat the supposed judgment was entered at a time when the dis-
§ trict court was not in session; in other words, when it was the
act of the judge in chambers and not of the court. [he case
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pretended that the will was approved at any other place. The 
decree is not in  the usual form, and does not on its fa ce show 
that the court was legally holden ; and if  it did, it was competent 
for the parties, as they have done, to agree upon the facts of the 
case, which show that the court had no jurisdiction. The acts 
of the defendant i n  appearing before the probate judge at George­
town,  and entering an appeal to this court, could not give the 
court j urisdiction. 
As the supposed decree was void, because the probate court 
had no J Urtsd1ction, the appeal must be disWISSed ... 
Blackstone, adopting Coke's definition, says, "A court is a place · 
where j ustice is judicially administered." 3 Com. 24-
"The prominence of the word place in this definition, no doubt, arises 
from the ancient idea that the king was the fountain and dispenser of 
j ustice, and wherever he was domiciled was a court or place whei:e jus­
tice was dispensed. In modern times, and under our form of government, 
the j udicial power is exercised by means of courts. A court is an instru­
mentality of government. It is a creation of  the law, and, in some 
respects, it i s  an imaginary thing that exists only in legal contemplation, 
very similar to a corporation . A time when, a place where, and persons 
by whom j udicial functions are to be exercised, are essential to complete 
the idea of a court. It · in its organized as ect with all these const' -
ent ele 'me at comp e es e t ea o 
court m I le ation of the ter u a court many ex1s 
in egal contemplation, without any o cers charged with the duty of ad­
ministering j ustice. The officers might al l die or resign, and stil l the 
legal fiction would continue to exist." Lei•y v. Bigelow, 6 Ind. App. 677, 
682. In this case it was held that the record sufficiently showed that a 
motion for a new trial was presented and denied by the trial court in term 
time, and therefore that the denial by the judge was the action of the 
court. 
� The Time of Holding Court. 
} 
• 
GA!\IBLE v. BUFFALO COU�TY, in  Neb. Sup. Ct., Dec. 8, 18<)8-57 
Neb. 163, 77 N. W. 341 .  
l RVI � E ,  C. This wa$ a n  action on two official bonds of 
a former treasurer of Buffalo county. The principal did not 
answer. There was a trial of issues joined on the answer of 
the sureties and a judgment in form entered for the plainti ff. 
The sureties bring the case here for review. 
I t  appears from the record, and is  conceded i n  th e briefs,  
\hat the supposed judgment was entered at a time when the dis­
trict court was not in  session ; in other words, when it ,\,as the 
act of the judge i n  chambers and not of the court. Tl1e case 
beinft a simple action of a legal nature. apd the jpclpment hcjgg 
� t 1c recovery of monev1 and not of such a nature as the law.. 
cases on JUDGMENTS, ere.
if
permits the 'ud e to render in chambers, the attem ted 'ud m t
[-'164] was coram non udicc an v01 . 0 gin v. Whilcomb,
51 Neb. 617.
It is urged that the defendants consented to the entry of
judgment in vacation. No such consent appears in the record.
The entry which it is contended supports that assertion is the
entry recording the trial and submission, and contains this: “De-
cision of this cause to be rendered in vacation.” This indicates
an order of the court rather than a stipulation of the parties.
Moreover, had there been consent it would be immaterial. The
-defect is of jurisdiction of the subject-matter,—want of authority
in the judge to make the order. Such authority cannot be sup-
plied by consent.
Reversed and remanded.
HF..\lMENS v. BENTLEY, Mich. Sup. Ct., April 30, 1875-32 Mich. 89.
C001,]-1v, J. The defendant in error sued Hemmens
to recover under the statute (Comp. L., ch. 69) for moneys paid
to the latter by the husband of the former in the purchase of
intoxicating [*9o] drinks. The principal question in the case is,
whether a previous suit between the same parties was not a bar
to this. The circuit court held it to be no bar.
It sceins to have been made out that the previous suit was
for the same cause of action.
of the peace, and was tried without a jury, February 21st, 1874.
The justice states in his docket, that after hearing the proofs
“thereupon the court took till the 23d clay of February, 1874, at
' ten o'clock A. M., to render his decision at his olfice in Clinton.
appeared, and I, the said justice, do decide and determine that
the above named plaintiff has no cause of action against said
defendant, and judgment is hereby rendered in favor of said
defendant and against the said plaintiff for the sum of forty-
seven cents and costs of suit.” This judgment the plaintiff
§February 23d, 1874, _ten o'clock A. M., cause called and parties
The decision must turn upon the statute of 1871 (Comp. L.,
§ Ijjo) which provides that certain days, among them the twenty-
second of February, “shall, for all purposes whatsoever, as re-
gards the presenting for payment or acceptance, and of the pro-
;treated as void, and proceeded to institute the present suit.
\
bank notes and promissory notes, made after this act shall take
tfect, also for the holding of courts, be treated and considered
E testing and giving notice of the dishonor of bills of exchange.
















































































































































20 CASES ON J UDG M ENTS, :£TC. 
permits the · ud e to render in chambers, the attem t 
L 164]  was coram non 1ud1ce, an vo1 . o gin v. iVJiitcomb, 
5 1  l'\ cb. 6 1 7. 
I t  i s  urged that the defendants consented to the entry of 
j udgment in vacation. No such consent appears in the record. 
The entry which it is contended supports that assert ion is the 
entry record ing the trial and submission, and contains this : "De­
cis ion of thi s cause to be rendered in vacation." This indicates 
an order of the court rather than a stipulation of the parties .  
l\Iorcover, had there been consent it would be immaterial. The 
-defect is of j urisdiction of the subj ect-matter,-want of authority 
in the j udge to make the order. Such authority cannot be sup­
plied hy consent. 
Reversed and remaJ:ded. 
H E :\ ll\I E X S  v. BENTLEY, :Mich. Sup. Ct., April 30, 1875-32 }IJ ich. 89. 
Com,gy, J .  The defendant in error sued I lemmens 
to recover under the statute ( Comp. L ., cli . 69 ) for moneys paid 
to the latter by the husband o f  the former in the purchase of 
intoxicating [ *go ] drinks. The principal question iH the case is, 
whether a previous suit between the same parties was not a bar 
to this .  The circuit court held i t  to be no bar. 
It seciiis tb have been made out that the previous suit was 
for the same cause of action. It was brought before a j ustice . 
of the peace, and was tried without a j ury, February 2 1 st ,  1 874. 
The j ust ice states in his docket, that after hearing the proofs 
"thereupon the court took till the 23d day of February, 1874, at 
· ten o'clock A .  M., to render his decision at his office in Clinton. 
February 23d, 1 8i4, ten o'clock A. 1\1. ,  cause called and part ies 
appeared, and I ,  the · said j ustice, do decide and determine that 
the above named plaintiff has no cause of act ion against said 
defendant, and judgment is hereby �endered in favor of said 
' defendan t and against the said plaint iff for the sum of forty-
'\ seven cents and costs of su i t ."  This judgment the plaintiff 1 t reated as vo id ,  and proceeded to institute the present suit .  
\ The decision must turn upon the statute of 187 1  ( Comp.  L.,  
§ 155rJ )  which provides that certain days,  among them the twcnty­
scconc l  of February, "shal l ,  for al l purposes whatsoever, as re� 
gard s the presen ting for payment or acceptance, and of the pro­
test ing and giving notice of the dishonor of bil ls of exchange, _' b�nk notes  and promissory notes, made after thi s  act shall take �ffect , ai m  for the holding of courts, be treated and considered 
Q J
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s is the first day of the week commonly called Sunday: Pro-
ided, That in case any of said holidays shall fall upon a Sunday,
hen the Monday following to be considered as the said holiday”
-—-with other provisos not important here. In 1874, the 22d day
of February fell upon Sunday.
It is contended on behalf of Hemmens that the mere rendi-
n of a judgment by a justice in a case previously tried is not
in contemplation of the statute the holding of a court, inasmuch
as the parties are under no obligation to attend. Also that if the
justice could not properly render judgment on the 23d, as he
did, it was an irregularity merely, and not a void act, and advan-
tage should have been taken [*9I] of the error by an appeal or
, on certiorari. Whether either of these positions is tenable would
§seem, 1mder the statute, to depend upon whether it might be
sustained if the day had been Sunday, instead of a day which
by the statute is to “be treated and considered as is” Sunday.
he purpose to put them upon the same footing is clearly mani-
t in the statute. But had the day been Sunday, it cannot be
doubted that the act of rendering a judgment would have been
a void act. Swann v. Broome, Burr., 1595, is a direct authority
this point.—See also, Fox v. Abel, 2 Conn., 541; Pearce v.
wood, 13 l\Iass., 324, 347; Story v. Elliot, 8 Cow., 28. It is
learly a judicial act, and it is necessary to hold a court in order
I
\Ve find no error in the judgment, and it must be affirmed
=ith costs. The other justices concurred.
$ Similar case: Datidson v. Mnnsey, 27 Utah 87, 74 Pac. 431.
SMURR v. STATE, in Ind. Sup. Ct. Ja11. 26, 1886—1o5 Ind. 125, 4
N. E. 445. V
ELLIOTT, J. On the twenty-second day of September, 1883,
the VVhitley circuit court, then being regularly in session, entered
an order directing that an adjourned term be held, commencing-
on the twenty-ninth day of October, 1883, and notice was given
of the adjourned term according to law. The time [*126] fixed
in the order was a time when, under the provisions of the statute-,
, the court in Kosciusko county might be in session; and Kosciusko
county, in conjunction with VVhitley county, constituted the
thirty-third judicial court. The court in the former county was
actually in session on e twenty-third day of October, 1883, and

















































































































































,. I ( ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION 2 1  
s i s  the first day of the week commonly called Sunday : Pro­
.Wed, That in case any of said holidays shall fall upon a Sunday, 
hen the Monday following to be considered as the said holiday" 
-with other provisos not important here. In 1874, the 22d day 
of February fell upon Sunday. 
It is contended on behalf of Hemmens that the mere rendi­
n of a j udgment by a j ustice in a case previously tried is no� 
in contemplation of the statute the holding of a court, inasmuch 
as the parties are under no obligation to attend. Also that if the 
j ustice could not properly render j udgment on the 23d, as he 
did, it was an irregularity merely, and not a void act, and advan­
tage should have been taken [ *91 ] of the error by an appeal or �n certiorari. Whether either of these positions is tenable would ' 
��eem, under the statute, to depend upon whether it might be sustained if the day had been Sunday, instead of a day which 
by the statute is to "be treated and considered as is" Sunday. 
he purpose to put them upon the same footing is clearly mani­
t in the statute. But had the day been Sunday, it cannot be 
doubted that the act of rendering a j udgment would have been 
a void act. Swann v. Broome, Burr. ,  1 595, is a direct authority 
this point.-See also, Fox v. Abel, 2 Conn. , 54 1 ;  Pearce v. 
>A twood, 1 3 :Mass. , 324, 347 ;  Story v. Ell£ot, 8 Cow. , 28. It is 
]early a j udicial act, and it is necessary to hold a court in order 
o perform it. And being void, no one was under obligation to 
egard it. * * * 
We find no error in the j udgment, and it must be affirmed 
ith costs. The other j ustices concurred. 
Similar case : Da·vidson v. Munsey, 27 Utah 87, 74 Pac. 4JI.  
SMURR v. STATE, in Ind. Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 1886---105 Ind. 125, 4 
N. E. 445. 
ELLIOTT, J. On the twenty-second day of September, 1883,. 
the Whitley circuit court, then being regularly in session, entered 
an order directing that an adj ourned term be held, commencing 
n the twenty-ninth day of October, 1883 , and notice was given 
of the adjourned term according to law. The time [ * 126] fixed l· n  the order was a time when, under the provisions o f  the statute,. 
the court in Kosciusko county might be in session ; and Kosciusko 
county, in conj unction with Whitley county, constituted the 
thirty-third j udicial court. The court in the former county was 
actually in session on$ twenty-third day of October, 1883, an<l .Y '1 o:iu�in s;:::.,_n-j ing the time the trial of th
.
e appellant 
:J · - � -�fj , 
22 CASES ON JUDGMENTS, ETC.
was in progress; the judge of the thirty—third circuit having
appointed a special judge to hold that court. The adjourned
term of the \Vhitlcy circuit court, at which the appellant was
tried, was held by the duly-elected judge of that circuit. The
appellant entered into trial without any objection, -and made none
until after verdict, and then, for the first time, presented the
question of the authority of the judge of the thirty-third judicial
circuit to hold the adjourned term. The statute fixes the time
for holding the courts in the thirty-third circuit, and we
know judicially that the September term, 1883, of the \Vhitley
circuit court began on Monday, September 3d, and ended on the
twenty-second day of that month. We know, also, that the
September term of the Kosciusko circuit court began on the
Monday following the close of the \Vhitley circuit court, and, as
the term of the latter court began on the day named, Monday,
September 24, 1883, it had been in session five weeks when the
judge convened the adjourned term pursuant to the order pre-
viously made, and in accordance with the notice duly given. The
statute provides that the length of the term of the Kosciusko
circuit court shall be seven weeks, “if the business thereof re-
quires it"; but there is no command that it shall continue for
that length of time. The statute cannot be regarded as absolutely
fixing the term at that period, for it declares that it shall continue
for that length of time upon condition that the business shall
require it. * * * i
There is high authority for the proposition that, independent
of a statutory warrant, courts of superior jurisdiction have
authority to hold adjourned terms. M ecltattics’ Bank v. ,Withers,
6 \\’heat. I07; Harris v. Gest, 4 Ohio St. 469; Caeily v. State,
32 Ind. 62. \-Ve have, however, a statute authorizing courts to
appoint adjourned terms, and a court assuming to act under that
statute cannot be said to act without color of authority, although
it may proceed erroneously. The only possible objection to the
proceeding of the court in this instance is that it fixed the time
for holding the adjourned term at a time when another court in
the same circuit might have been in session; but as the term of
the other court might have been abridged by the order of the
judge so that it would not have been in session at the time fixed
for the adjourned term, and as the order for the adjourned term
was made while the court was lawfully in session, and under a
statute conferring authority to hold adjourned terms, the order
for holding that term cannot be regarded as void. The utmost
















































































































































22 CASES ON J UDG M E NTS,  ETC. 
was in progress ; the j udge of the thirty-third circuit having 
appointed a special j udge to hold that court. The adjourned 
term of the \Vhitley circuit court, at which the appel lant was 
trieo, was held by the duly-elected j udge of that circuit. The 
appellant entered into trial without any obj ection, and made none 
until after verdict, and then, for the first time, presented the 
question of the authority of the j udge of the thirty-third j udicial 
circuit to hold the adjourned term. The statute fixes the time 
for holding the courts in the thirty-third circuit, and we 
know j udicially that the September term, 1883, of the \Vhitley 
circuit court began on 1\fonday, September 3d, and ended on the 
twenty-second day of tha.t month. We know, also, that the 
September term of the Kosciusko circuit court began on the 
l\Ionday following the close of the \Vhitley circuit court, and, as 
the term of the latter court began on the day named, l\Ionday, 
September 24, 1 883, it had been in session five weeks when the 
j udge convened the adjourned term pursuant to the order pre­
viously made, and in accordance with the notice duly given. The 
statute provides that the length of the term of the Kosciusko 
circuit court shall be seven weeks, "if  the business thereof re­
quires i t ' '  ; but there is no command that it shall continue for 
that length of time. The statute cannot be regarded as absolutely 
fixing the term at that period, for it declares that it shall continue 
for that length of time upon condit ion that the business shall 
require it. * * * 
· 
There is high authority for the proposition that, independent 
of a statutory warrant, courts of superior j urisdiction have 
authority to hold adjourned terms. Mechanics' Bank v. Withers, 
6 \\'heat. 107 ; Harris v. Gest, 4 Ohio St. 469 ; Ca.sily v. State, 
32 Ind. 62. \Ve have, however, a statute authorizing courts to 
appoint adj ourned terms, and a court assuming to act under that 
statute cannot be said to act without color of authority, although 
it may proceed erroneously. The only possible objection to the 
proceed ing of the court in this instance is that it fixed the time 
for holding the adjourned term at a time when another court in 
the same circuit might have been in session ; but as the term of 
the other court might have been abridged by the order of the 
j udge so that it would not have been in session at the time fixed 
for the adj ourned term, and as the order for the adj ourned term 
was ma<lc while the court was lawfully in session, and under a 
statute conferring authority to hold adj ourned terms, the or<ler 
for holding that term cannot be regarded as void. The utmost 
that can be justly said in impeachment of that order, and the 
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acts done under it, is that they were erroneous, since the mistake,
if mistake there was, consisted solely in wrongly deciding upon
the force and effect of the statute.
\Ne do not [*129] controvert the general doctrine that a
court cannot be held at a time when there is clearly no authority
to hold it, nor do we impugn the general doctrine that it is error
to hold two courts in the same circuit at the same time, where
there is no statutory provision authorizing it. Cain v. Coda, 84
Ind. 209; Batten v. State, 80 Ind. 394; MeC0ol v. State, 7 Ind.
378; Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229; In re Millington, 24 Kan. 214;
Garlick v. Dunn, 42 Ala. 404; Freem. Judgm. § 121. It is not
necessary to question the soundness of the general doctrine stated,
for here there was power in the court to create a vacation by an
order, and there was also power to order an adjourned term;
so that here there is no question as to the existence of power in
the court to make a decision, but the sole infirmity in the pro-
ceedings relates to the mode of exercising the power residing in
the court. In every case in which a court makes erroneous ruling,
there is a wrongful exercise of authority; but such a wrongful
exercise of authority does not render the proceedings void,
although it does make them erroneous. The question of power
or authority might, perhaps, have arisen had the adjourned term
been fixed at a time when the law imperatively required
that the Kosciusko circuit should be in session; but its adjourned
term was not fixed at a time when that court was required to be
in session. On the contrary, it was fixed at a time when the
judge might rightfully have adjourned that court. This feature
is a prominent one, and distinguishes the case from such cases
as that of In re Millington, 24 Kan. 214. If the judge had made
the proper order declaring the Kosciusko circuit adjourned after
five weeks of the term had expired, as he undoubtedly might have
done, there could have been no question as to the regularity of
the adjourned court held by him in Whitley county, and the error
in this respect, while it might, perhaps, have been available had
objection been seasonably made, cannot be deemed to render the
order for the [*I3o] adjourned term void; and, if that order
was not void, the trial at that term was not a mere nullity. Casily
v. State, 32 Ind. 62; Knight v. State, 70 Ind. 375; Labadie v.
Dean, 47 Tex. 90; State v. Clark, 30 Iowa 168; Cook v. Smith.
54 Iowa, 636, 6 N. W. 259, and 7 N. W. 16.
Principle and authority logically lead to the conclusion that
nothing worse can be said of the adjourned term than that it was
















































































































































ELEMENTS OF JURISDI CTION 23 
acts done under it, i s  that they were erroneous, since the mistake, 
if mistake there was, consisted solely in wrongly deciding upon 
the force and effect of the statute. 
We do not [ * 129]  controvert the general doctrine that a 
court cannot be held at a time when there is clearly no authority 
to hold it ,  nor do we impugn the general doctrine that it is error 
to hold two courts in the same circuit at the same time, where 
there is no statutory provision authorizing it. Cain v. Goda, 84 
Ind. 20<) ; Batten v. State, 8o Ind. 394; Al cCool v. State, 7 Ind. 
378 ; D mrn v. State, 2 Ark. 229; In re .Millington, 24 Kan. 2 1 4 ; 
Garlick v. Du11 11, 42 Ala. 404; Freem. Judgm. § l 2 I .  It is not 
necessary to question the soundness o f  the general doctrine stated, 
for here there was power in  the court to create a vacation by an 
order, and there was also power to order an adjourned term ; 
so that here there is no question as to the existence of power in 
the court to make a decision, but the sole infirmity in the pro­
ceedings relates to the mode of exercising the power residing in 
tne court. In every case in which a court makes erroneous ruling, 
there is  a wrongful exercise of authority ; but such a wrongful 
exercise of authority does not render the proceedings void, 
although it does make them erroneous. The question of power 
or authority might, perhaps, have arisen had the adjourned term 
been fixed at a time when the law imperatively required 
that the Kosciusko circuit should be in session ; but its adj ourned 
term was not fixed at a time when that court was required to be 
in session. On the contrary, it was fixed at a time when the 
j udge might rightfully have adjourned that court. This feature 
is  a prominent one, and distinguishes the case · from such case� 
as that o f  In re Millington., 24 Kan. 2 14. If the judge had made 
the proper order declaring the Kosciusko circuit adjourned after 
five weeks of the term had expired, as he undoubtedly might have 
done, there could have been no question as to the regularity of 
the adjourned court held by him in Whitley county, and the error 
in this respect, while it might, perhaps, have been available had 
obj ection been seasonably made, cannot be deemed to render the 
order for the [ * 130] adjourned term void ; and, i f  that order 
was not void, the trial at that term was not a mere null ity. Casily 
v. State, 32 Ind. 62; Knight v. State, 70 Ind. 375; Labadie v. 
Dean, 47 Tex. � ;  State v. Clark, 30 Iowa 168 ; Cook v. Smit h .  
54 Iowa, 636, 6 N. W. 259, and 7 N. \V. 16. 
Principle and authority logically lead to the conclusion that 
nothing worse can be said of the adjourned term than that it was 
irregularly held. It cannot be justly affirmed that it was held 
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without color of authority. In the case of State v. Knight, 19
Iowa, 94, it was held that a judge might continue a term of court
into the time fixed by law for holding a court in the same dis-
trict, and the earlier cases of Davis v. Fish, I G. Greene, 406;
S. C. 48 Amer. Dec. 387, see note p. 392; and Grable v. State, 2
G. Greene, 559,—were in effect overruled. It was held by the
same court in W ear-er v. C ooledge, 15 Iowa, 244, that a judgment
rendered three days after the time fixed for the commencement
of another court in the same district was not void; and in State
v. Clark, supra, and Cook v. Smith, supra, like rulings were made.
In the very recent cases of State v. Sf(.’7.'£’ttS, 67 Iowa 557, 25 N.
\V. 777, and State v. Peterson, 67 Iowa 564, it was held that a
judgment pronounced at a. term continued after the time fixed for
another term of the same district was not even erroneous. The
supreme court of Vi/isconsin, in State v. Leahy, 1 \Vis. 225, denied
the doctrine of the two early Iowa cases, as well as that of Archer
v. Ross, 2 Scam. 303, and decided that holding a court during
the time designated by law for holding another court in the same
judicial circuit did not invalidate the proceedings. In the case
of State v. Montgomery, 8 Kan. 351, a like doctrine was declared.
In this last case it was said: “The legislature have named the
day for the opening of a term, but have not for the closing.
That is confined to the discretion of the judge, and is determined
by the amount of business, and the necessity of suitors.” This
is the case here,—the time was fixed for opening, but not for
closing, the Kosciusko circuit [*I31] court. That, as we have
seen, was left to the judgment of the judge.
Brewer v. State, 6 Lea, 198, decides that although a judge
pro tempore appoints an adjourned term, and orders it to be held
at a time when another court of the same circuit might be in
session, the proceedings are not void. The court placed its de-
cision upon the same principle as that which sustains the
rulings of a judge de facto, and said, among other things: “Nor
does the fact that the term of another court of the circuit com-
menced in the interval affect the result. This very point arose.
and was decided in favor of the validity of the proceedings, in
Cheek v. Merchants’ Bank, 9 Heisk. 489.”
In Venable v. White, 2 Head, 582, it was held that where no
objection is made, and there is color of authority for holding the
term, that, although the statute under which the judge assumed
to act had been repealed, still, the proceedings were not void. It
was there said: “There can be no doubt whatever, upon reason
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24 CASES ON J t:' DG M E N TS, ETC. 
without color of authority. In the case of State v. Knight, 1 9  
Iowa, 94, it was held that a judge might continue a term of court 
into the time fixed by law for holding a court in the same dis­
trict, and the earlier cases of Denis v. Fish, I G. Greene, 4o6 ;  
S .  C. 48 Amer. Dec. 387, see note p. 392 ; and Grable v. State, 2 
G. Greene, 5 59,-were in effect overruled . It was held by the 
same court in fVea-z·er v. Coo/edge, 1 5 Iowa, 244, that a j udgment 
rendered three days after the time fixed for the commencement 
of another court in the same district was not void ; and in State 
v. Clark, supra, and Cook v. Smith, supra, l ike rulings were made. 
In the very recent cases of State v .  Ste-ueus, 67 Iowa 5 57,  25 N. 
\V. 777, and State v. Peterson, 67 Iowa 564, it was held that a 
judgment pronounced at a term continued after the time fixed for 
another term of the same district was not even erroneous. The 
supreme court of \Visconsin, in State v. Leahj•, 1 \Vis. 225, denied 
the doctrine of the two early Iowa cases, as well as that of A rcher 
v. Ross, 2 Scam. 303, and decided that holding a court during 
the time designated by law for holding another court in the same 
judicial circuit did not invalidate the proceedings. In the case 
of State v. Montgom ery, 8 Kan . 35 1 ,  a like doctrine was declared. 
In this last case it was said : "The legislature have named the 
day for the opening of a term, but have not for the closing. 
That is confined to the discretion of the j udge, and is determined 
by the amount of business, and the necessity of suitors." This 
is  the case here,-the time was fixed for opening, but not for 
closing, the Kosciusko circuit [ * 1 3 1 ] court. That, as we have 
seen, was left to the j udgment of the j udge. 
Bre·wer v. Stale, 6 Lea, 1g8, decides that although a j udge 
pro tempore appoints an adjourned term, and orders it to be held 
at a time when another court of the same circuit might be in 
session , the proceedings are not void. The court placed its de­
cision upon the same principle as that which sustains the 
rulings of a j udge de facto, and said , among other things : "Nor 
does the fact that the term of another court of the circuit com­
menced in the interval affect the result. This very point arose. 
and was decided in favor of the validity of the proceedings, in 
Cheek v. �Merchan ts' Bank, 9 Heisk. 489." 
In Ve1iable v. White, 2 Head, 582, i t  was held that where no 
objection is made, and there is  color of authority for holding the 
term, that, although the statute under which the judge assumed 
to act had been repealed, still, the proceedings were not void. It 
was there said : "There can be no doubt whatever, upon reason 
and authority, that a j udgment given by a j udge de facto, sitting 
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and holding court at a proper time and place, is valid and free
from error as a judgment pronounced by a judge rightfully in
office. If so, upon what reason shall we hold that the judgments
and decrees of a judge rightfully in office are erroneous because
he held his court under color of a law that turned out to be re-
pealed or invalid?" In Henslie v. State, 3 Heisk. 202, the same
general principle is declared.
The cases, and among them our own, declare that where an
adjourned term is held under color of authority, it will be pre-
sumed that it was properly ordered and held. Porter v. State,
2 Ind. 435; Shirts v. Irons, 28 Ind. 458; Hwrjver v. State, 42 Ind.
405; Cook v. Skelton, 20 I11. 107; State v. Clark, 30 Iowa 168',
Cook v. Smith, 54 Iowa 636, 6 N. W. 259, 7 N. W. 16. This
principle justifies the conclusion that where there is color of
authority the proceedings cannot be deemed void, since it is an
elementary rule that no presumption can sustain a void act.
The principle which governs in cases in which the court is
[*I3z] held by a judge de facto is essentially the same as that
which governs the present. If a judge not legally elected or
qualified may, if acting under color of authority, pronounce valid
judgments, it cannot be doubted that, upon the same principle,
judgments pronounced at a term not legally held, but yet held
by a duly-qualified judge under color of law, must be valid. The
reason for the rule is stronger and clearer where the judge de
jure holds a term of court at an improper time, but under color
of authority, than where a term of court is held by a judge who
actually has no legal right, and simply acts under color of author-
ity. Yet the law is quite well settled that the acts of a judge,
who is only such de facto, are not void. VVe have many cases
in our own reports declaring and enforcing this general rule. * * *
There is some confusion, and perhaps conflict, in the
earlier cases; but the later cases, supported as they are by all the
well-considered cases in our reports, must be regarded as firmly
settling the rule that where a judge assumes~to actmu11_derv_la,w.ful
zfiihmfiflmiiflor‘. Q'T.11tifl1QtitL. Th.s..aéts§
he void, and that if the party voluntarily goes to trial wit_h_outfl
_i__0 Mon» _=m__O J5C“5'i:§IE_L§.b1b1i¢ti9.ri1..ii'i1TT2Er"ltO<3.1atéEoI..L2e..0.t_-
3_I_l_8._l_l_. is is in armony with the great weight of authority
elsewhere. Bank of North /1>nze'rica v. McCall, 4 Bin. 371 ; State
v. County Court, 50 M0. 317; Clark v. Com., 29 Pa. St. 138:
Com. v. Hawker, 123 Mass. 525; Com. v. Taber, Id. 253; Shee-
han’s Case, I22 Mass. 445; State v. Anone, 2 Nott & McC. 27;
















































































































































26 CASES ox JUDGMENTS, ere.
Mayo v. Stoncum, 2 Ala. 390; State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449.
The ultimate conclusion which we have reached is this:
Where a judge, having statutory authority to appoint an _ad-
jotirneil terfifil cou‘rT, does Tiak_"=1‘lTe or‘de'Fii1 'ter_m—time for hold-
mg an adjourned _term, causes notice ‘of’ such adjourned
term to Be given, appears at the time appointed and opens court,
t__h fie p‘r'o"c'c'eYliiigs at suc__h an adjourned court ‘are not void,'althou_.gh '
held at a time when another court of the same circuit might have
l)TWse.Tsi?ifi‘_§Q(Ier_t_he__st_atttte anil _\\_‘as in__s_e_s_:_sio11,_p_r__es_id_e_3l
o_\Fb_v'T_s-_pe cial judge. As the proceedings were not void, the
failure of the appellant to object at the trial was a waiver of all
questions as to the regularity of the proceedings at the adjourned
term. If he had made an objection before conviction, we should
have been faced by a very different question from that which
the record presents. It is not necessary for us to decide—nor,
indeed, would it be proper for us to do so—what would be the
rule if an objection were made, before trial, to proceeding at an
adjourned term held under such circumstances as that at which
the appellant was convicted.
The conclusion which we have reached does the appellant no
substantial injury, for he was tried by the rightful judge, and
was denied no right for which he asked. The utmost that can
be said is that the adjourned term was irregularly held by the
proper judge, and, as the appellant lost no substantial rights by
the alleged error of the judge, and made no [*135] objection
until after trial, we cannot, under the rule declared by our statute
and enforced by our decisions, reverse the judgment. * * *
Judgment affirmed.
In granting a prohibition against further proceeding on a new trial
granted by the regular judge on motion set for hearing at a special term
at which the hearing was adjourned by a specially elected judge till the
regular judge could attend, the court said: “It is not the meeting of the
judge and officers of a court at the county-seat that constitutes a court,
but that meeting must be at a time authorized by law. Brumley v. State,
20 Ark. 77: Ex [mrlc Osborn, 24 Ark. 479. The terms of the circuit court
are prescribed by statute. It is provided, however, that ‘special adjourned
sessions of any court may be held in continuation of the regular term.
upon its being so ordered by the court or judge in term time, and entered
by the clerk on the record.’ Mansf. Dig. §§ 1476, 1481. There is no
such thing known to our laws as two circuit courts held at the same cir-
cuit at the same time. one presided over by the regular judge and the
other by a special judge. Suitors are entitled to have their causes tried
before the circuit judge, unless he is disqualified or unable to preside
from causes beyond his control. It was lawful for the Desha circuit court
to adjourn its sittings to a distant day; but when that day arrived, and he
was detained by his judicial duties in another county of his circuit, the
adjourned session necessarily failed; for there was no power to supply
















































































































































CASES ON' J UJ){;MEN1'S, ETC. 
Mayo v. Sto11cum, 2 Ala. 390 ; State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449. 
The ult imate conclusion which we have reached is this : 
\\ihere a j udge, having statutory authority to appoint an a<l­
j6tTrne<l tcri1101Courr,Oocs mat:c an oraerli1 lCnn-timc for h0Id · 
Ing an adj"ourne<l--=1eri11,- -cau-ses notiCc "of- "su-ch a<ljourned 
term to be gr,;cn, app�ars at the time appointed and open s coun, 
�he J?rocccdings af sucJ1 an a<ljoti_�ncd court -ar-e not void, -althuttgh 
held at a fiii1c ,.,.:hen another court of the same circuit  might have 
been m scssi<i�: tTE_dcr_ th� .?t�tute, and ��a� in .. _����!911 _p_���-id.�l 
o\·er bv a special judge. As the proceedings were not void, the 
failure of the appellant to object at the trial was a waiver of all 
questions as to the regularity of  the proceedi ngs at the adjourned 
term. If he had made an obj ection before conviction, we should 
have been faced by a very di fferent question from that which 
the record presents. It is  not necessary for us to decide-nor, 
indeed , would it be proper for us to do so-what would be the 
rule if an ob.i cction were made, before trial , to proceeding at an 
adjourned term held under such circumstances as that at which 
the appellant was convicted. 
The conclusion which we have reached does the appellant no 
substantial injury, for he was tried by the rightful j udge, and 
was denied no right for which he asked. The utmost that ran 
be said i s  that the adj ourned term was irregularly held by the 
proper judge, and, as the appellant lost no substantial rights by 
the alleged error of the judge, and made no [ * 135] obj ection 
until after trial, we cannot, under the rule declared by our statute 
and enforced by our decisions, reverse the j udgment. * * * 
fttdf!nicnt aflirmed. 
In granting a prohibition against further proceeding on a new trial 
granted by the regular j udge on motion set for hearing at a special term 
at which the hearing was adj ourned by a specially elected j udge till the 
regular j udge could attend, the court said : " It is not the meeting of the 
judge and officers of a court at the county-seat that consti tutes a court, 
but that meeting must be at a time authorized by law. Brumley v. Stale, 
20 Ark. 77 ; Ex paflc Osborn, 24 Ark. 479. The terms of the circuit court 
arc prescribed by statute. It is  provided, however, that 'special adjourned 
sessions of any court may be held in  continuation of the regular term. 
upon its being so ordered by the court or j udge in term time, and entere1l 
by the clerk on the record.' Mansf. Dig. §§ 1476, 1481 .  There is no 
such thing known to our laws as two circuit courts held at the same <"'ir­
cuit at the same time, one presided over hy the regular j udge and the 
other by a special j udge. Suitors are entitled to have their causes tried 
before the circuit judge, unless he is disqualified or unahle to preside 
from causes beyond his control. It was lawful for the Desha c ircu it court 
to :idj ourn its sittings to a distant day ; but when that day arrived, and he 
was detained hy his j udicial duties in another county of his circuit, the 
adjourned session necessarily fai led ; for there was no power to supply 
his place temporari ly,' by a special election by the attorneys in attendance 
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—his abse11ce for this cause not being such an inability to continue to
hold tl1e court as is contemplated by § 21, Art. 7, Constitution of 1874."
Stale ex rel. Butler v. Williams (1887), 48 Ark. 227, 2 S. W. 843.
Effect of Order in Recess During Term. In refusing to dismiss an
appeal on the ground that the order appealed from was 1nade in vacation,
and therefore void, the court stated that six of the seven judges composing
the court below had signed an order Oct. 3, adjourning the term over
to Nov. 1, and the order appealed from was made Oct. 4 by the judge
who had not joined in the order of adjournment. The court said: “There
is a marked distinction between an adjournment sine die of a tcr1n of
court and those inter1nissions which inevitably occur during a term. A
court has the inherent power during the term to suspend business, as
occasion may require, from one hour or one day to another. I11 this
respect there is no difference between an adjournment from one day to
the next and adjournment to a more distant day. I11 either case the term
continues; and while, during the intermission, the functions of the court
are for some purposes suspended, still the court remains in existence.
and it is still term time. The judges do not by such an order lose all
power of control over the sessions, and may revoke the order of adjourn-
ment a11d reconvene before the time first fixed. Bowen v. Stewart, 128
Ind. 507, 26 N. E. 168; Wharton v. Sims, 88 Ga. 618, 15 S. E. 771; Cole
Co. v. Dallmeyer, 101 Mo. 57, 13 S. W. 687." Green v. Morse, 57 Neb.
391, 77 N. W. 925, 73 Am. St. Rep. 518.
Power to Hear and Determine Causes of the Kind in Question.
ARROYO DITCH AND WATER CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT, i11 Cal.
Sup. Ct., Nov. 23, 1901--92 Cal. 47, 28 Pac. 54, 27 Am. St. Rep. 91.
HARRISON, J. The plaintiff, a private corporation, brought
an action against one E.'J. Standlee, in the justiee’s court for
Downey township, in Los Angeles county, upon a promissory
note for twenty-one dollars, executed to it by him. The defend-
ant filed a verified answer to the complaint, alleging that the sole
consideration for which the note had been given was a pretended
assessment by the plaintiff upon its capital stock (of which he
held a certain number of shares), and that the said assessment
was illegal and void. Upon filin the answer the defendant
m2z_s¢I1t1ss____<>“rtt<>tr=111£r_t__Tl1____ns=Q=-mH=t-#nw- fi<*-a¢ti<>ntOth@su‘_" ‘
thf ground that it necessarily involve t e guestjgn of the legality
of an assessment, and thereu on the court sus ended all further
pmwmgr-TTTHFGM“-rTaaa!E&'EnJmTEE1li?T0a1?¢ET§
¢1enZFr1.—o§—Amg‘erss—¢6u—my._lT1f<?r'?H¢_1>'i)?<nT1§~
with the county clerE, the plaintiff moved the superior court to
remand the cause to the justice’s court upon the ground that that
court erred in transferring the cause to the superior court, and
that the superior court had no jurisdiction of the matter. This
motion was denied, and the court thereafter tried the cause, and
















































































































































28 CASES on JUDGMENTS, ETC.
of the plaintiff, a writ of review was issued out of this court to
the superior court, and in obedience thereto a transcript of the
records and proceedings of that court in the matter has been
certified to this court.
[*5o] The constitution, article VI section 5, declares that
“the superior court sha have original juris iction in all
cases at law which involve the * * * an P tax im ost,
ssessment,.toll, or munici al fine.” The term “assessment,” use
ir1—t'liis~fio_vi's'h)‘IFtF-ri(E>t_iH-_t:lude the installments or “calls,”
which are sometimes termed assessments, made under the pro-
visions of section 331 of the Civil Code, by a private corporation
upon its stockholders in accordance with an agreement on their
part, express or implied, to pay into its treasury the amount sub-
scribed by them to its capital stock. It has reference to such
assessments as are authorized by those provisions of the constitu-
tion which relate to revenue and taxation, and to such as may
be made under the authority of a municipal or other public cor-
poration for the purpose of meeting the cost or expense of some
public improvement. (Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 241.) The other
words in the clause, in connection with which the term is asso-
ciated, serve to illustrate its meaning, and resolve any doubt that
might otherwise be raised respecting the sense in which it is to
be interpreted. Each 0 these ' ' tax im os ,
munici al fine of which ' ' ' ion is thus conferred upon the
superior court, im lies a char 'm sed b ub 1c aut onty or
somé__i3151$7:"-'flg_-_"_gg_-L-L_2,_I;_h_Ti_—_"_ 2 pur pose ,an du ndertherulesb ywhlctem axjrn,
erre 0 1 o a in re nature InasmuchI thereforeI as the
constitution has not conferred upgn the superior court any origi-
nal juris iction to determine the legality of the assessment allcflr= ed
in t e answer 0 t e efcgdant, it follows tiat tie justice s court
had ull juris iction to determine all questions re atmg to such
asse s e ' ht n e tn
and ha 10 ' ' ' '
The proposition of the respondent, that the determination
of this question by the justice was conclusive, cannot be main-
tained. \Vhile a justice of the peace has jurisdiction to pass upon
any question of fact or of [*51] law which is involved in the
trial of an issue properly before him, so that his judgment in the
cause will be binding upon the parties in the absence of any
appeal or review, yet he has not the jurisdiction in this summary
mode to divest himself of jurisdiction, or to transfer a cause
















































































































































ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION 29
diction to determine it. If in the present case he had tried the
cause, and rendered judgment therein for the defendant upon
the ground that the justice’s court had no jurisdiction to deter-
mine the subject—matter presented by the defense, or to try the
cause, an appeal could have been taken from that judgment to
the superior court, and the superior court would then have had
the power, under its appellate jurisdiction, to pass definitively
upon the question. He could not, however, determine the ques-
tion in advance of trying the cause, and give to such determina-
tion the effect of a judgment.
Nor did the superior court acquire jurisdiction of the cause
by the fact that the justice had certified the pleadings to the
county clerk. The constitution has given to it original and appel-
late jurisdiction, but it can exercise its original jurisdiction only
in those cases provided by the constitution and its appellate
jurisdiction only in such cases as may be prescribed by law.
It cannot exercise original jurisdiction in those matters in which
its jurisdiction is only appellate. The jurisdiction that it exer-
cises under the provisions of section 838 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is original, and not appellate, and the provision in that
section, that “from the time of filing such pleadings or transcript
with the clerk, the superior court shall have over the action the
same jurisdiction as if it had been commenced therein.” implies
that if it would have had no jurisdiction over the action if it had
commenced therein. it can have no jurisdiction by the filing of
the pleadings certified by the justice.
Although the exercise of jurisdiction by the superior court
will be presumed to have been rightful, yet if it appears upon its
own records of its action in any matter [*52] that it had not
acquired jurisdiction either of the subject-matter or of the parties,
this presumption is destroyed. It cannot exercise jurisdiction
in any instance until after it has acquired it, and it can acquire
it only in the mode prescribed by statute. Merely certifying to
the county clerk by a justice of the peace the pleadings in a case
pending before him does not confer jurisdiction upon the
superior court of a matter of which jurisdiction has not
been conferred upon it by the constitution. Nor does
it acquire jurisdiction of the parties to that cause by thereafter
determining that it has jurisdiction, and by proceeding in the
trial of the cause, and rendering judgment therein. The fact
that a party, after his objection to the jurisdiction of a court has
been overruled, proceeds under such objection to try the cause
















































































































































ELEM ENTS OF J U RISDI CTION 
diction to determine it. I f  in the present case he had tried the 
cause, and rendered j udgment therein for the defendant upon 
the ground that the j ustice's court had no j urisdiction to deter­
mine the subj ect-matter presented by the defense, or to try the 
cause, an appeal could have been taken from that j udgment to 
the superior court, and the superior court would then have had 
the power, under its appellate j uris<liction, to pass definitively 
upon the question. He could not, however, detennine the ques­
tion in advance of trying the cause, and give to such determina­
tion the effect of a judgment. 
Nor did the superior court acquire j urisdiction of the cause 
by the fact that the j ustice had certified the pleadings to the 
county clerk. The constitution has given to it original and appel­
late j urisdiction, but it can exercise its original j urisdiction only 
in those cases provided by the constitution and its appellate 
j urisd iction only in such cases as may be prescribed by law. 
It cannot exercise original j urisdiction in those matters in which 
its j urisdiction is only appellate. The j urisdiction that i t  exer­
cises under the provisions of section 838 of the Code of C ivil 
Procedure is original , and not appellate, and the provision in that 
section, that "from the time of filing such pleadings or transcript 
with the clerk, the superior court shall have over the action the 
sam e j urisdiction as i f  it  had been commenced therein ," impl ies 
that if  it would have had no j urisdiction over the action i f  it had 
commenced therein, i t  can have no j urisdiction by the filing of 
the pleadings certified by the j ustice. 
Although the exercise of j urisdiction by the superior court 
will be presumed to have been rightful, yet if it �ppears upon its 
own records o f  its action in any matter [ *52 ]  that it had not 
acquired j urisdiction either of the subject-matter or of the parties, 
this presumption is destroyed. It cannot .exercise j urisdiction 
in any instance until after it has acquired it, and it can acquire 
it only in the mode prescribed by statute. l\Ierely cert i fying to 
the county clerk by a justice of the peace the plead ings in a case 
pending before him does not confer jurisdiction upon the 
superior court of a matter of which jurisdict ion has not 
been conferred upon it by the constitution. Nor doei; 
it  acquire j urisdiction of the parties to that cause by therea fter 
determining that it has jurisdiction ,  and by proceeding in the 
trial of the cause, and rendering judgment therein. The fact 
that a party, after his obj ection to the jurisdiction of a court has 
been overruled , proceeds under such obj ection to try the cause 
does not preclude him from thereafter questioning the power 
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of the court to take any steps in the matter. Lyman v. Milton,
44 Cal. 630; Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U. S. 479.
If the court never acquired jurisdiction over him, it does
not acquire it because he may have chanced to be in the court-
room when the case was called for trial, and while protesting
against the trial, endeavors to protect his rights against the
claims of his adversary. “The jurisdiction of the [superior]
court under section 838 was special, and that court could hear
and determine the cause only after the pleadings before the jus-
tice were filed with its clerk. The [superior] court had juris-
diction only because the pleadings had before the justice and filed
with its clerk presented the issue of the legality or validity of the
tax or impost, and could then take jursidiction only for the pur-
pose of trying the issue as to the legality of the tax or impost;
since, the amount being less than three hundred dollars, the jus-
tice’s court had jurisdiction to pass upon every other issue.”
Santa Cruz v. Santa Cruz R. R. Co., 56 Cal. 147.
Inasmuch as the only mode in which it is claimed that the
superior court acquired any jurisdiction of the action brought
by the plaintiff against Standlee was from the act of the justice
of the peace in certifying the pleadings [*53] therein to the
county clerk, and as we have seen that such act was unauthorized,
it follows that the action was never legally before the superior
court for determination, and that it was without any jurisdiction
to render a judgment in the case.
It is therefore ordered that the judgment of the superior
court, and all orders and proceedings by it taken in the case,
be and they are hereby annulled.
SHARPSTEIN, G.~\ROU'l‘TE, DEHAVEN, PATERSON, NICFARLAND,
JJ., and BEATTY, C.J., concurred.
Even though a circuit court would have original jurisdiction to try
an election contest, it acquires no jurisdiction by appeal from the de-
cision thereon of a board possessing no such jurisdiction. Davidson v.
Johnson (1902), 113 Ky. 202. 67 S. W. 996.
In Equity-Loose Use of VI/ord Jurisdiction. “VV-hile jurisdiction in
its proper sense means authority to hear and decide a cause, it is common
to speak of jurisdiction in equity or the jurisdiction of a court of equity
as not relating to the power of the court to hear and determine a cause,
but as to whether it ought to assume the jurisdiction and hear and decide
the cause. In Scott v. Wlzitlow, 20 Ill. 310, it was said that. al.though
the decree of a court might not be void for want of jurisdiction and the
court had the power to make the decree it did, it was not a proper ex-
ercise of its ehancery powers. And in Curtiss v. Brown. 29 Ill. 201, the
court called attention to the confusion arising from the use of the word
















































































































































ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION 3I
find the jurisdiction denied where the power exists but ought not to be
exercised, and in this sense is the word jurisdiction usually used when
applied to courts of chancery. \\/here there is want of -power the decree
is void collaterally, but, where there is said to be a want of jurisdiction
merely, it is only meant that it would be erroneous to exercise the power
and the decree would be reversed on appeal. It means a want of equity
and not a want of power." Miller v. Rowan (t9II), 251 III. 344, 96 N. E.
285.
Power to Render a Judgment Like the One in Question.
HUNT v. HUNT, in N. Y. Ct. of App., Jan. 28, I878—72 N. Y. 217.
28 Am. Rep. 129.
For.oaa, ]. This is a suit in equity, brought by the plaintiff
against the defendant, for a divorce a e'incul0 matrimonii. She
alleges that she is now his wife. She bases her right to a dissolu-.
tion of the marriage on an allegation of adultery committed by
him. That the plaintiff and defendant were once married is
admitted. It is also conceded, that since the marriage the de-
fendant has formed a matrimonial alliance in fact, with another
woman than the plaintiff. * * * [*225] The justification set up
by him in this suit is, that prior to the commencement of it, and
prior to that matrimonial alliance in fact, he had obtained a
judgment against the plaintiff of a dissolution of the relation of
marriage once existing between them, whereby he was set at
liberty to marry again. * * * It is claimed by the plaintiff that
that judgment was got [*226] by fraud upon her and upon the
court, and that it is void for want of jurisdiction in the court
which assumed to render it, in that the court had neither juris-
diction of the subject-matter nor of the party defendant.
\Ve do not think that the allegation of fraud is maintained.
* * * [227] * * * We come now to consider the question of the
jurisdiction of the court. * * * [228] * * * Power given by law
to a court, to adjudge divorces from the ties of matrimony, does
give jurisdiction of the subject-matter of divorce. Though the
proceedings before that court, from first to last of the testimony,
in an application for divorce, should show that a state of facts
does not exist which makes a legal cause for [229] divorce. yet
it cannot be said that the court has not jurisdiction of the subject-
matter; that it has not power to entertain the proceeding, to hear
the proofs and allegations, and to determine upon their sufficicncy
and legal effect. * * * Jurisdiction of the subject-matter is power
to adjudge concerning the general question involved. and is not
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find the j urisdiction denied where the power exists but ought not to be 
exerc ised, and in this sense is the word j uri sdiction usually used when 
appl ied to courts of  chance ry. \Vhere there is  want of ·power the de<:ree 
is void col lateral ly, but, where there i s  said to be a want of jurisdict ion 
merely, it is on}y meant that it would be erroneous to exercise the power 
and the decree would be reversed on appeal. It  means a want of equity 
and not a want o f  power." Miller v. Rowan ( 19n ) ,  25 1 1 1 1. 344, 96 N'. E. 
285. 
Power to Render a Judgment Like the One in Question. 
H U NT v. HUNT, in N. Y. Ct. of App., Jan. 28, 1878-72 N. Y. 217, 
28 Am. Rep. 129. 
FOLGER, J. This is a suit in  equity, brought by the plaintiff 
against the defendant, for a divorce a 1:£11rnlo matrimonii. She 
al leges that she is now his wife. She bases her right to a dissolu- . 
tion of the marriage on an allegation of adultery committed hy 
him. That the plaintiff and defendant were once married is 
admitted. It  i s  also conceded, that since the marriage the de­
fendant has formed a matrimonial all iance in fact, with another 
woman than the plaintiff. * * * [ *225 ] The justification set up 
by him in this suit is, that prior to the commencement of it, and 
prior to that matrimonial alliance in fact, he had obtained a 
j udgment against the plaintiff of a dissolution of the rel ation of 
marriage once existing between them, whereby he was set at 
liberty to marry again. * * * I t  is claimed by the plaintiff that 
that j udgment was got [ *226] by fraud upon her and upon the 
court, and that it is void for want of jurisdiction in the court 
which assumed to render it, in that the court had neither j uris­
d iction of the subject-matter nor of the party defendant .  
\Ve do not think that the allegation of fraud is maintained. 
* * * [ 227 ]  * * * \Ve come now to consider the question of the 
j urisdiction of the court. * * * [ 228] * * * Power given by law 
to a court, to adjudge divorces from the ties of matrimony, does 
give j urisdiction of the iiubj ect-matter of divorce. Though the 
proceedings before that court, from first to last of the testimony,  
in an appl ication for divorce, should show that a state of fac ts  
does not exist which makes a legal cause for [ 229] d ivorce. yet 
it cannot be said that the court has not j urisd ict ion of the snbj ect­
matter ; that it has not power to entertain the proceeding, to hear 
the proofs and allegat ions ,  and to determine upon their sufficiency 
and legal effect. * * * Jurisdict ion of the subj ect-matter is po\\'er 
to a<lj udgc concerning the general quest ion involve<l, and i s  not 
dependent upon the state of  facts wh ich mav appear in a par-
-� 
.. •. 
� · · "'•). 
I •  
. r · 
' 
\ticular case, arising, or which is claimed to have arisen, under
hat general question. One court has jurisdiction in criminal
X , cases; another in civil cases; each in its sphere has jurisdictioi
‘ of the subject-matter. Yet the facts, the acts of the party pro-
ceeded against, may be the same in a civil case as in a criminal
case,—as, for instance, in a civil action for false and fraudulent
representations and deceit, and in a criminal action for obtaining
property by false pretenses. \Vc should not say that the court
of civil powers had jurisdiction of the criminal action, nor vice
rsa, though each had power to pass upon allegations of the
same facts. So that there is a more general meaning of the
phrase [230] “subject matter,” in this connection, than power to
act upon a particular state of facts. It is the wer to _ U)
the 1d so to s eak the ' —
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divorce may come into any court of the state in which he is domi-
ciled, which is empowered to entertain a suit therefor, and to give
Qjudgment between husband and wife of a dissolution of their
' married state. If he does not establish a cause for divorce, juris-
diction to pronounce judgment does not leave the court. * * *
[231] * * * The court which rendered this judgment had lawful
'urisdiction of the subject-matter of divorce. The plaintiff, how-
mine at ' sented ca
' 'the exercise of the abstract ow A suitor for a judgment of
ever, makes the point against the validity of the judgment that
\ it was void in Louisiana, as wholly unauthorized by, and in con-
flict with, the constitution of the state. And here it is, that is is
§ of import to know what is meant by the term “jurisdiction of
the subject-matter.” If it means no more than power to act
when, and not till when, a state of facts is proven which exactly
squares with the grounds for divorce prescribed and established
)}' constitutional and valid statutes, then we must inquire what
e constitution of a state permits in the way of statutory regula-
tion, and whether the proofs in any case show that the court
which in that case adjudged a divorce had sufhcient evidence
before it to enable it to give judgment. In effect, we must review
the judgment upon the law and the facts. If the term means
what we have above pointed out that it does mean, then we are
to give credit to the judgment of a court which, having power to
act upon the general subject of divorce, has heard the cause, and
has proceeded to judgment. * * * [Here the court discussed the
sufficiency of substituted service to obtain jurisdiction of the
person in divorce proceedings, and held the service good] * * *
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.t:icular case, arising, or which is  claimed to have arisen, under 
hat general question. One court has jurisd iction in criminal 
cases ; another in civil cases ; each in its sphere has j urisdictio1 
of the subj ect-matter. Yet the facts, the acts of the party pro­
ceedetl against, may be the same in a civil case as in a criminal 
case,-as, for instance, in a civi l  action for false and fraudulent 
representat ions and deceit ,  and in a criminal action for obtaining 
property by false pretenses. \Ve should not say that the court 
� �f civil powers had j urisdiction of  the criminal action, nor 'uice ''rsa, though each had power to pass upon allegations of the 
same facts. So that there is  a more general meaning of the 
phrase [ 230 ] ' ' subj ect matter," in this connection , than power to 
act upon a particular state of facts. It i s  the wer to 
the d so to s eak the 
mine and adjud�e whether the particular facts presented call for 
· the" exercise of the abstract power. A suitor for a j udgment of 
divorce may come mto any court of the state in which he i s  domi­.J ci lcd, which is empowered to entertain a suit therefor, and to give � j udgment between husband and wife of a dissolution of their 
married state. If he does not establish a cause for divorce, j uris­
diction to pronounce j udgment docs not leave the court. * * * 
[ 23 1 ] * * * The court which rendered thi s j udgment had lawful 
urisdiction of the subj ect-matter of divorce. The plaintiff, how­
ever, makes the point against the val idity of the j udgment that 
it  was void in Louisiana, as wholly unauthorized by, and in con­
fl ict with, the constitution of the state. And here i t  is, that is is 
of import to know \\:hat is meant by the term "jurisdiction of 
the subj ect-matter." If it means no more than power to act 
when, and not t i l l  when, a state of facts is proven which exactly 
squares w ith the grounds for divorce prescribed and establ i shed 
y const itutional and valid statutes, then \Ve must inquire what 
c constitution of a state permits in the way of statutory regula­
tion, and whether the proo fs in any case show that the court 
which in that case adj udged a divorce had sufficient evidence 
before i t  to enable it to give j udgmcnt. In effect, we must review 
the judgment upon the law and the facts. If the term means 
what we have above pointed out that it does mean , then we arc 
to give cred it  to the j udgment of a court which, having power to 
act upon the general subj ect of d ivorce, has heard the cause, ancl 
has proceeded to j udgment. * * * [ Here the court di scussed the 
sufficiency of subst ituted service to obtain jurisdiction of the 
person in divorce proceedings, and held the service good . ]  * * * 
[ 245 ] * * * 
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/-47_.a-7'~,.,‘»....-‘i"7-‘(/fla-......4_ M ‘_,~
It, therefore a ears that as the 'ud ment of divorce, set 11
the sub'ect-m ‘ ‘ ' and defend-
ant * * ' ant a com lete defense to tl ‘‘
suit. * * *
d
Judgment afiirmcd.
WILKINS v. STILES, in Vt. Sup. Ct., Aug. 21, 19o2—75 Vt. 42, 52
At]. 1048, 98 Am. St. Rep. 804.
PETITION FOR WRIT or PROHIBITION. Heard on pleadings
and testimony at the October Term, 1901, of tl1is court, sitting
for the County of Chittenden.
MUNSON, The relator seeks to prohibit further proceed-
ings in an action wherein judgment was rendered against him
by Albert Worcester, a justice of the peace. He concedes that if
Justice \/Vorcester had jurisdiction over the claim or matter in
suit at the time this judgment was rendered, his petition will not
lie. But he claims that the jurisdiction which Justice \\/orcester
would otherwise have had was taken away by proceedings pre-
viously had before David Frechette, another [*44] justice of the
peace. His claim, more specifically stated, is that the matter of the
suit had been fully settled in the case decided by Justice Frechette;
that the plaintiffs split their claim in bringing these suits; and
that this was done to deprive the county court of its appellate
jurisdiction.
Both actions were suits in trover for the conversion of the
same two mileage books. The minute made by Justice Fre-
chette upon the writ, after noting appearances, was as follows:
“As the evidence in the case did not show to what degree the
defendant damaged the plaintiff, and no malicious intent from
the defendant, therefore the court adjudged that the case be dis-
missed, and that the defendant recover his costs.” The relator
insisted in the suit before Justice \Vorcester that the judgment
in the first suit was a bar to that action, and plaintiffs’ counsel
then produced the record of that judgment as finally made up
by Justice Frechette. This showed that the defendant moved
“that the plaintiffs become non-suited and the case be dismissed
because the plaintiffs had not put in sufiicient evidence as to the
distance which the defendant was entitled to go upon said mileage
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bv w ion o 
the subject-matter ;wcl of lfae pH�5ts8RB 9£ tlrn plajptjff and clefend­
al},L * * * jt affords to the c!efegdant a complete defense to ti� 
suit. * * * 
-
Judgment affirmed. 
WILKINS v. STILES, in Vt. Sup. Ct., Aug. 21, 1902-75 Vt. 42, 52 
Atl. 1048, 98 Am. St. Rep. 8o4. 
PE'rITION FOR WRIT or� PROHIDITIO N .  Heard on pleadings 
and testimony at the October Term, 190 1 ,  o f  this court, sitt ing 
for the County of Chittenden. 
M U N SON, J .  The relator seeks to prohibit further proceed­
ings in an action wherein j udgment was rendered against him 
by Albert Worcester, a j ustice of the peace. He concedes that i f  
J ustice Worcester had j urisdiction over the claim or matter i n  
s u i t  at t h e  time this j udgment was rendered, his petition w i l l  not 
l ie.  But he claims that the j u risdiction which Justice \tVorcester 
would otherwise have had was taken away by proceedings pre­
v iously had before David Frechette, another [*44] j ustice of the 
peace. His claim, more specifically stated, is that the matter of the 
suit had been fully settled in the case decided by Justice Frechette ; 
that the plaintiffs split their claim in bringing these suits ; and 
that this was done to deprive the county court of its appellate 
j urisdiction. 
Both actions were suits in trover for the conversion of the 
same two mileage book . The minute made by Justice Fre­
chette upon the writ, after noting appearances, was as follows : 
"As the evidence in the case did not show to what degree the 
defendant damaged the plaintiff, and no mal icious intent from 
the defendant, therefore the court adjudged that the case be dis­
missed, and that the defendant recover his costs." The relator 
insisted in the suit before Justice Worcester that the j udgment 
in the first suit was a bar to that action , and plaintiffs' counsel 
then produced the record of that judgment as finally made up 
by Justice Frechette. This showed that the defendant moved 
"that the plaintiffs become non-suited and the case be dismi ssed 
because the plainti ffs had not put in sufficient evidence as to the 
di stance which the defendant was enti tled to go upon said mi leag-e 
whereby the court could assess damages," and that a fter hear-
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ing the arguments upon this motion the justice found that
the evidence did not show to what degree the defendant damaged
the plaintiffs, and that plaintiffs should therefore become non-
suited and the case be dismissed and the defendant recover his
costs. Justice W'orcester held upon inspection of this record that
the prior judgment did not bar the proceedings before him, and
rendered judgment for the plaintiffs.
The judgment rendered by Justice Frechette, although called
in his record a judgment of non-suit, is shown by that record to
have been in fact a judgment upon the merits, and Justice “for-
cester erred in holding the contrary. It appeared from the record
that evidence in support of the plaintiffs’ claim [*45] was intro-
duced, and that the justice considered it, and gave judgment for
the defendant because of its inadequacy. A justice judgment
rendered upon such proceedings is necessarily a judgment on the
merits, whatever its form, and upon whatever motion it is given.
Smith v. Crane, 12 V t. 487.
This brings us to the question whether justice \Vorcester
exceeded his jurisdiction in giving judgment for the plaintiffs
in disregard of this prior adjudication. The case was certainly
within his jurisdiction in the sense in which the subject is treated
in Perry v. Morse, 57 Vt. 509; that is, he had jurisdiction of
claims in trover to the required amount, and of the process be-
fore him, and of the parties named in it. It was also within his jur-
isdiction to construe the record of the former judgment when of-
fered in evidence, and give it effect in reaching his decision. But
he was led by a misconstruction of this record to give jt1d_g'ine11t
upon a matter that had been previously adjudicated, and it is
claimed that in rendering the judgment he acted without juris-
diction.
The general rule is that when a court has jurisdiction of thc
subject matter and the parties, the writ of prohibition is not avail-
able for the correction of its erroneous decisions. But when the
erroneous decision is one which operates as an unlawful assump-
tion of jurisdiction, prohibition may be had, as appears from
Bu/lard v. '1'h0r[>e, 66 Vt. 599, 30 Atl. 36, 2: L. R. A. 605, 44
Am. St. Rep. 867. So the question for decision is whether the
error of law committed by justice \Vorcester carried him beyond
his jurisdiction.
In delivering the opinion in Bnllard v. T/10I'[>z’, Judge Taft
reviewed the decisions of different jurisdictions. many of which
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ing the arguments upon this motion the justice found that 
the evidence did not show to what degree the defendant damaged 
the plaintiffs, and that plaintiffs should therefore become non­
suited and the case be dismissed and the defendant recover his 
costs. Justice Vv orcester held upon inspect ion of this record that 
the prior j udgment did not bar the proceedings before him, and 
rendered judgment for the plaintiffs. 
The j udgment rendered by Justice Frechette, although called 
in his record a j udgment of non-suit, is shown by that record to 
have been in fact a j udgment upon the merits, and Justice \Vor­
cester erred in holding the contrary. It appeared from the record 
that evidence in support of the plaintiffs' claim [ *45] was intro­
duced, and that the j ustice considered it, and gave j udgment for 
the defendant because of its inadequacy . A j ustice judgment 
rendered upon such proceedings i s  necessarily a j udgment on the 
merits , whatever its form, and upon whatever motion it i s  gi ven . 
Smith v. Crane, 12  Vt. 487. 
This brings us to the ques t ion whether Justice \Vorcester 
exceeded his jurisdiction in giving judgment for the plaintiffs 
in d isregard of this prior adj udication. The case was certa inly 
w ithin his jurisdiction in the sense in which the subj ect is treated 
in Perry v. Morse, 57 Vt. 509 ; that is, he hacl j urisd ict ion of 
claims in trover to the required amount, and o t the process be­
fore him, and of the part ies named in it. It was also wi thin his j ur­
isdiction to construe the record of the former j udgment when of­
fered in evidence, and give it effect in reaching his deci sion . Dut 
he was led by a misconstruction of this record to give j udgment 
upon a matter that had been previously adj udicated , and i t  is 
claimed that in rendering the j udgment he acted wi thout ju ris­
diction. 
The general rule is that when a court has j urisd ic t ion of the 
suhj ect matter and the parties, the writ  of prohibi t ion i s  not avail­
able for the correct ion of i ts  erroneous decis ions. But when the 
erroneous decision is one which operates as an unlaw ful a :-; sump­
t ion of j ur isdict ion, prohibition may be had, as appears from 
Bullard v. Thorpe, 66 Vt. 599, 30 At! .  36, 25 L. R. :\ . 605 ,  4..J. 
.A m .  St .  Rep. 867. So the question for deci sion is wheth e r  the 
error of law commit ted by J usticc \Vorccster carried him beyo nd 
his  j ur isdiction. 
In delivering the opin ion in Bullard v. Th orpe, Judg-e Taft 
reviewed the decisions of d ifferent j urisdict ions,  many of which 
may seem from the brief statements there made to suppo rt the 
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relator’s contention, and some of which undoubtedly do support
it. But near the close of the opinion, ]_udge Taft reminds the
reader that this review was largely by way of illustration, [*46]
and that the case must not be taken as authority for anything be-
yond the exact point decided.
The general rule above stated is distinctly recognized in
Bullard v. Thorpe, and one of the cases cited in that connection
is Taft v. Rayner, 5 M. G. & S., 162, which is exactly in point
here. The defendant was sum ned before the county court in
Cambridgeshire in an action for goods sold and delivered, and it
appeared that the plaintiff had already recovered judgment against
him in an action for the same debt in the borough court of Cam-
bridge, and that his goods had been seized and sold upon that
judgment. The plaintiff recovered notwithstanding this, and the
defendant sought to prohibit further proceedings, on the ground
that, the matter being res judicata, the county court had no jur-
isdiction. The relator’s counsel was asked how it could be said
that the county court had no jurisdiction, and replied exactly in
the line of the present argument, that it had jurisdiction of the
matter at first, but that that jurisdiction ceased when the former
judgment was shown. But the court said that the round of the
application was neither more nor less than that the count ' court.
in deciding what it was competent for it to (1 ide made ' —
taE€T11—'__f_l\‘d"fl'_"'P‘__,__£S_L__‘a-LUJ5 pomtoaw ganiewritwasthere 11 pondenied.
t is certain that the matter now complained of was not juris-
dictional. The decision was not one by which the justice took
unlawful cognizance of the subject matter or the parties. His
jurisdiction of both was complete, and continued notwithstanding
the record of the former suit. The production of that record
merely raised a question incidental to the trial of his case. His W
erroneous decision of that question to the injury of the rclator
was a misfortune to which all suitors are liable in cases where
no appeal is allowed to a higher court. The extension of the rem-
edy of prohibition to such cases would lead to a review by this
court of all unappealahle cases where ignorance [*47] of our de-
cisions had led to the rendition of improper judgments.
This case is clearly distinguishable from Bullard v. Thor/we.
There was in each case an erroneous disposition of a. matter
which the court had authority to determine; in one a disregard '
of the doctrine of res judfcata, in the other a refusal to recognize W“
the entirety of the claim. But the first was a decision which had
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I
Q’
‘a final jurisdiction to which he was not entitled. Th_e_1egisla.t.u.:e
has denied liti ants the remed of e-
lllfllls does not exceed twenty dollars, but has given then] the rem-
ed' when the matter in demand exceeds - mm
cannot be eprlve 0 tns right by splitting an entire claim into
11115 e ow 1e s a u ory 1m1 . e wn o prohibition was held
va'Tl5blH(H)mw1____fTfiE_—_h?T-l?x_§1_£e_Q_§:__QeQflQn41as1Lmem1s,
but because the court thereb assumed an excl " ' ' ' 'on
to \ nc it was not entitle he decision now complained of
was equa y erroneous, but it worked no infringement of jurisdic-
Qfimal limits. ,
It is not necessary to examine the evidence upon which it
is claimed in argument that this case presents a splitting of the
claim that aflected the final jurisdiction. Tl15'_w_tiLign_dQ_e§_m;t_
in terms alle e, nor set forth facts whi in
‘ta sp lttmg 0 the claim and that matter cannot be treated as in
issue.
P¢’!iti0n dismissed with costs.
FIGGE v. ROWLEN, in Ill. Sup. Ct., April 21, I9oo—185 I11. 234, 57
N. E. 195.
[*237] Booos, J. On the hearing of the issues formed un-
der a bill in ehancery filed by the appellant against the appellees
to foreclose a mortgage on certain real estate in Saline county,
the appellees, over the objection of the appellant, were permitted
introduce in evidence a decree entered in the circuit court of
QSaline county in a certain proceeding in ehancery wherein the
appellant was defendant and the grantor of the appellee Fenwick
and cancelling the same as a cloud upon the true title to said real
estate. If the ruling of the court as to the admissibility of such
decree in evidence was correct, it is conceded the judgment of the
appellate court here appealed from affirming the decree entered
by the circuit court dismissing the appellant's bill for foreclosure
should be aflirmed by this court.
The grounds of objection to the admissibility of the decree
in evidence are that the court which rendered it did not have jur-
isdiction of the subject-matter of the proceeding or of the person
of the defendant thereto. * * * The bill on which the decree here
assailed is founded prayed a decree cancelling the mortgage which
was complainant, setting aside and declaring null and void the
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ti ) a final j ur isdiction to which he was not entitled . 
has denied liti ants the remed o f  J 
j b l b  r ·  · 1 .  · , cannot e epnvec o t 11s ng 1t y sp 1ttmg an entire c aim mto 
f vadable to prevent this-nQt because the decision was errnneg11s, 
. but because the court thereb assumed an excl · · · · t"on ' to ' 1c 1t was not entitled. he decision now complained of ' / was equally erroneous, but it worke� no infringement of j urisd ic-�mal l imits. J 
J 
I t  is not necessary to examine the evidence upon which it 
is claimed in argument that this case p resents a splitting of  the � claim that affected the final j u risdiction. The '1etitjon does not ' in terms alle e, nor set forth facts ·hi h in i 
� a sp 1ttmg o the claim1 and that matter cannot be treated as in 
, ,. issue. 
costs. 
v. ROWLEN, in I l l .  Sup. Ct. ,  April 21,  1 900-185 Ill. 234 57 
N. E. 195. 
l *237] Boccs, J. On the hearing of the issues formed un­
der a bill in chancery filed by the appellant against the appellees 
to foreclose a mortgage on certain real estate in Saline county, 
the appellees, over the objection of the appellant, were permitted 
i ntroduce in evidence a decree entered in the circuit court of 
« 1 
� Saline county in a certain proceeding in chancery wherein the 
appellant was defendant and the grantor of the appellee Fenwick 
wa·s complainant, setting aside and declaring null and void the 
said mortgage sought by the appellant to be foreclosed herein, 
and cancelling the same as a cloud upon the true title to said real 
estate. I f  the ruling of the court as to the admissibility of such 
decree in evidence was correct, it is conceded the j udgment of the 
i (\' � �
I� � � 
lo appellate court here appealed from affi rming the decree entered 
1 � by the circuit court dismissing the appellant's bill for foreclosure 
should be affirmed by this court. 
The grounds of objection to the admissibil ity of the decree 
in evidence are that the court which rendered it did not have jur­
i sdiction of the subj ect-matter of the proceeding or of the person 
o f  the d e fendant thereto. * * * The bill on which the decree here 
assailed is founded prayed a decree cancelling the mortgage wh ich 
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appellant in this proceeding seeks to foreclose, as a cloud on the
title of the complainant in the bill, but it was not averred in the
_bill that complainant had possession of the land or that it was
vacant and unimproved. \\/e h_z1ve_repQ1_teQly Ed that it is es-
sential to the right of a complainant to maintain? p-roceeding
in chancery to remove a cloud on the title to real estate that it
should be alleged in the bill and proved upon a hearing, that the
complainant had possession of the land or that it was vacant and
unoccupied. The appellant insists that in view of these holdings,
and of the lack of averment in the bill upon which the decree is
founded, the court was lacking in jurisdiction of the subject-mat
ter to render the degree.
The jurisdiction of courts of equity to remove a cloud from
le to real estate is of common-law origin. [*24o] 2 Am. & Eng.
$§Enc. Law 389. Jurisdiction of the subject-matter of a proceeding
is conferred by law. The power to decide any particular case of
the subject—matter whereof the court has jurisdiction is conferred
y the pleading. If the court has jurisdiction of the subject-mat-
of a real cause of the character of the one attempted to be set
forth in the pleading, it has jurisdiction of the subject-matter o
the controversy, and judicial power to determine whether the case
made by the pleadings is one within its jurisdiction. In Bostwick
v. Skinner, 80 Ill. I47, 153, we quoted with approval the remarks
of Mr. Justice Allen in C or v. Thomas, 9 Grat. 323, as follows
(page 326): “The only question would seem to be whether the
K subject-matter was within the jurisdiction of the court. If it was
-—if the jurisdiction of the court extended over that class of cases
it was the province of the court to determine for itself whether
the particular case was one within its jurisdiction.” In People V.
.S‘ceI_\'c, 146 Ill. I89. 221, 32 N. 458, we said: “If a court has
jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties it is altogether
immaterial, where its judgment is collaterally called in question.
I ow grossly irregular or manifestly erroneous its proceedings may
have been. Its final order cannot be regarded as a nullity, and
j cannot therefore be collaterally impeached. * * * The court is
invested with power to determine the rights of the parties, and
' no irregularity or error in the execution of the power can prevent
4 ‘ the judgment, while it stands unreversed, from disposing of such
\ rights as fall within the legitimate scope of its adjudication.” The
author of the article entitled ]m'1'.rdI'cti0n in 12 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 129
remarks: “But as a general proposition, jurisdiction of the sub-
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appellant in this proceeding seeks to foreclose, as a cloud on the 
title of the complainant in the bill, but it was not averred in the 
• bill that complainant had possession of the land or that it was 
:vacant and unimproved. \V � have_repeat� he�d that it is es­
sential to the right of a complainant to maintain a proceeding 
in chancery to remove a cloud on the title to real estate that it 
should be al leged in the bill and proved upon a hearing, that the 
complainant had possession of the land or that it was vacant and 
unoccupied. The appellant insists that in view of these holdings, 
and of the lack of averment in the bill upon which the decree is 
founded, the court was lacking in jurisdiction of the subject-mat 
ter to render the degree. 
The j urisdiction of courts of equity to remove a cloud from 
� le to real estate is of common-law origin .  [*240] 2 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law 389. Jurisdiction of the subject-matter of a proceeding 
is conferred by law. The power to decide any particular case of 
the pleading. If the court has j urisdiction of the subj ect-mat� 
of a real cause of the character of the one attempted to be set 
rth in the pleading, it has j urisdiction of the subject-matter o 
e controversy, and j udicial power to determine whether the case 
made by the pleadings is one within its j urisdiction. In Bostwick �v. Skinner, 8o Ill .  147, 1 53 ,  we quoted with approval the remarks 
of Mr. Justice Allen in Co:r v. Thomas, 9 Grat. 323, as follows 
(page 326) : "The only question would seem to be whether the 
'l subject-matter was within the jurisdiction of the court. If it was ' ..-if the j urisdiction of the court extended over that class of cases 
it was the province of the court to determine for itself whether 
e particular case '"'as one within its jurisdiction." In People v. 
eelyc; 146 Ill. 189, 22 1 ,  32 N. 'f!.. 458, we said : "If  a cou rt has 
jurisdiction of the subject-m
. 
atter and of the parties it is altogether 
mmaterial ,  where its j udgment is collaterally called in question, 
ow grossly irregi.tlar or manifestly erroneous its proceedings may 
ave been. Its final order cannot be regarde<l as a nullity, and 
/ annot therefore be collaterally impeached. * * * The court is  invested with power to <leterm inc the rights of the part ies , and 
J 
1 no irregulari ty or error in the execution of the power can prevent 
� ' the j udgment, while i t  stands tmrever.�ed, from disposing- o f  such 
� rights as fall within the legi timate scope of  its adj u<licat ion . "  The author of the article entitled Jurisdiction in I 2 Enc. Pl.  & Pr. 1 29 
remarks : "Ilut as a general proposit ion , j urisd ict ion of the sulr­
j ect-ma tter is con ferred by law, and does not rest u pon an�rmcnts 
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in pleadings, nor is affected by error in sustaining a pleading;
and if the pleadings contain sufficient matter to challenge the at-
tention of the court, and such a case is thereby presented as to
authorize the court to [*24I] deliberate and act, it is sufficient
for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction.”
The circuit court of Saline county, in chancery sitting, had
jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the proceeding in which the
decree in question was rendered—that is, it had jurisdiction of
that class of cases wherein decrees may be lawfully rendered re-
moving clouds from titles. It had jurisdiction and power to
judicially consider and determine whether the case as disclosed
by the bill entitled the complainant in the bill to relief of that
character. That it fell into error in the exercise of its jurisdiction
and power could not operate to deprive it of jurisdiction to act.
An error in the exercise of jurisdiction cannot be urged to im-
peach its decree in a collateral proceeding, Having complete jur-
isdic i n of the ersons and of the sub'ect—matter, it was clothed
with lawful power to act; an its action, however errogegus, must
be regarded as valid and binding in every collateral roe“ ' .
Hobson v. Ermrz, 62 11]. I4): cnncr v. mrnton, 98 Ill. I56.
“When jurisdiction has once attached, the court has a right to
decide every question arising_in the case, and errors of judgment
or irregularities, however gross, which do not render the judg-
ment absolutely void, are not available on collateral attack; but
the judgment is valid until reversed or vacated by direct proceed-
ing.” 12 Enc. Pl. & Pr. I97. The judgment of the appellate
court must be and is_affirmed..
Judgment aflirnzcd.
l\I.-\GRUDL-ZR, ]., dissenting. The decree in the former suit was
not binding on the defendant, because he was served only by pub-
publication. There was no personal service. A man cannot be
deprived of his property, under the United States constitution,
without due process of law. Service by mere publication, in such
a case as is shown here, isz>t due )I'OC(3SS of law. Pennoycr V.



















































































































































CASES ON J l:LJG �U::NTS, F.TC. 
in pleadings, nor is affected by error in sustaining a pleading ; 
and i f  the pleadings contain sufficient matter to challenge the at­
tention of the court, and such a case is thereby presented as to 
authorize the court to [ *241 ] del iberate and act, i t  i s  sufficient 
for the purpose of con ferring jurisdiction." 
The circu it  court of Saline county, in chancery sitting, had 
jur i:.:d iction of the subj ect-matter of the proceeding in which the 
decree in quest ion was rendered-that is, i t  had j urisdiction of 
that class of cases where in decrees may be lawfully rendered re­
moving clouds from titles. It had jurisdiction and power to 
judicially consider and determine whether the case as disclosed 
by the bill entitled the complainant in the bill to rel ief of that 
character. That it fel l into error in the exercise of its jurisdiction 
and power could not operate to deprive i t  of j urisdiction to act. 
An error in the exercise of j uri sdict ion cannot be urged to im­
peach its decree in a collateral proceeding. Having complete jur­
ist ic i of the ersons and of the sub · ect-matter, it was cloth eel 
with law ful power to act ; an i ts action, however erroneous. must 
be re arded as valid and bind ing in every collateral roe · · · 
I fo bso 1t v. E'i.1.m1, 62 1 1 1 .  q : cmi cr v. iomto11, 98 Il l .  1 56. 
"\\'hen jurisdiction has once attached , the court has a right to 
decide every ques tion arising _ in the case, and errors of j udgment 
or irregularities, however gross, which do not render the j udg­
ment absolutely void, are not available on collateral attack ; hut 
the j udgment is valid until reversed or vacated by direct proceed­
i.og." 1 2  Enc. PI. & Pr. 1 97. The j udgment of the appellate 
court must be and is .  affirmed . .  
Judgment affirmed. 
l\L\GRUDER, J. ,  dissenting. The decree in the former sui t was 
not binding on the defendant, because he was served only by pub­
publication. There was no personal sef'vice. A man cannot be 
deprived of his property, un<ler the United States constitution, 
wi thout due process of  law. Service by mere publication, in such 
a
.
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JURISDICTION DEPENDING ON THE PROCEEDINGS
IN THE CAUSE.
What Brings the Parties Within the Court's Power.
BUCH.-\N.\N v. RUCKER, in English Common Pleas, Jan. 25, 1808-9
East 192.
Assumpsit on judgment rendered by the island court of To-
bago on summons served “by nailing up a copy of the declaration
at the court—h0use door,” and on default. Plaintiff was non-
suited and moved for a new trial.
[*1g4] Loan ELLENBUROUGH, C. J. There is no foundation
for this motion even upon the terms of the law disclosed in the
affidavit. By persons absent from the island must necessarily be
understood persons who have been present and within the juris-
diction, so as to have been subject to the process of the court;
but it can never be applied to a person who, for aught that ap-
pears, never was present within or subject to the jurisdiction.
Supposing, however. that the act had said in terms that though
a person sued in the island had never been present within the jur-
isdiction, yet it should bind him upon proof of nailing up the
summons at the court door; how could that be obligatory upon
the subjects of other countries? Can the island of Tobago pass
a law to bind the rights of the whole world? \/Vould the world
submit to such an assumed jurisdiction? The law itself, however,
fairly construed, does not warrant such an inference; for “absent
from the island” must be taken only to apply to persons who had
been present there, and were subject to the jurisdiction of the
court out of which the process issued; and as nothing of that
sort was in proof here to show that the defendant was Eubject to
the jurisdiction at the time of commencing the suit, t ere is no
foundation for raising an assumpsit in law upon the judgment so
obtained. PER CURIAMZ Rule refused.
DOUGLAS et al. v. FORREST, Exr., in Court of Common Pleas of
England, Easter Term, 1824—4 Bingham (13 E. C. L.) 686.
BEST, C. J. This was an action brought by the assignees of
Stein & Co., bankrupts, against the executor of the will of John
Hunter. \
[*698] On the 31st day of May, I799, the testator acknowl-
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JURISDICTION D EPENDING ON THE PROCEEDINGS 
IN THE CAUSE. 
What Brings the Parties Within the Court's Power. 
B L'CH ANAN v. RCCKER, in English Common Pleas, Jan. 25, 18o8--9 
East 192 . 
.:\ssumpsit on j udgment rendered by the island court of To­
bago on summons served ' 'by nailing up a copy of the declaration 
at the court-house door," and on default. Plaintiff was non­
suited and moved for a new trial. 
[ * 194] Lmm EI.LEN DUROUGH, C. J. There is no foundation 
for this motion even upon the terms of the law disclosed in the 
affidavit. By persons absent from the isla11d must necessarily be 
understood persons who have been present and within the j ur i s­
dic!ion, so as to have been subj ect to the process of the court ; 
but it can never be applied to a person who, for aught that ap­
pears, never was present within or subj ect to the j urisdict ion. 
Supposing, however, that the act had said in terms that though 
a person sued in the island had never been present w ithin the j u r­
i sdiction, yet it should bind him upon proof o f  nailing up the 
summons at the court door ;  how could that be obligatory upon 
the subj ects o f  other countries ? Can the island of Tobago pass 
a law to bind the rights of the whole world ? \Vould the world 
submit to such an assumed j urisdiction ? The law itsel f, however, 
fairly construed, does not wa rran t  such an in ference ; for "absent 
from the island" must be taken only to apply to persons who had 
been p resent there, and were subj ect to the j urisdiction of the 
court out of which the process issued ; and as nothing of that 
sort was in proof here to show that the defendant was �ubj ect to 
the j urisdiction at the time of commencing the suit, there is no 
foundation for raising an assumpsi t in law upon the j udgment so 
obtained. P.ER CuRL\ M  : Rule refused. 
DOUGLAS et al. v .  FORREST, Exr., in Court of  Common Pleas of 
England, Easter Term, 1824-4 Bingham ( 13 E. C. L.) 686. 
BEST, C. J. This was an action brought by the assignees of  
Stein & Co., bank rupts, against the  executor of the  wi l l  of  J olm 
Hunter. 
[ * 698] On the 3 1 st day of �fay, I /ry:), the testator acknowl­
edged himsel f to be indebteJ to Stein & Co. in the sum of 447/. 
40 CASES ON JUDGMENTS, ETC.
(is. 3d.; and on the 11th of June, in the same year, he acknowl-
edged that he owed 751. to Robert Smith, one of the bankrupts,
and one of the firm of Stein & Co. These debts were contracted
in Scotland, of which country the deceased was a native, and in
which he had a heritable property. Shortly after the year 1799,
the deceased went to India. He died in India in 1817, having
never revisited Scotland.
On the 25th of February, 1802, two decrees were pronounced
in the court of session in Scotland against the deceased, one at
the instance of Stein & Co., and the other at the instance of Rob-
ert Smith. In the first of these the deceased was ordered to pay
to Stein & Co. 4471. 6s, 3d., with interest, from the day of
, besides expenses of process, &c. In the second decree the
deceased was ordered to pay Robert Smith the sum of 75]., with
interest, from the of , besides expenses of process, &c.
It appeared, from these decrees, that the deceased was out of Scot-
land at the time the proceedings were instituted in these causes.
He never had any notice of these proceedings. The decrees stated,
that the deceased had been (according to the law of Scotland)
summoned at the market-cross of Edinburgh, and at the pier and
shore of Leith. A Scotch advocate proved, that, by the law of
Scotland, the court of session might pronounce judgment against
a native Scotchman who had heritable property in that country,
for a debt contracted in Scotland, although the debtor had no no-
tice of any of the proceedings, and was out of Scotland at the
time. After such proclamations as were mentioned in these de-
crees had been made, the same witness proved, that a person
against whom such a decree was pronounced, might, at anv time
within forty years, dispute the merits of such decree; but that
after the [*6g9] expiration of forty years, it was conclusive
against him, and all who claimed under him.
By a decree of the court of session, of the date of the 5th of
July, 1804, that court adjudged that certain property which the
deceased possessed in Scotland should belong to Robert Smith
and his heirs, in [>fl_\'ment and satisfaction of the sum of 75]., with
interest from the Ilth of June, 1799. By another decree of the
same date, the court of session adjudged, that certain other prop-
erty of the deceased in Scotland should belong to Stein & Co., and
their heirs. in payment and satisfaction of the sum of 4471. 6s. 3d.,
with interest from the Itth of june. I799. The last two decrees
fill up the blanks left in the first decrees, by giving the time from
















































































































































C.\SI�S ON J CDG!\I E N TS, ETC. 
6s. 3d. ; and on the 1 1 th of June, in the same year, he acknowl­
edged that he owed 75/. to Robert Smith, one of the bankrupts, 
and one of the firm of Stein & Co. The·se debts were contracted 
in Scotland, of which country the deceased was a native, and in 
which he had a heritable property. Shortly after the year 1 799, 
the deceased went to India. He died in India in 1 8 1 7, having 
never revisited Scotland. 
On the 25th of February, 18o2, two decrees were pronounced 
in the court of session in Scotland against the deceased, one at 
the instance of Stein & Co., and the other at the instance of Rob­
ert Smith. In the first of these the deceased was ordered to pay 
to Stein & Co. 447/. 6s, 3d., with interest, from the -- day of 
--, besides expenses of process, &c. In the second decree the 
deceased was ordered to pay Robert Smith the sum of 75!. , with 
interest, from the -- of --, besides expenses of process, &c. 
It appeared , from these decrees, that the deceased was out of Scot­
land at the time the proceedings were instituted in these causes. 
He never had any notice of these proceedings. The decrees stated , 
that the deceased had been ( according to the law of Scotland ) 
summoned at the market-cross of Edinburgh , and at the pier and 
shore of Leith. A Scotch advocate proved, that, by the law of 
Scotland, the court of session might pronounce j udgment against 
a native Scotchman who had heritable property in that country, 
for a debt contracted in Scotland, although the debtor had no no­
tice of any of the proceedings, and was out of Scotland at the 
time. After such proclamations as were mentioned in these de­
crees had been made, the same witness proved, that a person 
against whom such a decree was pronounced, might ,  at anv time 
within forty years, dispute the merits of such decree ; but that 
a fter the [ *699 ] expi ration of  forty years, it  was conclusive 
against him,  and all who claimed under him.  
Ily a decree of the court of  session, of the date of the .5th of  
July ,  1 804, that court adj udged that certain property which the 
deceased possessed in Scotland should belong to Robert Smith 
and his heirs, in payment  and sa.t isfaction of the sum o f  75/.,  with 
interest from the 1 1 th of  June , 1 799· Ily another decree of the 
same date, the court of  session adjudged, that certain other prop­
erly of the deceased in  Scotland should belong to Ste in & Co. ,  and 
their heirs .  in pa:mzc11t and satisfaction  of the sum of 447/. 6s. 3d. , 
w ith interest from the l I th of June, 1 799. The last tv.·o decrees 
fill up the blanks left in the first decrees , by giving the time from 
which interest was to be paid on the dehts, namely, from the I 1 th 
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of June, 1799; and if the plaintiffs can maintain their action, en-
titles them to a verdict for the sum of 8621. The terms in which
the last two decrees are expressed, seem to import that the lands
adjudged to Stein & Co., and Smith, were given to and accepted
by them in satisfaction of these debts; but this cannot be the true
construction of these decrees, because none of the decrees are
conclusive against the deceased and those who claim under him,
until the expiration of forty years from the time of pronouncing
the first two decrees. The advocate who was examined in the
cause proved, that by the law of Scotland, these decrees would
not operate as satisfaction of the debts, during the period that the
debtor had a right to dispute the validity of the first judgments.
A Scotch statute, which we have looked into, shows the accuracy
of the opinion given to us on the Scotch laws by the learned advo-
cate: and I feel it due to him to say, that, from the manner in
which he gave his evidence, the clearness and precision with which
he explained the grounds of his opinion, I have no doubt that he
is extremely well acquainted with the [*7oo] Scotch law, and
that we may safely rely on every part of his evidence.
The last two decrees, proving that interest was to run from
1799, and the testimony of the learned advocate—who proved,
that when decrees adjudged that interest should be paid, but did
not show the time from which it was to run, interest was payable
from the time of the citation—disposes of the objection that no
interest could be recovered upon these decrees.
The plaintiffs rested their claim on these decrees. The de-
fendant insisted that these decrees would not support an action in
our courts, because they were repugnant to the principles of jus-
tice, having been pronounced whilst the deceased was at a great
distance from Scotland, and without any notice given to him that
any proceedings were instituted against him. This defence was
made on the general issue. The defendant also pleaded, that the
plaintiffs’ cause of action did not accrue within six years before
the commencement of the suit. To this there was a replication,
that the deceased, at the time when the cause of action accrued.
was beyond seas, and remained beyond the seas until the year
1817, when he died; and that the plaintiffs sued out their writ
against the defendant, within six years after he first took on him-
self the burthen and execution of the will of the deceased in Great
Britain, and that he had no other executor in Great Britain. This
replication was fully proved, and, therefore, the issue taken on
















































































































































ELEMENTS OF J li RISDICTION 41 
of June, 1799 ; and if the plaintiffs can maintain their action, en­
titles them to a verdict for the sum of 862l. The terms in which 
the last two decrees are expressed, seem to import that the lands 
adj udged to Stein & Co., and Smith, were given to and accepted 
by them in satisfaction of these debts ; but this cannot be the true 
construction of these decrees, because none of the decrees are 
conclusive against the deceased and those who claim under him, 
until the expiration of forty years from the time of pronouncing 
the first two decrees. The advocate who was examined in the 
cause proved, that by the law of Scotland, these decrees would 
not operate as satisfaction of the debts, during the period that the 
debtor had a right to dispute the validity of the first j udgments. 
A Scotch statute, which we have looked into, shows the accuracy 
of the opinion given to us on the Scotch laws by the learned advo­
cate : and I feel it due to him to say, that, from the manner in 
which he gave his evidence, the clearness and precision with which 
he explained the grounds of his opinion, I have no doubt that he 
is extremely well acquainted with the [ *700 ] Scotch law, and 
that we may safely rely on every part of his evidence. 
The last two decrees, proving that interest was to run from 
1 799, and the testimony of the learned advocate-who proved, 
that when decrees adj udged that interest should be paid, but did 
not show the time from which it was to run, interest was payable 
from the time of the citation-disposes of the objection that no 
interest could be recovered upon these decrees. 
The plaintiffs rested their claim on these decrees. The de­
fendant insisted that these decrees would not support an action in 
our courts, because they were repugnant to the principles of j us­
tice, having been pronounced whilst the deceased was at a great 
distance from Scotland , and without any notice given to him that 
any proceedings were instituted against him. This defence was 
made on the general issue. The defendant also pleaded , that the 
plaintiffs' cause of action did not accrue within six years before 
the commencement of the suit. To this there was a repl ication, 
that the deceased, at the time when the cause of action accrued , 
was beyond seas, and remained beyond the seas until the year 
1 8 1 7, when he died ; and that the plaintiffs sued out their writ 
against the defendant ,  within six years after he first took on him­
sel f the burthen and execution of the will of the deceased in Great 
Britain, and that he had no other executor in Great Britain. This 
replication was fully proved , and, therefore, the issue taken on 
it was properly found for the plaint iffs. 
4,2 CASES ON JUDGMENTS, ETC.
The questions to be decided are, first, whether an action can
be maintained in England on these judgments of the court of
session in Scotland. Secondly, whether the replication is an an-
swer to the pleas of the statute of limitations.
On the first question we agree with the defendant’s counsel,
that if these decrees are repugnant to the [*7OI] principles of
universal justice, this court ought not to give effect to them; but
we think that these decrees are perfectly consistent with the prin-
ciples of justice. If we held that they were not consistent with
the principles of justice, we should condemn tl1e'proceedings of
some of our own courts. If a debt be contracted within the city of
London, and the creditor issues a summons against the debtor, to
which a return is made, that the debtor hath nothing within the
city by which he may be summoned, or, in plainer words, hath
nothing by the seizure of which his appearance may be enforced,
goods belonging to the debtor in the hands of a third person, or
money due from a third person to the debtor, may be attached;
and unless the debtor appears within a year and a day, and dis-
putes his debt, he is for ever deprived of his property or the
debts due to him.
In such cases the defendant may be in the East Indies whilst
the proceedings are going on against him in a court in London,
and may not know that any such proceedings are instituted. In-
stead of the forty years given by the Scotch law, he has only one
year given to him to appear and prevent a decision that finally
transfers from him his property. Lord Chief Justice De Grey
thought this custom of foreign attachment was an unreasonable
one, but it has existed from the earliest times in London, and
in other towns in England, and in many of our colonies from their
first establishment. Lord Chief Justice De Grey and the court of
common pleas, after much consideration, decided against the val-
idity of the attachment, according to the report1 in 3 ‘Wilson, 207.
because the party objecting to it had ncrwr been summoned or had
notice. The report of the same case in 2 Blackstone, 834, shows
that the court did not think a personal summons necessary, or any
summons that could convey any information to the person sum-
moned, but a smimzoizs with it return of nihil; that is, such 21
[*7oz] summons as I have mentioned, namely, one that shows
that the debtor is not within the city, and has nothing there, by
the seizing of which he may be compelled to appear. The 54 G.
3, c. 137, not only recognizes the practice on which these decrees
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The questions to be decided are, first, whether an action can 
be maintained in England on these j udgments of the court of 
sess ion in Scotland. Secondly, whether the replication i s  an an­
swer to the pleas of the statute of limitations. 
Un the first question we agree with the defendant's counsel, 
that if these decrees are repugnant to the [ *701 ] principles of 
universal justice, this court ought not to give effect to them ; but 
we think that these decrees are perfectly consistent with the prin­
ciples of justice. If we held that they were not consistent with 
the principles of j ustice, we should condemn the · proceedings of 
some of our own courts. If a debt be contracted within the city of 
London, and the creditor issues a summons against the debtor, to 
which a return is made, that the debtor hath nothing within the 
city by which he may be summoned, or, in plainer words, hath 
nothing by the seizure of which his appearance may be en forced, 
goods belonging to the debtor in the hands of a third person , or 
money due from a third person to the debtor, may be attached ; 
and unless the debtor appears within a year and a day, and dis­
putes his debt, he is  for ever deprived of his property or the 
debts due to him. 
In such cases the defendant may be in the East Indies whilst 
the proceedings arc going on against him in a court in London, 
and may not know that any such proceedings are instituted. In­
stead of the forty years given by the Scotch law, he has only one 
year given to him to appear and prevent a deci sion that finally 
transfers from him his property. Lord Chief Justice De Grey 
thought this custom of foreign attachment was an unreasonable 
one, but it has existed from the earliest times in London, and 
in other towns in England,  and in many of our colonies from their 
first establishment. Lord Chief Justice De Grey and the court of 
common pleas, after much consideration , decided against the val­
idity of the attachment, accord ing to the report1 in 3 \Vi lson , 297. 
because the party objecting to i t  had I U''<'Cr been s1m1 1110 11 cd or had 
notice. The report of the same case in 2 Blackstone, 834, shows 
that the court did not think a personal summons necessary, or any 
summons that coul<l convey any in formation to the person sum­
moned, but a si1 111111 0 11s 7.ttith a return of nihil ; that is. such a 
[ *702 ] summons as I have mentioned, namely, one that shows 
that the debtor is not within the city, and has nothing there, by 
the seizing of which he may be compelled to appear. The 54 G. 
� .  c. I 37. not only recognizes the practice on which these decrees 
1Fishcr v. La flc, 2 Wm. Biacht. 8J.t, 3 Wits. 297. 
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are founded, as being according to the law of Scotland, but enacts,
that on notices being given at the nu1rket—cr0ss at Edinburgh, and
on the pier and shore of Leith, to debtors out of the kingdom, in
default of their appearance the creditors may issue a sequestra-
tion against their effects. Can we say that a practice which the
legislature of the United Kingdom has recognized and extended
to other cases, is contrary to the principles of justice? A natural
born subject of any country, quitting that country, but leaving
property under the protection of its law, even during his absence,
owes obedience to those laws, particularly when those laws en-
force a moral obligation. The deceased, before he left his native
country, acknowledged, under his hand, that he owed the debts‘.
he was under a moral obligation to discharge those debts as soon
as he could. It‘ must be taken for granted, from there being no
plea of [>lenc adinilzistraz-it, that the deceased had the means of
paying what was due to the bankrupts. The law of Scotland has
only enforced the performance of a moral obligation, by making
his executor pay what he admitted was due, with interest during
the time that he deprived his creditors of their just debts.
The reasoning of Lord Ellenborough, in the case of Buchan-
an v. Rucleer, I Campb. 63, and 9 East, 192, is in favor of these
decrees., Speaking of a case decided by Lord Kenyon, his lord-
ship says, in that case the defendant had property in the [*7o3]
island, and might be considered as m'rtuaVly present. The court
decided against the validity of the attachment, because it did not
appear that the party attached ever was in the island, or had any
property in it. In both these respects that case is unlike the pres-
ent. In the case of Ccwan v. Stewart, I Starkie 525, Lord Ellen-
borough says, you must prove him summoned, or, at least, that
he was once in the island of Jamaica, when the attachment issued.
To be sure, if attachments issued against persons who never were
within the jurisdiction of the court issuing them, could be sup-
ported and enforced in the country in which the person attached
resided, the legislature of any country might authorize their
courts to decide on the rights of parties who owed no allegiance
to the government of such country, and were under no obligation
to attend its courts, or obey its laws. VVe confine our judgment
to a case where the party owed allegiance to the country in which
the judgment was so given against him, from being born in it,
and by the laws of which country his property was, at the time
those judgments were given, protected. The debts were contract-
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are founded, as being according to the law of Scotland, but enacts, 
that on notices being given at the nwrket-cross at Edinburgh, and 
on the pier and shore of Leith, to debtors out of the k ingdom, in 
default of their appearance the creditors may i ssue a sequestra­
tion against their effects. Can we say that a practice which the 
legislature of the United Kingdom has recognized and extended 
to other cases, is contrary to the principles of j ustice ? A natural 
born subj ect of any country, quitting that country, but leaving 
property under the protection o f  its law, even during his absence, 
owes obedience to those laws, particularly when those laws en­
force a moral obligation. The deceased, before he left his native 
country, acknowledged, under his hand, that he owed the debts : 
he was under a moral obligation to discharge those debts as soon 
as he could. It must be taken for granted , from there being no 
plea of ple1ic administrm:it, that the deceased had the means of 
paying what was due to the bankrupts. The law of Scotland has 
only enforced the performance of a moral obl igation, by making 
his executor pay what he admitted was due, with interest during 
the time that he deprived his creditors of their j ust debts. 
The reasoning of Lord Ellenborough, in the case of B uchan­
an v. Rucker, I Campb. 63, and 9 East, 192, is in favor of these 
decrees. . Speaking of a case decided by Lord Kenyon, his lord­
ship says, in that case the defendant had property in the [*703] 
i sland, and might be considered as ·virtually present. The court 
decided against the validity of the attachment, because it did not 
appear that the party attached ever was in the island, or had any 
property in it. In both these respects that case is unlike the pres­
ent. In the case of Cavan v. Ste·wart, I Starkie 525, Lord Ellen­
bOrough says, you must prove him summoned, or, at least, that 
he was once in the island of Jamaica, when the attachment issued. 
To be sure, if attachments issued against persons who never were 
within the jurisd iction of the court issuing them, could be sup­
ported and enforced in the country in which the person attached 
resided, the legislature of any country might authorize their 
courts to decide on the rights of parties who owed no al!egiance 
to the government of such country, and were under no obl igation 
to attend its courts, or obey its laws. We confine our j udgment 
to a case where the party owed allegiance to the country in which 
the judgment was so given against him, from being born in it, 
and by the laws of which country his property was, at the time 
those j udgments were given, protected. The debts were contract­
ed in the country in which the judgn1cnts were given , whilst the 
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btor resided in it. The only other case that has been mentioned
is that of Williams v. Lord Bagot, 3 B. & C. 772; in that case a
summons to appear, and an attachment to compel appearance, is-
Q sued at the same time, and were returnable at the same time.
These proceedings were not only contrary to justice, but contrary
to our law, and the court from which these proceedings issued
was governed by English law_ * * * J
I§ e
Judgment for flaintifis.
\ BALLINGER v. TARBELL, in Iowa Sup. Ct., June 22, 1864—I6 Iowa 491,
85 Am. Dec. 527.
Petition to have judgment against Tarbell and Robertson
I set off against judgment in favor of Tarbell. Petition dismissed,
1 and petitioner appeals.
DILLON, It is claimed by the defendants, Claggett, Browne,
(1 Claggett, that the judgment of the plaintiff against Tarbell
arid Robertson was wholly void, as against Tarbell, because the
\jl:stice of the peace, who rendered the san1e had no jurisdiction
of the person of the defendant, Tarbell; and this is the first ques-
tion which we are called upon to determine. The plaintiffs action
' against Tarbell and Robertson was brought before H. H. _\Vilson,
I a justice of the peace, and the return day was fixed by the justice
for the 11th day of February, I860. The original papers in this
i action were not before the court, but the transcript showed that the
I original notice was served by the constable on the 6th day of Feb-
; \ruar_v, 1860, on the wife of Robertson, and as to Tarbell the ser-
vice as recited in the justice’s transcript, was as follows: “On the
7th day of February, 1860, I, H. H. Wilson, a justice of the
peace, served the said notice upon ]ohn Tarbell, by reading the
same to him personally in the city of Keokuk, who confessed
judgment”; and on the 11th day of February, 1860, the justice
§ rendered judgment against Tarbell on this service. It would have
been, without doubt reversed on writ of error. But it was erron-
' / eous simply, and not void. It is not a case where there is no
service at all. but a case where there was a defective service. The
justice erred in deciding that this service authorized him to ren-
\ N \der judgment against Tarbell; but neither Tarbell nor his assign-
ees can question the validity of this judgment, or claim to have
it treated as void in this collateral proceeding. Bonsail v. Isctt,
14 Iowa 309; Cooper v. .S‘unde1'la11d, 3 Id. 114; Morrow v. lVt‘ed,

















































































































































against Tarbell was therefore valid, the same never having been
set aside or reversed.
The next question which arises is whether the plaintifi has a
right, legal or equitable, to have his judgment against Tarbell set
off against the judgment in favor of Tarbell and assigned to
Claggett, Browne, & Claggett. * * * The legislature not having
invested judgments with the qualities which attach to commercial
paper, they stand upon the footing of things in action. * * *
Decree ret'¢’rSed.
Acconn: Cam/tbell v. Hays, 41 Miss. 561; Cole v. Baxter, 43 Me. 401.
CONTRA: Manson v. Pawnee Cattle Co. (1912 Colo.), I26 Pac. 275.
PENNOYER v. NEFF, in U. S. Sup. Ct., 1877—95 U. S. (5 Otto) 714.
Action in the United States circuit court for the district of
Oregon by N eff against Pennoyer to recover land in Multnomah
county, Oregon. From a judgment for Nefi, on a special verdict
found by the court on a trial without a jury, pursuant to written
and filed stipulation, Pennoyer brings error. Affirmed.
FIELD, J. This is an action to recover the possession of a
tract of land, of the alleged value of $15,000, situated in the state
of Oregon. The plaintiff asserts title to the premises by a patent
ofthe United States issued to him in 1866, under the act of Con-
gress of September 27, I850, usually known as the Donation law
of Oregon. The defendant claims to have acquired the premises
under a sheriff’s deed, made upon a sale of the property on execu-
tion issued upon a judgment recovered against the plaintiff in one
of the circuit courts of the state. The case turns upon the validity
of this judgment.
It appears from the record that the judgment was rendered
in February, 1866, in favor of J. H. Mitchell, for less than $300,
including costs, in an action brought by him upon a demand for
services as an attorney; that, at the time the action was com-
anenced and the judgment rendered, the defendant therein, the
plaintiff here, was a non-resident of the state; [*72o] that he was
not personally served with process, and did not appear therein;
and that the judgment was entered upon his default in not answer-
ing the complaint, upon a constructive service of summons by
publication.
The Code of Oregon provides for such service when an action
is brought against a non-resident and absent defendant, who has
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against Tarbell was therefore valid, the same never having been 
set aside or reversed. 
The next question which arises is whether the plaintiff has a 
right, l egal or equitable, to have his j udgment against Tarbell set 
off against the judgment in favor of Tarbell and assigned to 
Claggett, Browne, & Claggett. * * * The legislature not having 
invested j udgments with the qualities which attach to commercial 
paper, they stand upon the footing of things in action. * * * 
Decree re-versed. 
ACCORD : Campbell v. Hays, 41 Miss. 561 ; Cole v. Baxter, 43 Me. 401. 
CoNTR.o\ : Mun.sou v. Pawnee Cattle Co. ( 1912 Colo. ) ,  126 Pac. 275. 
PENNOYER v. NEFF, in U. S. Sup. Ct., 1877--95 U. S. (5 Otto) 714 
Action in the United States circuit court for the district of 
Oregon by Neff against Pennoyer to recover land in Multnomah 
county, Oregon. From a j udgment for Neff, on a special verdict 
found by the court on a trial without a jury, pursuant to written 
and filed stipulation, Pennoyer brings error. Affirmed. 
Fu�LD, J. This is an action to recover the possession of a 
tract of land, of the alleged value of $1 5,000, situated in the state 
rt" 
of Oregon. The plaintiff asserts title to the premises by a patent 
of the United States issued to him in 1866, under the act of Con- y 
gress of September 27, 1850, usually known as the Donation law 
of Oregon. The defendant claims to have acquired the premises ,J 
under a sheriff's deed, made upon a sale of the property on execu� ..,,-
tion i ssued upon a j udgment recovered against the plaintiff in one 
of the circuit courts of the state. The case turns upon the validity 
of this j udgment. 
It appears from the record that the j udgment was rendered 
in February, 1866, in favor of J. H. Mitchell, for less than $Joo, 
including costs, in an action brought by him upon a demand for 
services as an attorney ; that, at the time the action was com-
. menced and the j udgment rendered, the defendant therein, the 
plaintiff here, was a non-resident of the state ; [ *720] that he was 
not personally served with process, and did not appear therein ; 
and that the j udgment was entered upon his default in not answer-
ing the complaint, upon a constructive service of summons by 
publication. 
The Code of Oregon provides for such service when an action 
is brought against a non-resident and absent defendant, who hac:> 
property within the state. It also provides, where the action is 
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for the recovery of money or damages, for the attachment of the
property of the non-resident. And it also declares that no natural
person is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of the state, “unless
he appear in the court, or be found within the state, or be a resi-
dent thereof, or have property therein; and, in the last case, only
the extent of such property at the time the jurisdiction at-
ched.” Construing this latter provision to mean, that, in an
ction for money or damages where a defendant does not appear
in the court, and is not found within the state, and is not a resi-
dent thereof, but has p‘r_QQer_t;:_.t.hiig,_the 'urisdiction of e
court extends onl over such ro ertv the declaration ex r
6) a rinciple of eneral if not universal, law. The authority of
% every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of
the state in which it was established. Any attempt to exercise
authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every other
forum, as has been said by this court, an illegitimate assumption
of power, and be resisted as mere abuse. D’/lrcy v. Ketchum at
al., II How. 165. Intlie___c_a_s<:’aga,inst__tl1e__pM¥£_Q&)_j_)_c;r_t_\/
here in controvers sold under the 'udgment rendered was not
attached, nor lg guy way brought under the ]t1I'iS(liCtiO11 of the
court. Its first connection with the case was caused by a levy
of the execution. It was not, therefore, disposed of pursuant to
any adjudication, but only in enforcement of a personal judg-
ment, having no relation to the property, rendered against a non-
resident without service of process upon him in the action, or his
appearance therein. The court below did not consider that an
attachment of the property was essential to its jurisdiction or to
the validity of the sale, but held that the judgment was invalid
from defects in the affidavit by which the publication was proved.
[*72I] There is some difference of opinion among the mem--
bers of this court as to the rulings upon these alleged defects. The
majority are of opinion that inasmuch as the statute requires, for
an order of publication, that certain facts shall appear by affidavit
to the satisfadion of the court or judge, defects in such afiidavit
. can only be taken advantage of on appeal, or by some other direct
proceeding, and cannot be urged to impeach the judgment col-
laterally. The majority of the court are also of opinion that the
provision of the statute requiring proof of the publication in a
Q newspaper to be made by the “afiidavit of the printer. or his fore-
" '{ man, or his principal clerk,” is satisfied when the afiidavit is made
by the editor of the paper. The term “printer,” in their judg-
' ment, is there used not to indicate the person who sets up the
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for the recovery of money or damages, for the attachment of the 
property of the non-resident. And it also declares that no natural 
person is subject to the j urisdiction of a court 9f the state, "unless 
he appear in the court, or be found within the state, or be a resi­
dent thereof, or have property therein ; and, in the last case, only 
the extent of such property at the time the j urisdiction at­
ched." Construing this latter provision to mean, that, in an 
ction for money or damages where a defendant does not appear 
in the court, and is not found within the state, and is not a resi­
dent thereof, but has P.ropercy therein, the jurisdiction of the 
• • 
court extends onl over such ro ert the declaration ex r 
a rmctp e o eneral i f  not universal, law. The authority of 
every tn unal is  necessarily restricte y the territorial limits of 
the state in which it was established. Any attempt to exercise 
authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every other 
forum, as has been said by this court, an il legitimate assumpt ion 
of power, and be resisted as mere abuse. D'Arcy v. Ketch 1' m et 
al., I I  How. 165. In the case ag:afost the plaintiff the 2ropl!rtv 
here in cont rovers sold under the · udgmen t rendered was not 
attached. nor in any way brought under t 1e Jur i sd iction of till! 
court. Its first connection with the case was caused by a levy 
of the execution. It  was not ,  therefore, d i sposed of pursuant to 
any adj udicat ion, but on ly in en forcement of a personal j udg­
ment, having no relation to the property , rendered again st a non­
res i<lcnt w ithout service of process upon him in  the action , or his 
appearance therein. The court below did not consider that an 
attachment of the property was essential to i ts  j ur i sd iction or to 
the val id ity o f  the sale,  but held that the j udgment was invalid 
from defects in the affidav it by which the publ ication was proved . 
[ '� 72 1 ]  There is some d i fference of  opin ion among the mcm-· 
hers of  this court as to the rul ings upon these al leged def ccts .  The 
majority arc of  opin ion that inasmuch as the statute requires,  for 
an order of publication, tha t certain fac t s  shall  appear by affidavit  
to the satisfactio 1 1  of the court or j11dgc, dcfrcb in such affidavit 
can only be taken advantage of on appea l ,  or by some other direct 
procccc l ing, and cannot be u rged to impeach the j udgment col­
latera lly . The major ity of the court are al so of op in ion that the 
prov is ion of the statute requiring- proof of the publ ication in  a 
new spaper to he made by the "affidavit of the printer , or his fore­
m a n ,  or h i s  principal clerk," is sat isfied when the affidavit is ma<le 
hy the ed i tor of the paper. The term "printer," in their j udg­
n1C 'nt,  is there u sed not to indicate the person who sets up the 
typr,-he docs not usually have a foreman or clerks,-it is rather 
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used as synonymous with publisher. The supreme court of New
Xork so held in one case; observing that, for the purpose of mak-
§ing the required proof, publishers were “within the spirit of the
7 statute.” Btmce v. Reed, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 347. And, following
“his rule, the supreme court of California held that an afiidavit
made by a “publisher and proprietor” was sufiicient. Sharp v.
QlDaugney, 33 Cal. 505. The term “editor,” as used when the . .
statute of New York was passed, from which the Oregon law is
orrowed, usually included not only the person who wrote or
Q selected the articles for publication, but the person who published
I the paper and put it into circulation. \Vebster, in an early edition-
“ of his dictionary, gives as one of the definitions of an editor, a
\ person "who superintends the publication of a newspaper.” It is
principally since that time that the business of an editor has
been separated from that of a publisher and printer, and has be-
come an independent profession.
If, therefore, we were confined to the rulings of the court
below upon the defects in the afiidavits mentioned, we should be
\unable to uphold its decision. But it was also contended in that
court and is insisted u on here hat th ud ment in the stat
court a ainst the laintifi was void for want of ersonal service
0 rocess on 11' 0 of his a earance in the action in which it
was rendered, and that the remises in controversy could not be
sub ecte to the )ayment of the demand * 22] of a rcsid> t
Qcrcditor exce t by a I)l‘OCC€t mg in rem; that is, by a direct pra-
\ceeding against the property or 121 purpose. If tiese positions‘W
\are sound, the ru mg 0 1e circuit court as to the invalidity of '
that judgment must be sustained, notwithstanding our dissent
|from the reasons upon which it was made. And that they are
sound would seem to follow from two well-established principles
f public law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent state
t ver persons and property. The several states of the union are
5 \ not. it is true, in every respect independent, many of the rights
nd powers which originally belonged to them being now vested
331 the government created by the constitution. But, except as
restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exer-
Ncise the authority of independent states, and the principles of pub-
j \lic law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of L
rithese principles is, that every state possesses exclusive 'urisdic-
tion ant 'erei t' over ersons . \'1thin i s terr'-
' re-
scrihe t ' on which thev may contract, the forms and
‘{ toga...‘ As a conse uence every state has the ower to determine
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�sed as synonymous with publi sher. The supreme court of New 
York so held in one case ; observing that, for the purpose of mak­
�ing the required proof, pubii shers were "within the spirit of the 
') statute." Bunce v. Reed, 16 Barb. ( N. Y. ) 347. And, following 
bhis rule, the supreme court of California held that an affidavit 
made by a "publisher and proprietor" was sufficient. Sharp v. 
�Da11g11ey, 33 Cal. 505. The term "editor," as used when the • . 
statute of  New York was passed, from which the Oregon law is 
orrowed, usually included not only the person who wrote or 
� selected the articles for publication, but the person who publisheJ 
' the paper and put it into ci rculation . \Vebster, in an early edit ion . 
1\ of his dictionary, gives as one of the definitions of  an ed itor, a 
\ person ' 'who superintends the publ ication of a newspaper." I t  is 
principally since that time that the business of  an editor has 
been separated from that of a publisher and printer, and has be-
come an independent profession . \ 
• 
I f, therefore , we were confined to the rulings of the court 0 )  �be low upon the defects i n  the affidavits mentioned , w e  shou ld be \ 
"\unable to uphold i ts  decision. But i t  was al so contended in that '\, cou rt, and is insisted upon here. that the juagment i n  the stat� 
court a ainst the lain t iff was void for want o f  ersonal service 
o process on him. or of his  appearance in the action in which it 
• \fas rendered , and that the remi scs in controversv co uld not be 
t sub ec e to the aymcnt of the dem and * 22 of a res id t � '( cred itor exec t bv a proccel mg in rem ; that is, by a dircq pr.o-1 , cced ing a ainst the property or 1a pur ose. If  ffiese pos i t ions 
'are sound , the ru mg o 1c c1rcmt court as to the inval id i ty of 1'°� 
I / that j udgmen t must be sustained, notw it hstand ing our d i �scnt fT a l  
1 from the reasons upon which it was made. And that  they arc r ..J f '\_sound would seem to fo. llow from two well-establ ished p r inc ipl es ti' � �f public law respect ing the j u risdict ion o f  an independent  state 
�ver persons and property. The several s t ates o f  the u n ion arc 
o( 
� not,  it is true,  in every respect independent , many of the righ t s 
pnd po wers wh ich or igina lly belonged to them be ing- no\\· vested 
" in t h e  government created b y  t h e  const itution . But, except a s  
restrained a n d  lim ited b y  t h a t  in strument , they possess and exer­
�ise the authority of  independent states, and the principle., o f  puh-
\ '\lie law to which we have re ferred arc appl icable to them. One o f  I. 
"'t thcse principles is ,  that cverv state possesses exclu sive " uri-;;JfC-
tion anc · re1 t • over erson , ' · 1thi 11 i s t err·-
.. � t� A s  a con sequence, every state has the power to determ i n e  
' fo r  itsel f  the civil  status and capacities of its inhahjtants.i..to  � j scribe the subjects upon wh ich thev may contract, the form s an 
48 cxsr.s ox wncmenrs, ere.
lsolemnities with which their contracts shall
ed the r‘ hts
1 atoms arisin from them and the m
I . ,1 . I I ._
validity shall be determined and their obligations enforced; and
also to regulate the manner and conditions u on which property
sitgw:-iitliin sucfi §€I'l'ltOI'Z both personal and real; may lie
cquire , enjoye , and transferred. The other principle of pub-
lic law referred to follows from the one mentioned; that is, that
no state can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over per-
ons or property without its territory. Story, Confl. Laws, c. 2;
Vheat. Int. Law, pt. 2, c. 2. The several states are of equal dig-
nity and authority, and the independence of one implies the ex-
clusion of power from all others. And so it is laid down by
jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one state have
no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed
by comity; and that no tribunal established by it can extend its
process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or
property to its decisions. “ ny exertion of authority Qf this sort
beyond this limit,” says Stor , “is a mere nullit and inea able
bm m suc1 persons or propert in an other tribunals.”
Story, Contl. Laws, 539.
But as contracts made in one state may be enforceable only
in another state, and property may be held by non-residents, the
exercise of the jurisdiction which every state is admitted to pos-
sess over persons and property within its own territory will often
affect persons and property without it. To any influence exerted
in this way by a state affecting persons resident or property sit-
uated elsewhere, no objection can be justly taken; whilst any
direct exertion of authority upon them, in an attempt to give ex-
territorial operation to its laws, or to enforce an ex-territorial
jurisdiction by its tribunals, would be deemed an encroachment
upon the independence of the state in which the persons are domi-
ciled or the property it situated, and be resisted as usurpation.
Thus the state, through its tribunals, may compel persons
domiciled within its limits to execute, in pursuance of their con-
tracts respecting property elsewhere situated, instruments in such
form and with such solemnities as to transfer the title, so far as
such formalities can be complied with; and the exercise of this
jurisdiction in no manner interferes with the supreme control
over the property by the state within which it is situated. Perm
v. Lord Baltimore, I Ves. Sr. 444; Masie v. Watts, 6 Cranch. I48;
Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 2'5; Corbett v. Nutt, IO Wall. 464.
So the state, through its tribunals, may subject property sit-
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"solemnities with which their contracts shall 
an o 1gations arising from them, and the mode in wbjch their 
validity shall be determined and their obligations enforced ; � 
also to regulate the manner and conditions u on which property 
sit w1 un sue erntor both ersona an rea ma �cqmre , en 1oye , and transferred, The other principle of pub­
ic law ref erred to follows from the one mentioned ; that is, that 
o state can exercise direct j urisdiction and authority over per­
ons or property without its territory. Story, Confi. Laws, c. 2 ;  
:Vheat. Int. Law, pt. 2, c. 2. The several states are of equal dig­
nity and authority, and the independence of one implies the ex-
clusion of power from all others. And so it is laid down by 
j urists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one state have 
no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed 
by comity ; and that no tribunal established by it can extend its 
process beyond that territory so as to subj ect either persons or 
property to its decisions. ".t\ni exertion of authority of this sort. 
beyond this limit," says Sto , "is a mere nullit and inca able 
bm m * 2 sue 1 persons or propert in an other tribunals." 
Story, Confl. Laws, 539. 
But as contracts made in one state may be enforceable only 
in another state, and property may be held by non-residents, the 
exercise of the j urisdiction which every state is admitted to pos­
sess over persons and property within its own territory will often 
affect persons and property without it. To any influence exerted 
in this way by a state affecting persons resident or property sit­
uated elsewhere, no obj ection can be justly taken ; whilst any 
direct exertion of authority upon them, in an attempt to give ex· 
territorial operation to its laws, or to enforce an ex-territorial 
j urisdiction by its tribunals, would be deemed an encroachment 
upon the independence of the state in which the persons are domi­
ciled or the property it situated, and be resisted as usurpation. 
Thus the state, through its tribunals, may compel person s 
domiciled "'.ithin its limits to execute, in pursuance of their con­
tracts respecting property elsewhere situated , instruments in such 
form and with such solemnities as to transfer the title, so far as 
such formalities can be complied with ; and the exercise of this 
j urisdiction in no manner interferes with the supreme control 
over the property by the state within which it is situated. Penn 
v. Lord Baltimore, I Ves. Sr. 444 ; M asie v. Watts, 6 Cranch. 148 ; 
Watkins v .  Holman, 16 Pet. 2·5 ; Corbett v. Nutt, 1 0  Wall. 464. 
So the state, through its tribunals, may subject property sit­
uated within its limits owned by non-residents to the payment of 
.. 
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the demand of its own citizens against them; and the exercise of
this jurisdiction in no respect infringes upon the sovereignty of
the state where the owners are domiciled. Every state owes pro-
tection to its own citizens; and, when non-residents deal with
them, it is a legitimate and just exercise of authority to hold and
appropriate any property owned by such non-residents to satisfy
the claims of its citizens. It is in virtue of the state’s jurisdiction V _y
over the property of the non—resident situated within is limits 0“
that its tribunals can inquire into that non-resident’s obligations
to its own citizens, and the inquiry can then be carried only to "
the extent necessary to control the disposition of the property. I
If the non-resident [*724] have no property in the state, there is 8
nothing upon which the tribunals can adjudicate.
These views are not new. They have been frequently ex-
pressed, with more or less distinctness, in opinions of eminent '
judges, and have been carried into adjudications in numerous
11,134, Mr. Justice Story said :—
cases. Thus, in Pfquet v. Swan, 5 I\Iason 35, Fed. Cas. No.
“Vt-’here a party is within a territory, he may justly be sub-
jected to its process, and bound personally by the judgment pro- V
nounced on such process against him. Where he is not within ' such territory, and is not personally subject to its laws, if, on K
account of his supposed or actual property being within the terri-
tory, process by the local laws ma-' ' achm ' to com el
his appearance, and or 1S (efault to a ear 'udwment mar be
pronounc agamst him, such a jud ment must, u on eneral 1
prmapIes;1vuemmn1rnrv-rcTmfiI131E1'g{5TII2'tTm_0¥HEii—F5p-
ert , and cannot have the elfect of a conclusive jud ment In Mr-
sonam, for the plain reasonI that, except sg far as the property _ .'
is coneerne , It is a ud nent coram -non jud1'ce’’ , If
‘TA-rTd:i_fi-F5-;t?zlT.lr7.'§1_.s_c:2_\T._(T__H-W(nm3j,6, where the title if’ '
of the plaintiff in ejectment was acquired on a sheriff’s sale, under I" r
a money decree rendered upon publication of notice against non- }
residents, in a suit brought to enforce a contract relating to land, 1 L1,
Mr. justice McLean said :— J .' ' '
“Jurisdiction is acquired in one of two modes: first, as’~‘l .' ii against the person of the defendant b_v the service of process; or. K’
secondly, b)__a' mocedure against the property of the (lefe;]g];;|,11t~'l ‘
within the jurisdiction of the com}, I th latte * >; ‘
fen ant is not ers n ' ' ‘ "In beyond _
pro ert in tio A ' >' Y * -
mg against the ro ert I b ' ' ' _'
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These citations are not made as authoritative expositions of
the law; for the language was perhaps not essential to the de-
cision of the cases in which it was used, but as expressions of the
opinion of eminent jurists. But in Coojwr V. Rcyn-olds, 77 U. S.
(10 \Vallace) 308, it was essential to the disposition of the case
to declare the effect of a personal action against an absent party,
without the jurisdiction of the court, not served [*725] with
process or voluntarily submitting to the tribunal, when it was
sought to subject his property to the payment of a demand of a
resident complainant; and in the opinion there delivered we have
a clear statement of the law as to the efiicacy of such actions,
and the jurisdiction of the court over them. * * * [*726] * * *
[Here the court states the facts and quotes at length‘ from the
opinion in Cooper v. Raynolds. See this book. p. 125.]
The fact that the defendants in that case had fled from the
state, or had concealed themselves, so as not to be reached by
the ordinary process of the court, and were not non-residents, was
not made a point in the decision. The opinion treated them as
being without the territorial jurisdiction of the court; and the
grounds and extent of its authority over persons and property
thus situated were considered, when they were not brought within
its jurisdiction by personal service or voluntary appearance.
The writer of the present opinion considered that some of the
objections to the preliminary proceedings in the attachment suit
were well taken, and therefore dissented from the judgment of
the court; but to the doctrine declared in the above citation he
agreed, and he may add, that it received the approval of all the
judges. It is the only doctrine consistent with proper protection
to citizens of other states. If, without personal service, judg-
ments in jtcrsonam, obtained 0.1‘ [mrte against non-resid_ents and
absent parties, upon mere publication of process, which, in the
great majority of cases, would never be seen by the parties in-
terested, could be upheld and enforced, they would be the constant
instruments of fraud and oppression. Judgments for all sorts of
claims upon contracts and for torts, real or pretended, would be
thus obtained, under which property would be seized, when the
evidence of the transactions upon [*727] which they were found-
ed, if they ever had any existence, had perished.
Substituted service by publication, or in any other authorized
form. may be sufficient to inform parties of the object of pro-
ceedings taken where property is once brought under the control
of the court by seizure or some equivalent act. The law assumes
















































































































































50 C.\SES ON J l'DG �I E N TS, ETC. 
These citations are not made as authoritative expositions o f  
the law ; fo r the language was perhaps not essential to the de­
cis ion of the cases in which i t  was used, but as expressions of the 
opin ion of eminent j urists .  But in Cooper v .  Reynolds, 77 U. S. 
( I O \Vallacc ) 3o8, i t  was essential to the disposition of the C'.lse 
to declare the effect of a personal action against an absent part�·.  
w ithout the j ttri5diction of the court, not served [ *725]  v.:ith 
process or voluntarily submitting to the tribunal , when it was 
sought to subject his property to the payment of  a demand of a 
resident complainant ; and in the opinion there del ivered we have 
a clear statement of  the law as to the efficacy of such action s,  
and the j urisd iction of  the court over them . * * * [ *7261 * * * 
l Here the court states the facts and quotes at length· from the 
opinion in  Cooper v. Raynolds. See th is  book, p. 125 . ]  
The fact that the defendants in that case h a d  fled from the 
state, or had concealed themselves, so as not to be reached by 
the ordinary process of  the cou rt, and were not non-residents, was 
not made a point in the decision. The opin ion treated them as 
being wi thout the territorial j u risdiction of the court ; and the 
grounds an<l extent of  its authority over persons and property 
thus situated were considered , when they were not brough t within 
i ts  j u ri sdiction by personal service or voluntary appearance. 
The writer of the present opinion considered that some of the 
. obj ections to the prel iminary proceedings in the attachmen t sui t  
were wel l  taken , and therefore di ssented from the j udgment of 
the court ; but to the doctrine declared in the above ci tation he 
agreed, and he may add , that i t  received the approval o f  al l  the 
/j udg-es. It i s  the only doctrine consistent with proper protection 
to citizens of other states. I f , without personal service, j udg-
ments hz pcrso1 1am, obtained rx parte ag-ainst non-rcsiqents and 
absent part i e s ,  upon mere publi cation of  process,  which, in  the 
great majori ty of cases, would never be seen by the pa rties in­
terested , could be upheld and enforced , they would be the c0nstant 
. instru ments of fraud and oppression.  Judgments for all sorts of 
claims upon contracts and for torts,  real or pretended, would be 
t h u s  ohtained, under which property woul d be seized, when the 
evidence of the transactions upon [ * 727 ]  which they were found­
ed, if they ever had any exi stence, had perished . 
Substituted service by publ ication , or in any other authorized 
form . mav lie sufficient  to i n form parties  o f  the obj ect of pro­
ceedings taken where property is once brought under the con trol 
of the court hv seizure or some equivalent act. The law assumes 
that property i s  always in the possession of its owner,  i n  person 
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or by agent; and it proceeds upon the theory that its seizure will
inform him, not only that it is taken into the custody of the court,
but that he must look to any proceedings authorized by law upon
such seizure for its condemnation and sale. Such service may
also be sufficient in cases where the object of the action is to
reach and dispose of property in the state, or of some interest
therein, by enforcing a contract or a lien respecting the same. or
to partition it among different owners, or, when the public is a
party, to condemn and appropriate it for a public purpose. In
other words, such service may answer in all actions which are
substantially proceedings in rem. But where the entire object of
the action is to determine the personal rights and obligations of
the defendants, that is, where the suit is merely in personam,
constructive service in this form upon a non-resident is ineffec-
tual for any purpose. Process from the tribunals of one state
cannot run into another state, and summon parties there domi-
ciled to leave its territory and respond to proceedings against
them. Publication of process or notice within the state where
the tribunal sits cannot create any greater obligation upon the
non-resident to appear. Process sent to him out of the state, and
process published within it, are equally unavailing in proceedings
to establish his personal 1-iability.
The want of authority of the tribunals of a state to adjudicate
upon the obligations of non-residents, where they have no prop-
erty within its limits, is not denied by the court below; but the
position is assumed, that, where they have property within the
state, it is immaterial whether the property is in the first instance
brought under the control of the court by attachment or some wt
other equivalent act, and afterwards applied by its judgment to
the satisfaction of demands against its owner; or such demands
be first established in a personal action, and [*728] the property
of the non-resident be afterwards seized and sold on execution. ,r
But the answer to this position has already been given in the J
statement, that the jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and
determine his obligations at all is only incidental to its jurisdic- -
tion over the property. Its jurisdiction in that respect cannot be ‘\‘
made to depend upon facts to be ascertained after it has tried the
cause and rendered the judgment. If the judgment be previouslydr
void, it will not become valid by the subsequent discovery ofv,'
property of the defendant or by his subsequent acquisition of it.
The judgment, if void when rendered, will always remain void:
it cannot occupy the doubtful position of being valid if property
















































































































































E £.E�l E :\ 'fS OF J L'RISDI CTIOX 5 1 
o r  by agmt ; aml i t  proceeds upon the theory that its seizure will  
in form him, not only that i t  is taken into the custody of the court, 
bll t  that he must look to any proceedings authorized by law upon 
such seizure for its condemnation and sale. Such service may 
also be sufficient in cases where the obj ect of the action is to 
reach and dispose of property in the state, or of some interest 
therein, by en forcing a contract or a lien respecting the same. or 
to partit ion it among different owners, or, when the public is a 
party, to condemn and appropriate it for a public purpose. In  • 
other words, such service may answer in all actions which are � 
substantially proceedings in rem. But where the entire obj ect o f  • �· j l\ the action is to determine the personal rights and obligations of � 
the defendants, that is ,  where the suit i s  merely in personam, _,. · r. ! 
constructive service i n  this form upon a non-resident is ineffec-t-i........ ""V 
tual for any purpose. Process from the tribunals of one state � \' _\)' 
cannot run into another state, and summon parties there domi- '/::In 
ciled to leave its territory and respond to proceedings against f l" · 
them. Publication of process or notice within the state where �f�, 
the tribunal sits cannot create any greater obligation upon the i\ 
non-resident to appear. Process sent to him out o f  the state , and V., l process published within it ,  are equally unavailing in proceedings 1 
to establish his personal liability. 
The want of authority of  the tribunals of a state to adj udicate 
upon the obl igations of non-residents, where they have no prop­
erty within its limits, is  not denied by the court below ; but the 
position is  assumed, that, where they have property within the 
state, it is immaterial whether the property is in  the first instance 
brought under the control of the court by attachment or some 
other equivalent act, and afterwards applied by its j udgment to 
the sati sfaction of demands against its owner ; or such demands 
be first established in a personal act ion , and [ *728] the property 
of  the non-res ident be afterwards seized and sold on execution. 
But the an s,vcr to this posit ion has al ready been given in the 
statement, that the j u risdiction of the court to inquire into and 
determine his obligations at all is only incidental to its j ur i sdic­
tion over the property. Its jur isdiction in that respect cannot be 
made to depend upon facts to be ascertained after it has tried the �' 
cause and rendered the j udgment. I f  the j udgment be previou sly t'f. 
void, it will not become valid by the subsequent di sc<wery of �\r. · 
property of the defendant or by his  subsequent acqui s i t ion o f  i t .  
The j u dgment, if  void when ren dered, wil l  always remain  void : 
� it cannot occupy the doubt fu l  position of heing val id i f  prope rty · be found, and void i f  there be none. Even i f  the posi t ion a s , 11 1 1 1ed 
� _r/ 
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were confined to cases where the non-resident defendant possessed
property in the state at the commencement of the action, it would
still make the validity of the proceedings and judgment depend
upon the question whether, before the levy of the execution, the
defendant had or_ had not disposed of the property. If before
the levy the property should be sold, then, according to this posi-
tion, the judgment would not be binding. This doctrine would
introduce a new element of uncertainty in judicial proceedings.
T1sL22n1umaLhL1QsJ2!LL£hsJudkfinL1fi_=¥¢os+udgnmn_dn2seQ§
upon the jurisdiction of the court before it is renderedI not upon
what may occur subse uent -' n ebstcr v. Reid, 11 Howard
437f_fl'i€pl'aT1_1lTFf'_cl'aTn_iqed'_ti_t)l-eht‘o land sold under judgments re-
covered in suits brought in a territorial court of Iowa, upon pub-
lication of notice under a law of the territory, without service of
process; and the court said :—
“These suits were not a proceeding in rem against the land,
but were in jwrsonam against the owners of it. \Vhether they
all resided within the territory or not does not appear, nor is it
. a matter of any importance. No person is required to answer in
‘ a suit on whom process has not been served, or whose property
has not been attached. In this case, there was no personal notice,
nor an attachment or other proceeding against the land, until
after the judgments. The judgments, therefore, are nullities, and
did not authorize the executions on which the land was sold.”
[*729]
The force and effect of judgments rendered against non-
residents without personal service of process upon them, or their
voluntary appearance, have been the subject of frequent consid-
eration in the courts of the United States, and of the several
states, as attempts have been made to enforce such judgments
in states other than those in which they were rendered, under
the provision of the constitution requiring that “full faith and
credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of every other state”; and the act of Con-
gress providing for the mode of authenticating such acts, records,
and proceedings, and declaring that, when thus authenticated,
“they shall have such faith and credit given to them in every
court within the United States as they have by law or usage in
the courts of the state from which they are or shall be taken."
In the earlier cases, it was supposed that the act gave to all judg-
ments the same effect in other states which they had by law in
the state where rendered. But this view was afterwards qualified



















































































































































CASES ON J UDG MENTS, ETC. 
were confined to cases where the non-resident defendant possessed 
property in the state at the commencement of the action, it would 
still make the validity of the proceedings and j udgment depend 
upon the question whether, before the levy of the execution, the 
defendant had or. had not disposed of the property. If before 
the levy the property should be sold, then, according to this posi­
tion, the j udgment would not be binding. This doctrine would 
introduce a new element of uncertainty in j udicial proceedings. 
The contrary is the law : the validity of every jl!(lgment depends 
u on the · urisdiction of the court before it is rendered no on 
what may occur subsc uent ' n ebster v. Reid, 1 I Howard 
43 , 1e p am 1 c aimed title to land sold under j udgments re­
covered in suits brought in a territorial court of Iowa, upon pub­
lication of notice under a law of the territory, without service of 
process ; and the court said :-
"These suits were not a proceeding iii rem, against the land, J but were i'n personam against the owners of it .  \Vhether they 
, all resided within the territory or not does not appear, nor is it 
a matter of any importance. No person is required to answer in 
a suit on whom process has not been served, or whose property 
has not been attached. In this case, there was no personal notice, 
nor an attachment or other proceeding against the land, until 
after the j udgments. The j udgments, therefore, are nullities, and 
did not authorize the executions on which the land was sold." 
[ * 729 ]  
The force and effect o f  j udgments rendered against non­
residents \vithout personal service of process upon them, or their 
voluntary appearance, have been the subject of frequent consid­
eration in the courts of the United States, and of the several 
states ,  as attempts have been made to enforce such j udgments 
in  states other than those in which they were rendered, under 
the provision of the constitution requiring that "full faith and 
cred i t shal l be given in each state to the public acts, record s, and 
j udicial proceedings of every other state" ; and the act of Con­
gn.'ss providing for the mode of authenticating such acts, records, 
and proceedings, and declaring that, when thus authenticated) 
"they shall have such faith and credit given to them in every 
court with in the Cnited States as they have by law or usage in 
the courts of the state from which they are or shal l be taken ." 
In the earl ier cases, it was supposed that the act gave to all j udg­
ments the same effect in other states which they had by law in 
the state where rendered. But this v iew was afterwards qual ified 
so as to make the act applicable only when the court rendering 
ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION
the judgment had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-
matter, and not to preclude an inquiry into the jurisdiction of
the court in which the judgment was rendered, or the right of the
state itself to exercise authority over the person or the subject-
matter. M’EImoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312. In the case of l)’Arc3I
v. Ketcltziiri, reported in the 11th of Howard, this view is stated
with great clearness. That was an action in the circuit court of
the United States for Louisiana, brought upon a judgment ren-
dered in New York under a state statute, against two joint debt-
ors, only one of whom had been served with the process, the
other being a non-resident of the state. The circuit court held
the judgment conclusive and binding upon the non-resident not
served with process; but this court reversed_its decision, ob-
serving, that it was a familiar rule that countries foreign to our
own disregarded a judgment merely against the person, where
the defendant had not been served with process nor had a day in
court; that national comity was never thus extended; that the
proceeding was deemed an illegitimate assumption of power, and
resisted as mere abuse; that no faith and credit or force and effect
had been given to such judgments by any state of the union, so
far [*73o] as known; and that the state courts had uniformly,
and in many instances, held them to be void. “The international
law,” said the court, “as it existed among the states in 1790, was
that a judgment rendered in one state, assuming to bind the per-
son of a citizen of another, was void within the foreign state
when the defendant had not been served with process or volun-
tarily made defence; because neither the legislative jurisdiction
nor that of courts of justice had binding force.” And the court
held that the act of Congress did not intend to declare a new rule,
or to embrace judicial records of this description. As was stated
in a subsequent case, the doctrine of this court is, that the act
“was not designed to displace that principle of natural justice
which requires a person to have notice of a suit before he can be
conclusively bound by its result, nor those rules of public law
which protect persons and property within one state from the
exercise of jurisdiction over them by another.” The Lafayette
Insurance Co. v. French at al., 18 How. 404.
This whole subject has been very fully and learnedly consid-
ered in the recent case of Thompson v. Whitman, I8 \Vall. 457,
where all the authorities are carefully reviewed and distinguished.
and the conclusion above stated is not only reaffirmed, but the
doctrine is asserted, that the record of a judgment rendered in
















































































































































ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION 53 
the j udgment had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject­
matter, and not to preclude an inquiry into the j urisdiction of 
the court in which the j udgment was rendered, or the right of the 
state itself to exercise authority over the person or the subj ect­
matter. M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 1 3  Pet. 312.  In the case of D'Arc')' 
v. "Ketchum, reported in the 1 1 th of Howard, this view is stated 
with great clearness. That was an action in the circuit court of 
the United States for Louisiana, brought upon a j udgment ren­
dered in New York under a state statute, against two joint debt­
ors, only one of whom had been served with the process, the 
other being a non-resident of the state. The circuit court held 
the j udgment conclusive and binding upon the non-resident not 
served with process ; but this court reversed its decision, ob­
serving, that it  was a familiar rule that countri.es foreign to our 
own disregarded a j udgment merely against the person, where 
the defendant had not been served with process nor had a day in 
court ; that national comity was never thus extended ; that the 
proceeding was deemed an illegitimate assumption of power, and 
resisted as mere abuse ; that no faith and credit or force and effect 
had been given to such j udgments by any state of the union , so 
far [ *730] as known ; and that the state courts had uniformly. 
and in many instances , held them to be void. "The international 
law," said the court, "as it existed among the states in 1 790, was 
that a j udgment rendered in one state, assuming to bind the per­
son of a citizen of another, was void within the foreign state 
when the defendant had not been served with process or volun­
tarily made defence ; because neither the legislat ive j urisdiction 
nor that of courts of j u stice had binding force." And the co�1 rt 
held that the act of Congress did not intend to declare a new rule ,  
or to embrace j udicial records o f  this description. As was stated 
in a subsequent case, the doctrine of this court is, that the act 
"was not designed to displace that principle of natural j ustice 
which requ ires a person to have notice of a suit before he can be 
conclusively bound by its result, nor those rules of public law 
which protect persons and property within · one state from the 
exercise o f  jurisdiction over them by another." The Lafayette 
Insurance Co. v. French ct al., 18 How. 404. 
This whole subj ect has been very fuJly and learnedly consid­
ered in the recent case of Thompson v. Tflhitman, 18 \Vall. 457, 
where all the authorities are carefully reviewed and distinguished, 
and the conclusion above stated is not only reaffirmed, but the 
doctrine is asserted , that the record of a _judgment rendered m 
another state may be contradicted as to the facts necessary to 
54 CASES ON JUDGMENTS, ETC.
give the court jurisdiction against its recital of their existence.
in all the cases brought in the state and federal courts, where
attempts have been made under the act of Congress to give effect
in one state to personal judgments rendered in another state
against non-residents, without service upon them, or upon sub-
stituted service by publication, or in some other form, it has been
held, without an exception, so far as we are aware, that such
judgments were without any binding force, except as to prop-
erty, or interests in property, within the state, to reach and affect
which was the object of the action in which the judgment was
rendered, and which property was brought under control of the
court in connection with the process against the person. The
proceeding in such cases, though in the form of a personal action,
has been uniformly treated, where service was not obtained, and
the party did not voluntarily [*731] appear, as effectual and bind-
ing merely as a proceeding in ram, and as having no operation
beyond the disposition of the property, or some interest therein.
And the reason assigned for this conclusion has been that which
we have already stated, that the tribunals of one state have no
jurisdiction over persons beyond its limits, and can enquire only
into their obligations to its citizens when exercising its conceded
jurisdiction over their property within its li1nits. In Bisscll v.
Briggs, 9 Mass. 462, decided by the supreme court of Massachu-
setts as early as 1813, the law is stated substantially in conformity
with these views. I n that case, the court considered at length the
effect of the constitutional provision, and the act of Congress
mentioned, and after stating that, in order to entitle the judgment
rendered in any court of the United States to the full faith and
c1edit mentioned in the constitution, the court must have had ju-
risdiction not only of the cause, but of the parties, it proceeded to
illustrate its position by observing, that, where a debtor living in
one state has goods, effects, and credits in another, his creditor
living in the other state may have the property attached pursuant
to its laws, and, on recovering judgment, have the property ap-
plied to its satisfaction; and that the party in whose hands the
property was would be protected by the judgment in the state of
the debtor against a suit for it, because the court rendering the
judgment had jurisdiction to that extent; but that if the prop-
erty attached were insufficient to satisfy the judgment, and the
creditor should sue on that judgment in the state of the debtor,
he would fail, because the defendant was not amenable to the
court rendering the judgment. In other words, it was held that
















































































































































54 CA SI�S ON J UDG �l EN 'rS, ETC. 
give the court j urisdiction against its recital of their existence. 
l n  all  the cases brought in the state and federal courts, where 
attempts have been made under the act of Congress to give effect 
in one �tate to personal j udgments rendered in another state 
against non-residents, without service upon them, or upon sub­
stituted service by publication, or in some other form, it has been 
held, w ithout an exception, so far as we are aware, that such 
j udgments were without any binding force, except as to prop­
erty, or interests in property, within the state, to reach and affect 
which was the obj ect of the action in which the j udgment was 
rendered, and which property was brought under control of the 
court in  connection with the process against the person. The 
proceeding in such cases, though in the form of a personal action, 
has been uniform1y treated, where service was not obtained, and 
the party did not voluntarily [*73 1 ]  appear, as effectual and bind­
ing merely as a proceeding in rem, and as having no operation 
beyond the disposition of the property, or some interest therein. 
And the reason assigned for this conclusion has been that which 
we have airea<ly stated, that the tribunals of  one state have no 
j urisdiction over persons beyond its limits, and can enquire only 
into their  ob�igations to i ts citizens when exercising its conceded 
j u risdiction over their property within its limits. In Bissell v. 
Briggs, 9 Mass. 462, decided by the supreme court of .l\'lassachu­
setts a�. early as 1 8 13 ,  the law is  stated substantially in conform ity 
with these views. J n  that case, the court considered at length the 
effect of the constitutional provision, and the act of Congress 
mentioned, and after stating that, in order to entitle the j udgment 
rcmlerc<l in any court of the United States to the full faith and 
c1  edit mentioned in the constitution, the court must have had j u­
ris�l iction not only of the cause, but of the parties, it proceeded to 
i l lustrate its posit ion by observing, that, where a debtor living in 
one state has goods, effects, and credits in  another, his creditor 
liv ing in the other state may have the property attached pursuant 
to its laws,  and, on recovering j udgment, have the property ap­
pl ied to its sat isfaction ; and that the party in whose hands the 
property was would be protected by the j udgment in the state o f  
t h e  debtor against a suit for it, because the court rendering the 
j udgment had ju risdiction to that extent ; but that if the prop­
ertv attached were insufficient to satisfy the j udgment, and the 
cre
.
d i tor should sue on that j udgment in the state of the debtor, 
he would fail , because the defendant was not amenable to the 
court rendering the judgment. In other words, i t  was held that 
over the property w ithin the state the court had j urisd iction by 
ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION
the attachment, but none over his person; and that any determina-
tion of his liability, except so far as was necessary for the dis-
position of- the property, was invalid.
In I'\'ilb0ur1I- v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 37, an action
of debt was brought in New York upon a personal judgment
recovered in hlassachusetts. The defendant in that judgment
was not served with process; and the suit was commenced by the
attachment of a bedstead belonging to the defendant, accompanied
with a summons to appear, served on his wife after she had left
her place in Massaclmsetts. The court held that [*732] the
attachment bound only the property attached as a proceeding
in ram, and that it could not bind the defendant, observing, that
to bind a defendant personally, when he was never personally
summoned or had notice of the proceeding, would be contrary
to the first principles of justice, repeating the language in that
respect of Chief Justice DeGrey, used in the case of Fisher v.
Lane, 3 Wils. 297, in 1772. See also Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns.
(N. Y.) I2I, and the cases there cited, and Harris v. Ha-rdcman
at al., 14 How. 334. To the same purport decisions are found
in all the state courts. In several of the cases, the decision has
been accompanied with the observation that a personal judgment
thus recovered has no binding force without the state in which
it is rendered, implying that in such state it may be valid and
binding. But if the court has no jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant by reason of his non—residence, and, conse-
quently, no authority to pass upon his personal rights and obliga-
tions; if the whole proceeding, without service upon him or his
appearance, is coram non judicc and void; if to hold a defendant
bound by such a judgment is contrary to the first principles of
justice,—it is difficult to see how the judgment can legitimately
have any force within the state. The language used can be justi-
ficd only on the ground that there was no mode of directly re-
viewing such judgment or impeaching its validity within the state
where rendered; and that, therefore, it could be called in question
only when its enforcement was elsewhere attempted. In later
cases, this language is repeated with less frequency than formerly,
it beginning to be considered, as it always ought to have been.
that a judgment which can be treated in any state of this union
as contrary to the first principles of justice, and as an absolute
nullit_v, because rendered without any jurisdiction of the tribunal
over the party, is not entitled to any respect in the state where
















































































































































EI.EMENTS OF J URISDICTION 55 
the attachment, but none over his person ; and that any determina­
t ion of his l iabil ity, except so far as was necessary for the dis­
position of - the property, was invalid. 
In Kilboum v. Wood,worth, 5 Johns. ( N. Y. ) 37, an action 
of debt was brought in New York upon a personal j udgment 
recovered in l\Iassachusetts. The defendant in that j udgment 
was not served with process ; and the suit was commenced bv the 
attachment of a bedstead belonging to the defendant, accompanied 
with a summons to appear, served on his wife after she had left 
her place in �fassachusetts. The court held that [ *132]  the 
attachment bound only the property attached as a proceeding 
fo rem, and that it  could not bind the defendant, observing, that 
to bind a defendant personally, when he was never personally 
summoned or had notice of the proceeding, would be contrary 
to the first principles of justice, repeating the language in that 
respect of Chief Justice DeGrey, used in the case o f  Fisher v. 
Lane, 3 \Vils. 297, in 1 772. Sec also Borden v. Fitch, 1 .5  Johns. 
( N .  Y. ) 1 2 1 ,  and the cases there cited, and Harris v. Hardeman 
ct al., 14 How. 334. To the same purport decisions are found 
in all the state courts. In several of the cases, the decision has 
been accompanied w ith the observation that a personal judgment 
thus recovered has no binding force without the state in which 
i t  is rendered, implying that in such state it may be valid and 
binding. But if the court has no j urisdiction over the person 
of the defendant by reason of his non-residence, and, conse­
quently, no authority to pass upon his personal rights and obliga­
tions ; if the ·whole proceeding, without service upon him or his 
appearance, i s  coram 11 on judicc and void ; i f  to hold a defendant 
bound by such a j udgment is contrary to the first principles of 
j ustice,-it is  difficult to see how the j udgment can legitimately 
have any force within the state. The language used can be j usti­
fied only on the ground that there was no mode of  directly re­
viewing such j udgment or impeaching its validity within the state 
where rendered ; and that, therefore, it could be called in question 
only when its enforcement was elsewhere attempted. In later 
cases, th i s  language is  repeated with less frequency than formerly, 
i t  beginn ing to be considered , as it  always ought to have been , 
that a j11dgment which can be treated in  any state of this un ion 
as contrary to the first principles of justice, and as an absol ute 
null ity, because rendered \vithout any j ur i sdiction of the tribnnal 
over the party, i s  not entitled to any respect in the state where 
rendered. Smith v.  AfcCutchcon, 38 Mo. 4 1 5 ; Darra11cc v. I'rcs-
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ton, 18 Iowa, 396 ; Hake: v. Shupe, 27 id. 465; M itchell’s Admin-
istrator v. Gray, 18 Ind. 123.
Be that as it may, the courts of the United States are not
required to give effect to judgments of this character when any
rights are claimed under them. Whilst they are not foreign tri-
bunals in their relations to the state courts, they are tribunals
[*733] of a different sovereignty, exercising a distinct and inde-
pendent jurisdiction, and are bound to give to the judgments of
the state courts only the same faith and credit which the courts
of another state are bound to give to them.
Since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment to the fed-
eral constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly
questioned, and their enforcement in the state resisted, on the
ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the
personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court
has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law. “that;
ever ditficulty may be experienced in ivm hose tern
de m on \ r em race every permissible exertion of pgwer
a ecting rivate ri hts and exclud uch as is forbiddenl there
can be no doubt Qf their meaning when applied to judicial pro-.
ceedin s. The »' then mean a course of le 1 r eedings accord:
ing to those rules nd principles wl_1_ich haye been €_$_l;Zlllli_$l_l_€LL iu.~_
our systems of jurisprudence for the rotection and enforcement,
0 we suc1 roceedings any validity, there
0
I-]ll1St be a tribunal competent by its constitution .
law of its creation—to ass 11 on the sub'ect-inatter_of_tl1e_su~it-‘r
and, if that involves merel' a mination of the erson ‘ -
bihty 0 tie e endant, he must be brought within
'service of rocess " ' ‘ ' r-'a) earan .
Except in cases affecting the personal status of the plaintiff,
and cases in which that mode of service may be considered to have
been assented to in advance, as hereinafter mentioned, the substi-
tuted service of process by publication, allowed by the law of
Oregon and by similar laws in other states, where actions are
brought against non-residents, is effectual only where, in connec-
tion with process against the person for commencing the action.
property in the state is brought under the control of the court,
and subjected to its disposition by process adapted to that pur-
pose, or where the judgment is sought as a means of reaching
such property or affecting some interest therein: in other words,
where the action is in the nature of a proceeding in rem. As
stated by Cooley in his treatise on Constitutional Limitations, 40;,
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ton, 18 Iowa, 3¢ ; Hakes v. Shupe, 27 id. 465 ; Mitchell's Admin­
istrator v. Gray, 18 Ind. 123. 
Be that as it may, the courts of the United States are not 
required to give effect to judgments of this character when any 
rights are claimed under them. Whilst they are not foreign tri­
bunals in their relations to the state courts, they are tribunals 
[*733 ] of a different sovereignty, exercising a distinct and inde­
pendent jurisdiction, and are bound to give to the judgments of 
the state courts only the same faith and credit which the courts 
of another state are bound to give to them. 
Since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment to the fed­
eral constitution, the validity of such j udgments may be directly 
questioned, and their enforcement in the state resisted, on the 
ground that proceedings in a court of j ustice to determine the 
personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court 
has no j uri sdiction do not constitute due process of law. \'lhat.=. 
ever difficulty may be experienced in 1 m ose t r 
de n on ' r  ;\'J em ra�e _ ever_y�missi_�!e_ exert ion of p_Qlver 
a ect ing private r ights, an<l exclude such as i s  forbid9en.i. there 
can be no doubt of thei r meaning when appl ied to jud ic ial  pro­
ceed ings . They then mean a course of legal proceedings accord­
ing to those rules and principles which have been e.!:2.tablishetl. in_ 
our systems of J u risprudence for the rotect ion and en forcwcnt. 
o nva o ive sue 1 roceed ings any validity ,  there 
tl1l1 St be a tribunal competent by its constitut ion- la IS J • 
law of its  creation-to ass u on the sub · ect-matter of the iuit-; 
an , i f  that involves mere! • a minat ion o f  the e rson · 
bihty o t 1e e endant, he must be brought with.in. its jmisr!iction 
bJ service of process within the state, or his voluntary appearance:._ 
Except i n  cases affecting the personal status of the plaint iff , 
and cases i n  which that mode of service may be considered to have 
been assented to in advance, as hereina fter mentioned, the substi­
tuted service of  process by publication,  allowed by the law of 
Oregon and by s imi lar Jaws i n  other states, where actions are 
brought against non-residents, is  effe.ctual only where, in connec­
tion w i th process against the person -for commencing the act ion, 
property in the state is brought under the control of the court, 
and subj ected to its d i spos ition by process adapted to that pur­
pose, or where the judgment is sought as a means of reach ing 
such property or affecting some interest therein : in other words,  
where the action is  in the nature of a proceeding in rem .  As 
stated by Cooley in his treati se on Constitutional Limitat ions , 40 .� .  
for any other purpose than to subj ect the property o f  a non-rcsi-
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dent to valid claims against [*734] him in the state, “due process
of law would require appearance or personal service before the
defendant could be personally bound by any judgment rendered.”
It is true that, in a strict sense, a proceeding in rem is one
taken directly against property, and has for its object the disposi-
tion of the property, without reference to the title of individual
claimants ; but, in a larger and more general sense, the terms are
applied to actions between_parties, where the direct object is to
reach and dispose of property owned by them, or of some interest
therein. Such are cases commenced by attachment against the
property of debtors, or instituted to partition real estate, foreclose
a mortgage, or enforce a lien. So far as they affect property in
the state, they are substantially proceedings in -rem in the broader
sense which we have mentioned.
It is hardly necessary to observe, that in all we have said we
have had reference to proceedings in courts of first instance, and
to their jurisdiction, and not to proceedings in an appellate tri-
bunal to review the action of such courts. The latter may be
taken upon such notice, personal or constructive, as the state
creating the tribunal may provide. They are considered as rather
a continuation of the original litigation than the commencement
of a new action. Nations et al. v. Johnson et al., 24 How. 195.
It follows from the views expressed that the personal judg-
ment recovered in the state court of Oregon against the plaintiff
herein, then a non-resident of the state, was without any validity,
and did not authorize a sale of the property in controversy.
To prevent any misapplication of the views expressed in this
opinion, it is proper to observe that we do not mean to assert, by
any thing we have said, that a state may not authorize proceed-
ings to determine the status of one of its citizens towards a non- ,
resident which would be binding within the state, though made
without service of process or personal notice to the non-resident.
The jurisdiction which every state possesses to determine the civil
status and capacities of all its inhabitants involves authority to
prescribe the conditions on which proceedings affecting them may
be commenced and carried on within its territory. The state, for
example, has absolute [*735] right to prescribe the conditions
upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall
be'created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved. One of
the parties guilty of acts for which, by the law of the state, a dis-
solution may be granted, may have removed to a state where no
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dent to valid claims against [*734] him in the state, "due process 
of law would require appearance or personal service before the 
defendant could be personally bound by any judgment rendered." 
It is true that, in a strict sense, a proceeding in rem is one 
taken directly against property, and has for its obj ect the disposi­
tion of the property, without reference to the title of individual 
claimants ; but, in a larger and more general sense, the terms are 
applied to actions between . parties, where the direct object is to 
reach and dispose of property owned by them, or of some interest 
therein. Such are cases commenced by attachment against the 
property of debtors, or instituted to partition real estate, foreclose 
a mortgage, or enforce a lien . So far as they affect property in 
the state, they are substantially proceedings i1' rem in the broader 
sense which we have mentioned. 
It is hardly necessary to observe, that in all we have said we 
have had reference to proceedings in courts of  first instance, and 
to their juri sdiction, and not to proceedings in an appellate tri­
bunal to review the action of such courts. The latter may be 
taken upon such notice, personal or constructive, as the state 
creating the tribunal may provide. They are considered as rather 
a continuation of the original litigation than the commencement 
of a new action. Natio 1ls et al. v. Johnson  et al. ,  24 How .  195. 
It follows from the views expressed that the personal j udg­
ment recovered in the state court of Oregon against the plain tiff 
herein, then a non-resident of the state, was without any valid ity, 
and did not authorize a sale of the property in controversy. 
To prevent any misapplication of the views expressed in this 
opinion, it is proper to observe that we do not mean to assert, by 
any thing we have said, that a state may not authorize proceed­
ings to determine the status of one of its citizens towards a non- . 
resident which would be binding within the state, though made 
without service Qf process or personal not ice to the non-resident. 
The jurisdiction which every state possesses to determine the civil 
status and capacities of all its inhabitants involves authority to 
prescribe the conditions on which proceedings affecting them may 
be commenced and carried on within i ts territory. The state, for 
example, has absolute [*735 ] right to prescribe the conditions 
upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall 
be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved. One of  
the parties guilty of  acts for which, by the law of the state, a dis­
solution may be granted, may have removed to a state where no 
dissolution is permitted. The complaining party would , there-
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/
fore, fail if a divorce were sought in the state of the defendant;
and if application could not be made to the tribunals of the com-
plainant's domicile in such case, and proceedings be there insti-
tuted without personal service of process of personal notice to
the. offending party, the injured citizen would be without redress.
Bish. Marr. and Div., § 156.
Neither do we mean to assert that a state may not require a
non-resident entering into a partnership or association within its
limits, or making contracts enforceable there, to appoint an agent
or representative in the state to receive service of process and
notice in legal proceedings instituted with respect to such partner-
ship, association, or contracts, or to designate a place where such
service may be made and notice given, and provide, upon their
failure, to make such appointment or to designate such place that
service may be made upon a public ofiicer designated for that
purpose, or in some other prescribed way, and that judgments
rendered upon such service may not be binding upon the non-
rcsidents both within and without the state. As was said by the
/, court of cxchequer in Vallcc v. Dumergue, 4 Exch. 290, “It is not
' contrary to natural justice that a man who has agreed to receive
a particular mode of notification of legal proceedings should be
bound by a. judgment in which that particular mode of notification
has been followed, even though he may not have actual notice of
them.” See also The Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French et al., 18
llow. 404, and G-illcspic v. Commercial Mutual Marine Imsurance
Co., I2 Gray (Mass.) 201. Nor do we doubt that a state, on
creating corporations or other institutions for pecuniary or char-
itable purposes, may provide a mode in which their conduct may
be investigated, their obligations enforced, or their charters re-
voked, which shall require other than personal service upon their
officers or members. Parties becoming members of such corpora-
tions or institutions would hold their [*736] interest subject to
the conditions prescribed by law. C0[n'n v. /ldamson, Law Rep.
9 Es 345-
In the present case, there is no feature of this kind, and, con-
sequently, no consideration of what would be the effect of such
legislation in enforcing the contract of a non-resident can arise.
The question here respects only the validity of a money judgment
rendered in one state, in an action upon a simple contract against
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fore, fai l  i f  a divorce were sought in the state of the defendant ; 
and i f  appl ication could not be made to the tribunals of the com­
pla inan t 's domicile in such case, and proceedings be there insti­
tuted wi thout personal service of process of personal notice to 
the offending party, the inj ured citizen would be without redress. 
Bish. Marr. and Div., § I 56. 
1\ ei ther <lo we mean to assert that a state may not require a 
non-resident entering into a partnership or association within its 
l imits, or making contracts enforceable there, to appoint an agent 
or representative in the state to receive service of process and 
notice in legal proceed ings instituted with respect to such partner­
ship, association, or contracts, or to designate a place where such 
service may be made and notice given, and provide, upon their 
failure, to make such appointment or to designate such place that 
service may be made upon a public officer designated for that 
purpose, or in some other prescribed way, and that j udgmf:'nts 
rendered upon such service may not be binding upon the non-
residents both within and without the state. As was said by the 
.I, court of exchequer in Vallee v. Dumerg ue, 4 Exch. 290, "It is not 
contrary to natural j ustice that a man who has agreed to receive 
::i. particular mode of notification of legal proceedings should be 
bound by a.  j udgment in which that particular mode of notification 
' has been fol lowed, even though he may not have actual notice of  
them." See also The Lafayette Insurance Co. v. Fre11cli e t  al., 1 8  
, I low.  404, and G1'/lcspie v.  Co mmercial Jlutual Jl.f arinc Insuran ce 
Co., I 2 Gray ( Mass . ) 20 I .  N' or do we doubt that a state, on 
creat ing corporations or other in stitutions for pecuniary or char­
i table purposes, may provide a mode in which their  conduct may 
be investigated, their obl igations enforced , or their charters re­
YC >kecl, which shall require other than personal service upon their 
officers or members. Part ies becoming members of such corpora­
tions or institutions would hold their [ * 736] interest stthj cct to 
the conditions prescribed by law. Copin v. A damso n ,  Law Rep. 
�J E x . 345 . 
In the present case, there is no feature of this k ind , and , con­
seq uently,  no consideration of what \vould be the effect of such 
legi slat ion in enforcing the con tract of a non-resident can arise. 
The quest ion here respects only the val id i ty of a money j mlg-ment 
renclere<I i n one state, in  an action upon a s imple contract ag-a inst 
the resident of another, without service of process upon him,  or 
h1s appearance therein. 
Judgm ent affirm ed. 
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umv. or um. um ununv.
HUNT, ]., dissenting. I am compelled to dissent from the
opinion and judgment of the court, and, deeming the question
involved to be important, I take leave to record my views upon
it. * * '
The judgment of this court is based upon the theory that the
legislature had no power to pass the law in question; that the
principle of the statute is vicious, and every proceeding under it
void. It, therefore, afiects all like cases, past and future, and in
every state. * * * [*737]
The result of the authorities on the subject, and the sound
conclusions to be drawn from the principles which should govern
the decision, as I shall endeavor to show, are these :—-
_I. A sovereign state must necessarily have such control
over the real and personal property actually being within its lim-
its, as that it may subject the same to the payment of debts justly
due to its citizens.
2. This result is not altered by the circumstance that the
owner of the property is non-resident, and so absent from the
state that legal process cannot be served upon him personally.
3. Personal notice of a proceeding by which title to prop-
erty is passed is not indispensable; it is competent to the state to
authorize substituted service by publication or otherwise, as the
commencement of a suit against non-residents, the judgment in
which will authorize the sale of property in such state.
4. It belongs to the legislative power of the state to deter-
mine what shall be the modes and means proper to be adopted
to give notice to an absent defendant of the commencement of a
suit; and if they are such as are reasonably likely to communi-
cate to him information of the proceeding against him, and are
in good faith designed to give him such information, and an op-
portunity to defend is provided for him in the event of his ap-
pearance in the suit, it is not competent to the judiciary to de-
clare tha‘uch proceeding is void as not being by due process of
law.
5. VVhether the property of such non-resident shall be seized
[*738] upon attachment as the commencement of a suit which
shall be carried into judgment and execution, upon which it shall
then be sold, or whether it shall be sold upon an execution and
judgment without such preliminary seizure, is a matter not of
constitutional power, but of municipal regulation only.
To say that a sovereign state has the power to ordain that
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Hu N T, J. ,  dissenting. I am compelled to dissent from the 
opinion and j udgment of the court, and, deeming the question 
involved to be important, I take leave to record my views upon 
it. * * ;� 
The j u<lgment of this court is  based upon the theory that the 
legislature had no power to pass the law in question ; that the 
principle of the statute is vicious, and every proceeding under it 
void. It, therefore, affects all like cases, past and future, and in 
every state. * * * [*737]  
The result o f  the authorities on the subject, and the sound 
conclusions to be drawn from the principles which should govern 
the decision , as I shall endeavor to show, are these :-
. 1 .  A sovereign state must necessarily have such control 
over the real and personal property actually being within its lim­
its, as that it may subj ect the same to the payment o f  debts j ustly 
due to its citizens. 
2. This result is not altered by the circumstance that the 
owner of the property is non-resident, and so absent from the 
state that legal process cannot be served upon him personally. 
3. Personal notice of a proceeding by which title to prop­
erty is passed is not indispensable ; it is competent to the state to 
authorize substituted service by publication or otherwise, as the 
commencement of a suit against non-residents, the j udgment in 
which will authorize the sale of property in such state. 
4. It belongs to the legislative power of the state to deter­
mine what shall be the mo<les and means proper to be adopted 
to give notice to an absent defendant of the commencement of a 
suit ; and i f  they are such as are reasonably likely to communi­
cate to him information of the proceeding against him, and are 
in good faith designed to give him such information, and an op­
portunity to defend is provided for him in the event of h is  ap­
pearance in the suit, it is not competent to the j udiciary to de­
clare thaeuch proceeding is void as not being by du� process of 
law. 
5 .  \Vhether the property of  such non-resident shall be  seized 
[ *738] upon attachment as the commencement of a suit which 
shall be carried into j udgment and execution, upon which it  shall 
then be sold , or whether it shall be sold upon an execution and 
j udgment without such prel iminary seizure, is a matter not of 
constitutional power, but of  municipal regulation only. 
To say that a sovereign state has the power to ordain that 
the property of non-residents within its territory may be sub-
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jected to the payment of debts due to its citizens, if the property
is levied upon at the commencement of a suit, but that it has not
such power if the property is levied upon at the end of the suit,
is a refinement and a depreciation of a great general principle
that, in my judgment, cannot be sustained. * * *
ST. CLAIR v. COX, in U. S. Sup. Ct., Dec. 18, 1882—Io6 U. S. 350, I Sup.
Ct. Rep. 354.
Action in the circuit court of the United States for the
Eastern District of Michigan, on two notes for $2,500 each.
The defense was failure of consideration. On the trial defend-
ants offered in evidence acertified copy of the record of a judg-
ment recovered by them in the circuit court for Marquette county,
Mich., against the VVinthrop Mining Co., an Illinois corporation,
the payee of the notes. This evidence was excluded and judg-
ment given for the plaintiff for the amount claimed. The de-
fendants bring the case here by writ of error, and the exclusion
(of the record of the judgment is the only error assigned.
FIELD, _]'. * * * The judgment of the circuit court in Michi-
gan was rendered in an action commenced by attachment. If
the plaintiffs in that action were, at its commencement, residents
of the state, of which some doubt is expressed by counsel, the
jurisdiction of the court, under the writ, to dispose of the prop-
erty attached, cannot be doubted, so far as was necessary to
satisfy their demand. No question was raised as to the validity
of the judgment to that extent. The objection to it was as evi-
dence [*352] that the amount rendered was an existing obliga-
tion or debt against the company. If the court had not acquired
jurisdiction over the company, the judgment established nothing
as to its liability, beyond the amount which the proceeds of the
property discharged. There was no appearance of the company
in the action, and judgment against it was rendered Qr $6,450
by default. The ofi‘icer,to whom the writ of attachment was
issued, returned that, by virtue of it, he had seized and attached
certain specified personal property of the defendant, and had
also served a copy of the writ, with a copy of the inventory of
the property attached, on the defendant, “by delivering the same
to Henry ]. Colwell, Esq., agent of the said Winthrop Mining
Company, personally, in said county.”
The laws of Michigan provide for attaching property of
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j ected to the payment of debts due to its citizens, if the property 
is levied upon at the commencement of a suit, but that it has not 
such power if the property is levied upon at the end of the suit, 
is  a refinement and a depreciation of a great general principle 
that, in my judgment, cannot be sustained. * * * 
ST. CLAIR v. COX, in U. S. Sup. Ct., Dec. 18, 1882-100 U. S. 350, 1 Sup. 
Ct. Rep. 354-
Action in the circuit court of the United States for the 
Eastern District of Michigan, on two notes for $2,500 each. 
The defense was failure of consideration. On the trial defend­
ants offered in evidence a certified copy of the record of a j udg­
ment recovered by them in the circuit court for Marquette county, 
Mich . ,  against the \Vinthrop l'.f ining Co. ,  an Illinois corporation, 
the payee of the notes. This evidence was excluded and judg­
ment given for the plaintiff for the amount claimed. The de­
fendants bring the case here by writ of error, and the exclusion (of the record o f  the judgment is the only error assigned. 
FIELD, J. * * * The j udgment of the circuit court in Michi­
gan was rendered in an action commenced by attachment. If 
the plaintiffs in that action were, at its commencement, residents 
of the state, of which some doubt is expressed by counsel , the 
jurisdiction of the court, under the writ, to dispose of the prop­
erty attached , cannot be doubted , so far as was necessary to 
sat i sfy their demand. No question was raised as to the validity 
of the j udgment to that extent. The objection to it was as evi­
<lcnce [ *352] that the amount rendered was an existing obl iga­
tion or debt against the company. If the court had not acquired 
j urisdiction over the company, the j udgment established nothing 
as to its liability, beyond the amount which the proceeds of the 
property discharged. There was no appearance of the company 
in the action, and judgment against it was rendered .r $6.450 
by default. The officer, · to whom the writ of attachment was 
issued, returned that, by virtue of it, he had seized and attached 
certain specified personal property of the defendant, and had 
also served a copy of the writ, with a copy o f  the inventory of 
the property attached , on the defendant, "by del ivering the same 
to Henry J. Colwell, Esq. , agent of the said Winthrop Mining 
Company, personally, in said county." 
The laws of Michigan provide for attaching property of 
absconding, fraudulent, and non-resident debtors and of foreign 
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corporations. They require that the writ issued to the sheriff,
or other officer by whom it is to be served, shall direct him to
attach the property of the defendant, and to summon him if he
be found within the county, and also to serve on him a copy of
the attachment and of the inventory of the property attached.
They also declare that where a copy of the writ of attachment
has been personally served on the defendant, the same proceed-
ings may be had thereon in the suit in all respects as upon the
return of an original writ of summons personally served where
suit is commenced by such summons. 2 Comp. Laws, 187I, sects.
6397 and 6413.
They also provide, in the chapter regulating proceedings by
and against corporations, that “suits against corporations may
be commenced by original writ of summons, or by declaration,
in the same manner that personal actions may be commenced
against individuals, and such writ, or a copy of such declaration,
in any suit against a corporation, may be served on the presiding
otficer, the cashier, the secretary, or the treasurer thereof; or,
if there be no such officer, or none can be found, such service
may be made on such other officer or member of such corpora-
tion, or in such other manner, as the court in which such suit
is brought may direct ;”,and that “in suits commenced by attach-
ment in favor of a resident of this state against any corporation
created by or under the laws of any other state, [*353] govern-
ment, or country, if a copy of such attachment and of the in-
ventory of property attached shall have been personally served
on any oflicer, member, clerk, or agent of such corporation within
this state, the same proceedings shall be thereupon had, and with
like effect, as in case of an attachment against a natural person,
which shall have been returned served in like manner upon the
defendant.” 2 Comp. Laws, 1871, sects. 6544 and 6550.
The courts of the United States only regard judgments of
the state courts establishing personal demands as having validity
or as importing verity where they have been rendered upon
personal citation of the party, or, what is the same thing, of
those empowered to receive process for him, or upon his volun-
tary appearance.
In Pemzoyer v. Nefi’ [rmfe 41] we had occasion to consider at
length the manner in which state courts can acquire jurisdiction
to render a personal judgment against non-residents which would
be received as evidence in the federal courts; and we held that
personal service of citation on the party or his voluntary appear-
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corporations. They require that the writ issued to the sheriff, 
or other officer by whom it is to be served, shall direct him .to 
attach the property of the defendant, and to summon him i f  he 
be found within the county, and also to serve on him a copy of 
the attachment and of the inventory of the property attached. 
They also declare that where a copy of the writ of attachment 
has been personally served on the defendant, the same proceed­
ings may be had thereon in the suit in all respects as upon the 
return of an original writ of summons personally served where 
suit is commenced by such summons. 2 Comp. Laws, 187 1 ,  sects. 
6397 and 641 3. 
They also provide, in the chapter regulating proceedings by 
and against corporations, that "suits against corporations may 
be commenced by original writ of summons, or by declaration, 
in the same manner that personal actions may be commenced 
against individuals, and such writ, or a copy of such declaration, 
in any suit against  a corporation, may be served on the presiding 
officer, the cashier, the secretary, or the treasurer thereof ; or, 
if there be no such officer, or none can be found, such service 
may be made on such other officer or member of such corpora­
tion, or in such other manner, as the court in which such suit 
is brought may direct ;", and that "in suits commenced by attach­
ment in favor of a resident of this state against any corporation 
created by or under the laws of any other state, [*353] govern­
ment, or country, if a copy of such attachment and of the in­
ventory of property attached shall have been personally served 
on any officer, member, clerk, or agent of such corporation within 
this state, the same proceedings shall be thereupon had, and with 
l ike effect, as in case of  an attachment against a natural person, 
which shall have been returned served in like manner upon the 
defendant." 2 Comp. Laws, 187 1 ,  sects. 6544 and 6550. 
The courts of the United States only regard judgments of 
the state courts establishing personal demands as having validity 
or as importing verity where they have been rendered upon 
personal citation of the party, or, what is the same thing, of 
those empowered to receive process for him, or upon his volun­
tary appearance. 
In Pemwyer v. N cff [ aufe 4 1 ] we had occasion to consider at 
length the manner in which state courts can acquire jurisdiction 
to render a personal judgment against non-residents which would 
be received as evidence in the federal courts ; and we held that 
personal service of citation on the party or his voluntary appear­
ance was, with some exceptions, essential to the j urisdiction of 
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the court. The exceptions related to those cases where proceed-
ings are taken in a state to determine the status of one of its
citizens towards a non-resident, or where a party has agreed to
accept a notification to others or service on them as citation to
himself. 95 U. S. 714.
The doctrine of that case applies, in all its force, to personal
;'judgments of state courts against foreign corporations. The
ourts rendering them must have acquired jurisdiction over the
party by personal service or voluntary appearance, whether the
party he a corporation or a natural person. There is only this
difference: a corporation being an artificial being, can act only
( through agents, and only through them can be reached, and
- process must, therefore, be served upon them. In the state where
a corporation is formed it is not diflicult to ascertain who are
authorized to represent and act for it. Its charter or the statutes
of the state will indicate in whose hands the control and manage-
ment of its affairs are placed. Directors are readily found, as
also the officers appointed by them to manage its business. hit
I!‘ the moment the boundary [*354] of the state is passed difliculties
arise; it is not so easy to determine who represent the corpora-
\tion there, and under what circumstances service on them will
bind it.
Formerly it was held that a foreign corporation could not be
sued in an action for the recovery of a- personal demand outside
of the state by which it was chartered. The principle that a
corporation must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot,
as said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney, migrate to another sov-
ereignty, coupled with the doctrine that an officer of the cor-
poration does not carry his functions with him when he leaves
his state, prevented the maintenance of personal actions against
it. There was no mode of compelling its appearance in the for-
eign jurisdiction. Legal proceedings there against it were, there-
fore, necessarily confined to the disposition of such property
belonging to it as could be there found; and to authorize them
legislation was necessary. .
In JlIcQncen v. llfiddlefori Manufactmfng Co., decided in
1819, the Supreme Court of New York, in considering the ques-
tion whether the law of that state authorized an attachment
against the property of a foreign corporation. expressed the
opinion that a foreign corporation could not be sued in the
state, and gave as a reason that the process must be served on
the head or principal officer within the jurisdiction of the sov-
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the court. The exceptions related to those cases where proceed­
ings are taken in a state to determine the status of one of its 
citizens towards a non-resident, or where a party has agreed to 
accept a notification to others or service on them as citation to 
himself. 95 U. S. 714. 
The doctrine of that case appl ies, in all its force, to personal 
)j udgments of  state courts against foreign corporations. The 
G, ourts rendering them must have acquired j urisdiction over the party by personal service or voluntary appearance, whether the party be a corporation or a natural person. There is only this ( difference : a corporation being an artificial being, can act only 
through agents, and only through them can be reached, and 
process must, therefore, be served upon them. In the state where 
a corporation is formed it is not difficult to ascertain who are 
authorized to represent and act for it. Its charter or the statutes 
of the state w ill indicate in whose hands the control and manage­
ment of its affairs are placed. Di rectors are readily found.  as 
. also the officers appointed by them to manage its business. llut 
i the moment the boundary [*354] of  the state i s  passed difficulties \1 arise ; i t  is not so easy to determine who represent the corpora­
tion there, and under what circumstances service on them wil l  
. bind it. 
Formerly it was held that a foreign corporation could not be 
sued in an action for the recovery of a personal demand outside 
of  the state by which it was chartered . The principle that a 
corporation must dwell in the place of  its creation , and cannot, 
as said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney, migrate to another sov­
ereignty, coupled with the doctrine that an officer of the cor­
poration does not carry his functions with him when he leaves 
his state, prevented the maintenance of personal actions against 
it. There was no mode of  compelling its appearance in the for­
eign jurisdiction. Legal proceedings there against it were, there­
fore, necessarily confined to the disposition of such property 
belonging to it as could be there found ; and to authorize them 
legislation was necessary. 
In ��fcQ11ce1t v. ll.f£ddleto11, �Manufacturing Co. ,  decided in 
18IC), the Supreme Court of New York, in considering the ques­
tion whether the law of that state authorized an attachment 
against the property of a foreign corporation. expresse<l the 
opinion that a foreign corporation could not be sued in the 
state, and gave as a reason that the process must he served on 
the head or principal officer within the jurisdiction of the sov­
ereignty where the artificial body existed ; observing that if the 
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president of a bank went to New York from another state he
would not represent the corporation there; and that "his func-
tions and his character would not accompany him when he moved
beyond the jurisdiction of the government under whose laws he
derived this character.” 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 5. The opinion thus
expressed was not, perhaps, necessary to the decision of the case,
but nevertheless it has been accepted as correctly stating the law.
It was cited with approval by the Supreme Court of Massachu-
setts, in 1834, in Peckham v. North Parish in Haverlzill, the court
adding that all foreign corporations were without the jurisdiction
of the process of the courts of the commonwealth. 16 Pick.
(Mass) 274. Similar expressions of opinion are found in numer-
ous decisions, accompanied sometimes with suggestions that the
doctrine might be otherwise if the foreign corporation sent its
[*355] officer to reside in the state and transact business there
on its account. Libbey v. Hodgdon, 9 N. H. 394; Moulin v.
Trenton Insurance Co., 24 N. J. L. 222.
This doctrine of the exemption of a corporation from suit in
a state other than that of its creation was the cause of much
inconvenience, and often of manifest injustice. The great in-
crease in the number of corporations of late years, and the im-
mense extent of their business, only made this inconvenience and
injustice more frequent and marked. Corporations now enter
into all the industries of the country. The business of banking.
mining, manufacturing, transportation, and insurance is almost
entirely carried on by them, and a large portion of the wealth
of the country is in their hands. Incorporated under the laws
of one state, they carry on the most extensive operations in other
states. To meet and obviate this inconvenience and injustice,\
the legislatures of several states interposed, and provided for.
service of process on officers and agents of foreign corporationsl
doing business therein. \Vhilst the theoretical and legal view,
that the domicile of a corporation is only in the state where it
is created, was admitted, it was perceived that when a foreign
corporation sent its officers and agents into other states and
opened offices, and carried on its business there, it was, in effect,
as much represented by them there as in the state of its creation.
As it was protected by the laws of those states, allowed to carry
on its business within their borders, and to sue in their courts,
it seemed only right that it should be held responsible in those
courts to obligations and liabilities there incurred.
All that there is in the legal residence of a corporation in
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president of  a bank went to Kew York from another state he 
would not represent the corporat ion there ; and that "his func ­
tions and h is  character would not accompany him when he moved 
beyond the j urisdict ion of the government under whose laws he 
derived this character." 16 Johns. ( N . Y. ) 5. The opinion thus 
expressed was not, perhaps, necessary to the decision of the case, 
but nevertheless it has been accepted as correctly stating the law. 
It was cited with approval by the Supreme Court of  Massachu­
setts ,  in  1 834, in  Peckham v. l\'orth Parish iii Haverhill, the court 
adding that all foreign corporations were without the j urisdiction 
of the process of the courts of the commonwealth. 16 Pick. 
( :l\Iass . )  274. Similar expressions of opinion are found in numer­
ous decisions, accompanied sometimes with suggestions that the 
doctrine might be otherwise if the foreign corporation sent its 
[ *355] officer to reside in the state and transact business there 
on its account .  Libb e}' v. Hodgdon,  9 N. H. 394 ; Jfo u/in v. 
Trc11ton Insurance Co ., 24 N. ]. L. 222. 
This doctrine of the exemption of a corporation from suit in 
a state other than that of its creation was the cause of much 
inconvenience, and often of manifest injustice. The great in­
crease in the number of corporations of late years, and the im­
mense extent of their business, only made this inconvenience and 
injustice more frequent and marked. Corporations now enter 
into all the industries of the country .  The business of banking. 
mining, manufacturing, transportation, and insu rance is almost 
entirely carried on by them, and a large portion of the \vealth 
of the country i s  in thei r hands. Incorporated under the laws 
of one state, they carry on the most extensive operat ions in other 
states. To meet and obviate this inconvenience and injustice, \ 
the legislatures of several states interposed , and provided for .. 
service of  process on officers and agents of foreign corporations I 
doing business therein .  \Vhilst the theoretical and legal view, 
that the domicile of a corporation is only in the state where i t  
i s  created , \va s  admitted, it was perceived that  when a foreign 
corporation sent i t s  officers and agents into other states and 
opened offices, and carried on its business there, i t  was,  in effect, 
as much represented by them there as in the state of i t s  creat ion. 
As it was protected by the la  \\'S of those states ,  allowed to carry 
on i ts  business wi thin their borders, and to sue in their courts. 
it  seemed only right that i t  should be held responsible in those 
courts to obl igations and l iabi l i t ies there incurred. 
All that there is in the legal residence of a corpo ration in 
the state of  its creation consi sts in  the fact that hy i ts laws the 
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corporators are associated together and allowed to exercise as
a body certain functions, with a right of succession in its mem-
bers. Its officers and agents constitute all that is visible of its
existence; and they may be authorized to act for it without as
well as within the state. There would seem, therefore, to be no
sound reason why, to the extent of their agency, they should not
be equally deemed to represent it in the states for which they
are respectively appointed when it is called to legal responsibility
for their transactions.
[*356] The case is unlike that of suits against individuals.
They can act by themselves, and upon them process can be
directly served, but a corporation can only act and be reached
through agents. Serving process on its agents in other states, '
for matters within the sphere of their agency, is, in efiect, serving
process on it as much so as if such agents resided in the state
where it was created.
I A corporation of one state cannot do business in another
1 state without the latter’s consent, express or implied, and that
L consent may be accompanied with such conditions as it may think
‘- proper to impose. As said by this court in Lafayette Insurance
Co. v. French, “These conditions must be deemed valid and ef-
fectual by other states and by this court, provided they are not
repugnant to the constitution or laws of the United States, or
inconsistent with those rules of public law which secure the
jurisdiction and authority of each state from encroachment by
all others, or that principle of natural justice which forbids con-
denmation without opportunity for defence.” 18 How. 404, 407;
Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. I68.
The state may, therefore, impose as a condition upon which
1a foreign corporation shall be permitted to do business within
1 her limits, that it shall stipulate that in any litigation arising
out of its transactions in the state, it will accept as sufficient
the service of process on its agents or persons specially desig-
. nated; and the condition would be eminently fit and just. And
such condition and stipulation may be implied as well as ex-
pressed. If a state permits a foreign corporation to do business
within her limits, and at the same time provides that in suits
against it for business there done, process shall be served upon
its agents, the provision is to be deemed a condition of the per-
mission: and corporations that subsequently do business in the
state are to be deemed to assent to such condition as fully as
though they had specially authorized their agents to receive ser-
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corporators are associated together and allowed to exercise as 
a body certain functions, with a right of succession in its mem­
bers. Its officers and agents constitute all that is visible of its 
existence ; and they may be authorized to act for it without as 
well as within the state. There would seem, therefore, to be no 
sound reason why, to the extent of their agency, they should not 
be equally deemed to represent it  in the states for which they 
are respectively appointed when it is called to legal responsibility 
for their transactions. 
[*356] The case is unlike that of suits against individua ls. 
They can act by themselves, and upon them process can be 
directly served, but a corporation can only act and be reached 
through agents. Serving process on its agents in other �tatcs, 
for matters within the sphere of their agency, is, in effect, serving 
process on it as much so as if such agents resided in the state 
where it was created. 
A corporation of one state cannot do business in another 
: state w ithout the latter's consent, express or implied, and that  
: consent may be accompanied with such conditions as it  may think '
. proper to impose. As said by this court in Lafayette Insurance 
Co. v. French, "These conditions must be deemed valid and ef­
fectual by other states and by this court, provided they are not 
repugnant to the constitution or laws of the United States, or 
inconsistent with those rules of  public law which secure the 
jurisdiction and authority of each state from encroachment by 
all others, or  that principle of natural j ustice which forbids con­
demnation without opportunity for defence." 18 How. 404, 407 ; 
Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 1 68. 
The state may, therefore, impose as a condition upon which 
.' a foreign corporation shall be permitted to do business within 
· her l imits, that it shall stipulate that in any litigation arising 
out of its transactions in the state, i t  will accept as sufficient 
the service of process on its agents or persons specially desig-
' nated ; and the condit ion would be eminently fit and j ust .  And 
such condition and stipulation may be implied as well as ex­
pressed. I f  a state permits a foreign corporation to do business 
within her limits, and at the same time provides that in suits 
against it for business there done, process shall be served upon 
its agents, the provision is to be deemed a condition of the per­
mission : and corporations that subsequently do business in the 
state arc to be deemed to assent to such condition as fully as 
though they had specially authorized their agents to receive ser­
vice o f  the process. Snch condition must not, however, encroach 
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upon that principle of natural justice which requires notice
of a suit to a party before he can be bound by it. It must be
reasonable, and the service provided for should be only upon
such agents as may be properly deemed representatives of the
foreign corporation. The decision of this [*357] court in La-
fayette Insurance Co. v. French, to which we have already re-
ferred, sustains these views.
The state of Michigan permits foreign corporations to trans-
act business within her limits. Either by express enactment, as
in the case of insurance companies, or by her acquiescence, they
are as free to engage in all legitimate business as corporations
of her own creation. Her statutes expressly provide for suits
being brought by them in her courts; and for suits by attach-
ment being brought against them in favor of residents of the
state. And in these attachment suits they authorize the service
of a copy of the writ of attachment, with a copy of the inventorv
of the property attached, on “any officer, member, clerk, or agent
of such corporation” within the state, and give to a personal
service of a copy of the writ and of the inventory on one of
these persons the force and effect of personal service of a sum-
mons on a defendant in suits commenced by summons.
It thus seems that a writ of foreign attachment in that state
is made to serve a double purpose,—as a command to the ofiicer
to attach property of the corporation, and as a summons to the
latter to appear in the suit. \-Ve do not, however, understand
the laws as authorizing the service of a copy of the writ, as a
summons, upon an agent of a foreign corporation, unless the
corporation be engaged in business in the state, and the agent
be appointed to act there. \‘Ve so construe the words “agent
of such corporation within this state.” They do not sanction
service upon an officer or agent of the corporation who resides
in another state, and is only casually in the state, and not charged
with any business of the corporation there. The decision in
Neteell v. Great Western Railreay C0., to Mich. 336, supports
this view, although that was the case of an attempted service
of a declaration as the commencement of the suit. The defendant
was a Canadian corporation owning and operating a railroad
from Suspension Bridge in Canada to the Detroit line at \Vindsor
opposite Detroit, and carrying passengers in connection with the
Michigan Central Railroad Company, upon tickets sold bv such
companies respectively. The suit was commenced in Michigan.
the declaration alleging a contract bv the defendant to carry
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upon that principle of natural j ustice which rcqmres notice 
of a suit to a party before he can be bound by it .  It must be 
reasonable, and the service provided for should be only upon 
such agen ts as may be properly deemed representatives of the 
foreign corporation. The decision o f  this [ *357] court in La­
fayette 111s11ra11ce Co. v. Fren ch, to which we have already re­
ferred, sustains these views. 
The state of !\Iichigan permits foreign corporations to trans­
act business within her limits. Either by express enactment, as 
in the case of insurance companies, or by her acquiescence, they 
are as free to engage in all legitimate business as corporations 
of her own creation. Her statutes expressly provide for suits 
being brought by them in her courts ; and fo r suits by attach­
ment being brought against them in favo r of residents of the 
state. And in these attachment suits they authorize the service 
of  a copy of the writ of attachment, with a copy of the invcntorv 
of the property attached, on "any officer, member, clerk ,  or agen t 
o f  such corporation" within the state, and give to a personal 
service of a copy of the writ and of the inventory on one of 
these persons the force and effect of personal service of a sum­
mons on a defendant in suits commenced by summons. 
It thus seems that a writ of foreign attachment in that state 
is made to serve a double purpose,-as a command to the officer 
to attach property of the corporation, and as a summons to the 
latter to appear in the suit.  \Ve <lo not , however, understand 
the laws as authorizing the service of a copy of the w rit ,  as a 
summ0ns , upon an agent of  a foreign co rporation , unless the 
corporation he engaged in business in the state ,  and the agent 
he appointed to act there. \Ve so con stru e the words "agent 
of such corporation w i th in this state ."  They do not sanction 
service upon an officer or agent of the corporat ion who resides 
in another state, and is  only casu ally in the state ,  and not charged 
with any business of the corporation there. The decision in 
Newell v. Great Western Railwa·y Co. ,  1 9  M ich.  336, supports 
this view, although that was the case of an attempted service 
of a declaration as the com mencement of  the suit .  The defendant 
was a Canadian corporat ion own ing and operating a rai l road 
from Suspension Bridge in Canada to the Detroi t l ine at \Viml ;;;or 
opnosite Detroit,  and carrying passengers in conn ection with the 
Michigan Central Rail road Company , upon tickets sold bv such 
compan ies respectivelv. The su it  '"·as commenced in �f ich i(?"an . 
the declaration alleging a cont ra ct hv the d efendant to ea rn· 
the plain t i ff over its road,  and its violation of the contract hy 
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["‘358] removing him from its cars at an intermediate station.
The declaration was served upon Joseph Price, the treasurer of
the corporation, who was only lcasually in the state. The cor-
poration appeared specially to object to the jurisdiction of the
court, and pleaded that it was a foreign corporation, and had no
place of business or agent or officer in the state, or attorney to
receive service of legal process, or to appear for it; and that
Joseph Price was not in the state at the time of service on him
on any official business of the corporation. The plaintiff having
demurred to this plea, the court held the service insufficient.
“The corporate entity,” said the court, “could by no possibility
enter the state, and it could do nothing more in that direction
than to cause itself to be represented here by its ofiicers or agents.
Such representation would, however, necessarily imply some-
thing more than the mere presence here of a person possessing,
when in Canada, the relation to the company of an officer or
agent. To involve the representation of the company here, the
supposed representative would have to hold or enjoy in this state
an actual present oflicial or representative status. He would be
required to be here as an agent or officer of the corporation,
and not as an isolated individual. If he should drop the official
or representative character at the frontier, if he should bring
that character no further than the territorial boundary of the
government to whose laws the corporate body itself, and conse-
quently the oflicial positions of its officers also, would be con-
stantly indebted for existence, it could not, with propriety, be
maintained that he continued to possess such character by force
of our statute. Admitting, therefore, for the purpose of this
suit, that in given cases the foreign corporation would be bound
by service 011 its treasurer in Michigan, this could only be so
when the treasurer, the then official, the officer then in a manner
impersona-tin-g the comjmny, should be served. Joseph Price was
not here as the treasurer of the defendants. He did not then
represent them. His act in coming was not the act of the com-
pany, nor was his remaining the business or act of any besides
himself. He had no principal, and he was not an agent. He had
no ofificial status or representative character in this state.” p. 344.
According to the view thus expressed by the Supreme Court
[*359] of l\lichigan, service upon an agent of a foreign corpora-
tion will not be deemed sufficient, unless he represents the cor-
poration in the state. This representation implies that the cor-
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[*358] removing him from its cars at an intermediate station. 
The declaration was served upon Joseph Price, the treasurer of 
the corporation, who was only ·casually in the state. The cor­
poration appeared specially to obj ect to the jurisdiction of the 
court, and pleaded that it was a foreign corporation, and had no 
place of business or agent or officer in the state, or attorney to 
receive service of legal process, or to appear for it ; and that 
J os·eph Price was not in the state at the time of service on him 
on any official business of the corporation. The plaintiff having 
demurred to this plea, the court held the service insufficient. 
"The corporate entity," said the court, "could by no possibility 
enter the state, and it could do nothing more in that direction 
than to cause itself to be represented here by its officers or agents. 
Such representation would, however, necessarily imply some­
thing more than the mere presence here of a person possessing, 
when in Canada, the relation to the company of an officer or 
agent. To involve the representation of the company here, the 
supposed representative would have to hold or enjoy in this state 
an actual present official or representative status. He would be 
required to be here as an agent or officer of the corporation , 
and not as an isolated individual. If  he should drop the official 
or representative character at the frontier, if he should bring 
that character no further than the territorial boundary of the 
government to whose laws the corporate body itself, and conse­
quently the official positions of its officers also, would be con­
stantly indebted for existence, it coul� not, with propriety, be 
maintained that he continued to possess such character by force 
of our statute. Admitting, therefore, for the purpose of this 
suit, that in given cases the foreign corporation would he bound 
by service on its treasurer in Michigan, this could only be so 
when the treasurer, the then official, the officer then in a manner 
impersonating the compawy, should be scrr:ed. Joseph Price was 
not here as the treasurer of the defendants. He did not then 
represent them. His act in coming was not the act of the com­
pany, nor was his remaining the business or act o f  any besides 
himself. He had no principal, and he was not an agent. He had 
no official status or representative character in this state." p. 344. 
According to the view thus expressed by the Supreme Court 
:' f*359] of Michigan, service upon an agent of a foreign corpora­
' tion will not he deemed sufficient, unless he represents the cor­
poration in the state. This representation implies that the cor­
poration does business, or has business, in the state for the trans-
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action of which it sends or appoints an agent there. If the agent
occupies no representative character with respect to the business
of the corporation in the state, ‘a judgment rendered upon ser-
vice on him would hardly be considered in other tribunals as
possessing any probative force. In a case where similar service
was made in New York upon an ofiicer of a corporation of New
Jersey accidentally in the former state, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey said, that a law of another state_ Which sanctioned
such service upon an officer accidentally within its jurisdiction
was “so contrary to natural justice and to the principles of inter-
national law, that the courts of other states ought not to sanction
it.” Moulin v. Trenton Insurance Co., 24 J. L. 222, 234.
\‘\-’ithout considering whether authorizing service of a copy
of a writ of attachment as a summons on some of the persons
named in the statute--a member, for instance, of the foreign
corporation, that is, a mere stocl<holder—is not a departure from
the principle of natural justice mentioned in Laflzyette Insurance
Co. v. French, which forbids condemnation without citation, it
is sufficient to observe that we are of opinion that when service
is made within the state upon an agent of a foreign corporation,
it is essential, in order to support the jurisdiction of the court
to render a personal judgment, that it should appear somewhere
in the record—either in the application for the writ, or accom-
panying its service, or in the pleadings or the finding of the court
--that the corporation was engaged in business in the state. The
transaction of business by the corporation in the state, general
or special, appearing, a certificate of service by the proper oflicer
on a person who is its agent there would, in our opinion, be
sufficient prima facie evidence that the agent represented the
company in the business. It would then be op II, when the record
is offered as evidence in another state, to show that the agent
stood in no representative character to the company, that his
duties were limited to those of a subordinate employé, or to a
particular [*36o] transaction, or that his agency had ceased when
the matter in suit arose.
In the record, a copy of which was offered in evidence in this
case, there was nothing to show, as far as we can see, that the
Winthrop Mining Company was engaged in business in the state
when service was made on Colwell. The return of the ofiicer.
on which alone reliance was placed to sustain the jurisdiction of
the state court, gave noinformation on the subject. It did not.
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action of which it sends or appoints an agent there. If the agent 
occupies no representative character with respect to the business 
of the corporation in the state, 
·
a judgment rendered upon ser­
vice on him would hardly be considered in other tribunals as 
possessing any probative force. In a case where similar service 
was made in New York upon an officer of a corporation of New 
Jersey accidentally in the former state, the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey said, that a law of another state_ which sanctioned 
such service upon an officer accidentally within its jurisdiction 
was "so contrary to natural justice and to the principles of inter­
national law, that the courts of other states ought not to sanction 
it." Moulin v. Trenton. Insurance Co., 24 N. J. L. 222, 234. 
\Vithout considering whether authorizing service of a copy 
of a writ of attachment as a summons on some of the persons 
named in the statute-a member, for instance, of the foreign 
corporation , that is, a mere stockholder-is not a departure from 
the principle of natural justice mentioned in Lafa'yette Insurance 
Co. v. French, which forbids condemnation without citation, it \ 
is sufficient to observe that we are of opinion that when service , 
is made within the state upon an agent of a foreign corporation, 
it is essential, in order to support the jurisdiction of the court 
to render a personal judgment, that it should appear somewhere 
in the record--either in the application for the writ, or accom­
panying its service, or in the pleadings or the finding of the court 
-that the corporation was engaged in business in the state. The 
transaction of business by the corporation in the state, general 
or special, appearing, a certificate of service by the proper officer 
on a person who is its agent there would, in our opinion, be 
sufficient prinia facie evidence that the agent represented the 
company in the business. It would then be op;n, when the record 
is offered as evidence in another state, to show that the agent 
stood in no representative character to the company, that his 
duties were limited to those of a subordinate employe, or to a 
particular [ *360] transaction, or that his agency had ceased when 
the matter in suit arose. 
In the record, a copy of which was offered in evidence in this 
case, there was nothing to show, as far as we can see, that the , 
Winthrop Mining Company was engaged in business in the state i 
when service was made on Colwell. The return of the officer .
. 
on which alone reliance was placed to sustain the j uri sdiction o f  
the state court, g-ave no 
·
information on the subject. It di<l not. 
therefore, appear even prima fade that C'olwell stood in any such 
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representative character to the company as would justify the
service of a copy of the writ on him. The certificate of the
sheriff, in the absence of this fact in the record, was insufficient
to give the court jurisdiction to render a personal judgment
against the foreign corporation. The record was, therefore,
properly excluded.
Judgment a/lirmed.
ST. MARY'S FRANCO-AMERICAN PETROLEUM CO. v. WEST
VIRGINIA. in U. S. Sup. Ct., Dec. 3, mo6—2o3 U. S. 183,
51 L. ed. 144, 27 S. Ct. Rep. 132.
\Nrit of error to review a judgment of the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West \"irginia awarding a peremptory writ of
mandamus commanding the St. Mary's F. A. P. Co. to appoint
the state auditor general its attorney in fact, to accept service
of process and notice on it, according to W’. Va. Code c. 54, § 24,
and Acts of 1905 c. 39, providing that such auditor shall be such
attorney for every foreign corporation and every non-resident do-
mestic corporation and receive for the state $to from the corpor-
ation for each process served on him for it. The St. Mary’s F.
A. P. Co. is a corporation organized under the laws of VV. Va.,
and having its office and chief works out of the state at Lima,
Ohio.
FULLER, C. J. It is argued that the act of February 22, 1905,
is invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it deprives
the company of liberty of contract and property without due
process of law, and denies it the equal protection of the laws.
But in view of repeated decisions of this court, the contention
is without merit. 'I‘he state had the clear right to regulate its
own creations, and, a fortiori, forei n corporations permitted to
transact business within its borders3
In this instance it pp]; all non-resident dgmgstig §Q[QQ[3.j,iQQS,
which elected to have their laces of business and works
of the state, and all forei n cor orations comin int l
on the same footing in respect of the service of process, and the
law 0 erated on all these alik
5 -g-lassifiéafion was reasonable and not open to consti-
tutional Qlzjeetiog, Orient Insurance Conzjrauy v. Daggs, 172
U. S. 557, 563; l/Voters-Pierce Oil Company v. Texas, 177 U. S.
43; Central Loan and Trust C0m[>au_v v. Campbell, 173 U. S.
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representative character to the company as would justify the 
service of a copy of the writ on him. The certificate of the 
sheriff, in the absence of this fact in the record, was insufficient 
to give the court jurisdiction to render a personal judgment 
against the foreign corporation . The record was, therefore, 
properly excluded. 
Judgment affirmed. 
ST. MARY'S FR A N CO-A!vlERICAN PETROLEUM CO. v. WEST 
VIRG I N IA, in U. S. Sup. Ct., Dec. 3, 1oo6---203 U. S. 183, 
5 1  L. ed. 144, 27 S. Ct. Rep. 1 32. 
\Vrit of error to review a j udgment of the Supreme Court 
of  Appeals of \Vest Virginia awarding a peremptory writ of  
mandamus commanding the St .  Mary's F. A.  P. Co.  to appoint 
the state auditor general its attorney in fact, to accept service 
of process and notice on it, according to \V. Ya. Code c. 54, § 24, 
and Acts of 1 905 c. 39, providing that such auditor shall be such 
attorney for every foreign corporation and every non-resident do­
mestic corporation and receive for the state $ r o  from the corpor­
ation for each process served on him for it. The St. Mary ' s  F. 
A. P. Co. is a corporation organized under the laws of \V. Va.,  
anc i  having its office and chief works out of the state at Lima, 
Ohio. 
FuL.I,ER, C. J.  I t  is argued that the act of February 22, 1905 , 
is invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it deprives 
the company of liberty of contract and property without due 
process of  law, and denies it  the equal protection of the laws. 
But in view of  repeated decisions of this court, the contention 
is without merit. fr'he state had the clear right" to regulate its 
own creations , and, ci fortiori, forei�1 corporations permitted to 
transact business with in its borders.) 
In this instance it put all non-resident <lornestic corporation_s, 
which elected to have thei r places of business and works  outside 
of the state, and all forei n cor orations comin int 
on t 1e same footing in respect of the service of process, and the 
law o erate<l on all these alik 
lassifi ion was reasonable and not o en to con i ­
tutional objection, O rien t Iusura11 ce Com pany v. Da r;gs, 172 
U. S. 557,  563 : fVatcrs-Pierce Oil Compaws v. Texas, 177 U. S. 
43 ; Ce11 tra! L oan and Trust Co mpany v. Campbell, 1 73 U. S. 
·R � :  National Co u n cil v. State Council, 203 U. S. 1 5 1 ; !v'ortlzH•cst-
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cm Life Insurance Comjvany v. Riggs, 203 U. S. 243; Brannon
on Fourteenth Amendment, Chap. 16.
‘ It is true that the prior law left it to the corporation to
appoint an attorney to represent it, and that the act of February,
1905, changed this so as to make the auditor such attorney, but
this at the most was no more than an amendment as to the
appointment of an agent, and when the St. ' "s_C.ompanX__
accepted its charter it did so subject to the right of aingudmgm,
nd we agree with the state court that the [*I9z] requirement
of the payment of ten dollars to the auditor for the use of the
tate does not amount to a taking of property without due process
0% an unjust discrimination. Charlotte Railroad v. Gibbs, 142
U. S. 386; People v. Squire, 145 U. S. I75. If the act is valid,
that is.
The objections going to the expediency or the hardships and
justice of the act, and its alleged inconsistency with the state
constitution and laws, are matters with which we have nothing
0 do on this writ of error: and the question whether the pro-
vision that the corporation shall not be required to pav any fee
to any one theretofore appointed an attorney is invalid or not.
equires no consideration on this record.
Judgment afiirnzed.
That a public corporation cannot be sued out of its county or state
is held in Board of Dirertors \'. Bodkin (1902), I08 Tenn. 700. 69 S. W.
‘~2‘"0. .
hat Questions the Pleadings Enable the Court to Decide.
' EYNOLDS v. STOCKTON. in U. S. Sup. Ct., May 11, 189r—u0 U.
$ S. 254. II S. Ct. 773.
Q
Error to the court of chancery of New Jersey. The question
5 whether the court was bound to give full faith and credit under
the constitution to a judgment of the supreme court of New York
"discharging" Joe‘ Parker as ancillary receiver of the New jersey
'fe insurance Co. The court of chancery refused to give cticct
to The judgment of the New York court. on the ground that it
was without jurisdiction. not being responsive to any prayer or
petition in the case before it.
‘Er,’
BRE\\'F.R, \Ve are of opinion that the decision of the chan-
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c m  L ife /ns11ra11ce Company v. Riggs, 203 U. S. 243 ; Brannon 
on Fourteenth Amendment, Chap. 1 6. 
It i s  true that the prior law left i t  to the corporation to 
appo int an attorney to represent i t ,  and that the act of February, 
1 905,  changed this so as to make the auditor such attorney, but 
lhis at the most was no more than an amendment as to the 
appointment of an agent ,  and whrn the St. !\(ary's Companx._ 
accepted its charter it did so subject to the right of  amendment. 
n<l we agree with the state court that the [ * 192] requirement 
of the payment of ten dollars to the auditor for the use of the 
�tate does not amount to a taking of property without due process 
o� an unjust discrimination. Charlotte Railroad v. Gibbs, q.2 
iU. S. 386 ; People v. Squire, 145 U. S. 1 75·  If the act is val id,  
hat is. 
The objections go ing to the exped iency or the hardships amt 
j ustice of the act, and its al leged incons istency with the state 
constitution and laws. are matters with which we have nothing 
· o <lo on th is  writ of  error : and the question whether the pro­
:vision that the corporat ion shall not he required to pav any fee 
to any one theretofore appo inted an attorney is invalid or not, 
e<Juires no consideration on this record . 
Juclgm ent  aflirm ed. 
'I;'hat a puhHc rorporation can not he sue-cl out of its cotmty o r  state 
is  held in Board <>f Direc tors , .. R1 1dki11 ( 1 902 ) ,  108 Tenn. 700. 6cJ S. \V. 
·, , , • , .2,0. -�t Questions the Pleadings Enable the Court to Decide. 
� ' ltEY!'iOLDS v .  STOCKTOX. ; n  U.  S.  Sup.  Ct. ,  Mar I I , 18'>1-qo U. 
�  '\ S. 25,, I I  s. Ct. 77.l· 
J 
'.'.t- Error to the court o f  chancery o f  X ew J crsey. The <Jncst ion 
� ls whether the court w a s  hound t o  g· ive fu l l  fai th ancl cred i t  under 
� 
\he const i tut ion to a j u clg-inen t of the supreme court o f  Xew York 
"tl ischarging Jot\ Parker as anci l lary rece i ver of the X cw Jersey 
· re Jn ,urance Co. The cou rt of chancery re fused to gfrc e ffect 
to 
·
the judgment of the "!\ew York court .  on the g-roun c l  that it 
was wi thout j ur i sd ict ion , not hcing- respons ive to any prayer 01 
petition in the  case before i t .  
� TIREW F.R,  J. "'e are of  opinion tb at the dec is ion  of  the  chan­
c�ry court of New Jersey, as s 1 1 s ta ine c l  by the court o f  errors and 
1 
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7O CASES ON JUDGMENTS, ETC.
appeals of that state, is correct, and must be affirmed. The first
and obvious reason is that the 'ud ment of the su reme _
i cw ‘or was not res onsive to the iss - * he sec-
tion of the federa constitution which is invoked by plaintiffs is
Section I of Article IV, which provides that “full faith and credit
shall be given in each state to the public acts. records, and judicial
proceedings of every other state.” Under that section the full
faith and credit demanded is only that faith and credit which the
judicial proceedings had in the other state in and of themselves
require. It does not demand that a judgment rendered in a court
of one state without jurisdiction of the person shall be recognized
by the courts of another state as valid, or that a judgment ren-
dered by a court which has jurisdiction of the person, but which is
in no way responsive to the issues tendered by the pleadings and is
rendered in the absence of the defendant, must be recognized as
valid in the courts of any other state. The requirements of that sec-
tion are fulfilled when a judgment rendered in a court of one state,
which has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the person,
and which is substantially responsive to the issues presented by
the pleadings. or is rendered under such circumstances that it is
apparent that the defeated party was in fact heard on the matter
determined, is recognized and enforced in the courts of another
state. The scope of this constitutional provision has often been
presented to and considered by this court, although the precise
question here presented has not as yet received ' attention. It
has been adjudged that the constitutional provisi does not make
a judgment rendered in one state a judgment in another state
upon which execution or other process may issue; that it does
not forbid inquiry in the courts of the state to which the judg-
ment is presented, as to the jurisdiction of the court in which it
was rendered over the person, or [*265] in respect to the subject-
matter, or, if rendered in a prececding in rem its jurisdiction of
the res. W'ithout referring to the many cases in which this con-
stitutional provision has been before this court, it is enough to
notice the case of Thompson \'. lVhitman,_I8 Wall. 457. The
view developed in the opinion in that case, as well as in prior
opinions cited therein, paves the way for inquiry into the question
here presented. If the fag; Qf a judgment rendered in a court of
n’! ‘ ‘I \ \ I . yr .
to the 'urisdicti ' ' U‘ 1 t V
person or the subject-matter, it certainly also does not preclude
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l ew , or was not res on s1ve to he iss  he sec­
tion of the fcdera constitution which is invoked by plain tiffs is 
Sect ion I of Article IV, which provides that " full faith and credit 
shall he given in each state to the public acts. records, and judicial 
proceedings of every other state ."  C ncler that section the full 
fai th and crecl i t  demanded is only that faith and credit whicJ1 the 
j udic ial proceedings had in the other state in and of themselves 
reciu i re. It  does not demand that a j udgment rendered in a court 
o f  one state w i thout jurisd iction of the person shall be recognized 
by the courts of  another state as val id ,  or that a j udgment ren­
dered by a court wh ich has j urisdiction of the person , hut which is 
in no way responsive to the i ssues tendered by the pleadings and is 
rendered in  the absence of the defendant,  must be recognized as 
val id i n  the courts of  any other state. The requirements of that sec­
t ion are fu lfillecl when a j udgment rendered in a court of one state, 
wh ich has jur isdiction of  the subj ect-matter and of  the person, 
and which is  substantially respon s ive to the i �sues presen ted by 'k 
the pleadings, or is rendere\! under such ci rcumstances that i t  is 
apparent that the de feated party was in fact heard on the matter 
determined ,  i s  recog-nizecl and enforced in the courts of another 
state.  The scope of  this constitutional provision has often been 
presented to and comidered by this court , although the precise 
quest ion here presentecl has not as yet received A attention. I t  
has  been ad j udged that the  const itutional provisi�loes not make 
a j udgment rendered in one state a judgment in another state 
upon wh ich execution or other process may issue ; that it does 
not forbid inquiry in the courts of the state to which the j udg­
men t is presented, as to the j ur isdiction of the court in which it 
was rendered over the person, or [ *265 ] in respect to the subj ect­
matter, or, if rendered in a prececcl ing in rem its ju risdiction of  
the res. \Vithout re f  erring to the many ca:'es in  which this  con­
s t i tu t i onal provis ion has hcen before this  court, it is enough to 
notice the case of Tho mpson , . .  TVh itma11, . 1 8 \Vall. 457. The 
view developed in the opinion in that case , a s  \vel l  as in prior 
opinions ci tc(l there in ,  paves the way for inqui ry into the question 
here presented . U the fact of a judgment rendered in a court of 
gns srntr clrws not p!iiwhole in�nisy in the coprts pf another as. 
to the j ur isd i c t iog pf the co11rt rendering tl]e judgment over t!u; 
person or the subj ect-matter, i t  certainly also does not preclude 
inqui ry as to whether the judgment so rendcrecl was so far re-
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sponsive to the issues tendered by the pleadings as to be a proper
\ exercise of jurisdiction on the part of the court rendering it. Take
“I an extreme case: Given a court of general jurisdiction, over
0') actions in ejectment as well as those in replevin, a complaint in
replevin for the possession of certain specific property, personal
Y service upon the defendant, appearance and answer denying title;
could (there being no subsequent appearance of the defendant and
no amendment of the complaint) a judgment thereafter rendered
in such action for the recovery of the possessioh of certain real
‘i estate be upheld? Surely not; even in the courts of the same
\ state. If not there, the constitutional provision quoted gives no
greater force to the same record in another state.
\\'e are not concerned in this case as to the power of amend-
ment of pleadings lodged in the trial court, of the effect of any
3 amendment made under such power. for no amendment was made
- g or asked. And without amendment of the pleadings, a judgment
0 for the recovery of the possession of real estate, rendered in an
‘ action whose pleadings disclose only a claim for the possession
of personal property. cannot be sustained, although personal ser-
vice was made upon the defendant. The invalidity of the judg-
\
i . . .
\\~\ ment depends upon the fact that it is in no manner responsive to
the issues fendered by the pleading s. llus idea uilderhes all liti-
1 tion. Its emphatic language is that : <r ~ ~ 11-
,'\\, _.SIVC u on tic iartie to tie hti ation must be responsive to the
\ matters controverted “‘26o . Nor are we concerned witi
\ '\ question as to the rule which obtains in a case in which, while
-S the matter determmed was not, in fact, put in issue by the plead-
‘ ings, it is apparent from the record that the defeated party was
\ ‘ present at the trial and actually litigated that matter. In such a
\
§
\ case the proposition so often affirmed, that that is to be considered
as done which ought to have been done, may have weight, and the
amendment which ought to have been made to conform the lead-
ings to the evidence may be treated as having been made. Here
there was no appearance after the filing of the answer, and no
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sponsive to the i Stles tendered by the plead ings a s  t o  be a proper 
exercise of j u risdiction on the part of the co11rt rendering i t. Take 
an ext reme ca e :  Given a court of general j u risdiction , over 
actions in ej ectment as ,,·el l as those in replevin,  a complaint in 
repleY in for the possession of certain specific property, personal 
sen·ice t1pon the defendant, appearance and ans\\"er denying title ; 
could ( there being no subsequent appearance of the defendant and 
no amendment of  the complaint ) a j udgment thereafter rendereil 
in such action for the recO\·ery of  the po. sess ioh o f  certain real 
estate be upheld ? Surely not : even in the courts of the same 
state. I f  not there ,  the con titu tional prO\· i:-;ion q uoted gives no 
greater force to the same record in another state. 
\ \' e are not concerned in this case as to the power of amend­
ment of pleadings lodged in the t rial cou rt,  of the effect of  anv 
amendment made under such po\\"er. for no amendment was macl
-
e 
or asked. And without amendment o f  the pleadings, a j udgment 
for the recovery o f  the pos ession of real estate, rendered in an 
action "·hose pleadings disclose only a claim for the possession 
of personal property. cannot be sustained. although per onal ser­
vice was made upon the defendant. The invalid ity o f  the j lldg­
ment depends upon the fact that it is in no manner respon s i ve 1o 
the issues tendered by the pleadings. 'I h1 idea underlies all  l iti-
I t emphatic langua O"e i . tha , · u-
- s1ve l1 on t 1 )arl1e o t 1e liti()"ation must be respon si\·e to the 
matters con troverted [ *266]. X or are we concerned \\" I t  1 1c 
question as  to the ru le \\"hich obtains in a case in  w h ich,  while 
the matter determined was not, in fact , put  in i sue by the plead­
ings, i t  is apparent from the record that the de feated party was 
present at the trial and actllally l i t igated that matter. In such a 
case the propo it ion o o ften affirmed, that that i to be considered 
as done w h ich ought to han been clone, may h ave \\"eight, and the 
amendment \\"hich ough t to have been made to con form the , lead ­
ings t o  the evidence may be treated as having h en mack. He re 
there was no appearance after the fil ing o f  the an \\' Cr, and no 
participation in the trial or other proceedina . 'h. l\:\ r may 
be the rule '' here ubstantial amendmen t · laint a r
-
e 
permitted and macle. and the defendan here 
i t  appear that he take.:; actual pa · 
determined, the rule i uni 
pond only to the 
thereto. the · 
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which determines the conclusiveness of a judgment rendered in
one court of a state, as to all subsequent inquiries in the courts
of the same state, enters into and limits the constitutional pro-
vision quoted, as to the full faith and credit which must be given
in one state to judgments rendered in the courts of another state.
In the opinion of the court of errors and appeals, the case of
.l/unday v. Vail, 34 N. J. Law 4IS, is cited. In that case the prop-
osition stated in the syllabus. and which is fully sustained by the
opinion, is that ‘a decree in equity, which is entirely aside of the
issue raised in the record. is invalid, audwill be treated as a
nullity even in a collateral proceeding?‘ It appeared that on
May I2, I8J,I, Asa .\londay, the owner, with his wife, Hetty
Monday, conveyed the premises for which the action (which was
one of ejectment) was brought, to John Conger, upon the follow-
lowing trust. to-wit: “For the use and benefit of the said Asa
Monday and wife, and the survivor of them, with the remainder
to the children of said Asa Monday and wife. in equal parts and
shares, in fee.U Plaintiff was the sole surviving issue of Asa
Monday and Iietty [*267] .\londay, and took, under the facts,
all the title which, on the 12th of ‘.\lay, 1841, was vested in Asa
l\londay. On January 16, 1844, Ephriam .\Ionday filed his bill
in the court of chancery, setting forth that he had loaned certain
moneys to Asa Monday upon an agreement that he, the said Asa,
would secure said loan by a mortgage upon his land, including
the premises in question: and that Asa, in violation of his agree-
ment, and to defraud him of his rights, had conveyed them away
to John Conger, upon the trust already mentioned. The bill also
showed that plaintiff had obtained judgment for his debt. The
prayer was. “that the deed of conveyance of said lands so made
by the said Asa Monday and Iletty, his wife, to the said John
Conger. and the said deed and declaration of trust so made
and executed by the said John Conger and wife as aforesaid, may,
by the order and decree of this honorable court, he set aside and
declared to be fraudulent and void against the said judgment and
writ of execution on your orator. and that the said judgment and
execution of your orator may be decreed a lien on said lands, and
tenements so conveyed to said John Conger,” etc. Plaintiff was
a defendant in that action, and, then an infant, appeared by her
father as her guardian. The decree, which was entered on the
15th of December, 1846, was generally that the said deed from
Asa I\londay and wife to Conger was fraudulent, null, and void.
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which determines the conclusiveness of a j udgment rendered in 
one court of a state, as to all subsequent inquiries in  the courts 
o f  the same state, enters into and l imits  the con stitu tional pro­
vision quote d ,  as  to the ful l  faith and credit wh ich must be given 
in one state to j uclg-ments rendered in the courts of another state. 
In  the opin ion of the court of  errors and appeals,  the case o f  
Mo11day v. Vail, 3 -t  I\ .  J.  Law 4 1 8, i s  cited.  In that case the prop­
osi tion stated in the syllabus,  and which is fu l l \- sustainecl  b\" the 
opinion,  is that "- de�ree in equity,  which is e�tircly as ide �f the 
i s sue rai sed in the record. is invali d ,  and · will he treated as a 
null i ty even in a col lat eral proceed ing. ' '
• 
I t  appeared th at on 
l\T ay 1 2 ,  1 8-.p ,  .-\ sa :\Ionday, the owner, w ith his  w i fe ,  Hetty 
1\ f onclay , conyeyecl the p rem ises for which the action ( wh ich was 
one of ej ectmen t )  was brought , to Joh n  Cong-e r, upon the fol low­
low ing t m s t ,  to- wit : ' ' For the use and hcnefit o f  the said :\sa 
l\Ionday and wi fe ,  and the survivor of them, w i th the remainder 
to the ch i ldren of said .-\sa � l onday and w i fe ,  in equal parts and 
shares,  in fee . ' '  Plai n t i ff  was the sole surviving- issue of Asa 
:\ l on d ay and Hetty [ *267 ] ::\Ionday, ancl took, under the facts, 
all the t it le  wh ich , on the I zth of ). lay, I 8 .. p .  was v ested i n  Asa 
Monday. On January 1 6, 1 8-+4, Ephriam :\Ionday filed his  bill 
i n  the court of chancery, setting forth that h e  had loaned certain 
moneys to Asa :\lond ay upon an agreement that he,  the said Asa, 
would  secure said loan by a mortgage upon his land, including 
the premises in question : and that .Asa, in violation of his agree­
ment,  and to de fraud him of h is rights, had conveyed them away 
to Joh n Conger, upon the trust already mentioned. The bi ll also 
sho\\'cd that plaint i ff  hacl obtained j udgment for h is  deht.  The 
p rayer was,  ' ' that the deed o f  conveyance o f  said land s  so made 
by the sai d Asa ::\Ion<lay and H etty . his wi fe,  to the said John 
Conger. and the sai r l  deed and declaration o f  tru s t  s o  made 
a nd e x ecuted hy th e said John Cong-e r and w i fe as aforesa i d .  may, 
by th<l order anrl c!C'cree o f  this honorable court , be set as i r le and 
dcclarecl  to be fraudulent and voi d against  the s a i d  j u dgment and 
writ of execution on your orator, and that the saic l  j u dgmen t and 
execution of your orator may be dec reed a l ien on said land s , and 
t e n ements so conveyed to said Joh n Conger ,"  etc. Plain t iff was 
a de frn<lant i n  that action , and ,  then an in fant,  appeared by her 
fat her as h e r  guardian.  The decree, w h i ch was entered on the 
1 5th o f  December, T 846, was  general ly that the said deed from 
A s a  ). fon cla\" and ·w i fe to Con�cr was fraudulent ,  nu l l ,  ancl void.  
and of no 
.
force whatever in law or equ i ty ; and orderecl and 
• 
,. 
• ·  
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adjudged that it be delivered up to be cancelled; and further, that
the 'plaintifi's judgment is and was a lien. No proceedings were
had under this decree, the money due plaintifi having been paid
or secured to him. Subsequently and on September I5, 1851, a
decree for costs against Asa Monday, in another suit, was entered
in the chancery court. Upon such decree the property in question
was levied upon and sold to defendant. The validity of the title
acquire by this proceeding was the matter in controversy. The
title of plaintiff was good under the trust deed of May I2, 1841,
unless defeated by this. sale and the deed thereon ; and defendant’s
title, adverse to plaintiff's, depended on the question whether the
decree of December 15, 1846, was valid to the extent of [*268]
its language. annulling absolutely the conveyance from Asa Mon-
day and wife to John Conger, and directing the surrender of such
deed, or notwithstanding its general language. was to be limited
to the matters of inquiry presented by the complaint and answer,
and, therefore simply an adjudication that the deed was voidable,
and annulling it so far as it conflicted with the rights of plaintiff
in that suit, leaving it to stand good as a deed inter [’(l-l'fC’S, and
valid as to all other parties. It was held that the latter was the
true construction, and that the general language in the decree was
limited by the matters put in issue by the pleadings. \/Ye quote
from the opinion: “The inquiry is, had the court jurisdiction to
the extent claimed? jurisdiction may be defined to be the right
to adjudicate concerning the subject-matter in the given case. To
constitute this there are three essentials: I. the court must have /
cognizance of the class of cases to which the one to be adjudged
belongs: 2, the proper parties must be present; and, 3, the point
decided must be, in substance and effect. within the issue. That a
court cannot go out of its appointed sphere. and that its action
is void with respect to persons who are strangers to its proceed-
ings, are propositions established by a multitude of authorities. A
defect in a judgment arising from the fact that the matter decided
was not embraced within the issue has not, it would seem, re-
ceived mnch judicial consideration. And yet I cannot doubt that,
upon general principles, such a defect must avoid a judgment. It
is impossible to concede that because ;'\ and 13 are parties to :1
suit, a court can decide any matter in which they are interested, \/
whether such matter be involved in the pendingr litigation or not.
Persons by becoming suitors do not place themselves for all pur-
poses under the control of the court. and it is only over these par-
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adjudged that it be del ivered up to be cancelled ; and further, that 
the ·pla intiff's judgment is and was a lien. No proceedings were 
had under this decree, the money due plaintiff having been paid 
or secured to him. Subsequently and on September 1 5 ,  185 1 ,  a 
decree for costs against Asa �Ionday, in another suit ,  was entered 
in the chancery court. Gpon such decree the property in question 
was levied upon and sold to defendant. The val id i ty of the title 
acquire by th is  proceeding was the matter in controversy. The 
title of plaintiff was good under the trust deed of �fay 1 2 , i 8. p ,  
unless defeated bv this sale and the deed thereon ; and defendant's 
title, adverse to plaint�ff's, depended on the question \vhether the 
decree of  December 1 5 , 1846. was valid to the extent of  [ *268] 
its language. annull ing absolutely the conveyance from Asa �fon­
day and wife to John Conger, and d irect ing the surrender of such 
deed, or notwithstanding its general language ,  was to be l imited 
to the matters of inqu iry presented by the complaint and answer, 
and , therefore simply an adj ud ication that the deed was voidable, 
and annul l ing it so far as it  conflicted with the rights of plaintiff 
in that suit ,  leaving i t  to stand good as a deed in ter pa-rtcs, and 
valid as to a11 other parties. I t  was held that the latter was the 
true construction, and that the general language in the decree was 
limited by the matters put in issue by the plead ings. \V e quote 
from the opinion : ' 'The inquiry is ,  had the court  jurisd iction to 
the extent claimed ? Jurisd iction may be defined to be the right t 
to adjudicate concerning the subj ect-matter in  the given case. To r/ 
consti tute thi s  there are three essentials : I .  the court must have 1 
cognizance of the class of cases to which the one to be adj udged l 
belongs : 2, the proper parties must he present ; and, 3, the point 
decided must be,  in  substance and effect. within the i ssue. That a 
court cannot go out of its appoi nted sphere, and that its action . 
) is void with respect to persons who are strangers to its proceed-
ings, are propositions established hy a mult i tude o f  authorities. A 
defect in a judgment aris ing from the fact that the matter decided 
was not embraced within the issue has not, i t  would seem, re­
ceived much judicial consideration . Arn\ yet I cannot doubt that, 
upon general principles, such a defect must avoid a j udgment. It  
i s  impossible to concede that  because A anct H are part ies to :i 
suit ,  a court can decide any matter i n  which th ey are in terested , t/ 
whether such mat ter be involved in the pending- lit igat ion or not. 
Persons by becoming suitors do not place them s eh·es for all pur­
poses under the control of the court. and it i s  only over these par­
ticular interests, which they choose to draw in quest ion ,  that a 
74 CASES ON JUDGMENTS, ETC.
!
power of judicial decision arises.’ And again, “A judgment
upon a matter outside of the issue must, of necessity, be altogether
arbitrary and unjust, as it concludes a point upon which the parties
have not been heard. And it is upon this very ground that the
parties have been heard, or have had the opportunity of a hearing,
that the law gives so [*269] conclusive an effect to matters ad-
judicatedp And this is the principal reason why judgments be-
come estoppels. lut records or judgments are not estoppels with
reference to every matter contained in them. They have such
efficacy only with respect to the substance of the controversy and
its essential concomitants. Thus Coke, treating of this doctrine,
says: ‘A matter alleged that is neither traversable nor material
shall not estop.’ Co. Litt. 352b. And in a note to the Duchess of
Kingston’s Case, in 2 Smith’s Lead. Cases 535, Baron Comyn is
vouched for the proposition that judgments ‘are conclusive as to
nothing which might not have been in question, or were not ma-
terial.’ for the same doctrine, that in order to make a decision
conclusi e not only the proper parties must be present, but that
the court must act upon ‘the property according to the rights that
appear" upon the record, I refer to the authority of Lord Redes-
dale: Gifford v. Hort, Sch. 8: Lef. 386, 408. See also. Gore v.
Stacjmole, I Dow. 18, 30; Colclough v. Sternu-m, 3 Bligh, 181,
186.” Reference is made in the opinion to the case of C0r'niithe
v. Grifling, 21 Barb. 9, in respect to which the court said: “Com-
missioners in partition, in their distribution, embraced land other
than that contained in the petition, and the court confirmed their
report, and it was held that such judgment was a nullity, ‘as the
jurisdiction was confined to the subject-matter set forth and de-
scribed in the petition.’ In this case the court had jurisdiction in
cases of partition, and the decision was upon the ground that the
decree was void, as it was aside from the issue which the pro-
ceedings presented."
This case is very much in point. \Ve regard the views sug-
gested in the quotation from the opinion as correct, and as proper-
ly indicating the limits in respect to which the conclusiveness of
a judgment may be invoked in a subsequent suit inter partes. See,
also, Unfried V. Heberer, 63 Ind. 67. In that case the inquiry
was as to the effect of a decree of foreclosure rendered upon de-
fault. In the complaint in the foreclosure proceedings the widow
and children of the mortgagor were named as parties, he having
(lied prior to the commencement of the suit. The allegation of
















































































































































74 C A SES ON J UDG M E N T S, F.TC. 
power of j udicial decision arises." And again,  "A j udgment 
upon a matter outside of the issue must, of necessity ,  be al together 
arbitrary and unj ust, as it concludes a point upon which the parties 
have not been heard. And it is  upon this very ground that the 
parties have been heard ,  or have had the opportunity of  a hearing, 
that the law gives so l *269] conclus ive an effect to matters ad­
j uclicatecl. · Ami this is the principal reason why j udgments be­
come estoppcls .  But records or j udgments are not estoppels with 
re ference to every matter contained in them. They have such 
efficacy only with respect to the substance of the controversy and 
i ts  essential concomitants. Thus Coke, treating of th i s  doctrine, 
says : 'A matter alleged that is  neither traversable nor material 
shall not estop. '  Co. Litt. 35 2b. And in a note to the Ducllcss of 
Kingston 's Case, in 2 Smith's  Lead. Cases 53 5 ,  Baron Comyn is 
vouched for the proposition that j udgments \are conclusive as to 
nothing which might not have been in quest ion , or were not ma· 
terial . '  for the same doctrine, that in order to make a decision 
conclusi�e not only the proper parties must be present , hu t that 
the court must act upon 'the property according to the rights that 
appear' upon the record , I ref er  to the authori ty of Lord Redes­
dale : G ifford v. Hort, Sch. & Lc f. 386, 4o8. See also. Go re v. 
Stacpoolc, I Dow. 1 8, 30 ; Colclo ugli v. Sternum, 3 Bligh,  1 8 1 ,  
186." Reference i s  made i n  the opinion t o  the case o f  Corwithe 
v. Griffing, 21 Barb. 9, in respect to which the court said : ' 'Com­
missioners in partition, in their d istribution, embraced land other 
than that contained in the peti tion, and the court confirmecl their 
report, and it was held that such judgment was a null ity, 'as the 
jurisd iction was confined to the subj ect-matter set forth and de­
scribed in the petition . '  Jn this case the court had jurisdiction in 
cases of partition, and the decision was upon the ground that the 
decree \Vas void , as i t  was aside from the issue which the pro­
ceedings presented . ' '  
Th is  case is very much in  point. \V c regard the views sug­
gested in the quotation from the opin ion as correct, ancl as  proper­
ly indicat ing the limits in respect to which the conclusiveness of 
a j udgment may be invoked in a subsequent suit i11 ter partcs. See, 
also, Unfried v. H cbcrcr, 63 Ind. 67. In that case the inqu iry 
was as to the effect of a decree of foreclosure rendered upon de­
fault. In  the complaint in the foreclosure proceedings the widow 
and children of  the mortgag-or were named as parties, he having 
died prior to the commencement of the suit .  The allegation of 
the complaint was [ *270] that the defendants were in tere�tecl as 
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heirs, and the prayer was for a decree foreclosing such interests.
It was not averred that the widow had joined in the mortgage, or
even that she was a widow; but she was made a defendant, and
alleged to be an heir. Subsequently she asserted rights in the
premises as widow, and in respect to this decree upon default,
the court observed: “A widow is an heir of her deceased husband
only in a special and limited sense, and not in the general sense
in which that term is usually used and understood. When the said
Anna made default in the action for foreclosure, nothing was
taken against her as confessed, nor could have been, which was
not alleged in the complaint, and, as nothing was alleged hostile
to her claim as widow, it follows that nothing concerning her claim
as such widow was concluded against her by the judgment of
foreclosure. This proposition we regard as too well founded in
principle to need the citation of authorities to sustain it. See,
however, Helms v. Low, 4I Ind. 210; Fletcher v. Holmes, 25 Ind.
458; Minor v. 1/Valtcr, 17 Mass. 237.” See, also, Gaucher v. Clay-
ton, decided by Vice—Chancellor \-Vood, and reported in II Jurist
n. s. 107, 34 L. J. n. s. Ch. 239.
In the case of Packet Company v. Sicklcs, 24 How. 333, 34I,
Mr. Justice Campbell, speaking for the court, declared, that “the
essential conditions under which the exception of the res judicata
becomes applicable are the identity of the thing demanded, the
identity of the cause of the demand, and of the parties in the
character in which they are litigants.” In the case of Smith v.
Ontario, 18 Blatchford 454, 457, Circuit Judge \Va1lace observed,
that Qhe matter in issue” has been defined in a case of leading‘
authority, as “that matter upon which the plaintilf proceeds by
his action, and which the defendant controverts by his pleading/l
King v. Chase, 15 N. H. 9. ‘mt without multiplying authorities,
the proposition, suggested by those referred to, and which we
aflirm, is, that in order to give a judgment, rendered by even a
court of general jurisdiction, the merit and finality of an adjudi-
cation between the parties, it must, with the limitations heretofore
stated, be responsive to the issues tendered by the pleadings. In
other [*27I] words, that when a complaint tenders one cause of
J
action, and in that suit service on, or appearance of. the defend- /
ant is made, a subsequent judgment therein, rendered in the ab-
sence of the defendant, upon another and different cause of action
than that stated in the complaint, is without binding force within
















































































































































ELEM ENTS OF JURISDICTION 75 
heirs, and the prayer \Vas for a decree foreclosing such interests. 
It was not averred that the widow had joined in the mortgage, or 
even that she was a widow ; but she was made a defendant, and 
al leged to be an heir. Subsequently she asserted rights in the 
premises as widow, and in respect to this  decree upon default ,  
the court observed : "A widow i s  an heir of  her deceased husband 
only in a special and limited sense, and not in the general sense 
in which that term is usually used and understood . \Vhen the said 
Anna made default in the act ion for forec losure, nothing was 
taken against her as con fessed, nor could have been, wh ich was 
not alleged in the complaint, and, as nothing was al leged hostile 
to her claim as widow, i t  follows that noth ing concerning her claim 
as such widow was concluded against her by the j udgment of  
foreclosure. This proposition we regard as too well founded in  
principle to  need the citation of  authorities to  sustain i t. Sec, 
however, Helms v. Lo< ·e, 4 I Ind. 2 1 0 ; Fletch er v. Holm es, 25 Ind. 
458 ; .:J!i11or  v . . vValtcr, i7 l\fass. 237." See, also, Goucher v. Clay­
ton, decided hy Vice-Chancellor \Vood, and reported in I 1 Jurist 
n. s .  107, 34 L. ]. n. s. Ch. 239. 
In the case of Packet Company v. Sickles, 24 How. 333, 34 1 ,  
l\fr. Justice Campbell ,  speak ing for the court, declared, that "the 
essential condi tions under wh ich the e?Cception of the res judicata 
becomes appl icable are the identity of the thing demanded, the 
identity of  the cause of the demand, and of  the part ies in the 
character in which they are l itigants ." In  the case of Smith v. 
Ontario, 18 Blatchford 454, 457, Circuit Judge \Vallace observed , 
that 4!ie matter in issue" has been defined in a case of leading' 
authority, as ' 'that matter upon which the plaint iff proceeds byj v' 
his action, and which the defendant controverts by h is  pleading. '' 
King v. Chase, 1 5  N. H. 9. But without mul tiplying authorit ies, 
the proposition, suggested by those referred to, and which we 
affirm, is ,  that in order to give a j udgment, rendered by even a 
court of  general j uri sdiction, the merit and final ity of  an adj udi­
cation between the parties , it must, with the l imitat ions heretofore 
stated, be responsive to the issues tendered by the pleadings. In 
other [ * 27 1 ] words, that when a complaint tenders one cause of 
action, and in that suit  service on, or appearance of .  the defend- ( 
ant is made, a subsequent j udgment therein,  rendered i n  the ab­
sence of the defendant, upon another and different cause of  act ion 
than tha t stated in the complaint, is without binding force within 
the courts of the same state ; and, of  course, notwith-
76 cases on woomenrs, ETC.
standing the constitutional provision hereinbefore quoted, has no
better standing in the courts of another state.
This proposition determines this case; for, as has been shown,
the scope and object of the suit in the New York court was the
subjection of the fund in the hands of the superintendent of the
insurance department of that state to the satisfaction of claims
against the New York company. The cause of action disclosed
in the original complaint was not widened by any amendment;
and there was no actual appearance by the receiver Parker or the
New Jersey company subsequently to the filing of their answer.
No valid judgment could, therefore, be rendered therein, which/
went beyond the subjection of this fund to those claims.
But another matter is also worthy of notice. At the time of
the rendition of this judgment in the Supreme Court of New
York, Parker had lost all authority to represent the New jersey
company. His authority in New Jersey, the state of primary ad-
ministration, had been transferred to Stockton. the present re-
ceiver. By a decree in the very court, and in the very suit in the
state of New York, in which he had been appointed ancillary re-
ceiver for that state, a decree had been entered discharging him
from further power and responsibility. If it be said that the at-
tention of the court in which the judgment in question was en-
tered had not been called to this loss of representative power on
the part of Parker, a sufficient reply is, that if the power was gone
it is immaterial whether the court knew of it or not. \?\"l1atever
reservation of power a court may have by num: fro tum: entry to
make its judgments operative as of the time when the represen-
tative capacity in fact existed, it is enough to say that no exercise
of that power was attempted in this case. Suppose it had been.
or suppose that Parker, as ancillary receiver, had not been [*272]
discharged by any order in the New York court, would the ad-
ministration of this estate in the chancery court of New jersey,
through a receiver appointed by it, or the assets in the hands of
such receiver, be bound by this decree entered in the court of
New York? Clearly not. The idea which underlies this runs
through all administration proceedings, and has been recently
considered by this court in the case of Johnson v. Powers, I39 U.
S. 156, II S. Ct. 525. If Parker had still remained the ancillary
receiver in the State of New York, a judgment rendered against
him as such would bind only that portion of the estate which
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stand ing the constitutional provi s ion hereinbefore quoted , has no 
better standing in the courts of another state . 
This proposition determines this case ; for. as has been shown , 
the scope and obj ec t o f  the su it in  the New York court was the 
subjection of the fund in the hands of the superintendent of the 
insurance department of  that state to the satisfaction of claims 
against the New York company. The cause of  action d isc losed 
in the original complaint was not w i<lened by any amendmen t ; 
and there \vas no actual appearance by the receiver Parker or the 
Kew Jersey company subsequently to the filing of their answer ../ 
No val id j udgment cou ld ,  therefore , be rendered therein,  which 
went beyond the subj ection of  this fund to those claims. 
But another matter i s  also worthy of notice. At  the time of 
the rendition of this j udgment in the Supreme Court  o f  1\ c w  
York , Parker had lost  al l  author i ty to represent the 1\ ew J ersey 
company . His authority in Kew J ersey, the state of pri ma ry ad­
mini stration , had hcen trans fe rred to Stockton , the pres::>n t re­
ce iver. Dy a decree in the very cou rt,  and in the very su i t in  the 
state of New York , in which he had been appo i nted ancil lary re­
ce iver for that state, a decree had been entered d ischarging him 
from further power and responsihil ity .  If  it he sa id that the at­
tention of the court in which the j udgment in quest ion was en­
tered had not been called to this loss of represen tative po\\'er on 
the part of Parker, a sufficient reply is, that if the power was gone 
i t  is immaterial whether the court knew of it or not.  \Vhatever 
reservation of power a court may have by 11 1wc tro t u n e  entry to 
mak e its  j udgments ope rat ive as of the time when the repre�en-
, tativc capac ity in fact existecl , it is enough to say that no exerc ise 
of that power was attempted in this case. Suppose it hacl been, 
or suppose that Parker, as anci l lary receiver, had not been [ * 2 7 2 ]  
discharged by any order in  t h e  N cw York court, would t h e  ad­
ministration of th is estate in the chancery court of Xew Jersey, 
through a rece iver appointed by i t ,  or the assets in the hands of 
such receiver, be bound by th i s  decree entered in the court of  
N" ew York ? Clearly not. The idea wh ich underlies th is  nms 
through all administration proceedi ngs , and has been recently 
con sidered by this  court in the case of Joh nson v. P O'<i.'Cr s, I 39 U. 
S. I 56, I I  S. Ct. 525. If Parker had sti l l  remained the anci l lary 
receiver in  the State of -:\" ew York , a judgment rendered against 
him as such wou ld b ind only that port ion of the estate which 
came into h is  hand s as ancillary receiver, and wou ld not be an 
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operative and final adjudication against the receiver appointed by
the court of original administration. Where a receiver or ad-
ministrator or other custodian of an estate is appointed by the
courts of one state the courts of that state reserve to themselves
full and exclusive jurisdiction over the assets of the estate within
the limits of the state. V\/hatever orders, judgments, or decrees
may be rendered by the courts of another state in respect to so
much of the estate as is within its limits, must be accepted as
conclusive in the courts of primary administration; and whatever
matters are by the courts of primary administration permitted to
be litigated in the courts of another state, come within the same
rule of conclusiveness. Beyond this, the proceedings of the courts
of a state in which ancillary administration is held are not con-
clusive upon the administration of the courts of the state in which
primary administration is had. And this rule is not
changed, although a party whose‘ estate is being ad-
ministered by the courts of one state permits himself
or itself to be made a party to the litigation in the
other. Whatever may be the rule i f jurisdiction is acquired by a
court before administration proceedings are commenced, the mo-
ment they are commenced, and the estate is taken possession of
by a tribunal of a state, that moment the party whose estate is thus
taken possession of ceases to have power to bind the'estate in a
court of another state, either voluntary or by submitting him-
self to the jurisdiction of the latter court. So, as Stockton, the
receiver appointed by the chancery court of [*273] New Jersey,
the court having primary jurisdiction, was not a party to the pro-
ceedings in the New York court, and was not authoritatively rep-
resented therein, the judgment. even if responsive to the issues
tendered by the pleadings, was not an adjudication binding upon
him, or the estate in his hands.
For these reasons the decree of the court below was correct
and it is affirmed.
A decree forclosing the title of a defendant against -whom no relief
was asked in the original complaint was held not void because there was
_ an amended complaint filed asking such relief, and notice of it given
such defendant before such decree. Harrison v. Union Trust Co., 144
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operative and final adj udication against the receiver appointed by 
the court of original administration. \Vhere a receiver or ad­
ministrator or other custodian of  an estate is  appointed by the 
courts of one state the courts of that state reserve to themselves 
full and exclusive jurisdiction over the assets of the estate within 
the l imits of  the state. \Vhatever orders, j udgments, or decrees 
may be rendered by the courts of another state in respect to so 
much of the estate as is within its limits, must be accepted as 
conclusive in the courts of primary administration ; and whatever 
matters are by the courts of primary administration permitted to 
be litigated in the courts of  another state , come within the same 
rule of conclusiveness. Beyond this, the proceedings of the courts 
of a state in which ancillary administration is held are not con­
clusive upon the administration of the courts of the state in \vhich 
primary administration 1s had. And this rule 1s not 
changed, al.though a party whose · estate is being ad­
minis tered by the courts of one state permits himself 
or i tsel f to be made a party to the litigation in  the 
other. vVhatever may be the rule if j urisdiction is acquired by a 
court before administration proceedings are commenced, the mo­
ment they are commenced, and the estate is taken possession of 
by a tribunal of  a state, that moment the party whose estate is  thus 
taken possession of  ceases to have power to bind the· estate in a 
court o f  another state , either voluntary or by submitting him­
sel f to the j urisdiction of  the latter court. So, as Stockton, the 
receiver appointed by the chancery court o f  [ *273]  ::\ew Jersey, 
the court having primary j urisdiction, was not a party to the pro­
ceedings in the �ew York court, and was not authoritatively rep­
resented therein, the j udgment ,  even i f  responsive to the issues 
tendered by the plead ings, was not an adj udication binding upon 
him, or the estate in his hands . 
For these reasons the decree of the court below was correct 
and it is affirmed. 
A decree forclosing the title of  a defendant against whom no rel ief  
was asked in  the original complaint was  held  not  void because there w a s  
. an amended complaint fried asking such relie-f, and notice of i t gi ven 
such defendant before such decree. llarriso11 Y. U11 io11 Trust Co., 144 
326, :39 N.  E. 352. 




SACHE v. WALLACE, in Minn. Sup. Ct., May 31, I907—l0I Minn. I69,
112 N. W. 386, 118 Am. St. Rep. 612, II L. R. A. N. S. 803
Action by W'm. R. Sache against Ellen M. Gillette and
Emma L. Wallace. Judgment for plaintiff, and he appeals from
an order modifying it. '
BROWN, J. This action was brought under Revised Laws
of 1905, section 4424, to determine adverse claims to certain real
property. The complaint, so far as here material, alleges that
the plaintiff is the owner in fee simple of the land, which is
described therein; that it is vacant and unoccupied; and that
defendant claims some title or interest therein adverse to plain-
tiff. (‘Wherefore the plaintiff prays that he may be adjudged
to be the owner in fee simple of the above described real
estate, * * * and that the defendant may be adjudged to have
no right, title, interest or estate in said real estate, * * * and
that he may have such other and further relief,” etc. )The sum—
mons was duly served, but defendant made no appearance in
the action. Thereafter, on application of plaintiff, the court below
made an order reciting the service of the summons and default
of defendant and directing the entry of judgment (‘in all things
in accordance with the prayer of the complaint’) There were
no findings of fact disclosing the source of plaintiff’s title to the
property, or the title or right of defendant, nor any finding upon
which to predicate a judgment transferring to plaintiff defend-
ant's title, if any she had. The order for judgment was in the
form often used in default cases, and does not disclose that any
evidence was offered for the consideration of the court. On
June 27, I905, judgment was duly entered by the clerk, substan-
tially asj prayed for in the complaint, to the effect that plaintiff
was the owner of the property and that defendant had no title
or right therein, and for the following further relief not prayed
for in the complaint, nor embraced within the scope of the order
for judgment, namely: “ t is further ad'ud ed and ‘ t
all the ri ht it ' ‘ ' ' '
e cndant be and it is hereb' transferr
\Villiam R. Sache, the plaintifi in this action.”
Defendant was in fact neither owner of the property at the
time of the commencement of the action nor had she any interest
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SACHE v .  WALLA CE, in M inn. Sup. Ct., May 31, 1907-101 Minn. r6g, 
I I 2  N. W. 386, 1 18 Am. St. Rep. 612, I I  L. R. A. N. S. 8o3 
Action by \Vm. R. Sache against Ellen M .  Gi llette and 
Emma L. Wallace. J udgment for plaintiff, and he appeals from 
an order modifying it. 
BROW N, J. This action was brought under Revised Laws 
of r905, section 4424, to determine adverse claims to certain real 
property. The complaint, so far as here material, alleges that 
the plaintiff is the owner in fee simple of the land, which is 
described therein ; that it is vacant and u noccupied ; and that 
defendant claims some title or interest therein adverse to plain­
tiff. \'.'Wherefore the plaintiff prays that he may be adj udged 
to be the owner in fee simple of the above described real 
estate, * * * and that the defendant may be adj udged to have 
no right, title, interest or estate in said real estate, * * * and 
that he may have such other and further relief," etc. ) The sum­
mons was duly served, but defendant made no appearance i n  
the action. Thereafter, on application of plaintiff, the court below 
made an order reciting the service of the summons and default 
of defendant and direct ing the entry of j udgment f'in all things 
in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. ') There were 
no findings o f  fact disclosing the source of plaintiff's title to the 
property, or the title or right o f  defendant, nor any finding upon 
which to predicate a j udgment transferring to plaintiff defend­
ant's title, if any she had. The order for j udgment was in the 
form often used in default cases, and does not disclose that any 
evidence was offered for the consideration of the court. On 
June 27, 1905, j udgment was duly entered by the clerk , substan­
tially as· prayed for in the complaint, to the effect that plaintiff 
wa the owner of the property and that defendan t had no title 
or right therein, and for the following further relief not pra.vecl 
for in the complaint, nor embraced within the scope of the order 
for judgment, namely : "It  is further adjudged and deqeed tbat 
all the right, title. int rest, estate gr lien jp. to. u,pqn, or agaimt 
said prem ises held, owned, or o. se ed b said lie · 
ae enclant]. be and it is he reby transferred to and yested j.g 
\\'i l! iam R .  Sache, the plaintiff in this action . "  
Defendant was in  fact neither owner of the property a t  the 
time of the commencement of the action nor had she any interest 
therein when j udgment was entered, having prior thereto con-
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veyed the same to Emma L. Wallace; but the deed had not then
been recorded. On October 3!, 1906, more than a year after the
entry of the judgment, [*171] Mrs. Wallace, upon affidavits set-
ting forth her ownership of the property and her ignorance of
the action or judgment, moved the court to strike from the judg-
ment the provision quoted above in full, by which the title of
defendant was transferred to and vested in plaintiff, on the
ground, among others, that the court had no authority to incor-
porate the same in the judgment, in that the relief thereby grant-
ed was not prayed for in the complaint. The court granted the
motion, and plaintiff appealed.
It is contended by appellant that, conceding for the purposes
of the point that the relief granted exceeded that to which
plaintiff was entitled under the complaint, the inclusion thereof
in the judgment was an error or irregularity not going to th
jurisdiction of the court, to be corrected by motion or appea
within the time prescribed by statute for the correction of suc
errors; that the judgment, not having been so proceeded against
became, after the time for appeal had expired, final and con
elusive as to all the world. 1 ri ' '
WMMW
wholly upon the uestion whether the embodi ent of the exc -
sive rehef 1n the judgment was a mere irre ularit Y hether
mere
May that
a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, aftefihe expira-
tion of the time of appeal, cannot be impeached, either directl_v
or indirectly, for mere errors or irregularities not going to the
jurisdiction of the court; but in all cases where the court exceeds
its jurisdiction, and want of jurisdiction appears upon the face
of the record, the judgment may be attacked at any time, before
or after the time for appeal, even by a person not a party to the
action, but who is affected thereby in his property rights: M nel-
Icr v. Reimer, 46 Minn. 314, 48 N. NV. 1120; I2 Ency. of P1. &
Pr. I88: Phelps v. Hcaton, 79 Minn. 476, 82 N. W. 990.
I. The courts are not in full harmony as to what constitutes
an irregularity within the meaning of the rule referred to. Gen-
erally speaking, however, an irregularity may be defined as a
failure to follow appropriate and necessary rules of practice or
procedure, omitting some act essential to the due and orderly
conduct of the action or proceeding. or doing it in an improper
manner: 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed.. 48r: ]cm1c.r.¢ v.
C1'rcm't Judge, 42 Mich. 469, 4 N. W. 220: Holmes v. Russel.
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veyed the same to Emma L. Wallace ; but the deed had not then 
been recorded. On October 3 I ,  1906, more than a year after the 
entry of the j udgment, [ * 1 7 1 ]  Mrs. Wallace, upon affid�vits set­
ting forth her ownership of the property and her ignorance o f  
the action o r  judgment, moved the court t o  strike from the j udg­
ment the provision quoted above in full, by which t�e title of 
defendant was trans ferred to and vested in plaintiff, on the 
ground, among others, that the court had no authority to incor­
porate the same in the j udgment, in that the rel ief thereby grant­
ed was not prayed for in the complaint. The court granted the 
motion, and plaintiff appealed. 
It is contended by appellant that, conceding for the purposes 
of the point that the relief granted exceeded that to which 
plaintiff was entitled under the complaint, the inclusion thereo 
in the j udgment was an erro r  or irregularity not going to th 
j u risdiction of the court, to be corrected by motion or appea 
within the time p rescribed by statute for the correction of sue 
errors ; that the j udgment, not having been so proceeded against 
became, after the time for appeal had expired, final and con 
elusive as to all the world. '.IJlF merits of this cgpteptjgg denewl 
wholly u on the uestion whether the embo i ent of the exc -
s1ve re 1e m t e j udgment was a mere irre ularit :}lether 
i xcee e 1c ion an ower o t e court. I f  a mere 
i rre n y, counse s contention is sound. It is eleffifntary that 
a j udgment of a court of competent j urisdiction , after1"the expira­
tion of the time of appeal, cannot be impeached, either directly 
or indirectly, for mere errors or irregularities not going to the 
j urisdiction of the court ; but in all cases where the cou rt exceeds 
its j u risdiction , and want of jurisdiction appears upon the face 
I of the record, the j udgment may be attacked at any time, before 
or a fter the time for appeal,  even by a person not a party to the 
action, but who is affected thereby in his property rights : M1tel­
ler v. Reimer, 46 Minn. 3 1 4, 48 N. \V. 1 1 20 ; 1 2  Ency . of Pl . & 
Pr. 188 ; Phelps v. Heaton, 79 l'viinn. 476, 82 N. \V. 990. 
1 .  The courts are not in full harmony as to what constitutes 
an irregularity within the meaning of the rule referred to. Gen­
erally speaking, however, an irregularity may be define<l as a 
failure to follow appropriate and necessary rules of practice or  
procedure, omitting some act essential to the due and orderly 
conduct of the action or proceeding. or doing it in an improper 
manner : 1 7  Am . & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2<l ed . .  48 1 : f c11 ncss v. 
Cirrnit Judge, 42 Mich. 469, 4 N. W. 220 : Holm es v. Russel. 
9 Dowl. 487. Errors or defects of this character, f 1 72 ]  that 
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may be amended without prejudice to the absolute rights of the
parties, do not affect the jurisdiction of the court to the extent
that its final action is a nullity, but proceedings outside the au-
thority of the court, or in violation or contravention of statutory
prohibitions, are, whether the court have jurisdiction of the
parties and subject matter of the action or proceedings, or not,
utterly void: Ex parte Simmons, 62 Ala. 416; Er partc Gibson,
31 Cal. 619, 91 Am. Dec. 546; Barton v. Saunders, 16 Or. 51, 8
Am. St. Rep. 261, 16 Pac. 921.
The mere fact that the court has jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter of an action before it does not justify an exercise
of a power not authorized by law, or a grant of relief to one of
‘the parties the law declares shall not be granted. If the court
may do so under the guise of “jurisdiction of the subject matter,”
then it may commit all sorts of depredations upon the rights of
parties, particularly in default cases. “Jurisdiction of the subject
matter” means, not only authority to hear and determine a par-
ticular class of actions, but authority to hear and determine the
partictilar questions the court assumes to decide. Though it has
‘general jurisdiction over the subject matter, for instance, of
actions to foreclose mortgages, to quiet title to real property, or
for damages for personal injuries, its power to decide and deter-
mine matters in dispute between the parties in a given action is
limited to hose questions which are brought before it by the
pleadings. he foundation of the rule that judgments of a court
of competent jurisdiction are attended with a presumption of
absolute verity is the fact that the parties have been properly
brought into court and given an opportunity to be heard upon
the matters determined. But the foundation falls and the rule of
verity ceases when it afiirmatwe y app eeorel-thatr
the judgment a(ju<1cated and determin d ~ 'eh
the_p_ar r . ' en the court goes beyond and
outside the issues made by the pleadings, and in the absence of
one of the parties determines property rights against him which
he has not submitted to it, the authority of the court is exceeded,
even though it had jurisdiction of the general subject of the
matters adjudicated. Such a departure cannot be held a mere
irregularity. This position is sustained both from the view point
of our statutes upon the subject and under the rules and prin-
ciples of the common law.
2. The action was one to determine adverse claims to real
property. [I73] The complaint alleges title in plaintiff. and that
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may be amended without prejudice to the absolute rights of the 
parties, do not affect the j urisdiction of the court to the extent 
that its final action is a null ity, but proceedings outside the au­
thority of the court, or in violation or contraventioP. of statutory 
prohibitions, are, whether the court have j urisdiction of the 
parties and subj ect matter of the action or proceedings, or  not, 
utterly void : E.r pa.rte Simmons, 62 Ala. 4 1 6 ; E.r partc Gibso n ,  
3 1  Cal. 6 1 9, 9 1  Am. Dec. 546 ; Barto n v. Sa unders, 1 6  Or.  5 1 ,  8 
Am. St. Rep. 26 1 ,  1 6  Pac. 92 1 .  
The mere fact that the court has j uri sdiction of  the sub­
j ect matter of au action before i t  docs not j usti fy an exercise 
of a power not authorized by law, or  a grant of relief to one of 
1 the parties the law declares shall not be granted. I f  the court 
may do so under the guise of "j urisdiction of  the subj ect matter," 
then it may commit all sorts of  dcprctlat ions upon the rights of 
part ies, part icularly in default cases. "Jurisdiction of the subj ect 
matter" means, not only authority to hear and determine a par­
ticular class of actions, but authority to hear and determine the 
·particu lar quest ions the court assumes to decide. Though it has 
"general jurisdiction over the subj ect matter, for instance, of 
actions to foreclose mortgages, to quiet title to real property, or 
for damages for personal injuries, its power to decide and deter­
mine matters in di spute between the parties in a given action i s  
limited to  Jhosc questions which are brought before it by the 
pleadings. 'J°'he foundation of the rule that j udgments of a court 
of competent jurisdiction are attended with a presumption of 
absolute verity is the fact that the parties have been properly 
brought into court and given an opportunity to be heard upon 
the matters determined. But the foundation falls and the rule of 
verity ceases when it affirmatively appears from fbe re-rordthat-­
the judgment ad1 uchcated and cletermin 'ch 
the p�1r r . en the court goes be:vond and 
outside the issues ma<le by the pleadings, ancl in the absence of 
one of the parties determines p roperty rights against him which 
he has not submitted to it ,  the authority of the court is exceeded, 
even though it had jurisdiction of the general subject of the 
matters adj udicatecJ . Such a departure cannot be heM a mere 
irregularity. Th i s position is sustained both from the view point 
of our st atutes upon the subj ect and uncler the rules and prin­
c iples of  the common law. 
2. The action was one to determ ine aclver� e claims to real 
property. f 1 731  The complaint alleg-cs t it le in plain tiff, and that 
defendant claims to have some estate or interest therein adverse 
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to plaintiff. The prayer for relief was that plaintiff be decreed
the owner of the property, and that defendant be adjudged to
have no interest in or title to the same. The court ordered judg-
ment for the relief demanded in the complaint. Plaintifi‘ caused
judgment to be entered for the other and further relief now
objected to.
Our statutes (Rev. Laws 1905, see. 4264) provide
That “as against a defendant who does not answer, the relie /
granted to plaintiff shall not exceed that demanded in the com
plaint. Against all others, he may have any relief consistent wit
the complaint and within the issue actually tried.” This plain
and explicit language ought, it would seem, to relieve from
serious doubt the question whether a judgment entered in viola-
tion of its terms is void for want of jurisdiction. The command
of the statute is unqualified, and its purpose is obvious. The
object of the statute was to prevent “snap judgments” against
defendants, who, upon examination of the complaint in an action
against them, are content that the plaintiff may have the relief
therein demanded, and for that reason do not appear or answer.
Defendants so situated may rely upon the statute for their pro-
tection, and are not required to follow the action or the proceed-
ings therein, for the purpose of ascertaining whether a judgment
other than that demanded has been entered against them. A
judgment in violation of the statute cannot, therefore, be a mere
irregularity to be cured by amendment, but the exercise of power
expressly withheld from the court, and consequently beyond its
jurisdiction.
‘Although every exercise of power not possessed by a court
will not necessarily render its action a nullity, it is clear that
every final act, in the form of a judgment or decree, granting
relief the law declares shall not be granted, is void, even when
collaterally called in question. ‘This is fundamental, and must
be applied to this case, unless we are to adopt a new rule, not
contemplated by the lawmakers, which will compel all litigants
to be vigilant in preventing an Imlawful invasion of their rights.
A construction of the statute which would require this of the
defendant in a case of this character, or sustain a judgment for
greater relief than that demanded, on the theory that the exces-
sive relief was a mere irregularity, would emasculate the statute
and render [174] it inoperative and of no practical value. \V;,d,o
n2t_§)_£Qr_LSLLu£italmL_nn_fl1lL££zx1£IiL_Mtl1Lt_a.JdQlaLkm-of
'. c m nd ' extra'u ' ' and void. Of course, an instance
















































































































































ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION 8 I  
to  plaintiff. The prayer for relief was that plaintiff be  decreed 
the owner o f  the property, and that defendant be adj u<lge<l to 
have no interest in or title to the same. The court ordered judg­
ment for the relief demanded in the complaint. Plaintiff caused 
judgment to be entered for the other and further rel ief now 
obj ected to. 
Our statutes ( Rev. Laws 1905, sec. 4264) provide] 
That "as against a defendant who does not answer, the rel ie V granted to plaintiff shall not exceed that demanded in the com 
plaint. Against all others, he may have any relief consistent wit 
the complaint and within the issue actually tried." This plain 
and explicit language ought, it would seem, to relieve from 
serious doubt the question whether a judgment entered in viola-
tion of its terms is void for want of j urisdiction. The command 
of the statute is unqualified, and its purpose is obvious. The 
obj ect of the statute was to prevent "snap j udgments" against 
defendants, who, upon examination of the complaint in an action 
against them, are content that the plaintiff may have the relief 
therein demanded, and for that reason do not appear or answer. 
Defendants so situated may rely upon the statute for their pro­
tection, and are not required to follow the action or the proceed-
ings therein, for the purpose of ascertaining whether a j udgment 
other than that demanded has been entered against them. A 
judgment in violation of the statute cannot, therefore, be a mere 
irregularity to be cured by amendment, but the exercise of power 
expressly withheld from the court, and consequently beyond its 
jurisdiction. 
I Although every exercise of power not possessed by a court 
will not necessarily render its action a nullity, it is clear that 
every final act, in the form of a j udgment or decree, granting 
relief the law declares shall not be granted, is  void, even when 
collaterally called in question. I This is fundamental , and must 
be applied to this case, unless we are to ado�t a new rule, not 
contemplated by the lawmakers, which wil l  compel all l itigants 
to be vigilant in prev-enting an Jmlawful invasion of their rights. 
A construction of the statute which would require this of  the 
defendant in a case of this character, or sustain a j udgment for 
greater rel ief than that demanded , on the theory that the exces­
sive relief was a mere irregularity, would emasculate the statute 
and render [ 1 74 ]  it inoperative and of no pract ical value. \�o 
not so construe it, but, an the contrary, hold that a yjglation of 
its command is extrajudicial and void. Of course, an instance 
might arise, in the case of an imperfectly framed prayer for 
82 cases on wnenenrs, ETC.
wit lit] the alle ati
The prayer of the complaint here before us is complete, and asks
for all the relief the allegations of the complaint justify.
A number of authorities are cited by counsel for the
plaintiff which apparently sustain his view of this question. But
we are not inclined to follow them. They are at variance, as
seems to us, with sound logic, reason, and the weight of authority.
In VVisconsin, for instance, it has been held that a judgment
sentencing a person to a longer term of imprisonment than the
statute warrants is an irregularity, to be corrected by appeal, and
not void for want of jurisdiction: In re Graham, 74 VVis. 450,
17 Am. St. Rep. 174, 43 N. VV. 148. The contrary doctrine is
upheld by the supreme court of the United States: Ex parte
Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 672, 33 L. ed. 118. and
cases there cited. The VVisconsin rule is followed in South
Dakota, but by a divided court. Under a statute similar to our
own, two of the three judges of the supreme court of that state
held that a judgment in a default case which granted relief be-
yond that demanded in the complaint was not void, but merely
erroneous or irregular: Mach ‘Z’. Blanchard, 15 S. Dak. 432, 9r
Am. St. Rep. 698, 90 N. VV. I042, 58 L. R. A. 8II. In Indiana,
in actions for the recovery of money, a judgment for an excessive
amount is held erroneous but not void ;1 while in other forms of
actions, as will be presently shown, judgments granting relief in
excess of that demanded by the pleadings are held by that court
void for want of jurisdiction: Gum E. R. Co. v. Mexico R. Co.,
140 Ind. 158, 39 N. E. 443, 3 L. R. A. 700; McFadden v. Ross,
108 Ind. 512, 8 N. E. 161. The distinction between the two
classes of judgments is found in the fact that the miscalculation
of interest, or other mistakes in reference to the amount of re-
covery, are clerical in their nature, and should be corrected by
motion or appeal.(A clear departure from the relief demanded
in equitable actions materially differs from an excessive judg-
ment in actions for money only.‘
3. But the weight of authority sustains the proposition that
at common [I75] law the judgment is void for want of jurisdic-
tion. In fact, it may be said our statute created no new rule on
the subject, but merely adopted that existing at common law.
It is laid down in I Black on Judgments, 242, as a general prin-
ciple. that. in addition to jurisdiction of the parties and subject
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rsJjf,f. where a judgment beyopd its scape might be sustained, if 
w1 t\in the allegations of the cowplaiAt But such is not tbii; �ai;@, 
1'hc prayer of the complaint here be fore us is  complete, and asks 
for all the relief the allegat ions of the complaint just ify. 
A number of authorities are cited by counsel for the 
plaintiff which apparently sustain his view of this question. But 
we are not inclined to follow them. They are at variance, as 
seems to us,  with sound logic, reason , and the weight of authority . 
In  \Visconsin, for instance, it has been held that a judgment 
sentencing a person to a longer term of imprisonment than the 
statute warrants is  an irregularity, to be corrected by appeal, and 
not void for want of j urisdiction : Iii re Graham, 74 \Vis. 450, 
17 Am. St. Rep. 1 74, 43 .N. \V. 148. The contrary doctrine is 
upheld by the supreme court of the Vnited States : Ex parte 
1\'ielscn, 1 3 1  U. S. 176, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 672, 33 L. ed. 1 18. and 
cases there ci ted. 1'he \Visconsin rule is followed in South 
Dakota, but by a divided court. Under a statute s imi lar to our 
own, two of the three j udges of  the supreme court of that state 
held that a judgment in a default case which granted relief be­
yond that demanded in the complaint was not void,  but merely 
erroneous or i rregular : Mach '£'. Bla11 cliard, 1 5  S. Dak. 432, 9 1  
Am.  St. Rep. 698, 9<:> N .  W. 1042, 58  L.  R. A .  8 1  r .  In Indiana, 
in actions for the recovery of money, a judgment for an excessive 
amount is held erroneous but not void ;1 while in other forms of 
actions, as will  be presently shown, judgments granting rel ief in 
excess of that demanded by the pleadings are held by that court 
void for want of jurisdiction : Gum E. R. Co. v.  M c.rico R. Co . ,  
140 Ind. 1 58, 39 N. E. 443, 3 L. R. A .  700 ; llfcFaddcn v. Ross, 
108 Ind. 5 12,  8 N .  E. 1 6 1 .  The distinction between the two 
classes of judgments is found in the fact that the miscalculation 
of in terest, or other mistakes in reference to the amount of re­
covery, are clerical in  their nature, and should be corrected bv 
motion or appeal .( A clear departure from the relief demanded 
in eqtlitable actions materially differs from an excessive j udg­
ment in actions for money only. 1 
3 .  Rut the weight of authority sustains the proposition that 
at common r 1 7 5 ]  law the j udgment is void for want of  j urisdic­
tion. In fact, i t  may be said our statute created no new rule on 
the subject, but merely adopted that existing at common law. 
It  is  laid down in I Black on Judgments, 242, as a general prin­
ciple, that, in addit ion to jurisdiction of the parties and subject 
'Acco rd : Kctci111 m \'. IVhitc ,  i2 Iowa I iJ, 33 �- \V. 62j. 
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matter of the action, it is necessary to the validity of a judgment
that the court should have had jurisdiction of the precise question
which the judgment assumes to decide, or the particular remedy
or relief which it assumes to grant. Support for this doctrine
is found in numerous well-considered cases.
In McFadden v. Ross, I08 Ind. 512, 8 N. E. I61, a complaint
in replevin tendered no issue except the right of possession, yet
judgment was entered determining the title to the property as
between the parties. It was contended in an action upon the
replevin bond that, the court having had jurisdiction of the parties
and the subject matter of the replevin action, the judgment there-
in was conclusive against collateral attack. The court held the
judgment void, in so far as it attempted to adjudicate upon the
question of title to the property, for the reason that that question
was not involved under the pleadings. The court said: “Neither
reason nor authority lends any support to the view that, because
suitors have submitted certain designated matters to the con-
sideration of a court, the tribunal is thereby authorized to deter-
mine any other matter in which the parties may be interested,
whether it be involved in the‘ pending litigation or not”; citing
Mimday v. Vail, 34 N. J. L. 418; Fairchild v. Lynch, 99 N. Y.
359, 2 N. E. 20; King v. Chase, 15 N. H. 9,41 Am. Dec. 675;
Bigelow on Estoppel, 92. The decision in that case was followed
in Knopf v. Morel, III Ind. 570, I3 N. E. 51, and in Unfricd v.
Heberer, 63 Ind. 67. The last case was cited with approval by
Mr. justice Brewer in Reynolds v. Stockton, I40 U. S. 254, II
Sup. Ct. Rep. 773, 35 L. ed. 464.
A judgment for relief beyond the issues was held unauthor-
ized, and “not within the power of the court,” in Booglmr v.
Frazier, 99 M0. 325, I2 S. W’. 885. Such is the law in the state
of Illinois: People v. Seeyle, I46 Ill. I89, 32 N. E. 458; Belfard
v. l/Voodevard, 158 I11. 122, 41 N. E. I097, 29 L. R. A. 593. In
Spoors v. Cocn, 44 Ohio St. 497, 9 N. E. 132, the Ohio supreme
court held that a judgment on a subject of litigation within the
jurisdiction of the court, but not brought before it by any state-
ment or claim of the parties, is null and void, and [176] may
be collaterally impeached; citing Strobe v. Downer, I3 \Vis. I0,
80 Am. Dec. 709; Lewis v. Smith, 9 N. Y. 502, 61 Am. Dec. 706.
To the same effect, Seamster v. Blackslocle, 83 Va. 232, 5 Am.
St. Rep. 622, 2 S. E. 36. It was said in Sandoznl v. Rosser, 86
Tex. 682, 26 S. \V. 933, “that a court has no more power, until
its action is called into exercise by some sort of pleading, to
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matter of  the action, it  is necessary to the validity of a j udgment 
that the court should have had jurisdiction of the precise question 
which the j udgment assumes to decide, or the particular remedy 
or rel ief which it assumes to grant. Support for this doctrine 
is found in numerous well-considered cases. 
In McFadden v. Ross, 108 Ind. 5 12, 8 N. E. 16 1 ,  a complaint 
in replevin tendered no issue except the right of possession, yet 
judgment was entered determining the title to the property a& 
between the parties. It was contended in an action upon the 
replevin bond that, the court having had jurisdiction of the parties 
and the subj ect matter of the replevin action, the judgment there­
in was conclusive against collateral attack. The court held the 
j udgment void, in so far as it attempted to adjudicate upon the 
question of title to the property, for the reason that that question 
was not involved under the pleadings . The court said : "Neither 
reason nor authority lends any support to the view that, because 
suitors have submitted certain designated matters to the con­
sideration of a court, the tribunal is thereby authorized to <leter­
mine any other matter in which the parties may be interested, 
whether it be involved in the pending litigation or not" ; citing 
Jfunday v. Vail, 34 N. J.  L. 418 ; Fairchild v. L'ynch, 99 N. Y. 
359, 2 N. E. 20 ; King v. Chase, 15 N. H. 9, 41 Am. Dec. 675 ; 
Bigelow on Estoppel, 92. The decision in that case was followerl 
in Knopf v. Morel, 1 1 1  Ind. 570, 1 3  N. E. 5 1 ,  and in Unfricd v. 
Heberer, 63 Ind. 67. The last case was cited with approval by 
Mr. Justice Brewer in Re'ynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254, I I  
Sup. Ct. Rep. 773, 35 L. ed. 464. 
A j udgment for relief beyond the issues was held unauthor­
ized, and "not within the power of the court," in Boogher v. 
Fra::ier, 99 Mo. 325, 1 2  S. \V. 885.  Such is the  law in  the  state 
of Illino is : People v. See'yle, 146 Ill .  189, 32 N. E. 458 ; Belford 
v. Woodward, 1 58 I ll .  1 22, 41  N .  E. 1097, 29 L. R. A.  593.  In 
Spoors v. Coe n, 44 Ohio St. 497, 9 N .  E. 1 32, the Ohio supreme 
court held that a j udgment on a subj ect of l itigation wi thin the 
j urisdiction of the court, but not brought before it by any state­
ment or claim of the parties ,  is null and void ,  and [ 1 76 l may 
be col laterally impeached ; cit ing- Strobe v. Do<.1.mer, 13 \Vis .  IO, 
8o Am. Dec. 709 ; Lewis v. Smith, 9 N. Y. 502 , 6 1  Am. Dec. 7o6. 
To the same effect, Seamster v. Blackstock, 83 Va. 232, 5 Am. 
St. Rep. 622, 2 S.  E. 36. It was said in Sando<. ·al v. Rosser, 86 
Tex. 682, 26 S. \V. 933, "that a court has no more power, until 
its action is called into exercise by some sort of pleading, to 
render a j udgment in favor o f  a party than it has to enter a 
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judgment against him.” And the judgment there involved,
granting relief beyond the pleadings, was held open to collateral
attack: Dunlap v. Southerlin, 63 Tex. 38; I Black on Judg-
ments, 241.
The case of Ritchie v. Sayers (C. C.), I00 Fed. 520, involved
a collateral attack on a judgment, and the court after referring
to the rule as generally stated in the books, namely, that the
judgment of a court having jurisdiction of the parties and the
subject matter of the action is conclusive and cannot be col-
laterally called into question, said: “That may be conceded.
But the question is, Did it have jurisdiction to enter the particu-
lar decree and judgment thereon that it did enter? As we have
before seen, we reach the conclusion that the particular judgment
could not be entered; and it is a well—settled principle that, al-
though a court may have jurisdiction of a case, yet, if it appears
from the record that it did not have jurisdiction to enter the
decree and particular judgment, then that decree and judgment
may be collaterally impeached"; citing United States v. ll/alker,
109 U. S. 258, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277, 27 L. ed. 927; Ex [mrte N1'el-
scn, 131 U. S. 176, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 672, 33 L. ed. 118; Err [>arte
Cuddy, 131 U. S. 280, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 703, 33 L. ed. 154; Folger
v. Columbian Ins. Co., 99 Mass. 267, 96 Am. Dec. 747; Scamstcr
v. Blackstock, 83 Va. 232, 5 Am. St. Rep. 262, 2 S. E. 36.
The two cases in I31 U. S. are directly opposed to the doc-
trine of the \Visconsin supreme court laid down in I u re Graham,
74 Wis. 450, 17 Am. St. Rep. 174, 43 N. W. 148, as already
pointed out. In the Nielsen case (131 U. S. I76, 9 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 672, 33 L. ed. 118), the supreme court of the United States
declared such a judgment wholly void, and the person there
under sentence of imprisonment not authorized by law was re-
leased upon habeas corpus. In the Cuddy case (131 U. S. 280,
9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 703, 33 L. ed. I54), the same court held that
the fact that a judgment was excessive and unauthorized might
be shown in habeas corpus, though the excess did not appear on
the face of the record. It was held in I/Valdron v. Hw‘2'c~,', 54 \V.
Va. 608, 102 Am. St. Rep. 959, 46 S. E. 603, that, to render a
judgment within the jurisdiction of the court, not only jurisdic-
tion [I77] over the parties _and the subject matter must appear,
but it must also appear that the matter acted upon by the court
was before it under the pleadings, and the judgment there in-
volve<l. as to matters not presented in the pleadings, was held
void on indirect attack. Such is the law in Kansas (lV0!lein.s‘
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j udgment against him." And the j udgment there involved, 
granting relief beyond the pleadings, was held open to collateral 
attack : Dunlap v. Souther/in, 63 Tex. 38 ; I Black on Judg­
ments,  24 1 .  
The case of Ritchie v .  Sayers (C. C.) , 1 00  Fed. 520, involved 
a collateral attack on a j udgment, and the court after referring 
to the rule as generally stated in the books, namely, that the 
j udg-ment of a court having jurisdiction of the parties and the 
subj ect matter of the act ion is conclusive and cannot be col­
laterally called into question, said : "That may be conceded . 
But the question is ,  Did it have j urisdiction to enter the particu­
lar decree and j udgment thereon that it did enter ? As we have 
before seen, we reach the conclusion that the particular j udgment 
could not be entered ; and it is a well-settled principle that, al­
though a court may have jurisd iction of a case, yet, if it appears 
from the record that it did not have jurisdiction to enter the 
decree and particular judgment, then that decree and j udgment 
may be coll aterally impeached' ' ; citing U11 ited Sta./es v .  l Valker, 
1 09  U. S .  258, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277, 27 L. ed. 927 ; E:r parte Niel­
sen, 1 3 1  U. S.  176, 9 Sup. Ct .  Rep. 672, 33 L. ed. 1 1 8 ;  E.r parte 
C11dd-y:, 1 3 1  U. S. 28o, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 703, 33 L. ed . 1 54 :  Folger 
v. Columbian Ins. Co ., 99 :Mass. 267, 96 Am. Dec. 747 ;  Seamster 
v. Blackstock, 83 Va. 232, 5 Am. St. Rep. 262, 2 S. E. 36. 
The two cases in 1 3 1  U. S. are directly opposed to the doc­
trine of the \Visconsin supreme court laid down in Jn re Graham, 
74 \Vis. 450, 17 Am. St. Rep. 1 74, 43 N. Vv. 148, as already 
pointed out. In the Nielsen case ( 1 3 1  U. S. 1 76, 9 Sup. Ct. 
Rep . 672, 33 L. ed. 1 1 8 ) ,  the supreme court of the United States 
decl ared such a judgment wholly void , and the person there 
under sentence of imprisonment not authorized by law was re­
leased upon habeas corpu s .  In the Cuddy case ( 1 3 1  V. S.  280, 
9 Sup . Ct.  Rep. 703 , 33 L. ed. r 54) , the same court held that 
the fact that a judgment was excessive and unauthorized might 
he shown in habeas corpus, though the excess did not appear on 
the face of the record . I t  was held in f.Valdro ii v. Han·ev, 54 \V. 
Va. 608, ro2 Am. St. Rep. 959, 46 S .  E. 6o3, that, to render a 
j udgment within the jur i sdiction of  the court ,  not only j.urisdic­
t ion [ 1 77 ]  ove r the part ies and the subj ect matter must appear, 
but it must also appear that the matter acted upon by the court 
w a s  before it under the pleadings, and the judgment there in­
\·olvccl . as to matters not presented in the pleadings, was held 
void on ind irect attack. Such is the law in Kansas ( TVatkills 
[� . Jf. Co. v . •  �fullc11, 8 Kan.  A�p. 705 , 54 Pac. 92 1 ) ,  where 
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the court approves the rule as laid down in 12 American
and English Encyclopedia of Law, second edition, 246, to the
effect that a judgment of a court having jurisdiction of the case,
but not jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, may be
collaterally impeached, citing United States v. Walker, 109 U. S.
258, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277, 27 L. ed. 927, Ex [mrte Nielsen, 131
U. S. 176, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 672, 33 L. ed. 118, and other cases
herein referred to. That jurisdiction of the question the court
assumes to decide, as well as of the parties and the subject mat-
ter of the action, is essential to the validity of a judgment is laid
down as a g‘eneral rule in 23 Cyc. 684.
The tendency of the courts to enlarge the definition of “juris-
diction,” by many text-writers and judges seemingly limited to
authority _over the subject matter and parties is referred to in
Newman v. Bullock, 23 C010. 217, 47 Pac. 379, with the state-
ment that it should, properly defined, include, not only power to
hear and determine, “but power to render the particular judg-
ment in the particular case.” The court in that case sustained
a collateral attack upon a judgment ofi‘ered as evidence on the
ground that it was void on its face, for the reason that the relief
therein granted exceeded the issues made by the pleadings; citing
1 Black on Judgments, secs. 215, 242; Johnson v. Johnson, 20
C010. 143, 36 Pac. 898; Mundoy v. Vail, 34 N. J. L. 418. In
the case last cited a decree in equity granted relief beyond that
prayed for in the complaint, and the court, on collateral attack,
held it invalid. It is a leading case on this subject, and is quoted
from in Reynolds v. Stockton, I40 U. S. 254, II Sup. Ct. Rep.
773, 35 L. ed. 464. In disposing of the question the New Jersey
court said: “A defect in a judgment, arising from the fact that
the matter decided was not embraced within the issue, has not,
it would seem, received much judicial consideration. And yet
I cannot doubt that, upon general principles, such a defect must
avoid a judgment. It is impossible to concede that, because A
and B are parties to a suit, a court can decide any matter in which
they are interested, whether such matter be involved in the pend-
ing litigation or not. Persons by becoming suitors do not place
themselves for all purposes under the control of the court, and
it is only over these [178] particular interests which they choose
to draw in question that a power of judicial decision arises.”
The doctrine of the cases cited has been applied in
this state. In State v. Miesen, 98 Minn. I9, 106 N. W‘. 1134, 108
N. W. 513, a judgment imposing a punishment in contempt pro-
















































































































































ELEM ENTS OF J U RlSDIC'l'iON 
the court approves the rule as laid down in 12 American 
and English Encyclopedia of Law, second .edition, 246, to the 
effect that a judgment of a court having jurisdiction of the case, 
but not jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, may be 
collaterally impeached, citing Unt'.ted States v. Walker, IO<) U. S. 
258, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277, 27 L. ed. 927, Ex parte Nielsen, 1 3 1  
U. S .  176, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 672, 33 L. ed. I 18, and other cases 
herein referred to. That jurisdiction of the question the court 
assumes to decide, as well as of the parties and the subject mat­
ter of the action, is essential to the validity of a judgment is laid 
down as a general rule in 23 Cyc. 684. 
The tendency of the courts to enlarge the definition of "juris­
diction," by many text-writers and judges seemingly limited to 
authority pver the subject matter and parties is referred to in 
Ne'lvm<Jn v. Bullock, 23 Colo. 2 17, 47 Pac. 379, with the state­
ment that it should, properly defined, include, not only power to 
hear and determine, "but power to render the particular judg­
ment in the particular case." The court in that case sustained 
a collateral attack upon a judgment offered as evidence on the 
ground that it was void on its face, for the reason that the relief 
therein granted exceeded the issues made by the pleadings ; citing 
I Black on Judgments, secs. 2 1 5, 242 ;  Johnson, v. Johnson, 20 
Colo. 143, 36 Pac. 898 ;  Munday v. Vail, 34 N. J. L. 418. In 
the case last cited a decree in equity granted relief beyond that 
prayed for in the complaint, and the court, on col lateral attack, 
held it invalid. It is a leading case on this subject, and is quoted 
from in Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254, l I Sup . Ct. Rep . 
773, 35 L. ed. 464. In disposing of the question the New Jersey 
court said : "A defect in a judgment, arising from the fact that 
the matter decided was not embraced within the issue, has not, 
it would seem, received much j udicial consideration. And yet 
I cannot doubt that, upon general principles, such a defect must 
avoid a judgment. It is impossible to concede that, because A 
and B are parties to a suit, a cou rt can decide any matter in which 
they are interested, whether such matter be involved in the pend­
ing litigation or not. Persons by becoming suitors do not place 
themselves for all purposes under the control of the court, and 
it is only over these [ 1 78] particular interests which they choose 
to draw in question that a power of judicial decision arises . "  
The doctrine of the cases cited has been applied in 
this state. In StaJe v. Miesen, 98 Minn. 19, 1o6 N. \V. I 1 34. ro8 
N. W. 5 13 ,  a judgment imposing a punishment in contempt pro­
ceedings not authorized by law was collaterally assailed an<i held 
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void in habeas corpus proceedings: In re White, 43 Minn. 250,
45 N. W. 232. See; also, Lincoln Nat. Bank v. Virgin, 36 Neb.
735, 38 Am. St. Rep. 747, 55 N. NV. 218, I2 Ency. of Pl. & Pr.
131, and cases there cited. In view of this array of judicial
opinion, we have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the
judgment in question, in so far as it attempts to transfer to
plaintiff the title held by defendant, is coram non jndice, and void.
4. But it is further contended by plaintiff that this par-
ticular feature of the judgment came within the scope of the
complaint and the action, and that the relief was therefore
properly granted. This contention is untenable. he statute
providing for this for1n of action to determine rig ts in real
property was not designed as a means for acquiring title, but, on
the contrary, was intended as an expeditious mode of quieting
and extinguishing claims of title held adversely to plaintiff:)
Camp v. .S‘mz'th, 2 Minn. I31 (155). A judgment in such an
action, based upon the usual form of complaint, does not of itself a I
operate to transfer title from defendant to plaintiff: Minn.
Debentnre Co. v. Johnson, 94 Minn. 150, 110 Am. St. Rep. 354,
I02 N. VV. 381. The reason for this is found in the fact, like
the old ejectment action, that there is nothing of record to dis-
close or reveal the title that was in fact adjudicated. And though
an ordinary judgment in such an action might be made a link
in the chain of title, by evidence dehors the record connecting
plaintiff with the title adjudicated (Sedgwick & Wait on Title
to Land. sec. 523), yet, standing alone, the judgment is evidence
only of the fact that the rights of the defendant have been ex-
tinguished.
But, conceding that a transfer of title may be effected in.’
this form of action under proper pleadings,'it is clear that such
was not the purpose of this action. The complaint was not
framed upon such a theory. It_simp1;LLl¢eged that defendant
claimed some title or interest in the lagd adverse to plain_ti_ff,_a.nd
Judgment was demanded __that she be adjudged_to have no titk.
[179] The case in this respect is analogous to Lincoln Nat.
Bank v. Virgin, 36 Neb. 735, 38 Am. St. Rep. 747, 55 N. W. 218;
I2 Ency, of Pl. & Pr. 131. There, in an action to foreclose
a mortgage, the complaint alleged that one of the defendants
claimed some lien upon or interest in the mortgaged prem-
ises, the basis of which was unknown to plaintiff, but that it was
-subordinate and junior to plaintiff’s mortgage. judgment was
demanded that defendant set up his claim or be forever barred
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void in habeas corpus proceedings : /n re iVJiite, 43 Minn. 250, 
45 N. vV. 232. See; also, Lincoln Nat. Bank v. Virgin, 36 Neb. 
735, 38 Am. St. Rep. 747, 55 N. vV. 2 18, 1 2  Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 
I 3 1 ,  and cases there cited. In view of thi s  array of j udicial 
opinion, we have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the 
j udgment in question, in so far as it  attempts to t ransfer to 
plaintiff the title held by defendant, is coram non judice, and void. 
4. But it is  further contended by plaintiff that this par­
ticular feature of the j udgment came within the scope o f  the 
complaint and the action, and that the rel ief was therefore 
properly granted. This contention is untenable. ffhe statute 
providing for this form of action to determine rights in real 
property was not designed as a means for acquiring title, but, on 
the contrary, was intended as an expeditious mode of quieting 
and extinguishing claims of title held adversely to plainti ff :) 
Camp v. S1Jiith, 2 Minn. 1 3 1  ( 1 55 ) .  A j udgment in such an 
action , based upon the usual form of complaint, does not of itself · ( 
operate to transfer title from defendant to plaintiff : Mimi . 
Deben ture Co. v. Johnson, 94 M inn. 1 50, 1 10 Am. St. Rep. 3 54, 
1 02 N. \V. 38 1 .  The reason for this is found in the fact, like 
the old ej ectment action, that there is nothing of record to dis­
close or reveal the title that was in fact adjudicated. And though 
an ordinary j udgment in such an action might be made a link 
in the chain of title, by evidence dehors the record connecting 
plaintiff with the title adj udicated ( Sedgwick & Wait on Title 
to Land. sec. 523 ) , yet, standing alone, the j udgment is evidence 
only o{ the fact that the rights of the defendant have been ex­
tinguished. 
But, conceding that a transfer of  title may be effected in fl1"" 
this form of action under proper pleadings, · it is clear that such 
was not the purpose of this action. The complaint was not 
framed upon such a theory. It simply alleged that defendapt 
claimed some title or interest if! the land adverse to__plaintiif._ao<l 
j udgment was- demanded that she be adjudged to have no .title. 
[ 179 l The case in this respect is analogous to Lincoln Nat. 
Bank v. Vfrgin, 36 Neb. 73 5, 38 Am. St. Rep. 747, 55 N. \V. 2 1 8 ; 
1 2  Ency, of Pl . & Pr. 1 3 1 .  There, in an action to foreclose 
a mortgage, the complaint alleged that one of the defendants 
claimed some lien upon or interest in the mortgaged prem­
ises, the basis of which was unknown to plaintiff, but that it was 
subordinate and j unior to plaintiff's mortgage. Judgment was 
-demanded that defendant set up his claim or be forever barred 
from asserting it. The defendant did not answer, and de fault 
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judgment was taken against him, in which it was adjudged that
he had no right, title or interest in the property whatsoever. In
a subsequent action by defendant to foreclose a mortgage upon
the property held by him, and existing at the time of the pendency
of the former action, it was insisted that his rights under the
mortgage were barred by the former judgment, for it was there
determined that he had no interest in the property. The court
held that the judgment went beyond the issues made by the com-
plaint in the former suit, and was void. The case is parallel to
that at bar and in line with the authorities heretofore cited. As
pertinent to this feature of the case, see Alexander v. Thompson,
IOI Minn. 5, III N. W’. 385. The complaint in the case before
us did not seek a transfer of title, and section 4391 of Revised
Laws of I905 has no application. That statute can have no refer-
ence to other than actions in which it is necessary to pass title
in order to carry the judgment of the court into effect.
This disposes of all the questions necessary to be considered,
and results in an affirmance of the order appealed from. It is
probable, under the authorities cited, that the judgment could
have been as successfully assailed in other proceedings, when
offered in evidence in support of plaintiff’s title to the land;
but the right to correct it in this manner is clear.
Order afiirmed.
What Brings the Property or Things Within the Court's
Power.
LINDLEY v. O’REILLY, in N. J. Ct. of Errors & App., Aug. 9, I888—-
50 N. J. L. 636, I5 Atl. 379, 7 Am. St. Rep. 802, I L. R. A. 79.
Ejectment by Catherine O'Reilly against David Lindley for
land in Atlantic county. From judgment in favor of plaintiff,
defendant brings error. Reversed.
Dnpurz, J.‘ Patrick O’Reilly died in I881. In his lifetime
he was seized of a tract of land in the county of Atlantic, in this
state, the subject of controversy in this suit. By his will, dated
December 5th, 1877, proved before the surrogate of Atlantic
county July 5th, 1881, and letters testamentary granted thereon,
he devised his entire estate to the plaintiff, his wife, for life.
Exception was taken to the admission of a certified copy of this
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judgment was taken against him, in which it was adj udged that 
he had no right, t itle or interest in the property whatsoever. In  
a subsequent action by defendant to  foreclose a mortgage upon 
the property held by him, and existing at the time of the pendency 
of the former action, it was insisted that his rights under the 
mortgage were barred by the former judgment, for i t  was there 
determined that he had no interest in the property. The court 
held that the j udgment went beyond the issues made by the com­
plaint in the fonner suit, and was void. The case is parallel to 
that at bar and in line with the authorities heretofore cited. As 
pertinent to this feature of the case, see A lexmider v. Thompson, 
IO I  Minn. 5, I I I  N. W. 385. The complaint in the case before 
us did not seek a transfer of title , and section 4391 of Revised 
Laws of 1905 has no application . That statute can have no refer­
ence to other than actions in which it is necessary to pass title 
in order to carry the j udgment of the court into effect. 
This disposes of all the questions necessary to be considere<l, 
and results in an affirmance of the order appealed from. It is 
probable, under the authorities cited , that the judgment could 
have been as successfully assailed in other proceedings, when 
offered in evidence in support of plaintiff's title to the land ; 
but the right to correct it in this manner is clear. 
Order afflrmed. 
What Brings the Property or Things Within the Court's 
Power. 
LINDLEY v. O'REILLY, in N. ]. Ct. of Errors & App., Aug. 9, 1888-
50 N. ]. L. 636, 15 Atl. 379, 7 Am. St. Rep . &r.z, 1 L. R A. 79. 
Ejectment by Catherine O'Reilly against David Lindley for 
land in Atlantic county. From judgment in favor of plaintiff, 
defendant brings error. Reversed. 
DEPUE, J. · Patrick O'Reilly died in 188 1 .  In his lifetime 
he was seized of a tract of land in the county of Atlantic, in this 
state, the subject of controversy in this suit. By his will, dated 
December 5th, 1877, proved before the surrogate of Atlantic 
county July 5th, 1881 ,  and letters testamentary granted thereon, 
he devised his entire estate to the plaintiff, his wife, for l i fe. 
Exception was taken to the admission of a certified copy of this 
will, but the printed case does not contain a full copy of the 
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will, nor does any assignment of error touch the competency of
this evidence. It must be assumed that this will was duly execut-
ed to devise lands under the laws of this state, and that the same
was duly probated to make a certified copy competent evidence.
On this presentation of title, the plaintiff would have been entitled
to a verdict.
The obstacle in the way of the plaintiff’s recovering, in virtue
of her title under her husband’s will, arose from a deed made by
O'Reilly and wife to one Henry Francis Felix, on the 14th of
January, 1861. This deed purported to be an absolute convey-
ance, in fee simple, for the consideration of $18,000. To sustain
title under her husband’s will, it was necessary for the plaintiff
to overcome or extinguish the legal title thus conveyed.
The plaintiff contended, at the trial, that the deed to Felix
was, in fact, a mortgage, and that the debt or liability for which
it was given was paid and satisfied, and that on the discharge of
the obligation for which the conveyance was made, the estate of
the mortgagee was extinguished. In a trial at [*639] law it is
not competent to show, by oral testimony, that an absolute deed
was, in reality, a mortgage. In our judicial system, the juris-
diction to convert an absolute deed into a mortgage, by parol
evidence, is exclusively in the equity courts. The competency
and effect of the evidence produced by the plaintiff for this pur-
pose, are the issues raised by the bill of exceptions and assign-
ments of error.
Felix died in 1866. By his will he gave all his property for
the benefit of his wife, Alicia Kate, and a charitable society
known as the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, and
made the Right Reverend James F. VVood, Roman Catholic
Bishop of Philadelphia, executor.
Felix, at the time of his death, resided at Reading, in the
county of Berks. Pennsylvania. On the 4th of December, I867.
O'Reilly filed a bill of equity in the court of common pleas of the
county of Berks, against the Right Reverend James F.-\Vood,
executor of the last will and testament of Henry F. Felix, Alicia
Kate Felix, widow of said Henry F. Felix, and the religious
order of the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary.
The bill set out. that the Right Reverend James F. \Vood
was a resident of Philadelphia, that Alicia Kate Felix resided in
Reading, and that the religious order of the Sisters of the Tm-
maculate Heart of Mary was a society established in Reading.
It charged that the deed of conveyance made by O'Reilly to
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will, nor does any assignment of error touch the competency of 
this evidence. It must be assumed that this will was duly execut­
ed to devise lands under the laws of this state, and that the same 
was duly probated to make a certified copy competent evidence. 
On this presentation of title, the plaintiff would have been entitled 
to a verdict . 
. The obstacle in the way of the plaintiff's recovering, in virtue 
of her title under her husband's will, arose from a deed made by 
O'Reilly and wife to one Henry Francis Felix, on the 14th of 
January, 1861 . This deed purported to be an absolute convey­
ance, in fee simple, for the consideration of $18,000. To sustain 
title under her husband's will, it was necessary for the plaintiff 
to overcome or extinguish the legal title thus conveyed. 
The plaintiff contended, at the trial, that the deed to Felix 
was, in fact, a mortgage, and that the debt or liability for which 
it was given was paid and satisfied, and that on the discharge of 
the obligation for which the conveyance was made, the estate of 
the mortgagee was extinguished. In a trial at [*639] law it is 
not competent to show, by oral testimony, that an absolute deed 
was, in reality, a mortgage. In our j udicial system, the j uris­
diction to convert an absolute deed into a mortgage, by parol 
evidence, is exclusively in the equity courts. The competency 
and effect of the evidence produced by the plaintiff for this pur­
pose, are the issues raised by the bill of exceptions and assign­
ments of error. 
Felix died in 1866. By his will he gave all his property for 
the benefit of his wife, Alicia Kate, and a charitable society 
known as the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, and 
made the Right Reverend James F. Wood, Roman Catholic 
Bishop of Philadelphia, executor. 
Felix, at the time of his death, resided at Reading, in the 
county of Berks, Pennsylvania. On the 4th of December, 1867. 
O 'Reilly filed a bill of equity in the court of common pleas of the 
county of Berks , against the Right Reverend James F.- Wood, 
executor of the last will and testament of Henry F. Felix, Alicia 
Kate Felix, widow of said Henry F. Felix, and the religious 
order of the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary. 
The bi ll set out, that the Right Reverend James F. \Vood 
was a resident of Philadelphia, that Alicia Kate Felix resided in 
Reading, and that the religious order of the Sisters of the Tm­
maettlate Heart of Mary was a society established in Reading. 
It charged that the deed of conveyance made by O'Reilly to 
Fel ix was, in legal effect, a mortgage ; that the same was made 
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as security to indemnify Felix against his liability on certain
promissory notes made by O’Reilly and endorsed by Felix, and
discounted by the Farmers’ Bank of Reading, and under protest,
and that, subsequently, the said notes were fully paid and satis-
fied by the said O'Reilly; that the said Felix sustained no loss or
damage in consequence of the said endorsements, and prayed
a reconveyance of the legal title. The defendants named in the
bill appeared and filed an answer. By consent of parties an
examiner was appointed January 27th, 1868, who filed his report
November 1st, I869, and in September, 1880, the case was
brought on for hearing, by consent, [*64o] on the bill, answer
and report of the examiner; and on the 20th of September, 1880,
a decree was signed, in which, after reciting that the court being
satisfied that the allegations of the plaintiif’s bill were correct and
true, and that all the notes endorsed by Felix, and liabilities in-
curred by him for O’Reilly, had been, by O’Reilly, fully paid,
discharged and satisfied, it was ordered and decreed that the
Right Reverend James F. \/Vood, executor of the last will and
testament of deceased, should execute and deliver to Patrick
O’Reilly, a deed of reconveyance of the premises in fee simple.
All the parties to the suit resided in Pennsylvania. The
Pennsylvania court had jurisdiction of the parties and also of the
subject-matter of the suit. The contested problem is the effect
of its decree upon the title to lands in this state. If the decree
can affect the title to lands in this state, it extinguished the
Felix title without a reconveyance, for in this state a mortgage
is regarded as a mere security for the debt or liability for which
it is given, and payment or satisfaction of the debt or liability
discharges the mortgage, and revests the mortgaged premises in
the mortgagor without a reconveyance. Shields v. Losear, 5
Vroom 496; Kloepping v. Stellma-clwr, 7 Id. 176; Jackson v.
Terrell, 10 Id. 329; Schalk v. Kingsley, 13 Id. 32.
Ever since Penn v. Lord Baltimore, I Ves. Sr., 444, it has
been established law that in cases of contract, trust, or fraud, the
equity courts of one state or country, having jurisdiction of the
parties, are competent to entertain a suit for specific performance.
or to establish a trust, or for a conveyance, although the con-
tract, trust, or fraudulent title pertains to lands in another state
or country. The principle upon which this jurisdiction rests is,
that chancery, acting in [wrsonam and not in rem, holds the con-
science of the parties bound without regard to the s1'tns of the
property. It is a jurisdiction that arises when a special equity
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as security to indemnify Felix against his liability on certain 
promissory notes made by O'Reilly and endorsed by Felix, and 
discounted by the Farmers' Bank of Reading, and under protest, 
an(l that, subsequently, the said notes were fully paid and satis­
fied by the said O'Reilly ; that the said Felix sustained no loss or 
damage in consequence of  the said endorsements, and prayed 
a reconveyance of the legal title. The defendants named in the 
bill appeared and filed an answer. By consent of parties an 
examiner was appointed January 27th, 1868, who filed his report 
November 1 st, l86g, and in September, 1880, the case was 
brought on for hearing, by consent, [*640] on the bill, answer 
and report of the examiner ; and on the 20th of Septemher, 1880, 
a decree was signed, in which, after reciting that the court being 
satisfied that the allegations of the plaintiff's bill were correct and 
true, and that all the notes endorsed by Felix, and liabilities in­
curred by him for O'Reilly, had been, by O'Reilly, fully paid, 
discharged and satisfied, it was ordered and decreed that the 
Right Reverend James F. Wood, executor of the last will and 
testament of deceased, should execute and deliver to Patrick 
O'Reilly, a deed of reconveyance of the premises in fee simple. 
All the parties to the suit resided in Pennsylvania. The 
Pennsylvania court had jurisdiction of the parties and also of the 
subject-matter o f  the suit. The contested problem is the effect 
of its decree upon the title to lands in this state. If the decree 
can affect the title to lands in this state, it extinguished the 
Felix title without a reconveyance, for in this state a mortgage 
is regarded as a mere security for the debt or liability for which 
it is given, and payment or satisfaction of the debt or l iability 
discharges the mortgage, and revests the mortgaged premises in 
the mortgagor without a reconveyance. Sh ields v. Lo:;ea r, 5 
Vroom 496 ; Kloepping v. Stellmacher, 7 Id. 1 76 ;  Jackson v. 
Terrell, 10  Id. 329 ; Schalk v. Kfogsley, 13 Id. 32. 
Ever since Penn v. Lord Balti111orc, I Ves. Sr., 44-1-. it has 
been established Jaw that in cases of contract, trust, or fraud, the 
equity courts of one state or country, having j urisdiction of the 
parties, are competent to entertain a suit for specific performance. 
or to establish a trust, or for a conveyance, although the con­
tract, trust, or fraudulent title pertains to lands in another state 
or country. The principle upon which this jurisdiction rests is, 
that chancery, acting in personani and not iii rem. holds the con­
science of the parties bound without regar<l to the situs of the 
property. It is a jurisdiction that arises when a special eciuity 
can be shown which forms a ground for compelling a party to 
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convey or release, or for restraining him from asserting a title
or right in lands so situated, and is strictly limited to those cases
in which the relief [*64I] decreed can be obtained through the
party’s personal obedience. If it went beyond that the assump-
tion would not only be presumptuous but ineffectual. \Vestlake
on International Law, 57, 58. The decree in a suit of this aspect
imposes a mere personal obligation, enforceable by injunction.
attachment, or like process, against the person, and cannot operate
e.r proprio vigore upon lands in another jurisdiction to create,
transfer or vest a title. The cases on this subject are numerous.
They are collected in the note to Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 2 Lead.
Cas. in Eq. 1806, (I047). Brett's Lead. Cas. in Eq. 254; Ewing
v. Orr Ewing, 9 App. Cas. 34; Norris v. Chambrcs, 29 Beav. 246:
Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148; Wood v. Warner, 2 McCarthy
(D. C.) 81; Vaughan v. Barkley, 6 Wharton (Pa.) 392. In
Davis v. Headley, 7 C. E. Gr. 115, the complainant obtained a
decree in the circuit court of Kentucky against Headley, that a
conveyance of lands in New Jersey, made by the complainant,
should be rescinded and set aside, the possession restored and the
defendant enjoined from setting up the conveyance. He then
filed a bill in the court of ehancery of this state to enforce the
decree. The jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter
of that suit was undisputed. The bill to enforce the decree was
nevertheless dismissed. Chancellor Zabriskie, in dismissing the
bill, declared that it was a well settled principle of law in the
decisions of England and of this country, and acquiesced in by
the jurists of all civilized nations, that immovable property is
exclusively subject to the laws and jurisdiction of the courts of
the state or nation in which it is located, and that no other laws
or courts could affect it. He added, “I find no case in which
a statute, judgment or proceeding in one country has been held
to affect such property in another country or beyond the juris-
diction of the sovereign or court making the statute or decree.”
After referring to Penn v. Lord Baltimore, and the cases in which
decrees for specific performance of contracts relating to lands
without their jurisdiction were made, the learned chancellor said:
“But in these cases it is admitted, as it was by Lord Hardwicke,
that these [*642] decrees could not affect the land, but could only
be enforced where the court had jurisdiction of the person of the
defendant and thus compel him to execute the conveyance. In
such cases it is the conveyance and not the decree that has the
effect.”
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convey or release, or  for restraining him from asserting a title 
or right in lands so situated, and is strictly limited to those cases 
in which the relief [ *641 ] decreed can be obtained through the 
party's personal obedience. If it  went beyond that the assump­
tion would not only be presumptuous but ineffectual . \Vestlake 
on International Law, 57, 58. The decree in a suit of this aspect 
imposes a mere personal obligation, enforceable by inj unction. 
attachment, or like process, against the person, and cannot operate 
ex proprio 'l.,.;gore upon lands in another j urisdiction to create, 
transfer or vest a title. The cases on this subj ect are numerous. 
They are collected in the note to Perui v. Lord Baltimore, 2 Lead. 
Cas. in Eq. 18o6, ( 1047 ) .  Brett's Lead. Cas. i n  Eq. 254 ; E·wing 
v. Orr Ewing, 9 App. Cas. 34 ; Norris v. Chambres, 29 Beav. 246 : 
Af assie v. 1Vatts, 6 Cranch 148 ;  ivood v. Warner, 2 McCarthy 
(D. C . )  8 1 ; Vaughan v. Barkley, 6 Wharton ( Pa. ) 392. In 
Dai-is v. Headley, 7 C. E. Gr. n 5, the complainant obtained a 
decree in the circuit court of Kentucky against Headley, that a 
conveyance o f  lands in New Jersey, made by the complainant, 
should be rescinded and set aside, the possession restored and the 
defendant enjoined from setting up the conveyance. He then 
filed a bill in the court of chancery of this state to enforce the 
decree. The jurisdiction of the parties and of the subj ect-matter 
of that suit was undisputed. The bill to enforce the decree was 
nevertheless dismissed. Chancellor Zabriskie, in dismissing the 
bill, declared that it was a well settled principle of law in the 
decisions of England and of this country, and acquiesced in by 
the jurists of all civilized nations, that immovable property i"J 
exclusively subject to the laws and jurisdiction of the courts of 
the state or nation in which it is located, and that no other laws 
or courts could affect it. He added, "I find no case in which 
a statute, judgment or proceeding in one country has been held 
to affect such property in another country or beyond the j uris­
diction of the sovereign or court making the statute or decree." 
After referring to Penn v. Lord Baltimore, and the cases in which 
decrees for specific performance of contracts relating to lands 
without their jurisdiction were made, the learned chancellor said : 
"But in  these cases it is admitted, as it was by Lord Hardwicke, 
that these [*642] decrees could not affect the land, but could only 
be enforced where the court had jurisdiction of the person of the 
defendant and thus compel him to execute the conveyance. !11. 
suclt. cases it is the conveyance and not the decree that has the 
effect .11 
A similar precedent in the federal courts enforced the same 
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view. Watts v. Waddle et al., I McLean 200; s. c. on appeal,
6 Peters 389. Lands situate in Ohio were covered by two patents,
one issued to Powell and the other to \Vatts. To remove this
cloud upon his title, Watts commenced suit against Powell’s heirs
in the circuit court for the district of Kentucky, and obtained a
decree sustaining his title. The court had jurisdiction of the
parties. By the decree the defendants were required to convey
the premises to the complainant. A statute of Kentucky au-
thorized the court, in case the defendant in such a suit failed to
convey, to appoint a commissioner to make conveyance. By the
decree a commissioner was appointed, and, no conveyance having
been made by the parties, a deed was executed by the commis-
sioner. A suit afterwards brought in the federal circuit court
of Ohio, brought in question the effect of the decree of the Ken-
tucky court, and of the commissioner's deed in execution of it,
upon the title to the lands. The court held that neither the decree
nor the commissioner’s deed vested the legal title in the com-
plainant. In the opinion in the supreme court, Mr. Justice Mc-
Lean said: “The most decisive objection to the decree against
Powell’s heirs is, that it does not vest the legal title in VVatts.
A decree cannot operate beyond the state in which the jurisdic-1
tion is exercised. It is not in the power of one state to prescribe
the mode by which real property shall be conveyed in another.
This principle is too clear to admit of doubt.”
These cases rest upon the rule, which is firmly established,
that the courts of one state or country are without jurisdiction
over title to lands in another state or country. The clause of the
federal constitution which requires full faith and credit to be
given in each state to the records and judicial proceedings of
every other state, is subordinate to this rule, and applies to [*643]
the records and proceedings of the courts only so far as they have
jurisdiction. Public-{Works v. Columbia College, 17 Wall. 521;
lVatts v. Waddle, 6 Peters 389; Brine v. Ins. Co., 96 U. S. 627,
635; Davis v. Headley, 7 C. E. Gr. 115, 121; Nelson v. Potter,
50 N. ]. L. 324.
The Pennsylvania court having no jurisdiction over title to
lands in this state, its decree, though conclusive within the juris-
diction which pronounced it, cannot be allowed to affect the title
to these lands. It could not, therefore, operate to convert the
deed to Felix into a mortgage, and then decree it a satisfied
encumbrance. For this reason, as well as another which will be
presently stated, the decree did not extinguish the Felix title.
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view. TVatts v. iv addle et al., 1 McLean 200 ; s. c. on appeal, 
6 Peters 389. Lands situate in Ohio were covered by two patents, 
one issue<l to Powell and the other to Watts. To remove this 
cloud upon his title, Watts commenced suit against Powell's heirs 
in the circuit court for the district of Kentucky, and obtained a 
decree sustaining his title. The court had j urisdict ion of the 
parties. By the decree the defendants were required to convey 
the premises to the complainant. A statute of Kentucky au­
thorized the court, in case the defendant in such a suit failed to 
convey, to appoint a commissioner to make conveyance. By the 
decree a commissioner was appointed, and, no conveyance having 
been made by the parties, a deed was executed by the commis­
sioner. A suit afterwards brought in th� federal circuit court 
of Ohio, brought in question the effect of the decree of the Ken­
tucky court, and of the commissioner's deed in execution of it, 
upon the title to the lands. The court held that neither the decree 
nor the commissioner's deed vested the legal title in the com­
plainant. In the opinion in the supreme court, Mr. Justice Mc­
Lean said : "The most decisive objection to the decree against 
Powell's heirs is, that it does not vest the legal title in Watts. 
A decree cannot operate beyond the state in which the jurisdic-1 
tion is exercised . It is not in the power o f  one state to prescribe 
the mode by which real property shall be conveyed in another. 
This principle is too clear to admit of doubt." 
These cases rest upon the rule, which is firmly established, 
that the courts of one state or country are without j urisdiction 
over title to lands in another state or country. The clause of the 
federal constitution which requires full faith and credit to be 
given in each state to the records and j udicial proceedings o f  
every other state, i s  subordinate t o  this rule, and applies t o  [ *643 ] 
the records and proceedings of the courts only so far as they have 
jurisdiction. Public ;Works v. Colmnbia College, 17  Wall. 52 1 ; 
Watts v. Waddle, 6 Peters 389 ; Brine v. Ins. Co., 9(5 U. S.  627, 
635 ; Davis v. Headley, 7 C. E. Gr. 1 1 5, 1 2 1 ; Nelso1i v. Potter, 
50 N. J. L. 324. 
The Pennsylvania court having no jurisdiction over title to 
lands in this state, its decree, though conclusive within the juris­
diction which pronounced it, cannot be allowed to affect the title 
to these lands. It could not, therefore, operate to convert the 
deed to Felix into a mortgage, and then decree it a satisfied 
encumbrance. For this reason, as well as another which will be 
presently stated , the decree did not extinguish the Felix title. 
The plaintiff also offered in evidence a deed made by Wood 
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to Patrick O’Reilly, dated October 16th, 1869, whereby the prem-
ises in suit were reconveyed to O’Reilly. This deed was made
pending the equity suit, after the evidence in that suit was taken,
and before the final decree. It sets out the substance of O’Reilly’s
bill, as to the nature and purpose of his deed to Felix, and the
payment and discharge by O’Reilly of thedebt or-liability ‘to
secure which the deed was given, and recites that the grantor is
satisfied that the allegations in the bill are true, and in formal
words it reconveys the premises to O'Reilly in fee. * * * [*65o]
* * *
To complete the chain of title from Felix it was necessary
for the plaintiff to show title in “food, and this could be done only
by proof of the Felix will. A copy of this will, certified by the
register of probate of the county of Berks, authenticated in the
manner prescribed by the act of Congress, was filed and recorded
in the office of the surrogate of Atlantic county, April [*65I]
11th, 1882, and a transcript of that record, certified by the surro-
gate, was produced and received in evidence as proof of the
will. * * * [*652] * * * It did not in any way appear before the
surrogate that the will had been admitted to probate [*653] in
Pennsylvania, except by the afiidavit of an attorney—at—law prac-
ticing in that state, that the said will had been duly proved and
admitted to probate, as well as recorded in the office of the regis-
ter of wills of Berks county. This aflidavit was not competent to
establish that fact.
The probate of a will is a judicial act, to be proven by a
sworn or duly certified copy of the record, or at least by the
certificate of the officer before whom the probate is made. And
where the object of making such a will a record in this state is
for the purpose of making title to lands, the record exemplified
from another state must contain the proofs taken upon the pro-
bate, that it may appear by such proof that the will was made
and executed in the manner and with the formalities prescribed
by the statute of this state for devises of lands. VVithout such
proofs, the record, however authenticated, is not even prima facie
evidence of title to lands. Allaire v. Allairc, 8 Vroom 312; s. c.
Id. 113; Nelson v. Potter, 50, N. I. L. 324.
The court erred in admitting the transcript of the will in
evidence, and in directing a verdict for the plaintiff. For these
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to Patrick O'Reilly, dated October 16th, 1869, whereby the prem­
ises in suit were reconveyed to O'Reilly. This deed was made 
pending the equity suit, after the evidence in that suit was taken, 
and before the final decree. It sets out the substance of O'Reilly's 
bill , as to the nature and purpose of his deed to Felix, and the 
payment and discharge by O'Reilly of the . debt or · liability to 
secure which the deed was given, and recites that the grantor is 
satisfied that the allegations in the bill are true, and in formal 
words it reconveys the premises to O'Reilly in fee. * * * [ *650] 
* * * 
To complete the chain of title from Felix it was necessary 
for the plaintiff to show title in Wood, and this could be done only 
by proof of the Felix will. A copy of this will, certified by the 
register of probate of the county of Berks, authenticated in the 
manner "prescribed by the act of Congress, was filed and recorded 
in the office of the surrogate of Atlantic county, April [ *651 l 
1 I th, 1882, and a transcript of that record, certified by the surro­
gate, was produced and received in evidence as proof of the 
will. * * * [ *652 ] * * * It did not in any way appear before the 
surrogate that the will had been admitted to probate [ *653 ] in 
Pennsylvania, except by the affidavit of an attorney-at-law prac­
ticing in that state, that the said will had been duly proved and 
admitted to probate, as well as recorded in the office of the regis­
ter of wills of Berks county. This affidavit was not competent to 
establish that fact. 
The probate of a will is a judicial act, to be proven by a 
sworn or duly certified copy of the record , or at least by the 
certificate of the officer before whom the probate is made. And 
where the obj ect of  making such a will a record in this state is 
for the purpose of making title to lands, the record exempl ified 
from another state must contain the proofs taken upon the pro­
bate, that it may appear by such proof that the will was made 
and executed in the manner and with the formali ties prescribed 
by the statute of th is state for devises of lands. \Vithout such 
proofs, the record, however authenticated , is not even prima facie 
evidence of title to lands. A llaire v. A llaire, 8 Vroom 3 1 2 ; s. c. 
Id. I I 3 ;  Nelson v. Potter, 50, N. J. L. 324. 
The court erred in admitting the transcript of the will in 
evidence, and in directing a verdict for the plaintiff. For these 
rea!'ons the judgment should be 
Reversed. 
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HARRIS v. BALK, in U. S. Sup. Ct., May 8, I905-—I98 U. S. 215, 49
L. ed. 1023, 25 S. Ct. Rep. 625.
Action commenced by Balk against Harris in justice court
in North Carolina to recover $180. Both parties resided where
the suit was brought. Harris pleaded in bar, that, while in Balti-
more, Md., he had been summoned as garnishee in a suit against
Balk, in which Balk had been served by publication according to
the law of Maryland, in which he had answered admitting said
indebtedness of $180 to Balk, and by consent of Harris’s counsel
judgment had been rendered against him for said amount, which
he had paid to the attorney for the creditor in the attachment
suit. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, which
was affirmed by the state supreme court (130 N. Car. 381, 4I
S. E. 940), on the ground that the Maryland court had no juris-
diction of the debt due Balk. Harris brings the case here by
writ of error.
PECKHAM, J. The state court of North Carolina has refused
to give any effect in this action to the Maryland judgment; and
the federal question is whether it did not thereby refuse the full
faith and credit to such judgment which is required by the fed-
eral constitution. If the Maryland court had jurisdiction to
award it, the judgment is valid and entitled to the same full faith
and credit in North Carolina that it has in Maryland as a valid
domestic judgment.
The defendant in error contends that the Maryland court
obtained no jurisdiction to award the judgment of condemnation,
because the garnishee, although at the time in the state of Mary-
land, and personally served with process therein, was a non-
resident of that state, only casually or temporarily within its
boundaries; that the situs of the debt due from Harris, the
garnishee, to the defendant in error herein, was in North Caro-
lina, and did not accompany Harris to Maryland; that, conse-
quently, Harris, though within the state of Maryland, had not
possession of any property of Balk, and the Maryland state court
therefore obtained no jurisdiction over any property of Balk in
the attachment proceedings, and the consent of Harris to the
entry of the judgment was immaterial. The plaintiff in error,
on the contrary, insists that, though the garnishee were but tem-
porarily in Maryland, yet the laws of that state provide for an
attachment of this nature if the debtor, the garnishee, is found
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HARRIS v. BA I.K, i n  U. S. Sup. Ct., May 8, 1905-198 U. S. 215, 49 
L. ed. 1023, 25 S. Ct. Rep. 625. 
Action commenced by Balk against Harris in justice court 
in North Carolina to recover $ 18o. Both parties resided where 
the suit was brought. Harris pleaded in bar, that, while in Balti­
more, Md., he had been summoned as garnishee in a suit against 
Balle, in which Balle had been served by publication according to 
the law of Maryland, in which he had answered admitting said 
indebtedness of $ 18o to Balk, and by consent of Harris's counsel 
j udgment had been rendered against him for said amount, which 
he had paid to the attorney for the creditor in the attachment 
suit. The trial court rendered j udgment for the plaintiff, which 
was affirmed by the state supreme court ( 1 30 N. Car_ 38 1 ,  4 1  
S .  E. 940) , on the ground that the Maryland court had no j uris­
dict ion of the debt due Balk. Harris brings the case here by 
writ of error. 
PECKHAM, J. The state court of North Carolina has refused 
to give any effect in this action to the l\faryland j udgment ; and 
the federal question is whether i t  did not thereby refuse the full 
faith and credit to such j udgment which is required by the fed­
eral constitution. If the Maryland court had jurisdiction to 
award it, the j udgment is  valid and entitled to the same full faith 
and credit in North Carolina that it has in Maryland as a valid 
domestic judgment. 
The defendant in error contends that the :Maryland court 
obtained no j urisdiction to award the judgment of condemnation, 
because the garnishee, although at the time in the state of Mary­
land, and personally served with process therein, was a non­
resident of that state, only casually or temporarily within its 
boundaries ; that the situs of the debt due from Harris, the 
garnishee, to the defendant in error herein, was in North Caro­
lina, and did not accompany Harris to Maryland ; that, conse­
quently, Harris, though within the state of Maryland, had not 
possession of any property of Balk, and the :Maryland state court 
therefore obtained no jurisdiction over any property of Balk in 
the attachment proceedings, and the consent of Harris to the 
entry of the j udgment was immaterial . The plaintiff in error, 
on the contrary, insists that, though the garnishee were but tem­
porarily in Maryland, yet the laws of that state provide for an 
attachment of this nature if the debtor, the garnishee. is fonncl 
in the state, and the court obtains jurisdict ion over him by the 
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service of process therein; that the judgment, condemning the
debt from Harris to Balk, was a valid judgment, provided Balk
could himself have sued Harris for the debt in Maryland. This,
it is asserted, he could have done, and the judgment was therefore
entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of North Carolina.
The cases holding that the state court obtains no jurisdiction
over the garnishee if he be but temporarily within the state [*22z]
proceed upon the theory that the situs of the debt is at the
domicil either of the creditor or of the debtor, and that it does
not follow the debtor in his casual or temporary journey into
another state, and the garnishee has no possession of any property
or credit of the principal debtor in the foreign state.
We regard the contention of the plaintiff in error as the
correct one. The authorities in the various state courts upon this
question are not at all in harmony. They have been collected
by counsel, and will be found in their respective briefs, and it is
not necessary to here enlarge upon them.
Attachment is the creature of the local law; that is, unless
there is a law of the state providing for and permitting the attach-
ment, it cannot be levied there. If there be a law of the state
providing for the attachment of the debt, then, if the garnishee
be found in that state, and process be personally served. upon
him therein, we think the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over
him, and can garnish the debt due from him to the debtor of the
plaintiff, and condemn it, provided the garnishee could himself
be sued by his creditor in that state. We do not see how the
question of jurisdiction vel non can properly be made to depend
upon the so-called original situs of the debt, or upon the char-
acter of the stay of the garnishee, whether temporary or perma-
nent, in the state where the attachment is issued. Power over
the person of the garnishee confers jurisdiction on the courts of
the state where the writ issues. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S.
7 189-206, 47 L. ed. 439-445, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277. If, while tem-
f porarily there, his creditor might sue him there and recover the
| debt, then he is liable to process of garnishment, no matter where
l
the situs of the debt was originally. VVe do not see the material-
ity of the expression "situs of the debt,” when used in connection
with attachment proceedings. If by situ.r is meant the place of
the creation of the debt, that fact is immaterial. If it be meant
that the obligation to pay the debt can only be enforced at the
sit-us thus fixed, we think it plainly untrue. The obligation of
the debtor to pay his debt clings to and accompanies him wherever
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service of process therein ; that the judgment, condemning the 
debt from Harris to Balle, was a valid j udgment, provided Balle 
could himself have sued Harris for the debt in Maryland. This, 
it is asserted, he could have done, and the judgment was therefore 
entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of North Carolina. 
The cases holding that the state court obtains no jurisdiction 
over the garnishee if he be but temporarily within the state [ •222 l 
proceed upon the theory that the situs of the debt is at the 
' domicil either of the creditor or of the debtor, and that it does 
not follow the debtor in his casual or temporary journey into 
another state, and the garnishee has no possession of any property 
or credit of the principal debtor in the foreign state. 
We regard the contention of the plaintiff in error as the 
correct one. The authorities in the various state courts upon this 
question are not at all in harmony. They have been col lected 
by counsel, and will be found in their respective briefs, and it is  
not necessary to here enlarge upon them. 
Attachment is the creature of the local law ; that is, unless 
there is a law of the state providing for and permitting the attach­
ment, it cannot be levied there. If there be a law of the state 
providing for the attachment of the debt, then, if the garnishee 
be found in that state, and process be personalJy served upon 
him therein, we think the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over 
him, and can garnish the debt due from him to the debtor of the 
plaintiff, and condemn it, provided the garnishee could himself 
be sued by his creditor in that state. \Ve do not see how the 
question of jurisdiction vcl no1i can properly be made to depend 
upon the so-called original situs of the debt, or upon the char­
acter of the stay of the garnishee, whether temporary or perma­
nent, in the state where the attachment is issued. Power over 
the person of the garnishee confers jurisdiction on the courts of 
the state where the writ issues. Blackstone v. },filler, 1 88 U. S. 
l 189-2o6, 47 L. ed. 439-445, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277. If, while tem-
1 porarily there, his creditor might sue him there and recover the 
debt, then he is liable to process of garnishment, no matter where 
the situs of the debt was originally. We do not see the matcrial-L ity of the expression "situs of the debt," when used in connection 
with attachment proceedings. I f  by si"ttt.s is meant the place of 
the creation of the debt, that fact is immaterial. If it be meant 
that the obligation to pay the debt can only he enforcr<l at the 
situs thus fixed, we think it plainly untrue. The obl igat ion of 
the debtor to pay his debt clings to and accompanies h im wherever 
he goes. He is as [*223 l much hound to pay his drht in a 
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foreign state when therein sued upon his obligation by his credi-
tor, as he was in the state where the debt was contracted. \»Ve
speak of ordinary debts, such as the one in this case. It would
be no defense to such suit for the debtor to plead that he was
only in the foreign state casually or temporarily. His obligation
to pay would be the same whether he was there in that way or
with an intention to remain. It is nothing but the obligation to
pay which is garnished or attached. This obligation can be en-
forced by the courts of the foreign state after personal service
of process therein, just as well as by the courts of the domicil of
the debtor. If the debtor leave the foreign state without appear-
ing, a judgment by default may be entered, upon which execu-
tion may issue, or the judgment may be sued upon in any other
state where the debtor might be found. In such case the situs
is unimportant. It is not a question of possession in the foreign
state, for possession cannot be taken of a debt or of the obliga-
tion to pay it, as tangible property might be taken possession of.
Notice to the debtor (garnishee) of the commencement of the
suit, and notice not to pay to his creditor, is all that can be given,
whether the garnishee be a mere casual and temporary comer,
or a resident of the state where the attachment is laid. His
obligation to pay to his creditor is thereby arrested, and a lien
created upon the debt itself. Cahoon v. Morgan, 38 Vt. 236:
National F. Ins. Co. v. Chambers, 53 N. J. Eq. 468, 483, 32 Atl.
663. W'e can see no reason why the attachment could not be
thus laid, provided the creditor of the garnishee could. himself
sue. in that state, and its laws permitted the attachment.
There can be no doubt that Balk, as a citizen of the state
of North Carolina, had the right to sue Harris in Maryland to
recover the debt which Harris owed him. Being a citizen of.
North Carolina, he was entitled to all the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the several states, one of which is the right to
institute actions in the courts of another state. The law of Mary-
land provides for the attachments of credits in a [*224J case like
this. See §§ 8 and I0 of article 9 of the Code of Public General
Laws of Maryland, which provide that, upon the proper facts
being shown (as stated in the article), the attachment may be
sued out against lands, tenements, goods, and credits of the
debtor. Section I0 particularly provides that “any kind of prop-
erty or credits belonging to the defendant, in the plaintiff's own
hands, or in the hands of any one else. may be attached; and
credits may be attached which shall not then be due.” Sections
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foreign state when therein sued upon his obligation by his credi­
tor, as he was in the state where the debt was contracted . ',Ye 
speak of  ordinary debts, such as the one in this case. I t  would 
be no defense to such suit for the debtor to plead that he was 
only in the foreign state casually or temporari ly. His obl igation 
to pay would be the same whether he was there in that way or  
with an intention to  remain. It is  nothing but  the obligation to • 
pay which is garnished o r  attached. This obligation can be en­
forced by the courts of the foreign state after personal service 
of process therein, just as well as by the courts of the domicil of 
the debtor. If the debtor leave the foreign state without appear­
ing, a judgment by default may be entered, upon which execu­
tion may issue, or the judgment may be sued upon in any other 
state where the debtor might be found. In such case the situs 
is unimportant. It is not a question of possession in the foreign • 
state, for possession cannot be taken of a debt or of the obliga­
tion to pay it, as tangible property might be taken possession of. 
Notice to the debtor (garnishee ) of the commencement of the 
suit, and notice not to pay to his creditor, is all that can be given, 
whether the garnishee be a mere casual and temporary comer, 
or a resident of the state where the attachment is laid. His 
obligation to pay to his creditor is thereby arrested , and a l ien 
created upon the debt itself. Cahoon. v. M orgau, 38 Vt. 236 : 
National F. Ins. Co. v. Chambers, 53 N. J. Eq. 468, 483,  32 Atl. 
663. vVe can see no reason why the attachment could not be 
thus laid , provided the creditor of the garnishee could. himself 
sue· in that state, and its laws permitted the attachment. 
There can be no doubt that Balk, as a citizen of the state 
of North Carol ina, had the right to sue Harris in l\faryland to 
recover the debt which Harris owed him. Being a citizen of . 
North Carolina, he was entitled to all the privileges and immuni­
ties of citizens of the several s tates, one of which is t?1e right to 
institute actions in the courts of another state. The law of l\Iary­
land provides for the attachments of credits in a [ *224] case like 
this. See §§ 8 and IO of article 9 of the Code of Public General 
Laws of !vlaryland, which provide that, upon the proper facts 
being shown ( as stated in the article ) ,  the attachment may be 
sued out against lands, tenements, goods, and credits of the 
debtor. Section IO particularly provides that "any kind of prop­
erty or credits belonging to the defendant, in the plaint iff's own 
hands, or in the hands of any one else. may be attached ; and 
credits may be attached \vhich shall not then be due." Sections 
I r , r2, and 13 of the above-mentioned article prov ide the general 
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practice for levying the attachment, and the proceedings subse-
quent thereto. \Nhere money or credits are attached, the inchoate
lien attaches to the fund or credits when the attachment is laid
in the hands of the garnishee, and the judgment condemning the
amount in his hands becomes a personal judgment against him.
Buschman v. Hanna, 72 Md. 1, 5, 6, 18 Atl. 962. Section 34 of
the same Maryland Code provides also that this judgment of
condemnation against the garnishee, or payment by him of such
judgment, is pleadable in bar to an action brought against him
by the defendant in the attachment suit for or concerning the
property or credits so condemned.
It thus appears that Balk could have sued Harris in Mary-
land to recover his debt, notwithstanding the temporary character
of Harris’ stay there; it also appears that the municipal law of
Maryland permits the debtor of the principal debtor to be gar-
nished, and therefore if the court of the state where the garnishee
is found obtains jurisdiction over him, through the service of
process upon him within the state, then the judgment entered is
a valid judgment. See Minor on Conflict of Laws, § 125, where
the various theories regarding the subject are stated and many
of the authorities cited. He there cites many cases to prove the
correctness of the theory of the validity of the judgment where
the municipal law permits the debtor to be garnished, although
his being within the state is but temporary. See pp. 289, 290.
This is the doctrine which is also adopted in Morgan v. I\='e7;ilIr,
74 Pa. 52, by the [*225] supreme court in Pennsylvania, per
Agnew, _I., in delivering the opinion of that court. The same
principle is held in Wyeth Hardware <5‘ Mfg. Co. v. H. F. Lang
6* Co., 127 M0. 242, 247, 27 L. R. A. 651, 48 Am. St. Rep. 626,
29 S. W. IOIO; in Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Corbetts, 165 Ill. 592,
36 L. R. A. 640, 56 Am. St. Rep. 275, 46 N. E. 631; and in
Harvey v. Great Northern R. Co., 50 Minn. 405, 406, 407, 17 L.
R. A. 84, 52 N. VV. 905; and to the same effect is Embree v.
Hanna, 5 johns. 10.1 ; also Savin v. Bond, 57 Md. 228, where the
court held that the attachment was properly served upon a party
in the District of Columbia while he was temporarily there; that
as his debt to the appellant was payable wherever he was found,
and process had been served upon him in the District of Colum-
bia, the supreme court of the district had unquestioned juris-
diction to render judgment, and the same having been paid, there
was no error in granting the prayer of the appellee that such
judgment was conclusive. The case in 138 N. Y. 209, 20 L. R.
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practice for levying the attachment, and the proceedings subse­
quent thereto. Where money or credits are attached, the inchoate 
lien attaches to the fund or credits when the attachment is laid 
in the hands of the garnishee, and the judgment condemning the 
amount in his hands becomes a personal j udgment against him. 
Buschman v. Hanna, 72 Md. 1,  5 ,  6, i8 Atl. g62. Section 34 of 
the same Maryland Code provides also that this j udgment of 
condemnation against the garnishee, or payment by him of such 
j udgment, is pleadable in bar to an action brought against him 
by the defendant in the attachment suit for or concerning the 
property or credits so condemned. 
It thus appears that Balk could have sued Harris in Mary­
land to recover his debt, notwithstanding the temporary character 
of Harris' stay there ; it also appears that the municipal law of 
l\faryland permits the debtor of the principal debtor to be gar­
nished, and therefore if the court of the state where the garnishee 
is found obtains ju risdiction over him, through the service of 
process upon him within the state, then the j udgment enterecl i s  
a valid j udgment. See Minor on Conflict of  Laws, § 1 25, where 
the various theories regarding the subject are stated and many 
of the authorities cited. He tht!re cites many cases to prove the 
correctness of the theory of the valid ity of the j udgment where 
the municipal law permits the debtor to be garnished, although 
his being within the state i s  but temporary. See pp. 28<), 290. 
This is the doctrine which is also adopted in Jl.f organ v. N e'Ville, 
74 Pa. 52, by the [ *225 ]  supreme court in Pennsylvania, pe: 
Agnew, J . , in delivering the opinion of that court. The same 
principle is held in TVycth Hardware & .Mfg. Co . v. H. F. Lan � 
& Co., 1 27 Mo. 242, 247, 27 L. R. A .  65 1 ,  48 Am. St. Rep. 626, 
29 S.  \V. 10 10 ; in Lan cash ire Ins. Co. v. Corbetts, 165 Ill .  592 , 
36 L. R. A. 640, 56 Am. St. Rep. 275, 46 N.  E. 63 1 ;  and in 
Han•ey v. Great Northem R. Co.,  50 l\Iinn . 405 , 406, 407, 1 7  L. 
R. A. 84, 52 N. \V. 905 ; and to the same effect i s  E m b ree v. 
H a11 11a, 5 Johns. 10.1 ; also Sat-in v.  Bo1 1d, 57 Md. 228, where the 
court held that the attachment was properly served upon a partv 
in the District of Columbia while he was temporarily there ; that 
as his debt to the appellant was payable wherever he was found, 
and process had been served upon him in the District of Colum­
bia, the supreme court of the district had unquestioned juris­
diction to render j udgment, and the same having been paid, there 
was no error in granting the prayer of the appellee that such 
judgment was conclusive. The case in 1 �8 N. Y. 20<), 20 L. R. 
A.  J I8, 34 Am. St. Rep. 448, 33 N. E. 938 ( Douglass v. Phenix 
ELEMENTS or JURISDICTION 97
Ins. Co.), is not contrary to this doctrine. The question there
was not as to the temporary character of the presence of the
garnishee in the state of Massachusetts, but, as the garnishee
was a foreign corporation, it was held that it was not within the
state of Massachusetts so as to be liable to attachment by the
service upon an agent of the company within that state. The gen-
eral principle laid down in Embree v. Hanna, 5 Johns. IOI, was
recognized as correct. There are, as we have said, authorities
to the contrary, and they cannot be reconciled.
It seems to us, however, that the principle decided in Chi-
cago, R. 1. (9 P. R. CO. v. Sturm, I74 U. S. 710, 43 L. ed. 1144,
19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797, recognizes the jurisdiction, although in
that case it appears that the presence of the garnishee was not
merely a temporary one in the state where the process was served.
In that case it was said: “All debts are payable everywhere
unless there be some special limitation or provision in respect to
the payment; the rule being that debts, as such, have no locus
or situs, but accompany the creditor everywhere, and authorize
a demand upon the debtor everywhere. 2 Parsons, Contracts,
8th ed. 702 [gth ed. 739]. The debt involved in the pending
[*226] case had no ‘special limitation or provision in respect to
payment.’ It was payable generally, and could have been sued
on in Iowa, and therefore was attachable in Iowa. This is the
principle and effect of the best considered cases,—the inevitable
effect from the nature of transitory actions and the purpose of
foreign attachment laws, if we would enforce that purpose.”
The case recognizes the right of the creditor to sue in the state
where the debtor may be found, even if but temporarily there;
and upon that right is built the further right of the creditor to
attach the debt owing by the garnishee to his creditor. The im-
portance of the fact of the right of the original creditor to sue
his debtor in the foreign state, as affecting the right of the credi-
tor of that creditor to sue the debtor or garnishee, lies in the
nature of the attachment proceeding. The plaintiff in such pro-
ceeding in the foreign state is able to sue out the attachment and
attach the debt due from the garnishee to his (the garnishee’s)
creditor, because of the fact that the plaintiff is really, in such
proceeding, a representative of the creditor of the garnishee, and
therefore if such creditor himself had the right to commence suit
to recover the debt in the foreign state, his representative has the
same right, as representing him, and may garnish or attach the
debt, provided the municipal law of the state where the attach-
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Ins. Co . ) ,  is not contrary to this doctrine. The question there 
was not as to the temporary character of the presence of the 
garnishee in the state of l\fassachusetts, but, as the garnishee 
\\las a foreign corporation, it was held that it was not within the 
state of l\lassachusetts so as to be liable to attachment by the 
service upon an agent of the company within that state. The gen­
eral principle laid down in Embree v. Hanna, 5 Johns. 10 1 ,  was 
recognized as correct. There are, as we have said, authorities 
to the contrary, and they cannot be reconciled. 
It seems to us, however, that the principle decided in Chi­
cago, R. 1. & P. R. Co. v. Sturm, 1 74 U. S. 7 10, 43 L. ed. I 144, 
19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797, recognizes the j urisdiction, although in 
that case it appears that the presence of the garnishee was not 
merely a temporary one in the state where the process was served. 
In that case it was said : "All debts are payable everywhere 
unless there be some special limitation or provision in respect to 
the payment ; the rule being that debts, as such, have no locus 
or siti4s, but accompany the creditor everywhere, and authorize 
a demand upon the debtor everywhere. 2 Parsons, Contracts, 
8th ed. 702 [9th ed. 739] . The debt involved in the pending 
[ *226] case had no 'special limitation or provision in respect to 
payment.' It was payable generally, and co uld have been. sued 
0 11 in Iowa, and tit.ere{ ore was attachable in, Iowa. This is the 
principle and effect of the best considered cases,-the inevitable 
effect from the nature of transitory actions and the purpose of 
foreign attachment laws, i f  we would enforce that purpose." 
The case recognizes the right of the creditor to sue in the state 
where the debtor may be found, even if but temporarily there ; 
and upon that right is built the further right of the creditor to 
attach the debt owing by the garnishee to his creditor. The im­
portance of the fact of the right of the original creditor to sue 
his debtor in the foreign state, as affecting the right of the credi­
tor of that creditor to sue the debtor or garnishee, lies in the 
nature of the attachment proceeding. The plaintiff in such pro­
ceeding in the foreign state is able to sue out the attachment and 
attach the debt due from the garnishee to his ( the garnishee's ) 
creditor, because of the fact that the plaintiff is really, in such 
proceeding, a representative of the creditor of the garnishee, and 
therefore i f  such creditor himself had the right to commence suit 
to recover the debt in the foreign state, his representative has the 
same right, as representing him, and may garnish or attach the 
debt, provided the municipal law of the state where the attach­
ment was sued out permits it. 
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It seems to us, therefore, that the judgment against Harris
in Maryland, condemning the $180 which he owed Balk, was a
valid judgment, because the court had jurisdiction over the gar-
nishee by personal service of process within the state of Maryland.
It ought to be and it is the object of courts to prevent the
payment of any debt twice over. Thus, if Harris, owing a debt
to Balk, paid it under a valid judgment against him, to Epstein,
he certainly ought not to be compelled to pay it a second time.
but should have the right to plead his payment under the Mary-
land judgment. It is objected, however, that the payment by
Harris to Epstein was not under legal compulsion. [*zz7] Har-
ris in truth owed the debt to Balk, which was attached by Epstein.
He had, therefore, as we have seen, no defense to set up against
the attachment of the debt. Jurisdiction over him personally had
been obtained by the Maryland court. As he was absolutely with-
out defense, there was no reason why he should not consent to
a judgment impounding the debt, which judgment the plaintiff
was legally entitled to, and which he could not prevent. There
was no merely voluntary payment within the meaning of that
phrase as applicable here.
But most rights may be lost by negligence, and if the gar- _
nishee were guilty of negligence in the attachment proceeding,
to the damage of Balk, he ought not to be permitted to set up the
judgment as a defense. Thus it is recognized as the duty of the
garnishee to give notice to his own creditor, if he would protect
himself, so that the creditor may have the opportunity to defend
himself against the claim of the person suing out the attachment.
This duty is affirmed in the case above cited of Morgan v. Nevifle,
74 Pa. 52, and is spoken of in Chicago, R. I. 6- P. R. Co. v.
Sturm, 174 U. S. 710, 43 L. ed. 1144, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797.
although it is not therein actually decided to be necessary, because
in that case notice was given and defense made. VVhile the want
of notification by the garnishee to his own creditor may have no
effect upon the validity of the judgment against the garnishee
(the proper publication being made by the plaintiff), we think
it has and ought to have an effect upon the right of the garnishee
to avail himself of the prior judgment and his payment there-
under. This notification by the garnishee is for the purpose of
making sure that his creditor shall have an opportunity to defend
the claim made against him in the attachment suit. Fair dealing
requires this at the hands of the garnishee. In this case, while
neither the defendant nor the garnishee appeared, the court, while
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It seems to us, therefore, that the judgment against Harris 
in Maryland, condemning the $18o which he owed Balk, was a 
valid judgment, because the court had jurisdiction over the gar­
nishee by personal service of  process within the state of Maryland. 
It ought to be and it is the object of courts to prevent the 
payment of any debt twice over. Thus, if Harris, owing a debt 
to Balk, paid it under a valid judgment against him, to Epstein, 
he certainly ought not to be compelled to pay it a second time, 
but should have the right to plead his payment under the Mary­
land judgment. It is objected, however, that the payment by 
Harris to Epstein was not under legal compulsion. [*227] Har­
ris in truth owed the debt to Balle, which was attached by Epstein. 
He had, therefore, as we have seen, no defense to set up against 
the attachment of the debt. Jurisdiction over him personally had 
been obtained by the Maryland court. As he was absolutely with­
out defense, there was no reason why he should not con�ent to 
a judgment impounding the debt, which judgment the plaintiff 
was legally entitled to, and which he could not prevent. There 
was no merely voluntary payment within the meaning of that 
phrase as applicable here. 
But most rights may be lost by negligence, and if the gar- . 
nishee were guilty of negligence in the attachment proceeding, 
to the damage of Balk, he ought not to be permitted to set up the 
judgment as a defense. Thus it is recognized as the duty of the 
garnishee to give notice to his own creditor, if he would protect 
himself, so that the creditor may have the opportunity to <lefond 
himself against the claim of the person suing out the attachment. 
This duty is affirmed in the case above cited of }.Jorgan v. N evi/:e, 
74 Pa. 52, and is spoken of in Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. 
Sturm, 1 74 U. S. 710, 43 L. ed. 1 144, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797. 
although it is not therein actuaJly decided to be necessary, because 
in that case notice was given and defense made. While the want 
of notification by the garnishee to his own creditor may have no 
effect upon the validity of the judgment against the garnishee 
( the proper publication being made by the plaintiff) , we think 
it has and ought to have an effect upon the right of the garnishee 
to avail himself of the prior judgment and his payment there­
under. This notification by the garnishee is for the purpose of 
making sure that his creditor shall have an opportunity to defend 
the claim made against him in the attachment suit. Fair dealing 
requires this at the hands of the garnishee. In this case, while 
neither the defendant nor the garnishee appeared , the court, while 
condemning the credits attached, could not, by the terms of the 
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Maryland statute, issue the writ of execution unless the plaintiff
gave bond or sufficient security before the court awarding the
execution, to make restitution of the money paid if the defendant
should at any time within a year and a day, [M28] appear in the
action and show that the plaintiff’s claim, or some part thereof,
was not due to the plaintiff. The defendant in error, Balk, had
notice of this attachment, certainly within a few days after the
issuing thereof and the entry of judgment thereon, because he
sued the plaintiff in error to recover his debt within a few days
after his (Harris’) return to North Carolina, in which suit the
judgment in Maryland was set up by Harris as a plea in bar to
Balk’s claim. Balk, therefore, had an opportunity for a year and
a day after the entry of the judgment to litigate the question of
his liability in the Maryland court, and to show that he did not
owe the debt, or some part of it, as was claimed by Epstein. He,
however, took no proceedings to that end, so far as the record
shows, and the reason may be supposed to be that he could not
successfully defend the claim, because he admitted in this case
that he did, at the time of the attachment proceeding, owe Epstein
some $344.
Generally, though, the failure on the part of the garnishee
I to give proper notice to his creditor of the levying of the attach-
ment would be such a neglect of duty on the part of the garnishee
which he owed to his creditor as would prevent his availing him-
self of the judgment in the attachment suit as a bar to the suit
of his creditor against himself, which might therefore result in
his being called upon to pay the debt twice.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina must
be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with the opinion of this court.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Day dissented.
LOUISVILLE & N. RY. CO. v. DEER, in U. S. Sup. Ct., Jan. 2, 1906-
200 U. S. 176, 50 L. ed. 426, 26 S. Ct. Rep. 207.
In error to the supreme court of Alabama by the Louisville &
N. Ry.Co.,to reverse a judgment affirming a judgment in debt,ren-
dered against plaintiff in error by the city court of Montgomery.
Plaintiff in error was not a corporation under the laws of
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Maryland statute, issue the writ of execution unless the plaintiff 
gave bond or sufficient security before the court awarding the 
execution, to make restitution of the money paid if  the defendant 
should at any time within a year and a day, [ *228] appear in the 
action and show that the plaintiff's claim, or some part thereof, 
was not due to the plaintiff. The defendant in error, Balk, had 
notice of this attachment, certainly within a few days after the 
issuing thereof and the entry of  j udgment thereon, because he 
sued the plaintiff in error to recover his debt within a few days 
after his ( Harris' ) return to North Carolina, in which suit the 
judgment in Maryland was set up by Harris as a plea in bar to 
Balk's claim. Balle, therefore, had an opportunity for a year and 
a day after the entry of the judgment to l itigate the question of 
his l iability in the Maryland court, and to show that he did not 
owe the debt, or some part of it, as was claimed by Epstein. He, 
however, took no proceedings to that end, so far as the record 
shows, and the reason may be supposed to be that he could not 
successfully defend the claim, because he admitted in this case 
that he did, at the time of the attachment proceeding, owe Epstein 
some $344· 
Generally, though, the failure on the part o f  the garnishee 
to give proper notice to his creditor of the levying of the attach­
ment would be such a neglect of duty on the part of the garnishee 
which he owed to his creditor as would prevent his availing him­
self of the judgment in the attachment suit as a bar to the suit 
of his creditor against himself, which might therefore result in 
his being called upon to pay the debt twice. 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina must 
be reversed , and the cause remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with the opinion of this court. 
Reversed. 
Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Day dissented. 
LOUI SVILLE & N. RY. CO. v. DEER, in U. S. Sup. Ct., Jan. 2, 19Q6-
200 U. S. 1 76, 50 L. ed. 426, 26 S. Ct. Rep. 207. 
In error to the supreme court of Alabama by the Louisville & 
N. Ry. Co., to reverse a j udgment affirming a j udgment in debt , ren­
dered against plaintiff in error by the city court of l\font!!'omery. 
Plaintiff in error was not a corporation under the laws of 
Florida, but operated a railway there. The other facts appear 
by the opinion . 
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Ho1.1uEs, J. This is an action to recover a debt admitted to
have been due to the plaintiff, the defendant in error. But it
was agreed [*178] in the trial that a suit was brought by one
Brock against the plaintiff in Florida, in which the railroad com-
pany, the present plaintiff in error, was summoned as garnishee,
judgment was recovered against the latter as such for the sum
now in suit, and the sum paid by§_it into court, all before the
present suit was begun. The proceedings in Florida were strictly
in accordance with the laws of that state. The railroad company
did business there and was permanentlfliable to service and suit,
and the defendant, the present defendant in error, was notified
by such publication as the statutes of Florida prescribed. He
was not, however, a resident of the state, but lived in Alabama,
and the supreme court of the latter state affirmed a judgment
in his favor on the ground that the Florida court had no juris-
diction to render the judgment relied on as a defense.
Whatever doubts may have been felt when this case was
decided below are disposed of by the recent decision in Harris
v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215. There the garnishee was only tempo-
rarily present in Maryland, where the first judgment was ren-
dered, and the defendant in that judgment was absent from the
state, and served only as the defendant in error was served in
Florida. Yet the Maryland judgment was held valid. and a
decision by the supreme court of North Carolina denying the
jurisdiction of the Maryland court was reversed. In the present
case the railroad company was permanently present in the state
where‘it was served. In view of the full and recent discussion
in Harris v. Balk we think it unnecessary to SWTC.
Judgment reversed.
ROLLER v. HOLLY, in U. S. Sup. Ct., Feb. 26, 1900-176 U. S. 398,
20 S. Ct. 410.
Action by Roller to recover on five notes for $228 each, and
to foreclose a vendor’s lien therefor. From a judgment of the
trial court denying the vendor’s lien be sued error in the Texas
court of civil appeals, where the judgment below was affirmed.
Then he sued error in the supreme court of Texas, which again]
affirmed the judgment, and he now sues error here.
BROWN, I. Briefly stated, the case is this: Roller, the plain-
tiff, who was a resident of Virginia, bought this land in january
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Hou.I.Es, J. This is an action to recover a debt admitted to 
have been due to the plaintiff, the defendant in error. But it 
was agreed [ * I 78] in the trial that a suit was brought by one 
Brock against the plaintiff in Florida, in which the railroad com­
pany, the present plaintiff in error, was summoned as garnishee, 
j udgment was recovered against the latter as such for the sum 
now in suit, and the sum paid by �.it into court, all before the 
present suit was begun. The proceeilings in Florida were strictly 
in accordance with the laws of that state. The railroad company 
did business there and was permanentlNiable to service and suit, 
and the defendant, the present defendant in error, was notified 
by such publication as the statutes of Florida prescribed. He 
was not, however, a resident of the state, but lived in Alabama, 
and the supreme court of the latter state affirmed a j udgment 
in his favor on the ground that the Florida court had no j uris­
diction to render the j udgment relied on as a defense. 
\Vhatever doubts may have been felt when this case was 
decided below are disposed of by the recent decision in Ha rris 
v. Balk, 1 98 U .  S .  2 1 5 . There the garnishee was only tempo­
rarily present in Maryland , where the first j udgment was ren­
dered, and the defendant in that j udgment was absent from the 
state, and served only as the defendant in error was served in 
Florida. Yet the Maryland j udgment was held valid. and a 
decision by the supreme court of North Carolina denying the 
jurisdiction of the Maryland court was reversed. In the present 
case the railroad company was permanently present in the state 
where · it was served. In view o f  the full and recent discussion 
in Harris v. Balk we think it unnecessary to s�e. 
Judgment reversed. 
ROLLER v. HOLLY, in U. S. Sup. Ct., Feb. 26, 1900--176 U. S. 398, 
20 S. Ct. 410. 
Action by Roller to recover on five notes for $228 each, and 
to foreclose a vendor's l ien therefor. From a judgment of the 
trial court denying the vendor's lien he sued error in the TexasJ 
court of civil appeals, where the judgment below was affirmed.! 
Then he sued error in the supreme court o f  Texas, which again) 
affirmed the j udgment, and he now sues error here. 
BROWN, J. Briefly stated, the case is this : Roller, the plainl 
tiff, who was a resident of Virginia, bought this land in January 
1887, gave a note in part payment for $216. 17, which passed into 
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the hands of McClintic & Proctor, who brought suit thereon for
a personal judgment against the plaintiff, and for the foreclosure
of a vendor's lien upon the land, served plaintiff with notice of the
suit in Virginia, December 30, I890, to appear in Texas January
5, 1891, and took judgment against him by default January 9,'
I89I, for $276.65, and for a foreclosure of the lien. Upon a
sale in pursuance of this foreclosure, March 3, 1891, the land was
struck off to Williams and Jackson, and by them sold to Peoples.
Meantime, however, and on January I, 1890, a year before
the McClintic & Proctor suit was begun, plaintiff sold the land
to the Hollys, who went into possession, and took from them five
notes of $228 each, and also reserved a vendor's lien, which he
sought to foreclose in this suit. VVilliams, Jackson, and Peoples,
who purchased the land under the sheriff’s sale in the McClintic
& Proctor suit, were made parties defendant, 811d_1lfi_flE-I’-t-l-131
the plaintiffs title passed to them, which plaintiff denies upon the
ground that no process was served upon him within the state of
Texas, or within a reasonable time before he was required to
appear and answer.
The question in dispute, then, is whether a notice served upon
the plaintiff in Rockingham County, Virginia, December 30, 1890,
to appear in Limestone County, Texas, on January 5, 1891, to
answer the foreclosure suit, is due process of law within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment? The Hollys, who bought
this land and went into possession a year before the McClintic
& Proctor suit was begun, were not made parties to that suit,
probably because the deed from the plaintiff to them was not on
record in Limestone County at the time of the institution of the
suit, and their rights are not involved here. It is conceded that
the McClintic & Proctor judgment is invalid as a personal judg-
ment against the plaintiff under the case of Pennoyer v. Nefi, 95
U. S. 7I4, 723, and other cases in Texas of the same import.
I. The position of the plaintiff that, as there was no statute
in Texas authorizing a suit against a non-resident to enforce an
equitable lien for purchase money, and as there had been no seiz-
ure in rem of the lands, nor any notice to Roller’s vendees, the
Hollys, who were in possession, the jurisdiction of the Texas
courts could not attach, and the whole proceeding was void, is
unsound. ‘
[*4o3] In the case of Hart v. Sansom, 110 U. S. 155i. 3 S.
Ct., 586, relied upon in support of this contention, an action of
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the hands o f  -r-.IcClintic & Proctor, who brought suit  thereon for 
a per�onal j u<lgment against the plaintiff, and for the foreclosure 
of a vendor's lien npon the land, served plaintiff with notice of the 
suit in Yirginia, De,:ember 30, 189o, to appear in Texas January 
5,  189 1 ,  and took j udgment against him by default January 9, 
189 1 ,  for $z76.65, and for a foreclosure of the lien. Upon a 
sale in pursuance of this foreclosure, l\Iarch 3, 189 1 ,  the land wao; 
struck off to \Villiams and Jackson, and by them sold to Peoples. 
Meantime, however, and on January 1 ,  1 890, a year before 
the l\IcClintic & Proctor suit was begun, plaintiff sold the land 
to the Hollys, who went into possession, and took from them five 
notes of $228 each, and also reserved a vendor's lien, which he 
sought to foreclose in this suit. \Villiam s, Jackson, and Peoples, 
who purchased the land under the sheriff's sale in the McClintic 
& Proctor suit, were made parties defendant, and now ayer that 
tJ1e plaintiff's title passed to them, which plaintiff denies upon the 
ground that no process was served upon him within the state of 
Texas. or within a reasonable time before he was required to 
appear and answer. 
The question in dispute, then, is whether a notice served upon 
the plaintiff in Rock ingham County, Virginia. December 30, 1890, 
to appear in Limestone County, Texas, on January 5, 1 89 1 ,  to 
answer the foreclosure suit, is  due process of law within the mean­
ing o f  the Fourteenth A mendment ? The Hollys, who bought 
this land and went into possession a ye ar before the 1\fcClintic 
& Proctor suit was begun, were not made parties to that suit, 
probably because the deed from the plaintiff to them was not on 
record in Li mestone County at the time o f  the inst itution of the 
suit. and their rights are not i nvolved here. It  i s  conceded that 
the :McClintic & Proctor j udgment is invalid as a personal j u<lg­
ment againc;t the plaintiff under the case o f  Prn11 oycr v . .\'eff, 95 
U. S. 7 14. 723, and other cases in Texas of the same import . 
1 .  The position o f  the plaint iff that , as there was no statute 
in Texas authorizing a suit aga inst a non-resident to en forcr an 
equitable lien for purchase money, and a s  there had been no seiz­
ure iH rem of the lands, nor any notice to Rol ler's venrlecs. the 
Hollys, who were in possec;sion , the j ur i sdict ion of thP Texac; 
courts could not attach, and the whole proceed ing was Yoicl. is 
unsound. 
[*403] In the case of Hart "· Sansom ,  I I O e. s. 1 5 r .  3 s .  
Ct., 586. relied upon in support o f  t h i s  contention . an action of 
ej cctmcnt was brought against several defendants. " ho set up 
102 cnsns on JUDGMENTS, ETC.
in defence a judgment against the plaintiff as one having some
pretended claim or title to the lands, and other defendants hold-
ing recorded deeds thereof, which were averred to be fraudulent
and void. Plaintiffs in that suit averred that these pretended
deeds and claims cast a cloud upon their title; and that one of
the defendants had ejected them from the lands and withheld
possession from the plaintiffs. Due service was made on the oth-
er defendants, and a citation to Hart, who was a citizen of an-
other state, was published as directed by the local statutes. All
the defendants were defaulted, and upon a writ of inquiry the jury
found that Hart claimed the land, but had no title by record or
otherwise, and returned a verdict for the plaintiffs upon which
judgment was entered for a recovery of the land, the cancellation
of the deeds, and the removal of the cloud upon the title. It was
held that this judgment was no bar to an action by Hart in the
Circuit Court of the United States, to recover the land against
Sansom, who held under a lease from the plaintiffs in the former
suit. \Ve held that none of that judgment was applicable to Hart,
since that part which was for recovery of possession could not
apply to him, as he was not in possession; and that part which
was for the cancellation of the deeds set up in the petition, was a
decree in [>crs0nam merely, and could only be supported against
a non-resident of the state by actual service upon him within the
jurisdiction of the state, and that constructive service by publica-
tion was not sufficient. Neither of the plaintiffs, however, was
in possession of the land nor claimed a lien thereon.
In Arndt v. Griggs, I34 U. S. 316, it was held directly that
a state may provide by statute that the title to real estate within
its limits shall be settled and determined by a suit in which a
non-resident defendant is brought into court by publication. It
appeared in that case that a suit had been begun by a party alleg-
ing that he was the owner and in possession of the land in con-
troversy, by virtue of certain tax deeds, against defendants claim-
ing to have some title or interest in [*4o4] the lands by patent
from the United States, which title, as was alleged, was divested
by the tax deeds, and was unjust, inequitable, and a cloud upon
plaintiffs title, and that the suit was brought for the purpose
of quieting such title. The defendants were brought in by pub-
lication, and a decree entered in favor of plaintiff quieting his
title. The question was whether that decree was a bar to an
action in ejectment between the grantees of the respective parties
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in defence a j udgment against the plaintiff as one having some 
pretended claim or title to the lands, and other defendants hold­
ing recorded deeds thereof, which were averred to be fraudulent 
and void. Plaintiffs in that suit averred that these preten<led 
deeds and claims cast a cloud upon their title ; and that one of  
the defendants had ej ected them from the lands and withheld 
possess ion from the plaintiffs. Due service was made on the oth­
er defendants, and a citation to Hart, who was a citizen of an­
other state, was published as directed by the local statutes. All 
the defendants were defaulted , and upon a writ of inquiry the jury 
found that Hart claimed the land, but had no title by record or 
otherwise, and returned a verdict for the plaintiffs upon which 
j udgment was entered for a recovery of the land, the cancellation 
of the deeds, and the removal of the cloud upon the title. It  was 
held that this judgment was no bar to an action by Hart in the 
Circuit Court of the United States, to recover the land against 
Sansom,  who held under a lease from the plaintiffs in the former 
suit. \Ve held that none of that j udgment was applicable to Hart, 
since that part which was for recovery of possession could not 
apply to him, as he was not in possession ; and that part which 
was for the cancel lation of the deeds set up in the petition , was a 
decree in personam merely, and could only be supported against 
a non-resident of the state by actual service upon him within the 
j urisdiction of the state, and that constructive service by publica­
tion was not sufficient. Neither of  the plaintiffs, however, was 
in possession of the land nor claimed a lien thereon. 
In Arndt v. Griggs, 1 34 U. S.  3 1 6, it was held directly that 
a state may provide by statute that the title to real estate within 
its l imits shall be settled and determined by a suit in which a 
non-resident defendant is brought into court by publication. It 
appeared in that case that a suit had been begun by a party alleg­
ing that he was the owner and £n possess£on of  the land in con­
troversy . by virtue of certain tax deeds, against defendants claim­
ing to have some title or interest in [ *404] the lands by patent 
from the United States, which title, as was alleged, was divested 
by the tax deeds, and was unj ust, inequitable, and a cloud upon 
plaint iff's title, and that the suit was brought for the purpose 
of quieting such title. The defendants were brought in by pub­
l icat ion, and a decree entered in favor of plaintiff qui«.>ting his 
t it le .  The question was whether that decree was a bar to an 
action in ej ectment between the grantees of the respective parties 
to the proceedings to quiet title. In other words, as put by th e 
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court: “Has a state the power to provide by statute that the
title to real estate within its limits shall be settled and determined
by a suit in which the defendant, being a non-resident, is brought
into court only by publication?” The question was answered in
the affirmative. In delivering the opinion of the court Mr. Justice
Brewer observed: “The question is not what a court of equity,
by virtue of its general powers and in the absence of a statute,
might do, but it is, what jurisdiction has a state over titles to
real estate within its limits, and what jurisdiction may it give by.
statute to its own courts, to determine the validity and extent '
of the claims of non-residents to such real estate? If a state _
has no power to bring a non-resident into its courts for any pur-
pose by publication, it is impotent to perfect the titles of real es- .'
tate within its limits held by its own citizens; and a cloud cast
upon such title by a claim of a non-resident will remain for all
time a cloud, unless such non-resident shall voluntarily come into
its courts for the purpose of having it adjudicated. But no such
imperfections attend the sovereignty of the state. It has control
over property within its limits; and the condition of ownership
of real estate therein, whether the owner be stranger or citizen,
is subjection to its rules concerning the holding, the transfer, lia-
bility to obligations, private or public, and the modes of estab-
lishing titles thereto. It cannot bring the person of a non-resi-
dent within its limits—its process goes not out beyond its
borders —— but it may determine the extent of his title
to real estate with its limits; and for the purpose of such
determination may provide any reasonable method of imparting
notice. * * * Mortgage liens, mechanic’s liens, [*4o5] material-
men’s liens and other liens are foreclosed against non-resident
defendants upon service by publication only. Lands of non-resi-
dent defendants are attached and sold to pay their debts; and in-
deed, almost any kind of action may be instituted and maintained
against non-residents to the extent of any interest in property
they may have in Kansas, and the jurisdiction to hear and deter-
mine in this kind of cases may be obtained wholly and entirely
by publication.”
This case is readily distinguishable from that of Hart v. San-
som in the important fact that the plaintiffs in the judgment set
up as a defence in that case were out 0-f possession while the de-
fendants were in possession, and the action was really in ejectment
with a somewhat superfluous prayer for the cancellation of all
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court : "Has a state the power to provide by statute that the 
title to real estate within its limits shall be settled and determined 
by a suit in which the defendant, being a non-resident, is brought 
into court only by publication ?" The question was answered in 
the affirmative. In delivering the opinion of the court Mr. Justice 
Brewer observed : "The question is not what a court of equity, 
by virtue of its general powers and in the absence of a statute, 
might do, but it is, what j urisdiction has a state over titles to 
real estate within its limits, and what jurisdiction may it give by , 
statute to its own courts, to determine the validity and extent · 
of the claims of  non-residents to such real estate ? I f  a state . 
has no power to bring a non-resident into its courts for any pur­
pose by publication, it is impotent to perfect the titles of real es- � 
tate within its limits held by its own citizens ; and a cloud cast 
upon such tit le by a claim of a non-resident will remain for all ' 
time a cloud, unless such non-resident shall voluntarily come into 
its courts for the purpose of having it adj udicated. But no such 
imperfections attend the sovereignty of th� state. It has control 
over property within its limits ; and the condition of ownership . 
of real estate therein, whether the owner be stranger or citizen, 
is subj ection to its rules concerning the holding, the transfer, lia­
bility to obligations, private or public, and the modes of estab­
lishing titles thereto. It cannot bring the person of a non-resi­
dent within its l imits-its process goes not out beyond its 
borders - but it may determine the extent of his title 
to real estate with its limits ; and for the purpose of such 
determination may provide any reasonable method of imparting 
notice. * "' * Mortgage liens, mechanic's liens, [*405 ] material­
men's liens and other liens are foreclosed against non-resident 
defendants upon service by publication only. Lands of non-resi­
dent defendants are attached and sold to pay their debts ; and in­
deed, almost any kind o f  action may be instituted and maintained 
against non-residents to the extent of any interest in property 
they may have in Kansas, and the j urisdiction to hear and deter­
mine in this kind o f  cases may be obtained wholly and entirely 
by publication." 
This case is readily distinguishable from that of H Mt v. San ­
som in the important fact that the plaintiffs in the j udgment set 
up as a defence in that case were out  of possession while the de­
fendants were in possession, and the action was real ly in ejectment 
with a somewhat superfluous prayer for the cancellation of all 
the deeds under which the defendants claimed title. In A rndt v. 
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Griggs the plaintiffs were in possession, under tax deeds it 1"-‘
true, but having a prima facie valid title which they sought to
vindicate against the former owners.
The substance of these cases is that if the plaintiff be in
possession, or have a lien upon land within a certain state, he
may institute proceedings against non-residents to foreclose such
lien or to remove a cloud from his title to the land, and may call
them in by personal service outside of the jurisdiction of the
court, or by publication, if this method be sanctioned by the local
law.
In suits for the foreclosure of a m0t‘tg3.gc or other lien upon
such property, no preliminary seizure is necessary to give the
court jurisdiction. The cases in which it has been held that a
seizure or its equivalent, an attachment or execution upon the
property, is necessary to give jurisdiction are those where a gen-
eral creditor seeks to establish and foreclose a lien tl1ereby ac-
quired. Of this class Cooper v. Reynolds, I0.“/all. 308, is the
most prominent example. In that case a plaintifiC in an action for
false imprisonment had attached the property of Reynolds in
certain lands, which were sold upon execution to Cooper, who
was put in possession by the sheriff. Reynolds, the original own-
er, brought ejectment against him, and it was held by this court
that Reynolds's title to [*4o6] the land had been divested by the
attachment proceedings, upon the ground that, in this class of
cases, the levy of the attachment gave the court jurisdiction. But
the object of such attachment is merely to give a lien upon the
property which the courts may enforce; and if a lien» already
exists, whether by mortgage, statute, or contract, the court may
proceed to enforce the same precisely as though the property had
been seized upon attachment or execution.
It is true there is no statute of Texas specially authorizing
a suit against a non-resident to enforce an equitable lien for pur-
chase money, but article 1230 of the Code of Texas, hereinafter
cited, contains a general provision for the institution of suits
against absent and non-resident defendants, and lays down a
method of procedure applicable to all such cases. Obviously this
article has no application to suits in pcrsonam, as was held by
the Supreme Court of Texas in York v. State, 73 Texas, 651;
Kilrzlrzarle v. Houslon 65’ '1‘c.ra.s Cmtra-l Ra1ilwa_\', 76 Texas, 686;
1l1'add0.r v. Craig, 80 Texas, 600; and by this court in Pcmzoyer
v. Z\'cfi”, 95 U. S. 714, 723. The article must then be restricted
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Griggs the plaintiffs were in p0ssession, under tax deeds it -; � 
true, but having a prima fade valid title which they sought Lo 
vindicate against the former owners. 
The substance of these cases is that if the plaint iff be in 
possession, or have a lien upon land within a certain state, he 
may institute proceedings against non-residents to foreclose such 
l ien or to remove a cloud from his title to the land, and may call 
them in by personal service outside o f  the j urisd iction of the 
court, or by publ ication , if this method be sanctioned by the local 
law. 
In suits for the foreclosure of a mortgage or other lien upon 
such property, no preliminary seizure is necessary to give the 
court j urisdiction. The cases in which it has been held that a 
seizure or its equivalent , an attachment or execution upon the 
property, is necessary to give j urisdiction are those where a gen­
eral credi tor seeks to establish and foreclose a lien thereby ac­
quired. Of this class Cooper v. Re)'110/ds, J O .  Wall. 3o8, is the 
most prominent example. In that case a plaintiff in an action for 
fal se imprisonment had attached the property o f  Reynolds in 
certain lands, which were sold upon execution to Cooper, who 
was put in possession by the sheriff. Reynolds, the original own­
er, brought ej ectment against him, and it  was held by this court 
that Reynolds 's  title to [ *406] the land had been divested by the 
attachment proceedings, upon the ground that, in this class of 
cases, the levy of the attachment gave the court jurisdiction .  But 
the object of such attachment is merely to give a lien upon the 
property which the courts may enforce ; and if a lien alreadv 
exists, whether by mortgage, statute, or contract, the court may 
proceed to enforce the same precisely as though the property had 
been seized upon attachment or execution. 
It is true there is no statute of Texas specially authorizing 
a suit against a non-resident to en force an equitable l ien for pur­
chase money, but article 1 230 of the Code of Texas, hereinafter 
cited, conta ins a general provision for the inst itution of  suits 
against absent and non-resident defendants, and lays do\vn a 
method of procedure applicable to al l  such case�. Obviously this 
article has no appl ication to suits in pcrsonam, as was held by 
the Supreme Court of Texas in York v. State, 73 Texas, 65 I ; 
Kim m a.rlc v. Houston fr Texas Cen tral Ra·iltt•a3•, 76 Texas, 686 ; 
Maddox v. Craig, 8o Texas, 600 ; ancl by this court in Pc111 1oycr 
v. Xcff, 95 U. S. 7 14, 723. The art icle must then be restricted 
to act ions  in rem ; but to what class of actions, since none is men-· 
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tioned specially in the article? VVe are bound to give it some
effect. \/Ve cannot treat it as wholly nugatory, and as it is im-
possible to say that it contemplates a procedure in one class of
cases and not in another, we think the only reasonable construc-
tion is to hold that it applies to all cases where, under recognized
principles of law, suits may be instituted against non-resident
defendants. In the case of Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 4 Pet. 466,
relied upon by the plaintiff, a statute of Kentucky authorized
suits in chancery against non-residents “where any person or
persons, their heirs or assigns, claim land as locator, or by bond
or instrument in writing ;” and as the plaintiff in the case did
not claim as locator, it was held that the court acted without au-
thority, and that the decree was void for want of jurisdiction.
Where the statute specifies certain classes of cases which may be
brought against non-residents, such specification doubtless oper-
ates as a restriction and limitation upon the power of the court;
but where, as in article 1230 of the [*4o7] Texas Code, the power
is a general one, we know of no principle upon which we can say
that it applies to one class of cases and not to another. Unless
_we are to hold it to be wholly inoperative, it would seem that
suits to foreclose mortgages or other liens were obviously within
its contemplation. In any event, this was the construction given
to it by the court of civil appeals, and apparently by the su-
preme court of the state, and is obligatory upon this court as a
construction of a state statute. Battle v. Carter, 44 Texas, 485;
Oswald v. Kaufmann, 28 Fed. Rep. 36, a Texas case; Martin v.
Pond, 30 Fed. Rep. 15.
2. We are therefore remitted to the principal question in
dispute between these parties, namely, the sufficiency of the
notice given to the plaintiff of the McClintic & Proctor suit. In
this connection our attention is called to certain articles of the
Texas Code, the first one of which, Art. 1228, Sayles’ Texas
Civil Statutes, provides generally for the service of process by
giving five days’ notice, exclusive of the day of service and of
the return day. In addition to this there are the following sec-
tions:
Art. 1230. “\Vhere the defendant is absent from the state,
or is a non-resident of the state, the clerk shall, upon the appli-
cation of any party to the suit. his agent or attorney, address a
notice to the defendant requiring him to appear and answer the
plaintiff's petition at the time and place of holding of the court.
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tioned specially in the article ? \Ve arc bound to give i t  some 
effect. \Ve cannot treat it as wholly nugatory, and as it is im­
possible to say that it contemplates a procedure in one class o f  
cases and not in  another, w e  think the only reasonable construc­
tion is to hold that it applies to all cases where, under recognized 
principles of law, suits may be instituted against non-resident 
defendants. In the case of H olli11gsu_1orth v. Barbour, 4 Pet. 466, 
relied upon by the plaintiff, a statute o f  Kentucky authorized 
suits in chancery against non-residents "where any person or • 
persons, their heirs o r  assigns, claim land as locator, or by bond 
or instrument in writing ;" anci as the plaintiff in the case did 
not claim as locator, it was held that the court acted without au­
thority, and that the decree was void for want of j urisdiction. 
\\'here the statute specifies certain classes of cases which may be 
brought against non-residents, such specification doubtless oper­
ates as a restriction and lim itation upon the power of the court ; 
but where, as in article 1 230 of the [ *407 ] Texas Code, the power 
is a general one, we know of no principle upon which we can say 
that it applies to one class of cases and not to another. Unless 
we are to hold it to be \vholly iiioperative, it would seem that 
suits to foreclose mortgages or other l iens were obviously within 
its contemplation. In any event, this was the construction given 
to it by the court of civil appeals. and apparently by the su­
preme court of the state, and is obl igatory upon this court as a 
construction of a state statute. Battle v. Carter, 44 Texas, 485 ; 
Os1.oald v. Ka11fma1111, 28 Fed . Rep. 36, a Texas case ; J1Jartiu v. 
Pond, 30 Fed. Rep. 1 5 .  
2 .  \Ve are therefore remitted to the principal question in 
dispute between these parties, namely, the su fficiency of the 
notice given to the plaintiff of the l\IcClintic & Proctor suit. In 
this connection our attention is called to certain articles of the 
Texas Code. the first one of which, .\rt. 1 228, Sayles· Texas 
Civil Statutes, provides generally for the service of process by 
giving five days' notice, exclusive of the <lay of service and of 
the return day. In add ition to this there arc the following sec­
tions : 
.Art. 1 230. " \\rhere the defendant is absent from the state, 
or is a non-resident of the state. the clerk shall , upon tJ1e appl i­
cation of any party to the suit .  his  agent or attorney, address a 
notice to the defendant requiring h i m  to appear ancl anS\Yer t he 
plainti ff's petition at the t i me ancl place of holding o f  the court, 
naming such time and place. Its style shall he 'The State of 
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Texas,' and it shall give the date of the filing of the petition, the
file number of the suit, the names of all the parties, and the na-
ture of the plaintiffs demand, and shall state that a copy of the
plaintiff‘s petition accompanies the notice. It shall be dated and
signed and attested by the clerk, with the seal of the court im-
_pressed thereon; and the date of its issuance shall be noted there-
on; a certified copy of the plaintiff’s petition shall accompany the
notice.”
Art. 1234. “Where a defendant has been served with such
notice he shall be required to appear and answer in the same
manner, and under the same penalties as if he had been person-
ally served with a citation within this state.”
[*4o8] Art. 1280. “* * * The fifth day of each term of
the district court and the third day of each term of the county
court are termed appearance days."
Art. 1281. “It shall be the duty of the court on appearance
day of each term, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable,
to call in their order all cases on the docket which are returnable
in such term.”
Art. 1340. “Judgments for the foreclosure of mortgages
and other liens shall be, that the plaintiff recover his debt, dam-
ages and costs, with a foreclosure of the plaintiff's lien on the
property subject thereto, and (except in judgments against exec-
utors, administrators, and guardians) that an order of sale shall
issue to the sheriff or any constable of the county where such
property may be, directing him to seize and sell the same as under
execution, in satisfaction of the judgment; and if the property
cannot be found, or if the proceeds of such sale be insufficient to
satisfy the judgment, then to make the money, or any balance
thereof remaining unpaid, out of any other property of the de-
fendant, as in case of ordinary executions.”
From these requirements it appears that the time for service
of process in the courts of Texas was five days, exclusive of the
days of service and return, and that there is no distinction in this
particular between defendants living in the town where the court
is sitting and defendants living in other states, or even in a for-
eign country. In short, for aught that appears here, parties may
be called from the uttermost parts of the earth to come to Texas
and defend suits against them within five days from the da_v the
notice is served upon them. In the case under consideration it
is admitted that the defendant was served with notice on Decem-
















































































































































106 CASES ON JUDGMENTS, ETC. 
'f exas,' and it shall give the date of the filing of the petition, the 
file number of the suit, the names of all the parties, and the na­
ture of the plaintiff's demand, and shaU state that a copy of the 
plaintiff's petition accompanies the notice. It shall be dated and 
signed and attested by the clerk, with the seal of the court im-
. pressed thereon ; and the <late of its issuance shall be noted there­
on ; a certified copy of the plaintiff's petition shall accompany the: 
notice." 
Art. 1 234. "\\'here a defendant has been served with such 
notice he shall be required to appear and answer in the same 
manner, and under the same penalties as i f  he had been person­
ally served with a citation within this state ." 
[ *408] Art. 128o. "*  * * 'fhe fifth day of each term o f  
the district court and the third <lay o f  each term of the county 
court are termed appearance days. ' '  
Art. 1 28 1 .  "It shall be the duty of the court on appearance 
day of each term, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, 
to call in their order all cases on the docket which are returnable 
in such term." 
Art. 1 340. "] udgments for the foreclosure of mortgages 
and other liens shall be, that the plaintiff recover his debt, dam­
ages and costs, with a foreclosure of the plaintiff's lien on the 
property subject thereto, and ( except in j udgments against exec­
utors, administrators, and guardians )  that an order of sale shall 
issue to the sheriff or any constable of the county where such 
property may be, direct ing him to seize and sell the same as under 
execution, in satis faction of the j udgment ; and if the property 
cannot be found, or if the proceeds of such sale be insufficient to 
satisfy the j udgment, then to make the money, or any balance 
thereof remaining unpaid, out of any other property of the de­
fendant, as in case of ordinary executions." 
From these requirements it appears that the time for service 
of process in the co�1rts of Texas was five days, exclusive of the 
davs of service and return, and that there is  no distinction in this 
particular between defendants living in the town where the court 
is sitting and defendants living in other states, or even in a for­
eign country. In short, for aught that appears here, parties may 
be called from the uttermost parts of the earth to come to Texas 
and defend suits against them within five days from the day the 
notice is served upon them . In the case under consideration i t  
is admitted that the defendant was served with notice on Decem­
ber 30, 1890, at Harrisonburg, Rockingham County, Virginia, to 
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appear on January 5, 1891, at Groesbeck, Limestone County, Tex-
as; that it would have required four days of constant travelling
to reach Groesbeck, giving the plaintiff but one day, and that a
Sunday, to make preparations to comply with the exigencies of
the notice. This estimate, too, makes no allowance for accidental
delays in transit. It is true that, by articles 1280 and 1281, the
case could not have been called for trial or default until the fifth
day [*4o9] of the term, January 9, and that Roller’s default was
not actually taken and judgment entered until that day. But, as
a citizen of Virginia, he was not bound to know the practice of
the Texas courts in that particular, and was at liberty, even if
he was not compelled, to construe the notice as it read upon its
face. Very probably, too, the court which rendered the judg-
ment would have set the same aside, and permitted him to come
in and defend; but that would be a matter of discretion—a con-
tingency he was not bound to contemplate. The right of a citi-
zen to due process of law must rest upon a basis more substantial
than favor or discretion.
That a man is entitled to some notice before he can be de-
prived of his liberty or property, is an axiom of the law to which
no citation of authority would give additional weight; but upon
the question of the length of such notice there is a singular dearth
of judicial decision. It is manifest that the requirement of notice
would be of no value whatever, unless such notice were reason-
able and adequate for the purpose. Davidson v. New Orleans,
96 U. S. 97; Hagar v. Reclamation District, III U. S. 701-712.
VV hat shall be deemed a reasonable notice admits of considerable
doubt. In the case of a witness subpoena the command of the
writ is that the party served shall lay aside all his business and
excuses, and make his way to the court with the utmost dispatch,
or at least present himself upon the return day of the writ. An
ordinary summons, however, to answer the suit of a private indi-
vidual contemplates that the party served may have other busi-
ness of equal or greater importance engaging his attention, or
may require time for the retainer of counsel and the preparaton
of his defence.
In 2 Chitty’s General Practice, 175, it is said in reference to
summary proceedings before justices of the peace: “The time
appointed must always allow sufficient opportunity between the
service of the summons and the time of appearance, to enable
the party to prepare his defence and for his journey; and the
















































































































































ELE�IENTS OF J URISDICTION 
appear on January ;;, 189 1 ,  at Groesbeck, Limestone County, Tex­
as ; that it would have required four days of constant travelling 
to reach Groesbeck, giving the plaintiff but one day, and that a 
Sunday, to make prep:uations to comply with the exigencies of 
the notice. This estimate, too, makes no allowance for accidental 
delays in transit. It is true that, by articles 1 28o and 128 r ,  the 
case could not have been called for trial or default until the fifth 
day [ *409] of the term, January 9, and that Roller's default was 
not actually taken and j udgment entered until that day. Rut, as 
a citizen of Virginia, he was not bound to know the practice of 
the Texas courts in that particular, and was at liberty, even if 
he was not compel led, to construe the notice as it read upon its 
face. Very probably, too, the court which rendered the j udg­
ment would have set the same aside, and permitted him to come 
in and defend ; but that would be a matter of discretion-a con­
tingency he wa:s not bound to contemplate. The right of a citi­
zen to due process of law must rest upon a basis more substantial 
than favor or discretion. 
That a man is entitled to some notice before he can be de­
prived of his liberty or property, is an axiom of the law to which 
no citation of authority would give additional weight ; hut upon 
the question of the length of such notice there is a singular dearth 
of judicial decision. It  is mani fest that the requirement of notice 
would be of no value whatever, unless such notice were reason­
able and adequate for the purpose. Davidson v. New Orleans, 
g6 U. S .  97 ; Hagar v. Reclamation District, 1 1 1  U. S .  701-7 12.  
What shall be deemed a reasonable notice admits of considerable 
doubt. In the case of a witness subprena the command of the 
writ is that the party served shall lay aside all his business and 
excuses, and make his way to the court with the utmost dispatch, 
or at least present himself upon the return day of the writ. An 
ordinary summons, however, to answer the suit of a private indi­
vidual contemplates that the party served may have other busi­
ness of equal or greater importance engaging his attention, or 
may require time for the retainer of counsel and the preparaton 
of his defence. 
In 2 Chitty's General Practice, 1 75, it is said in reference to 
summary proceedings before justices of the peace : "The time 
appointed must always allow sufficient opportunity between the 
service of the summons and the time of appearance, to enable 
the party to prepare his defence and for his journey ; and the 
justice should in this respect take care to avoid any supposition 
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of improper hurry, or he may incur the censure of the Court of
King’s Bench, if not be subject to a criminal information. [*41o]
The precise time will generally depend on distance, and the other
circumstances of each particular case. With analogy to other
branches of the law, a man should not be required, omissis omni-
bus aliis negotiis, instantly to answer a charge of a supposed of-
fence necessarily less than an indictable misdemeanor, on the
same or even the next day, and should be allowed not only ample
time to obtain legal advice and assistance, but also to collect his
evidence; and even the convenience of witnesses should be con-
sidered; and therefore, in general, several days should intervenej
between the time of summons and hearing. In the superior
courts, in general, at least eight days’ notice of inquiry and of
trial are essential for the preparation of the defence.” In vol. 2,
page 144, it is said that the ancient practice was that a person re-
siding at a considerable distance from a metropolis should be al-
lowed more time for performing the act than a person within.
or near, the metropolis, but that there is now no distinction between
an arrest on process in London or Yorkshire, and in each case
the defendant must appear or put in bail within eight days after
the date of service or arrest. This, considering the small area of
the kingdom, and the rapid means of transportation, seems just
and reasonable.
\-Vhile, as before stated, there is but little in the way of judi-
cial authority upon the question, in the statutes of the several
states regulating proceedings against absent and non-resident
defendants, there is a consensus of opinion, which is entitled to
great weight in passing upon the question of the reasonableness
of such notice.
In the act of Congress providing for the enforcement of liens
upon property as against non-residents, Rev. Stat. § 738, the
court is required to make an order fixing a day certain. which
shall be served on the absent defendant wherever found, or, if
personal service be impracticable, such order shall be published
once a week for six consecutive weeks, with a proviso that, if
there be no personal service, he shall have one year after final
judgment to enter his appearance, and set aside the judgment.
The same proviso allowing the court to fix the time of appear-
ance is found in the statutes of Massachusetts, New Hampshire
Pennsylvania, Alabama, Maryland and Virginia.
[*4II] By the sixth rule of this court, a party moving to dismiss
















































































































































108 CA SES ON J UDGM E NTS, ETC. 
of improper hurry, or he may incur the censure of the Court of 
King's Bench, if not be subj ect to a criminal information .  [ *410] 
The precise time wil l  generally depend on distance, and the other 
circumstances of each particular case. With analogy to other 
branches of the law, a man should not be required, omissis onrni­
bt1s aliis negotiis, instantly to answer a charge of a supposed of­
fence necessarily less than an indictable misdemeanor, on the 
same or even the next day, and should be allowed not only ample 
time to obtain legal advice and assistance, but also to collect his 
evidence ; and even the convenience of witnesses should be con­
sidered ; and therefore, in general, several days should intervene l 
between the time of summons and hearing. In the superior 
courts, in general, at least eight days' notice of inquiry and of 
trial are essential for the preparation of the defence." In vol. 2, 
page 144, it is  said that the ancient practice was that a person re­
siding at a considerable distance from a metropolis should be al­
lowed more time for performing the act than a person within. 
or near, the metropolis ,  but that there is  now no distinction between 
an arrest on process in London or Yorkshire, and in ead1 case 
the defendant must appear or put in bail within eight days after 
the date of service or arrest. This, considering the small area of 
the kingdom, and the rapid means of transportation , seems just 
and reasonable. 
\Vhile, as before stated , there is but little in the way of judi­
cial authority upon the question, in  the statutes of the several 
states regulating proceedings against absent and non-res ident 
defendants, there i s  a consensus of opinion, which is entitled to 
great weight in passing upon the question of the reasonableness 
of such notice. 
In the act of Congress providing for the enforcement of liens 
upon property as against non-residents, Rev. Stat. § 738, the 
cou rt is required to make an order fixing a day certain. which 
shall be served on the absent defendant wherever found,  or, i f 
personal service be impract icable , such order shall be publi shed 
once a week for six consecutive weeks, with a proviso that, i f  
there be no personal service, he shall have one year after final 
judgment to enter his appearance, and set aside the judgment. 
The same proviso allow ing the court to fix the time of appear­
ance is found in the statutes of Massachusetts, � ew H3mpshire 
Pcnnsvlvania, Alabama, l\farvland and Virginia. • J • 
[*4n ] By the sixth ru le of th is court, a party moving to d i smiss 
must give a notice of at least three weeks, and where counsel 
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to be notified reside west of the Rocky Mountains, a notice of
at least thirty days. '
By the Code of Civil Procedure of New York, sec. 440, the
judge is required to make an order for publication once a week
for six consecutive weeks, and in addition thereto the plaintiff,
on or before the day of the first publication, is bound to mail a
copy of the summons, complaint and order for appearance to the
non-resident defendant. By see. 2525, citations from Surrogate's
Courts must be served on non-residents at least thirty days
before the return day.
By the General Statutes of Vermont, (1894) §§ 1641, I643,
non-resident defendants (served out of the state) are entitled
to at least twenty days’ notice before the time when they are re-
quired to appear.
By the practice in Michigan, the court orders the absent or
non-resident defendant to appear in not less than three months,
if he be a resident of the state, absent or concealed, and if a resi-
dent of some other of the United States or of the British prov-
inces, in not less than four months; and if a resident of any for-
eign state, in not less than five months from the date of making
the order; and if the order be not published for six successive
weeks, defendant shall be personally served at least twenty days
before the time prescribed for his appearance. 2 Howell's Stat-
utes, §§ 6670, 6671 and 6672.
By the Revised Statutes of Illinois, (1899) chapter 22, § 14,
there must be either publication or a personal service upon the
non-resident defendant, “not less than thirty days previous to
the commencement of the term at which such defendant is re-
quired to appear.”
By the General Statutes of New Jersey, (I895) Vol. 1, page
405, the chancellor may order the non-resident defendant to
appear not less than one nor more than three months from the
date of the order; “of which order such notice as the chancellor
shall by rule direct shall, within ten days thereafter, be served
personally on such defendant,” or be published for four weeks.
This gives the defendant at least twenty days’ personal notice.
[*412] By the General Statutes of Arkansas, (1894) §§
5677, 5678, a non-resident defendant is entitled to a copy of the
complaint and the summons warning him to appear and answer
“within sixty days after the same shall have been served on him."
By the Code of Georgia, (1895) § 4979, the party obtaining
















































































































































ELEMENTS OF J URISDICTION IO<) 
to be notified reside west of the Rocky .Mountains, a notice of 
at least thirty days. 
13y the Code of Civil Procedure of New York, sec. 440, the 
j udge is required to make an order for publication once a week 
for six consecutive weeks, and in addition thereto the plaintiff, 
on or before the day of the first publication, is bound to mall a 
copy of the summons, complaint and order for appearance to the 
non-resident defendant. By sec. 2525 ,  citations from Surrogate's 
Courts must be served on non-residents at least thirty days 
before the return day. 
lly the General Statutes of Vermont, ( 1894) §§ 1 64 1 ,  1643, 
non-resident defendants ( served out of the state ) are entitled 
to at least twenty days' notice before the time when they are re­
quired to appear. 
By the practice in Michigan, the court orders the absent or 
non-resident defendant to appear in not less than three months, 
if he be a resident of the state, absent or concealed, and if a resi­
dent of some other of the United States or of the British prov­
inces, in not Jess than four months ; and if a resident of any for­
eign state, in not less than five months from the date of making 
the order ; and if the order be not published for six successive 
weeks, defendant shall be personally served at least twenty days 
before the time prescribed for his appearance. 2 Howell 's  Stat­
utes, §§ 6670, 667 1 and 6672. 
By the Revised Statutes of Ill inois, ( 189')) chapter 22, § 14, 
there must be either publication or a personal service upon the 
non-resident defendant, "not less than thirty days previous to 
the commencement of the term at which such defendant is  re­
quired to appear." 
By the General Statutes of New Jersey, ( 1895 ) Vol. 1 ,  page 
405, the chancellor may order the non-resident defendant to 
appear not less than one nor more than three months from the 
date of the order ; "of which order such notice as the chancellor 
shall by rule direct shall, within ten days thereafter, be served 
personally on such defendant," or be published for four weeks.  
This gives the defendant at least twenty days' personal notice. 
[*412 ]  Bv the General Statutes of Arkansas, ( 1894) §§ 
5677, 5678, a non-resident defendant is entitled to a copy of the 
complaint and the summons warning him to appear and answer 
"within sixty days after the same shall have been served on him." 
By the Code of Georgia, ( 1895)  § 4979, the party obtaining 
an order for the appearance of a non-resident defendant shall 
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file in the oflice of the clerk, at least thirty days before the term
next after the order for publication, a copy of the newspaper in
which said notice is published, which the clerk is required to at
once mail to the party named in the order; and, by see. 4980, the
judge is required to determine whether the service has been prop-
erly perfected.
By the Revised Statutes of Florida, (1892) § 1413, the clerk
must publish the order for the appearance of a non-resident de-
fendant once a week for four consecutive weeks, and also, within
twenty days after the making of the order, mail a copy to the
defendant, if his residence be shown by the bill or afiidavit.
By the Code of Montana, (1895) § 638, publication must be
made for four successive weeks, and, where the residence of the
defendant is known, the clerk must forthwith deposit a copy of
the summons and complaint in the post ofiice, directed to the per-
son to be served at his place of residence. A similar practice also
obtains in California.
By the General Statutes of Mississippi, (1892) § 3423, pub-
lication may be dispensed with, if the summons be served upon
the absent party at least ten days before the return day. This is
the shortest length of notice to be found in any of the statutes.
By the Code of Oregon, (1892) § 57, in case of publication,
which must be not less than once a week for six weeks, the court
or judge shall also direct a copy of the summons and complaint
to be forthwith deposited in the post ofiicc, addressed to the de-
fendant, if his place of residence be known; and “in case of per—
sonal serviee out of the state, the summons shall specify the time
prescribed in the order for publication.”
It may be said in general, with reference to these statutes,
that in cases of publication notice is required to be given at [*413]
least once a week for from four to eight weeks, and in case of
personal service out of the state, no notice for less than twenty
days between the service and return day is contemplated in any
of the states except Mississippi, where a personal notice of ten
days seems to be sufiieient. VVhile, of course, these statutes are
not obligatory here, they are entitled to consideration as expres-
sive of the general sentiment of legislative bodies upon the ques-
tion of reasonableness of notice.
\Vithout undertaking to determine what is a reasonable no-
tice to non—residents, we are of opinion, under the circumstances
of this case, and considering the distance between the place of
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file in the office of the clerk, at least thirty days before the term 
next after the .order for publication, a copy of the newspaper in 
which said notice is published, which the clerk is required to at 
once mail to the party named in the order ; and, by sec. 49&>, the 
j udge is required to determine whether the service has been prop­
erly perfected. 
By the Revised Statutes of Florida, ( 1892) § 1413,  the clerk 
must publish the order for the appearance of a non-resident de­
fendant once a week for four consecutive weeks, and also, within 
twenty days after the making of the order, mai l  a copy to the 
defendant, if his residence be shown by the bill or affidavit. 
By the Code of Montana, ( 1895) § 638, publication must be 
made for four successive weeks, and, where the residence of the • 
defendant is  known, the clerk must forthwith deposit a copy of  
the summons and complaint in the post office, directed to  the per-
son to be served at his place of residence. A similar practice also 
obtains in California. 
By the General Statutes of Mississippi, ( 1892 ) § 3423, pub­
lication may be dispensed with, if the summons be served upon 
the absent party at least ten days before the return day. This is  
the shortest length of notice to be found in any of the statutes. 
By the Code of Oregon, ( 1892) § 57, in case of publication , 
which must be not less than once a week for six weeks, the court 
or j udge shall also direct a copy of the summons and complaint 
to be forthwith deposited in the post office, addressed to the de­
fendant, if his place of residence be known ; and "in case of per­
sonal service out of the state, the summons shall speci fy the time 
prescribed in the order for publication . "  
I t  may be said in general, with reference to these statutes, 
that in  cases of publication notice is required to be given at [ *413]  
least once a week for from four to  eight weeks, and in  case of  
personal service out  of  the state, no notice for less than twenty 
days between the service and return day is con templated in  any 
of the states except Mississ ippi , where a personal notice of ten 
davs seems to be sufficient. While, of course, these statutes are . . 
not obligatory here, they are entitled to cons iderat ion as expres-
sive of the general sentiment of legislative bodies upon the ques­
tion of reasonableness of notice. 
\Vithout undertak ing to determine what is a reasonable no­
tice to non-residents, we are Df op inion , under the circumstances 
of thi s case, and considering the distance between the place of 
service and the place of return , that five days was not a reasonable 
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notice, or due process of law; that the judgment obtained upon
such notice was not binding upon the defendant Roller, and con-
stitutes no bar to the prosecution of this action.
The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, affirming the judg-
ment of the District Court of Limestone County, must there-
fore be reversed, with instructions to remand the case to that
court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opin-
ion.
T1-11: CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BREWER dissented.
J
yTYLER v. JUDGES OF THE COURT OF REGISTRATION, in Mass.
Sup. Jud. Ct., Jan. 5, 19oo—175 Mass. 71, 55 N. E. 812, 51 L. R. A.
433-‘
HOLMES, C. J. This is a petition for a writ of prohibition
against the judges of the Court of Registration established bv
St. 1898, c. 562, and is brought to prevent their proceeding upon
an application concerning land in which the petitioner claims an
interest. The ground of the petition is that the act establishing
the court is unconstitutional. Two reasons are urged against the
act, both of which are thought to go to the root of the statute
and to make action under it impossible. The first and most im-
portant is that the original registration deprives all persons ex-
cept the registered owner of any interest in the land without due
process of law. There is no dispute that the object of the sys-
tem, expressed in § 38, is that the decree of registration “ shall
bind the land and quiet the title thereto,” and “shall be conclu-
sive upon and against all persons,” whether named in the proceed-
ings or not, subject to few and immaterial exceptions. And this
being admitted, it is objected that there is no sufficient process
against, or notice to, persons having adverse claims, in a pro-
ceeding intended to bar their possible rights.
The application for registration is to be in writing and signed
and sworn to. It is to contain an accurate description of the
land, to set forth clearly other outstanding estates or interests
known to the petitioner, to identify the deed by which he ob-
tained title, to state the name and address of the occupant if
1Writ of error to reverse this decision was dismissed on motion
in the Supreme Court of the United States, because no interest of peti-
tioner in the proceeding appeared or if he was interested he had knowl-
edge of the proceeding, and so had no ground to object. To this Fuller,
C. J.. and Harlan, Brewer, and Shiras, JJ., dissented. Tyler v. Judges
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notice, or due process of law ; that the j udgment obtained upon 
such notice was not binding upon the defendant Roller, and con­
stitutes no bar to the prosecution of this action. 
Th e judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, afnrming the judg­
m ent of the District Court of Linu:stone Cou nty, must th ere­
fore be reversed, with instructions to remand the case to that 
court for further proceedings not i·nconsistent -with this opin­
ion. 
THE CHIEF JusTICE and MR. JusTICE BREWER dissented. 
YTYLER v. JUDGES OF THE COURT OF REGISTRATION, in Mass. 
t Sup. Jud. Ct., Jan. 5, 1900-175 Mass. 71 ,  55 N. E. 812, 51 L. R. A. 
• 433·1 
HOLM ES, C. J.  This i s  a petition for a writ of prohibition 
against the j udges of the Court of Registration established bv 
St. 1898, c. 562, and is brought to prevent their proceeding upon 
an application concerning land in which the petitioner claims an 
interest. The ground of the petition is that the act establishing 
the court is unconstitutional. Two reasons are urged against the 
act, both of which are thought to go to the root of the statute 
and to make action under it impossible. The first and most im­
portant is that the original registration deprives all persons ex­
cept the registered owner of any interest in the land without due 
process of law. There is  no dispute that the obj ect of the sys­
tem, expressed in § 38, is that the decree of registration " shall 
bind the land and quiet the title thereto," and "shall be conclu­
sive upon and against all persons," whether named in the proceed­
ings or not, subj ect to few and immaterial exceptions. And this 
being admitted, it is obj ected that there is no sufficient process 
against, or notice to, persons having adverse claims, in a pro­
ceeding intended to bar their possible rights. 
The application for registration is to be in writing and signed 
and sworn to. It is to contain an accurate description of the 
land, to set forth clearly other outstanding estates or interests 
known to the petitioner, to identify the deed by which he ob­
tained title, to state the name and address of the occupant i f  
1 Writ of error t o  reverse this decision was d ismissed on motion 
in the Supreme Court of the United States, hecause no interest of peti­
tioner in  the proceeding appeared or i f  he was interested he had knowl­
edge of the proceeding, and so had no ground to obj ect. To this  Fuller, 
C. J., and Harlan, B rewer, and Shiras, JJ., d issented. T>•ler v. Judge.r of Court of Registration ( 190<>) , 179 U. S. 405, 45 L. ed. 252, 21 S. Ct. 206. 
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there is one, and also to give the names and addresses so far as
known of the occupants of all lands adjoining. § 21. As soon
as it is filed, a memorandum containing a copy of the description
of the land concerned is to be filed in the registry of deeds. § 20.
The case is immediately referred to an examiner (appointed by
the judge, § 12), who makes as full an investigation as he can
and reports to the court. § 29. If in the opinion of the exam-
iner the applicant has a good title as alleged, or if the applicant
after an adverse opinion elects to proceed further, the recorder
is to publish a notice by order of the court in some newspaper
[*73] published in the district where any portion of the land lies.
This notice is to be addressed by name to all persons known to
have an adverse interest, and to the adjoining owners and occu-
pants so far as known, and to all whom it may concern. It is to
contain a description of the land, the name of the applicant, and
the time and place of the hearing. § 31. A copy is to be mailed
to every person named in the notice whose address is known, and
a duly attested copy is to be posted in a conspicuous place on each
parcel of land included in the application, by a sheriff or deputy
sheriff, fourteen days at least before the return day. Further
notice may be ordered by the court. § 32.
It will be seen that the notice is required to name all persons
known to have an adverse interest, and this of course includes
any adverse claim, whether admitted or denied, that may have
been discovered by the examiner, or in any way found to exist.
Taking this into account, we should construe the requirement in
§ 21 concerning the application,as calling upon the applicant to
mention not merely outstanding interests which he admits, but
equally all claims of interest set up although denied by him. We
mention this here to disposeof an objection of detail urged by
the petitioner, and we pass to the general objection that, however
construed, the mode of notice does not satisfy the constitution,
either as to persons residing within the state upon whom it is not
served, or as to persons residing out of the state and not named.
If it does not satisfy the constitution, a judicial proceeding
to clear titles against all the world hardly is possible, for the very
meaning of such a proceeding is to get rid of unknown as well
as known claims,—indeed certainty against the unknown may be
said to be its chief end,—and unknown claims cannot be dealt with
by personal service upon the claimant. It seems to have been the
impression of the Supreme Court of Ohio. in the case most re-
















































































































































1 12 CASES ON J UDGM ENTS, ETC. 
there is  one, and also to give the names and addresses so far as 
known of the occupants of all lands adj oining. § 2 1 .  As soon 
as it is filed, a memorandum containing a copy of the description 
of the land concerned is to be filed in the registry of deeds. § 20. 
The case is immediately referred to an examiner ( appointed by 
the judge, § 1 2 ) ,  who makes as full an investigation as he can 
and reports to the court. § 29. If in the opinion of the exam­
iner the applicant has a good title as alleged, or if  the applicant 
after an adverse opinion elects to proceed further, the recorder 
is to publish a notice by order of the court in some newspaper 
[*73]  publ ished in the district where any portion of the land lies. 
This notice is to be addressed by name to all persons known to 
have an adverse interest, and to the adjoining owners and occu­
pants so far as known, and to all whom it may concern. It is to 
contain a description of the land, the name of the applicant, and 
the time and place of the hearing. § 3 I .  A copy is to be mailed 
to every person named in the notice whose address is known, and 
a duly attested copy is to be posted in a conspicuous place on each 
parcel of land included in the application, by a sheriff or deputy 
sheriff, fourteen days at least before the return day. Further 
notice may be ordered by the court. § 32. 
It will be seen that the notice is required to name all persons 
known to have an adverse interest, and this of course includes 
any adverse claim, whether admitted or denied, that may have 
been discovered by the examiner, or in any way found to exist. 
Taking this into account, we should construe the requirement in 
§ 2 I concerning the application, · as calling upon the applicant to 
mention not merely outstanding interests which he admits, but 
equally all claims of interest set up although denied by him. We 
mention this here to dispose · of an obj ection of detail urged by 
the petitioner, and we pass to the general obj ection that, however 
construed , the mode of notice does not satisfy the constitution, 
either as to persons residing within the state upon whom it is  not 
served, or as to persons residing out of the state and not named. 
If it does not satisfy the constitution, a j udicial proceeding 
to clear titles against all the world hardly is possible, for the very 
meaning of such a proceeding is  to get rid of unknown as well 
as known claims,-indeed certainty against the unknown may be 
said to be its chief end,-and unknown claims cannot be dealt with 
by personal service upon the claimant. It seems to have been the 
impression of the Supreme Court of Ohio. in the case most re­
lied upon by the petitioner, that such a judicial proceeding is im-
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possible in this country. State v. Gilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575, 629.
But we cannot bring ourselves to doubt that the Constitutions of
the United States and of Massachusetts at least permit it as fully
as did the common law. Prescription or a statute of limitations
may give a title good against the world and destroy all manner
of outstanding claims [*74] without any notice or judicial pro-
ceeding at all. Time and the chance which it gives the owner
to find out that he is in danger of losing rights are due process
of law in that case. JVlweler V. Jackson, 137 U. S. 245, 258, II
S. Ct. 76. The same result used to follow upon proceedings
which, looked at apart from history, may be regarded as standing
half way between statutes of limitations and true judgments in
ram, and which took much less trouble about giving notice than
the statute before us. \/Ve refer to the effect of a judgment on a
writ of right after the mise joined and the lapse of a year and a
day; Booth, Real Actions, I01, in margine; Fitz. Abr. Continual
Claim, pl. 7, Fan: Rccoz-re, pl. 1; Y. B. 5 Ed. III. 51, pl. 60;
and of a fine with proclamations after the same time or by a later
statute after five years. 2 B1. Com. 354; 2 Inst. 510, 518; St. 18
Ed. I., modus levandi fin-cs; 34 Ed. III. e. I6; 4 & 5 Hen. VII.
c. 24; 32 Hen. VIII. c. 36. It would have astonished John Adams
to be told that the framers of our constitution had put an end to
the possibility of these ancient institutions. A somewhat similar
statutory contrivance of modern days has been held good. Turner
V. New York, I68 U. S. 90, 18 S. Ct. 38. Finally, as was pointed
out by the counsel for the petitioner, a proceeding in rem in the
proper sense of the word might give a clear title without other
notice than a seizure of the res and an exhibition of the warrant
to those in charge. 2 Browne, Civ. & Adm. Law, 398. The gen-
eral requirement of advertisement in admiralty cases is said to be
due to rules of court. U. S. Adm. Rule 9. Betts, Adm. Practice
(1838), 33, 34, App- 14-
The prohibition in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Consti-
tution of the United States against a state depriving any person
of his property without due process of law, and that in the
twelfth article of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, refer to some-
what vaguely determined criteria of justification, which may be
found in ancient practice; Murray v. H oboken Land (9 Improve-
ment Co., 18 How. 272, 277; or which may be found in conven-
ience and substantial justice, although the form is new. Hurtado
v. People, 110 U. S. 516, 528, 53I, 4 S. Ct. III ; Holden v. Hardy,
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possible in th'.s country. State v. Gilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575, 629. 
But we cannot bring ourselves to doubt that the Constitutions of 
the United State:; and of Massachusetts at least permit it as fully 
as did the common law. Prescription or a statute of limitations 
may give a title good against the world and destroy all manner 
of outstanding claims [ * 74] without any notice or j udicial pro­
ceeding at all. Time and the chance which i t  gives the owner lto find out that he i s  in danger of losing rights are due process ' 
of law in that case. JV heeler v. Jackso11, 1 37 U. S .  245 , 258, 1 1  
S .  Ct .  76. The same result used to follow upon proceedings 
which, looked at apart from history, may be regarded as standing 
half way between statutes of limitations and true j udgments in 
rem, and which took much less trouble about giving notice than 
the statute before us. 'We refer to the effect of a j udgment on a 
writ of right after the mise joined and the lapse of a year and a 
day ; Booth, Real Actions, 1 0 1 ,  in margine; Fitz. Ahr. Continual 
Claim, pl. 7, Faux Recoi'l'e, pl. 1 ;  Y. B. 5 Ed. III .  5 1 ,  pl. 6o ;  
and of a fine with proclamations after the same time or by a later 
statute after five years. 2 Bl. Com. 354 ; 2 Inst. 5 10, 5 1 8 ; St. 18  
Ed. I . ,  modus le'l:andi fines ; 34 Ed. I I I .  c .  1 6 ; 4 & 5 Hen. VII. 
. c. 24 ; 32 Hen. VIII .  c. 36. It would have astonished John Adams 
to be told that the framers of our constitution had put an end to 
the possibility of these ancient institutions. A somewhat similar 
statutory contrivance of modern days has been held good. Turner 
v. 1Vew York, 1 68  U. S.  90, 18  S. Ct. 38. Finally, as was pointed 
out by the counsel for the petitioner, a proceeding in. rem in the 
proper sense of the word might give a clear title without other 
notice than a seizure of the res and an exhibition of the warrant 
to those in charge. 2 Browne, Civ. & Adm. Law, 398. The gen­
eral requirement of adverti sement in admiralty cases is said to be 
due to rules of court. U. S. Adm. Rule 9. Betts, Adm. Practice 
( 1838) , 33, 34, App. 14· 
The prohibition in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Consti­
tution of the United States against a state depriving an_v person 
of his property without due process of  law, and that in the 
twelfth article of the l\fassachuse!ts Bill 6f Rights, refer to some­
what vaguely determined criteria of j u stification, which may be 
found in ancient practice ; Jfurray v. Hobokm Land & Impr<Yue­
ment Co. ,  I8  How. 272, 277 ;  or which may be found in  conven­
ience and substantial justice, although the form is new. Hurtado 
v. People, 1 10 U. S. 5 16, 528, 53 1 ,  4 S.  Ct. 1 1 1 ; Holden v. Hardy, 
1 6g  U. S.  366, 388, 389, 18  S. Ct. 383. The prohibitions must 
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be taken largely, with regard to substance rather than to form,
or they are likely to do more harm than good. It is not enough
to show [*75]a procedure to be unconstitutional to say that we
never have heard of it before. Hurtado v. People, 110 U. S. 516,
537, 4 S. Ct. 111.
Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the
necessary requirements of justice, a proceeding in rem dealing
with a tangible res may be instituted and carried to judgment
without personal service upon claimants within the state or notice-
by name to those outside of it, and not encounter any provision
of either constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of
the court over the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would
be impossible, were this not so, for it hardly would do to make
a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who
were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when
the proceeding is to bar all. Pennoyer v. Nefi, 95 U. S. 714, 727;
The Mary, 9 Cranch, 126, 144;Ma11kin v. Chandler, 2 Brock. 125,
127 ; Brown v. Levee Commissioners, 50 Miss. 468, 481. Freem.
Judgments, (4th ed.) §§ 606, 611. In Hamilton V. Brazen-, 161
U. S. 256, 16 S. Ct. 585, a judgment of escheat was held con-
clusive upon persons notified only by advertisement to all persons-
interested. It is true that the statute under consideration required
the petition to name all known claimants, and personal service
to be made on those so named. But that did the plaintiffs no
good, as they were not named. So a decree allowing or disallow-
ing a will binds everybody, although the only notice of the pro-
ceedings given be a general notice to all persons interested. And
in this case, as in that of escheat just cited, the conclusive effect
of the decree is not put upon the ground that the state has an
absolute power to determine the persons to whom a man's prop-
erty shall go at his death, but upon the characteristics of a pro-
ceeding in rem. Bonncmort v. Gill, 167 Mass. 338, 340. See 161
U. S. 263, 274. Admiralty proceedings need only to be mentioned
in this connection, and further citation of cases seems unnecessary.
Speaking for myself, I see no reason why what we have said
as to proceedings in rent in general should not apply to such pro-
ceedings concerning land. In .-frndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316.'
327, 10 S. Ct. 557, it is said to be established that “a state has
power by statute to provide for the adjudication of titles to real
estate within its limits as against non-reside11ts who are brought
into court only by publication.” In Hmm'Iton v. Brazen, 161 U. S.
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be taken largely, with regard to substance rather than to form, 
or they are likely to do more harm than good. It is not enough 
to show [ *75] a procedure to be unconstitutional to say that we 
never have heard of it before. Hurtado v. People, I 10 U. S. 5 16, 
537, 4 s. Ct. I I I . 
Looked at either from the point of  view of  history or of the 
necessary requirements of justice, a proceeding in rem dealing 
with a tangible res may be instituted and carried to j udgment 
· without personal service upon claimants within the state or notice · 
by name to those outside of it, and not encounter any provision 
o f  either constitution. Jurisdiction is gecured by the power of  
the court over the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would 
be impossible, were this not so, for it hardly would do to make 
a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who 
were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when 
the proceeding is to bar all. Pem1oyer v. N cff, 95 U. S. 714, 727 ; 
The Mary, 9 Cranch, 1 26, 144 ; A-fan kin v. Chandler, 2 Brock . I25 ,  
1 27 ; Bro1.lm v. Levee Commissioners, 50 l\l iss. 468, 48 1 . Freem. 
Judgments, (4th ed. ) §§ 6o6, 6u.  In Hamilton v. Brown, 161  
U. S. 256, 16  S.  Ct. 585 ,  a j udgment of escheat was  held con­
clusive upon persons notified only by adverti sement to all persons . 
interested . It is true that the statute under consideration required 
• the petition to name all known claimants, and personal service 
to be made on those so named. But that did the plaintiffs no 
good, as they were not named. So a decree allowing or disallow­
ing a will binds everybody, although the only notice of the pro­
ceedings given be a general notice to all persons interested . And 
• in this case, as in that o f  escheat j ust cited, the conclusive effect 
of the decree is  not put upon the ground that the state has an 
absolute power to determine the persons to whom a man's prop­
erty !='hall go at his death, but upon the characteristics of a pro­
ceeding in rem.  Bonncmort v. Gill, 1 67 Mass. 338, 340. See 16 1  
U .  S. 263, 274. Admiralty proceedings need only to be mentionet! 
in this connection , and further ci tat ion of cases seems unnecessary. 
Speaking for mysel f, I sec no reason why what we have said 
as to proceedings in rc11i in general should not apply to such pro­
ceed ings concerning land. In A rndt v. Griggs, 1 34 U. S. 3 1 6, 
�p7, IO  S.  Ct. 557, it is said to be establi shed that "a state has 
power hy statute to provide for the adj ud ication of titles to real 
estate within its l imits as against non-residents who are brought 
in to court only by publication ." In Ha111 ilto1 1  v.  BrO'i.l'l l ,  1 6 1  U. S. 
[ *76] 256, 274, it was declared to be within the power of  a state 
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“to provide for determining and quieting the title to real estate
within the limits of the state and within the jurisdiction of the
court, after actual notice to all known claimants, and notice by
publication to all other persons.” I doubt whether the court will
not take the further step when necessary, and declare the power
of the states to do the same thing after notice by publication
alone. See Huling v. Kaw Valley Railway 6‘ I mpr0'z/emcnt C 0.
130 U. S. 559, 564, 9 S. Ct. 607; Parker v. Overman, 18 How.
I 37, I40, 141 et seq. But in the present case provision is made for
notice to all known claimants by the recorder, who is to mail
a copy of the published notice to every person named therein
whose address is known. § 32. \Ve shall state in a moment our
reasons for thinking this form of notice constitutional. See fur-
ther Cook v. Allen, 2 Mass. 462, 469, 470; Dascomb v. Davis, 5
Met. 335, 340; Brock v. Old Colony Railroad, 146 Mass. 194, 195.
But it is said that this is not a proceeding in rem. It is cer-
tain that no phrase has been more misused. In the past it has
had little more significance than that the right alleged to have
been violated was a right iwrn. Austin thinks it necessary to
quote Leibnitz for the sufiiciently obvious remark that every right
to restitution is a right in pezsanarn. So as to actions. If the
technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some
particular person, with a judgment which generally, in theory
at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or ob-
jection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in
defence, the action is in personam, although it may concern the
right to or possession of a tangible thing. Manikin v. Chandler,
2 Brock. I25, 127. If, on the other hand, the object is to bar
indifierently all who might be minded to make an objection of
any sort against the right sought to be established, and if any one
in the world has a right to be heard on the strength of alleging
facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding
is in rem. Freem. Judgments, (4th ed.) § 606 ad fin. All pro-
ceedings, like all rights, are really against persons. \Vhether
they are proceedings or rights in rem depends on the number of
persons aitected. Hence the res need not be personified and made
a party defendant, as happens with the ship in the admiralty; it
need not even be a tangible thing at all, as [*77] sufiiciently ap-
pears by the case of the probate of wills. Personification and
naming the res as defendant are mere symbols, not the essential
matter. They are fictions, conveniently expressing the nature of
















































































































































ELEMENTS OF J URISDICTION I I 5 
"to provide for determining and quieting the title to real estate 
within the limits of the state and within the jurisdiction of the 
court, after actual notice to all known claimants, and notice by 
publication to all other persons." I doubt whether the court will 
not take the further step when necessary, and declare the power 
of the states to do the same thing after notice by publication 
alone. See Huli11g v. Kaw Valley Railway & Improvemc11 t Co. 
1 30 U. S. 559, 564, 9 S. Ct. 007 ; Parker v. Overman, 18 How. 
1 37, 140, 141  et seq. But in the present case provision is made for 
notice to all known claimants by the recorder, who is to mail 
a copy of the published notice to every person named therein 
whose address is known. § 32. We shall state in a moment our 
reasons for thinking this form of notice constitutional. See fur­
ther Cook v. Allen, 2 Mass. 462, 469, 470 ; Dascomb v. DCltVis, S 
Met. 335, 340 ; Brock v. Old Colony Railroad, 146 Mass. 194, 195. 
But it is said that this is  not a proceeding in rem. It is  cer­
tain that iio phrase has been more misused. In the past it has 
had little more significance than that the right alleged to have 
been violated was a right in..um. Austin thinks it necessary to 
quote Leibnitz for the sufficiently obvious remark that every right 
to restitution is a right in pe.z;&.Q.nam. So as to actions. If the 
technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some 
particular person, with a judgment which generally, in theory 
at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or ob­
jection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in 
defence, the action is in personani, although it may concern the 
right to or possession of a tangible thing. Afankfo v. Chandler, 
2 Brock. 1 25,  127. If, on the other hand, the object is to bar 
indifferently all who might be minded to make an obj ection of 
any sort against the right sought to be established, and if any one 
in the world has a right to be heard on the strength of alleging 
facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding 
is in rem. Freem. Judgments, (4th ed. ) § 6o6 ad fin. All pro- • 
ceedings, like all rights, are really against persons. \Vhether ' 
they are proceedings or rights in rem depends on the number of 
persons affected . Hence the res need not be personified and made 
a party defendant, as happens with the ship in the admiralty ; it 
need not even be a tangible thing at all , as [ *77 ] sufficiently ap­
pears by the case of the probate of wills. Personification and 
naming the res as defendant are mere symbols, not the essential • 
matter. They are fictions,  conveniently expressing the nature of 
the process and the resu lt, nothing more. 
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It is true as an historical fact that these symbols are used in
admiralty proceedings, and also, again merely as an historical
fact, that the proceedings in rem have been confined to cases
where certain classes of claims, although of very divers sorts,—-
for indemnification for injury, for wages, for salvage, ete.,—are
to be asserted. But a ship is not a person. It cannot do a wrong
or make a contract. To say that a ship has committed a tort is
merely a shorthand way of saying that you have decided to deal
with it as if it had committed one, because some man has com-
mitted one in fact. There is no a priori reason why any other
claim should not be enforced in the same way. If a claim for a
wrong committed by a master may be enforced against all inter-
ests in the vessel, there is no juridical objection to a claim of title
being enforced in the same way. The fact that it is not so en-
forced under existing practice affords no test of the powers of
the legislature. The contrary view would indicate that you
really believed the fiction that a vessel had an independent per-
sonality as a fact behind the law. Furthermore, naming the res
as defendant, although a convenient way of indicating that the
proceeding is against property alone, that is to say, that it is not
to establish an infinite personal liability, is not of the essence. If,
in fact, the proceeding is of that sort, and is to bar all the world,
it is a proceeding in rem.
Then as to seizure of the res. It is convenient in the case
of a vessel, in order to secure its being on hand to abide judg-
ment, although in the case of a suit against a man jurisdiction is
regarded as established by service without the need of keeping
him in prison to await judgment. It is enough that the personal
service shows that he could have been seized and imprisoned.
Seizure, to be sure, is said to be notice to the owner. Scott v.
Shearman, 2 W. Bl. 977, 979. Mankin v. Clmmfler, 2 Brock. I25,
127. But fastening the process or a copy to the mast would seem
not necessarily to depend for its effect upon the continued custody
of the vessel by the marshal. However this may be, when we
come to deal with immovables there [*78] would be no sense
whatever in declaring seizure to be a constitutional condition of
the power of the legislature to make a proceeding against land a
proceeding in rem. Hamilton v. Brown, I6I U. S. 256. 274, 16'
S. Ct. 585. The land cannot escape from the jurisdiction, and,’
except as security against escape, seizure is a mere form, of no
especial sanctity, and of much possible inconvenience. ,
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It is true as an historical fact that these symbols are used in 
admiralty proceedings, and also, again merely as an historical 
fact, that the proceedings in rem have been confined to cases 
where certain classes of claims, although of very divers sorts,­
for indemnification for inj ury, for wages, for salvage, etc. ,-are 
to be asserted. But a ship is not a person. It cannot do a wrong 
or make a contract. To say that a ship has committed a tort is 
merely a shorthand way of saying that you have decided to deal 
with it as if it had committed one, because some man has com­
mitted one in fact. There is no a priori reason why any other 
claim should not be enforced in the same way. If a claim for a 
wrong committed by a master may be enforced against all inter­
ests in the vessel, there is no juridical objection to a claim of title 
being enforced in the same way. The fact that it is  not so en­
forced under existing practice affords no test of the powers of 
the legislature. The contrary view would indicate that you 
really believed the fiction that a vessel had an independent per­
sonality as a fact behind the law. Furthermore, naming the res 
as defendant, although a convenient way of indicating that the 
• proceeding is against property alone, that is to say, that it is not 
to establish an infinite personal liability, is not of the essence. I f, 
in fact, the proceeding is of that sort, and is to bar all the world, 
it is a proceeding in rem. 
Then as to seizure of the res. It is convenient in the case 
of a vessel, in order to secure its being on hand to abide judg­
ment, although in the case of a suit against a man jurisdiction is 
regarded as established by service without the need of keeping 
him in prison to await judgment. It is enough that the personal 
service shows that he could have been seized and imprisoned. 
Seizure, to be sure, is said to be notice to the owner. Scott v. 
Shcarmari, 2 W. Ill. 977, 979. A-lankin v. Chandler, 2 Brock. 125, 
127. Ilut fastening the process or a copy to the
. 
mast would seem 
not necessarily to depend for its effect upon the continued custody 
of the vessel by the marshal. However this may be, when we 
come to deal with immovables there [*78] would be no sense 
whatever in declaring seizure to be a constitutional condition of 
the power of the legislature to make a proceeding against land a 
proceeding iti rem. Hamilton v. Brou'tl, 161  U. S. 256, 274, 16 , 
S. Ct. 585. The land cannot escape from the jurisdiction, and, / 
• except as security against escape, seizure is a mere form, of no 
especial sanctity, and of much possible inconvenience. 
I <lo not wish to ignore the fact that seizure, when it means 
ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION II7
real dispossession, is another security for actual notice. But when
it is considered how purely formal such an act may be, and that
even adverse possession is possible without ever coming to the
knowledge of a reasonably alert owner, I cannot think that the
presence or absence of the form makes a constitutional difference;
or rather, to express my view still more cautiously. I cannot but
think that the immediate recording of the claim is entitled to
equal effect from a constitutional point of view. I am free to
confess. however, that, with the rest of my brethren, I think the
act ought to be amended in the direction of still further precau-
tions to secure actual notice before a decree is entered, and that,
if it is not amended, the judges of the court ought to do all that
is in their power to satisfy themselves that there has been no
failure in this regard before they admit a title to registration.
The quotations which we have made show the intent of the
statute to bind the land, and to make the proceedings adverse to
all the world, even if it were not stated in § 35, or if the amend-
ment of 1899 did not expressly provide that they should be pro-
ceedings in rem. St. 1899, c. 131, § 1. Notice is to be posted
on the land just as admiralty process is fixed to the mast. Any '
person claiming an interest may appear and be heard. § 34.
But perhaps the classification of the proceeding is not so im-
portant as the course of the discussion thus far might seem to
imply. I have pursued that course as one which is satisfactory
to my own mind, but for the purposes of decision a majority of
the court prefer to assume that in cases in which, under the con-
stitutional requirements of due process of law, it heretofore has
been necessary to give to parties interested actual notice of the
pending proceeding by personal service or its equivalent in order
to render a valid judgment against them, it is not in the power’)
of the legislature, by changing the form of the proceeding from
an action in personam to a suit in rem, to avoid the [*79] neces-
sity of giving such a notice, and to assume that under this statute
personal rights in property are so involved and may be so affected _
that effectual notice and an opportunity to be heard should bel
given to all claimants who are known or who by reasonable effort ‘
can be ascertained.
It hardly would be denied that the statute takes great pre-
cautions to discover outstanding claims, as we already have shown
‘in detail, or that notice by publication is sufiicient with regard
to claimants outside the state. With regard to claimants living
within the state and remaining undiscovered, notice by puhlica— ‘
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real dispossession, is  another security for actual notice. But when 
it is considered how purely formal such an act may be, and that 
even adverse possession is possible without ever coming to the 
knowledge of a reasonably alert owner, I cannot think that the 
presence or absence of the form makes a constitutional d!fference ; 
or rather, to express my view stil l  more cautiously, I cannot but 
think that the immediate recording of the claim is entitled to 
equal effect from a constitutional point of view. I am free to 
confess, however, that, with the rest of my brethren, I think the 
act ought to be amended in the direction of still further precau­
tions to secure actual notice before a decree is entered, and that , 
if it is not amended, the judges of the court ought to do all that 
is in their power to satisfy themselves that there has been no 
failure in this regard before they admit a title to registration. 
The quotations which we have made show the intent of the 
statute to bind the land, and to make the proceedings adverse to 
all the world, even if it were not stated in § 35, or i f  the amend­
ment of 1899 did not expressly provide that they should be pro­
ceedings in rem. St. 1899, c. 1 3 1 ,  § I.  Notice is  to be posted 
on the land just as admiralty process is fixed to the mast. Any ' 
person claiming an interest may appear and be heard .  § 34. 
But perhaps the classification of the proceeding is not so im­
portant as the course of the discussion thus far might seem to 
imply. I have pursued that course as one which is satisfactof)o 
to my own mind, but for the purposes of decision a maj ority of 
the court prefer to assume that in cases in which, under the con­
stitutional requirements of due process of law, it heretofore has 
been necessary to give to parties interested actual notice of the 
pend ing proceeding by personal service or its equivalent in order 
to render a valid j udgment against them, it is not in the poweri 
of the legislature, by changing the form of the proceeding from I an act ion in perso uam to a suit in rem, to avoid the [*79]  neces­sity of giving such a notice, and to assume that under this statute 
personal rights in property are so involved and may be so aff ecte<f . 
that effectual notice and an opportunity to be heard shou l d  be • 
given to all claimants who are known or who by reasonahle effort 
can be ascertained . 
' 
It hardly would be denied that the statute takes great pre­
cautions to discover outstanding claims,  as we alreadv have shown 
. in detail , or that notice by publ ication is suffici ent with re<Yard 
to claimants outside the state. With regard t0 claimants l iv ing­
within the state and remaining undiscovered , notice by puhl ica- · 
tion must suffice of  necessi ty. As to claimants liv ing within the 
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state and known, the question seems to come down to whether
we can say that there is a constitutional difference between send-
ing notice of a suit by a messenger and sending it by the post
office beside publishing in a newspaper, recording in the registry,
and posting on the land. It must be remembered that there is no
constitutional requirement that the summons, even in a personal
action, shall be served by an ofiicer, or that the copy served shall
be officially attested. Apart from local practice, it may be served
by any indifferent person. It may be served on residents by leav-
ing a copy at the last and usual place of abode. W’ hen we are
considering a proceeding of this kind, it seems to us within the
power of the Legislature to say that the mail, as it is managed in
Massachusetts, is a sufficient messenger to convey the notice, when
other means of notifying the party, like publishing and posting,
also are required. VVe agree that such an act as this is not to be
upheld without anxiety. But the difference in degree between
' the case at bar and one in which the constitutionality of the act
would be unquestionable seems to us too small to warrant a dis-
tinction. If the statute is within the power of the legislature, it
is not for us to criticise the wisdom or expediency of what the
legislature has done.
VV e do not think it necessary to refer to the elaborate collec-
tion of statutes presented by the attorney general for the pur-
pose of showing that the principle of the present act is old. [*8o]
Although no question is made on that point, we may mention
that an appeal is given to the Superior Court with the right to
claim a jury. In our opinion, the main objection to the act fails.
See .S‘hej.'>herd v. Ware, 46 Minn. 174, 48 N. VV. 773; People v.
Sim-on, 176 I11. 165, 52 N. E. 910, 44 L. R. A. 801, 68 Am. St.
Rep. 175; Short v. Caldwell, 155 Mass. 57, 59, 28 N. E. 1124;
Loring v. Hildreth, 170 Mass. 328, 49 N. E. 652, 40 L. R. A. 127.
The other objection to the constitutionality of the statute is
with regard to the powers and duties of the recorder and assist-
ant recorder. * * *
Finally, it is said that there is no provision for notice before
registration of transfers or dealings subsequent to the original
registration. It must be remembered that at all later stages no
one can have a claim which does not appear on the face of the
registry. * * * Petition denied.
The part of the opinion discussing the objection that the law is
unconstitutional because it contemplates a delegation of judicial power
by the courts to examiners and gives appointing power to the courts,
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state and known, the question seems to come down to whether 
we can say that there is a constitutional difference between send­
ing notice of a suit by a messenger and sending it by the post 
office beside publishing in a newspaper, recording in the registry, 
and posting on the land. It must be remembered that there is no 
constitutional requirement that the summons, even in a personal 
action, shall be served by an officer, or that the copy served shall 
be officially attested. Apart from local practice, it may be served 
by any indifferent person. It may be served on residents by leav­
ing a copy at the last and usual place of abode. \.Vhen we are 
considering a proceeding of this kind, it seems to us within the 
power oi the Legislature to say that the mail ,  as it is  managed in 
Massachusetts, is a sufficient messenger to convey the notice, when 
other means of notifying the party, like publishing and posting, 
also are required. We agree that such an act as this is not to be 
• upheld without anxiety. But the difference in degree between 
· the case at bar and one in which the constitutionality o f  the act 
would be unquestionable seems to us too small to warrant a dis­
tinction. If the statute is within the power of the legislature, it 
is not for us to criticise the wisdom or expediency of  what the 
legislature has done. 
\Ve do not think it necessary to refer to the elaborate collec­
tion of statutes presented by the attorney general for the pur­
pose of showing that the principle of the present act is old. [ *So] 
Although no question is made on that point, we may mention 
that an appeal is given to the Superior Court with the right to 
claim a jury. In our opinion, the main objection to the act fails. 
See Shepherd v. Ware, 46 Minn. 1 74, 48 N. \V. 773 ; People v. 
Simon, 1 76 I ll. 165,  52 N. E. 9 1 0, 44 L. R. A. 801, 68 Am. St. 
Rep. 1 75 ; Short v. Cald·well, 1 55 Mass. 57, 59, 28 N. E. I 124 ; 
Loring v. Hildreth, 1 70 Mass. 328, 49 N. E. 652, 40 L. R. A. 1 27. 
The other objection to the constitutionality of the statute is 
with regard to the powers and duties of the recorder and assist­
ant recorder. * * * 
Finally, it is said that there · is no provision for notice before 
registration of transfers or dealings subsequent to the original 
registration. It must be remembered that at all later stages no 
one can have a claim which does not appear on the face of the 
registry . * * * Petition denied. 
The part of the opinion discussing the obj ection that the law is 
unconstitutional because it contemplates a delegation of j udicial power 
by the courts to examiners and gives appointing power to the courts, 
whereas by the constitution officers are to be elected by the people or 
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appointed by the governor, &c., is omitted; also, the dissenting opinion
of Loring, _I., concurred in by Lathrop, J’.
Acconn: Robinson v. Kerrigan (I907), 151 Cal. 40, 90 Pac. 129;
People ex rel. Smith v. Crissman (I907), 4t Colo. 450, 92 Pac. 949;
People ex rel. Deneen v. Simon (1898), I76 Ill. I65, 52 N. E. 910, 44 L.
R. A. 801, 68 Am. St. Rep. 175; State ex rel. Douglas v. Westfall (1902),
85 Minn. 437, 89 N. W. 175, 57 L. R. A. 297
Contra: Slate ex rel Monnctt v. Guilbert (I898), 56 Ohio St. 575,
47 N. E. 551, 38 L. R. A. 105, 60 Am. St. Rep. 756.
Jurisdictional Effect of Departures from Prescribed Form and
Procedure.
GREENVAULT v. FARMERS AND MECHANIS’ BANK, in Mich.
Sup. Ct., Jan. Term, I847—2'Doug. 498. /
Ejectment in the Lenawee circuit court by David Green-
vault against the President, Directors and Company of the Farm-
ers and Mechanics’ Bank. Case reserved for the opinion of this
court. Judgment for defendant.
Greenvault claims under attachment proceedings instituted in
the Lenawee circuit by C. N. Ormsby against Ed. Bissell, Sept.
28 and levied Oct. I8 8, culminating in judgment for Ormsby,
Greenvault, and several other creditors who filed claims, in Octo-
ber, 1839, and a sale to Greenvault thereunder, May 2, I840. The
Farmers and Mechanics’ Bank claims under a mortgage executed
to it by Bissell, Dec. 23, I838I and since forgglgsed. Bissell
moved the court at the April term, 1842, to set the attachment
and the proceedin s thereon aside, becat1s<2\tl'1nt'tT1H1T11e_'nT'affi-
davit was void. Ihe court refused this mgflgn and allowed a new
tac ment a avit to be then filed, on authoritv of the act of
ii‘ Eril 20, {EH3-th__e-—banE was in possession when
this action was commenced.
VVII1PPI.E, J. The paper purporting to be an affidavit, filed
with the clerk as the foundation of the attachment against Bissell
under which the plaintiff claims, was sworn to before the clerk
of the circuit court of Lenawee county, in yggation. * * * No
provision conferring such authority is to be found in the Revised
Statutes of I838; and it follows, as a necessary consequence, that
the act of the clerk in administering the oath, was extrajudicial
and void. * * *
The next question to be determined, is, whether the issuing
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appointed by the governor, &c., is  omitted ; also, the dissenting opinion 
of Loring, J., concurred in by Lathrop, J. 
AccoRn : Rob it1son v. Kerrigan ( 1907) ,  1 5 1  Cal. 40, 90 Pac. 129 ; 
People ex rel. Smith v. Crissman ( 1907 ) ,  41 Colo. 450, 92 Pac. 949 ; 
People ex rel. Deneen v. Simon ( 1898) , 1 76 Ill. 165, 52 N. E. 910, 44 L. 
R. A. Sor ,  68 Am. St. Rep. 1 75 ;  State ex rel. Douglas v. Westfall ( 1902) , 
85 Minn. 437, 89 N . W. 1 75, 57 L. R. A. 297 
Contra : State ex rel Motinett v. Guilbert ( 1898) , 56 Ohio St. 575, 
47 N. E. 55 1, 38 L. R. A. 105, 6o Am. St. Rep. 756. 
Jurisdictional Effect of Departures from Prescribed Form and 
Procedure. 
GREENVAULT v. FARMERS AND MECHANIS' BANK, in Mich. 
Sup. Ct., Jan. Term, 1847-2
_ 
Doug. 498. / 
Ej ectment in the Lenawee circuit court by David Green­
vault against the President, Directors and Company of the Farm­
ers and Mechanics' Banlc.  Case reserved for the opinion of this 
court. Judgment for defendant. 
Greenvault claims under attachment proceedings instituted in 
the Lenawee circuit by C. N. Ormsby against Ed. Bissell, Sept. 
28 and levied %0ct. 9, 1838, culminating in j udgment for Ormsby, Greenvault, and several other creditors who filed claims, in Octo­
ber, 1 8391 and a sale to Greenvault thereundeL May 2, 1 840. The 
Farmers and Mechanics' Bank claims under a mortgage executed 
to it by Bissell, Dt,_c. 23, 1 838, and since forec12sed. Bissell 
moved the court at the April term, 1 842,  ...!_o set the attac�ment 
and the proceedin s thereon aside, because the attachment affi-
davit was yoid. he court refused this n an al owe a 
filed, on authorit of the act of 
�C!.!..�L.2.��_.!.ID::.-1.S:W�...Q.l��-oan was in possession when 
W H IPPLE, J. The paper purporting to be an affidavit, filed 
with the .clerk as the foundation of the attachment against Bissell 
under which the plaintiff claims, was sworn to before the clerk 
of the circuit court of Lenawee county, in yac:ition. * * * No 
provision conferring such authority is  to be fou;d in the Revised 
Statutes of 1838 ; and it follows, as a necessary consequence, that 
the act of the clerk in administering the oath, was extraj udicial 
and void. * * * 
The next question to be determined, is ,  whether the issuing 
of the writ,  without an affidavit, was also void ; or, in other words, 
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did the authority to issue the process, depend upon the making
and filing of the affidavit with the clerk? This question must be
answered in the affirmative. * * * [*5o7]
The next inquiry is, what was the legal effect of issuing the
writ without making and filing the affidavit required by law, upon
the judgment and subsequent proceedings of the circuit court.
This inquiry is answered by the opinion of this court in the cases
of Palmer v. Oakley, 2 Doug. Mich. 433; Wight v. Warner, I
ibid. 384, and Clark v. Holmes, ibid. 390. In the case first named,
we recognized the rule as laid down i11 the case of Elliott v. Peir-
sol, 26 U. S. (I Peters) 328, 340, and the decision of a court
which has acquired jurisdiction of a cause, will be held binding
until reversed; but that if a court act without authority its 'udg-
ments will be regarded as nulhties; and that the jurisdiction of
ulfiifu I - - n ‘ -- n 0 -- l'li1'K~I0)_-gr-.-In "-
re relied on b a art claiming the benefit of such proceedings.
%lE_tlfii_s_}l,ziM%v\m,k1sfiTflflTEstab1T§l1T2'd"b?‘tTrE'rmmrr0us
decisions referred to in that case, and is recognized in all courts,
where the common law prevails, as too firmly settled to be shaken.
Another rule, sustained by an unbroken current of decisions in
this country and England is, ~£MQSMEitIi
. . .t
extr wers, under a s ecial statute
COUI;S8,_LlJ.3.l'_£Q1]!'S€ ought to be exactly'observed ; and the facts
which ' ' ' 'tion oug tto a a ' ow that
i s ' ' n u we. These principles are applicable
to all courts, whether of inferior or superior jurisdiction; the only
difference being, that in respect to inferior courts, jurisdiction
must appear on the face of the proceedings; while, in regard to
superior courts, jurisdiction will be presumed, until the contrary
is shown. It will be unnecessary, at this time, to recur to the
reasoning [*5o8] or authorities by which these propositions are
sustained, as the cases to which I have referred, contain not only
a. full exposition of our views upon those propositions, but a full
citation of many of the leading authorities by which they are
established.
Nothing remains for us but to apply the principle laid down
by us in those cases, to the questions now before us. VVhat, then.
was the character of the court, and the nature of the jurisdiction
it exercised in suits in attachment? The circuit court was a court
of general common law jurisdiction. in both civil and criminal
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did the authority to issue the process, depend upon the making 
and filing of the affidavit with the clerk ? This question must be 
answered in the affirmative. * * * [ *507] 
The next inquiry is, what was the legal effect o f  issuing the 
writ without making and filing the affidavit required by law,  upon 
the judgment and subsequent proceedings of the circuit court. 
This inquiry is answered by the opinion of this cou rt in the cases 
of Palmer v. Oakley, 2 Doug. Mich. 433 ; Wight v. Wa,,-ner, I 
.ibid. 384, and Clark v. Ho/mes, ibi.d. 390. In the case first named, 
we recognized the rule as laid down in the case of Elliott v. Peir­
so/, 26 U. S. ( I  Peters ) 328, 340, and the decision of a court 
which has acquired j urisd iction of a cause, will be held binding 
until reversed ; but that if  a court act without authority, hs j udg­
ments will be regarded as nullities ; and that the J urisdiction of 
�Afr e�er�l�:(
y
::iiu�lty oder a sugrc: m:;er, m�be in-
e jgt I �  r whe e the p {)CC chn Of rne Otmer 
re relied on b a art claiming the benefit of such proceedings. 
The ru e t us laid down, is e y us  
decisions referred to  in that case, and is  recognized in  a l l  courts, 
where the common law prevails, as too firmly settled to be shaken. 
Another rule, sustained by an unbroken current of decisions in 
this country and England is, that where a cqurt is vested with 
extragrdipary powers, under a special statute prescrjhmg -its 
�ou rse ou ht to be exactl •observed ; and the facts 
which give jurisdiction, oug t to appear. in order to show t 1at 
its�roceedinsli are mrmn judice. These principles are applicable 
to all courts, whether of in ferior or superior j urisdiction ; the only 
difference being, that in respect to inferior courts, jurisdiction 
must appear on the face of the proceedings ; while, in regard to 
superior courts, jurisdiction will be presumed, unti l the contrary 
is shown. It will be unnecessary, at this t ime, to recur to the 
reason ing [ *508] or authorities by which these propositions are 
sustained, as the cases to which I have referred, contain not only 
a ful l  exposition of our views upon those proposition s, but a full 
citat ion of many of the leading authorities by which they are 
es tablished . 
Nothing remains for us but to apply the principle laid down 
by us in those cases, to the questions now before us. \Vhat . then , 
was the character of the cou rt, and the nature of the j u risdiction 
i t  exercised in suits in attachment ?  The circuit court was a court 
of general common law jurisd iction , in both civil and criminal 
cases. Its general powers are clearly defined by statute. It  was. 
• 
• 
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in other words, a court of superior jurisdiction. Do proceedings
in attachment fall within the circle of the general powers con—.
ferred upon the circuit court by statute? They clearly do not.
The jurisdiction in this respect is special and extraordinary. The \
mode of proceeding is peculiar, and in derogation of the common
law. It is special, because limited to cases either of ahscrmding
or non-resident debtors. }15_;g_r3_o_r_gl,ina;-y,-beeause—t-he-psocess,
contrary to the eneral rule reco ized in es acts upon
the property and not the on f the debtor. It is, in its nature,
Tgn-T<2eir1gi_cl'-’fitT1Tto_Dc-%Ilie#lelJtcfi1e from a debtor to his
creditor. It is in derogation of the common law, because it is a
direct proceeding to subject the real estate, by actual sale, to
the payment of debts.
I have already said that there was no preliminary proof what-
ever to authorize the issuing of the attachment. The facls which
give jurisdiction, do not appear in the proceedm;shTT1'1'e_ab-
?e:fi'€<msm:})wo<)L__f__IT___Tx7FE,_1t_11u1_y5E-7i§Ee_(I,'is’tlie judgment which
the law pronounces upon such proceedings? There being no au-‘
thority to issue the process, it is of course void. Being void, the
service was void; the property attached never was brought within
[*5o9] the jurisdiction of the court, and the court had no author-
ity to order its sale. In short, the circuit court never had juris-
diction of the subject matter, because the facts necessary to call’
that jurisdiction into exercise never existed. Can a party, then,’
to such proceedings—one who stood in the character of a plaintiff,
so far as the prosecution of his own claim was concerned-—pro-
tect himself, under a sale made by virtue of an order entered in
the records of a court which never acquired jurisdiction of the
subject matter—a court within whose jurisdiction the property
never was brought? As well might it be contended that a judg-
ment, where the proceedings are in jaersonam, could be sustained,
when it affirmatively appears in the record, that the person to be
affected by the judgment never was brought within the jurisdic-
tion of the court by whom it was rendered. The distinction is
well defined between cases where jurisdiction is acquired, and is
improvidently exercised, and cases where jurisdiction never was
acquired. In the first class of cases the judgment will bind until
reversed. In the other, the judgment is a mere nullity; it is as
though it had never been entered. In the first class, the record
cannot. in general, be impeached, in the last it may be impeached,
especially if it shows on its face that jurisdiction was usurped.
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for the same reason, as acts done without authority by either the
executive or legislative departments of the government. If either
of these departments usurp an authority not conferred by the
constitution or laws of the state, and a party seeks to shelter him-
self under such usurped authority, in a judicial proceeding, the
court before whom such a proceeding is pending, would not hes-
itate to declare all acts done under such authority void. If not,
then we should have to submit quietly to the well merited re-
buke, that rights the most sacred are no [*5to] longer guarded
and protected by just laws enacted by our consent; but are left
to the tender mercies of a man or set of men, who, although act-
ing under color of authority, are mere usurpers. Apply this rea-
soning to the case before us. The powers possessed over the
person and property of the citizen, by the judicial tribunals, are
as accurately defined as are the powers conferred upon the other
departments of the government. In the particular case before
us th ' ' awee county was authorized b ' a ‘u-
dicial proceeding, to divest one person o us property and trans-
fer it to another, under a certain state of facts. Ifie facts -
ever, w 1c an e act to be done, did not exist‘ never-
theless, the court proceeded to do the act, by which, under color of
ega proc e in s, one man ' ' ' s rans-
ferreil to another. What ddference, it may be asked, is there
Between such an act, and an act of the legislature which should
declare that the property of A. should become the property of B.
No difierence in principle exists between the two cases. In the
one case, it would be regarded as a bold and palpable usurpation:
in the other, the usurpation would appear less bold, although more
dangerous, because partially concealed beneath the solemn drapery
with which judicial proceedings are invested. The theory of our
government contemplates that its powers should be distributed,
and administered by three departments, neither of which should
exercise powers conferred upon another. This principle, so nec-
essary to the existence of free government, should be carefully
observed; yet, it is to be regretted, that, to suit the emergencies
of particular cases, courts of justice have sometimes assumed leg-
islative powers. Not contented with expc_>unding the law, they
have resolved themselves into legislativeiflodies, and made laws
adapted to the supposed equities of particular cases. The opin-
ions of men are thus [*5II] substituted for the will of the com-
munity expressed through the legislature. In the case before us,
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for the same reason, as acts done w ithout au thority by either the 
executive or legislative departments of the government. If e i ther 
of these departments usurp an authority not conferred by the 
const i tution or laws of the state, and a party seeks to shelter h im­
sel f under such usurped authbrity, in a j udicial proceeding, the 
court before whom such a proceeding is pending, would not hes­
i tate to declare all acts done under such authority void.  If not, 
then we shou ld have to submit quietly to the well merited re­
buke, that rights the most sacred are no [ * 5 ro] longer guarded 
and protected by j u st laws enacted by our consent ; but are left 
to the tender mercies of a man or set of men, who, although act­
ing under color of authority, are mere usurper . Apply this rea­
soning to the case before us. The powers possessed over the 
person and property of the citizen, by the j udicial t ribunals, are 
as accurately defined as are the powers conferred u pon the other 
departments of the government .  I n  t h e  particular case before 
us th · · a wee county was authorized b a · u­
dicial proceeding, to divest one person o 11s property and trans­
fer 1 t  to another, under a certam state of facts. I he facts. how­
ever, which autho nzM the act to be done, did not exist ; never­
theless, the court proceeded to do the act, by which, under color of 
legal proceedrngs, one man is divested of !ti" e:3tatc, and it is trans 
£erred to another. What difference, it may be asked, i s  there 
between such an act, and an act of the legislature which should 
declare that the p roperty of A. should become the property of B. 
No di fference in principle exists between the two cases. In the 
one case, it would be regarded as a bold and palpable usurpation ; 
i n  the other, the usurpation wo uld appear less bold, although more 
dangerous, because partially coocealed beneath the solemn drapery 
with which j udicial proceedings are invested. The theory of our 
government contemplates that its powers should be dis tributed, 
and administered by three departments, neither of which should 
exercise powers conferred upon another. This principle, so nec­
essary to the existence of free government, should be carefully 
observed ; yet, it is to be regretted, that, to suit the emergencies 
of particular cases, courts of j ustice have sometimes assumed leg­
islative powers. Not contented with expounding the law, they 
have resolved themselves into legislative bodies, and made laws 
adapted to the supposed equit ies of particular cases. The opin­
ions of men are thus [ *5 u ]  substituted for the will  of the com­
munity expressed through the legislature. In the ca�e before us, 
the legislature have thought proper to give to the circuit court 
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jurisdiction in certain cases, and upon certain conditions. To
call this jurisdiction into exercise, it must be shown that the con-
ditions upon which it depended have been fulfilled; and where
this ' ' ' ' ' ' ' lin "thin
t e line which circumscribes the general Ewers of the court, it
“gwwummmemmmmgmwie
existence of all the facts necessa to call into action the s ecial
powers thus granted. 3 Blackf. R. 230.
WWW was placed upon the case of Voorhees V. Bank
United States, 35 U. S. (10 Peters) 449, 473. But the distinc-
tion between that case and the one before us is so obvious as to
render it impossible to use it as an authority. I. In that case,
Voorhees was the alienee of Cutter, who was the defendant in
the attachment, by a conveyance executed long after the judgment
in attachment. Cutter, then, stood in no better plight than Voor-
hees would have done, had he brought suit against the bank. 2. It
was competent for Voorhees to have brought error upon the judg-
ment, which he failed to do. In the case before us, the defendants
could not have availed themselves of this remedy to reverse the
proceedings below. 3. Stanley, under whom the Bank of the
United States purchased, was regarded in the light of an inno-
cent purchaser; whereas, in the case before us, the plaintiff was
a party to the proceedings in attachment, and was bound to see
that the court had jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of the Uni-
ted States decided in that case, that from what appeared on the
face of the proceedings, it might be fairly presumed that all the
facts necessary to give jurisdiction to the court of common pleas
of Ohio, were shown to that court before the rendition of the
judgment confirming the acts of the [*5r2] auditors. In the case
before us, nothing is left to implication. The verdict sets out
all the proceedings, from which it manifestly appears that there
was no aflidavit proving the facts necessary to confer authority
upon the circuit court to issue the process. * * *
It is not to be denied, that some of the views expressed by
Mr. Justice Baldwin, touching the conclusz'c'cne_rs of judgments
rendered in attachment causes, differ essentially from those ex-
pressed by other judges and courts of great respectability. * * *
The last question to be considered, is, as to the legal [*5I3]
effect of the filing a new affidavit, by the plaintiff, by virtue of
the order made at the April Term, 1842, of the circuit court.
First: ‘Was it competent to grant the order? The act of
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jurisdiction in certain cases, and upon certain conditions. To 
call this j urisdiction into exercise, it  must be shown that the con­
ditions upon which it depended have been fulfilled ; and where 
this · · · · · lin ·thin 
t e line which circumscribes the general powers of the court, it 
would seem that the recgrd itseJ f 5hrn1ld show affirmatively the 
existence of all the facts necessa to call into action the s ecial 
powers thus grante . 3 Black £. R. 230 . 
. Much reliance was placed upon the case of Voorhees v. Ba1i.k 
U11ited States, 35 U. S .  ( 1 0  Peters ) 449, 473. But the distinc­
tion between that case and the one be fore us is so obvious as to 
render it impossible to use it as an authority. I .  In that case, 
Voorhees was the alicnee of Cutter, who was the defendant in 
the attachment, by a conveyance executed long after the j udgment 
in attachment. Cutter, then, stood in no better plight than Voor­
hees would have done, had he brought suit against the bank. 2. It 
was competent for Voorhees to have brought error upon the j udg­
ment� which he failed to do. In the case before us, the defendants 
could not have availed themselves of this remedy to reverse the 
proceedings below. 3. Stanley, under whom the Bank o f  the 
Cnited States purchased, was regarded in the light of an inno­
cen t purchaser ; whereas, in the case before us, the plaintiff was 
a party to the proceedings in attachment, and was bound to see 
that the court had j urisdiction. The Supreme Court of the Uni­
ted S tates decided in that case, that from what appeared on the 
face of the proceedings, it might be fairly presumed that all the 
facts necessary to give j urisdiction to the court of common pleas 
of Ohio, \vere shown to that court before the rendition of the 
judgment confirming the acts of the [*512]  auditors. In the case 
be fore us, nothing is left to implication. The verdict sets out 
all the proceedings, from which it manifestly appears that there 1 
was no affidavit proving the facts necessary to confer authority 
upon the circu it court to issue the process. * * * 
It is not to be denied, that some of the views expressed by 
Mr. Justice Baldwin, touching the conclusi·veness of j udgments 
rendered in attachment causes, differ essentially from those ex­
pressed by other judges and courts of great respectability. * * * 
The last question to be considered, is, as to the legal [*513]  
effect of the filing a new affidavit, by the plaintiff, b y  virtue of 
the order made at the April Term, 1 842, of the circuit court . 
First : Was it competent to grant the order ? The act of 
1839 provides, that "no writ shall be quashed on account of any 
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defect in the atfidavit on which the same issued: Provided, That
the plaintiff, his agent, or attorney shall, whenever objection may
be made, file such affidavit as is required by law.” S. L. 1839,
p. 228, § 36. This law, it is to be observed, was not in force at
the time the paper purporting to be an aflidavit, and upon which
the attachment was issued, was filed. Do the words of the act
authorize a new affidavit to be filed, where the original affidavit
was void; or, in other words, where_no afiidavit was made or
filed, as contemplated by the statute? The amendatory act speaks
of defects in the afiidavit upon which the writ issued; from which
it results, by necessary implication, that defects could not be sup-
plied, in cases where no affidavit whatever was filed. It evidently
contemplated cases where affidavits were filed, but which,
through ignorance, inadvertence, or mistake, did not embody all
the facts necessary to authorize the issuing of the writ; but it
could not have been the intention of the legislature to authorize
an affidavit to be filed after judgment was rendered and the prop-
erty attached sold, and thus legalize acts which were absolutely
void. The language, in the latter part of the act, is conclusive
upon this point. It authorizes a party to “file such afiidavit as is
required by law” ; implying that the original mfidavit was not such
as is required by law. In the case before us, if the construction
contended for by the plaintiff, be correct, an afifidavit filed three
years after the rendition of the judgment, would have the effect
of rendering a proceeding legal, which was before that time a
mere nullity ;—of giving jurisdiction to a court, which, at the time
the [*5x4] writ issued and the judgment was rendered, had no
jurisdiction. Such a power the legislature would hardly exercise:
and there is nothing in the amendatory act, from which it can,
with“aFy show of reason, be contended that such was the inten-
tion of the legislature.
But, supposing for a moment, that the legislature might, in
the plenitude of its authority, exercise such a power, and that the
act of I839 warrants the construction contended for by the plain-
tiff, how could it affect the rights of the present defendants? The
filing, with the register, of the writ of attachment, did not operate
as constructive notice to the defendants, who purchased soon after
the date of the writ, or create a lien on the premises, for the reason
that the writ itself was void. To affect a party with notice, the
deed. or in this case, the writ, must be such an one as in the case
of a deed, the law authorizes to be registered, or in the case of a
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defect in the affidavit on which the same issued : Pro1lided, That 
the plaintiff, his agent, or attorney shall, whenever obj ection may 
be made, file such affidavit as is required by law." S. L. 1 839, 
p. 228, § 36. This law, it is to be observed, was not in force at 
the t ime the paper purporting to be an affidavit, and upon which 
the attachment was issued, was filed. Do the words of the act 
authorize a new affidavit to be filed, where the original affidavit 
was void ; or, in other words, where no affidavit was made or 
filed, as contemplated by the statute ? The amendatory act speaks 
of defects in the aflidcwit upon which the writ issued ; from which 
it results, by necessary implication, that def eels could not be sup­
plied, in cases where no affidavit whatever was filed. It evidently 
contemplated case-s where affidavits were filed, but which, 
through ignorance, inadvertence, or mistake, did not embody all 
the facts necessary to authorize the issuing of the writ ; but it 
could not have been the intention o f  the legislature to authorize 
an affidavit to be filed after judgment was rendered and the prop­
erty attached sold, and thus legalize acts which were absolutely 
void. The language, in the latter part of the act, is conclusive 
upon this point. It authorizes a party to "file such affidavit as is 
required by law" ; implying that the original a:lli.dall.,;,t was not such 
as is required by law. In the case before us, if the construction 
contended for by the plaintiff, be correct, an affidavit filed three 
years after the rendition of the j udgment, would have the effect 
of rendering a proceeding legal , which was before that time a 
mere nullity ;-of giving jurisdiction to a court, which, at the time 
the [ *5 14] writ issued and the judgment was rendered, had no 
jurisdiction. Such a power the legislature would hardly exercise : 
and there is nothing in the amendatory act, from which it can , 
witli: any show of reason, be contended that such was the inten­
tion of the legislature. 
nut ,  supposing for a moment, that the legislature might, in 
the plen itude of its authority, exercise such a power, and that the 
act of 1 839 warran ts the construction contended for by the plain­
tiff, how could it affect the rights of the present defendants ? The 
filing, with the register, of the writ of attachment, did not operate 
as constructive notice to the defendants, who purchased soon after 
the date of the writ, or create a lien on the premises, for the reason 
that the writ itsel f was void .  To affect a party with notice, the 
deed , or in this case, the writ, must be such an one as in  the case 
of a deed , the law authorizes to be regi stered, or in the case of a 
writ .  i t  must be a writ, the issuing of which is  authorized by law. 
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notice of the enden ' ‘ hment. There
bemg, then, neither actual nor constructive notice, how could the
rights of the defendants be affected by an order of the court made
three years after they had acquired a valid title to the premises?
. . I
legislation, could under th ' e s ecia
ic t e effect cl ' ' ' ' at of divesting an
estate acquired b and transferring
' t e amtiff in this case. The original proceedings in attac -
_ment, then, being void, and no subsequent legislation, or orders of
the court, having applied remedies sufficiently potent to cure those
proceedings of the infirmities which beset them, it follows, that
the judgment on the special verdict must be rendered for the de-
fendants. , Certified accordingly.
J
COOPER v. REYNOLDS, in U. S. Sup. Ct., Dec., X870-77 U. S. (10
Wallace) 308. .
Ejectment by Reynolds against Cooper in the circuit court
for the eastern district of Tennessee. From judgment for plain-
tiff, defendant brings error.
On the trial it .was admitted that Reynolds owned the land
unless Cooper had acquired title by virtue of the following de-
scribed judicial proceedings. The record in the case of,_B;um;,
loag_y_._Bgy_polds in the circuit court for Knox county, Tennessee,
which was put in evidence by Cooper, showed that on Sept. 26th,
1863, G. W. Brownlow sued out of that court a summons in tres-
pass agamst said Reynolds and others for false imprisonment,
&c.; damages, $25,000. To this writ the ‘sim-ma-fhat
“he had made search and that none of the defendants were to
be found in his county.” The day the writ was issued Brownlow
filed with the clerk of the court an affidavit for attachment against
the property of said Reynolds and the others; alleging, among
other things, “that all of the defendants have fled from this §tgte
or that they so abseond or conceal themsel es that the ordinary
process of law cannot reach tliem.ll In the record is also an at-
tachment bond for $50,000, and an attachment for $25,000, all
bearing the same date. The attachment recites the substance of
the affidavit, and directs the sheriff to attach sufficient of the prop-
erty of Reynolds and the others to satisfy the said demand of
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The special verdict does not find tha• the d@feA'1aAtli h&8 fu;tual 
.fOtiCe of the pendency of the proceedings in attachment. There 
being, then, neither actual nor constructive notice, how could the 
rights of the defendants be affected by an order of the court made 
three years after they had acquired a valid title to the premises ? 
J'i9 e:r parte legisl3tjgp5 or order pf the coprt founded ypon such 
legislation,  could under th  
· · 
s ecial 
t e effect cl · at of divestin an 
it to t e p amtiff in this case. The original proceedings in attac -
.ment, then , being void, and no subsequent legislation , or orders of 
the court, having applied remedies sufficiently potent to cure those 
proceedings of the infirmities which beset them, it follows ,  that 
the j udgment on the special verdict must be rendered for the de-
fendants. Certified accordingly . 
.) 
COOPER v. REYNOLDS, in U. S. Sup. Ct., Dec., 1870-77 U. S. ( 10 
Wallace)  3o8. 
Ejectment by Reynolds against Cooper in the circuit court 
for the eastern district of Tennessee. From judgment for plain­
tiff, defendant brings error. 
On the trial it .was admitted that Reynolds owned the land 
unless Cooper had acquired title by virtue of the following de­
.
scribed judicial proceedings. The record in the case of, Brown-.. 
lo.&' v. Reypolds in the circuit court for Knox county, Tennessee, 
which was put in evidence by Cooper, showed that on Sept. 26th, 
1863, G. W. Brownlow sued out of  that court a summons in tres­
pass agamst said Reynolds and others for false imprisonment, 
&c. ; damages, $25,000. To this wri t  the sheriff returned ffiat 
"he had made search and that none of  the defendants were to 
be found in his county." The day the writ was issued Brownlow 
filed with the clerk of the court an affidavit for attachment against 
the property of said Reynolds and the others ; alleging, among 
other things, "that all of the defendants have fled fro m this Upte 
or tha.t they so abscond or conceal them�ilies that the ordinary 
process of law cannot reach them." In the record is also an at­
tachment bond for $50,000, and an attachment for $25 ,000. all 
bearing the same date. The attachment recites the substance of 
the affidavit, and directs the sheriff to attach sufficient of the prop­
erty of Reynolds and the others to sati s fy the said demand of 
$25,000, and hold the same ready to be disposed of as the court 
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should direct. To this attachment the sheriff returned that he
had thereon attached all the title and right of Reynolds in 160
acres of land, the property now in controversy, describing it. The
court ordered publication to be made in the Knoxville Whig, a
county paper, notifying the defendants to appear and plead, an-
swer, or demur, or the suit would be taken as confessed as to
them and proceeded in ex parte. T_Ll]Q_LQQQLd__d,QQS_QQ_t&V_V_t_l'I_Ht
this ublication was ever in fact made, except inferentiall b ' set-
or pu ication an re 1 cc wn as 1 ' ' "Ie
um he record goes on to say that the defendants, being
solemnly called to come into court, came not, but made default,
and it appearing that the attachment has been duly levied, and
that fmblication has been made according to law, it is ordered
that the plaintiff do recover his damages. These were assessed
at $25,000 ,and for that sum execution was ordered to issue, and
that the sheriff should sell the attached land. The land was ac-
cordingly sold by the sheriff under a 2-cnditi0m' c.r[wnas, and deed
made to Cooper as urchaser, who was ut into ossession under
a hahen farms, issued from the same court in the same proceeding.
‘~T'l§=:—m?d'_b'e-1'ti-g'_—tlFsii1<:\ri(~lfirt instructed the
jury that the sheriffs deed was null and void, and conveyed no
title, because the judgment on which the sale was made was void
for want of either personal service on or appearance by the de-
fendants therein, or a valid attachment: and that the attachment
was void because it does not appear that publication was ever in
fact made and because the aflidavit did not conform to the law.
Verdict being found for the plaintiff under the instructions of the
court, defendant alleges as error that the instructions were not
correct.
l\'IILLER, J. The objections taken to the proceeding in at-
tachment under which Cooper, the defendant below, claimed title,
are, 1st, that by the law of Tennessee the attachment could not
be issued, at the beginning of the suit where the action was ex
Qlicto, but could only be issued after suit commenced; 2d, tlfit
the afiidavit was defective; 3d, that there was no publication of
notice, as required by the statutes.
The question of the conformity of these proceedings to the
requirements of the statutes under which they were had, has been
very fully discussed by counsel, and if we were sitting here as on
a writ of error to the judgment of the state court under which
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should direct. To this attachment the sheriff returned that he 
had thereon attached all the title and right of Reynolds in 16o 
acres of land, the property now in controversy, describing it .  The 
court ordered publication to be made in the Knoxville Whig, a 
county paper, notifying the defendants to appear and plead, an­
swer, or demur, or the suit would be taken as confessed as to 
them and proceeded in ex parte. The record does not show that 
this ublication was ever in fact made, except inferentiall b set­
ting out the order for pu 1ca on, w 1c was entlt e 
� e record goes on to say that the defendants, being 
SOiemnly called to come into court, came not, but made default, 
and it appearing that the attachment has been duly levied, and 
that publication has been made according to law, it is ordered 
that the plaintiff do recover his damages. These were assessed 
at $25,oex> ,and for that sum execution was ordered to issue, and 
that the sheriff should sell the attached land. The land was ac­
cordingly sold by the sheriff under a i·cttditioni e:rpo1ias, and deed 
made to Cooper as urchaser, who was ut into ossession under 
a en actas, issued from the same court in the same proceeding. 
- The record being thus in evidence the court instructed the 
jury that the sheriff's deed was null and void, and conveyed no 
title, because the judgment on which the sale was made was void 
for want of either personal service on or appearance by the de­
fendants therein, or a valid attachment ; and that the attachment 
was void because it does not appear that publication was ever in 
fact made and because the affidavit did not conform to the law. 
Verdict being found for the plaintiff under the instructions of the 
court, defendant alleges as error that the instructions were not 
correct. 
MILI .. ER, J. The objections taken to the proceeding in at­
tachment under which Cooper, the defendant below, claimed title, 
are, 1 st, that by the law of Tennessee the attachment could not 
be issued, at the beginning of the suit where the action was ex 
d.(licto, but could only be issued after suit commenced ; 2d, thit 
the affidavit was defective ; 3d, that there was no publication of 
notice, as required by the statutes. 
The question of the conformity of these proceedings to the 
requirements of the statutes under which they were had, has been 
very fully discussed by counsel, and if we were sitting here as on 
a writ of error to the judgment of the state court under which 
the land was sold, we might not find it easy to affirm or reverse 
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the judgment on satisfactory grounds, notwithstanding the abun-
dant citation of authorities from the Tennessee courts. But we '
occupy no such position. The record of this case is introduced
collaterally as evidence of [*3!6] title in another suit, between
other parties, and before a court which has no jurisdiction to re-
verse or set aside that judgment, however erroneous it may be.
Nor can it disregard that judgment, or refuse to give it effect,
on any other ground than a want of jurisdiction in the court
which rendered it.
It is of no avail, therefore, to show that there are errors in
that record, unless they be such as prove that the court had no
jurisdiction of the case, or that the judgment rendered was be-
yond its power. This principle has been often held by this court,
and by all courts, and it takes rank as an axiom of the law. But
that its applicability to the present case may be thoroughly under-
stood, reference is made to the most important of the decided
cases in this court and in the Supreme Court of Tennessee.1
It is necessary, therefore, in the present case to inquire
whether the errors alleged affect the jurisdiction of the court.
It is as easy to give a general and comprehensive definition
of the word jurisdiction as it is diflicult to determine, in special
cases, the precise ondi io s, ,which the right to exercise it
depends. This rig§t"li‘a1‘.sLi”‘f:;('a'f§c'e"Pc'>_the power of the court over
the parties, over thésubject-matter, over the res or property in
contest, and to the authority of the court to render the judgment
or decree which it assumes to make.
By jurisdiction over the subject-matter is meant the nature
of the cause of action and of the relief sought; and this is con-
ferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court, and
is to be sought for in the general nature of its powers, or in au-
thority specially conferred. Iurisdiction of the person is obtained
by the service of [*3I7] process, or by the voluntary appearance
of the party in the progress of the cause. jurisdiction of the res
is obtained by a seizure under process of the court, whereby it
is held to abide such order as the court may make concerning
it. The power to render the decree or judgment which the court
may undertake to make in the particular cause. depends upon the
nature and extent of the authority vested in it by law in regard to
the subject-matter of the cause.
‘Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. 328, and cases there cited; Il{cG(Wock v.
Bell, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 512; Stevenson v. McLean, 24 Tenn. (5 Hump.)
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the judgment on satisfactory grounds, notwithstanding the abun­
dant citation of authorities from the Tennessee courts. But we · 
occupy no such position. The record of  this case is introduced 
collaterally as evidence of [*316] title in another suit, between 
other parties, and before a court which has no j urisdiction to re­
verse or set aside that j udgment, however erroneous it may be. 
Nor can it  disregard that j udgment, or refuse to give it effect, I on any other ground than a want o f  jurisdiction in the court 
which rendered it. 
It is of no avail ,  therefore, to show that there are errors in l 
that record, unless they be such as prove that the court had no 
jurisdiction of the case, or  that the j udgment rendered was be­
yond its power. This principle has been often held by this court, 
and by all courts, and it takes rank as an axiom of the law. But 
that its applicability to the present case may be thoroughly under­
stood , reference is made to the most important of the decided 
cases in this court and in the Supreme Court o f  Tennessee.1 
It is necessary, therefore, in the present case to inquire 
whether the errors alleged affect the jurisdiction of the court. 
It is as easy to give a general and comprehensive definition 
of the word j urisdiction as it is difficult to determine, in special 
cases, the precise ondi io s. • which the right to exercise it  
depends. This r i  t as re e ence o he power of the court overl 
the parties, over th�subject-matter, over the res or property in 
contest, and to the authority of the court to render the judgment 
or decree which it assumes to make. 
By jurisdiction over the subj ect-matter is meant the nature 
of the cause of action and of the relief sought ; and this is con­
ferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court, and 
is to be sought for in the general nature of its powers, or in au­
thority special ly conferred. Jurisdiction of the person is obtainedf 
by the service of [*317 ]  process, or by the voluntary appearance 
of the party in the progress of the cause. Jurisdiction of the res 
is obtained by a seizure under process of the court, whereby it \ 
is held to abide such order as the court may make concern ing I it. The power to render the decree or j udgment which the court 
may undertake to make in the part icular cause , depends upon the J 
nature and extent of the authority vested in i t  by law in regard to ' 
the subject-matter of the cause. 
1Harvty v. T'!t•ler, 2 Wall. 328, and cases there cited ; McGm•nck v. 
Bell, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold .)  5 1 2 ; Stevenson v. McL�m1, 24 Tenn. ( 5  Hump. ) 
332, and cases ci ted. 
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It is to be observed that in reference to jurisdiction of the
' person, the statutes of the states have provided for several kinds
of service of original process short of actual service on the party
to be brought before the court, and the nature and effect of this
service, and the purpose which it answers, depend altogether upon
the effect given to it by the statute. So also while the general
rule in regard to jurisdiction in rem requires the actual seizure
and possession of the res by the officer of the court, such jurisdic-
tion may be acquired by acts which are of equivalent import, and
which stand for and represent the dominion of the court over the
thing, and in effect subject it to the control of the court. Among
this latter class is the levy of a writ of attachment or seizure of
real estate, which being incapable of removal, and lying within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court, is for all practical pur-
poses brought under the jurisdiction of the court by the officer's
levy of the writ and return of that fact to the court. So the writ
of garnishment or attachment, or other form of service, on a
party holding a fund which becomes the subject of litigation.
brings that fund under the jurisdiction of the court, though the
money may remain in the actual custody of one not an officer of
the court.
\tl/hen we come to the application of these principles to the
case before us, that which leads to some embarrassment is the
complex character of the proceeding which we are to consider.
Its essential purpose or nature is to establish, by the judgment
of the court, a demand or claim against the defendant, [*318]
and to subject his property, lying within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the court, to the payment of that demand.
But the plaintiff is met at the commencement of his pro-
ceedings by the fact that the defendant is not within that territorial
jurisdiction, and cannot be served with any process by which he
can be brought personally within the power of the court. For
this difficulty the statute has provided a remedy. It says that.
upon affidavit being made of that fact, a writ of attachment may
be issued, and levied on any of the defendant's property, and a
publication may be made warning him to appear, and that there-
after the court may proceed in the case, whether he appears or
not.
If the defendant appears the cause becomes mainly a suit in
pen-onam, with the added incident, that the property attached re-
mains liable, under the control of the court, to answer to any de-
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It is to be observed that in reference to jurisdiction of the 
person, the statutes of the states have provided for several k inds 
of service of original process short of actual service on the party 
to be brought before the court, and the nature and effect of this 
service, and the purpose which it answers, depend altogether upon 
the effect given to it by the statute. So also while the general 
rule in regard to j urisdiction in rem requires the actual seizure 
and possess ion of the res by the officer of the court, such j urisdic­
tion may be acquired by acts which are of equ ivalent import, and 
which stand for and represent the dominion of the court over the 
thing, and in effect subj ect it to the control of the court. Among 
this latter class is the levy of a writ of attachment or seizure of 
real estate , wh ich being incapable of removal, and lying within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the court, is for all pract ical pur­
poses brought under the j urisdiction of the court by the officer's 
levy of the writ and return of that fact to the court. So the writ 
of garnishment or attachment, or other form of service, on a 
party holding a fund which becomes the subj ect of litigation , 
brings that fund under the j urisdiction of the court, though the 
money may remain in the actual custody of one not an officer of 
the court. 
\rVhen we come to the application of these principles to the 
case before us, that which leads to some embarrassment is the 
complex character of the proceeding which we are to consider. 
Its essential purpose or nature is to establ ish, by the j udgment 
of the court, a demand or claim against the defendant, [*318]  
and to subject h is  property, lying within the territorial jurisdic­
tion of the court, to the payment of that demand. 
But the plaintiff is met at the commencement of his pro­
ceedings by the fact that the defendant i s  not within that territorial 
jurisdiction , and cannot be served with any process by which he 
can be brought personally within the power of the court. For 
this difficulty the statute has provided a remedy. It says that. 
upon affidavit being made of that fact, a writ of attachment may 
be issued, and levied on any of the defendant's property, and a 
publication may be made warning him to appear, and that there­
after the court may proceed in the case, whether he appears or 
not. 
If the defendant appears the cause becomes mainly a suit in 
personam, with the added incident, that the property attached re­
mains l iable, under the control of the court , to answer to any de­
mand which may be established against the defendant by the final 
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judgment of the court. But, if there is no appearance of the de-
fendant, and no service of process on him, the case becomes, in
its essential nature, a proceeding in rem, the only effect of which
is to subject the property attached to the payment of the demand
which the court may find to be due to the plaintiff.
That such is the nature of this proceeding in this latter class
of cases, is clearly evinced by two well-established propositions:
first, the judgment of the court, though in form a personal judg-
ment against the defendant, has no effect beyond the property
attached in that suit. N 0 general execution can be issued for any
balance unpaid after the attached property is exhausted. No suit
can be maintained on such a judgment in the same court or in an
otaer. nor can 1 )e usu as evi ence in any other procee mg not
at ectmg the attached proper ', nor could t 1e cost -
mg ie co ec e o (e em an ' l
. .c1e< m t e sgjt. Second, the court, in such suit, cannot pro-
ceed unless the officer finds some property of defendant on which
to levy the writ of attachment. A return, that none can be found,
is the end of the case, and deprives the court of further jurisdic-
tion, [*319] though the publication may have been duly made and
proven in court.
Now, in this class of cases, on what does the jurisdiction of
the court depend? It seems to us that the seizure of the property,
or that which, in this case, is the same in effect, the levv of the
writ of attachment on it, is the one essential re uisite to 'urisdic-
tion, as it unr uestionabl is in roceedin s urel Ti em. VVitl1-
out this the court can proceed no further; with it the court can
proceed to subject that property to the demand of plaintiff. If
the writ of attachment is the lawful writ of the court, issued in
proper form under the seal of the court, and if it is by the proper
ofiicer levied upon property liable to the attachment, when such
a writ is returned into court, the power ofthe court over the res
islestablished. TI~Wit.
It may be a defective affidavit, or possibly the ofiicer whose duty
it is to issue the writ may have failed in some manner to observe
all the requisite formalities; but the writ being issued and levied,
the affidavit has served its purpose, and, though a revisory court
mi; ht see in some such departure from the strict direction Qf the
statute sufiicient error to reverse the 'ud ment vi c to
b the writ l ' d upon defendant’s roperty.
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j udgment of the court. But, i f  there is no appearance of the de­
tendant, and no service of process o n  him, the case becomes, in 
its essential nature, a proceeding in reni, the only effect of which 
is  to subject the property attached to the payment of the demand 
which the court may find to be due to the plaintiff. 
That such is the nature of this proceeding i n  this latter class 
of  cases, is  clearly evinced by two well-established propositions : 
first, the j udgment o f  the court, though in form a personal j udg­
ment against the de fendant, has no effect beyond the property 
attached in that suit. No general execution can be issued for any 
balance unpaid after the attached property is exhausted. No suit 
can be maintained on such a j udgment in the same court or in an 
other, nor can 1 e use as ev1 ence i n  any other procee mg not 
a ectmg the attached proper , nor could the cost 
1e m t e s..u.it.  Second, the court, in such suit, cannot pro-
'" . ceed unless the officer finds some property o f  defendant on wluch 
to levy the writ o f  attachment. A return, that none can be found, 
is the end of the case, and deprives the court of further j urisdic­
tion, [*319] though the publication may have been duly made and 
proven in court. 
Now, in this class of cases, on what does the j urisdiction o f  
the court depend ? I t  seems t o  us that the seizure o f  the property, 
or that ·which, in this case, is the same in effect, the levy of the 
writ of  attachment on it, is the one essential re uisite to · urisdic­
tion, as it unquestiona y is in proceedings purely in rem . With­
out this the court can proceed no further ; with i t  the court can 
proceed to subject that property to the demand of plaintiff. I f  
the writ of  attachment is  the lawful writ o f  the court,  issued in 
prpper form under the seal of the court, and i f  it is by the proper 
officer levied upon property liable to the attachment, when such 
a writ is returned into court, the power of the court over the res 
is . established . The affidavit is the preliminary to issuing the writ. 
It may be a defective affidavit, or possibly the officer whose duty 
it is to issue the writ may have failed in some manner to observe 
all the requisite formalities ; but the writ  being issued and levied, 
the affidavit has served its purpose. and. though a revisory court 
; jght see in some such departure from the strict direction of the 
statute sufficient error to reverse the 'udo-ment . to 
see n de rive the court o f  the 'u risdi · 
b the writ I · d upon defendant's roperty. 
So also of the pu l ication of not ice. I.Lis the duty oL the 
-----w-�- -
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court to order such ublicati ' * that i ‘ p-
er1' made and, undoubtedly, if there has been no such 'ut)li‘ —
tron, a court of errors m1g1 reverse the judgment. But \\-'l1§u__
the writ has been issued, the property seized and that I
_]l1I'15t 1ct1o11 or want 0 a sufficient ublicati t1ce. \Ve
(1-(_)_I1(T-ZIWII-1Ft_l1_t2—r€_33‘_E;E1—SFVl1lCl!d,—1i)t partaking of the na-
ture of proceedings in rem, when the judgment is to have an
effect on personal rights, as in divorce suits, or in proceedings
to compel conveyance, or other personal acts, in which the legis-
lature has properly made the jurisdiction to depend on this publi-
cation of notice, or on bringing the [*32o] suit to the notice of
the party in some other mode, when he is not within the territor-
ial jurisdiction.
lt is not denied that the court had authority to issue writs of
attachment against the property of persons absconding the state,
and that such writs could issue in actions for torts. The court
has a general jurisdiction as to torts, and attachment is one of
its remedial agencies in such cases. Wl1ether the writ should
have been issued simultaneousl with the institution of t 't,
or at some other stage of its rogress cannot '
'ur1s ' 1t is an ' other ' ff t Y's
rights ould as well be held to affect the 'urisdi ‘
artures from tie rules which should uide the court in the con-
The case of Voorhees v. re an of the nited States,
10 Peters 449, was much like this, and required stronger pre-
sumptions in favor of the jurisdiction of the court to sustain its
acts than the one before us. The defendant there, as here, held
land under attachment proceedings against a non—resident who
had never been served with process or appeared in the case. No
affidavit was produced, nor publication of notice, nor appraise-
ment. of the property, but it was condemned and sold without
waiting twelve months from the return of the writ, and without
calling him at three different terms of the court. all of which are
specially required by the act regulating the proceedings in Ohio.
where they were had. This court held that there was sufficient
evidence of jurisdiction in the court which rendered the judg-
ment, notwithstanding the defects we have mentioned, and that
they were not fatal in a collateral proceeding.
In the present case there is a sufficient writ of attachment,
















































































































































1§I.El\IF.N’I'S OF JURISDICTION I3I
the order to sell the property, the sale under the wnditioni ex-
jwnas, the writ of possession, sheriff's deed and [*32I] actual
delivery of possession under order of the court. To hold them
void is to overturn the uniform course of decisions in this court,
to unsettle titles to vast amounts of property, long held in reliance
on those decisions, and, in our judgment, would be to sacrifice
sound principle to barren technicalities; and, after a careful ex-
amination of the reported cases on this subject, we believe this to
be the law, as held by the courts of Tennessee.
] ud_g1ncnt reversed, and a new trial ordered.
FIELD, ]., dissenting. I dissent from the judgment in this
case. I am of opinion that the state court of Tennessee never
acquired jurisdiction in the case of Brownlow v. Reynolds.
DEEGAN v. STATE, for the use of STODDARD, Com’r., &c., in 1nd.
Sup. Ct., Nov. 4, 1886—108 Ind_ 155, 9 N. E. 148. t/
l\II'I‘CHELL, This was a suit by Stoddard, as drainage com-
missioner, against Margaret Deegan and her husband, to enforce
the collection of an assessment for drainage purposes against the
lands of Mrs. Deegan. The assessment was made in pursuance
of proceedings instituted and had under the circuit court act of
I88I as amended by the act of 1883. The complaint avers that
Paul Freed petitioned the Porter circuit court, setting forth the
necessity for the drainage of certain lands, and that he gave due
notice of the filing of such petition by posting up notices thereof
in three public [*r56] places in each township in which the lands
described in such petition were situate. The complaint avers that
such furtherproceedings were had in that behalf as that an assess-
ment of benefits amounting to $70 was made, and duly confirmed
against the appellee’s lands, and that the commissioner of drain-
age duly called for 80 per cent. thereof, which remains due and
unpaid. It is now said that, beca11S__,c__tl1§ complaint fails to_aver-
that the ap—pellants; la_n(ls~_were described in the petition, or that
‘ Either of__tl1é'aj§péIlants’ names appeared ' h etition or notice..
tt' was fat_ally defective, and tiat error was committed by the:
court belo\\/\if1__<)\7—rTulif177flTt:_a'_ demurrer thereto.
—€$_sFtiWfl1_€_—’___SElII1f;()Fj;l‘;'I7.(%StTB—l¥3_TTmT.‘_IT) a complaint in
the analogous case of ]acks0n V. State, 104 Ind. 516, where it was
















































































































































I32 CASES ON JUDGMENTS, ETC.
shows that a petition had been filed and notice given, and that
these were followed by such proceedings as resulted in a judg-
ment establishing the drain, and confirming the assessments, is
good as against a collateral attack. Where it ere
was a petition and notice, in a given case thus invokin the ‘uris-
(*1-’\r—'—-B"-'_""—__g_'i,¢1<m<)rme¢<mr<wemst1 |ect—matteran(lover1;>e1-sons af-
E~E~M.MQMQL—
\\ e m uged when tie rocee m re drawn in uestion
c?)ll_aterally, that the eti ' and notice were in all res ects su -
/ ‘ nd such as the law required. In-
aianajwlis, ctc., Co. v. State, 105 Ind. 37, 4 - . . 31 ; Pickering
v. State, 106 Ind. 228, 6 N. E. 611, and cases cited; McM-ullen v.
State, 105 Ind. 334, 4 N. E. 903. If assessments were made
against lands not described in the petition, or against persons
without an attempt to give such notice as the law requires, these
become matters of defense as against a complaint which alleges
a petition and notice.
There was a special finding of facts by the court, and con-
clusions of law stated thereon. j_*I57] It appears from the spec-
ial findings of the court that Freed, who petitioned for the ditch,
posted notices on March 19, 1883, of his intention to present his
petition for the establishment of the drain to the Porter circuit
court on the ninth day of the ensuing April, and that he did not
file his petition until the day after the notices were posted. The
proceefiggj having been instituteg undifi £83,
' h r 1' h ' he notices are
msted.,.4L' is now contended that, because there was no peti ion on
wwgmwws as the
subse uent proceedings wer vo . ills V. State, IO Ind. 114;
'To’n;;(Lvfp?T5',_2—3,_fidI._%-51-3’riggs v. Sneghan, 45 Ind. 14; and
Brooks V. Allen, 62 Ind. 4oI,—are relied on as sustaining this
view. The cases which lend any support to the position contended
for are cases which bring in question, on a direct appeal, the
validity of a summons issued in a civil case before the filing of a
complaint. They hold that a summons s0 issued is invalid and
void, and that. unless notice is waived by an appearance, a default
will not be authorized on such summons. VVithout further exam-
ination of these cases, they do not, in our opinion, exert a controll-
ing influence here, where the attack is collateral. The controlling
fact in the case we are considering is that ,3,t_tm_tjm§_thg_gourt
e roceedings and gave judgmen e as
















































































































































ICLEMENTS OF JURISDICTION I33
notice was r r l ' ut a ' ty.
In this preceeding we must assume that the court passed upon
and adjudged both the petition and notice sufficient. However
erroneous this judgment may have been, it was not void. Not
being void, it canriot be assailed, in this indirect method, for mere
irregularities and defects. This precise question was made and
determined in the case of ll/ICll[1lll£’7l v. State, supra.
As we find no error, the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
Where a statute of the state prescribed the method of accusation of
crime to be presentation of indictment by a grand jury to be selected by
the judges of election, a conviction of murder before a court having
jurisdiction to try for murder on proper indictment was attacked by
petition forrlhabeas corpus, on the ground that the conviction was void
for the reason’t]iat the presentation in this case was by a jury not com-
posed of electors, and not selected by the judges of election but by the
sheriff. HELD, that power to pass on the charge of murder included
the power to pass on the sufficiency of the accusation, and in sustaining
the charge the court of necessity held it suflicient in form. If in this
the court was wrong it was error, not want of jurisdiction. Ex Parte
Moran, (Court of App. 8th Cir., 1906), 144 Fed. 594, 75 C. C. A, 396.
In an action in equity to cancel a decree of foreclosure in a prior
suit, objection that the sheriff's return in the foreclosure case did not
show that the copy was left at the mortgagor's usual place of residence
as required by the statute was held not avaiilable in collateral attack,
because the court in decreeing the foreclosure necessarily passed on the
sufficiency of the return and service; and if it erred in this the error
could be corrected only by appeal. Kefehum v. While, 72 Iowa ‘I93, 33
N. W. 627.
Olir1er v Monona Cmmly, (1902), 117 Iowa 43, 90 N. W. 510, was
a suit to enjoin further construction of a public ditch and to enjoin
collection of assessments thereon, because the petition for the ditch did
not have the statutory number of freeholders signed thereto (100).
There were more than I00 signatures, some women, some non-residents,
some foreigners, etc., and not too freeholders. The court held the pro-
ceedings could not be attacked on that ground. saying: “It being con-
ceded that the petition was apparently sufificient, the determination by
the board, duly made of record, that it was in fact such as the law re-
quired—~involving as it did an adjudication as to whether I00 signers to the
petition were al-l voters of the courrty—was an adjudication of fact. which
cannot be inquired into in collateral proceedings." Bill dismissed.
Reid v, Morton (1886), 119 Ill. I18, 6 N. E. 414, was ejectment -by
former wards to recover against the vendee of their guardian. The
court overruled the objection that the petition for order to sell was not
properly signed, that the certifiacte for publication -was not properly signed,
that the land was situated outside of the city -where the court sat. that
the order of sale was made without sufiicient proofs, that the statute
had not been complied with in other respects, etc., saying: “Irregularities
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notice was perniaturely e-iyep, was at most hut an jqegnltwity. 
In this preceeding we must assume that the court passed upon 
and adjudged both the petition and notice sufficient. However 
erroneous this j udgment may have been, it was not void. Not 
being void ,  it cannot be assailed , in this indirect method, fur mere 
irregularities and defects. This precise question was made and 
determined in the case of lvfc�Mullen v. State, supra. 
As we find no error, the judgment is affirmed, with costs. 
Where a statute of the state prescribed the method of accusation of 
crime to be presentation of indictment by a grand j ury to be selected by 
the j�dges of  election. a conviction of murder before a court haV'ing 
jurisdiction to try for murder on proper in<lictment was attacked by 
petition for 'habeas corpus, on the ground that the conviction was void 
for the reason -iliaf the presentation in this case was by a j ury not com­
posed of dedors, and not selected by the judges of election but by the 
sheriff. HE·LD, that po�r to pass on the charge of murder included 
the power to pass on t!M! sufficieocy of the accusation, and in sustaining 
the charge the court of necessity held it sufficient in form. I f  in  this 
the court was wrong it was error, not want of j urisdiction. Ex Parte 
Moran, (Court of App. 8th Cir., 1<)o6) , 144 Fed. 594 75 C. C. A. yfi. 
In an action in equity to cancel a decree of foreclosure in a prior 
suit, objection that the sheriff's return in the foreclosure case did not 
show that the copy was left at the mortgagor's usual place of residence 
as requi red by the statute was held not avaj.lable in collateral attack, 
because the court in decreeing the foreclosure necessarily passed 0111 the 
sufficiency of the return and service ; and if it erred in this the ert"or 
could be corrected only by appeal . Ketchum v. White, 72 Iowa ' 193. 33 
N. W. 6'27. 
Oliver v Mottona Count:.•, ( 1902) , 1 17 Iowa 43, 90 N. W. 5 10, was 
a suit to enjoin furrher construction of a public d�tch and to enjoin 
col lection of  assessments thereon, because the petition for the ditch did 
not have the statutory numher- of freeholders signed thereto (100) . 
There were more than 100 signatures, some women, some non-residents. 
some foreigners, etc., and not 100 freeholders. The court he.Jd the pro­
ceedings could not be attacked on that ground, saying : "It being con­
ceded that the petition was apparently sufficient, the determination by 
the board, duly made of record, that it was in fact such as the law re­
quired-irwolving as it did an adjudication as to whether 100 signers to the 
peliition were all voters of the courrty-was an adj udication of fact, which 
cannot ·he inquired into in collate ral proceedings." Bill dismissed. 
Reid v� Morion ( 1886) , 1 19 J l l .  n8, 6 N. E. 414, was ejectment by 
former wards to recover against the vendee o f  their guardian. The 
court overruled the objection that the petition for order to sell was not 
properly signed, that the certifiacte for publ ication .was not properly sig11ed, 
that the Land was situated outside of the city where the court sat, that 
the order of sale was made without sufficient proofs, that the statute 
had not been complied with in other respects, etc., saying : "Irregularities 
and errors in the course of the proceeding are inisisted upon as invalidat-
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ing the guardian’s sale. It is certainly the well settled general rule that,
where a court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties
to the litigation, its judgments and decrees will be held valid when
questioned collaterally. And this court has many times applied the rule
in the very case of this special statutory and extraordinary proceeding
of a guardian’s sale, which this is so much dwelt upon as being."
An early Alabama decision upheld the title of a purchaser at an
administrator's sale made without obeying several provisions of a stat-
ute providing that “any order of sale, and sale, made without a com-
pliance with the requisitions of this act, shall be wholly void.” The
court held that “this art” meant this section; but the reasons given for
so holding would equally sustain the contention that the statute applied
only to direct attacks. The following is from the opinion of the court
in this case: “It is argued for the appellants, that under the last clause
of the fifth section of this statute [above quoted], every order of sale
and sale, made without a compliance with each of the several requistions
of the five sections above noticed, is wholly void. \r\/e cannot assent
to such a proposition. The maintenance of it would lead to consequences
alike absured and injurious. lt would make a strict compliance with a
large number of statutory requisitions the unyielding standard of the
validity of all orders of sale. Some of those requisitions pertain to
matters not evidenced by the record. For example, a decree of sale
would be void, if the guardian ad litem were of kin to the administrator,
or if there was an inaccuracy in the list or description of the heirs, or
their residences, or if the directions as to the mode and time of giving
notices were not strictly observed. One desiring to purchase at the sale
would be unable to ascertain, by an examination of the record and
papers, whether the title would be valid. After making the most care-
ful inquiry, and finding no defect in the proceedings, and therefore
venturing on a purchase, his title might be defeated by evidence that
there was some heir whose name was overlooked or forgotten by the
administrator, or not known by him, and, therefore, not inserted in his
petition. In like manner, his title might be defeated by a mistake as to
the residence of any one or more of the heirs. Many other equally
forcible illustrations of the unavoidable and irrcmcdiable uncertainty of
such sales might be given.
“When it is considere(l that the probate judges do not usually be-
long to the profession of the law, and are not chosen generally for their
legal attainments, it is not dilhcult to preceive that, if the proposition as-
serted !by the counsel should be maintained, a valid sale of land under the
order of the probate court, since the date of the act of 1854, would
he an exception to a general rule. Not merely the tendency, but the
inevitable effect of such a decision, would be to destroy confidence in
such sales, and cause great injury to heirs by sales at greatly depreciated
prices, when an exceptional case of a compliance with the numerous re-
quistions of the statute occurs. The legislature will be held to have
absurdly subverted its own purpose of ben-efitting estates, by affording a
safe. cheap, and expeditious mode of accomplishing the sales required
by the process of administration, with the strictest care for the interest
of the persons interested; and to have adopted a plan which would lead
to the sacrifice of estates.
“The courts of the country would be filled with suits, in which the
















































































































































1 34 CASES ON J l'.DG �t EXTS, ETC. 
ing the guardian's sale. It is certainly the well settled general rule that, 
where a court has jurisdiction of the subj ect-matter and of the parties 
to the l itigation, its j udgments and decrees will be held valid when 
quest ioned collaterally. And th is  court has many times applied the rule 
in the ve ry case of this special statutory and extra.ordinary proceeding 
of  a guardian's sale, which th is  i s  so much dwelt upon as bei11g." 
An early Alabama deci sion uphe ld the tit le o f  a purchaser at an 
administrator's sale made without obeying several provisions of a stat­
ute provi(Jlng that "any order of sale,  and sale., made wi thout a com­
pl iance with the requisit ions of this act, shaJI be wholly void." The 
court held that "this act" meant t li is sectio n ;  but the reasons given for 
so holding would equally sustain the contention that the statute appl ied 
only to d i rect attacks. The fol lowing i s  f rom the opinion o f  the court 
in th is case : "It is  argued for the appel l'ants, that under the last clause 
o f  the fi fth section o f  this statute [above quoted] ,  every order of sale 
and sale, made without a compl iance wi th each of the several requistions 
of the five sect ions above noticed, is wholly void. \Ve cannot assent 
to such a proposition. The maintenance of i t  wou ld lead to consequences 
alike absured and inj nriom. It would make a strict compl-iance with a 
large number o f  statutory requisit ions the unyielding standard o f  the 
vali dity of all  orders of sale. Some of  those requis i t ions pertain to 
matters n'Ot evidenced by the record. For example, a decree o f  sale 
wot:ld be void, i f  the guardian ad /item were o f  kin to the admi n i st rator, 
or if tht• re w a s  an inaccuracy in the list or description of the hei rs, or 
their res i dences, or  i f  the di rections as to the mode and time of  giving 
notices were not stri.:tly ohserved. One desiring to purchase at the sale 
would be unabl e to ascertain, by an examination of the record and 
papers. whether the �itlc would be valid. After making the most care­
ful  inqui ry, and finding 1 10 defrct in the proceedings, and therefore 
venturi•1g 0!1 a purchase, his  title might be defeated by evidence that 
there was some heir whose name was overlooked or forgotten by the 
admin istrator, or not known by him, and, there fore, not inserted in h is  
peti tion. In like manner, his title might be de feated by a mistake as to 
the res idence of any one or more o f  the heirs. Many other equally 
forcib'.e i l lustrations of the unavoidable and i rremediable uncertainty of 
such sales mig1ht be given. 
"W hen it is con s idered that the probate judges do not usually he­
long to the profession o f  the  law, and are not chosen generally for their 
l egal attainments ,  it i s  not d ifficult to preceive that, if the proposition as­
serted hy the counsel  should be maintained, a valid sale of land under the 
order  o f  the probate court, s ince th e date of the act of 1854, would 
he an except ion to a general rule. Not merely the tendency, but the 
ineYitahlc e ffect of  such a dec ision, would he to destroy conlidence in 
rnd1 sales ,  and cause great in jury to heirs by sales a t  greatly depreciated 
pr ice' s ,  when  an  exce-ptional case o f  a compl iance with the numerous re­
q1 1 i s t io ' ls  o f  the  statute occurs.  The legislature wi l l  be held to have 
absurdly sub\·erted i ts  own purpose of bencfi tt ing estates, by affording a 
sa fe, cheap, and r.xpedit ious mode o f  accomplishing the sales required  
b y  the  process of  administration, with the  strictest care for  the  interest 
o f  t h e  persons intere . .;ted ; and to have adopted a plan which wou ld  lead 
to the s:i.crifice  of  estates. 
"The courts of the country would be fi l led wi th suits, i n  which the 
val id ity of sales will be contested upon the quest ion of a compliance 
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with all the minute details of the machinery by which the sale was
reached. The absurd and ruinous consequences of a statute which is
plain, afford no justification for setting it aside by the courts; * * *
but i-f there is uncertainty and obscurity in the law, such consideration
may be taken into view, as a help to the ascertainment of the legislative
intention. Sate/1er v. Sarrlierlr Admr., 41 Ala. 26, 91 Am. Dec. 498; to the
same effect, Woerner on Administration § 145.
TERRILL v. AUCHAUER, in Ohio Sup. Ct., I862—I4 Ohio St. 80.
Action in Muskingum county common pleas by Terrill to
recover real property, alleging that he is owner in fee, and that
Auchauer unlawfully kept him out of possession. General denial
by defendant and judgment for defendant. Plaintiff brings error.
Both parties claim under John T. Brown. Oct. 27, 1855,
Brown and wife gave a trust deed mortgage on the land to one
Thomas, recorded the same day. Sept. 10, 1856, Brown and
wife gave another trust deed mortg age on the same land to se-
cure a debt due Terrill. The debt secured by the Thomas trust
deed being unpaid and past due, the assignee of the debt ins-tituted
proceedings to foreclose, on which Auchauer and another ap-
pointed by the sheriff for that purpose appraised the property at
$580. Terrill and the other lien holders were made defendants in
that suit. Later the sheriff advertised and sold the land under the
order of the court at auction to the highest l)l(l(l€l',_:\l1Cll3Ll€I',
for $511, Aug. I, 1859, and the sale was confirmed by the court
Aug. 25, without objection by any party, and the proceeds ap-
plied in payment of the mortgage debt. The note to Terrill being
due and unpaid, the trustee, in conformity to the terms of the
trust deed given to secure it, conveyed the land in fee to Terrill,
the creditor, june 30, I860.
BRINKERIIOFF, J. * * * The sale and conveyance to the defend-
ant, Auchauer, having been made under a decree upon a mort-
a e riot, in date and record to the trust deed under 'hich
Terrill, the ainti , claims; the plaintiff, in argument, tacitly
a.\tli1_1i't?,_-a.s_FePTum_li_a?I-t-lie sale to the defendant, Auchauer,
been in all respects regularly made, he would have the better
title to the premises in question. hit it is contended by the
plaintiff, that inasmuch as .~\uchauer was one of the a raisers
of the premises sold, the suhsc uent sa e con rmation. and con-
veyafife fo H81] him, were an absolute nullity, of which the
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with a l l  the minute details o f  t h e  mach inery by which the sale was 
reached. The absurd and ruinous con sequences of a statute which is  
plain,  a fford no j usti ticat ion for sett ing i t  aside by the courts ; * * * 
but i·f there is unce rtainty and obscurity in the law, such con sideration 
may be taken into view, a s  a help to the ascertain ment o f  the legi slative 
i ntcnt icn.  Satcher '" Satclier's .Admr. ,  41  Ala.  26, 91 Am. Dec. 493 ; to the 
sam e e ffect, \Voerner on Administration § 1 45. 
TERRILL v. AliCHAli ER, in Ohio Sup. Ct., 1862-14 Ohio St. So. 
Action in l\[uskingum county common 'pleas by Terri ll to 
recover real property, alleging that he is owner in fee, and that 
Auchauer unlaw fully kept him out of possession. General cknial 
by defendant and judgment for defendant. Plain tiff brings error. 
Both parties claim under John T. Brown. Oct. 27, 1 85 5 , 
Drown and \vife gave a trust deed mortgage on the land to one 
Thomas, recorded the same day. Sept .  10,  1 856, Brown and 
wife gave another trust deed mortgage on the same land to se­
cure a debt due Terrill. The debt secured by the Thomas trust 
deed being unpaid and past due, the assignee of the debt instituted 
proceedings to foreclose, on which Auchauer and another ap­
pointed by the sheriff for that purpose appra i sed the property at 
$s8o. Terrill and the other l ien holders were made de fendants  in  
that suit. Later the sheriff advertised and sold the la1'.ld under the 
order of  the court at  auction to the highest bidder, . :\uchauer, 
for $5 I 1 ,  Aug. 1 ,  1 859, and the sale was confirmed by the con rt 
Aug. 25, without obj ection by any party, and the proceeds ap­
plied in payment of  the mortgage debt. The note to Terrill bei ng 
due and unpaid, the trustee, in conformity to the terms of the 
trust deed given to secure it, conveyed the land in fee to 'I'err i l l ,  
the cred itor,  June 30, 186o. 
DtuK KER II OFF_. J. * * * The sale and conveyance to the de fend­
ant, Auchauer, having been made under a decree upon a mort-
a e rior, in date and record to the tru st <leed under ·hich 
Terrill , the amt1 , claims ; the pla int iff.  in a rgument, tacit ly 
a m1ts , a s  he mu s t ,  that rn<  t e sale to the de fendan t .  :\uchauer , 
been in all  respects reg-nhrly macle.  he wonltl have the better 
tit le to the premiSC'S in  question . J1ut i t  i s  contended by the 
plaint iff,  that inasmuch a s  :\uchauer w a s  one o f  the a raisers 
of the premises mid ,  the suhs�·�ue1 1t  sa e, con rmat ion , ar!!I con­
,:Cyance to [*841 him, were an absolute 1 1 1 1 !//tv, of wh ich the 
plamfiff 1s enfttietl to take advan tage in th i s  pi;cee< l ing. under 
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§ 441 of the code of civil procedure. That section provides that
"no sheriff or other ofiicer making the sale of property. shall.
either directly or indirectly, purchase the same, and every purchase
so made shall be considered fraudulent and ‘Z-'oia'.”
The question is not made by the pleadings in the case
whether—taking the sale, for the reason alleged, to have been
an absolute nullity, the defendant is not substituted, by way of
equitable defense, to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee,
and to hold the premises as a mortgagee in possession until the
amount paid by him to satisfy preferable liens is reimbursed to
him; nor is it made a question—though, in my opinion, it is a
very serious one—whether, under the legislation and policy of
Ohio, a’s_ale, without appraisement under a deed of trust in the
nature of a mortgage is admissible; and we therefore pass them
over, and proceed to consider and determine the case upon the
the question which arises upon the construction of the clause
of the statute above quoted.
And taking the case as if dependent on that question alone,
then, if a sale to an appraiser be a-bsolu-tely 2-old, so that it may
be impeached in a collateral proceeding, it follows that the de-
fendant has no legal title to the premises in controversy; but if
the sale be voidable only, and good until avoided by a direct
interposition or proceeding for that purpose, then he has a legal
title to the premises, and the judgment of the court below was
right.
The language of the statute is, “every purchase so made
shall be considered fraudulent and 'z-'0ia'.” What is the precise
idea which the legislature intended to express in the use of this
language? VVas it intended that such sales, and all conveyances
made in pursuance of them, should be, as to all the world, and
under all circumstances, as if they had never been made—how—
ever advantageous the sale may have been to all parties interested.
and however desirous such parties might be to maintain and en-
force it? Or was it intended only. that whenever a party inter-
ested in the sale [*85] should directly interpose, or institute a
porceeding to avoid the sale. it should “be considered,” that is to
say adjudged by the court, that the fact of the purchaser having
been an appraiser was conclusive evidence of fraud, and that
the sale should therefore "be considered” or adjudged void?
This is the question.
If the language of the statute were entirely unequivocal we
should be bound to follow it. to whatever consequences it might
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§ 441 of the code of civil procedure. That section provides that 
"no sheriff or other officer making the sale of property. shall. 
either directly or indirectly, purchase the same, and every purchase 
s0 made shall be considered fraudulent and void." 
The question is not made by the pleadings in the case 
whether-taking the $3.le, for the reason alleged , to have been 
an absolute nullity, the defendant is not substituted, by way of 
equitable defense, to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee, 
and to hold the premises as a mortgagee in possession until the 
amount paid bv him to satisfy preferable liens is reimbursed to 
him ; nor is it
· 
made a question-though, in my opinion, it is a 
very serious one-whether, under the legislation and policy of 
Ohio, a_ �ale, without appraisement under a deed of trust in tlie 
nature of a mortgage is admissible ; and we therefore pass them 
over, and proceed to consider and determine the case upon the 
the question which arises upon the construction of the clause 
of the statute above quoted. 
And taking the case as if dependent on that question alone, 
· then, if a sale to an appraiser be absolrtJely 'i!Oid, so that it may 
be impeached in a collateral proceeding, it follows that the de­
fendant has no legal title to the premises in controversy ; but i f  
the sale be voidable only, and good until avoided by a direct 
interposition or proceeding for that purpose, then he has a legal 
title to the premises, and the judgment of the court below was 
right. 
The language of the statute is, "every purchase so made 
shall be considered fraudulent and void." What is the precise 
idea which the legislature intended to express in the use of this 
language ? Was it intended that such sales, and all conveyances 
made in pursuance of them, should be, as to all the world, and 
under all circumstances, as if they had never been made-how­
ever advantageous the sale may have been to all parties interested, 
and however desirous such parties might be to maintain and en­
force it ? Or was it intended only, that whenever a party inter­
ested in the sale [*85] should directly interpose, or insti tute a 
porceeding to avoid the sale. it should "be considered," that is to 
say adjudged by the court, that the fact of the purchaser having 
been an appraiser was conclusive evidence of fraud, and that 
the sale should therefore "be considered" or adj udged void ? 
This is the question. 
If the language of the statute were entirely unequivocal we 
should be bound to follow it, to whatever consequences it might 
lead, short of a manifest absurdity. But this can hardly be said 
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of tl1e language of this clause of the statute. In common par-
lance, consideration means deliberation, thought; but in legal
phraseology, the c0nsidera!‘i0n of the court means the judgment
of the court: and “it is considered by the court" is equivalent to
“it is adjudged by the court.” The suggestion is, at least, not
without plausibility, that this language of the statute indicates a
rule prescribed as a guide to judicial action, when invoked for
the purpose, rather than a legislative fiat always and everywhere
operative irrespective of judicial action. * * *
In the construction of statutes we may look to the mischiefs,
if any, which the statute was designed to remedy, and also to
the consequences which would flow from any particular con-
struction; and if the statute be fairly susceptible of two different
constructions. we are at liberty to choose that one which, while
it remedies the mischief aimed at, avoids the absured or unjust
consequences which would flow from the other. Now, the mis-
chief which ' tatute aims to prevent is obviously that which
arises from fraudul ra ' a view to t e
at t e sa e. , is misc 1e 15 as effectually prevented by 0 ding
the sale to be voidable, at the option of the parties interested, on
a proceeding for that purpose, as it would be by holding it to be an
absolute nullity; while the injurious consequences,—which would
often follow if the sale be held to be strictly void,—of depriving
the parties interested of the benefit of a highly advantageous
sale, and a purchaser who, though held fraudulent by the policy
of the statute, may be wholly innocent in fact, of the purchase
money he had paid,—would be avoided. For it may well be, that
an appraiser may be willing to bid more for a parcel of real
estate than any one else; he may have bought at the request of
all the parties interested; and yet if his purchase be strictly void,
it can not stand, although all parties may be anxious to sanction
and confirm it. * * * [*88] * * *
It may be here said, however, that the plaintiff, Terrill, was
a party interested in the sale; and that he does wish to avoid it
by means of this suit. But not so. This is a suit for the re-
covery of land; and is not a suit to avoid the sale, in the sense
of causing it to be set aside and a new sale made, so that justice
may be done to all parties: but the circumstances would indicate
that he is wishing to atfirm the sale so far as to have a lien perfer-
able to his own, satisfied by the proceeds of the sale, and to
disafiirm it so far as necessary to enable him wrongfully to dis-
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of the language of this clause of the statute. In common par­
lance, consideration means deliberation, thought ; but in legal 
phraseoloey, the considera/'ion of the court means the judgment 
of the court ; and '·it is considered by the court" is equivalent to 
"it is adjudged by the court." The suggestion is, at lea t, not 
without plausibility, that this language of the statute indicate!:> a 
rule prescribed as a guide to judicial action, when invoked for 
the pu rpose, rather than a legislative fiat always and everywhere 
operative irrespective of judicial action. * * * 
Tn the construction of statutes we may look to the mi chiefs, 
if  any, which the statute was designed to remedy, and also to 
the consequences which would flow from any particular con-
truction : and if the statute be fairly susceptible of two d ifferent 
constructions. we are at liberty to choose that one which, while 
it remedies the mischief aimed at, avoids the absured or unj ust 
consequences which would flow from the other. Now, the mis­
chief whic t · statute aims to prevent is obviously that which 
arises from fraudul ra a view to t e 
in iv1 ual advantage of the appraiser when he becomes a bid<ler 
at the sale. , This m1sch1ef is as effectually prevented by holding · 
the sale to be voidable. at the option of the parties interested, on 
a proceeding for that purpose, as i t  would be by holding it to be an 
absolute nullity ; while the injurious consequences,-which would 
often follow if the sale be held to be strictly void ,-of depriving 
the parties interested of the benefit of a highly advantageous 
sale, and a purchaser who, though held fraudulent by the policy 
of the statute, may be wholly innocent in fact, of the purchase 
money he had paid,-would be avoided. For it may well be, that 
an appraiser may be willing to bid more for a parcel of real 
estate than any one else ; he may have bought at the request of  
all the parties interested ; and yet if  h i s  purchase be  strictly voicl, 
it can not stand, although all parties may be anxious to sanction 
and confirm it. * * * [ *88 ] * * * 
It may be here said, however, that the plaintiff, Terri11 , was 
a party interested in the sale ; and that he does wish to avoid it 
by means of this suit. But not so. This is a S\tit for the re­
covery of land ; and is not a suit to avoid the sale, in the sense 
of causing it to be set aside and a new sale made, so that j ustice 
may be done to all parties : but the ci rcumstances would ind icate 
that he is wishing to affirm the sale so far as to have a lien perfer­
able to his own, satisfied by the proceeds of the sale, and to 
disaffirm it  so far as necessary to enable him wrongfully to dis-
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possess the purchaser, and to appropriate the land under his own
junior lien. With such a disaffirmance we can have no special
sympathy. * * *
Judgment affirmed.
P1-:cx, C. J., GIIOI.SON and Scorr, JJ., concurred.
J., dissented.
R.\ .\' x i-LY,
WINDSOR v. McVEIGlI, in U. s. Sup. Ct., 1876-93 U. s. (3 0m) 27+
FIELD, J. This was an action of ejectment to recover certain
real [*275] property in the city of Alexandria, in the state of
Yirginia. It was brought in the corporation court of that city,
and a writ of error from the court of appeals of the state to re-
view the judgment obtained having been refused, the case was
brought here directly by a writ of error from this court. Author-
ity for this mode of procedure will be found stated in the case of
Gregor v. Mel/ef_glz, 23 \Vallace 294.
The plaintiff in the corporation court proved title in himself
to the premises in controversy, and consequent right to their im-
mediate possession, unless his life-estate in them had been divest-
ed by a sale under a decree of condemnation rendered in March,
1864, by the District Court of the United States for the Eastern
District of Virginia, upon proceedings for their confiscation. The
defendant relied upon the deed to his grantor executed by the
marshal of the district upon such sale. l
The proceedings mentioned were instituted under the act of
Congress of July I7, 1862, “to suppress insurrection, to punish
treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of
rebels, and for other purposes.”
In July, 1863, the premises in controversy were seized by
the marshal of the district, by order of the district attorney, act-
mg under instructions from the attorney-general. In August
following, a libel of information against the property was filed in
the name of the Iinited States, setting forth that the plaintiff in
this case was the owner of the property in question; that he had.
since the passage of the above act, held an office of honor and
trust under the government of the so-called Confederate States,
and in various ways had given aid and comfort to the rebellion;
that the property had been seized in pursuance of the act in com-
pliance with instructions from the attorney-general, and, by rea-
son of the premises, was forfeited to the United States, and
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pos�ess the purchaser, an<l to appropr iate the land under  his own 
j unio r l ien . \\" ith such a disaffirmance we can have no spec ial 
sympathy. * * * 
Judgment affirm ed. 
P1�cK, C. J . ,  Gno1.sox and ScoTT, JJ . ,  concurre<l. R.\ !'\ X EY, 
] . ,  dissented. 
W I �DSOR v. l\kVEIGII ,  in  U. S. Sup. Ct . ,  1876-93 U. S. (3 Otto ) 27+ 
FI ELD, J . This was an action of ej ectmen t to recover certain 
real [ * 2 75]  property in the city of  A lcxan<lria, in the state of 
V irgin ia . It was brough t in  the corporation court of that city, 
and a writ of error from the court of appeal s of the state to re­
view the j u<lgment obta ined having been refused, the case was 
brought here direct ly by a writ of error from th i s court. Au thor­
ity for this mode o f  procedure wil l  be found stated in the case of  
Gregor v .  JlcVeigli, 23 \Vallace 294. 
The plaintiff in the corporation court proved title in himsel f 
to the premises in controversy, and consequent r ight to their im­
mediate possession, un less his li fe-estate in  them had been divest­
ed hy a sale under a decree of condemnation rendered in  l\Iarch , 
1 864, by the District Court of the United States for the Eastern 
District of Virginia,  upon proceed ings for their confiscation. (The 
defendant relied upon the deed to his grantor executed by the 
marshal of the district upon such sale. I 
The proceed ings mentioned were inst ituted under the act of 
Congress of Ju ly 17,  1 862, "to suppress insurrection , to punish 
treason and rebel l ion, to seize and confiscate the property of 
retcls ,  and for other purposes." 
Jn July,  1 863, the premises in controversy were seized by 
t he marshal of the district ,  by order of the d istrict attorney, act­
mg u nder instructions from the attorney-general. In :\ugust 
fol lowing, a l ibel of  in fo rmat ion against the property was filed in 
the name of the l�nited States, setting forth that the pla in t iff in 
th is case was the owner of  the property in  question ; that he had . 
since the passage of the above act, held an office of honor and 
trust  under the government o f  the so-called Con federat<.' Stat es, 
an ti in various ways had g iven aid and com fort to the rebell ion ; 
that the property had been seized in pursuance of the act in  com­
pliance with ins tructions from the attorney-general , and, by rea· 
son of the prem ises, was forfeited to the Cnited States,  and 
should he con demned . I t  closed with a prayer that process o f  
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monition might issue against the owner or owners of the prop-
erty and all persons interested or claiming an interest therein,
warning them at some early day “to appear and answer” the libel ;
and, as the owner of the property was a non-resident and absent,
that an order of publication in the usual form be also made. Upon
this libel the district judge ordered process of monition to issue
as prayed, and designated [*276] a day and place for the trial of
the cause, and that notice of the same, with the substance of the
Iibcl, should be given by publication in a newspaper of the city,
and by posting at the door of the court-house. The process of
monition and notice were accordingly issued and published. Both
described the land and mentioned its seizure, and named the day
and place fixed for the trial. The monition stated that at the
trial all persons interested in the land, or claiming an interest,
might “appear and make their allegations in that behalf.” The
notice warned all persons to appear at the trial, “to show cause
why condefnnation should not be decreed, and to intervene for
their interest.”
\The owner of the property, in response to the monition and
notice, appeared by counsel, and filed a claim to the property
and an answer to thelibel. Subsequently, on the 10th of March.
1864, the district attorney moved that the claim and answer and
the appearance of the respondent by counsel be stricken from the
files, on the ground that it appeared from his answer that he
was at the time of filing the same “a resident within the city of
Richmond, within the confederate lines, and a rebel.” \On the
same day the motion was granted, and the claim and answer
ordered to be stricken from the files. The appearance of the
respondent was by his answer. The court immediately entered
its sentence and decree, condemning the property as forfeited to
the United States, reciting that, the usual proclamation having
been made, the default of all persons had been duly entered.
The decree ordered the issue of a z'endz'tz'0m' m-ponas for the sale
of the property, returnable on the sixteenth day of the following
April. At the sale under this writ the grantor of the defendant
became the purchaser.
The question for determination is,_whether the decree of
condemnation thus re_n-(l‘er_e(l‘,_\‘vit_h’oi1t_allowing the ‘owner of the
property to appear in response to the monition, interpose his
claim for the property, and answer the libel, was of any validity.
In other words, the question is, whether the property of the plain-
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monition might issue against the owner or owners of the prop­
erty and all persons interested or claiming an interest therein, 
warning them at some early day ' ' to appear and answer" the libel ; 
and, as the owner o f  the property was a non-resident and absent, 
that an order of publication in the usual form be also made. Upon 
this l ibel the district j udge ordered process of monition to issue 
as prayed, and designated [ *276] a day and place for the trial of 
the cause, and that notice of the same, with the substance of the 
libe l ,  should be given by publication in a newsp<tper of the city, 
and by posting at the door of the court-house. The process of 
monition and notice were accordingly issued and publ ished. Both 
described the land and mentioned its seizure, and named the day 
and place fixed for the trial. The monition stated that at the 
trial all persons interested in the land, or claiming an interest, 
might "appear and make their allegations in that behalf." The 
notice warned all persons to appear at the trial, "to show cause 
why condemnation should not be decreed, and to intervene for 
their interest. ' ; \ The owner of the property, in response to the monition and 
notice, appeared by counsel, and filed a claim to the property 
and an answer to the libel. Subsequently, on the 10th of March . 
1 864, the district attorney moved that the claim and answer and 
the appearance of the respondent by counsel be stricken from the 
files, on the ground that it appeared from his answer that he 
was at the time of filing the same "a resident within the city of 
Richmond, within the confederate lines ,  and a rebel ." \ On the 
same day the motion was granted, and the claim and answer t­
ordered to be stricken from the files. The appearance of the 
respondent was by his answer. The court immediately entered 
its sentence and decree, condemning the property as forfeited to 
the L'nited States, reciting that, the usual proclamation having 
been made , the default of all persons had been duly entered . 
The decree ordered the issue of a venditioni e.rponas for the sale 
of the property, returnable on the sixteenth clay of the following 
April . At  the sale under this writ the granter of the defendant 
became the purchase r. 
The question for determination is. whether the decree of 
condemnation thus ren(lereJ,-,\.itlloi1t alicm:i�g the -owner of die 
property to appear in response to the monition, interpose h i s  
claim for the property, and answer the lihel, was  of any val idity. 
In other words, the question is ,  whether the property o f  the plain­
tiff could be forfeited by the sentence of the court in a j udicial 
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proceeding to which he was not allowed to appear and make
answer to the charges against him, upon the allegation of which
the forfeiture was demanded. [*277]
There were several libels of information filed against the
property of the plaintiff at the same time with the one here men-
tioned. They were identical in their allegations, except as to the
property seized, and the same motion to strike from the files the
appearance, claim, and answer of the respondent was made in
each case, and on the same day, and similar orders were entered
and like decrees of condemnation. One of these was brought
here, and is reported in the Ilth of Wallace. In delivering the
unanimous opinion of this court, upon reversing the decree in the
case, and referring to the order striking out the claim and answer,
Mr. Justice Swayne said: (“The order in effect denied the re-‘
spondent a hearing. It is alleged he was in the position of an
alien enemy, and could have no locus standi in that forum. If
assailed there, he could defend there. The liability and right are
inseparable. A different result would be a blot upon our juris-
prudence and civilization. We cannot hesitate or doubt on the
subject. It would be contrary to the first principles of the social
compact and of the right administration of justice.” M cl/eigh v.
United States, 78 U. S. (11 Wall.) 259, 267.
' The principle stated in this terse language lies at the founda-
tion of all well—ordered systems of jurisprudence. Wherever one
is assailed in his person or his ro ert * h ' defend fo
il1.£_1£l-rl'l_ll'5£(_iI;lg__t_iI£J',u5:p2&3¢blE_ This is a principle of
natura justice, recognized as such by the common intelligence
and conscience of all nations. A sentence of a court pronounced
against a party without hearin-—\_'_Mhim ‘or gwm gnnano pportun-
ity to be heard, is not a judicial determination of his rights, and
s no ent1te to res ec m an ot er a.
That there must be notice to a party of some kind, actual or
constructive, to a valid judgment afiecting his rights, is admitted.
Until notice is given, the court has no jurisdiction in any case
to proceed to judgment, whatever its authority may be, by the
law of its organization, over the subject-matter. But notice is
only for the purpose of affording the party an opportunity of
being heard upon the claim or the charges made; it is a summons
to him to appear and speak, if he has any thing to say, why the
judgment sought should not be rendered. A denial to a party of
the benefit of a notice would be in effect to [*278] deny that he is
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proceeding to which he was not allowed to appear and make \ 
answer to the charges against him, upon the allegation of which 
the forfeiture was demanded. [*277]  
There were several libels of  information filed against the 
property of the plaintiff at the same time with the one here men ­
tioned. They were identical in their allegations, except as to thi! 
property seized, and the same motion to strike from the files the 
appearance, claim, and answer of the respondent was made in 
each case, and on the same day, and similar orders were enterell 
and like decrees of condemnation . One of these was brought 
here, and is reported in the 1 1 th of Wallace. In delivering the 
unanimous opinion of this court, upon reversing the decree in the 
case, and referring to the order striking out the claim and answer, 
M r. Justice Swayne said : ( "The order in effect denied the re-
' 
spondent a hearing. It is alleged he was in the position of an ·: 
alien enemy, and could have no locus standi in that forum. If  
assailed there, he could defend there. The l iabil ity and right are 
inseparable. A different result would be a blot upon our j uris­
prudence and civilization. We cannot hesitate or doubt on the 
subject. It would be contrary to the first principles of the social 
compact and of the right administration of j ustice." M cVeigli v. 
United States, 78 U. S. ( I I  \Vall . )  259, 267. 
· 
The principle stated in this terse language lies at the founda­
tion of all well-ordered systems o f  jurisprudence. Wherever one 
is assailed in his person or his ro ert ..,._- ef end fo 
t e 1a 1 1ty an e ng t are inseparable This is a principle of 
natural j ustice, recognized as such by the common intell igence 
and conscience of all nations. A sentence of a court pronounced 
against a party without hearing him, or givmg him an opportli'i"i-
"'ity to be heard, is not a j udicial determination of his rights, �d 
"is not entitled to respect m any other tribunal. 
That there must be notice to a party of some kind, actual or 
constructive, to a valid j udgment affecting his rights, is admitted. 
Until notice is given, the court has no jurisdiction in any case 
to proceed to judgment, whatever its authority may be, by the 
law of its organization, over the subject-matter. But notice is 
only for the purpose of affording the party an opportunity of 
being heard upon the claim or the charges made ; it is a summons 
to him to appear and speak, if he has any thing to say, why the 
judgment sought should not be rendered. A denial to a party of 
1 the benefit of a notice would be in effect to [*278] deny that he is 
entitled to notice at all, and the sham and deceptive proceeding 
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had better be omitted altogether. \It would be like saying to 1
party, Appear, and you shall be heard; and, when he has appeare
saying, Your appearance shall not be recognized, and you shal
not be heard. In the present case, the district court not only effect said this, but immediately added a decree of condemnatio ,
reciting that the default of all persons had been duly entered.
It is difiicult to speak of a decree thus rendered with moderation-
it was in fact a mere arbitrary edict, clothed in the form of
judicial sentence.
The law is, and always has been, that whenever notice or
citation is required, the party cited has the right to appear and b{
heard; and when the latter is denied, the former is ineffectna
for any purpose. The denial to a party in such a case of the
right to appear is in legal effect the recall of the citation to him.
The period within which the appearance must be made and the
right to be heard exercised is, of course, a matter of regulation,
depending either upon positive law, or the rules or orders of the
court, or the established practice in such cases. And if the ap-
pearance be not made, and the right to be heard be not exercised,
within the period thus prescribed, the default of the party prose-
cuted, or possible claimants of the property, may, of course, be
entered, and the allegations of the libel be taken as true for the
purpose of the proceeding. But the denial of the right to appear
and be heard at all is a different matter altogether.
The position of the defendant’s counsel is, that, as the pro-
ceeding for the confiscation of the property was one in rem, the
court, by seizure of the property, acquired jurisdiction to deter-
mine its liability to forfeiture, and consequently had a right to
decide all questions subsequently arising in the progress of the
cause; and its decree, however erroneous, cannot, therefore. be
collaterally assailed. In supposed support of this position, opin-
ions of this court in several cases are cited, where similar language
is used respecting the power of a court to pass upon questions
arising after jurisdiction has attached. But the preliminary
proposition of the counsel is not correct. The jurisdiction ac-
quired by the court by seizure of the res was not to condemn the
property without further proceedings. The physical [*z7g]
seizure did not of itself establish the allegations of the libel, and
could not, therefore, authorize the immediate forfeiture of the
property seized. A sentence rendered simply from the fact of
seizufe would not be a judicial determination of the question of
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seizure in a suit in rem only brings the property seized within the
custody of the court, and informs the owner of that fact. Db
theory of the law is that all ro)ert* is in the ossession of its
owner, in person or by agent, and that its seizure will, therefore,
Wmiijiart notiE to him. Where notice is thus given, the
-memme riglitrtoiappear and be heard respecting the charges
for which the forfeiture is claimed. That right must be recog-
nized and its exercise allowed before the court can proceed be-
yond the seizure to judgment. The jurisdiction ac uired bvj_h<;
seizure is not to pass upon themfififgffiiwmufiajgbsamelyt,
T)Ti't'_t'oo[)_as_s'1_11_)E)"ri‘tl1_zt—t‘?]iiestion after 05 o’r“t_uuit -' ‘ .hci:n_a.f£o.tde.tl
t ' owner and parties mterested to appear and be heard u on
.mmmmmamfis.
be‘y—o_iTd'é?1t_arisitig from the seizure, prescribing the time within
which the appearance must be made, is essential. Such notifica-
tion is usually given by monition, public proclamation, or publica-
tion in some other form. The manner of the notification is im_-
material, but the notification itself i ' (l
iese views find corroboration in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Story, in the case of Bradstreet v. Neptune Insurance Co., 3
Sumn. 6oo, Fed. Cas. No. 1,793. In that case, the action was
upon a policy of insurance upon a vessel, the declaration alleging
its loss by seizure of the Mexican government. The defendants
admitted the seizure. but averred that it was made and that the
vessel was condemned for violation of the revenue laws of Mex-
ico, and to prove the averment produced a transcript of the record
of the proceedings of the Mexican court against the vessel, and
of the decree of condemnation. Among the questions considered
by the court was the effect of that record as proof of the laws
of Mexico, and of the jurisdiction of the court and the cause of
seizure and condemnation. After stating that the sentence of
a foreign court of admiralty and prize in rem was in general
conclusive, not -only in respect to the parties in interest. but
[*28o] also for collateral purposes in collateral suits, as to the
direct matter of title and property in judgment, and as to the
facts on which the tribunal professed to proceed, Mr. Justice
Story said, that it did not strike him that any sound distinction
could be made between a sentence pronounced in mm by a court
of admiralty and prize, and a like sentence pronounced by a muni-
cipal court upon a seizure or other proceeding in rem; that in
each the sentence was conclusive as to the title and property, and,
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the sentence professed to be founded. But the learned judge
added, that it was an essential ingredient in every case, when
such effect was sought to be given to the sentence, that there
should have been proper judicial proceedings upon which to
found the decree; that is, that there should have been some cer-
tain written allegations of the offence, or statement of the charge
for which the seizure was made, and upon which the forfeiture
was sought to be enforced; and that there should be some per-
sonal or public notice of the proceedings, so that the parties in
interest, or their representatives or agents, might know what the
offence was with which they were charged, and might have an
opportunity to defend themselves, and to disprove the same. “ t
is’alul_e,lLsa.id.-thelearned judge, “founded in the first principles
of natural justice, that a party shall have an opportunity to be
hardwiii his defence before his property is condemned, and that
charges on which the condemnation is sought shall be specific.
determinate, and clear. If a seizure is made and condemnation
is”p—a's.sIe'd without the allegation of any specific cause of forfeiture
or offence, and without any public notice of the proceedings, so
that the parties in interest have no opportunity of appearing and
making a defence, the sentence is not so much a judicial sentence
as an arbitrary sovereign edict. It has none of the elements of
a judicial proceeding, and deserves not the respect of any foreign
nation. It ought to have no intrinsic credit given to it, either for
its justice or for its truth, by any foreign tribunal. It amounts
to little more, in common sense and common honesty, than the
sentence of the tribunal which first punishes and then hears the
party,—castigaIq-ur, auditquc. It may be binding upon the sub-
jects of that particular nation. But, upon the [*281] eternal
principles of justice, it ought to have no binding obligation upon
the rights or property of the subjects of other nations; for it
tramples under foot all the doctrines of international law, and is
but a solemn fraud, if it is clothed with all the forms of a judicial
proceeding.”
In another part of the same opinion the judge characterized
such sentences “as mere mockeries, and as in no just sense judi-
cial proceedings”; and declared that they “ought to be deemed,
both ex dirccto in ram and collaterally, to be mere arbitrary edicts
or substantial frauds.”
This language, it is true, is used with resp_ect to proceedings
in rem of a foreign court, but it is equally applicable and pertinent
to proceedings in mm of a domestic court, when they are taken
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the sentence professed to be founded. But the learned judge 
adde<l , that it was an essential ingredient in every case, when 
such effect was sought to be given to the sentence, that there 
should have been proper judicial proceedings upon which to 
found the decree ; that is, that there should have been some cer­
tain written allegations of the offence, or statement of the charge 
for which the seizure was made, and upon which the forfeiture 
was sought to be enforced ; and that there should be some per­
sonal or public notice of the proceedings, so that the parties in 
interest, or their representatives or agents, might know what the 
offence was with which they were charged, �nd might have an 
opportunity to defend themselves, and to disprove the same. \ ':It 
is��-the-learned j udge, " founded in the first principles 
of natural justice, that a party shall have an opportunity to be 
heara-iii his defence before his property is condemned, and that 
charges on which the condemnation is sought shall be specific. 
determinate, and cleaf'. If a seizure i s  made and condemnation 
ispasse-d without the allegation o f  any specific cause of forfeiture 
or offence, and without any publ ic  notice of the proceed ings, so 
that the parties in interest have no opportunity of appearing and 
making a defence, the sentence is not so much a judicial sentence 
as an arbitrary sovereign edict. It has none of the elements of 
a j udicial proceeding, and deserves not the respect o f  any foreign 
nat ion . It ought to have no intrinsic credi t given to it, e i ther for 
its justice or for its truth, by any foreign tribunal. It amounts 
to l ittle more, in common sense and common honesty, than the 
sentence of the tribunal which first punishes and then hears the 
party,-castigatquc, auditque. It may be binding upon the sub­
jects of that particular nation . But, upon . the [ *281 ] eternal 
principles of justice, it ought to have no binding obligation upon 
the rights or property of the subjects of other nations ; for it 
tramples under foot all the doctrines of international law, and i s  
but  a solemn fraud, i f  i t  i s  clothed with a l l  the forms of a j udicial 
proceeding." 
In another part of the same opinion the j udge characterized 
such sentences "as mere mockeries, and as in no j ust sense j udi­
cial proceedings" ; and declared that they "ought to be deemed ,  
both ex dirccto in rem and collaterally, to be mere arbitrary edicts 
or substantial frauds." 
This  language, it i s  true, is used with respect to proceedings 
in reni of a foreign court, but it i s  equally applicable and pertinent 
to proceedings in, rem of a domestic court, when they are taken 
without any monition or public notice to the parties. In Wood-
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ruff v. Taylor, 20 Vt. 65, the subject of proceedings in rem in our
courts is elaborately considered by the Supreme Court of Ver-
mont. After stating that in such cases notice is given to the
whole world, but that from its nature it is to the greater part of
the world constructive only, and mentioning the manner in which
such notice is given in cases of seizure for violation of the rev-
enue laws, by publication of the substance of the libel with the
order of the court thereon specifying the time and place of trial,
and by proclamation for all persons interested to appear and con-
test the forfeiture claimed, the court observed, that in every
court and in all countries where judgments were respected, notice
of some kind was given, and that it was just as material to the
validity of a judgment in rem that constructive notice at least
should appear to have been given as that actual notice should
appear upon the record of a judgment in personam. “A proceed-
ing,” continued the court, “professing to determine the right of
property, where no notice, written or constructive, is given, what-
ever else it might be called, would not be entitled to be dignified
with the name of a judicial proceeding. It would be a mere
arbitrary edict, not to be regarded anywhere as the judgment of
a court.”
In the proceedings before the district court in the confisca-
tion case, monition and notice, as already stated, were issued and
published ; but the appearance of the owner, for which they called,
having been refused, the subsequent sentence of [*282] confisca-
tion of his property was as inoperative upon his rights as though
no monition or notice had ever been issued. _'Ll_1e__l_egg,L_e_flgc_t_Q_t_,
striking out his appearance was to recall the monitigg and ngtige
as 0 1m. is position wit re erence to su sequent proceeding
was then not unlike that of a party in a personal action, after the
service made upon him has been set aside. A service set aside is
. never service by which a judgment in the action can be upheld.
The doctrine invoked by counsel, that, where a court has
once acquired 'urisdiction it has a ri ht to decide everv uestion
E:-E_rF_’Tr"§_Cfl.HiL3mLLL5_J£$lg.m&lLhQJl€AL€L€ILQnEDU5H1c no e co aterally assailed, is undoubtedly correct a
quai cations_ Lr_1_it_s_ application. All courts, even the highest, are
m limited in their jurisdiction: they are limited to par-
ticular classes of actions, such as civil or criminal; or to particular
modes of administering relief, such as legal or equitable: or to
transactions of a special character, such as arise on navigable
waters, or relate to the testamentary disposition of estates; or to
















































































































































ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION I45
the use of particular process in the enforcement of their judg-
ments. .\'orton v. Meader, 4 Sawyer 603, Fed. Cas. No. 10,351.
Though the court may possess jurisdiction of a cause, of the
subject-matter, and of the parties, it is still limited in its modes
of procedure, and in the extent and‘ character of its judgments.
ust act 'udiciall * i ll thin and canno n ‘ld
tll‘e_P%)‘l_____.c()I1fe"fi.Q¥-111-1-13-ilk If, for instance, the action be
upon a money demand, the court, notwithstanding its complete
jurisdiction over the subject and parties, has no power to pass
judgment of imprisonment in the penitentiary‘ upon the defendant.
If the action be for a libel or personal tort, the court cannot order
in the case a specific performance of a contract. If the action be
for the possession of real property, the court is powerless to admit
in the case the probate of a will. Instances of this kind show
that the general doctrine stated by counsel is subject to many
qualifications. The judgments mentioned, given in the cases sup-
posed, would not be merely erroneous: they would be absolutely
void, because the court in rendering them would transcend the
limits of its authority in those cases. See the language of Mr.
Justice ["*'283] Miller, to the same purport, in the case of Ex
jbarte Lange, I8 Vi/'all. 163. So it was held by this court in
Bigelow v. Forrest, 9 id. 339, 351, that a judgment in a confisca-
tion case, condemning the fee of the property, was void for the
remainder, after the termination of the life—estate of the owner.
To the objection that the decree was conclusive that the entire fee
was confiscated, Mr. Justice Strong, speaking the unanimous
opinion of the court, replied: “Doubtless a decree of the court,
having jurisdiction to make the decree, cannot be impeached col-
laterally; but, under the act of Congress, the district court had
no power to order a sale which should confer upon the purchaser
rights outlasting the life of French Forrest (the owner). Had
it done so, it would have transcended its jurisdiction.” Id. 350.
So a departure from established modes of procedure will
often render the judgment void; thus, the sentence of a person
charged with felony, upon conviction by the court, without the
intervention of a jury, would be invalid for any purpose. The
decree of a court of equity upon oral allegations, without written
pleadings, would be an idle act, of no force beyond that of an
advisory proceeding of the chancellor. And the reason is, that
the courts are not authorized to exert their power in that way.
The doctrine_ s_ta_ted by c_o_u_n,sel is _(_)_I‘l_lJ'_QO_I1'€‘Ct whenll1§_;QuIt
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the use of particular process in the enforcement of their j udg­
ments. l\' ortoti v . . Meader, 4 Sawyer 6o3, Fed. Cas. I\ o. 10,35 I .  
Though the court may possess j urisdiction o f  a cause, of the 
subject-matter, and of the parties, it  is still limited in its modes 
of procedure, and in the extent and· character of its j udgments. 
It must act judicially in all thin�s. and cannot then transcend 
the power conferred by the la>x., If, for instance, the action be 
upon a money demand, the court, notwithstanding its complete 
j urisdiction over the subj ect and parties, has no power to pass 
j udgment of imprisonment in the penitentiary upon the defendant. 
If the action be for a libel or personal tort , the court cannot order 
in the case a specific performance of a contract . If the action be 
for the possession of real  property, the court is powerless to admit 
in the case the probate of a will. Instances of this kind show 
that the general doctrine stated by counsel is subj ect to many 
qualifications. The j udgments mentioned, given in the cases sup­
posed, would not be merely erroneous : they would be absolutely 
void, because the court in rendering them would transcend the 
limits of its authority in those cases. See the language of Mr. 
Justice [ *283 ] :Miller, to the same purport, in the case of Ex 
parte Lange, 18  \.Vall. 163. So it was held by this court in 
B igelow v. Forrest, 9 id. 339, 35 1 ,  that a judgment in a confisca­
tion case, condemning the fee of the property, was void for the 
remainder, after the termination of the li fe-estate of the owner. 
To the obj ection that the decree was conclusive that the entire fee 
was confiscated, Mr. Justice Strong, speaking the unanimous 
opinion of the court, repl ied : "Doubtless a decree of the court , 
having j urisdiction to make the decree, cannot be impeached col­
laterally ; but, under the act of Congress, the di strict court had 
no power to order a sale which should confer upon the purchaser 
rights outlasti!lg the l ife of French Forrest ( the owner ) .  Had 
it done so, it would have transcended its jurisdiction." Id .  350. 
So a departure from establ ished modes of procedure will 
often render the judgment void ; thus, the sentence of a person 
charged with felony, upon conviction by the court, without the 
intervention of a jury ,  would be invalid for any purpose. The 
decree of a court of equity upon oral allegations, without written 
pleadings, would be an idle act ,  of no force beyond that of an 
advisory proceed ing of the chancellor. And the reason is, that 
the courts are not authorized to exert thei r power in that way. 
The doctrine_ st<Ued .by_ <:9_ll!l.sel i� _9_njy_ �ox.rect whcn..!.he court 
proceeds, aftc-r acquiring jurisd iction of the c�usc .. �cling to - -
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the established modes governing tl1eclass_t_o which the case be-
_l(mgWiI"doe's“riot’trai1scend, in the extent or gliaracter of its
_.___i,udgment, the law which isapplicable to _it. The statement of
the'1’roct1'ine‘by'I\’l1'7‘_Tustfce_S1vayfiE'i'ii-the case of Cornett v.
W'1'llitrnzs, 2o \/Vallace 226, is more accurate. “The jurisdiction,”
says the justice, “having attached in the case, every thing done
'u'itlu'n the [>02cer of that jurisdiction, when collaterally questioned,
is held conclusive of the rights of the parties, unless impeached
for fraud.” 2o \/Val]. 250.
It was not within the power of the jurisdiction of the district
court to proceed with the case, so as to affect the rights of the
owner after his appearance had been stricken out, and the benefit
of the citation to him thus denied. For jurisdiction [*284] is the
right to hear and determine; not to determine without hearing.
-And where, as in that case, no appearance was allowed, there
could be no hearing or opportunity of being heard, and, therefore,
could be no exercise of jurisdiction. By the act of the court, the
respondent was excluded from its jurisdiction.
Judgment afiirmed.
MILLER, BRADLEY and HUNT, _U., dissented.
HALL v. LA\/V, in U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, 1880-102 U. S. 461.
FIELD, ]. This is a suit to quiet title to certain real pro-
perty in the state of Indiana, of which it is charged that one
William P. Hall, who died intestate in 1857, was seized in fee.
By the law of Indiana, his real estate descended to the complaint-
ants. H462] The premises in controversy are situated in the
city of Evansville, in that part known as Lamasco. They con-
stitute a part of a fractional section in the subdivision of the
public lands in a township of the state. A small stream runs
through the section, known as Pigeon Creek, on the west of which
four-sevcnths of the section lie, and on the east three—sevenths.
The premises in suit are on the west side of the creek. In 1831,
the deceased, \Villiam P. Hall, became the owner of two undivided
sevenths of the section. In 1833 proceedings were taken in the
circuit court of the county in which the section lies, at the instance
of the possessor of an undivided interest, for a partition of the
land and an assignment in severalty of the interests of the differ-
ent owners. |These proceedings resulted in a partition. by which
the interest of Hall was set apart out of that portion of the sec-
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t h e  establi shed modes governing the dass to which the case be­
longs,  and does riot-transcend, in the - extciit or character of it3 
judgment, the law which is - applicable to it . TI1e statement o f  
ttre- -noctrine- by -Mr. Justice S\vay'iie,ln the case of  Cornett v. 
Hlilliams, 20 \Vallace 226, i s  more accurate . "The j urisdiction," 
says the justice, "having attached in the case, every thing done 
'l.('iflzin the f'O'icer of that jurisdictiotz,, when collaterally quest ioned, 
is held conclusive of the rights of the parties, unless impeached 
for fraud." 20 \Vall .  250. 
It was not within the power of the j urisdiction of the district 
court to proceed with the case, so as to affect the rights of the 
owner after his appearance had been stricken out, and the benefit 
of the citation to him thus denied. For j uri sdiction [ *284] is  the 
right to hear and determine ; not to determine without hearing. 
J 
· And where, as in that case, no appearance was allowed, there 
could be no hearing or opportunity of being heard, and, therefore, 
could be no exercise of j urisdict ion . By the act of the cou rt, the 
respondent was excluded from its j urisdiction. 
Judgment affirmed. 
MILLF.R, BR .\DI.EY and HUNT, J J. ,  di ssented . 
H ALL v. LAW, in U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, 1&.Qo.--1 02  U. S. 461 .  
Fmr.o, J .  Th i s  i s  a suit t o  quiet title t o  certain real pro­
perty in the state of Indiana, of which it is charged that one 
\Vil l iam P. Hall ,  who died intestate in 1857, was seized in fee. 
By the law of Indiana, his real estate descended to the complaint­
ants. [ *462]  The prem i ses in controversy are situated in the 
city of Evansv i l le , in that part known as Lamasco . They con­
st i tute a part of a fract ional section in the subd ivi sion of the 
public lands in  a townsh ip of the state. A small  stream runs 
th rough the section , known as Pig-eon Creek, on the west of  wh ich 
four-scn�nths of the sec t ion l ie .  ancl on the east three-sevenths.  
The prem i ses in suit  arc on the west s ide  of the creek .  Jn 183 1 ,  
the deceased , \V il l iam P. H a l l ,  became the owner o f  two undivided 
sevenths of the section. In  1 833 proceed ings were taken in  the 
ci rcuit  cou rt of the county in wh ich the section l ies ,  at the instance 
of the possessor of an undivided interest , for a part it ion of the 
lanrl and an ass igmnent in severalty of the interests of the d i ffer­
ent o w ners. I These proceedi ngs resulted in a partit ion.  hy which 
the  in t erest o f  I Ial l was set apart out of  that portion of the sec­
tion ly ing east of Pigeon Creek. /I f these proceedings are val i d ,  
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the claim of the complaintants, as the children and widow of the
deceased, is without foundation. He was divested of all interest
in the property in controversy several years before his death. * * *
The validity of this partition is assailed because no complaint
or petition of the applicant for the partition appears in the record .
as the foundation of the proceedings, and without one it is con-
tended that they were void. The statute does not in terms re-
quire the application of the proprietor seeking a partition to be '
presented in writing, or, if one be presented, to be found among
the records of the court. All that it designates as necessary to
authorize the court to act is, that there should be an application
for the partition by one or more joint proprietors, after giving
notice of the intended application in a public newspaper for at
least four weeks. [*4fiq] VI/'hen application is made, the wt
must consider whether it 1s 5v a proper party.___a_nil w_hether
it is sufficient in form and__su|)_s_tapce, and )yhethe;r___th_e_"
requisite notice I155 been given as prescribed. Its order
rrrad'e_tlTe'reon' is an adjudication upon these matters. The
recitals in the order show a compliance with the statute: they
show jurisdiction in the court over the subject. That jurisdic-
tion arises upon the presentation of the application, accompanied
with proper proof of previous notice of it. The order of th Irt
appointing the commissioners is a (letern1ina_ti§i_Tl_I:?$e;i$]‘:;_ilQitca—
tiE)'i'1's’sTFlic_i’ent_, and {1Ta‘{lTt{é";1otTI:é 'of4_i_tAha.seheen_gi\u2u.- This
c—oRlIi"sIon‘"1s not open to collateral attack; it can only be ques-I
tioned on appeal or writ of error, by a superior tribunal invested’
with appellate jurisdiction to review it. V007‘/ICES v. Bank of U.
5. IO Peters 449; Thompson v. Tolmic, 2 Id. I57; Comsfock v.
Cram-ford, 3 -Wall. 306.
The cases of Lease v. Carr, 5 Black f. (Ind-.) 353, and Shaw
V. Parker, 6 Id. 345, cited by complaintants, do not support their
position. In the first case, the supreme court of Indiana, having
the proceedings in partition before it for review on writ of error,
held that the petition of the appellant should show the extent and
nature of his interest in the land. and that he holds it in common
with the defendants, whose interests (if known to him) should
also be stated; and that as the petition in that case was silent iI1
these particulars. and merely requested the appointment of com-
missioners to divide the land, it was defective, and the order made
thereon was erroneous. But the court did not hold or intimate
that the order and subsequent proceeding were. from the defec-
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case of the reversal of proceedings because of intervening error.
If not thus corrected, the existance of the error in no respect im-
pairs the validity and eflicacy of the subsequent proceedings, or
of the order or judgment thereon. The distinction between
erroneous and void orders and judgments is too familiar to call
for extended observation, and is fully recognized, not only in the
courts of Indiana, but in those of every state in the union.
Hcr/wr v. Doe, I Ind. 130; Doe v. S-mith, Id. 451 ; Doe v. Hart'c_v,
3 Id. [*465] 104; Ashley v. Laird, 14 Id. 222; Cox v. .'lIa-thaws,
17 Id. 367; Et.'ans v. Aslzlcy, 22 Id. 15; Walt: v. Borrozuay, 25
Id. 380; Hawkins v. HGI('kiIlS, 28 Id. 67; Comjwarct v. Hanna, 34
Id. 74.; Gavin v. G1'(I_\'d01l, 4r Id. 559; Burk v. Hill, 55 Id. 419;
Hays V. FOrd, Id. 52; Hunter V. Bltrnsrflle Turn[>ikc C0. 56 Id.
218; lVil¢’y \'. Par'e_v, 61 Id. 457. The second case, Slutrc v.
Parker also came before the supreme court on a write of error,
and follows in its decision Lease v. Carr. \Ve see nothing in
either to impeach the validity of the order of the circuit court of
the county appointing the commissioners, or its order confirming
their report. Thus confirmed, the report constituted, in the
language of the statute, a partition of the lands described in it.
The complaintants, treating as invalid the partition proceed-
ings, sue for the undivided two-sevenths of that portion of the
fractional section lying west of Pigeon Creek, and assume in their
bill of complaint that the title of the defendant rests upon a deed
made under a decree in a suit in chancery commenced against the
deceased in 1836, three years after the alleged partition. It
seems that a claim was made at that time that the two undivided
sevenths of the fractional section were conveyed by their then
owner, Nathaniel Ewing and wife, to one VViIliam Prince, upon
a condition which had failed; that upon the death of Prince, his
estate being insolvent. the property had been sold by order of the
probate court to one \/Villiam Daniel, for forty-five dollars, and for
the like sum had, by him and his wife, been conveyed to the
deceased \Villiam P. Hall; and the suit in chancery was brought
by parties who had obtained another conveyance from Ewing and
wife to set aside the probate sale, and to compel the deceased to
convey his interestto them. The suit resulted in a decree di-
recting the execution of a deed of the title and interest of the
deceased to the complainants in that suit, of whom the defendant
was one. by a commissioner appointed by the court. The decree
describes the two undivided sevenths as being the same tract
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case of the reversal of proceedings because of intervening error. 
If not thus corrected, the existance of the error in no respect im­
pairs the validity and efficacy of the subsequent proceedings, or 
of the order or j udgment thereon. The distinction between 
• erroneous and void orders and judgments is too familiar to call 
for extended observation, and is fully recognized, not only in the 
courts of Ind iana, but in those of every state in the union. 
flcmcr v. Doc, I Ind. 1 30 ;  Doe v. Smith, Id .  45 1 ; Doe v. Han.·ey, 
3 Id .  [ *465 ] 104 ; .1 shlc3• v. Laird, 1 4  Id .  222 ; Co..i: v. M athe<t•s, 
1 7  Id .  367 ; £1..•ans v. A.slzley, 22 Id. 1 5 ; 1Valt:: v. Borro'll'CJ_\', 2j 
Id.  38o ; Hawkins v .  Ha:(•ki11s, 28 Id.  67 ; Comparct v .  Ham1a, 34 
l cl . 74 ; Gm •iu v. Gra:ydon, 4 I Id. 559 ; Burk v. Hill, 55 Id .  4 19 ; 
Ha_\'S v. Ford, Id. 52 ; Hun ter v. B u rns;:ille Tu.mpike Co . 56 Id .  
2 18 ; TViley , . .  Pa1. ·ey, 6 r  Id .  4j7. The second case. Slr trH' v. 
Parker also came before the supreme court on a write of error,  
anc \  follows in its decision Lecrse \". Carr. \Ve sec nothing in 
either to impeach the validity of the order of the circuit court of  
the county appoint ing the  commissioners , or i t s  order confirming 
their report. Tims confirmed , the report const i tu ted, in  the 
language of  the statute,  a parti t ion of the lands clescribed in it. 
The complaintants, treating as inval id the partition proceed� 
ings, sue for the undivided two-sevenths of that portion of the 
fractional section lying west of Pigeon Creek, and assume in their 
bi l l  of complaint that the tit le of  the defendant rests upon a deed 
made under a decree in a suit in chancery commenced against the 
deceased in 1836, three years after the alleged partition. It 
seems that a claim was made at that t ime that the two undivided 
sevenths of the fractional section were conveyed by thei r then 
owner, Xathaniel Ewing ancl wife, to one '\Vill iam Prince, upon 
a condition which had failed ; that upon the death of Prince, his 
estate being insolvent . the property had been sold by order of the 
probate court to one \Vill iam Daniel ,  for forty-five dollars, and for 
the l ike sum had, by him and his  wife, been conveyed to the 
dere:ised \Vi l l iam P. Hall : and the suit in chancery was brought 
by parties who had obtained another conveyance from Ewing and 
w i fe to set asi<le  the probate sale, and to compel the deceased to 
com·e\· his interest · to them. The suit resulted in a clecree di­
recting- the execution of a deecl of the title and inttrest of the 
deceased to the complainants in that suit, of whom the defrnclant 
was one. by a commissioner appointed by the court. The decree 
describes the two undivided sevenths as being the same tract 
assigne<l to the deceased in the partition proceed ings. The father 
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of the deceased was appointed the commissioner, and he executed
the deed ordered.
The complainants here assailed the validity of this decree,
as [*_466]_ beingirendered without service upon the deceased,
who was then aminor under ten years of age, upon an answer
filed by aiguardian ad‘ litcm; who was not authorized to waive g
_ _,'_.._ .__
service on his ward. It is not necessary to examine into the
validity of the decree for this and other reasons. This deed pur-
ports to pass whatever title the deceased possessed in the lands
conveyed under the probate sale, whether it be considered as the
two undivided sevenths of the whole fractional section, or the
tract assigned to him on the partition. It gave at least color of
title. Whenever an instrument, by apt words of transfer from
grantor to grantee-—whether such grantor act under the authority
of judicial proceedings or otherwise—in form passes what pur-
ports to be the title, it gives color of title. The deed of the com-
missioner in this case with the return of the commissioners in the
partition proceedings, gave such color. Even should they be
considered as invalid, possession under them for the period pres-
cribed by statute bars the right of the true owners as effectually as
possession under the most perfect title. It is an absolute defense
to the action of ejectment. And a suit in equity, brought after
that period, for the determination of the title, and for possession
of the property, will not be entertained, as it is founded on a stale
claim. As the statutes of limitations in most states, and in
Indiana among them, apply in terms only to legal remedies,
courts of equity are considered as bound by them only in cases
of concurrent jurisdiction. In other cases they are said to act
only by analogy, and not in obedience to the statutes. Though
the present case is in form a suit in equity, and as the bill asks
for an injunction it may be so treated, it is essentially a suit to
recover the possession of the land. The complainants are out of
possession, and the defendant, or parties claiming under him, are
in possession. The determination in favor of the complainants’
title is nly preliminary to a decree for the surrender of posses-
sion. f not a concurrent remedy with the comm0n—law action of
ejectment, it so nearly resembles the latter as to justify the rule
that in such cases the statute equally applies. \
The defendant and his associates in the deed of the com-
missioner. or persons claiming under them have been in posses-
sion of the entire fraction-section for over forty years, and
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of the deceased was appointed the commissioner, and he executed 
the deed ordered. 
The complainants here assailed the val idity of this decree, 
as [*466l �being - rendered without service upon the deceased, 
who was then a .minor under ten years of age, upon an ans_wer 
filed by a gu�nii�n_.a.d litcm�· who was not authorized to_ waivt! 
service on his ward. It is not necessary to"' examine into. -the . ­
validity of the decree for this and other reasons. This deeu pur­
ports to pass whatever title the deceased possessed in the lands 
conveyed under the probate sale, whether it  be considered as the 
two undivided sevenths of the whole fractional section, or the 
tract assigned to him on the partition. It gave at least color of 
title. Whenever an instrument, by apt words of transfer from 
grantor to grantee-whether such grantor act under the authority 
of judicial proceedings or otherwise-in form passes what pur­
ports to be the title, it gives color of title. The deed of the com­
missioner in this case with the return of the commissioners in the 
partition proceedings, gave such color. Even should they be 
considered as invalid, possession under them for the period pres­
cribed by statute bars the right of the true owners as effectualJy as 
possession under the most perfect title. I t  is an absolute defense 
to the action of ej ectment. And a suit in equity, brought after 
that period, for the determination of the title, and for possession 
of the property, will not be entertained, as it i s  founded on a stale 
claim. As the statutes of limitations in most states, and in 
Indiana among them, apply in terms only to Jega] remedies, 
courts of equity are considered as bound by them only in cases 
of concurrent j urisdiction. In other cases they are said to act 
only by analogy, and not in obedience to the statutes. Though 
the present case is in  form a suit in  equity, and as the bill a�k s 
for an injunction it may be so treated, it is essentialJy a suit to 
recover the possession of the land. The complainants are out o f 
possession , and the defendant, or parties claiming under him, are 
in possession. The determination in favor of the complainants" 
title is  ionly preliminary to a decree for the surrender of posses-. 
sion. lf not a concurrent remedy with the common-law action of 
ej ectment, i t  so nearly resembles the latter as  to justi fy the rule 
that in such cases the statute equally applies. \ 
The defendant and his associates in the deed of the com­
missioner, or persons claiming under them have been in posses­
sion of the entire fraction-section for over forty years, and 
[*467]  during all this period have exercised acts of  ownership 
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of almost every kind. They have laid out the land into lots,
blocks, and alleys, and have made extensive improvements either
upon them or in connection with them. They have also sold
parcels to a large number of persons, who have gone into posses-
sion, and still hold them, and have erected buildings thereon.
The town of Lamasco, laid out by them upon the land, reached
a population of ten thousand inhabitants before it was annexed
to the city of Evansville, of which it now forms a part.
[The statute of Indiana reserved to the deceased a right of
action to recover the premises for five years after he came of age.
and though he lived ten years after that period, within the vicinity
of the property, and was cognizant of the possession of the de-
fendant and his associates, and of the parties holding under them,
and of their claim of ownership and of their improvements, he
made no attempt to disturb them in its possession, use, and en-
joyment, or in the sale of portions of it. The claim now set up
by the complainants is a_ stale one, and, under the facts disclosed,
without merit. The decree dismissing the bill must, therefore,
be affirmed; and it is so ordered.
For other decisions holding judgments valid though rendered on oral
pleadings under a statute requiring the pleadings to be in writing, see:
Queen v. Hughes (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 614, 14 Cox Cr. -Cas. 284, 40 L. T.
685, 25 .\loal< 67; Kimball v. Brown (1898), 77 Minn. 167, 75 N. W. 1043;
Emerson v. Ross (1879), 17 Fla. I22; Tremble v. Williams (1885), I8
Neb. 144, 24 N. W. 716; Leach v. Western Ry. C0. (1871), 65 N. Car.
486; Robbin: v. '1'¢’fs (I878). 12 R. I, 67. Also article in 10 Mich. Law
Rev. 384-391.
The defendant in ejectment claimed title under an administrator's
deed, setting up and offering -the record in such proceeding to prove
his title. It appeared that an administrator petitioned for license to-
sell, which license was granted, but he did not sell, being unable to
find a -buyer. Later he resigned, his resignation was accepted, a suc-
cessor appointed, and later the probate court made an order licensing
the successor to sell without any petition for such license having been
tiled by him. It was objected that the order granting the last license
was void, because made without petition therefor, and that the first
license was void, and the sale thereunder void, because the petition
therefor did not allege any statutory ground to authorize the court to
grant such license. The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that no new
petition was necessary, the new and old administrators being one person
in law, and that the sufiiciency of the petition was immateriatl on collateral
attack, saying: “The petition in our view, states sufficient to authorize
the court to issue the license; but even if it did not, and the court would
so hold in a direct proceeding to set it aside, yet where it has -been
acted upon as sutlicient by the court having exclusive original jurisdic-
tion of the subject-matter, it will be sustained in the court when collerally
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of almost every k ind . They have laid out the land into lots, 
blocks, and alleys, and have made extens ive improvements either 
upon them or in connect ion wi th them . They have also sold 
parcels to a large number of persons , who have gone into posses­
sion, and st i ll hold them, and have: erected bui ldings thereon . 
The town of Lamasco , laid out by them upon the land, reached 
a population of ten thousand i nhabitants before i t  was annexed 
to the city of Evansville, of which it now forms a part.  
. The s tatute of Indiana reserved to the deceased a right of 
action to recover the prem ises for five years after he came o f  age. 
and though he lived ten years after that per iod , within the vicinity 
of the property, and was cognizant of the possess ion of the de­
fendant and his associates, and of the part ies holding under them, 
and of their claim of ownership and of thei r improvements,  he 
m ade no attempt to di sturb them in it� possess ion , use, ancl en­
j oyment, or in the sale of portions of it. The claim no\v set up 
hy the com pla inan ts is  a. stale one, and,  under the facts disclosed , 
wi thout merit. The decree dismissing the bil l must,  therefore, 
be affirmed ; and it is so ordered . 
. For other decisions holding j udgments valid though rendered on oral 
plead i n-gs u n der a statute requi ring the pleadings to be in w riting, see : 
Queen \'. Hughes ( 1879 ) ,  4 Q. B. D. 614, 1 4  Cox Cr. Cas. 284, 40 L. T. 
6S5, 25 :\I oak c7 ; K i111 bail v. Brown ( 1 898 ) ,  77 Minn.  167, 75 N. W. 1 043 ; 
Emerso u v. Ross ( 1879 ) ,  17 Fla. 1 22 ;  Tremble v. Willia ms ( 1885 ) ,  1 8  
Neb. 14� ,  24 N .  W .  7 16 ; Leach v. Western Ry. C o .  ( 1871 ) ,  65 N. Car. 
4% ; Robbi11s v. Te ff s ( 1878 ) . 12 R. I . 67. Also article in 10 :!Vlich. Law 
Rc:v. 3�-39 1 .  
The defendant in  ejectment claimed title under a n  administrator's 
deed, sett ing up and o ffering the record in such proceedi ng to prove 
his t itle.  It appeared that an administrator petitioned for l i cense to 
sell ,  which license was granted, but he did not sell, being unable to 
fin d  a buyer. Later he resigned, h i s  resignation was a<Xep.tcd, a suc­
cessor appo inted,  and later the p robate court made an order l i censing 
the successor to sell without any petit ion for such lice n se having been 
filed by him. It was obj ected that the order granting the last license 
was void,  because made without petition there for, and that the first 
l icense was void ,  and the sale the reunder void, because th e petit ion 
there for d i d  n ot al lege any statutory ground to authorize the court to 
grant such l i cense. The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that no new 
petition was necessary, the new and old administrators being one person 
in law, and that the sufficiency of the petition was immateria1l 011 collateral 
attack, sayi ng : "The pet ition in our view, states sufficient to authorize 
the court to issue the l icense ; but even i f  it  did not ,  and the court  would 
so hold in  a d i rect proceeding to set it aside, yet where it has been 
acted upon as sufficient by the court having excl usive original j u risd ic­
tion o f  th e subj ect-matter, it will be sustained in th e court when colleral ly 
attacked, where  there was no col lusion and fraud. The autho rity to  
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grant a license to sell real estate carries with it the implied power to de-
termine the necessity for such sale, and the sufficiency of the pleadings
presented to the court for that purpose; and where it has jurisdiction,
its orders and judgments are valid until set aside. There is nothing,
therefore, in this objection. * * * The original purchase price was
used in paying their father’s debts, and the purchaser should be protected.
If this was not so, it would be impossible for an executor or administrator
to sell real property belonging to the estate of the deceased for the pay-
ment of debts due from the estate, for any sum near its true value. No
one but a speculator in disputed titles would care to invest in property
the title to which might be overturned many years afterwards, and the
effect would be to prevent competition, depress the value of the pro-
perty, and, in many cases, deprive the creditors of their just dues."
Truinble v. Williams (1885), 18 Neb. 144, 24 N. W. 716.
MILLER v. BROVVN, in _Michigan Supreme Court, Dec. 2, 1899-122
Mich. 147, 80 N. W. 999.
MONTGOMERY, J. This is a bill to quiet title. The bill
was dismissed, and complainant appeals. The complainant claims
under a tax deed from the auditor general for taxes of 1893, on a
sale made tmder a decree rendered October 4, 1895. It is con-
tended that the decree authorizing sale was unauthorized, for the
reason that the owner was not allowed five days in term within
which to present application for leave to file objections. The
order fixed the day of hearing as September 24, 1895. The cir-
cuit judge was not present on that day, but sent an order to ad-
journ the court to Monday, the 30th, which was done. The court
was in session on the 30th and adjourned to October 4th, when
the decree was rendered. Section 66 of the tax law provides
that: "If within the first five days after the day fixed in such
'notice for the hearing of such petition it shall be made to appear
to the court that any person has been prevented from filing his
objections to any tax, without any fault on his part, such further
time may be granted for that purpose as may seem proper, not
exceeding five days." \Ve think the owner of lands’ is entitled
under this section to five court days; i. e., five days in which he can
make it appear to the court that he has been prevented from filing
objections, etc. See ll1'cGinle_v v Calumet 6} Hecla Mining Co.,
and Hall <9 Manson Co. v. Auditor General, 121 Mich. 88. 79 N
\V. 928. This does not mean five consecutive days, but five day:
in which the proceedings authorized may be taken. The case
is unlike Gates V. Johnson, 121 Mich. 663, 80 N. Vt/. 709. In that
case it appeared that the court was adjourned from day to day
















































































































































ELEM E NTS OF JURISDICTION 
grant a l icense to sell real estate carries with it the implied power to de­
termine the necessi ty for such sale, and the su ffic iency of the pleadings 
presented to the rnurt for that purpose ; and wh ere i t  has j urisdiction, 
its orders and j u dgment s are valid un til set as ide. There is noth ing, 
there fore, in thi s obj ectior:. * * * The original purchase price was 
used in  paying their  father's debts, and th e purchaser should be protected. 
I f  th is was not so, it would be impossible for an executor or administrator 
to sell real property be longing to the estate of the deceased for the pay­
ment o f  debts due from the estate, for any sum near its true value. No 
one but a speculator in d isputed titles would care to i nv est in p roperty 
the tit l e to which might be overturned many years a fterwards, and the 
e ffect ,would be to prevent competiti on, depress the value o f  the pro­
perty, and, in many cases, deprive the creditors o f  the ir j ust du.es." 
Trn111b/c \'. 1-Villia ms ( 1885 ) ,  18 Neb. 144, 24 N. W. 716. 
MILLER v. BROWN, in . M ichigan Sup reme Court, Dec. 21 1&»--122 . 
M ich. q.7, 8o N. W. 99<). 
MONTGOMERY, J. This is a bill to quiet title. The bill 
was dismissed, and complainant appeals . The complainant claims 
under a tax deed from the auditor general for taxes of 1893, on a 
sale made tmder a decree rendered October 4, 1895. It is con­
tended that the decree authorizing sale was unauthorized, for the 
reason that the owner was not allowed five days in term with in 
which to present application for l eave to file  obj ections. The 
order fixed the day of hearing as September 24, 1895. The cir­
cuit judge was not present on that day, but sent an order to ad­
j ourn the court to Monday, the 30th, which was done. The court 
was in session on the 30th and adjourned to October 4th, when 
the decree was rendered . Section 66 of the tax law provides 
that : ' " I f  within the first five days a fter the day fixed in such 
·notice for the hearing of such peti tion i t  shall be made to appear 
to the court that any person has been prevented from filing his 
objections to any tax, without any fau lt on his part, such further 
time may be granted for that pu rpose as may seem proper, not 
exceeding five days." \Ve think the owner of lands· i s  entitled 
under this section to five court clays ; i .  e. ,  five days in which he can 
make it  appear to the court that he has been prevented from filing 
obj ections,  etc. See ;.UcGinley v Calumet & Hecla .ilfin ing Co . . 
and Hall & Mu11so11 Co. v. A uditor General, 1 2 1  Mich. 88. 79 N 
\V. ()28. This does not mean five consecutive days ,  but five dayf. 
in wh ich the proceedings authorized may be taken . The case 
i s  unl ike Gates v. Jolinso 11, 1 2 1  Mich. 663 , 8o N. \¥. 70CJ· In that 
ca.se it appeared that the court was adjourned from day to day 
for the express purpose of receiving appl ications ,  and that i t  was 
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a fair inference that the judge was ready to appear in court at
any time to hear any taxpayer desiring to present his claim.
This was held suflicient. But in this case there was no opportunity
to present an application to the court before September 30th, and
after that date no other opportunity until October 4th. The de-
cree will be afiirmed. The other justices concurred.
That premature entry of judgment does not render it liable to
collateral attack: White v. Crow, 110 U. S. 183, 4 S. Ct. 71; Anderson v.
Bell, 9 Cal. 315; Fitzpatrick v. Rutter, 160 Ill. 282, 43 N. E. 392; Essig v.
Lower, 120 Ind. 239. 21 N. E. 109o;Darmh v. Watson, 36 Iowa 116;
Mitchell v, Aten, 37 Kan. 33, 14 Pac. 407. I Am. St. Rep. 231; Anheuscr
Bush B. A. v. McGowan, 49 La Ann. 630, 21 S0. 766; Kipp \'. Kullerton,
4 Minn. 473; Altman \'. Srlrool Dist, 35 Ore. 85, 56 Pac. 291; Glover \'.
Holman, 3 Heisk. 519; Duchoneau v. Ireland, 5 Uta-h no, 13 Pac. 87;
















































































































































CASES ON J UDGME NTS, ETC. 
a fair inference that the judge was ready to appear in court at 
any time to hear any taxpayer desiring to present his claim. 
This was held sufficient. But in this case there was no opportunity 
to present an application to the court before September 30th, and 
after that date no other opportunity until October 4th . The de­
cree wilt be affirmed. The other justices concurred. 
That premature entry of judgment does not ren<ler it .Jiable to 
collateral attack : White v. Crow, I IO U. S. 183, 4 S. Ct. 7 1 ;  Anderson v. 
Bell, 9 Cal. 315 ; Fitzpatrick v. Ru tter, 100 Ill. 282, 43 N. E. 392 ; Essig v. 
Lower, 120 I nd. 239, 21  N. E. log<> ;Darrah v. Wats011, 36 Iowa J I6 ;  
Mitchell v. A ten, 37 Kan. 33, 14 Pac. 4Q7. I Am. St. Rep. 231 ; A nheuser 
Bush B. A. v. McGouxm, 49 La Ann. 630, 21 So. 766 ; Kipp v. Kullerton, 
4 Minn. 473 ; A ltmati v. Sch ool Dist., 35 Ore. 85, 56 Pac. 291 ; Glover v. 
Holman, 3 Heisk. 519 ; Duchcnea u v. Ireland, 5 Utah I IO, 13 Pac. 87 ;  
Belles v. Miller, IO Wash. 259, 38 Pac. 1050. 
THE RECORD OF THE JUDGMENT
AMENDING THE RECORD.
CRADOCK v. RADFORD, in King's Bench, Hilary Term, 6 \/Vm. &
Mary, I695—4 Modern 371.
A judgment of twenty years standing came this term to be
revived by scire facias against the heir and terre-tenants. It was
“quad />raed. Thomas rccnpeTet,” instead of “praed. Arthurus.”
It was prayed that the roll might be brought into court and
amended. because it was only thetfault of the clerk.) The like
amendment was in the common pleas in Michaelmas term, 33
Eliz. where the judgment was “quod idem Johannes sit in miseri-
cordia,” instead of Thomas. Louis v. Hay, Cro. Eliz. 299. So
where the judgment was “quod jbraed. Ge0rgins ca[>ialur,” and it
should have been Elias Skarning v. Shartwell, Cro. Eliz. 609.
For where the parties are named right in the record, and the
name of them misplaced or mistaken for the other it is reasonable
that the record should be amended, to entitle the plaintiff to an
honest debt. It has been ruled to be amended in a much stronger
case, viz. the misprison of the clerk has been in the very point of
the judgment; as in ejectment the plaintiff had a verdict for a
messuage, ten acres of meadow, and thirteen of pasture; now,
there was no land in the verdict, and less meadow and pasture than
in the judgment, yet it was amended upon the statute, for the ver-
dict is to guide the judgment, and so it ought to have been en-
tered accordingly.
But on the other side this was opposed, for that it was not
amendable, being an error in judgment, which must be imputed
the act of the court and not of the clerk: as where a capiatur
is entered instead of miscricordia, or concessum cst for curiam
instead of consideratnm est for these are erroneous in point of
law; and the very same case with this was held not to be amend-
able in Easter term, in the fourth year of Elizabeth. So where
the judgment was quad querens recufwrct I001. fer juratores
assess., and 5l. per fro jurat. hic de incremento adjudicat, when
‘it should have been per curinm, it was not amended, because it was
the fault of the court in the judgment itself)
But upon the authorities cited for the amendment, the court
















































































































































THE RECORD OF THE JUDGMENT 
AMENDING THE RECORD. 
CRADOCK v. RADFORD, in King's Bench, Hilary Term, 6 Wm. & 
.Mary, 16<)5-4 Modern 371.  
A j udgment of twenty years standing came this term to be 
revived by scire facias against the heir and terre-tenants. It was 
"quod praed. Thomas rccupere1," instead of "praed. Arthurus." 
It was prayed that the roll might be brought into court and 
amended. because it was only the l fault of the clerk. J The like 
amendment was in the common pleas in Michaelmas term, 33 
Eliz. where the j udgment was "quod idem Johannes sit in miseri­
cordia," instead of Thomas. Louis v. Hay, Cro. Eliz. 299. So 
where the judgment was ';quod praed. Georgins capiatur," and it 
should have been Elias Skarning v. Shart7.t'Cll, Cro. Eliz. 6oc). 
For where the parties are named right in the record, and the 
name of them misplaced or mistaken for the other it is reasonable 
that the record should be amended, to entitle the plaintiff to an 
honest debt. It has been ruled to be amended in a much stronger 
case, viz. the misprison of the clerk has been in the very point of 
the judgment ; as in ejectment the plaintiff had a verdict for a 
messuage, ten acres of  meadow, and thirteen of pasture ; now, 
there was no land in the verdict, and less meadow and pasture than 
in the j udgment, yet it was amended upon the statute, for the ver­
dict is to guide the j udgment, and so it ought to have been en­
tered accordingly. 
Dut on the other side this was opposed, for that it was not 
amendable, being an error in judgment, which must be imputed 
the act of the court and not of the clerk : as where a capiat11r 
is entered instead of misericordia, or concessum est per curiam 
instead of consideratum est for these are erroneous in point of  
law ; and the very same case with this was held not to  be amend­
able in Easter term, in the fourth year of Elizabeth. So where 
the judgment was quod querens recupcret 100/. per j11 ratorcs 
assrss., and 5/. per pro jurat. hie de incremento adjudicat. , when �t should have been per curiam , it was not amended, because it was 
the fault of the court in the judgment itself) 
But upon the authorities cited for the amendment, the court 
ruled this should be amended, which was done accord ingly. 
W cases ox JUDGMENTS, arc.
@
Indrjtcndrnt of any Statule—The power of all courts to amend their
records at any time so as to make them speak the truth is generally ad-
mitted to exist independent of any statute:
King v. .llu_vor, 7 Term 699: King v, Stale Bank (1848), 9 Ark. 185,
47 Am. Dec. 739; People v. District Court (1904), 33 Col. 77, 79 Pac.
1014; Day 1'. (jondwin (1898), 104 Iowa 374, 65 Am. St. Rep. 465, 73 N.
W. 864 ;1l_\-dc v. }lIi'rl1cl.rm (1897), 52 Neb. 680, 66 Am. St. Rep. 533, 72
N. W. 1035, though interests in the property had been acquired by others
in the mean time; Ewing v. Jennmgs (1880), 15 Nev. 379; Clii-chcster v.
Cande (1824), 3 Cowen (N. Y.) 39, 15 Am. Dec. 238; Strickland V. Strick-
land (1886). 95 N. Car. 437; Huber Mfg. Co. V. Sweny (1897), 57 Ohio
St. 169, 48 N. E. 879; Rush v. Rush (1896), 97 Tenn. 279, 37 ‘S. \-V. 13;
Obern/Jorfer \'. dlryer (1906), 30 Utah 325, 84 Pac. 1102; Shad:-ark v.
l/Voolfolk, (1880), 32 Grat. (Va) 707
ll/'l1crv Third Persons Hare .-lcquircd Riglzts relying on the previous
entry or lack of it the courts often refuse to permit correction to their
prejudice. Ninde v. Clark (1886), 62 .\lich. 124, 4 Am. S-t. Rep. 823, 28
N. \V. 765. Mr-Cormirk v. ll’I1er-lrr, 36 Ill_ 114.
Amendments should be liberally allowed; but when proceedings are
ancient the opposite party should be notified if possible, and if made
on extrinsic evidence all precaution against error should be used. Mont-
go/ner_v \'. Merrill (1877), 36 ‘.\lich. 97.
Refusal of the mart to correct the record on evidence appearing in
the papers in the case was held not reviewable in Missouri K. & E. Ry.
Co. v. Holsrhlag (1898), 144 M0. 256, 45 S. W. IIOI, 66 Am. St. Rep,
418.
“Did the court err in denying the plaintifi"s application to file and
make part of the judgment roll mm: pro tune the printer's affidavit show-
ing the publication to the summons? This was a matter within the dis-
cretion of the court. But the exercise of a sound dcscretion requires
that all applications of this kind should be granted except in cases where
it would be unjust to the defendants or to innocent third parties to do
so.” .'\tiir111ed. Slai v, Selzien (1902). 87 Minn. 271, 92 N. W. 6.
BALCH & VVIFE v. SHA\V, in Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., March Term, 1851
—61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 282.
\\"rit of entry, dated Aug. 25, 1849, by Benjamin L. Balch
a11d wife in this court against Robt. G. Shaw. Case ‘reserved.
Demandants claimed in right of the wife as heir of John
Tilley. The tenant relied on a record of the court of common
pleas showing a sale to him by the executors of Tilley by order
of that court, at the October term, 1824. Demandants objected
to the record because it was not made up and entered at large
till 1838; and then without sufficient record to make it up from,
without notice, on the petition of an improper person, that the
clerk had no power to make up the record then, and that the
















































































































































CASES ON J UDG � E NTS, F.TC. 
Independent of O ii}' Sta/14/e-The power o f  all courts to amend their 
records at any t ime so as to make them speak the truth is general ly ad­
mitted to exist  ind ependent of any statute : 
King \'. .lla)•or, 7 Term 6c)9 : Ki�1g \' , State Bank ( 1848) ,  9 Ark. 1 85, 
47 :\m.  Dec. 739 ; People v. District Co11rt ( 1 904 ) ,  33 Col. 77, i9 Pac. 
r n q ; Day \'. Goodwin ( 1898 ) .  104 Iowa 374, 65 Am. St. Rtp. 465, 73 N. 
W. 8fi4 ;f/yde v. Michelsr11 ( 18<)7 ) ,  52 Neb. 6&>, 66 Am. St. Rep.  533, 72 
�- \V. 1 035, t hough interests  in th e property ha<l been acq ui re d by others 
in the mean t i m e ; Ewing v. Je11 11 1 11gs ( 1 8&> ) ,  15 N ev. 379 ; Clt ic l1rslcr v. 
Ca 11 de ( 1 824 ) , 3 Cowen ( N. Y. ) 39, 15  Am. Dec. 238 ; Strick la nd ,., Strick­
land ( 1&% ) .  95 �. Car. 4.l7 ; JJ 11 ber M f,q. Co. Y. S·we11y ( 1897 ) .  57 Ohio  
St. 169, 48 X.  E .  879 ; Rush '" R.11sli ( 1896 ) ,  97 Tenn. r;9, 3 7  ·S. W.  13 ; 
Ober11dorfer \'. M e:,•er ( 1Qo6) , .W etah 325, 8-t Pac. 1 102 ; Shadrack v. 
Wooljolk, ( 1AAo) , 32 Grat. ( Va. ) 707 
When• Tltird Pcrso 11s lia1·c A cq11 ired R.iglits relying on the previou � 
e n t ry or lack o f  i t the courts  o ften refuse to pe rmit  correcti on to their 
prej udice. X i 1 1de ,., Clari� ( 1886 ) ,  62 �I ich.  1 24, 4 Am. S-t. Rep. 823, 28 
N. \\'. 765. McCo rm ick '" Wheeler. 36 J l l . 1 14. 
Atm' n dments should be l ibe ra l ly allowed ; but when proc eed ings are 
ancient the opposite party should be noti fied i f  possible ,  and if made 
on extr ins ic  e vi dence all  precaution again st error should be ttSed. M 0 11t­
go111er.v v. Mari/I ( 18i7 ) .  36 ::\l ich.  97. 
Refusal of the court / (I  co rrect the record on evidence appeari ng in 
the papers in the case was held not rcvicwable i n  M issou ri K. & E. Ry. 
Co. \'. Jiolsch lag ( 1898) , 144 Mo. 256, 45 S. W. 1 101 , 66 Am. St. Rep. 
41�. 
"Did the court err in denying the plaint i ff's application to file  and 
make part o f  the j udgment rol l 11 1m c pro tu 11c the printer's affidavit show­
ing the publ ication to the summons ?  This was a matter within the d i s­
cret ion  o f  the court. But the exercise o f  a sound descret ion requires 
that all  applications of this kind shou ld be gran ted except in  cases where 
it would be unj ust to the de fendan ts or to innocent third parties to do 
so." Affirmed. Stai v. Seldc11 ( 1902) . 87 l\Hnn. 271 ,  92 N. W. 6. 
BALCH & WIFE v. SHAW, in Mass . Sup. Jud. Ct., March Term, 185 1  
-6 1  Mass. (7  Cush . )  282. 
\Vrit of entry, dated Aug. 25 ,  18..i9, by Benjamin L. Balch 
an<l w i fe in this court against Robt. G. Shaw. Case ·reserved. 
Deman<lants claimed in right of the wife as heir of John 
Tilley. The tenant rel ied on a record of  the court of common 
plt?as showing a sale to him by the executors of Tilley b�· order 
of that court , at the October term, 1 824. Demanclants objected 
to the record because it was not made up and entered at large 
t i l l  1 838 : and then without sufficient record to make it up from, 1 
without notice, on the petition o f  an improper person , that the 
clerk had no power to make up the record then, and that the 
record as made up was not true. 
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FLETCHER, J. This is a writ of entry. The demandants
claim in right of the wife as heir of John Tilley. The tenant
claims under a sale by the executors of john Tilley, by virtue of
a license of the court of common pleas. To make out his title,
the tenant produced a record of the court of common pleas. |The
case turns, therefore, upon the question whether the record was
rightfully amended, so that the tenant can maintain his title on
that record.‘
There can be no doubt that it is competent for a court of
record, under its general, inherent, and necessary authority, to
correct the mistakes and supply the defect of its clerk or record-
ing offieer, so as to have the record conform to the actual facts
and truth of the case, and that this may be done at any time as
well after as during the term, mmc pm tmw./TI1_1m1_gth of time
in this case, between granting the license and making up the
record, does not take away the right or jurisdiction of the court.
The authorities upon this point are numerous and conclusive.
This was not a case of want of jurisdiction, in which the record
cannot be amended, because, there being an omission to act, there
is nothing to record; in such case, the defect is not in the record,
but in the action of the court.
It was further said in argument, that there was not sufiicient
material fro1n which to make up the record. But the court of
common pleas, having the exclusive right and jurisdiction in the
matter, were the proper judges of the necessity and propriety of
extending the record, and of the proofs and of the sufficiency of
the proofs upon which to proceed. (Such a record, when made up,
is conclusive, until altered or set aside by the same or some other
court having jurisdiction, but it cannot be drawn in question col-
laterally when such record is used or relied upon in support of
a title. ;
It was further said, that the extended record was invalid,
because made without notice. But this was not a case for [*285]
notice. Surely a court of record need not give notice to all the
world to come in and show cause why it should not make its
record conform to the truth of the case. Any party, who sup-
poses he can show such cause, should apply to the court to have
the record set aside or expunged, after it is made.
Then as to the objection that the record was extended upon
the application of Vinal, who was not interested in the premises
demanded in this suit; if he had an interest in the demanded prem-
ises, or if he had no interest, it would not be material. The court
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FLETCHER, ] .  This is  a writ of entry. The demandants 
claim in right o f  the wife as heir of John Tilley. The tenant 
claims under a sale by the executors of John Tilley, by v irtue of 
a license of the court of common pleas. To make out his title, 
the tenant produced a record of the court of common pleas. IThe 
case turns, therefore, upon the question whether the record was 
rightfully amended, so that the tenant can maintain his title on 
that record. \ 
There can be no doubt that i t  i s  competent for a court of  
record, under i t s  general, inherent, and necessary authority, to  
correct the mistakes and supply the defect o f  i t s  clerk or record- /-
ing officer, so as to have the record conform to the actual facts .(..,_ l ;. , -,, ,, · 
and truth of  the case, and that this may be done at a1_1y time as /1 / :J ,  '( ·'···) �­
well af ter as <luring the term, mmc pro tu.11c.�th of time 
in this case, between grant ing the l icense and making up the 
record, docs not take away the right or j urisdiction of the court. 
The authorities upon this point are numerous and conclusive. 
This was not a case of want of j urisdiction, in which the record 
cannot be amended, because, there being an omission to act, there 
is nothing to record ; in such case, the defect is not in the record, 
but in the action of the court. 
It was further said in argument, that there was not sufficient 
material from which to make up the record. But the court of 
common pleas, having the exclusive right and j urisd iction in the 
matter, were the proper judges of  the necessity and propriety of 
extending the record, and of the proofs and of the sufficiency of 
the proofs upon which to proceed. (Such a record, when made up, 
is  conclusive, until altered or set aside by the same or some other 
court having j ur i sdiction, but it cannot be drawn in question col­
laterally when such record is used or rel ied upon in support of 
a title. ; 
It was further said, that the extended record was invalid, 
because made without notice. But this was not a case for [ *285 ] 
notice. Surely a court of record need not give notice to all the 
world to come in and show cause why i t  should not make its 
record con form to the truth of  the case. Any party, who sup­
poses he can show such cause, should apply to the court to have 
the record set aside or expunged, after i t  i s  made. 
Then as to the obj ection that the record was extended upon 
the application of Vinal, who was not interested in the premises 
demanded in th is  suit ; if he had an interest in the demande<l prem­
ises, or if he had no interest, it would not be materia1 . The court 
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might amend their records upon their own motion, or upon the
motion or suggestion of any one interested. It is not a proceed-V
ing in which there need be any parties. It is the act of the court j/'
itself, correcting its own records, to make them conform to the
truth of the case.
These general views will render it unnecessary to consider
particularly some other ingenious arguments which were offered
by the counsel for the demandant. The court being of opinion
that there was a sufficient record of the order of the court of com-
mon pleas to sell the premises conveyed to Jones, there must be
Judgment for the tenant.
N0 Notice to the opposite party of application to amend is necessary:
Odell v. Reynold: (1895), 70 Fed. 656, 17 C. C. A. 3I7; Ware v. Kent
(1890), 123 Ala. 427, 26 So_. 208, 82 Am. St. Rep. 132; Estate of Cook
(1888), 77 Cal, 220, I. L. R. A. 567, II Am. St. Rep. 267, I9 Pac. 431;
Christisen v. Bartlett (1906), 73 Kan. 4m, 85 Pac. 594; Monarch v. Bray
(1899), 106 Ky. 688, 2r Ky. L. R. 279, 51 S. W. 191; Lewis v. Ross (1854),
37 Me. 230, 59 Am. Dec, 49.
Collateral Im/zeachment: “The power resides in- every court to correct
and amend the entries on its minutes nunc pro tunc; and no court can
incidentally question the verity of the record as amended. The court re-
ceiving the amended record must take it as it is certified by the proper
officer, and‘ is not at liberty to look beyond it to inquire how it came
to be as it is. The remedy against an improper amendment is by appeal
or some other method of direct attack.” Ware v. Ktnt (1902), 123 Ala.
427, 82 Am. St. Rep. 132, 26 So. 208.
Entry After Death of Party. ‘A decree of divorce being orally
ordered and note thereof made in- the minutes of the court, April 23,
1880, the woman married again May 30, following; later the man married
another; in Nov. 1883, the woman died; it was then discovered that no
formal decree had ever been entered persuant to the order made orally
in open court; upon petition filed by the second husband Sept. 4, 1885,
without notice to the first, the court entered an order Sept. 8, reciting
the due determination of the case in April 1880, reciting all the facts,
and directing the clerk forthwith to enter said decree, nunc Pro hmc
as of April 23, 1880, which was done; both men claimed half of the
woman's estate as -her surviving husband; the court administering the
estate excluded the judgment roll made up as above stated, on the
ground that it appeared on the face of it to be void, because no decree
was rendered during -the life of the woman; and. therefore, the property
was awarded to the first husband as surviving husband not divorced. On
appeal this judgment was affirmed by four judges against one; but on
rehearing this judgment was reversed, four judges against one; and it was
held that there was a decree of divorce when ordered by the court, though
not entered up, and that the entry of it nunc /iro tunc five years later
furnished proper evidence of the eourt’s original action, which the pro-
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might amend their records upon their own motion, or upon the � 
motion or suggestion of any one interested. It  is not a proceed­
ing in which there need be any parties. It is the act of the court r · 
itself, correcting its own records, to make · them conform to the 
truth of the case . 
These general views will render it unnecessary to consider 
particularly some other ingenious arguments which were offered 
by the counsel for the demandant. The court being of opinion 
that there was a sufficient record of the order of the court of com­
mon pleas to sell the premises conveyed to Jones, there must be 
Judgment for the tena>it. 
No Notice to the opposite party of appl icat ion to amend i s  necessary : 
Odell v. Reynolds ( 1895 ) ,  70 Fed. 656, 17 C. C. A. 317 ; Ware v. Kent 
( 1899 ) ,  123 Ala. 427, 26 So .  208, 82 Am. St. Rep. 132 ; Estate of Cook 
( 1888) ,  n Cal. 220, I. L. R A. 567, 1 1  Am. St. Rep. 267, 19 Pac. 431 ; 
Christisen v. Bartlett ( 1906) , 73 Kan. 401, 85 Pac. 594 ; Monarch v. Brey 
( 1899) ,  Io6 Ky. 688, 21 Ky. L. R .  279, 51 S. W. 191 ; Lewis v. Ross ( 1854 ) ,  
37 M e. 230, 59 Am. Dec. 49. 
Colla teral Impeach ment : "The power resides in every court to co rrect 
and amer.d the entries on its minutes nu11c pro tune ; and no court can 
incidentaily question the verity o f the record as amended. The courl re­
ceiving the amended record must take it as it is certifi ed' by the proper 
officer, and is  not at liberty to look beyond it to inquire how it came 
to be as it is.  The remedy against an improper amendment is by appeal 
or some other method of direct attack." Ware v. Kimt ( 1902 ) ,  123 Ala. 
427, 82 Am. St. ){ep. 132, 26 So. 2o8. 
Entr}' After Death of Party. A decree of di vorce being oral ly 
ordered and note thereof made in the minutes of the court, April 2,3, 
188o, the woman married again May 30, following ; later the man married 
another ; in Nov. 1883, the wo man died ; :t was then discovered that no 
fo rmal decree had ever been entered persuant to the order made orally 
in open court ; upon petition filed by the second husband Sept. 4, r885, 
w ithout notice to the first, the cou rt entered an o nler Sept. 8, reciting 
the due determ ination of the case in April 188o, reciting all the facts, 
and di r�ti ng the clerk forthwith to enter said decree, 111111c pro tune 
as of April 23, 1 88o, which was done ; both men claimed hal f  of the 
woman's estate as her surviving husband ; the court administering the 
estate excluded the j udgment roll made up as above stated, on the 
ground that it appeare d on the face of it to be void, because no decree 
was rende red during the l i ft'  o f  the woman ; and.  t<here fore, the property 
was awn rded to th e fi rst husband as surviving hushand not di vorced. On 
appeal this judgment was affirmed by four j u dges against one ; but on 
rehearing thi s  judgment was reversed, four j udges against one ; and it was 
he ld  that th ere was a decree of divorce when ordered by the court, th ough 
not entered up, and that the entry of it n u n c  pro t u n e  five years later 
furnished proper evidence of the court's original action, which the pro­
bate court was bound to receive and respect. Estate of Co ok ( 1888) 1  77 
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Cal. 220, 1 L. R. A. 567, 11 Am. St. Rep. 267, 17 Pac. 923, 19 Pac. 431;
same case on next appeal: (1890), 83 Cal. 415, 23 Pac. 392. See also:
Wilkins v. Wainright (1899), 173 Mass. 212, 53 N. E. 397.
Notwithstanding this decision, the supreme court of Missouri 1held
that in a partition suit, the court below did not err in refusing to admit
in evidence a Califonia decree of divorce similarly entered; on the ground
that there was no decree till the record was entered, which was after
the death of the party against whom divorce had been granted. Young -
V. Young (1901), 165 M0. 624, 65 S. W. 1016, 88 Am. St. Rep. 440.
Court: Take Judicial Notice of lVhat Occurs In Open Court before
them. and require no proof of it; and on this principle it would seem
that they need no proof of what they have themselves done, that any-
thing which wili refresh their recollection may be resorted to by them
for that punpose, and that they may act on their unsupported memory
of the transaction. or any other memoranda which satisfies them of the
fact. And accordingly it has been so held by several courts. Odell v.
Reynolds (1895), 70 Fed. 656, 660, 17 C. C. A. 317; Clmlrtian v. Bartlett
(1906), 73 Kan. 401, 85 Pac. 594; Lewis v. Ross (1854), 37 Me. 230. 59
Am. Dec. 49; 1-ink v. Fink (1862), 43 N. H. 508, 80 Am. Dec. 189; Sui/i;-an
San. Inst. v. Clark (1882), 12 Neb. 578, 12 N. W. 103; Hollister v. ./ndycs
(1857), 8 Ohio St. 201, 70 Am. Dec. 100; Wyman v. Buckstafi‘ (1869),
24 Vt/is. 477, amendment on memory of judge alone.
Record Evidence to Amend by. In a number of states it is held that
a judgment cannot be entered up mun: pro lune at a term subsequent to
the one in which it is pronounced unless there is some note or memoran-
dum in the record, judge's notes, clerk's journal, or papers in the case.
to furnish a guide as to how the judgment should be drawn; and that
if there is nothing but the recollection of the judge and spectators the
judgment must ‘be pronounced de now, and if entered can be amended
only on the like evidence. Melsger v. Marley (1902), 197 Ill. 208, 90
Am. St. Rep_ 158, 64 N. E. 280; Boyd v. Srlsott (1899), 152., Ind. 161, 52
E. 752;Burnside v. Wand (1902), 170 M0. 531, 71 S. W. 337, 62 L.
R. A. 428; Nicklin v. Robertson, (1995), 28 Ore. 278,, 42 Pac. 993. "I2,
-135—Bre_v v. Th0mas—]udgt." was held a sufficient note to warrant entry.
.Ma/mrch V. Bre_v (1899), I06 Ky. 688, 51 S. \V. 191.
HOLLISTER AND SMITH v. THE JUDGES OF THE DISTRICT
COURT, in Ohio Sup. Ct., December term, 1857—8 Ohio St.
201, 70 Am. Dec. 100.
Motion for a peremptory mandamus to compel the judges of
the district court of Lucas county to restore to the bill of excep-
tions in Reznor v. Hollister, clauses stricken by the judge of
the common pleas without consent of defendants Hollister and
Smith.
Bi\RTLEY, C. J. The objections made to the correction of.
the alteration in the bill of exceptions, on behalf of the defendants
appear to be the following: I, That two of the judges know noth-
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Cat. 220, 1 L. R. A. 567, 1 1  Am. St.  Rep. 26;-, 17 Pac. 923, 19 Pac. 431 ; 
same case on next appeal : ( 189(>) , 83 Cal. 415 ,  23 Pac. 392. See also : 
Wilkins v. Wai11riglrt ( 1899) ,  1 73 :\l ass. 2 1 2, 53 N. E. 397. 
Xotwithstanding this decision, the supreme court of  ::\f issouri 1h eld 
that in a partition suit, the court below did not err in refusing to admit 
in evideoce a Cali fonia decree of divorce similarly entered ; on .the ground 
that there ·was no dec ree t i lil the record was entered, which was a fter 
the death of  the party against whom divorce had been granted. You11g · 
v. Yo u ng ( 1901 ) ,  165 Mo. 624, 65 S. W. 1 016, 88 Am. St. Rep. 440. 
Courts Take Judicial Notice of 1¥hat  Occurs fo Open Court before 
them. an•l reqt! ire  1 1 0  proo f of  it ; and on th is  principle i t  would s e e m  
that they need no proof o f  what th ey have them selves done, th at any­
thing which wil i  re fresh the ir  recoll ection may be resorted to by them 
for that pu ripose, and that they may act on their un supporte<l memory 
of the tran saction, or anv other me moranda which satisfies them of the 
fact. And accordingly it has been so held by several courts. Odell v. 
Reynolds ( 1&)5 ) ,  70 Fed. 656, 66o, 1 7 C. C. A. 317 ; C!t ristia1' v. Bartlet t  
( 1906) , 73 Kan. 401 ,  85 Pac. 59+ ; Lewis v. Ross ( 1854 ) ,  37 Me. 230, 59 
Am.  Dec.  49 ; J. iitk \'. Fink ( rfo2 ) ,  43 N. H.  5o8, 8o .'-\m. Dec. 18g ; S11!/i� .1u 
.'la ;•. fost. \'. CJ.i rk ( 1 882 ) ,  u N eb. 578, 12 N. W. 1 03 ;  Hollister \'. hdges 
( 1857 ) ,  8 Ohio St. 20 1 , 70 Am. Dec. 100 ; Wy111aii v. Buckstaff ( 1869) , 
24 \Vis. 4i7. amendment on memory o f  j udge alone. 
Record Evide11ce to A 111e11d by. In a number of  states  it i s  hdd that 
a judgment cannot be entered up 11 u11c pro tune  at a term subsequt>nt to 
the one in which it i s  pronounced unless there is some note or m emoran­
dum i n  the record, judge's notes, clerk's journal, or papers in the case. 
to furnish a guide as to how the judgment should be drawn ; and thai: 
i f  there is  nothing but the recol lection of the judge and spectators the 
j udgment must he pronounced de noi·o, and i f  entered can be amended 
only on the like evidence. Afet::ger v. Morley ( 1902 ) ,  197 I l l .  208, 90 
Am. St. Rep. 1 58, 64 N. E. 28o ; Boyd ''· Schott ( 1899 ) ,  152, Ind. 16 1 , 52 
N. E. 752 ;E11rnside v. Wa nd ( 1902 ) ,  1 70 ::\fo. 531,  71 S. W. 337, 62 L. 
R. A. 428 ; Nicklin \'. Robertson, ( 1�5 ) ,  28 Ore. 2j8,  42 Pac. 993. "12, 
4-'35-Brcy \'. Tlzomas-Judgt." was held a sufficient note to warrant entry. 
Mo11arcli v. Bre.v ( 18g) ) ,  106 Ky. 688, 51 S. \V. 191 .  
HOLLI STER AND S �f I T H  v .  TH E JUDGES OF THE DI ST.RIOT 
COURT, in Oh io Sup. Ct. , December term, 1857-8 Ohio St. 
201 ,  70 Am. Dec. 1 00. 
Motion for a peremptory mandamus to compel the judges of  
the district court o f  Lucas county to  restore to  the bi l l  of excep­
tions in Reznor v. Hollister, clauses stricken by the j udge o f  
the common pleas without consent o f  defendants Hollister and 
Smith. 
ilARTLEY, C. J. The obj ect ions made to the correction of . 
the alterat ion in the bill of  exceptions, on behalf  of the defendants 
appear to he the following : I ,  That two of the judges know noth­
ing · about the facts. 2. That they have no authority over the 
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clerk in the premises, and can make no order that he is bound’
to obey. 3. That they are judges of the court of common
pleas, and only as such authorized to hold a district court. 4.
That the alterative writ was directed to them as judges of the
district court, and not to the district court.
Every court of record has a supervisory and protecting
charge over its records and the papers belonging to its files; and
may at any time direct the correction of clerical errors, or the
substitution of papers in case the originals are purloined or lost;
and, in exercise of the same authority, in case the records or
files should be fraudulently or otherwise improperly altered or
defaced, may direct their correction and restoration to their origi-
nal condition. And in making such corrections, the clerk is
under the control and authority of the court.
Two of the judges, it is said, have no knowledge of the
facts touching the alleged alteration of the hill of exceptions.
This is no legal excuse for not doing the act directed. when they
have the unquestionable authority to direct the relators and other
parties interested, to produce their proofs in relation to the
matter. \The personal knowledge of the judge is not essential
to the correction of a clerical error. He may inquire into the mat-
ter and inform himself by competent evidence, and act upon
that, as he acts upon proofs given in court in the performance of
other judicial acts.‘
It is objected that the defendants are judges of the court
of common pleas, and only as such authorized to ["‘2o4] hold a
district court. It matters not in what form of expression the
judicial power is conferred. The defendants are, by the constitu-~
tion and laws of the state, constituted judges of the district court,
and as such clothed with full authority to hold the district court
and exercise its jurisdiction and authority. And their authority
to exercise chambers powers in vacation causes pending in the
district court, by allowing and dissolving injunctions, and per-
forming other acts as judges of the district court cannot be con-
troverted. ;\nd the fact that they are judges of the common
pleas does not, under the constitution and laws of this state,
render them incompetent to act as judges of the district court.
There is nothing in the objection that the writ is directed to
them as the judges of the district court instead of the district
court. The writ was properly directed. They are the judges
of that court, and as such, clothed by constitution and laws of the
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clerk 111 the premises, and can make no order that he is bound · 
to obey. 3. That they are j udges of the court of common 
pleas, and only as such authorized to holcl a district court. 4 .  
That the al terative writ was d i rected to them a s  j udges o f  the 
district court, and not to the district court. 
Every court of record has a supervisory and protecting 
charge over its records and the papers be longing to its files ; and 
may at any t ime direct the correction of clerical errors, or the 
substitution of papers in case the originals are purlo ined or lost ; 
and, in exercise of  the same authority, in case the records or 
files should be fraudulently or otherwise improperly altered or "" 
defaced, may direct their correction and restoration to their origi­
nal condition. And in making such correct ions, the clerk is 
under the control and authority o f  the court .  
Two o f  the j udges, it is said, have no knowledge o f  the 
facts touching the a l leged alteration of  the bill  o f  exception s. 
This i s  no legal excuse for not doing the act dirrcted , when they 
have the unquestionable authority to direct the rd ators all ll othe r  
parties in terested , t o  produce their proo fs i n  relation t o  the 
matter. \The personal knowledge o f  the j udge is not essent ia l  
to the correction of a clerical error. I le may inqu i re into th1? mat­
ter and inform himsel f  by competent evidence, and act upon 
that , as he acts upon proo fs given in court in the performance of 
oth er j ud icial acts. 1  
It is  obj ected that the  defendants are jmlges of t h e  cou r t  
of common pleas, and on ly as  such authorized to [ *204] holrl a 
dis trict court. I t  matters not in what form of express ion the 
j ud icial JX>wer is  con ferred . The defendants arc, by the consti tu-· 
tion and laws of  the state, constituted judges o f  the di strict court ,  
and as such clothed with full  authority to hold the district court 
and exercise its j u risdiction aml authority. And their authori ty 
to exerc i se chambers powers i n  vacation causes pending in the 
d istrict court, by al low ing- and d i ssolving- injunct ion s , and per­
forming- other acts as judg� o f  the d i strict court canno t he con­
troverted .  :\ml the fact that they arc j udges of the common 
pl eas does not , under the const i tution and laws o f  this state , 
render them incompeten t to act as judg-es o f  the d i strict court. 
There is  nothing in the obj ection that the writ is d i rected to 
them as the j uc lges of the district court instead of the d is trict 
court. The writ was properly d i rected . They are the j mlg-cs 
of that conrt,  and as such, clothed by con st itut ion ancl  laws o f  the 
state,  with power to hold that court and exercise i ts authority. 
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A writ of mandamus to a subordinate judicial tribunal is
properly directed to the judge or judges of the court and especi-
ally where there may be other judges authorized to hold or_ par-
ticipate in holding the court. In case of disobedience to the
mandate of the supervisory court, the authority to compel obedi-
ence is exercised over the judges personally having the power to
exercise the functions of the court. Peremptory mandamus
awarded.
BRINKERHOFF and SCOTT, ]]., concurred. J. R. Sw.\N, _I.,
dissented, holding that a motion in the district court
to correct its record, if overruled, could, on exception and petition
in error, be revised ; and consequently a mandamus is not, in such
case, the proper remedy.
Amendment by Another Judge “The plaintiffs in error contend that
the defendant in error has been guilty of gross laches in permitting the
journal to stand in its present condition for more than eight years. It
appears from the record that the defendant has been striving to enforce
the decree, and obtain a deficiency judgment from the date of its rendi-
tion to the present time; that the property was sold as soon as a pur-
chaser could be found in the ordinary course of procedure; that the
sale was confirmed, and the defendant herein promptly made application
for a deficiency judgment; that her application was denied, and from that
order she prosecuted error to this court. She then ascertained for the first
time that no final judgment or decree of forclosure had been rendered
in the records of the trial court, and for that reason the order of the
court denying her a deficiency judgment was affirmed. As soon as the
cause was remanded, the proceeding which is the foundation of the
present action was commenced and which resulted in the entry of the
decree which is now complained of. So it cannot be successfully urged
that she has been guilty of laches. * * * It is beyond question that
the district court had jurisdiction to order the decree which was actually
rendered by Judge .\larshall Dec. 7, I895, entered upon the journal of
the court as of that date. * * * The present presiding judge could
have no personal knowledge of the terms bf the decree which was actually
rendered, because it was not rendered by him. He is the successor of
Judge Marshall, who rendered the judgment, and who is now deceased.
A nun: pro tuna judgment must conform to, and be no broader than
the one originally rendered. ‘We find no evidence in the record show-
ing, or even tending to show, that the judge of the district court, when
he rendered the judgment of Dec. 7, 1805, made any finding whatever
as to the liability of the plaintiffs herein' for a deficiency. So we con-
clude that the evidence is insufiicient to sustain the finding contained in
the present judgment on that point.” PIzrl[1.r v. Wolff (1905) 74 Neb. 44,
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A writ of  mandamus to a subordinate j udicial tribunal is 
properly di rected to the judge or j udges of the court and especi­
ally where there may be other j udges authorized to hold or. par­
ticipate in  holding the court. In case of d isobedience to the 
mandate of the supervisory court, the authority to compel obedi­
ence is exerci sed over the j udges personally having the power to 
exercise the functions of the court. Peremptory mandamus 
awarded. 
BRIN KERHOFF and ScoTT, JJ. ,  concurred. J. R. SwA N ,  J.,  
djssented, holding that a motion in the district court 
to correct its record, if overruled, could, on exception and petit ion 
in error, be rev ised ; and consequently a mandamus is  not, in such 
case, the proper remedy. 
A 111 e11dt11 ent  by A n o ther J11 dg e  "The plain tiffs in  error contend that 
the defendant in error has been guilty of gross !aches in permitting the 
journal to stand in its present condition for more than eight years. It 
appears from the record that the de fendant has been striving to enforce 
the decree, and obtain a deficiency j udgment from the date of its rendi­
tion to the present t ime ; that the property was sold as soon as a pur­
chaser could be found in the ord inary course o f  proce dure ; that the 
sale was confi rmed , and the defendant herein promptly made appl ication 
for a deficiency j udgment ; that her appl ication was denied, and from that 
order she prosecuted error to this  court. She then ascertained for the fi rst 
time that no fi r.al j udgment or decree o f  forclosure had been rende red 
in the records of the trial court, and for that reason the order o f  the 
cou rt denying her a defic iency j udgment was affirmed.  A s  soon as the 
cause was remanded, the prot·ceding which i s  the foundation of  the 
present action was commenced and wh ich resulted in the entry of the  
decree wh ich is now com p la ine d o f. So i t  cannot be  succe s s f u l ly u rged 
that she has been gu i lty of !aches. * * * It  is  beyond quest ion that 
the d istrict cou rt had j ur i sd iction to order the decree which was actually 
rendered by Judge �Iarshal l  Dec. 7, 1&J5, en te red upon the j ournal o f  
the court as o f  thnt date. * * * T h e  present presiding j udge cou ld  
have no persona l knowledge o f  the terms b f  the decree which was actt!a lly 
rendered,  because it was not rendered hy him. He is the successor of 
Judge :'.\larsh<11l l ,  who re ndered the j udgment, and who is now deceased. 
A 11 u1 1c pro t1111c judgment must  conform to,  and be no broader  th an 
the one originally rendered. \Ye find no evidence in  the record show­
ing, o r  even ten d ing to show, that the  j udge of the d i str ict  court ,  when 
he rendered the  j udgm e n t o f  Dec. 7,  1895, made any finding whatever 
as to the l ia:b i l ity o f  the plai n t i ffs herein for a d e ficie ncy. �o we con­
clude that the evidence i s  i nsufficient to susta i n  the find i n g contained in 
the present j udgment on that point ."  Phclfis v. Wolff ( 1905 ) 74 Neb. 44, 
IOJ N. w. 1o62. 
160 cases ON JUDGMENTS, ETC.
GRO'I‘-ON BRIDGE & MFG. CO. v. CLARK PRESSED BRICK CO.,
in United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, March
24, 1905-136 Fed. 27, 68 C. C. A. 577.
Before Sanborn, Circuit Judge, and Philips and Riner, Dis-
trict Judges.
_ Error to the circuit court of U. S. for Eastern Dist. of .»\rk.
Action by the bridge company against the brick company to
recover $1,999 damages for failure of the brick company to
furnish brick according to its contract with plaintiff for con-
struction of a bridge. To this the brick company answered, that
in a suit by it for the price of bricks furnished under such con-
tract, the bridge company answered, claiming damages for said
breach, but failed to defend, and judgment was obtained therein
by default for the value of the bricks so furnished, whereby the
claim herein sued for is barred. To this answer the bridge com-
pany demnrred, which demurrer was overruled. The trans-
cript ofiered in evidence by the brick company to prove the former
proceedings, indicated that the court rendering the former judg-
ment had, on motion of the plaintiff therein, and without notice
to the defendant therein. amended the record of that proceeding
nearly a year after the judgment was rendered, thereby making
it appear that the cause had been submitted on the pleadings. &c.
In the present action defendant's plea of former adjudication was
sustained on the hearing: and the bridge company brings error.
PHILIPS, District Judge. The question to be decided is
whether the judgment of the state court in the suit of the brick
company against the bridge company creates an estoppel against
the maintenance of the action brought in the United States cir-
cuit court.
The first contention on behalf of plaintifl in error is that the
mmc fro tunc entry, whereby the word “reply" was inserted in
the judgment, should be regarded as a nullity, for the reason that
it was made without notice to the defendant therein. The emenda_
tion of court records by subsequent entries was expressly author-
ized hy St. 8 Hen. VI, c. 12, which declared that:
“The justices are further empowered to examine and amend
what they shall think, in their discretion, to be misprisions of
their clerks, in any record. process, word, pleading, power of
attorney, writ, panel or return." Tidd's prac. (Am. Ed.) § 712.
' This statute is a part of the common law of the state of
Arkansas. It does, however, but give sanction to the inherent
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reside in every court of high jurisdiction, to enable it to see to
it that its records speak the truth, as a false record is an offense
to the law. A judgment is what the court pronounces. The
entry made by the clerk may be evidence of what the pronounce-
ment of the court was; but, as it is the act of the scrivener of the
court, his failure to properly and exactly put down what the court
in fact ordered is a mere misprision of the clerk, which the court
at any time can, and should, rectify by having the order or judg-
ment the court in fact directed entered mmc Pro tune. This is
succinctly expressed in St. 8 Hen. VI, supra, empowering the
judges “to examine and amend what they shall think, in their dis-
cretion, to be misprisions of their clerks.”
In re Wright, 134 U. S. 136, 10 S. Ct. 487, 33 L. Ed. 865, the
petitioner had been indicted in the United States district court
for the southern district of Michigan. After conviction he filed a
motion for new trial and in arrest of judgment, the hearing of
which the district court certified and remitted to the next circuit
court of the district. On hearing before Circuit Judge Jackson,
and Brown, District Judge, the motions were denied; and on the
same day the judge of the district court proceeded to judgment
of sentence against \\/right, who thereupon applied for his dis-
charge on writ of habeas corpus to Mr. justice Harlan, the jus-
tice assigned at that time to the sixth circuit. The basis of this
application was that the record failed to show that on the over-
ruling of said motions by the circuit court there was an order
remitting the case back to the district court. Confessedly, after
the transfer of the case to the circuit court, unless the district
court regained jurisdiction of the case by proper order of the
circuit court remitting the case to the district court. the latter
had no jurisdiction to sentence the petitioner. This fact being
called to the attention of the judges of the circuit court, they
caused an order to be made, mmc [W0 tune based “upon the in-
spection of said rcco'rds,” remanding the cause to the district
court; and thereupon the writ of habeas corpus was discharged.
In reviewing this action of the circuit court Ur. Justice .\liller
went quite fully into the question, and approved that line of
decisions which holds that the power is inherent in courts of re-
cord. by entry mmr fro tune at a term subsequent to that at which ‘I
the judgment was rendered. to make the record show fully the I
order or judgment the court in fact made at the proper term. but
which the record failed to disclose.
















































































































































THE RECORD or: THE J UDG M E N T  I U I  
reside i n  every court o f  high j urisc..l iction, to enable i t  t o  see to 
it that its records speak the truth, as a false record is an offense 
to the law. A judgment is what the court pronounces. The 
entry made by the clerk may be evidence of  what the pronounce­
ment of the court was ; but,  as it is the act o f  the scrivener of the 
court, his failure to properly and exactly put down what the court 
in fact ordered is a mere misprision of the clerk, which the court 
at any time can, and should, recti fy by having the order or j udg­
ment the court in fact directed entered nunc pro fu,nc. This is 
succinctly expressed in St. 8 Hen. VI, supra, empowering the 
j udges "to examine and amend what they shall think, in their dis­
cretion, to be misprisions o f  their clerks." 
In re Wright, 134 L'". S. 1 36, 10 S. Ct. 487, 33 L. Ed. 865, the 
petitioner had been indicted in the United States district court 
for the southern district of Michigan. A fter conviction he filed a 
motion for new trial and in arrest of judgment, the hearing of 
which the district court certified and remitted to the next circuit 
court of the district. On hearing before Circuit Judge Jackson, 
and Brown, District Judge, the motions were denied ; and on the 
same day the j udge of the district court proceeded to j udgment 
o f  sentence against \Vright, who thereupon applied for his  dis­
charge on writ of habeas corpus to l\Ir. Justice Harlan, the j us­
tice assigned at that time to the sixth circuit .  The basis of this 
appl ication was that the record failed to show that on the over­
rul ing of said motions by the circu it court there was an order 
remitting the CJ.Se back to the dis trict court. Con fessedly, a fte r 
the transfer of  the case to the circuit court ,  unless the district 
court regained j urisd iction of the case by proper o rder of the 
circuit court  rem itting the case to the d istrict  court. the lat ter 
had no j urisd iction to sentence the pet i t ioner. This  fact being 
cal led to the attention of the j nclg-es of the circuit court ,  they 
caused an order to be made, 1w n c  pro tu I le  based "upon the jn­
spect ion of  said reco"rds , "  rcmanc\ ing the · cause to the d istrict  
cour t : and thereupon the writ  o f  habeas corpu s was d ischarged . , 
In reviewing th is act ion o f  the c i rcu it cour t 1\Ir. Just i ce � I i l ll'r  
went qu i te ful ly into the question , and approved that l ine  of  
dec is ions wh ich hol c l s  that the power i s  inherent i n  courts of re­
cord . by en try 1 1 1 1 11 c  pro t 1 1 1 1c  a t  a term snb::-t?quent to that  at  which / 
the j u dgmen t ,,· a s  rcnd ercc l .  to make the record show folly the  1 
orde r or j udgmen t the court in  fact made at the proper term . h u t  
which the record fa ikd to  cl i sclosi:.  
I n  no j u ri s d i ct ion i s this  pract ice more fo l ly rec,1gn i z ed t km 
162 CASES on JUDGMENTS, are.
by the courts of Arkansas. In Bobo V. State. 40 Ark. 231-232,
Chief Justice English presented a summary of the decisions of that
court touching this practice, the sum of which is that: “Courts have
a continuing power over their records, not affected by the lapse of
time. Should the record in any case be lost or destroyed, the
court whose record it was possesses the undoubted power, at
any time afterwards, to make a new record. In doing this it
must seek information by the aid of such evidence as may be with-
in its reach tending to show the nature and existence of that
which it is asked to re-establish. There is no reason why the
same rule should not apply, when, instead of being lost, the re-
cord was never made up, or was so made up as to express a dilIer-
ent judgment than the one pronounced by the court. Hence the
general rule that a record may be amended, not only by the
judge's notes, but also by other satisfactory evidence"—Citing.
Frink v. Frink 43 N. H. 514, 80 Am. Dec. 189, 82 Am. Dec.
I7-2_ * * *
The answer to all this, made by the learned counsel for
plaintiff in error, is that there was no notice given of the motion
for the mmr fro tune entry. * -* *
Iii ].en-is v. Ross, 37 Me. 230, 59 Am. Dec. 49, the court said:
“On general principles it is competent for a court of record, and
incident to its authority, to correct mistakes in its records which
do not arise from the judicial action of the court. but from the
mistakes of its recording ofiicer. In doing this it may regulate
its own actions upon its own sense of responsibility and duty,
and proceed, upon suggestion or motion of those interested, or
upon its own ‘certain knowledge and mere motion.’ * * * ‘It
would not be an adversary proceeding, in which, of necessity.
there should be parties, or in which notice would be required."
In Odell v. Rvy11olds at al., 70 Fed. 656, 17 C. C. A. 317. the
court, in discussing the practice of such entries mmc [W0 tune,
said: ~"'Sometimes the propriety of such action exists in cases where
the correction may be made upon that which appears in the re-
cord itself, and is necessary to make it consistent and harmonious,
one part with another. In other cases it is necessary, in the in-
terests of justice, to act upon matters not appearing from the
record; for example, things resting in the recollection of the
judge, or evidence adduced aliunde. In the former case notice
to the parties is not necessary. No new thing is brought upon
the record. * * * There is nothing to litigate. No right is
















































































































































CASES ON J l."DG �! E N TS, ETC. 
by the courts of Arkansas. In Bobo v. State. 40 Ark. 23 1 -232, 
Ch ief  Justice English presented a summary of the decisions of that 
court touching this practice, the sum of which is tha t : • ·courts have 
a cont inu ing power over their records, not affected by the lapse of 
time. Should the record in any case be lost or destroyed,  the 
court w hose record it was possesses the undoubted power, at 
any time afterwards, to make a new record . In do ing this i t  
must seek information by the aid of such evidence as may be with­
in its reach tend ing to show the nature and existence of that 
which it  is a�ked to re-establ ish. There is no reason why the 
same rule shou ld not apply, when , instead of being lost, the re­
cord was never  made up, or was so made up as to express a cl iff er­
ent j udgment than the one pronounced by the court. Hence the 
general rule that a record may be amende<l ,  not only hy the 
j udge's notes, but also by o ther sat isfactory evidence"--Citing. 
Frin k v. Fn"n k 43 1\ .  H. 5 14, 80 Am. Dec. i &J, 82 Am. Dec. 
1 72. * * * 
The answer to all this, made by the learned counsel for 
, p lain tiff in error, is that there was no notice given of  the mot ion 
for the n u n c  p ro tune entry. * -* * 
fo l� ewis v. Ross, 37 Me. 230, 59 Am. Dec. 4'), the court said : 
"On genera l principles i t is competent for a court of recorcl , and 
incident to its authority, to correct mistakes in its records which 
do not arise from the judicial action of the court, but from the 
mistakes of its recording officer. In doing this it  may regulate 
its own actions upon its own sense of responsibility and duty, 
and proceed , upon suggestion or motion of those in terested , or 
upon its own 'certain knowledge and mere motion.' * * * ' I t  
would not he an  adversary proceeding, in wh ich , of necessity . 
there shou ld be parties , or in which notice would be required ."  
In Odell v .  Reyn olds e t  al., iO Fed. 656, i7  C. C. A.  3 1 7, the 
court, in discu ss ing the practice o f such entries 11 1111 c pro tune, 
sa id :  ;'Sometimes the propriety of such action exists in  cases where 
the correction may be made upon that which appears in the re­
cord i tsel f ,  and is necessary to make it cons istent and harmon ious , 
one part with another. In other cases it is necessary, in the in­
teres ts of just ice,  to act upon matters not appearing from the 
record ; fo r example, th ings rest ing in the recollection of the 
j udg-e,  or evidence adduced al iunde . In the former case notice 
...,. to the part ies i s  not necessary. No new th ing is brought upon 
the record. * * * There is nothing to l i t igate. :\"o r igh t i s  
substantially affected. * * * I f  it i s  the recollection of  the 
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court, it is doubtful whether notice is required, for the reason
that it is not open to contest. At all events, it would seem, upon
the authorities, that corrections of the record made by the court
upon its own recollection would not be eollaterially assailable,
though made without notice.”
The order of the court amending the record in the case here
under review shows that is was based upon the knowledge 01' the
court of the facts. It was, therefore, a matter appealing to the
conscience of the judge to have the record of his court contain the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. The require-
ment of notice to a party implies the right to appear and contest.
A challenge to the court on an entry directed to be made, based
upon its own knowledge, would present an unseemly contention be-
fore the presiding judge. How could such an issue be tried?
The presiding judge says, “\Vithin my own knowledge the case
was tried on the petition, answer, and reply.” Would the defend-
ant, in the face of the court's statement, be heard to say, “I deny
it”? If the court is to try it out, is the judge to yield his own
knowledge, his inward consciousness, to what some witness may
say? The inevitable presumption that the court would follow its
own knowledge and conscience is, in itself, a contradiction of such
practice. At no time during this controversy has the plaintiff
in error challenged the truth of the fact recited in the mute fro
tuna entry.
The next contention on behalf of the plaintiff in error is that
when it, in the state court, failed to appear and presecute its coun-
terclaim, it was tantamount to a nonsuit, or withdrawal of the
counterclaim, and the court should have so treated it. Therefore
there should have been no trial of the issues raised by the answer
and reply, and no judgment thereon. If this were conceded.
would it follow that the action of the court in proceeding to trial
and judgment on the whole issues presented by the pleadings
rendered the judgment subject to collateral attack? The defend-
ant therein having appeared and filed answer, it remained in court
for all purposes connected with the litigation until such answer
was withdrawn, which was never done. The court being one if
general jurisdiction over the parties and the subject-matter, it
had the power to adjudicate. At the utmost, therefore, its action
in not treating the failure of the defendant to urge its counter-
claim as a constructive abandonment thereof was only an irregu-
larity in a matter of procedure, a voidable error, and not a judg-
















































































































































T H �  RECORD OF 'fHE J UDG M E NT 
court, it is doubtful whether notice is required, for the reason 
that it is not open to contest. At all events, it would seem, upon 
the authorities, that corrections of the record made by the court 
upon its O\vn recollection would not be collaterially assailable, 
though made without notice." 
The order of the court amending the record in the case here 
under review shows that is was based upon the kno\\rledge oi the 
court of the facts. It was, therefore, a matter appealing to the 
conscience of tht j udge to have the record of his court contain the 
truth , the whole tr nth, and nothing but the truth. The require­
ment of notice to a party implies the right to appear and contest. 
A challenge to the court on an entry directed to be made, based 
upon its own knowledge, would present an unseemly contention be­
fore the presiding judge. How could such an issue be t ried � 
The presiding judge says, "\Vithin my own knowledge the case 
was tried on the petition, answer, and reply." \;\/ould the defend­
ant, in the face o f  the court's  statement, be heard to say, " I  deny 
it" ? I f  the court i s  to try it out, is the j udge to yield his own 
knowledge, his inward consciousness, to v;hat some witness may 
say ? The inevitable presumption that the court would follow its 
own knowledge and conscience is ,  in itself ,  a contradiction of such 
practice. At no time during this controversy has the plaintiff 
in error challenged the truth of the fact recited in the 11w1c pro 
tune entry. 
The next contention on beha1 £ of the plaint iff  in error is that 
when it ,  in the state court, failed to appear and presecute its coun­
terclaim, it was tantamount to a nonsuit, or withdrawal of the 
counterclaim, and the court should have l'O treated it .  There fore 
there should have been no trial of the issues raised by the answer 
and reply, and no j udgment thereon. If this were conceded. 
would i t  follow that the action of  the court in proceeding to trial 
and j udgment  on the whole issues presented by the pleadings. 
rendered the j udgment subject to collateral attack ? The defend­
ant therein having appeared and filed answer, it remained in court 
for all purposes connected with the litigation until such answer 
was withdrawn, which was never done. The court being one i f  
general j urisdiction over the parties and the subj ect-matter, i t  
had the power to  adjudicate. At the utmost, therefore, its action 
in not  treating the failure of the defendant to urge its counter­
claim as a constructive abandonment thereof was onlv an irre<ru-. ,..., 
larity in a matter o f  procedure, a voidable error, and not a j udg­
ment coram non judice. 
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In Shower 6’ Son v. Shell, 24 Ark, 122-123, the justice of the
peace, where the suit was on an open account and the plaintiff
failed to appear, instead of entering a nonsuit against the plain-
tiff, as contemplated by the practice act, rendered judgment by
default against the defendant. Of a collateral attack made on
this judgment, English, C. _I., said: “The justice should have
nonsuited the plaintiff: and it was an error for him to render
judgment by default against the defendant, which she could have
corrected by appeal; but, failing to appeal, the judgment became
final. The justice having jurisdiction of the subject-matter of
the suit, by service of the process, which afifirmatively appears,
the judgment could not be regarded as null and void, when pre-
sented to the circuit court collaterally, on account of the error
of the justice in rendering it without evidence"-—citing Hill v.
Steel, 17 Ark. 440; Alston, Ex parte, Id. 580.
Such a proceeding was merely erroneous, correctable by writ
of error. Putting v. Spring Valley Coal Co., 98 Fed. 81 I, 39 C. C.
A. 308. ‘It is not subject to collateral attack. Dorecll v. Apple-
gate, 152 U. S. 339, 340, 14 Sup. Ct. 611, 38 L. Ed. 463. Free-
man on Judgments, p.252, § I35,says: “Jurisdiction being obtained
over the person and the subject-matter, no error or irregularity
in its exercise can make a judgment void.” * * *
By leaving its answer on file in the case, judgment by de-
fault against the defendant could not go. It placed the plaintiff
under the necessity of going to trial on the issues, and adducing
proof to show what the contract was and that it had not violated
it. That particular fact, therefore, was included in the matter
adjudged. The very foundation of the suit in the federal court
is that the brick company did not observe and keep its contract,
but broke the same, to the damage of the bridge company in the
sum of $3,000. As under the Code if Arkansas no reply is re-
quired, except as to counterclaims and the like set up in the answer.
the judgment pleaded as an estoppel, with or without the amend-
ment made by the state court, concluded the controversy as to
who had broken or kept the contract. because it was. directly in-
yolved in the issues made by the defendant‘s answer. Dnrlzcmz
\'. l.?0rt'cr, 77 X. Y. 80, 33 .-\m. Rep. 570: Patric]: \'. Sclm/‘h~r', ()4
N. Y. 423-507: Cr0n1t\'¢'ll \-'. Sac County ()4 U. S. 353. 24 L. Ed.
105; Southern .ll'inn. Ry. Co. v. St. Paul, etc., Ry C0., 55 Fed.
605, 6()6, 5 C. C. A. 240.

















































































































































CASE!:i ON J UDGME NTS, ETC. 
In Shover & Son v. Shell, 24 Ark, 1 22- 1 23, the j ustice of the 
peace, where the suit was on an open account and the plaintiff 
failed to appear, instead of entering a nonsuit against the plain­
tiff, as contemplated by the practice act. rendered judgment by 
default against the defendant. Of a collateral attack made on 
this judgment, English, C. J., said : "The justice should have 
nonsuited the plaintiff : and it was an error for him to render 
j udgment by default against the defendant, which she could have 
corrected by appeal ; but, failing to appeal, the judgment became 
final. The j ustice having j urisdict ion of the subj ect-matter of 
the suit, by service of the process, which affirmatively appears, 
the judgment could not be regarded as null and void, when pre­
sented to the circuit court collaterally, on account of the error 
of the j ustice in rendering it without evidence"-citing Hill v. 
Steel, 17 Ark. 440 ; Alston, E.r parte, I<l. 58o. 
Such a proceeding was merely erroneous, correctable by writ 
of error. Patting v. S pri11g Valley Coal Co ., 98 Fed. 8 I I , 39 C .  C.  
A. 3o8. · I t  is  not subject to col lateral attack. Do'i.cell v. A pple­
gate, 1 52 V. S. 339, 340, 14  Sup. Ct. 61 1 ,  38 L. Ed. 463. Free­
man on Judgments, p. 252, § I 35,  says : "J u ris<liction being obtained 
over the person and the subj ect-matter, no error or irregularity 
in its exercise can make a judgment void." * * * 
Dy leaving its answer on file in the case, judgment by de­
fault against the defendant could not go. It placed the plaintiff 
under the necessity of going to trial on the issues, and adducing 
proof to show what the contract was and that it had not violated 
it. That particular fact, therefore , was included in the matter 
adj udged. The very foundation of the suit in the federal court 
is that the brick company did not observe and keep its contract, 
but broke the same , to the damage of the bridge company in the 
smn of $3 ,000. As under the Code if Ark ansas no reply is re­
quired , except as to countercla ims ancl the l ike  set up in the answer. 
the j udgment pleaded as an estoppel ,  w ith or w ithout the amend­
ment made by the state court, concluded the controversy as  to 
who had brok en or kept the contract . because i t  was d irectl v in­
vo lved in  the issues made hy the defendant's answer . D 1 1 rlza 11 1  
, .. H (m·cr. 77 :\ .  Y. 80, 33 Am. Rep. 570 : Patrick \'. SclwtTcr. C).f 
:-{ .  Y. 423- 507 : Cro m't. •cll v. Sac Co 1 1 1 1 t:.' 04 e. S. 353 .  24 L. Eel . 
H) j ; So u thcm M i11 1 1 .  Ry. Co . v. St. Pa u l, etc., Ry Co., 5 5 Fed. 
()()5 .  riq(> .  5 C' . C .  A. 24q. 
It resu l t s  that the jmlg-ment of the c ircui t court must  l ie a f-. . 
ti rm e d .  
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ORBAN v. NORTHWESTERN FIRE & MARINE INS. CO., in Mich.
Sup. Ct., March 29. 19t2—i69 Mich. 404, 135 N..W. 257.
Bill by John Orban against the Northwestern Fire 8: Marine
Insurance Company to correct a judgment of a justice of the
peace. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainant appeals.
OSTRANDER, J. A justice of the peace having jurisdiction of
the parties and the subject-matter rendered a judgment in an
action of assumpsit in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant on December 24, I910. The docket entry shows that
the cause was heard and the judgment rendered on December 26.
1910. For the purposes of holding court. December 26, I910.
being Monday. was dies 11011. An execution was issued and
returned unsatisfied, and later a transcript was filed in the circuit
court and an execution issued. which is outstanding. Defendant
on February 7. I911. moved in the circuit court [*4o5] to vacate
the transcript and recall the execution upon the ground that the
judgment was void because rendered on a holiday. Pending a
hearing upon the motion, plaintiffs filed their bill in equity. setting
up the above stated facts. and that the docket entry and date
were inadvertently and mistakenly made by the justices clerk and
by inadvertence the erroneous date was not discovered by the
justice, asking the court to find that the judgment was rendered
December 24. I()IO. and to enter a decree correcting the docket
and transcript accordingly. A temporary injunction restraining
proceedings to recall the execution and avoid the transcript was
asked for. ;\ general demurrer to the bill was sustained. and a
decree entered dismissing the bill. Complainants appeal.
The docket shows a void judgment. which was no bar to (1
new suit. hendering judgment by a justice of the pe.ace is a
judicial act. to perform which it is necessary to hold court. and
he is forbidden to hold court on a statutory holiday. Hcnznmw \'.
/ft‘!!!/t‘_\', 33 .\lich. Rt).
Plaintilfs had. and. so far as appears. they still have. an
adequate remedy at law. 'l‘hey might have at once begun a new
suit. \\'e do not now either affirm or deny the jurisdiction of
equity to grant relief upon the ground of accident where the party
seeking relief has no other adequate remedy. The question is
interesting. and not free from difficulties. Such complaints as the
one presented here are usually made by the defendant at law
seeking relief from a judgment at law. as in I.otl1r0[* \'. IM_IficlrI,
I34 .\lich. 485 (oh X. \\'. 577). See. generally. (3 l’omeroy's
















































































































































166 casrs on JUDG‘.\lENTS, are.
It is said in the brief for appellant that it is settled law in
this state that the circuit courts have authority to correct the
docket of a justice of the peace so as to make it speak the truth,
citing Cag-ncy v. Wattles, 121 Mich. 469 (80 N. W. 245). That
case and State, ex rel. Marsh, v. I/Vhittet, 61 Wis. 351 (21 N. VV.
245) (see, also, State, ex rel. Fourth Nat. Bank, v. Johnson, 103
Wis. 591 [79 N. W. 1081, 51 L. R. A. 33]), appear to be author-
ity for the [_*4o6] proposition that, in absence of any other
remedy, the circuit courts in some cases, in the exercise of the
power to supervise and control inferior courts, may grant relief
against false judgments by requiring justices to enter such a
judgment as the proven or admitted facts and the statute required .
in the first instance. But this jurisdiction is not invoked in the
present oase. And see O’Brien v. Tallman, 36 Mich. 13.
The decree dismissing the bill is affirmed, with costs to
appellee.
Moomi, C. J., and STEERE, MCALVAY, BROOKE, and STONE,
]]., concurred. BLAIR, ]., concurred in the result. BIRD, _I., did
not sit.
That justices of the peace have no power to amend docket entries once
formally entered up and signed by them: Merritt v. Votes (1874), 71 Ill.
636, 639; St. Louis B. 6- S. Ry. Co. v. Gmtlach (1896), 69 Ill. App. 192;
Foster v. Aldon (1870), 21 Mich. 507; Kluck v. Murphy (1897), 115 Mich.
128, 73 N. W. 128; People v. Delaware County (1836), 18 Wend. (N. Y.)
553- '
SEE A1.so: Levy v. Ferguson L. Co. (1888), 5r Ark. 317, 11 S. W. 284;
Corrigon v. Morris (1891), 43 Mo. App. 456.
CONTRA; Gates v. Bennett (1878), 33 Ark. 475, 489, even by the succes-
sor in the otfice; Benson v. Dyer (1882), 69 Ga. 190; Honlin v. Baxter
(1878), 20 Kan. 134; York: v. Ackcrman (1811), 3 N. J. L. 900; Torilla

















































































































































1 66  CASES ON J CDC �I E NTS, ETC. 
It is  said in the brief for appellant that it is settled law in 
this state that the circu it courts have authority to correct the 
docket of a justice of the peace so as to make i t  speak the truth, 
citing Cagney v. TVattles, 1 2 1  Mich. 469 (8o N. W. 245 ) .  That 
case and State, ex rel. J'l.farsh, v. U.7/iittet, 6 1  Wis. 35 1  ( 2 1  N. \V. 
245 ) ( see, also, State, e:r rel . Fourth Nat . Batik, v. Johnson, 103 
\V is . 59 I [ 79 X .  \V. 1 o8 I ,  5 1  L. R. A. 33 ] ) , appear to be author­
ity for the [ *406 ] proposition that, in absence of any other 
remedy, the ci rcuit courts in  some cases, in  the exercise of the 
power to supervise and control inferior courts, may grant relief 
against false j udgments by requi ring justices to enter such a 
judgment as the proven or admitted facts and the statute required 
in the first instance. But this j urisdiction is not invoked in the 
present oase. And see O'Brien v. Tallman, 36 Mich. 1 3. 
The decree dismissing the bill i s  affirmed, with costs to 
appellee. 
MooRF., C. ]. ,  and STEERE, �kALVAY, BROOKE, and STONE,  
JJ., concurred. BLAIR, J . ,  concurred in the result. BIRD, J. , d id 
not sit. 
That justices o f  the peace have no power to amend docket entries once 
formally entered up and signed by them : M crritt v. Yates ( 1874) , 71 Il l .  
636, 639 ; St. Louis B. & S. Ry. Co. v.  Gunlach ( 1896),  69 1 11. App. 1 92 ; 
Foster v. A lden ( 1870 ) , 2 1  Mich. 507 ; Kluck v. Murphy ( 18g7 ) ,  I I 5  Mich. 
128, 73 N. W. 1 28 ; Peop le v. Delaware Cou n ty ( 1836 ) ,  18 Wend. ( N. Y.) 
558. 
St<:t ALSO : Levy v. Ferguson L. Co. ( 1888) ,  5 1  Ark. 317, I I  S. W. 284 ; 
Corrigan v. Morris ( 18g1 ) ,  43 :\fo. App. 456. 
CoNTRA : Ga tes v. Be11nett  ( l8i8) , 33 Ark. 475, 489, even by the succes­
sor in t'he office ; Bensoti v. Dyer ( 1 882 ) ,  6g Ga. 190 ; Han lin \', Baxter 
( I8i8 ) ,  20 Kan. 1 34 ;  Yorks v. Ackerman ( 18u ) ,  3 N. J. L. 900 ; Tori/la 
\'. A lc:ra 11der ( 1900) ,  104 Tenn. 453, 58 S. W. 124, 78 Am. St. Rep. 928. 
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CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE RECORD.
GLANVILLE, Liber 8, cc. 8 & 9—A. D. 1180?
The justices being present in court and perfectly concurring
as to the record, it necessarily follows, that their record must be
abided by, neither party being allowed to deny it, as we have al-
ready observed. But if the justices entertain any doubt upon the
subject and it cannot be ascertained, then the plea must be again
commenced and proceeded on in court. (c. 9.) It should be
understood that no court generally speaking, has a record except
the king's court: for in other courts, if a man should say a thing
which he would afterwards retract, he may deny it against the
whole court by the oath of three witnesses, atfirming that he had
not said the thing imputed to him, or, indeed, by a greater or less
number of witnesses, according to the custom of the different
courts.
MICHELS v. STORK, in Mich. Sup. Ct., Dec. 21, 1883—52 Mich. 260,
17 N. W., 833.
Trover by Henry Stork against Jacob Michels in the Su-
perior Court of Detroit. From judgment for plaintiff defendant
brings error.
COOLEY, J. The only question important to the decision of
this case is, whether an officer’s return of service of process is
conclusive upon the parties to the suit in which the process issued.
when brought in question in some collateral suit or proceeding.
Michels, it appears, on August 10, 1874, procured an attach-
ment from a justice of the peace against the chattels of Stork,
and put it into the hands of constable John Gnau for service. The
constable made return that by virtue of the writ he did, on the 10th
day of August, 1874, seize the goods and chattels of the defendant
mentioned in the inventory annexed thereto, and that on the 12th
day of August, 1874, he served upon the defendant a copy of the
writ and inventory, duly certified by him, by leaving the same at
his usual place of abode with his wife, a person of [*261] suitable
age and discretion. whom he informed of its contents. \Vhat fur-
ther was done in the attachment suit does not appear.
The present action is trover for the conversion of the prop-
erty which the constable returned that he had attached. The
plaintiff claims that the constable did not attach the goods at all,
















































































































































T H E  RECORD OF T H E  J UDG MENT 
CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE RECORD. 
GLA N VILLE, Libcr 8,  cc. 8 & 9-A. D. uSo ? 
The j ustices being present in court and perfectly concurring 
as to the record, it necessarily follows, that their record must be 
abided by, neither party being allowed to deny it, as we have al­
ready observed. But if the j ustices entertain any doubt upon the 
subj ect and it cannot be ascertained, then the plea must be again 
commenced and proceeded on in court. ( c. 9. ) It should be 
understood that no court generally speaking, has a record except 
the king's court : for in other courts, if a man should say a thing 
which he would afterwards retract, he may deny it against the 
whole court by the oath of three witnesses, affirming that he had 
not said the thing imputed to him, or, indeed, by a greater or less 
number of ,.,· itnesses, atcording to the custom of the different 
courts. 
MICHELS v. STORK, in Mich. Sup. Ct. ,  Dec. 2r, 1883-52 Mich. 200, 
1 7  N. W., 833. 
Trover by Henry Stork against Jacob l\:Iichels in the Su­
perior Court of Detroit. From j udgment for plaintiff defendant 
brings error. 
COOLEY, J.  The only question important to the decision of 
this case is, whether an officer's return of service of process is  
conclusive upon the parties to the suit  in which the process issued , 
when brought in question in some collateral suit or  proceeding. 
Michels, it appears, on August I O, 1874, procured an attach­
ment from a justice of the peace against the chattels of Stork, 
and put it  into the hands of constable John Gnau for service. The 
constable made return that by virtue of the writ he did, on the 10th 
day of August , 1874, seize the goods and chattels of the defendant 
mentioned in the inventory annexed thereto, and that on the 1 2th 
day of August, 1874, he served upon the defendant a copy of the 
writ and inventory, duly certified by him, by leaving the same at 
his usual place of abode with his wi fe, a person of [ *261 ] suitable 
age and discretion , whom he informed of its contents. \Vhat fur­
ther was done in the attachment suit does not appear. 
The present action is  trover for the conversion of the prop­
erty which the constable returned that he had attached. The 
plaintiff claims that the constable did not attach the good s at all, 
but that the officer and the defendant together took the:n a w�y: 
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and that they were immediately left by the ofiicer with the de-
fendant, and plaintiff never saw them afterwards. * * *
The question in this court arises upon the following instruc-
tions of the trial judge: * * * [*z62] * * * “Now, you are to
determine whether Mr. Gnau did really levy an attachment on
that property or not. If he did, that ends the suits. You are to
determine, in the second place, if he did not levy an attachment,
whether he and Michels went there to get the goods into Michel’s
possession simply for that purpose, and not for the purpose of
levying the attachment. If Michels thought that Gnau had at-
tached the goods and Gnau had the proper papers to attach them
—and for the purposes of this case I charge you that he did have
-—then Michels would not be responsible; that is, if he was acting
in good faith in the transaction. You see the question is a very
simple one. It all turns on whether l\lich_els and Gnau went there
for the purpose of levying that attachment or whether they went
there for the purpose of giving Michels possession of those goods,
without any regard to the attachment. I charge, as a matter of
law, it makes no difi'erence what the officer returned, so far as
.\lichels was concerned.” * * *
The purport of this instruction is, that the return is to be
taken as frhna facic evidence of the facts stated in it, [*263] but
that it may be contradicted by parol evidence, and if the jury
are convinced by such evidence that the return is untrue, they
are at liberty to disregard it. And the jury in this case did dis-
regard it. and gave judgment for the plaintiff, grounding their
action upon a finding that no attachment had in fact ever been
made.
Had the suit been brought against the officer for a false re-
turn. it is conceded that the plaintiff would have been at liberty
to show the falsity of the return by any evidence fairly tending
to show it. He might do this also by affidavit on a motion in the
srime suit to set aside the return: and this is not an unconnnon
proceeding when the truth of the return is disputed. ('/mf>mau
\'. Cumming, I7 N. _I. I.. ll: Curr \'. ('0/In/1t’rcz'aI Bank, 16 \\'is.
_-’-O; Bond V. ll'z'l.rrm. 8 Kan. 2.28. 12 .\m. Rep. 466. It has also
been held that the ofiicer's return may be contradicted in equity
in a proceeding instituted to set aside a judgment founded upon
it. ()t\'t’n.r \'. RGIISft’G(f, 22 Ill. I61 : .\'c~m't>/Ill) \‘. I)¢’:t'e_\', 27 Iowa
381 : ]f)'l'(f_Qt’]'<)r'! S<Wi11g.r Bunk \'. Eld/wl'gc, 28 Conn 556; Bell
\'. Il'1'//1'0/us, 38 Tenn. (1 Ileadl 23o; Ridgert-a_\' \'. Bank of Ten-

















































































































































TITFI RECORD OF THE JUDGMENT I69
& J. (Md.) 358, 32 Am. Dec. 172; Le/‘ta-ick v. Hamilton, 9 Heisk.
310. It is also held that the ofi-icer's return is not conclusive as
to facts stated therein which he must learn by inquiry of othersT'
as, for example, that the person upon whom the process was
served was the incumbent of a certain corporate oflice, such as
that of president of a bank. St. John v. Tombeckbee Bank, 3
Stew. (Ala.) I46; Rowe v. Table <"rc. Co., 10 Cal. 441 ; Wilson v.
Spring &c. C0., IO Cal. 445. See Chapman v. Cumming, I7 N. ].
L. II; Sanford v. Nichols, 14 Conn. 324; and compare State v.
O'Neill, 4 Mo. App. 221. And a person not a party or privy to the
proceeding in which the return is made, is never concluded by
it from showing the real fact. Nall v. Granger, 8 Mich. 450.
And where suit is brought upon a foreign judgment, it seems to
be competent to disprove jurisdiction by showing, in contradiction
of the ofiicer’s return, that no service was made upon the party
defendant. [*264] Knowles V. Gaslight &'C. CO. 86 U. S. (I9
Wall.) 58; Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 457;
Carlton v. Bicleford, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 591; MoDerm0tt V.
Clary, 107 Mass. 501; Gilman v. Gilman, 126 Mass. 26, 30 Am.
Rep. 646; Bowler v. Huston, 30 Grat. (\’a.) 266, 32 Am. Rep.
673 ; Lotec v. Lozcc, 40 Iowa 220.
None of these cases are analogous to the one before us;
but it must be conceded that there are cases which are directly
in point, and which tend to support the instructions. Cunning-
ham v. .l[itclzcll, _(Va.) 4 Rand. I89; Bntfs v. Francis, 4 Conn.
424; Watson v. Walson, 6 Conn. 334; Hutchins v. Johnson, 12
Conn. 376: Slnith v. Late, 27 N. Car. (5 Ired. L.) I97; Joyner v.
fllillcr, 55 Miss. 208: Abel] v. Simon, 49 Md. 318: Gary v. S/ale,
II Tex. App. 527 ;Dashcr v. Dasher, 47 Ga. 320; Elder v. Cosarl‘,
59 Ga. 199; Jones v. Commercial Bank, 6 Miss. (5 How.) 43, 35
Am. Dec. 419. The Georgia cases appear to be based upon a
statute. If it were important now to examine the other cases
critically, some of them might perhaps be distinguished, but their
tendency is unq11estio11abl}' as above stated.
On the other hand. the ruling of this court in Greo/z v. Kind_\'.
43 .\lich. 2'0. is distinctly adverse to the instructions. It was
there held that the return of a sherifiC to a writ of replevin, in
which he certified that the plaintiff in the suit had not filed a forth-
comingT bond, was conclusive upon the parties, and would pre-
clude any such bond being set up. This case. which seems to
have been overlooked on the trial. is in entire accord with the
















































































































































T J J f,  Rl<;CORD OF T H E  J UDG M ENT 
& ]. ( Md . )  358, 32 Am. Dec. 1 72 ; Left·wick v. Hamilton, 9 Heisk. 
3 10. It is  also held that the officer's return is not conclusive as 
to facts stated therein which he must learn by inquiry of others; 
as, for example, that the person upon whom the process was 
�erved was the incumbent of a certain corporate office, such as 
that of president of a bank . St. John v. To mbeckbee Bank, 3 
Stew. ( Ala. ) 1 46 ;  Ro'ic:e v. Table &c. Co., I O  Cal . 44 1 ; 1Vilsou v. 
Spring &c. Co., IO  Cal. 445 .  See Chapman. v. Cum m ing, 1 7  N. J. 
L. 1 1 ; Sanford v .  Nichols, 14 Conn. 324 ; and compare State v. 
0 '1Vcil/, 4 l\Io. App. 22 1 .  And a person not a party o r  privy to the 
proceeding in which the return is made, is never concluded by 
it from showing the real fact. Nall v. Granger, 8 Mich. 450. 
And where suit is brought upon a foreign j udgment, it seems to 
be competent to disprove j urisdiction by showing, in contrad iction 
of the officer's return , that no setvice was made upcin the party 
defendant. [ *264] K11 ow/es v. Gasligh t &c. Co. 86 U. S. ( 1 9  
\Val l . ) ° 58 ; Tho mpson v .  Whitmau, 8 5  U .  S. ( 1 8 \Vall . ) 457 ; 
Carlton v. Bickford, 79 �lass.  ( 1 3  Gray ) 59 1 ; .Al cDerm ott v. 
Clary, I 07 l\f ass.  50 1 ; Gilman v. Gilman, 1 26 Mass. 26, 30 Am. 
Rep . 646 ; Boar/er v. Huston, 30 Grat. ( Va. ) 266, 32 Am. Rep. 
673 ; Lo'Lcc v. LO'i('C, 40 Iowa 220. 
None of these cases are analogous to the one before us ; 
but i t  must be conceded that there are cases which are d irectly 
in point, and wh ich tend to support the instructions .  C11 11 1 1 i11g­
lram v. M itclu:/l, . ( Va. ) 4 Rand . 1 89 ; B u tts v. Francis, 4 Conn. 
42-i. ; TFatso u v. TVatso 11,  6 Conn. 334 ; H u tchins v. f oh 11so11,  1 2  
Conn.  376 ; Sm ith v. L(l'W, 27 N .  Car. ( 5  I red . L . )  1 97 ; Joyner v .  
Jl illcr, 5 5  �J iss.  2o8 : Abdi v .  Simo 11 ,  49 Md. 3 1 8 : Gary v .  State, 
I 1 Tex . .:\pp. 527 ;Dash er v. Dasher, 47 G a .  320 ; Elder \'. Co::art, 
59 Ga.  1 99 ; f 01 1cs v. Co m m ercial Ba11k,  G :'.\ I iss.  ( 5  How . )  43, 3 5  
Am. Dec. 4 1 9. T h e  Georgia cases appear to  b e  hasecl upon a 
statute. I f  it were important n o w  to exam i n e  the other cases 
cr i t ica l ly , some of them m i gh t perhaps he d i st inguished,  but their  
tendency i s  unquest ionably as above stak<L 
On the other hand.  the ru l ing of th is  court i n  G'ra11  \' . Kin d_\' , 
43 � I ich. 27<). i s  d i stinctly adverse to the i n s t ru ct ions .  I t  was 
there held that the  retu rn  o f  a sheriff to a w r i t  of  replev in , in 
wh ich he cert i fi ed that  the pla i n t i ff  i n  the su i t  hacl n n t  filed a forth­
coming hond ,  was concl us ive upon the  part i es ,  and "·ould prc­
clmlc any such bond he ing set  up. T h i s  case. which Sl 'Cl l l s  to 
have heen ovcrlonkccl on the tr ial .  i s  i n  ent i re accorcl w i t h  the 
Engl i sh authorit ies .  .·f o o 1 1 _\ · 1 1 1 0 1 1s, Lofft 372 : Bc1 1 tfry , . .  !lore ,  
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\
I Lev. 86; Find v. Pennington, Cro. Eliz. 872; Rex V. Ellcins,
4 Burr. 2129; Harrington v. Taylor, 15 East 378; Goubot V. De
(Irony, 2 Dowl. P. C. 86. But it is also in accord with the great
preponderance of authority in this country. In New York the
doctrine was strongly asserted in a case in which a constable had
served his own process, which the law of that state allowed. “The
constable’s return,” says the court, “is conclusive against the de-
fendant in the cause in which it is made. He cannot traverse the
truth of it by a plea in [*265] abatement or otherwise; but if it
be false, the defendant’s remedy is in an action against the con-
stable for a false return.” See Allen v. Martin, 10 \\/end. 300;
Boomer v. Laine, 10 W'end. 525. In Pennsylvania it was said
in an early case: “It is a well-settled principle, applicable to ev-
ery case, that credence is to be given to the sheriff’s return; so
much so, that there can be no averment against it in the same ac-
tion. A party may make an averment consistent with the sheriff's
return, or explanatory of its legal bearing and effect, where the
return is at large; but he cannot aver a matter directly at variance
with the facts stated in return, and contradictory to it, and show-
ing it to be false. If a party be injured by the false return of the
sheriff, his remedy is by action on the case against the sheriff
who makes it.” Knowles v. Lord, 4 Whart. 500; s. c. 34 Am.
Dec. 525. Like decisions were made in Zion Church v. St. Peter's,
5 W. & S. 215; Diller v. Roberts, 13 S. & R. 60; and the doctrine
is recognized in Pan-son’s Appeal, 49 Penn. St. 195. It has also
been distinctly and strongly affirmed in Massachusetts cases.
Slayton v. Chester, 4 Mass. 478; Bott v. Burnell, 11 Mass. 163;
Winchell v. Stiles, 15 Mass. 230; Bean v. Parker, 17 Mass. 591 ;
Campbell v. Webster, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 28 ;Dooley v. Wolcott,
86 Mass. (4 Allen) 406. In New Hampshire it is said: “As
between the parties, the return of the sheriff is conclusive upon
all matters material to be returned; and cannot be contradicted
by such parties or their privies, or by bail, endorsers, or others,
whose rights or liabilities are dependent upon the suit. The rem-
edy for a false return is by suit against the sheriff, and not by
defeating the proceedings in which such return is made." Bollcs
v. Bonwz, 45 N. H. 124, following Brown v. Davis, 9 N. H. 76;
Wciidcll v. Mugridgc, 19 N. H. 109; Angicr v. Ash, 26 N. H. 09:
./llrsser v. Bailey, 31 N. H. 9; Clongh v. Monroe, 34 N. H. 381.
To the same purport are the Kentucky cases. Trigg \". Lc1ei.r’s
l?.r'rs., 13 Ky. (3 Litt.) 129: Smith v. Hornlmck, 10 Ky. (3 A. K.
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l Lev. 86 ; Flud v. Peuliington, Cro . Eliz. 872 ; Rc:r v. Elkins, 
4 Burr. 2 1 29 ;  Harrington v. Taylor, 1 5 East 378 ; Goubot v. De 
Cro 11y, 2 Dowl. P. C.  86. Ilut it is also in accord with the great 
preponderance of authority in this country. In New York the 
doctrine was strongly asserted in a case in which a constable had 
served his own process, which the law of that state allowed. "The 
• constable's return," says the court, "is conclusive against the de­
fendant in the cause in which it is made. He cannot traverse the 
truth of it by a plea in [ *265] abatement or otherwise ; but if it 
be false, the defendant's remedy is in an action against the con­
stable for a false return ."  See A llen v. Martin, IO \Vend . 300 ; 
Boomer v. Laine, 10 \Vend. 525 . In Pennsylvania it was said 
in an early case : ' ' I t is a well-settled principle, applicable to ev­
ery case, that credence is to be given to the sheriff's return ; so 
much so, that there can be no averment against it in the same ac­
tion . A party may make an averment consi stent with the sheriff's 
return, or explanatory of its legal bearing and effect, where the 
return is at large ; but he cannot aver a matter directly at variance 
with the facts stated in return, and contrad ictory to it, and show­
ing it to be false. If a party be injured by the false retu rn of the 
· sheriff, his remedy is by action on the case against the sheriff 
who makes it." Knoides v. Lord, 4 Whart. 500 ; s. c. 34 Am. 
Dec. 525.  Like decisions were made in Zion Church v. St. Peter"s, 
5 W. & S. 2 1 5 ; Differ v. Roberts, 1 3  S. & R. 6o ;  and the doctrine 
is recognized in Paxson's Appeal, 49 Penn . St. i 95. I t  has also 
been distinctly and strongly affirmed in lVIassachusetts cases. 
Slayton v. Chrster, 4 Mass. 478 ; Bott v. B11niell, I I Mass. 163 ; 
TYi11chcll v. Stiles, 1 5 Mass. 230 ; Bean v. Parker, 1 7  Mass. 59 1 ; 
Campbell v. 1¥ ebster, 8 1  Mass. ( 1 5  Gray ) 28 ;Dooley v. iVolcott, 
86 Mass. ( 4 Allen ) 406. In New Hampshire it i s  said : "As 
between the parties, the return of  the sheriff i s  conclusive upon 
all matters material to be returned ; and cannot be contradicted 
by such parties or thei r privies, or by bail , endorsers, or others, 
whose rights or liabilit ies are dependent upon the suit. The rem­
edy for a fal�e return is by snit against the sheriff, and not by 
defeat ing the proceedings in which such return is made. " Bolles 
v. Bowen, 45 N. H. i 24, following Bro7.vn v. Dan's. 9 ?\. I I .  76 : 
I-Vc11dcll v. 1lf 11gridge . 1 9  N. H. 1 09 ; A ngier v. Ash ,  26 N .  H. Q<) :  
_Hesser v. Bailey•, 3 1  N.  H.  9 ;  Clo ugh v. Monroe, 34 )J .  H.  38 1 .  
To the same purport are the Kentucky cases. Trigg v. L CTc•is's 
R.r 'rs. , 1 3  Ky. ( 3 Litt . ) 1 29 : Sm ith v. Hornback, I O  Ky. (. �  A. K .  
l\larsh . )  379. In Vermont ancl Maine the cases in 1\fassaclmsetts 
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have been followed with approval. Eastman v. Curtis, 4 Vt. 616;
Swift v. Cobb, 10 Vt. 282; [*266] Wood v. Deane, 20 Vt. 612;
Stratton v. Lyons, 53 V t. 130; Gilson v. Parkhurst, 53 Vt. 384;
Stinson v. Snow, 10 Me. 263; Fairfield v. Paine, 23 Me. 498, 41
Am. Dec. 357. The decisions in Indiana are to the same effect.
Rotecll v. Klein, 44 Ind. 290; Splahn v. Gillespie, 48 Ind. 397;
Stockton v. Stockton, 59 Ind. 574; Clark v. Shaw, 79 Ind. 164.
So are those in North Carolina, Arkansas, Minnesota, and Ne-
braska. Hunter V. Kirk, II N. Car. (4 Hawks) 277; Rose v.
Ford, 2 Ark. 26; Tnllis v. Brawley, 3 Minn. 277, Gil. 195; John-
son v. Jones, 2 Neb. I26. In Illinois the English rule has been
recognized: Fitzgerald v. Kimball, 86 I11. 396; though it is said
some exceptions are made to it in the furtherance of justice in
that state. Ryan v. Lander, 89 Ill. 554. VVhat the exceptions
are is not pointed out in that case; but in the subsequent case of
Hunter v. Stonebnrner, 92 Ill. 75, 79, we have the following state-
ment as the result of prior decisions: “It is in rare cases only,
that the return of the officer can becontradicted, except in a direct
proceeding by suit against the oflicer for a false return. In all
other cases, almost without an exception, the return is held to be
conclusive. An exception to the rule is, where some other por-
tion of the record in the same case contradicts the return, but it
cannot be done by evidence dehors the record.”
These citations are sufiicient, and more than sufficient, to
justify the previous ruling by this court. It follows that the in-
struction complained of was erroneous, and it must be reversed
with costs and a new trial ordered.
Graves, C J., and Sherwood, ]., concurred.
Campbell, 1., dissenting. As I understand the controversy
in this case, the dispute was not whether the constable took the
property, but whether the taking was not by process designed by
the parties as a mere pretext for getting possession, and not for
any legitimate purpose. The case is one of abuse of process for
illegal purposes, in which it was claimed, and the jury must have
found, that Michels was active throughout as connected with the
constable. I do not [*267] understand that a fraudulent use of
process to get possession of property, and for no other purpose
is, under any circumstances, a justification to any person con-
cerned in the fraud. I think the court committed no error, and
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have been followed with approval. Eastman v. Curtis, 4 Vt. 616 ; 
,')'wift v. Cobb, IO Vt. 282 ; [*266] Wood v. Doane, 20 Vt. 612 ; 
Strattou v. Lyons, 53 V t. 1 30 ;  Gilso1i v. Parkhurst, 53 Vt. 384 ; 
Stillson v. Snow, 10  l\Ie. 263 ; Fairfield v. Paine, 23 Me. 498, 4 1  
Am. Dec. 357. The decisions i n  Indiana are t o  the same effect. 
Ro"ti.'cll v. Klein, 44 Ind. 290 ; SplaJm v. Gillespie, 48 Ind. 397 ; 
Stockton v. Stockton, 59 Ind. 574 ;  Clar k v. Shaw, 79 Ind. 1 64. 
So are those in North Carolina, Arkansas, Minnesota, and Ne­
bra�ka. Hunter v. Kirk, 1 1  N. Car. (4 Hawks) 277 ; Rose v. 
Ford, 2 Ark.  26 ; Tullis v. Bra'idey, 3 Minn. 277, Gil. 195 ; John­
son v. Jones, 2 Neb. 1 26. In I llinois the English rule has been 
recognized : Fit.=gcrald v. Kimball, 86 Ill. 396 ; though it is said 
some exceptions are made to it in the furtherance of justice in 
that state. Ryan v. Lander, 89 Ill .  554. What the exceptions 
are is not pointed out in that case ; but in the subsequent case of 
H 1 111 ter v. Stonebunzcr, 92 Ill. 75, 79, we have the following state­
ment as the result of prior decisions : "It  is in rare cases only, 
that the return of the officer can be.contradicted, except in a direct 
proceeding by suit against the officer for a false return. In all 
other cases, almost without an exception, the return is held to be 
conclusive. An exception to the rule is, where some other por­
tion of the record in the same case contradicts the return, but it 
cannot be done by evidence dehors the record." 
These citations are sufficient, and more than sufficient, to 
j ustify the previous ruling by this court. It follows that the in­
struction complained of was erroneous, and it must be reversed 
with costs and a new trial ordered. 
Grai!es, C.J., and Shcru.JOod, 1.,  concurred. 
Campbell, !., di ssenting. As I understand the controversy 
in this case, the dispute was not whether the constable took the 
property, but whether the taking was not by process designed by 
the parties as a mere pretext for getting possession , and not for 
any legitimate purpose. The case is one o f  abuse of process for 
illegal purposes, in which it was claimed, and the jury must have 
found, that l\.fichels was active throughout as connected with the 
constable. I do not [*267 ) understand that a fraudulent use of 
process to get possession of property, and for no other purpose 
is, under any circumstances, a justification to any person con­
cerned in the fraud. I think the cou rt committed no error, aml 
that the judgment should be affirmed. , ,  
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FERGUSON v. CRA“/FORD, in N. Y. Ct. of App., 1877—7o N. Y. 253.
26 Am. Rep. 589.
Foreclosure proceeding by Orson J. Ferguson against
Stephen H. Crawford and others. From a judgment of the gen-
eral term affirming a judgment in favor of defendants entered on
trial at the special term plaintiff appeals.
RAPALLO, J. This action was brought to foreclose a mort-
gage, held by the plaintiff, on certain real estate in the county of
Westchester. One of the defences was, that the rights of the
plaintiff, as mortgagee, had been barred by a judgment of fore-
closure of a mortgage prior to his, in favor of one McFarquahar,
covering the same premises, under which judgment the premises
had been sold to the defendant [*255] Horton. It was alleged
in the answer that the plaintiff was a defendant in the McFarqua-
har action, in which the judgment had been rendered, and ap-
peared therein, by John W’. Mills, as his attorney, but did not put
in any answer.
On the trial of the present. action, the defendants, in support
of this defense, put in evidence the judgment-roll in the last-men-
tioned action, which roll contained a notice of appearance for the
present plaintiff, and a consent that judgment be entered, pur-
porting to be signed by Mills. The judgment was entered by
default for want of an answer, and on this consent, and recited
that the summons had been served on the defendants therein, and
that none of them had appeared, except the present plaintiff, by
John \V. Mills, his attorney, and some others named in the judg-
ment. _
Thereupon the plaintiff called Mills as a witness, and offered
to prove by him, Ist. That the signature to the notice of appear-
ance and consent was a forgery; 2d. That Mills was never an-
thorized to appear for the plaintiff; and 3d. That he never did
appear for him.
No proof of service of the summons on the plaintiff is at-
tached to or contained in that judgment-roll, and it appears to
be conceded on the present argument, as matter of fact, that no
such service was made. The defendants rely wholly upon the
effect of the recital in the judgment and the notice of appearance
contained in the judgment-roll, and claim that in a collateral ac-
tion these import absolute verity and cannot be contradicted by
extrinsic evidence.
They also claim that the case of Rrorun \'. .\'1'r/1a/s. 42 N. Y.
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FERGU SON v. CRAWFORD, in N. Y. Ct. of App., 1877-70 N. Y. 253, 
26 Am. Rep. 589. 
Foreclosure proceeding by Orson J. Ferguson against 
Stephen H. Crawford and others. From a j udgment of the gen­
eral term affirming a judgment in favor of defendants entered on 
trial at the special term plaintiff appeals. 
RAPALLO, J. This action was brought to foreclose a mort­
gage, held by the plaintiff, on certain real estate in the county of 
\Vestchester. One of the defences was, that the rights of the 
plaintiff, as mortgagee, had been barred by a j udgment of fore­
closure of a mortgage prior to his, in favor of one McFarquahar, 
covering the same premises, under which j udgment the prrm ises 
had been sold to the defendant [ *255 ] Horton. It was alleged 
in the answer that the plaintiff was a defendant in the :rvicFarqua­
har action , in which the j udgment had been rendered, and ap­
peared therein ,  by John vV. Mills, as his attorney, but did not put 
m any answer. 
On the trial of the present. action , the defendants,  in support 
of  th is defense, put in  evidence the j udgment-rol l in  the last-men­
t ioned act ion , which roll con tained a notice of appearance for the 
present plaint iff , and a consent that j udgment be enterct l ,  pur­
port ing to be signed by l\Iills. The judgment was entert>cl by 
default for want of an answer, and on this consent,  and rec ited 
that the summons ha<l been served on the defendants there in ,  an cl 
that none of them had appeared , except the present plaint i ff , by 
John \V. l\ T i l l s ,  h i s  attorney, and some others named in the j udg­
ment. 
Th ereupon t h e  plai nt iff cal led ).J i l l s  as a witness,  and offered 
to prove b)· him, 1 st .  That the signature to the notice of  appear­
ance and con sent was a forgery ; 2d. That :\l i l l s  was newr au­
thorized to appear for the pla int i ff ; and 3 d .  That he never did 
appear for him.  
K o  proof o f  serv ice of the summon s on the  plaint i ff  i s  at­
tached to or contained in that j udgmen t-ml! , and i t  appears to 
be C< 1 1 1 ccdcd on the present argument , a s  matter of fac t .  t ! 1 a t  no 
such s e r v i c e  was made.  The d e fen dant s rely wholly upon the 
e ffect o f  the reci tal i n  the j ud gment aml the not ice  of  appearance 
rnnta incd in  th e j 1 1dgmcnt-rol l ,  and cla im that  in a cnlbtcral ac­
t ion the<:.c import a bsol u t e  verity and cannot he contrad icted by 
e x t r i n s i c  c\' i d cncc.  
They abn claim th at the case of  R rO-:\/l \'  . •  \'ich nls . ..f 2  :\ .  Y. 
:20. i s  d ('c i s i ve of th i s case .  There a j tHlg-rnent h a d  been l"l'CPV-
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ered against a defendant who had not been served with process,
but for whom an attorney had appeared without authority, and
it was held by this court that the judgment could not be attacked
on that ground for want of jurisdiction in a collateral proceeding.
That decision does not reach the present case. It is not
founded upon any doctrine which precludes a party from showing,
as matter of fact, that he was never brought before [*256] the
court, or appeared in it, but is based upon a long line of authority,
wlrich holds that when an attorney of the court appears for a party
his appearance is recognized and his authority will be presumed
to the extent, at least, of giving validity to the proceeding. That
he is an officer of the court, amenable to it for misconduct, and to
any party for whom he assumes to act without authority, for all
damages occasioned by such action, and for reasons of public pol-
icy the court holds the appearance good, leaving the aggrieved
party to his action for damages against the attorney, granting’
relief against the judgment, only in a direct application, and in
case the attorney is shown to be irresponsible. Danton v. Noyes,
6 Johns. 296. This, however, is an entirely different case. The
offer was not merely to show that the attorney was not authorized
to appear, but that he did not in fact appear, and that the pre-
tended appearance was a forgery. '
None of the principles upon which the decisions in Danton v.
1-\'0_ves, and Brown v. Nichols rest, can be applied to such a case.
There is no act of any officer of the court which public policy
requires should be recognized. There is no party against whom
the innocent defendant can have redress. He is sought to be held
bound by a judgment when he was never personally summoned or
had notice of the proceeding, which result has been frequently
declared to be contrary to the first principles of justice, and this is
sought to be accomplished by means of a judgment entered upon
forged papers. No principle of public policy requires or sanctions
sustaining such a judgment. The only difficulty in the case arises
upon the objection that the evidence offered tends to contradict
the record, and from the adjudications [?] which attach to the
judgment of a court of general jurisdiction, a conclusive presump-
tion of jurisdiction over the parties, which cannot be contradicted
except by matter appearing on the face of the record itself.
It is an elementary principle recognized in all the cases that,
to give binding effect to a judgment of any court, whether of gen-
eral or limited jurisdiction, it is essential that [*257] the court
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ered against a defendant who had not been served with process, 
but for whom an attorney had appeared without authority, and 
it was held by this court that the j udgment could not be attacked 
on that ground for want of jurisdiction in a collateral proceeding. 
That decision does not reach the present case. It is not 
founded upon any doctrine which precludes a party from showing, 
as matter of fact, that he was never brought before [*256] the 
court, or appeared in it , but is based upon a long line of authority, 
which holds that when an attorney of the court appears for a party 
his appearance is recognized and his authority will be presumed 
to the extent ,  at least, of giving validity to the proceedil)g. That 
he is an officer of the court, amenable to it for misconduct, and to 
any party for whom he assumes to act without authority, for all 
damages occasioned by such action, and for reasons of public pol­
icy the court holds the appearance good, leaving the aggrieved 
party to his action for damages against the attorney, granting · 
relief against the judgment, only in a direct application, and in 
case the attorney is shown to be irresponsible. Denton v. ]'/ O)!es, 
6 Johns.  296. This, however, is an entirely different case. The 
offer was not merely to show that the attorney was not authorized 1 
to appear, but that he did not in fact appear, and that the pre­
tended appearance was a forgery. 
Kone of the principles upon which the decisions in Dell fon v. 
X o-::.·es, and Bro·wn v. Nichols rest, can be applied to such a case. 
There is no act of any officer of the court which public poliq 
requires should be recognized. There is no party against whom 
the innocent defendant can have redress. He is sought to be held 
bound by a judgment when he was never personal ly summoned or 
had notice of  the proceeding, which resu lt has been fr�quently 
declared to be contrary to the first principles of j ust ice , and th is  i s  
sought to  be  accomplished by means of a j udgment entered upon 
forged papers. No principle of publ ic  policy requ ires or sanctions 
sustain ing such a j udgment. The only difficulty in the case arises 
upon the .obj ection that the evidence offered tends to contradict 
the record , and from the ad j ud ications [ ? ]  which attach to the 
j udgment of a court of general j uri sd iction, a conclusive pr<>sump­
t ion of  j urisd ict ion over the parties, wh ich cannot be cont radicted 
except by matter appearing on the face of  the record itsel f .  
I t  i s  an e lementa ry princ iple recog-n izccl in a l l  the  ca�cs  that ,  
to give binding effect to a j udgment of any court, whether o f  gen­
era l or l imited jurisdict ion, it is es sen t ial that [ •:< 25 7 ]  the court 
should have j urisdict ion of the person as well as th e subj ect -mat-
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ter, and that the want of jurisdiction over either may always be set
up against a judgment when sought to be enforced, or any benefit
is claimed under it. There is no difference of opinion as to this
general rule, but the point of difficulty is as to the manner in which
this want of jurisdiction must be made to appear, in the case of a
judgment of a domestic court of general jurisdiction, acting in the
exercise of its general powers, when it comes in question in a col-
lateral action: Whether, when the record is silent as to the steps
taken to bring the parties into court, it may be proved by evidence
that they were not legally summoned and did not appear; or
whether, when the record recites that they were summoned or
appeared, such recitals may be contradicted by extrinsic evidence;
or whether the jurisdiction over the person and subject-matter is
a presumption of law, which cannot be contradicted, unless it
appears on the face of the record itself that there was a want of
such jurisdiction, as in cases where the record shows that the
service of process was by publication or some other method than
personal.
On these points there has been as much diversity of opinion,
especially between the courts of this state and those of other states,
as upon any general question which can be mentioned, although
there has as yet been no authoritative adjudication in this state on
the subject. It is well settled by our own decisions, that in the
case of a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of a sister
state, although it is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of
jurisdiction which exists in favor of a judgment of one of our own
courts, yet the want of jurisdiction may be shown by extrinsic evi-
dence, and that even a recital in the judgment record that the
defendant was served with process, or appeared by attorney, or of
any other jurisdictional fact, is not conclusive, but may be con-
tradicted by extrinsic evidence. Borden v. Fin-I1_, I5 johns. I21;
Starbuck v. Murray, 5 VVend. I48; Slnmzzca_v v. Stillnzan, 6 \Vend.
447;Krrr v. Kerr, 41 N. Y. 272; Hoffman. v. Hofifntan, 46 N
Y. 30. [*258] .
And the same rule prevails in some of the other states in re-
gard to the judgments of courts of sister states. Although some
have held, even in regard to such a judgment, that if the record
contains recitals showing jurisdiction. they cannot be contradicted.
Field v. Gibbs, I Peters C. C. R., [Fed. Cas. No. 4,766]; Rob-
erts \'. Caldwell, 35 Ky. (5 Dana) 512; Erecr v. Cofiin, 55 Mass.
(I Cush.) 23; Ratlzbonc v. Terry, I R. I. 73; Shdton v. Tiflin, 6
















































































































































1 74 CASI·:s o� J UDGM E NTS, �TC. 
ter, and that the want of j urisdiction over either may always be set 
up against a j udgment when sought to be enforced, or any benefit 
is claimed under it. There is no difference o f  opinion as to this 
general rule, but the point of difficulty is as to the manner in which 
this want of j urisdiction must be made to appear, in the case of a 
j udgment of a domestic court of general jurisdiction, acting in the 
exercise of its general powers, when it comes in question in a col­
lateral action : Whether, when the record is silent as to the steps 
taken to bring the parties into court, it may be proved by evidence 
that they were not legally summoned and did not appear ; or 
whether, when the record recites that they were summoned or 
appeared , such recitals may be contradicted by extrinsic evidence : 
or whether the jurisdiction over the person and subj ect-matter i s  
a presumption of law, which cannot be contradicted, unless i t  
appears on the face of the record itsel f that there was a want of 
such jurisdict ion , as in cases where the record shows that the 
service of process was by publication or some other method than 
personal. 
On these points there has been as much diversity of opinion, 
especially between the courts of this state and those of other states, 
as upon any general question which can be mentioned , although 
there has as yet been no authoritative adjudication in this state on 
the subj ect. It is well settled by our own decisions, that in the 
case of a j udgment of a court of general jurisdiction of a sister 
state, although it is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of 
jurisd iction which exists in favor of a J udgment of  one of our own 
courts, yet the want of j urisdiction may be shown by extrinsic evi­
dence, and that even a recital in the j udgment record that the 
defendant was served with process, or appeared by attornev, or of 
any other jurisdictional fact , is not conclusive, but may be con­
tradicted by extrinsic evidence. Borden \'. Fitch , 1 5  Johns. 1 2 1 ; 
Starbuck v. Murray, 5 \Vend . 148 ; S/rn m'<m)' v. Stil/111a11, 6 \Vend. 
4--1-7 :Kerr v. Kerr, 4 1 N. Y. 272 ; Hoffman v. Ho ffman, 46 N 
Y. 30. [*258] 
And the same rule prevails in some of the other states in re­
garcl to the j udgments of courts of sister states .  Although some 
have held , even in regard to such a judgment ,  that if the record 
contains recitals showing jurisdiction . they cannot be con tr:ul icted. 
Field v .  Gibbs. I Peters C. C. R., [ Fed . Cas. No. 4,766 ] ; Rob­
e rts v. Cald1(•ell, 3 5  Ky. ( S  Dan;i ) 5 1 2 ; En•cr v. Coffin, 55 1\Iass. 
( I  Cush . )  23 ; Rathbone v. Terry, I R. I .  73 ; Shrlto11 v. Tiffin . 6 
How. ( U. S . ) 163, 186. 
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After considerable research, I have been unable to find a sin-
gle authoritative adjudication, in this or any other state, deciding
that in the case of a domestic judgment of a court of general juris-
diction, want of jurisdiction over the person may be shown by
extrinsic evidence, while there are a great number of adjudications
in neighboring states, holding that. in the case of such judgments,
parties and privies are estopped in collateral actions to deny the
jurisdiction of the court over the person as well as the subject-
matter, unless it appear on the face of the record that the court had
not acquired jurisdiction; and that in such cases there is a conclu-
sive presumption of law that jurisdiction was acquired bv service
of process or the appearance of the party. The cases are very
numerous, but the citation of a few of them will suffice.
In Cook V. Darling, 18 Pick. 393, in an action of debt on a
domestic judgment, the defendant pleaded that, at the time of the
supposed service upon him of the writ in the original action, he
was not an inhabitant of the state of Massachusetts; that he had
no notice of the action, and did not appear therein.
This plea was held bad on demurrer, on the ground that the
judgment could not be impeached collaterally. In Granger v.
Clarke, 22 Maine 128, also an action on a judgment, the plea was
the same, with the addition that the judgment had been obtained
by fraud ; but it was held to constitute no defense. Coit v. Haven,
30 Conn. 190, was a scire facias on a judgment, and the defend-
ant pleaded that the writ in the original action was never served
upon him, etc.; and the [*259] court held, in an elaborate opinion,
that a judgment of a domestic court of general jurisdiction could
not be attacked collaterally, unless the want of jurisdiction ap-
peared upon the face of the record, and that jurisdictional facts.
such as the service of the writ and the like, were conclusively pre-
sumed in favor of such a judgment, unless the record showed the
contrary, although this rule did not apply to foreign judgments, or
judgments of the courts of sister states, or to domestic judgments
of inferior courts, and that the only remedy in such a case was by
writ of error or application to a court of equity.
The same rule is held in Penobscot R. R. Co. V. Weeks, 52
Maine 456; Wingate V. Ha_vzvood, 40 N. H. 437; Clark V. Bryan.
16 Md. 171; Cullen V. Ellison, I3 Ohio St. 446; Horncr v. Doe,
I Ind. 131; Wright v. Marsh, 2 G. Greene (Iowa) 94 ;Prince v.
Gr-iflin, 16 Iowa 552, and in numerous other cases which are
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A fter considerable research, I have been unable to  find a sin­
gle authoritative adj udication, in this or any other state, c!eciding 
that in the case of a domestic j udgment of a court of general j uris­
diction , want of j urisdiction over the person may be shown hy 
extrinsic evidence, while there are a great number of adj udications 
in neighboring states, holding thaL in the case of such judgments, 
parties and privies are cstopped in collateral actions  to r! eny the 
jurisdiction of the court over the person as well as the subj�ct­
mattcr, unles5 it appear on the face of the record that the court had 
not acquired j urisdiction ; and that in such cases there is  a conclu­
sive presumption of law that jurisdiction was acquired bv service 
of process or the appearance of the party. The cases are very 
numerous, but the citation of a few of them will suffice. 
In Cook v. Darling, 18 Pick. 393 , in an action of debt on a 
domestic j udgment, the defendant pleaded that, at the time of the 
supposed service upon him of the \\Tit in the original action , he 
was not an inhabitant of the state of Massachusetts ; that he had 
no notice of the action, and did not appear therein. 
This plea was held bad on demurrer, on the ground that the 
j udgment could not be impeached collaterally. In Granger v. 
Clarke, 22 1\laine 1 28, also an action on a j udgment, the plea was 
the same, with the addition that the judgment had been obtained 
by fraud ; but it was held to constit�1te no defense. Coit v. llm:c11, 
30 Conn . 190, was a scire facias on a j udgment, and the defend­
ant pleaded that the writ in the original action was never served 
upon him, etc. ; and the [*259] court held, in an elaborate opinion , 
that a j udgment of a domestic court of general j urisd iction could 
not be attacked collaterally, unless the want of jurisdiction ap­
peared upon the face of the record, and that j urisdictional facts. 
such as the service of the writ and the like, were conclusiYely pre­
sumed in favor of such a j udgment, unless the record showed the 
contrary, although this rule did not apply to foreign j udgments, or 
j udgments of the courts of si ster states, or to domestic j udgments 
of inferior courts, and that the only remedy in such a case was by 
writ of error or application to a court of equ ity. 
The same rule is  held in Penobscot R. R. Co. v. TY fcks, 52 
1'-faine 456 ; Wingate v. H a)'4i.'Ood, 40 N. H. 437 ; Clark v. Br, •an .  
16 l\:[d. 1 7 1 ; Callen v .  Ellison, 1 3  Ohio St .  446 ; Horner v .  Doe , 
1 Ind. 1 3 1 ; TVright v . •  �!arslt, 2 G. Greene ( Iowa ) 94 ;Pri11 cc v. 
Griffin . 16  Iowa 552, and in numerous other cases which are 
referred to in the case of Halm v. Kelly, 34 Cal 39 1 ,  which adopts 
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the same rule and contains a full and instructive discussion of the
question.
There are many cases in other states, and in the courts of the
United States, containing expressions general in their character,
which would seem to sanction the doctrine that a want of jurisdic-
tion over the person or subject-matter may in all cases be shown
by extrinsic evidence, and they are sometimes cited as authorities
to that effect. Elliott v. Picrsol, 26 U. S. (1 Peters) 328, 340;
Holliiigsworlh v. Barbour, 29 U. S. (4 Peters) 466; Hickey v.
Stewart, 44 U. S. (3 How.) 750; Shrir/or v. Lynn, 43 U. S. (2
How.) 43; Williamson v. Berry, 49 U. S. (8 How.) 495; some v.
Ball, same 566; Enos v. Smith, 15 Miss. (7 Sm. & M.) 85; Camp-
bell v. Brown, 7 Miss. (6 How.) 106; Shaefer v. Gates, 41 Ky.
(2 B. Mon.) 453; Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U. S. (13 Peters) 498;
Miller v. Ewing, 16 Miss. (8 Sm. & M.) 421, and numerous other
cases not cited. But an examination of these cases discloses that
they all relate either to judgments of inferior courts, or courts of
limited jurisdiction, or courts of general jurisdiction acting in the
exercise of special statutory powers, which proceedings stand on
the [*26o] same footing with those of courts of limited and in-
ferior jurisdiction (3 N. Y. 511), or courts of sister states, or to
cases where the want of jurisdiction, appeared on the face of the
record, or to cases of direct proceedings to reverse or set aside the
judgment. I have not found one which adjudicated the point now
under consideration, otherwise than those to which I have re-
ferred. There are some cases which hold that the want of author-
ity of an attorney to appear may be shown by extrinsic evidence,
although the record states that an attorney appeared for the party,
but those are placed expressly on the ground that such evidence
does not contradict the record. Bodurtha V. Goodrich, 69 Mass.
(3 Gray) 508', Shelton v. Tiflin, 47 U. S. (6 How.) 163. 186;
Harris v. Ilardcnzan, 55 U. S. (14 How.) 334, 340. Those cases
are. however, in conflict with the decision of this court, in Brown
\'. .\'irhol.r, 42 N. Y. 26. and in many other cases.
The learned anuotators of Smith's Leading Cases, Hare &
Wallace. 1 Smith L. Cases, vol. 1, p. 842 (marg.) sum the matter
up by saying: “\\"hate\'er the rule may be where the record is
silent. it would seem clearly and conclusively established by a
weight of authority too great for opposition, unless on the ground
of local and peculiar law, that no one can contradict that which the
record actually avers. and that a recital of notice or appearance. or
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the same rule and contains a full and instructive discussion of the 
question. 
There are many cases in other states, and in the courts of the 
United States, containing expressions general in their character, 
which would seem to sanction the doctrine that a want of j urisdic­
tion over the person or subject-matter may in all cases be shown 
by extrinsic evidence, and they are sometimes cited as authorities 
to that effect. Elliott v. Piersol, 26 U. S. ( I  Peters ) 328, 340 ; 
Holli11gs·worth v. Barbol4r, 29 U. S.  (4 Peters ) 466 ; Hickev v. 
Steivart, 44 U. S. ( 3  How. )  750 ; Shriver v. L3•nn, 43 U. S� (2  
How . )  43 ; Williamso1t v. Berry, 49 U. S. (8  How.)  495 ; same v. 
Ball, same 566 ; Enos v. Smith, 1 5  Miss. ( 7  Sm. & M.)  85 : Camp­
bell v. Bro'i.r.m, 7 Miss . (6  How. ) I06 ;  Shaefer v. Gates, 4 1  Ky. 
( 2  B.  Mon. )  453 ; Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U. S .  ( 13  Peters ) 498 ; 
Mt'ller v. Ewing, 16 Miss. (8  Sm. & M . )  42 1 ,  and numerous other 
cases not cited. But an examination of these cases discloses that 
they all relate either to j udgments of inferior courts, or courts of 
l im ited jurisdiction , or courts of general jurisdiction acting in the 
exerc ise of special statutory powers, which proceed ings stand on 
the [ *260]  same footing with those of courts of limited and in­
ferior jurisdiction ( 3 N. Y. 5 1 1 ) ,  or courts of sister states, or to 
cases where the want of jurisdiction. appeared on the face of the 
record , or to cases of direct proceedings to reverse or set aside the 
j udgment . I have not found one which adj ud icated the point now 
under considerat ion , otherwise than those to which I have re­
f erred . There are some cases which hold that the want of author­
ity of an attorney to appear may be shown by extrinsic evidence, 
although the record states that an attorney appeared for the party, 
but those are placed expressly on the ground that such evidence 
docs not contradict the record . Bodurtlz a  v. Goodrich, 6<) Mass. 
( 3  Gray ) 5o8 ; Sliclto1 1  v. Tifli.11, 47 U . S.  (6 How . )  1 63 .  1 86 ; 
Harris v. J/ardc111a 11, 55 U. S .  ( 1 4  How. ) 33..i., 340. Those cases 
are, ho\\·ever, in confl ict with the dec i s ion of th is court, in Brown 
\' . . \ iclz o ls, 42 ;\. Y. 26, and in many other cases. 
The learned annotators of Smith's  Leading Cases, Hare & 
\ \" allace, I Sm ith L. Cases ,  vol . r ,  p. 8.p ( marg. ) sum the matter 
tt p hy saying : ' ' \Vhatevcr the rule may be where the record is 
� iknt . i t  wou ld seem clearly and conclusi\·ely establisher!  by a 
\\" e ight  of  authority too great for opposit ion , unless on the �ro1 1nd  
of  local and pecul iar  law,  that  no one can cont radict  that w h i c h  the 
renml actually avers.  and that a rec i ta l  o f  notice or  appearance, or 
a re t u rn  of .;cn·ice hy the  sheriff i n  t h e record o f  a domestic court 
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of general jurisdiction, is absolutely conclusive and cannot be dis-
proved by extrinsic evidence.”
It is quite remarkable, however, that notwithstanding the for-
midable array of authority in its favor, the courts of this state have
never sustained this doctrine by any adjudication, but on the con-
trary the great weight of judicial opinion, and the views of some
of our most distinguished jurists, are directly opposed to it.
As has been already stated, our courts have settled by adjudi-
cation in regard to judgments of sister states, that the question
of jurisdiction may be inquired into, and a want of jurisdiction
over the person shown by evidence, [*a6I] and have further de-
cided (in opposition to the holding of courts of some of the other
states) that this may be done, even if it involves the contradiction
of a recital in the judgment record. In stating the reasons for this
conclusion, our courts have founded it on general principles, quite
as applicable to domestic judgments as to others, and save in one
case, Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N. Y. 272, have in their opinions made
no discrimination between them. Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121 ;
Starbnck v. M nrray, 5 \\/'end. 148; Noyes v. Butler, 6 Barb. 613,
and cases cited.
When we come to consider the effect of these authorities, it
is difficult to find any solid ground upon which to rest a distinc-
tion between domestic judgments and judgments of sister states
in regard to this question, for under the provision of the consti-
tution of the United States, which requires that full faith and
credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and
judicial proceedings of every other state, it is now well settled that
when a judgment of a court of a sister state is duly proved in a
court of this state, it is entitled here to all the effect to which it is
entitled in the courts of the state where rendered. If conclusive
there it is equally conclusive in all the states of the union; and
whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in the state where
rendered, none others can he pleaded in any court in the United
States. Hamfton v. ll'[(‘COIl1lL’l, 16 U. S. (3 Wheaton) 234; Story
Com. on Cons, § 183; Mills v. Dnryce, II U. S. (7 Cranch) 481.
In holding, therefore, that a defense that the party was not
served and did not appear, although the record stated that he did,
was good, our courts must have held that such is the law of this
state and the conunon law, and, consequently, that in the absence
of proof of any special law to the contrary in the state where the
judgment was rendered, it must be presumed to be also the law of
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of general j urisd iction, is absolutely conclusive and cannot be dis­
proved by extrinsic evidence. " 
It  is quite remarkable, however, that not\ ... · ithstanding the for­
midable array of authority in its favor, the courts of this state have 
never sustained this doctrine by any adjudicat ion, but on the con­
trary the great weight of j udicial opinion, and the views of some 
of our most di stinguished j urists, are directly opposed to it .  
As has been already stated, our courts have settled by adj udi­
cation in regard to j udgments of  sister states, that the question 
of j urisdiction may be inquired into, and a want of  j urisdiction 
over the person shown by evidence, [*26 1 ]  and have further de­
cided ( in opposition to the holding of courts of some of the other 
states ) that this may be done, even if it involves the contradiction 
of a recital in the j udgment record . In stating the reasons for thio; 
conclusion , our courts have founded it on general principles, quite 
as applicable to domestic judgments as to others, and save in one 
case, Kerr v. Kerr, 4 r N .  Y. 272, have in their opinions made 
no discrimination between them. Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 1 2 1 ; 
Starb uck v. Afurray, 5 \Vend. 148 ; N O)'es v. Butler, 6 Barb. 6 13 ,  
and  cases cited. 
vVhen we come to consider the effect of  these authorities ,  it 
is difficult to find any sol id ground upon which to rest a di stinc­
t ion between domestic j udgments and j udgments of sister states 
in regard to this question, for under the provision of the consti­
tution of the lJnited States, which requires that full faith and 
credit shall he given in each state to the public acts, records and 
judicial proceedings of every other state, it is now well settled that 
when a judgment of a court of a sister state is duly proved in a 
court o f  this state, it is entitled here to all the effect to which it i s  
entitled in  the courts of the state where rendered. I f  conclusive 
there it is equally conclusive in all the states of the union ; and 
whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in the state where 
rendered, none others can be pleaded in any court in the United 
States. Hampton v. JlfcC01 1n el, 16 U. S. ( 3  \Vheaton ) 234 ; Story 
Com. on Cons., § 1 83 ; 1111'/ls v. Duryee, 1 1 U. S .  ( 7  Cranch ) 48 r .  
I n  holding, therefore, that a defense that the party was not 
served and did not appear, although the record stated that he did ,  
\vas good ,  our courts must have held that such is the law of  this 
state and the con�mon law, and, consequently, that in the absence 
of proof o f  any special law to the contrary in the state where the 
judgment was rendered,  it must be presumed to he a l so the law of 
that state. The j udgments of  our cou rts can stand on no other 
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ogical basis. The distinction which is made in almost all the other
states of the union between the effect of domestic judgments and
judgments [*262] of sister states, in regard to the conclusiveness
of the presumption of jurisdiction over the person, is sought to be
explained, by saying that in regard to domestic judgments the
party aggrieved can obtain relief by application to the court in
which the judgment was rendered, or by writ of error, whereas in
the case of a judgment rendered against him in another state he
would be obliged to go into a foreign jurisdiction for redress,
which would be a manifestly inadequate protection; and therefore
-the constitution may be construed so as to apply only where the
persons affected by the judgment were within the operation of the
proceeding. This explanation, however, does not remove the dith-
culty in making the distinction, for if there is a conclusive pre-
sumption that there was jurisdiction, that presumption must exist
in one case as well as in the other. The question whether or not
the party is estopped, cannot be made to depend upon the greater
inconvenience of getting rid of the estoppel in one case than in
another. .
But aside from this observation as to the effect of the authori-
ties, an examination of them shows that our courts did in fact pro-
ceed upon a ground common to both classes of judgments. The
reasons are fully stated in the case of Starbuck v. Murray, 5
VV end. 148. In that case, which was an action upon a Massachu-
setts judgment, the defendant pleaded that no process was served
on him in the suit in which the judgment sued on was rendered,
and that he never appeared therein in person or by attorney, and
this plea was held good, notwithstanding that the record of the
judgment stated that the defendant appeared to the suit. Marcy,
_I., in delivering the opinion of the court, and referring to the argu-
ment that the defendant was estopped from asserting anything
against the allegation of his appearance contained in the record.
says: “It appears to me that this proposition assumes the very
fact to be established, which is the only question in issue. For
what purpose does the defendant question the jurisdiction of the
court? Solely to show that its proceedings and judgments are
void, and therefore the supposed record is not [*263] in truth a
record. If the defendant had not proper notice of, and did not
appear to, the original action, all the state courts, with one excep-
tion, agree in opinion that the paper introduced, as to him, is no
record. But if he cannot show even against the pretended record
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(Jogical basis. The d istinction which i s  made in almost all the other 
states of the union between the effect of domestic judgments and 
j udgments [*26�] of s!st�r �ta�es, in regard to the .conclusiveness of the presumption of 1 unsd1chon over the person, 1s  sought to be 
explained, by saying that in regard to domestic j udgments the 
party aggrieved can obtain rel ief by application to the court in 
which the j udgment was rendered, or by writ of error, whereas in 
the case of a judgment rendered against him in another state he 
would be obliged to go into a foreign jurisdiction for redress , 
which would be a mani festly inadequate protect ion ; and therefore 
. the constitution may be construed so as to apply on ly where the 
persons affected by the j udgment were within the operation of the 
proceeding. This explanation, however, does not remove the diffi­
culty in mak ing the distinction, for i f  there is a conclusive pre­
sumption that there was juri sdict ion , that presumption must exist 
in one case as well as in the other. The question whether or not 
the party is estopped, cannot be made to depend upon the greater 
inconvenience of gett ing rid of the estoppel in one case than in 
another. 
But aside from this observation as to the effect of the authori­
ties, an examination of them shows that our courts did in fact pro­
ceed upon a ground common to both classes of judgments . The 
reasons are fully stated in the case of Starbuck v . .Murray , 5 
\Vend. 148. In that case, which was an action upon a Massachu­
setts j udgment , the defendant pleaded that no process was served 
on him in the suit in which the j udgmen t sued on was rendered, 
and that he never appeared therein in  person or by attorney, and 
this plea was held good, notwithstanding that the record of the 
j udgmen t stated that the defendant appeared to the suit. l\farcy , 
J . .  in delivering the opinion of the court, and referring to the argu­
ment that the defendant was estoppe<l from asserting anything 
against the allegat ion of h is appearance contained in the record , 
says : "It appears to me that this proposition assumes the very 
fact to be estahl ishe<l , which is the only question in issue. For 
what purpose does the defendant quest ion the j urisdiction of the 
court ? Solely to show that its proceedings and j udgments are 
\'O id ,  and therefore the supposed record is not [ *263] in truth a 
record . If  the defendant had not proper notice of, and did not 
appear to, the original action , all the state courts, with one excep­
tion, agree in opinion that the paper introduced , as to him,  is no 
record. But if he cannot show even against the pretended record 
that fact, on the alleged ground of the uncontrollable verity of the 
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record, he is deprived of. his defense by a process of reasoning
that is to my mind little less than sophistry. The plaintiff in effect
declares to the defendant—the paper declared on, is a record, be-
cause it says you appeared ; and you appeared, because the paper is
a record. This is reasoning in a circle. The appearance makes
the record uncontrollable verity, and the record makes the appear-
ance an unimpeachable fact.” And again, at p. 160, he says: “To
say that the defendant may show the supposed record to be a
nullity, by showing a want of jurisdiction in the court which made
it, and at the same time to estop him from doing so because the
court has inserted in the record an allegation which he offers to
prove untrue, does not seem to me to be very consistent.”
This is but an amplification of what is sometimes more briefly
expressed in the books, that where the defense goes to defeat the
record, there is no estoppel. That the reasoning of Marcy, J., is
applicable to domestic judgments, is also the opinion of the learned
annotators to Phillip’s Evidence. (Cowen & Hill’s notes, rst ed.,
p. 801, note 55I.) Referring to the opinion of Marcy, J., before
cited, they say: “The same may be said respecting any judgment,
sentence or decree. A want of jurisdiction in the court pronounc-
ing it may always be set up when it is sought to be enforced, or
when any benefit is claimed under it; and the principle which ordi-
narily forbids the impeachment or contradiction of a record has
no sort of application to the case.” The dicta of our judges are
all to the same effect, although the precise case does not seem to
have arisen. In Bigelow v. Stearns, 19 Johns. 39, 41, Spencer,
Ch. J., laid down the broad rule that if a court, whether of limited
jurisdiction or not, undertakes to hold cognizance of a cause with-
out having gained [*264] jurisdiction of the person by having him
before them in the manner required by law, the proceedings are
void. In Latham v. Edgerton, 9 Cow. 227, Sutherland, J., in
regard to a judgment of a court of common pleas, says: “The
principle that a record cannot be impeached by pleading, is not
applicable to a case like this. The want of jurisdiction is a matter
that may always be set up against a judgment when sought to be
enforced or where any benefit is claimed under it.” Citing Mills
v. Martin, 19 Johns. 7, 33. He also says (p. 229) : “The plaintiff
below might have applied to the court to set aside their proceed-
ings, but he was not bound to do so. He had a right to lie by until
the judgment was set up against him, and then to show that the
proceedings were void for want of jurisdiction.” In Davis v. Pack-
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record, he is  deprived o( his defense by a process of reasoning 
that is to my mind little less than sophistry.  The plaintiff in effect 
declares to the defendant-the paper declared on, is a record , be­
cause it says you appeared ; and you appeared, because the paper i s  
a record. This is  reasoning in a circle. The appearance makes 
the record uncontrolJable verity, and the record makes the appear­
ance an unimpeachable fact." And again, at p. 16o, he says : "To 
say that the defendant may show the supposed record to be a 
nullity, by showing a want of j urisdiction in the court which made 
it, and at the same time to estop him from doing so because the 
court has inserted in the record an allegation which he offers to 
prove untrue, does not seem to me to be very consistent." 
This is but an amplification of what i s  sometimes more briefly 
expressed in the book�. that where the defense goes to defeat the 
record, there is no estoppel . That the reasoning of Marcy, J . ,  is 
applicable to domestic judgments, is also the opinion of the learned 
annotators to Phillip's Evidence. ( Cowen & Hill's notes, 1 st ed. , 
p. 80 1 ,  note 55 I . )  Referring to the opinion of Marcy, J . ,  before 
cited, they say : "The same may be said respecting any judgment, 
sentence or decree. A want of jurisdiction in the court pronounc­
ing it may always be set up when it is sought to be enforced , or 
when any benefit i s  claimed under it ; and the principle wh!ch ordi­
narily forbids the impeachment or contradiction of a record has 
no sort of application to the case." The dicta of our j udges are 
all  to the same effect, although the precise case does not seem to 
have arisen. In Bigelo-w v. Stearns, 19 Johns. 39, 4 1 ,  Spencer, 
Ch. J., laid down the broad rule that if a court, whether of l imited 
jurisdiction or not, undertakes to hold cognizance of a cause with­
m1t having gained [*264] jurisdiction of the person by having him 
before them in the manner requ i red by law, the proceedings are 
void. In La.tham v. Edgerton, 9 Cow. 227, Sutherland , J . ,  in 
regard to a j udgment of a court of common pleas, says : "The 
principle that a rec<?rcl cannot be impeached by pleading-, i s  not 
applicable to a case l ike this. The want of jurisdiction is a matter 
that may always be set up against a j udgment when sought to be 
en forced or where any benefit is claimed under it ." Citin� Jf ills 
v. Martin, 19 Johns. 7, 33.  He also says ( p. 229) : "The pla int iff 
below might have appl ied to the court to set aside their proceed­
ings , but he was not bound to do so. He had a right to lie hv until 
the j udgment was set up against him, and then to show that the 
proceedings were void for want of j urisdiction." In Da<-·is \'. Pac/l­
ard, 6 \Vend. 327, 332, in the court of errors,  the chancellor, 
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speaking of domestic judgments, says: _ “If the jurisdiction of the
court is general or unlimited both as to parties and subject-matter,
it will be presumed to l1ave had jurisdiction of the cause unless it
appears affirmatively from the record, or by the showing of the
[mrly denying the jurzlrdiction of the court, that some special cir-
cumstances existed to oust the court of its jurisdiction in that par-
ticular case.” In Bloom v. Burdick, I Hill 130, Bronson, J., says:
“The distinction between superior and inferior courts is not of
much importance in this particular case, for whenever it appears
that there was a want of jurisdiction, the judgment will be void in
whatever court it was rendered;” and in People V. Cassels, 5 Hill
164, 168, the same learned judge makes the remark, that no court
or officer can acquire jurisdiction by the mere assertion of it. or
by falsely alleging the existence of facts upon which jurisdiction
depends. In Harrington v. The People, 6 Barb. 607, 610, Paige,
]., expresses the opinion that the jurisdiction of a court, whether
of general or limited jurisdiction, may be inquired into, although
the record of the judgment states facts giving it jurisdiction. He
repeats the same view in Noyes v. Butler, 6 Barb. 613, 617, and in
Hard v. Shi[>man, [*265] 6 Barb. 62I, 623, 624, where he says
of superior as well as inferior courts, that the record is never con-
clusive as to the recital of a jurisdictional fact, and the defendant’
is always at liberty to show a want of jurisdiction, although the
record avers the contrary. If the court had no jurisdiction, it had
no power to make a record, and the supposed record is not in truth 1
a record. Citing Starbnck v. Murray, 5 W'end. I58. The lan-
guage of Gridley, _I., in Wright v. Douglass, I0 Barb. 97, III, is
still more in point. He observes: “It is denied by counsel for the
plaintiff, that want of jurisdiction can be shown collaterally to
defeat a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction. The true
rule, however, is that laid down in the opinion just cited (op. of
Bronson, ]., in Bloom v. Burdick, I Hill 138, to I43), that in a
court of general jurisdiction, it is to be presumed that the court has
jurisdiction till the contrary appears, but the want of jurisdiction
may always be shown by L"Z'i(lC’llCt7, e.rceft in one solitary case,”
viz: “When jurisdiction depends on a fact that is litigated in a
suit, and is adjudged in favor of the party who avers jurisdiction,
then the question of jurisdiction is judicially decided, and the
judgment record is conclusive evidence of jurisdiction until set
aside or reversed by a direct proceeding.”
The general term, in that case, held that a judgment of the
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speaking of domestic j udgments, says : _ "If  the jurisdiction of the 
court i s  ge.neral or unlimited both as to parties and subj ect-matter, 
it will be presumed to have had j urisdiction of the cause unless it 
appears affirmatively from the record, or by the shou,;.ng of the 
parl'J' denyiug the ju risdiction of the cou rt, that some special cir­
cumstances existed to oust the court of its j urisdiction in that par­
t icular case." In Bloom v. Burdick, I Hill 130, Bronson, J ., says : 
"The distinction between superior and inferior courts i s  not of 
much importance in this particular case, for whenever it appears 
that there was a want of jurisdiction, the j udgment will be void in 
whatever court it was rendered ;" and in People v. Cassels, 5 Hill 
1 6-t-, 1 68, the same learned j udge makes the remark, that no court 
or officer can acquire j urisdiction by the mere assertion of it .  or 
by falsely alleging the existence of facts upon which j urisdiction 
depends. In Harrington v. The People, 6 Barb. 6o7, 610, Paige, 
J., expresses the opinion that the j urisdiction of a court, whether 
of general or limited j ur i sdiction, may be inquired into, although 
the record of the judgment states facts giving it jurisdiction. He 
repeats the same view in Noyes v. Butler, 6 Barb. 6 13 ,  617,  and in 
Hard v. Shipm an, [*265 ]  6 Barb. 62 1 ,  623, 624, where he says 
of superior as well as inferior courts, that the record is never con­
clusive as to the recital of a j urisdictional fact ,  and the defendant ' 
is al ways at l iberty to show a want of jurisdiction, although the 
record avers the contrary. If the court had no jurisdiction, it had 
no power to make a record, and the supposed record is not in truth ( 
a record. C i ting Starb uck v. Murray, 5 \Vend. 1 58. The lan­
guage of Gridley, J . ,  in iVright v. D o ugla.ss, IO Barb. 97, 1 1 1  . .  i s  
still more in point. He observes : "It is  denied by counsel for the 
plaintiff, that want of jurisdiction can be shown collaterally to 
defeat a j udgment of a court of general j urisdiction. The true 
rule, however, is that laid clown in  the opinion j ust cited (op. of 
B ronson , J., in Bloom v .  Burdick, 1 Hill 1 38, to 1 43 ) ,  that in a 
court of general jnr isdiction , it is to be presumed that the court has 
j ur i sdiction till the contrary appears, but the want of jur i sdiction 
may always be shown by fi •idc11 cc, except in one solitary case," 
viz : "\Vhen jurisd iction depends on a fact that is l itigated in a 
suit ,  and i s  adj mlged in favor of the party who avers jurisd iction, 
then the question of j urisdiction is  j udicially decided, and the 
j udgment record i s  conclusive evidence of jurisdiction until  set 
aside or reversed hy a direct proceeding." 
The general term, in that case, held that a j udgment of the 
supreme court was voi<l for want of  service of  an attachment, 
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notwithstanding that the record averred that the attachment had
been duly served and returned, according to law. The judgment
in the case cited was reversed (7 N. Y. 564), but not upon the
point referred to here. It cannot, however, be held to be an adju-
dication upon that point, because the judgment was not rendered
in the exercise of the general powers of the court, but in pursuance
of a special statutory authority.
In the Chemnng Canal Bank V. Judson, 8 N. Y. 254, the gen-
eral principle is recognized, that the jurisdiction of any court exer-
cising authority over a subject may be inquired into, and inAdams
v. The Saraloga <9 Washington R. R. Co. [*266], IO N. Y. 328,
333, Gridley, ]., maintains as to the judgments of all courts, that
jurisdiction may be inquired into, and disproved by evidence, not-
withstanding recitals in the record, and says that such is the doc-
trine of the courts of this state, although it may be different in
some of the other states, and perhaps also in England ; and he says
the idea is not to be tolerated, that the attorney could make up a
record or decree, reciting that due notice was given to the defend-
ant of a proceeding, when he never heard of it, and the decree held
conclusive against an offer to show this vital allegation false. That
was a case of special proceeding, and, therefore, not an authority
on the point. In Pcndlolon V. Wood, 17 N. Y. 72, 75, where a
judgment of the supreme court was sought to be attacked collat-
erally, it is said by Strong, ].: “It is undoubtedly true that the
want of jurisdiction of the person is a good defense in answer to a
judgment when set up for any purpose, and that such jnrisdiclion
is 0/>cn for inquiry," and by Comstock, J., at p. 77: “I assent to
the doctrine that where there is no suit or process, appearance or
confession, no valid judgment can be rendered in any court; that
in such a case the recital in the record of jnrisalictional facts is not
conclnsit'c.” Citing Starbnclc v. ."l[nrra_\'. “I think it is always
the right of a party against whom a record is set up, to show that
no jurisdiction of his person was acquired, and consequentlv that
there was no right or authority to make up the record against
him.” Selden and Pratt, ]_I., concurred in these views, but the
case was disposed of on a different point.
In Porter V. Bronson, 29 How. Pr. 292, I9 Abb. Pr. 236.
the court of common pleas of the city of New York held,
at general term, that assuming the marine court to be a court
of record, a defendant in an action on a judgment of that court
might set up that he was not served with process and (lid not ap-
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not\\· i thstan<ling that the record averred that the attachment had 
been duly served and returned, according to law. The j udgment 
in the case cited was reversed (7 N. Y.  56-t-) , but not upon the 
point referred to here. It cannot, however, be held to be an adj u­
dication upon that point, because the j udgment was not rendered 
in the exercise of the general powers of the court, but in pursuance 
of a special statutory authority. 
In the Clzem 1mg Canal Ba11k v. Judson, 8 N. Y. 254, the gen ­
eral principle is recognized, that the j urisdiction of  any court exer­
cising authority over a subj ect may be inquired into, and inA da 111.s 
v. Th e Saratoga & TVashington R. R. Co. [*266 ] ,  IO N.  Y. 3 28, 
�33· Gridley, J . ,  maintains as to the judgments of all courts, that 
jurisdiction may be inquired into, and disproved by evidence, not­
withstanding recitals in  the record, and says that such is  the doc­
trine of the courts of this state, although it may be diff ercnt in 
some of the other states, and perhaps also in England ; and he says 
the idea is not to be tolerated, that the attorney could make up a 
record or decree, reciting that due notice was given to the de fend­
ant of a proceeding, when he never heard of it, and the decree held 
conclusive against an offer to show this vital allegation false. That 
was a case of special proceeding, and, therefore, not an authority 
on the point. In  Pc11dleto1 i  v. W ced, 17 �. Y. 72, 75, where a 
j udgment of the supreme court was sought to be attacked col lat­
erally, it is  said by Strong, J . : "It i s  undoubtedly true  that the 
want of j urisdiction of the person is a good defense in answer to a 
j udgment when set up for any purpose, a1 1d tliat such jurisdiction  
is open for inqu iry ;" and by  Comstock , J . ,  a t  p.  77 : "I  assent tu  
the doctrine that where there is no  suit or  process ,  appearance or  
confess ion, no  valid judgment can be  rendered in  any court ; that 
in such a case the recital in the record of j11risdictio11al facts is 1 101  
con cl11sfr:c." Citing Starbuck v . . Murray.•. " I  think it is always 
the right of  a party ag-ainst whom a record i s  set up, to show that 
no j ur i sdiction of his  person was acquired , and consequenth' that 
there was no right or authority to make up the record aga in st 
him." Selden and Pratt ,  JJ . .  concurred in  these views, but the 
case was disposed of on a different point. 
In Porter v. B ronson, 29 How. Pr. 292 . 19 Abb. Pr. 2�6. 
the court of  common pleas of the city of Xew York helc l . 
at general term, that assuming the marine court to he a cour t 
of record , a defendant in an action on a j udgment of that court 
might set up that he was not served with process and did not ap­
pear, notwithstanding recital s in the record showing jur isd iction : 
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and in‘ Bolton v. Jacks, 6 Rob. 166, 198, Jones, _I., says that it is
now conceded, at least in this state, that want of jurisdiction will
render void [*267] the judgment of any court, whether it be of
superior or inferior, of general, limited or local jurisdiction, or of
record or not, and that the bare recital of jurisdictional facts in the
record of a judgment of any court, whether superior or inferior,
of general or limited jurisdiction, is not conclusive, but only prima
facie evidence of the truth of the fact recited, and the party against
whom a judgment is offered, is not by the bare fact of such recitals
estoppcd from showing, by afiirmative proof, that they were un-
true and thus rendering the judgment void for want of jurisdic-
tion. He cites in support of this opinion, several of the cases
which I have referred to, and Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 156, and
Hntchcr v. Roclzelcau, 18 N. Y. 86, 92. '
It thus appears that the current of judicial opinion in this
state is very strong and uniform in favor of the proposition stated
by Jones, _I., in 6 Rob. 198, and if adopted here, is decisive of the
present case. It has not as yet, however, been directly adjudicated,
and if sustained, it must rest upon the local law of this state, as
it finds no support in adjudications elsewhere. There are reasons,
however, founded upon our system of practice, which would war-
rant us in so holding. The powers of a court of equity being
vested in our courts of law, and equitable defenses being allow-
able, there is no reason why, to an action upon a judgment, the
defendant should not be permitted to set up, by way of defense,
any matter which would be ground of relief in equity against the
judgment; and it is conceded in those states where the record is
held conclusive, that when the judgment has been obtained by
fraud, or without bringing the defendant into court, and the want
of jurisdiction does not appear upon the face of the record, relief
may be obtained in equity.
The technical difiiculty arising from the conclusiveness of the
record is thus obviated. In the present case, the judgment is set
up by the defendants as a bar to the plaintiff’s action. But it must
be borne in mind, that this is an equitable action, being for the
foreclosure of a mortgage. The [*268] defendants set up the
foreclosure in the McFarquahar case as a bar, but being in a court
of equity, the plaintiff had a right to set up any matter showing
that the defendants ought not in equity to avail themselves of that
judgment. They offered to show that it was entered ex forte on
forged papers. It does not appear that the plaintiff ever had any
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and in· Bolton v. Jacks, 6 Rob. 166, 1g8, Jones, J., says that it is 
now conceded, at least in this state, that want of j urisdiction will 
render void [*267] the judgment of any court, whether it be of 
superior or in ferior, of general, limited or local j urisdiction, or of 
record or not, and that the bare recital of j urisdictional facts in the 
record of a j udgment of any court, whether superior or inferior, 
of general or l imited jurisdiction, is not conclusive, but only prima 
f acie evidence of the truth of the fact recited, and the party against 
whom a j udgment is offered, is not by the l>are fact of such recitals 
estoppcd from showing, by affirmative proof, that they were un­
true and thus rendering the j udgment void for want of jurisc..L1�­
tion. He cites in support of this opinion, several of the cases 
which I have referred to, and Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N .  Y. 1 56, and 
Hrrtchcr v. Roclzc/cau, 1 8 N .  Y. 86, 92. · 
It thus appears that the current o f  judicial opinion i_n this 
state is very strong and uniform in favor of the proposition stated 
by Jones, J . , in 6 Rob. 1g8, and if adopted here, is decisive of the 
present case. It has not as yet, however, been directly adj udicated, 
and if sustained, it must rest upon the local law of this state, as 
it  finds no support in adj udications elsewhere. There are reasons, 
however, founc.led upon our system of practice, which would war­
rant us in so holding. The powers of a court of equity being t 
vested in our courts of law, and equitable defenses being allow­
able, there is no reason why, to an action upon a j udgment, the 
defendant should not be permitted to set up, by way of defense, 
any matter which would be ground of relief in equity against the 
judgment ; and it is conceded in those states where the record is 
held conclusive, that when the judgment has been obtained by 1 
fraud, or without bringing the defendant into court, and the want 
of jurisdiction does not appear upon the face of the record, rel ief 
may be obtained in equity. 
The technical difficulty arising from the conclusiveness of the , 
record i s  thus obviated . In the present case, the j udgment is  set 
up by the defendants as a bar to the plaintiff's action. But it must 
be borne in mind, that this is an equitable action, being for the 
foreclosure of a mortgage. The [*268] defendants set up the 
foreclosure in the l\kFarquahar case as a bar, but being in a court 
of equity, the plaintiff had a right to set up any matter showing 
that the defendants ought not in equity to avail themselves of that 
j udgment. They offered to show that it was entered ex parte on 
forged papers. It does not appear that the plaintiff ever had any 
knowledge of it, and it is not pretended that he was legally sum-
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moned. Such a judgment would never be upheld in equity, even
in favor of one ignorant of the fraud and claiming bona fide under
it. He stands in no better position than any other party claiming
bona fide under a forged instrument.
The case is analagous in principle to that of the Bridgeport
Savings Bank v. Eldredge, 28 Conn. 556. That was a bill filed
by a second mortgagee to redeem mortgaged premises from a first
mortgagee. The first mortgagee had obtained a decree of fore-
closure against the second mortgagee, and the time limited for
redemption had expired. The record of the decree found the fact
that legal 'service of the bill in the first suit had been made on the
second mortgagee, but in fact none had been made, and he had no
actual knowledge of the pendency of the suit until after the time
limited for redemption had expired; and he would have redeemed _
if he had known of the decree.
It was held, I. That the decree was not in any proper sense
a bar to the present suit, as a judgment at law would be a bar to a
suit at law; but that, without impugning the decree, the court
could, for equitable reasons shown, allow a further time for re-
demption.
2. That, therefore, the question whether the plaintiff could
contradict the record by showing that no service of the bill was, in
fact, made upon him, did not present itself as a technical one. to be
determined by the rules with regard to the verity of judicial rec-
ords, but only in its relation to the plaintiffs rights to equitable
relief, and therefore that evidence of want of notice was admis-
sible.
The bill to redeem was not framed to open the former [*269]
decree, and contained no allegations adapted to or praying for
such relief, but was in the ordinary form of a bill for redemption,
taking no notice of the previous decree. The decree was set up in
the answer, and it was averred that it was rendered on legal notice
to the plaintiff. The court, however, held that this defense might
be rebutted by evidence of facts which should preclude defendants
from taking advantage of a decree of which they co_uld not con-
scientiously avail themselves.
Under the system of practice in this state, no reply to an
answer setting up new matter is required, but the plaintiff is al-
lowed to rebut it by evidence. Neither is it necessary to anticipate
a defense arising upon a deed or record by inserting matter in the
complaint in avoidance of it. The defense may never be set up,
















































































































































T H E  RECORD OF T H E  J UDG .Mr;NT 
moned. Such a j udgment would never be upheld in  equity,. even 
in favor of one ignorant of the fraud and claiming bona tide under 
it. He stan<ls in no better position than any other party claiming 
bo11a tide under a forged instrument. 
The case is analagous in principle to that of the Bridgeport 
Savings Bauk v. Eldredge, 28 Conn. 556. That was a bill filed 
by a second mortgagee to redeem mortgaged premises from a first 
mortgagee. The first mortgagee had obtained a decree of fore­
closure against the second mortgagee, and the time limited for 
redemption had expired. The record of the decree found the fact 
that legal 'service of the bill in the first suit had been made on the 
second mortgagee, but in fact none had been made, and he had no 
actual knowledge of the pendency of the suit until after the time 
limited for redemption had expired ; and he would have redeemed 
if he had known of the decree. 
It was held, I .  That the decree was not in any proper sense 
a bar to the present suit, as a judgment at law would be a bar to a 
suit at law ; but that, w ithout impugning the decree, the court 
could, for equ itable reasons shown, allow a further time for re­
demption. 
2. That, therefore, the quest ion whether the p la intiff c·ould 
contradict the record by showing that no service of the bill was, in 
fact, made upon him, did not present itsel f as a technical one . to be 
determined by the rules with regard to the verity of j udicial rec­
ords, but only in its relation to the plaint iff 's rights to equitable 
rel ief, and therefore that evidence of want of notice was admis­
sible. 
The bill to redeem was not framed to open the former [*269] 
decree, and contained no allegations adapted to or  praying for 
such relief, but was in the ordinary form of a bi ll for redemption , 
tak ing no notice of the previous decree. The decree was set up in 
the answer, and it  was averred that it  was rendered on legal notice 
to the plaintiff. The court , however, held that this defense might 
be rebutted by evidence of facts which shou ld preclude defendants 
from taking advan tage of a decree of which they could not con­
sci ent iously avail themselves. 
Cnder the system of practice in this state , no reply to an 
answer sett ing up new matter is required, but the plaintiff is al­
lowed to rebut i t  by evidence . Neither is i t  necessary to antic ipate 
a defense aris ing upon a deed or record by inserting matter in the 
complaint in avoidance of it . The defense may never he set up, 
and the plaint iff i s  not hound to suppose that i t  will be. The state 
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of the pleadings, therefore, presents no difiiculty. The only ques-
tion whic.h might be raised is, that McFarquahar, in whose name
the decree was obtained, should be before the court, but no such
objection was made at the trial, and if it had been, I do not see that
the decree and sale are parties to this action, and I see no reason
why the validity of the l\lcFarquahar foreclosure cannot be tried
herein as well as upon a motion or in a separate suit to set aside
the decree.
The judgments should be reversed, and a new trial ordered .
with costs to abide the event.
All concur; /lndI'cu'.s', 1., in result.
Judgment reversed.
DOWELL v. GOODWIN, in R. 1. Sup. Ct., Dec. 3. 1900-22 R. I. 287, 47
At]. 693, 51 L. R. A. 873, 84 Am. St. Rep. 842.
TI[.I.INGHAS'l‘, ]. This is a bill to enjoin the prosecution
of an oction at law against the complainant, and for other relief.
The bill sets out that on the 10th of March, 1896, the respondent
sued out a writ before the district court of the sixth judicial
district to recover from the complainant the sum fuf $80 for work
and labor done; that said writ was placed in the hands of one
john F. Ryan, a constable of Pawtucket, R. I., for service; that
it was returnable on the 23d day of March, T896, at which time
it was entered in said court; that said constable made a return on
the writ in which he set forth that on the 14th day of March,
1896, he attached the right, title, and interest of.the defendant in
that suit to certain land described in his return, and that on the
same da_v he summoned the defendant in that suit by leaving an
attested copy of the writ with him: that thercafterwards. on the
30th day of March, 1896, said court rendered judgment against
this complainant, the defendant in that suit. for said amount
claimed, with costs, which judgment has never been appealed
from or reversed: and that the same now stands in the record
of said court. The complainant then avers that said Ryan, con-
stable, never made any attachment of the real estate of this corn-
plainant on said I4th day of March, I806. nor on any other day,
and that he did not leave any copy of said writ with him (the
complainant), and that he did not summon him, as set forth in
his return, or in any other manner whatsoever. either on said
14th day of March or at any other time, and that the [*289] re-
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of the plead ings, there fore, presents no difficulty. The only ques­
tion which might be raised is, that McFarquahar, in whose name 
the decree was obtained, should be before the court, but no such 
obj ection was made at the trial, and if  it had been, I do not see that 
the decree and sale are parties to this action, and I sec no reason 
why the validity of the :\1cFarquahar 
·
foreclosure cannot be trie<l 
herein as well as upon a motion or in a separate suit to set aside 
the decree. 
The j udgments should be reversed , and a new trial ordered 
with costs to abide the event. 
All concur ; A 1 1drcu•s, !., in result. 
Judgment reversed . 
DOWELL v. GOOD\V I N, in R. I. Sup. Ct., Dec. 3, 1900-22 R. I. 287, 47 
Atl. 693, 5 1  L. R. A. 8iJ, 8� Am. St. Rep. 8.p. 
Tn.J. INGHAST, J. This is a bill to enj oin the prosecution 
of an oction at law against the complainant, and for other rel ief. 
The bill sets out that on the rnth of March, 1 89t), the respondent 
sued out a writ before the district court of the sixth j udicial 
d istrict to recover from the complainant the sum �f $8o for work 
and labor done ; that said writ was p laced in the hands of  one 
John F. Ryan, a constable of Pawtucket, R .  I . ,  for service ; that 
it  was returnable on the 23<1 day of March, 1 &j), at which time 
it was entered in said court ; that said constable made a return on 
the writ in which he set forth that on the qth day of l\Iarch , 
18')6, he attached the right, title, and intcre!'t of the defendant in 
that suit to certain land described in h i s  retu rn, and that on the 
same day he summoned the defendant in  that suit by leaving- an 
attested copy o f  the writ with him ; that thereafterwanls ,  on the 
�oth day o f  l\Iarch , 1 89G, said court rendered j udgment  against 
this complainant, the de fen dant in that �uit .  for said amount 
claimed, \\' i th costs ,  \\'hich j udgment has never been appeale'l 
from or reverse<! : and that the same now stands in the recorcl 
of saicl comt. The complainant then avers that said R,·an . con­
stable, never made any attachment of the real estate of th is  com­
plainant on sairl. 1 4th clay of l\Iarch , 1R<)6. nor on any other  d ay,  
and that he did not leave any copy o.f said \Hit w i th him ( the 
complainant ) ,  and that he d i d  not summon h im.  as set forth in 
his  return, or in any other manner what<;oever. either on said 
qth clay of 1\Tarch or at any other time, and that the f *289 l re­
turn of said officer was whol ly and absolu tely un true and frau<lul-
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ent in every particular. The complainant further avers that he did
not answer said action at law because he was wholly ignorant of
the existence of the same, and that he did not know thereof. or
of any judgment rendered therein, until on or about the 13th
day of .\lay, i899. He further alleges that he was not indebted
to the plaintiff in said action in any sum whatsoever, and that
the alleged claim set up therein is groundless. and that the judg-
ment rendered therein is fraudulent and void. The bill further
alleges that on the 19th day of May, 1899, the respondent com-
menced an action of debt on judgment against the complainant in
said district court, said judgment being the same that was obtained
in the fradulent action above referred to; that in said last-named
action he has attached the land of the complainant; and that said
action is now pending in said district court. The bill further
alleges that by the fraudulent acts of said Ryan, and his false re-
turn on said writ, the complainant has been greatly injured and
damaged, and that the respondent is aware of said illegal and
fraudulent acts, but persists in pursuing the complainant on said
fraudulent judgment, and also that the complainant is wholly
rernedilcss at law, and can only have relief in a court of equity.
\\"herefore he prays that the respondent be perpetually enjoined
from further prosecuting his action on said judgment. and for
other relief. To this bill the respondent demurs on the following
grounds, namely: (I) That the bill seeks relief against the en-
forcement of a judgment obtained upon the writ mentioned in
paragraph 2 of the bill. because, as the bill alleges, said writ
was not served at all, either by summons or by attachment. while
the bill itself and the copy of said writ attached thereto show a
return by a proper officer of full and regular service of said writ
upon the complainant, both by attaching his real estate, and by
personal [*z9o] service of a copy of the writ upon him; (2) that
the alleged grounds for relief consist wholly and only of the con-
tradiction of the return of the constable upon a writ which he
was competent to serve; (3) that the complainant has an adequate
remedy at law against the ofiicer and the surety on his bond ; and
(4) that the bill does not state a case entitling the complainant
to the relief prayed for.
The question raised by the first two grounds of demurrer
is whether, under the facts set forth in the bill, the otficer's return
on the writ in the action in which the judgment sued on was re-
covered can be contradicted. Or, to state it more generally, the
question raised is whether a bill in equity will lie to enjoin an
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ent in every particular. The  complainant further avers that he did 
not answer said action at law because he was wholly ignorant of 
the existence of the same, and that he did not know thereof. or 
of any judgmen t rendered therein, un t i l on or about the 1 3th 
day of �lay,  i899. He further alleges that he was not indebted 
to the plaintiff in  said action in any sum whats1)ever, and that 
the allegetl claim set up therein is groundless, and that the j udg­
ment rendered therein is fraudu lent and void. The bi l l  further 
alleges that on the 19th day of �lay, 1 899, the respondent com­
m enced an action of debt on judgment against the complainant in  
said district court, said judgment being the  same that was  obtained 
in the fradulent action above referred to ; that in said last-named 
action he has attached the ]and of the compla inant ; and that said 
action is  now pending in said district cou rt. The bill further  
alleges that by the fraudulent acts of  sa id  Ryan, and his false re­
turn on said writ ,  the complainant has been greatly inj ured anrl 
damaged , and that the respondent is aware of said i l legal atW 
fraudulent ac ts, but persists in pursuing- the complainant on said 
fraudulent j udgment, and also that the complainant is wholly 
remedilcss at law, and can only have rel ief in a court of equ ity. 
\Vherefore he prays that the respondent be perpetual ly enjoined 
from further prosecuting his action on said j udgment, and for 
other rel ief. To this bil l  the respondent demurs on the following 
grounds,  namely : ( r )  That the b i l l  seeks rel ief  against the en­
forcement of a j udgmen t obtained upon the writ men tioned in 
paragraph 2 of the bi l l ,  because, as the bill alleges, said w rit 
was not served at all, ei th er by sn-mmons or by attachment. while 
the bill  i tself and the copy of said \vrit attached thereto show a 
return by a proper officer of full and regu lar service of said w ri t  
upon the complainant , both by attaching his real estate, and by 
personal [ *290] service o f  a copy of the writ upon him ; ( 2 )  that 
the alleged grounds for relief consist wholly and only of the con­
tradiction of the return of the constable upon a writ  w h ich he 
was competent to serve ; ( 3 )  that the complainant has an adequ ate 
remedy at law against the officer and the surety on h i s  hand ; and 
(4)  that the bil l  does not state a case entitling the comp la inan t 
to the re l ief prayed for. 
The question raised by the first two grounds of demurrer 
is whether, under the facts set forth in the bil l ,  the officer's return 
on the writ  in the action in which the judgment sued o n  w a s  re­
covered can be contrad icted. Or, to state i t  more gen era l ly ,  the 
question ra i sed is whether a bi l l  in  eq u i ty will  l ie to en 1 0 1 11 an 
act ion at law on a judgment which was obtained hy the fraud 
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of the officer charged with the service of the writ in the original
action. The respondent's counsel contend that the officer’s return
cannot thus be contradicted, and that such a bill will not lie, and
that the cases of Angeli v. Bowler, 3 R. I. 77, Estes v. Cooke, 12
R. I. 6, and Bar-row; v. Rubber C0., 13 R. I. 48, fully sustain
them in the position which they take. The cases cited hold that an
ofiicer’s return is conclusive and cannot be contradicted incidentally
by motion or plea; also, that the return is part of the record, and
that parol evidence cannot be submitted to contradict the court
record; for, so long as it remains, it is conclusive upon the par-
ties, and in order to change it some appropriate proceeding act—
ing directly upon the record must be instituted. It is to be ob-
served, however, that the rule as thus laid down in cases relied
on applies to common-low actions. See Pratt v. Jones, 22 Vt.,
at page 345; Pettes v. Bank, 17 Vt., at page 444. And hence
the question arises whether it is applicable to suits in equity; for,
if so, it is controlling in the case at bar, unless it can be held that
this is a proceeding acting directly upon the record in said origi-
nal action, which we do not think it is. To state the question
more concisely, can a court of equity ever interfere and grant re-
lief by way of permitting the record of a common—law court to be
impeached as to the oflicer’s return on the writ, or as to any other
part of the record? \V e think this question must be answered
in the affirmative. [*29I] One of the peculiar provinces of a
court of equity is to relieve against willful misrepresentation and
fraud. A court of equity is a court of conscience, and whatever,
therefore, is unconscionable is odious in its sight. Indeed, it
is said by Judge Story, in his Commentaries, that “fraud is even
more odious than force.” That a judgment obtained in a court
of law by a false and fraudulent writ, or by a false and fraudulent
return thereon by the ofiicer, is so wholly unconscionable as to
shock the inherent sense of justice of all right-thinking men, no
one will deny. And it would be a reproach to our system of
jurisprudence if a court of equity could afford no relief against
a judgment so obtained. But that equity doesafford a full and
adequate remedy against such a wrong, and that the case stated
in the bill before us is clearly within the jurisdiction of such a
court, is fully shown by the authorities, to some of which we will
proceed to refer. Perhaps the leadincri case in this country upon
the subject of equitable relief agamst judgments at law is that
of Ins-urance Co. v. Hod son, Cranch, 332, 3 L. Ed. 362 in
which (‘Jgjef |ustice ‘EITSIZI speci e( e groun s or e inter-
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of the officer charged with the service of the writ in the original 
action. The respondent's counsel contend that the officer's return 
cannot thus be contradicted, and that such a bill will  not lie, and 
that the cases of Angell v. Bou•ler, 3 R. I. 77, Estes v. Cooke, 1 2  
R. I .  6 ,  and Barrows v. Rubber Co., 1 3  R. I .  48, fully sustain 
them in the position which they take. The cases dted hold that an 
officer's return is  conclusive and cannot be contradicted incidentally 
by motion or plea ; also, that the return is part of the record, and 
that parol evidence cannot be submitted to contradict the court 
record ; for, so long as i t remains, it is conclusive upon the par­
ties, and in order to change it some appropr iate proceeding act­
ing directly upon the record must be inst ituted. It is to be ob­
served, however, that the rule as thus laid down in cases relied 
on applies to common-low actions. See Pratt v. Jones, 22 Vt., 
at page 345 ; Pettes v. Bank, 17 Vt., at  page 444. And hence 
the question arises whether it is appl icable to suits in equity ; for, 
if so, it is controll ing in the case at bar, unless it can be held that 
this is a proceed ing acting directly upon the record in said origi­
nal action , \vhich we do not think it  is. To state the question 
more conc isely , can a court of equity ever interfere and grant re­
lief by way of permitting the record of a common-law court to be 
impeached as to the officer's return on the writ, or as to any other 
part of the record ? \Ve think this question must be answered 
in the affirmative. [ *291 ] One of the peculiar prov inces of a 
court of equity is to relieve against wi llful m isrepresentation and 
fraud. A court of equity is a court of conscience, and whatever, 
therefore, is unconscionable is  od ious in its sight. Indeed, it 
is said by Judge Story, in his Commentaries, that '' fraud i s  even 
more odious than force." That a judgment obtained in a court 
of law by a false and fraudulent writ, or by a false and fraudulent 
return thereon by the officer, is so wholly unconscionable as to 
shock the inherent sense of j ustice of all right .... thinking men, no 
one will den!·· And it would be a reproach to our system of 
j ur isprudence i f  a court of equ ity could afford no rel ief against 
a j udgment so obta ined. But that equity cloes · afford a full and 
ade<]uate remedy against such a wrong, and that the case stated 
in the bill before us is clearly within the jurisdict ion of such a 
court. i s  fully shown by the au thorities , to some of which we will 
proceed to refer. Perhaps the leading cg,ge in this country upon 
the subj ect of  equitable relief agamst judgments at  law i s  that 
of Insuran ce Co. v. Hod so n, Cranch , 332, L. Eel . 362 in 
whic Chief !usttce e groun s or e inter-
ference of equity in "vVithout 
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attempting to draw any precise line to which courts of equity
will advance, and which they cannot pass, in restraining parties
from availing themselves of judgments obtained at law, it may
safely be said that‘any fact which clearly proves it to be against
conscience to execute a judgment, and of which the injured party
could not have availed himself at law, but was prevented by fraud
or accident unmixed with any fault or negligence in himself or
his agents, will justify an application to a court of chancery.”
In Bank V. Eldredge, 28 Conn. 563, Storrs, C. J., said: “No
principle is better settled, or more frequently acted on, than that a
court of equity will interfere to restrain the use of an advantage
gained by the proceedings of a judicial tribunal, either of law or
equity, irrespective of the inquiry whether those proceedings were
regular or not, when they must otherwise make either of those
tribunals an instrument of injustice, in all cases where such ad-
vantage has been [*292] gained by the fraud of the opposite
party, or by accident or mistake, without the fault of the party
seeking relief against them. In regard to the judgment of a
court of law, it does not in such a case reverse that judgment, but
conceding it to be valid, it prevents its being used for an uncon-
scientious or inequitable purpose.” In Earle V. McVeigh, 91 U.
S., at page 507, 23 L. Ed. 400, Mr. Justice Clifford said: “Argu-
ment to show that no person can be bound by a judgment, or
any proceeding conducive thereto, to which he was never a party
or privy, is quite unnecessary, as no person can be considered in
,default with respect to that which it never was incumbent upon
him to fulfill. Standard authorities lay _down the rule that, in
order to give any binding effect to a judgment, it is essential that
the court should have jurisdiction of the person and the subject-
matter; and it is equally clear that the want of jurisdiction is a
matter that may always be set up against a judgment when
sought to be enforced, or where any benefit is claimed under it,
as the want of jurisdiction makes it utterly void and unavailable
for any purpose.” In Hogg V. Link, 90 Ind. 346, it is held to be
well settled that a judgment may be enjoined for fraud in ob-
taining it, at the suit of the injured party; such a fraud being
regarded as perpetrated upon the court as well as upon the in-
jured party. In Dobson V. Pearce, I2 N. Y. I56, it was held that
a court of chancery has power to grant relief against judgments
obtained by fraud. “Any fact,” says the court, “which clearly
proves it to be against conscience to execute a judgment, and of
which the injured party could not avail himself at law, but was
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attempting to draw any precise- line to which courts of equity 
will advance, and wh ich they cannot pass, in restraining parties 
from availing themselves of j udgments obtained at law, it  may 
safely be said that ,any fact which clearly proves it to be again�t 
conscience to execute a j udgment, and of which the inj ured party 
could not have availed himself at law, but was prevented by fraud 
or accident unmixed with any fault or negl igence in himself or 
his agents, will justify an appl ication to a cou rt of chancery." 
In Ban k v. Eldredge, 28 Conn. 563 , Storrs, C.  J . ,  said : "l\o 
principl.:! is better settled, or more frequently acted on, than that a 
court of equ ity will interfere to restrain the use of an advantage 
gained by the proceedings of a judicial tribunal, either of law or 
equity, irrespective of the inquiry whether those proceedings were 
regular or not, when they must otherwise make  either of those 
tribunals an instrument of inj ustice, in all cases where such ad­
vantage has been [ *292 ] gained by the fraud of the opposite 
party, or by accident or mistake, without the fault of the party 
seeking relief against them. I�  regard to the j udgment of a 
court of law, it does not in such a case reverse that j udgment, but� 
conced ing it to be valid, it prevents its being used for an uncon-1 
scientious or inequitable purpose." In Earle v. M cV ciglz, 9r U. 
S. ,  at page 507, 23 L. Ed. 400, l\fr. Justice Clifford said : "Argu­
ment to show that no person can be bound by a j udgment, or 
any proceeding conducive thereto, to which he was never a party 
or privy, i s  qu ite unnecessary, as no person can be considered in 
. default with respect to that which i t  never was incumbent upon 
him to fulfill . Standard authorities lay down the rule that, in 
order to give any binding effect to a judgment, i t  is essential that 
the court should have jurisd iction of the person and the subj ect­
matter ; and it is equally clear that the want of jurisdiction is a 
matter that may always be set up against a judgment when 
sought  to be en forced, or where any benefit is claimed under it ,  
as the want of jn ri sdiction makes it utterly void and unavailable 
for any purpose." In Hogg v. Lin k, 90 Ind. 346, it is held to be 
well settled that a judgment may be enjoined for fraud in  ob­
taining it, at the suit of the inj ured party ; such a fraud being 
regarded as perpetrated upon the court as well as upon the in­
jured party. In D obson v. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 1 56, it was held that 
a court of chancery has power to grant relief against judgments 
obtained by fraud. "Any fact," says the court, "which clearly 
proves it to be against conscience to execute a j udgment, and o f  
which the inj ured party cou ld not avail himsel f at law, but was 
prevented by fraud or accident, unmixed with any fault or negli-
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gence in himself or his agents, will justify an interference by a
court of equity." Perhaps no better summary of the law apper-
taining to the question now under discussion can be given than
that which is found in 2 Free1n. Judgm. § 495. That part of the
section which is pertinent reads as follows: [*293] “We shall
now consider the circumstances in which a defendant may be
relieved from a judgment or decree rendered in an action wherein
his failure to defend is not chargeable to the plaintiff. Promin-
ent among the grounds of relief belonging within this class of
cases is the one that the court has proceeded to condemn a party
without first giving him an opportunity to be heard. A judgment
pronounced without service of process, actual or constructive,
and without the defendant's knowing that a court has been asked
to adjudicate upon his rights, is regarded with such disfavor at
law that a variety of motions. writs, and proceedings are there
provided to overthrow it; and in many courts it is at all times and
upon all occasions liable to be entirely disregarded upon having
its jurisdictional infirmity exposed. ’But proceedings in equity-
are peculiarly appropriate for the exposure of this infirmity.
They permit of the formation of issues upon the question of
service of process, and of the trial of those issues after full
opportunity has been given to those who seek to sustain as well
as to those who seek to avoid the judgment. ‘lf_at such trial it
satisfactorily appears that the defendant was not summoned and
had no notice of the suit, a sufficient excuse is shown for his neg-
lect to defend; apd £g_uity_will IQ albl the jgdgme_n_t,_if_unjust,
tO_lJC usemainst h_ig1_, no m_a_tter what j1lI'li(£Cil0E.l recitals_i_t
contains.” To the same general effect are the followin_gflcases,
viz: Wistar v. .l/[cMancs, 54 Pa. St., on page 326; Stubbs v.
Lear-itt, 30 Ala. 352; Duncan v. Gcrdinc, 59 Miss. 550; Jcfi’ery v.
Fitch, 46 Conn. 601; Insm’a/ncc C0. \-'. *lVatcrrelzouse, 78 Iowa,
674, 43 N. \V. 611; Vilas v. Jones, 1 N. Y. 274; Wingate v.
Ho_meooci, 40 N. H. 437; Little V. Price, 1 Md. Ch. 182; Lester
v. Hos].-ins, 26 Ark. 63; Martin \'. Parsons, 49 Cal. 94; French
\'. S/10trecll, 5 Johns. Ch. 555. See, also, Beach. Iuj. §§ 615-631;
Spell. Extra. Relief, § 139. Although there is no decision in our
own reports which fully controls the case at bar, yet there are
several in which the validity of the doctrine above enunciated is
clearly recognized. In S[>00ncr V. Leland, 5 R. I. 348. which
was a bill to enjoin an execution [*294] in an action at law, this
court, while it denied the relief prayed for. on the ground that the
answer completely negatived all the allegations of the bill as to
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gcnce in h imse lf  or his agents, will j ustify an interference hy a 
court of  equity . ' '  Perhaps no better summary of the law apper­
taining to the question now under discussion can be given than 
that which is found in 2 Freem. Judgm. § 495. That part of the 
section which is pertinent reads as fol lows : [ * 293 ] " \Ve shall 
now consider the circumstances in which a de fendant may be 
relieved from a j udgment or <lecree rendered in an action wherein 
his failure to defend is not chargeable to the plaintiff. Promin­
ent among the grounds of relief belonging within this class of 
cases is the one that the court has proceeded to condemn a party 
w ithout first giving h im an o!Jportunity to be heard. A j udgment 
pronounced without service of process, actual or constructive, 
and without  the defendant's knowing that a court has been asked 
to adj udicate upon his rights, is regarded \\.' ith such disfavor at 
law that a variety of motions ,  writs, and proceedings are there 
provided to overth row i t ; and in many courts it is at all times and 
upon all occasions l iable to be ent irely disregarded upon having 
its juri sdictional infirmity exposcc!. · But proceed ings in equ ity .  
are peculiarly appropriate for the exposure o f  this infirmity. 
They permit of the formation of issues upon the question of 
service of process, and o f  the trial of those issues after full 
opportunity has been given to those who seek to sustain as well 
as to those who seek to avoid the j udgment. hf.at such trial it 
satis factorily appears that the defendant was not summoned and 
had no notice o f  the su it, a sufficient excuse i s  shown for his neg­
lect to defend ; a!!d .£g_uity�ill !22!. allow the jtt(lgm� if_unj_ust, 
t<LJ?e use1-!!gainst lli_m, no matter what j ur igli_ctional recitals� 
contains3 To the same general eff cct are the following cases, 
viz : lVistar v. "�fdfmz cs, s4 Pa. St . ,  on pag-e 32G ; Stubbs v. 
Lem·itt, 30 A la . 352 ; D wz ca11 v. Gerdine, 5<) �Iiss .  5 50 ;  Jeffery v. 
Fitch , 46 Conn. 6or ; Ins11 ran cc Co . v. ·lVa ten:ch ouse, 78 Iowa, 
674, 43 1\. \V. 6 I I ; Vilas v. Jones, I N. Y. 274 : TVingate v. 
Hay'i..cood, 40 N.  H. 437 ; I�frtle v. Price, I :\Id. Ch. 1 82 ; Lester 
v. fl oskins, 26 Ark .  63 ; .Martin v. Parsons, 49 Cal. 94 ; French 
\" . Sh o t<.cell, 5 Johns. Ch. 555 .  See,  also, Beach . Inj .  §§ 61 5-63 1 ; 
�pell .  Extra. Rel ief, § I 39. Althou gh there is no decision in our 
own reports which fully controls  the case at har, yet there are 
several in which the valid ity o f  the doctrine above enunciated is 
clearly recognized. In Spooner v. Leland, S R. I. 348. which 
w a s a bill to enj oin an execution [ *294] in  an act ion at law, this 
court, while i t  denied the relief prayed for. on the ground that the 
answer completely neg-atived all the allegation s of the bi l l  a s  to 
the defenses of the complainant in the original action, nt held that ,  
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if the party wronged had no notice or knowledge of the judgment
obtained against him until after the expiration of the year within
which he might have applied for relief on the law side of the court,
he would certainly, on the ground of breach of trust and for the
prevention of fraud, be entitled to it in equity. In Furbush v.
Collingzcood, 13 R. I. 720, which was a bill by a judgment creditor
for injunction and for revision of the judgment in the matter of
costs, it was held that a court of equity has no more jurisdiction
to revise and correct the judgments of a court of law in the mat-
ter of costs than in the matter of debt or damages, and that in
either matter it has jurisdiction only in case of fraud, accident,
or mistake, or something of that nature. In delivering the opin-
ion of the court, Durfee, C. _I., said: “We apprehend that what is
meant by fraud, as a ground for enjoining or setting aside a judg-
ment, is not mere falsity of claim or proof, but fraud outside of
them, perpetrated by some artifice or contrivance of the party
or person benefited, or by some collusion of both parties, whereby
in the course of the trial, or in entering judgment, the injured
party or the court has been imposed upon or betrayed into inatten-
tion and deceived. Freem. Judgm. 487, 489; High. §§ 86, 97, and notes; City of Muscatinc v. Mississippi <9‘ M. R.
Co., 1 Dill. 536, Fed. Cas. No. 9,971 ;Bateman v Willoe I Schoales
& L. 201, 204; Emerson v. Udall, 13 Vt. 477. No such fraud is
alleged here.” See, also, Linnell v. Battey, 17 R. I. 241, 21
Atl. 606; Rogers v. Rogers, 17 R. I. 623, 24 Atl. 46. The allega-
tions of the bill in the case at bar satisfy all of the conditions
which these cases, in common with the great current of authorities,
render essential in order to give jurisdiction to a court of equity,
and hence we have no doubt that it is maintainable.
The third ground of demurrer is not well taken. The [*295]
complainant has no adequate remedy at law. To permit the
respondent to prevail in his action on the judgment sued on, and
compel the complainant to pay the same, and then resort to an
action against the officer who served the writ, involves a circuity
and remoteness in attaining redress, and an uncertainty as to
the result of such an action, which is quite foreign to the spirit of
equity. I Black, judgm. § 377; Ridgeway v. Bank, II Hump.
523.
As the fourth ground of demurrer is covered by what we
have already said, there is no occasion for us to consider it
separately. The demurrer is overruled.
















































































































































VACATING, AMENDING. AND MODIFY-
ING THE JUDGMENT
BRONSON v. SCHULTEN, in U. S. Sup. Ct. I88I—I04 U. S.
(14 Otto) 410.
Motion dated Dec. 27, 1876, in the circuit court for the south-
ern district of New York, by I. VV. Schulten et al., to vacate a
judgment entered against Greene C. Bronson Aug. 5, 1800, for
money paid under protest to him, as United States revenue col-
lector for the port of New York, by the plaintiffs. From an order
granting the motion of Lucretia Bronson as executrix of G. C.
Bronson brings error.
l\/IILLER, J. * * * [*413] It appears that the original suit was
commenced in one of the state courts, Sept. 2, 1858, and afterwards
removed into the circuit court of the United States, where plain-
tiffs filed a declaration containing the common counts. It appears
that they also served a bill of particulars, setting out seventy-four
entries of goods at the custom house, on which they had been
charged excessive duties by the defendant Bronson, which they
had paid under protest. The affidavit of Murray, a refund clerk
in the custom-house, states that in thirty-four of these entries the
sums which should have been allowed plaintiffs were omitted in
the adjustment. * * * [*4I4]
VVe have thus a case in which plaintiffs sue for excessive
charges on account of these commissions paid on seventy-four
entries of goods, specifically set out in their bill of particulars. A
verdict is rendered in their favor fixing the precise error under
which the excessive duty had been exacted, and leaving to a
referee to ascertain the amount due on each of these entries. The
referee reports as to all but thirty-four, nearly half, of these en-
tries, and as to them makes no report. A judgment is rendered in
conformity to the report, the money paid and accepted, and seven-
teen years afterwards the judgment is opened to correct the omis-
sion of these thirty—four entries.
VVe are of opinion that, if there was any mistake in the report
of the referee and in the judgment rendered thereon. it was so
clearly due to the negligence and inattention of plaintiffs or their
















































































































































VACATING. AMENDING. AND MODIFY­
ING THE JUDGMENT 
BRONSON v. SCHULTEN, in U. S. Sup. Ct 1881-1o..i U. S. 
( 14 Otto ) 410. 
Motion dated Dec. 27, 1876, in the circuit court for the south­
ern district of New York, by J. \V. Schulten et al . ,  to vacate a 
judgment entered against Greene C. Bronson Aug. 5, 1860, for 
money paid under protest to him, as United States revenue col­
lector for the port of New York , by the plaintiffs. From ::tn order 
granting the motion of Lucret ia Bronson as executrix of G. C. 
Bronson brings error. 
MII.LER, J. * * * [ *413]  It appears that the original suit was 
commenced in one of the state courts, Sept. 2, 1858, and afterwards 
removed into the circuit court of the United States, \\'here plain­
tiffs filed a declaration containing the common counts. It appears 
that they also served a bill of particulars, setting out seventy-four 
entries of goods at the custom house, on which they had been 
charged excessive duties by the defendant Bronson, which they 
had paid under protest. The affidavit of Murray, a refund clerk 
in the custom-honse, states that in th irty-four of these er.tries the 
sums which should have been allowed plaintiffs were omitted in 
the adj ustment. * * * [ *414]  
\V c have thus a case in which plaintiffs sue  for excessive 
charges on account of these commissions paid on seventy-four 
entries of goods, specifically set out in their bill of particulars. A 
verd ict i s  rendered in their favor fixing the precise error under 
which the excessive duty had been exacted, and leaving to a 
referee to ascertain the amount due on each of these entries . The 
referee reports as to all but thi rty-four, nearly half ,  of these en­
tries, and as to them makes no report. A judgment is  rendered in  
con formity to  the report, the money paid and accepted , and seven­
teen years afterwards the judgment is opened to correct the omis­
s ion of these thirty-four entries. 
\Ve are of opinion that, if there was any mistake in t he  report 
of the referee and in the j udgment rendered thereon . i t  was so 
clearly due to the negligence and inattention of  plaint iffs or their 
attorney, that no case is  made for rel ief in any of the modes known 
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to the law, of correcting an erroneous judgment after the term at
which it was rendered.
Stress is laid upon the fact in argument that the referee was
one of the clerks in the custom-house, who had access to all the
books and papers of the office. It is probable he was selected by
both parties because of his familiarity with those accounts, but he
is not mentioned in the order of reference as such clerk or oflicer.
Any other person so appointed would have been permitted to ex-
amine the necessary books and papers, and in this matter he must
be held to be, as no doubt he was, an impartial referee, represent-
ing neither the collector nor the government which was to pay the
sum found due.
The plaintiffs had the same right to appear before him, exam-
ine his report and the evidence on which it was founded, to take
and urge to the court exceptions to it, as in case of any other refer-
ence. Nothing of the kind was done, and though it is here said
that no report at all was made as to thirty-four out of seventy—four
entries set out in plaintiff’s bill of particulars, no exception was
made to the report on that ground, nor any inquiry made as to
the reason for such omission. It is [*4I5] obvious that if this
had been done, the error which is now complained of would have
been corrected before the report of the referee was confirmed and
judgment rendered on it.
If, then, there was no question of lapse of time, or of the
power of the court over its own judgments after the term at which
they are rendered, and if this were a bill in chancery to set aside
this judgment on the ground of mistake, it is clear that no relief
could be granted, because of the negligence, carelessness, and in-
attention and laches of the plaintiffs, or of their attorne_v_, in the
matter. Does the power of the court over its own judgment, ex-
ercised in a summary manner on motion, after the term at which it
was rendered, extend beyond this?
In this country all courts have terms and vacations. The
time of the commencement of every term, if there be half a dozen
a year, is fixed by statute, and the end of it by the final adjourn-
ment of the court for that term. This is the case with regard to all
the courtsof the United States, and if there be exceptions in the
state courts, they are unimportant. It is a general rule of the law
that all the judgments, decrees, or other orders of the courts, how-
ever conclusive in their character, are under the control of the
court which pronounces them during the term at which they are
rendered or entered of record, and they may then be set aside,
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to  the law, of  correcting an  erroneous j udgment after the term at 
which it was rendered. 
Stress is laid upon the fact in argument that the referee was 
one of the clerks in the custom-house, who had access to all the 
books and papers of the office. It is probable he was selected by 
both parties because of his familiarity with those accounts, but he 
is not mentioned in the order of reference as such clerk or officer. 
Any other person so appointed would have been permitted to ex­
amine the necessary books and papers, and in this matter he must 
be held to be, as no doubt he was, an impartial referee, represent­
ing neither the collector nor the government which was to pay the 
sum found due. 
The plaintiffs had the same right to appear before him, exam­
ine his report and the evidence on which it was founded , to take 
and urge to the court exceptions to it, as in case of any other refer­
ence. Nothing of the k ind was done, and though it is here said 
that no report at all was made as to thirty-four out of seventy-four  
entries set out in plaintiff's bill of particulars, no exception was 
made to the report on that ground, nor any inquiry made as to 
the reason for such omission. It is [*415]  obvious that i f  this 
had been done, the error ·which is now complained of would have 
been corrected before the report of  the referee was confirmed and 
j udgment rendered on it. 
I f, then, there was no question of lapse of  time, or of  the 
power of the court over its own j udgments after the term at which 
they are rendered, and if  this were a bill in chancery to set aside 
this judgment on the ground of mistake,  it i s  clear that no rel ief 
could be granted , because of the negligence, carelessness, and in­
attention and laches of  the plaintiffs, or of their attorne�·, in the 
matter. Docs the power of the court over its own j udgment, ex-t 
ercised in a summary manner on motion, after the term at which it\ 
was rendered, extend beyond this ? 
In this country all courts have terms and vacations. The 
time of the commencement of every term,  if there be hal f a dozen 
a year, i s  fixed by statute, and the end of it b)• the final ad journ­
ment o f  the court for that term. This is the case with regard to all 
the courts . of the United States, and if there be exceptions in the 
state courts ,  they are unimportant .  It  is a general rule of the law 
that all the j udgments, decrees, or other orders of  the court� .  how­
ever conclusive in their character, are under the control of the 
court which pronounces them during the term at which they are 
rendered or entered of  record ,  and they may then be set aside, 
vacated , modified , or annulled by that court. 
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hit it is a rule equally well established, that after the term
has ended all final judgments and decrees of the court pass beyond
its control, unless steps be taken during that term, by motion or
otherwise, to set aside, modify, or correct them; and if errors exist,
they can only be corrected by such proceeding by a writ of error
or appeal as may be allowed in a court which, by law, can review
the decision. So strongly has this principle been upheld by this
court, that while realizing that there is no court which can review
its decisions, it has invariably refused all applications for rehear-
ing made after the adjournment of the court for the term at which
the judgment was rendered. And this is placed upon the ground
that the case has passed beyond the control of the court. Brooks
v. Railroad Company, I02 U. S. 107; Public Schools v. Walker,
[*416]9 Wall. 603: Brown v. Aspdcn, 14 How. 25;Camcr0n v.
.McR0brrts, 3 Wheat. 591 ; Slbbald v. United States, 12 Pet. 480;
United States v. The Brig Glamorgan, 2 Curtis, C. C. 236; Brad-
ford v. Patterson, 8 (I A. K. Marsh.) 464;Ballard v. Davis,
26 Ky. (3 Marsh.) 656.
But to this general rule an exception has crept into practice
in a large number of the state courts in a class of cases not well
defined, and about which and about the limit of this exception
these courts are much at variance. An attempt to reconcile them
would be entirely futile. The exception, however, has its founda-
tion in the English writ of error coram robis, a writ which was
allowed to bring before the same court in which the error was
committed some matter of fact which had escaped attention, and
which was material in the proceeding. These were limited gen-
erally to the facts that one of the parties to the judgment had died
before it was rendered, or was an infant and no guardian had ap-
peared or been appointed, or was a fume cowcrt and the like, or
error in the process through the default of the clerk. See Arch-
hold"s Practice.
In Rolle's r\l)t'l(l§.I€l]1Cflt, p. 749, it is said that if the error be
in the judgment itself. a writ of error does not lie in the same, but
in another and superior court.
ln Pickct’s Heirs v. Lcgerzeood. 7 Pet. I44, this court said
that the same end sought by that writ is now in practice generally
attained by motion, sustained, if the court require it, by athdavits;
and it was added, this latter mode had so far superseded the for-
mcr in the British practice, that Blackstone did not even notice the
writ as a remedy.
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But it is a rule equally wel l  established, that after the term 
has ended all final j udgments and decrees of the court pass beyond 
its control, unless steps be taken during that term , by motion or 
otherwise, to set aside, modify, or correct them ; and if errors exist , 
they can only be corrected by such proceeding by a writ of error 
or appeal as may be al lowed in a court which, by law, can rev iew 
the deci sion. So strongly has this principle been upheld by this 
court, that while realizing that there is  no court which can review 
its decisions, it has invariably refused all applications for rehear­
ing made af tcr the adjournment of the court for the term at which 
the j udgment was rendered. And this is placed upon the ground � 
that the case has passed beyond the control of the court. B rooks 
v. Ra ilroad Compa ny, 1 02 U. S. 1 07 ; Public Schools v. IVaJker, 
[*416 ]9 \Val l .  6o3 : BroH•1i v. A spden, q How. 25 ;Cam ero ll v. 
JfcRobcrts, 3 \Vheat. 59 1 ; Sibbald v. U11ited States, 1 2  Pct. 480 ; 
Un ited Sillies v. The Brig Glamorgan, 2 Curtis, C. C. 236 ; Brad­
ford v. Patterso n,  8 Ky. ( I  A. K. :Marsh . )  464 ;Ballard v. Dai-is, 
26 Ky. ( 3  J .  J. l\farsh. )  656. 
But to this general rule an exception has crept into practice 
in a large number of the state courts in a class of cases not well 
defined , and about which and about the limit of this exception 
these courts are much at variance. An at tempt to reconcile them 
would be ent i rely futile. The exception, however, has its founria­
tion in the English writ of error coram 'l 'obis, a writ which was 
al lowed to bring before the same court in which the error was 
committed some matter of fact which had escaped attention, and 
which was material in the proceeding. These were l imited gen­
erally to the facts that one of the parties to the j udgment had died 
hc fore it was rendcrec! , or was an infant and no guard ian had ap­
peared or been appointed, or was a femc  CO'i 'ert and the like, or 
error in the process through the default of the clerk .  Sre A rch­
bo!cl 's Pract ice. 
In Rolle 's  Abridgement, p. 749, i t  is said that if the error be 
in the j udgment itself. a writ of error docs not lie in the same, but 
in  anotlwr and superior cou rt. 
In Picl.·et's Heirs v. Leger<mod, 7 Pct. 144.  this court sa id 
that the same end sought hy that writ is  no w in pract ice genera l ly  
atta ined by motion , su stained, i f  the court requ ire it ,  hy affidavits ; 
: r nd  i t  was added , this latter mode had so far supe rsede(! the for­
t 1 H'r in the Dr i t ish pract ice ,  that Black stone d id not even notice the 
wri t  as a remedy. 
It i s  qu i te  clear upon the cxaminat i ! ln  r f  m aiw case<: of  thr; 
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exercise of this writ of error coram 1/obis found in the reported
cases of this country, and as defined in the case in this court above
mentioned, and in England, that it does not reach to facts submit-
ted to a jury, or found by a referee, or by the court sitting to try
the issues; and therefore it does not include the present case.
There has grown up, however, in the courts of law a tendency
to apply to this control over their own judgments some of the prin-
ciples of the courts of equity in cases which go a little further in
administering summary relief than the old-fashioned [*417] writ
of error coram vobis did. This practice has been founded in the
courts of many of the states on statutes which conferred a pre-
scribed and limited control over the judgment of a court after the
expiration of the term at which it was rendered. In other cases
the summary remedy by motion has been granted as founded in
the inherent power of the court over its own judgments, and to
avoid the expense and delay of a formal suit in chancery. It can
easily be seen how this practice is justified in courts of the states
where a system has been adopted which amalgamates the equitable
and common-law jurisdiction in one form of action, as most of
the rules of procedure do.
It is a profitless task to follow the research of counsel for the
defendants in error through the numerous decisions of the state
courts cited by them on this point in support of the action of the
circuit court. The cases from the New York courts, which go
farthest in that direction, are largely founded on the statute of
that state, and we are of opinion that on this point neither the stat-
utc of that state nor the decisions of its courts are binding on the
courts of the United States held there.
The Question relates to the 2Q'§t'Q[ gt the ggmts and not tg the
mode of procedure. It is whether there exists in the court the
authority to set aside, vacate, and modify its final judgments after
the term at which they were rendered; and this authority can
neither be conferred upon nor withheld from the courts of the
United States by the statutes of a state or the practice of its
courts.
VVe are also of opinion that the general current of authority '
in the courts of this country fixes the line beyond which they can-
not go in setting aside their final judgments and decrees, on
motion made after the term at which they were rendered, far
within the case made out here. If it is an equitable power sup-
posed to be here exercised, we have shown that a court of equity.
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exercise of this writ of error coram vobis found in the reported 
cases of this country, and as defined in the case in this court above 
mentioned, and in England, that it does not reach to facts submit­
ted to a j ury, or found by a referee, or by the court sitting to try 
the issues ; and therefore it does not include the present case. 
There has grown up, however, in the courts of law a tendency 
to apply to this control over their own j udgments some of the prin­
ciples of the courts of equity in cases which go a little further in 
administering summary relief than the old-fashioned [ *41 7]  writ 
of error coram vobis did. This practice has been founded in the 
courts of many of the states on statutes which conferred a pre­
scribed and l imited control over the j udgment of a court after the 
expiration of the term at which it was rendered. In other cases 
the summary remedy by motion has been granted as founded in 
the inherent power of the court over its own j udgments, and to 
avoid the expense and delay of a formal suit in chancery. It can 
easily be seen how this practice is j ustified in courts of the states 
where a system has been adopted which amalgamates the equitable 
and common-law jurisdiction in one form of action, as most of 
the rules of procedure do. 
I t  is a profitless task to follow the research of counsel for the 
defendants in error through the numerous decisions of the state 
courts cited by them on this point in support of the action of the 
circuit court. The cases from the New York courts, wh ich go 
farthest in that direct ion , are largely founded on the statute of 
that state, and we are of opinion that on this point neither the stat­
ute of that state nor the decisions of its courts are binding on the 
courts of the United States held there. 
The 9uestion relates to the power of the courts and not to the. 
mode of procedure. It i s  whether there exists in the court the 
authority to set aside, vacate, and modify its final judgments after 
the term at which they were rendered ; and this authority can 
neither be conferred upon nor withheld from the courts of tht 
United States by the statutes of a state or the practice of its 
courts. 
\Ve are also of opinion that the general current of authority · 
in the courts of this country fixes the line beyond which they can­
not go in setting aside their final j udgments and decrees, on 
mot ion made after the term at \vh ich they were rendere<l , far 
within the case made out here. If it is  an equitable power s11p­
posed to be here exerci sed, we have shown that a court of equity , 
on the most formal proceeding, taken in due time, could not , ac-
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cording to its established principles, have granted the relief wl1ich
was given in this case.
It is also one of the principles of equity most frequently relied
upon that the party seeking relief in a case like this [*418j must
use due diligence in asserting his rigl1ts, and that negligence and
laches in that regard are equally effectual bars to relief.
As we l1ave already seen, nothing hindered the plaintiffs from
discovering the mistake of which they complain for seventeen
years but the most careless inattention to the proceeding in which
they had claimed these rights and had them adjudicated.
There was here an acquiescence for that length of time iii the
correctness of a judgment which had been paid to them, when
the error, if any existed, only needed a comparison of their own
bill of particulars with the report of the referee, to be seen, or at
least to be suggested. Having been negligent originally, and hav-
ing slept on their rights for many years, they show no right, under
any sound practice of the control of courts over their own judg-
ments, to l1ave that in this case set aside.
It follows that the judgment of the circuit court must be
reversed, with directions that the order vacating the former judg-
ment be set aside, and the motion of plaintiffs in that matter be
overruled.
So ordcrod.
GOLDREYER v. CRONAN, in Co1m. Sup. Ct. of Errors, July 24, 1903
—76 Conn. 113, 55 At]. 594.
TORRANCE, C. J. The complaint in this case alleged that the
defendant owed the plaintiff divers sums of money, the amount
of one of the items being $300. The trial court allowed this item
and disallowed the others. The case was tried at the .\lovember
term of the court in 1902, and decided at the January term, 1903,
the precise date of judgment being the 26th day of February,
1903. On that day the judge filed in court a paper called “mem-
orauda on which judgment is based,” which. after reciting the
substance of the evidence in the case, stated that the court al-
lowed the $300 item and disallowed the others, and ended with
these words: “Judgment for plaintiff to recover $300, and costs.
J. Bishop. Judge.” On the same day the following entry was
made on the file in said case: “Judgment for the plaintiff to re-
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cording to its established principles, have granted the rel ief which 
was given in this  case. 
lt is also one of the principles of equity most frequcntl.v relied 
upon that the party seeking relief in a case like this [*418] must 
use <luc dil igence in asserting his rights, and that negligence and 
!aches in that regard are equally effectual bars to relief. 
As we have already seen, nothing hindered the plaintiffs from 
discovering the mistake of which they complain for seventeen 
years bu t the most careless inattention to the proceeding in which 
they had claimed these rights and had them adj ud icated . 
There was here an acquiescence for that length of time in the 
correctness of a j udgment which had been paid to them, when 
the error, if any existed, only needed a compari son of thei r own 
bil l of  particulars with the report of the re feree, to be seen, or at 
least to be suggested. Having been negligent original ly, and hav­
ing sl ept on their rights for many years, they show no right , under 
any sou nd pract ice of  the control of  courts over their own j uclg­
ments ,  to have that in this case set aside.  
It  fol low s that the j udgment o f  the circuit  court must be 
reve rsed , with direction s that the order vacat i11g the former j udg­
ment be set aside, and the motion of plaintiffs in that matter be 
overru led . 
So ordered. 
GOLDREYER v. CRONAN, in Conn.  Sup. Ct. of Errors, July 24, 1903 
-76 Conn. I IJ, 55 Atl. 594. 
ToRRA� CE, C.  J. The complaint in this case alleged that the 
defendant owed the plaintiff d ivers sums of money, the amount 
of one of the i tems being $JOO. The trial court allowed th is item 
and d i sallowed the others. The case was tried at the .N ovcmher 
term of  the cou rt in 1902, and decided at the January term , 1 903 , 
the  precise date of j udgment being the 26th day of February , 
I<)OJ.  On that day the j udge filed in court a paper called "mem­
oranda on which j udgment i s  based ,"  which . a fter recit ing the 
substance of the evidence in the case, stated that the court al­
lo \\'ed the $JOO i tem and disallowed the others, and ended with 
these words : "Ju dgment for pla int iff to recover $300, an d costs.  
!. Bishop , fudge." On the same day the fol lowing en try was 
made on the file in said case : "Judgmen t fo r the pl ai n t i ff to re­
cover �·wo. New Haven, Fehruary 26th , H)o3. !. Bish op.  
l11dgc." 
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It does not appear that any formal judgment in accordance
with said memoranda was ever entered up, but on the 11th of -
March, 1903, the court ordered judgment for $400.50 in favor
of the plaintiff to be formally entered up, and this was done under
the following circumstances, as stated in the finding: “On March
2d, 1903, the plaintiff and defendant appeared in court, and Judge
Julius C. Cable, one of the judges of the court, directed the clerk
to call in Judge Bishop to hold said court. Said court was duly
opened by the sheriff, and thereupon the plaintiff orally moved
that the judgment be corrected by adding interest. The defendant
objected to such correction on the ground that the January term
of said court had ended, and the March term begun; and further,
that if the court had jurisdiction the plaintiff was not in law en-
titled to such interest; and further, that the plaintiff by his fail-
ure to prosecut<‘3”‘his suit with due diligence waived whatever
right if any he had to interest on the judgment. On March nth.
I903, the court granted said motion of the plaintiff, and corrected
said judgment, and added the interest, amounting to $100.50.”
It will thus be seen that the judge, through said signed mem-
oranda, announced in effect that he found the damages [*1I5]
to be $300, and that he rendered judgment for the plaintiff for
that amount only, and costs of suit. After this the case was not
continued to the next term, not was it held for further considera-
tion or advisement, nor was any further action of the court neces-
sary to entitle the plaintiff to the entry of a formal judgment in
his favor for $300 damages and costs.
Assuming for the present that the entry of judgment thus
made was a true entry of the judgment actually rendered, we
must regard the judgment, for the purposes of this case, as one
finally disposing of the case until set aside or annulled by some
competent court of review. “The memorandum * * * must be
regarded as the final act of the judge, the act which exhausted
the rcsidmmz of power over the cause after final adjournment.”
.S‘tm'dcz'ant v. Stanton, 47 Conn. 579, 581. The case was finally
disposed of at the January term of the court, 1903.
Under these circumstances we think that what the trial court
did in this case in March must be regarded as having been done
at the March term of the court, 1903 (which by law began on
the second day of that month), and not as done at, or as of, the
preceding January term. The case, then, must be regarded as
one in which a final judgment at one term was, at a subsequent
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the ultimate controlling question in the case is whether the court
had the power to do this.
The plaintiff claims that on the 26th of February, 1903, the
court did in fact render judgment for $400.50, but that by a cler-
ical mistake a different and a smaller amount was entered up.
If the record sustains this claim, it may be conceded, for the pur-
poses of this case, that the court had the power to correct the
mistake at the succeeding term; or at-least that a new trial would
not be granted on account of its action i11 so doing. Mistakes
merely clerical, by which the judgment as recorded fails to agree
with the judgment in fact rendered, may be corrected at a term
subsequent to that in which the judgment was rendered, upon
proper notice to all concerned. Over its recorded judgments the
[*I16] court may exercise two powers: (1) Mower to correct
and amend the record so that it shall truly show what the judi-
cial action in fact was; (2) the power to set aside, annul and va-
cate such judgments. It is well settled that these powers may
be exercised during the term in which the judgment is rendered,
and, speaking generally, that the first can be exercised at any
subsequent term; while as a rule the second cannot be so exer-
cised, save under exceptional circumstances. Tyler v. Asffinzeall,
' 73 Conn. 493, 47 Atl. 755, 54 L. R. A. 758; Wilkie v. Hall, 15
Conn. 32, 37; Weed v. Weed, 25 id. 337; Hall v. Paine, 47 id. 429;
Sturdevant v. Stanton, 47 id. 579; Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S.
4ro; Foster v. Redfield, 50 Vt. 285; Maryland Steel Co. v. M ar-
ney, 91 Md. 360, 46 Atl. Rep. 1077; I Black on ]udg., Chap. 9,
§§ 153, 158, and cases there cited.
The case thus turns upon the question whether the claimed
mistake was a judicial one, in failing to include interest in the
judgment as rendered, or a clerical one, in failing to include in-
terest in the judgment as recordeB’. If the mistake was of the
former kind the court, upon the facts found, had no power to
correct the mistake at the March term. The claim that the mis-
take was a clerical one is based entirely upon the following part
of the finding: Upon the facts found in the paper called “mem-
oranda on which judgment is based,” the court found the issues
for the plaintiff “and allowed the item of $300, but in entering
the judgment, by oversight, inadvertence, and mistake, accident-
ally omitted to add thereto the interest from the time it fell due
to the date of the rendition of the judgment.” This is the only
finding upon this point, and, when read in the light of the other
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the ultimate controlling question in the case is whether the court 
had the power to do this. 
The plaintiff claims that on the 26th of February, 1903, the 
court did in fact render judgment for $400.50, but that by a cler­
ical mistake a different and a smaller amount was entered up. 
If the record sustains this claim, it may be conceded, for the pur­
poses of this case, that the court had the power to correct the 
mistake at the succeeding term ; or at- least that a new trial would 
not be granted on account of its action in so doing. Mistakes 
merely clerical, by which the judgment as recorded fails to agree 
with the judgment in fact rendered, may be corrected at a term 
subsequent to that in which the judgment was rendered, upon 
proper notice to all concerned. Over its recorded judgments the 
( * 1 16] court may exercise two powers : ( 1 )  tJm gpwcr to correct 
and amend the record so that it shall truly show what the judi­
cial action in fact was ; ( 2)  the po�er to set aside, annul and va­
cate such judgments. It is well settled that these powers may 
be exercised during the term in which the j udgment is rendered, 
and, speaking generally, that the first can be exercised at any 
subsequent term ; while as a rule the second cannot be so exer­
cised, save under exceptional circumstances. Tyler v. Aspinwall, 
73 Conn. 493, 47 Atl. 755, 54 L. R. A. 758 ; Wilkie v. Hall, 1 5  
Conn. 32, 37 ; Weed v. Weed, :J S  id. 337 ; Hall v. Paiine, 47 id. 429 ;  
Sturdn.1ant v. Stanton, 47 id. 579 ; Bron.son v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 
410 ; Foster v. Redfield, 50 Vt. 285 ; Maryland Steel Co. v. Afar-
11ey, 9 1  Md. 36o, 46 Atl. Rep. 1077 ; I Black on Judg., Chap. 9, 
§§ 1 53, 1 58, and cases there cited. 
The case thus turns upon the question whether the claimed 
mistake was a j u<jis;ial one, in failing to include interest in the 
judgment as rendered, or a clerical one, in failing to include in­
terest in the j udgment as recorded. If the mistake was of the 
former kind the court, upon the facts found, had no power to 
correct the mistake at the March term. The claim that the mis­
take was a clerical one is based entirely upon the following part 
of the finding : Upon the facts found in the paper called "mem­
-0randa on which j udgment is based," the court found the issues 
for the plaintiff "and a11owed the item of $300, but in entering 
the judgment, by oversight, inadvertence, and mistake, accident­
ally omitted to add thereto the interest from the time it fell due 
to the date of the rendition of the judgment." This is the only 
finding upon this point, and, when read in the light of the other 
parts of the record, we do not think it supports the content10n 
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that the mistake was a mere clerical one. \IV hat does the phrase
“in entering the judgment,” as used in this finding, mean? It
can only mean the act of the judge in making the memoranda
signed by him; for the record does not show that any other
“entry” of the February judgment was ever made by anybody
at the January term of court. It may be conceded that the fair
inference from this finding is that the [*I17] court intended to
include interest in the judgment to be rendered, and to enter
such judgment in said memoranda; but the question is, does the
record show that the court did in fact render such judgment?
The finding, as we have seen, is in effect that in making the
signed memoranda the judge by mistake failed to include the in-
terest; but it does not say that judgment as actually rendered
did in fact include interest; and the record nowhere explicitly
states that important fact. A judgment, speaking generally, is
the determination or sentence of the law speaking through the
court; and it does not exist as a legal entity until pronounced,
expressed, or made known, in some appropriate way. It may be
expressed orally, or in writing, or in both of these ways, in ac-
cordance with the customs and usages of the court in which the
judgment is rendered.
In the case at bar the February judgment was pronounced
in writing only in and by the signed memoranda of the judge.
There is no finding that it was ever otherwise pronounced or
made known. Before that entry was made the judgment had
no existence; when it was made, the judgment first came into
being. The entry of it was thus the only expression of it, the onlv
declaration of it, ever made by the judge. It was both pronounced
and entered up, so to speak, in the same words and at the same
moment. Of necessity, then, the judgment “entered up” was the
same as the judgment actually pronounced. It thus clearly ap-
pears from the record, outside of the finding now under consid-
eration, that the entry of the judgment made by the judge
is a true record of the judgment actually rendered, and
cannot, in the nature of things, be other than a true record: and
we think there is nothing in that finding absolutely inconsistent
with this conclusion. \Vhen read in the light of the other facts
found, all that the finding can fairly be said to mean is, that the
court, by mistake, accidentally failed to include interest in its
signed memoranda; and that is equivalent to saying that the
court failed to include interest in its judgment. and also in its
record of it. \Ve think any other view of the finding is untenable
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that the mistake was a mere clerical one. vVhat does the phrase 
"in entering the j udgment ," as used in this finding, mean ? I t  
can only mean the act o f  the j udge in making the  memoranda 
s igned by · him ; for the record does not show that any other 
"entry ' '  of the February judgment was ever made by anybody 
at the January term of court. It may be conceded that the fair 
inference from this finding is that the [ * 1 1 7 ]  court intended to 
include interest in the judgment to be rendered , and to enter 
such judgment in said memoranda ; but the question is, does the 
record show that the court did in fact render such judgment ? 
The finding, as we have seen, i s  in effect that in mak ing the 
signed memoranda the j udge by mistake failed to include the in­
terest ; but it does not say that judgment as actually rendered 
did in fact include interest ; and the record nowhere explic itly 
states that important fact . A judgment, speaking generally, is  
the determination or sentence of the law speaking throug-h the 
court ; and it  does not exist as a legal entity until pronounced, 
expressed , or made known , in some appropriate way. It may be 
expressed orally , or in writing, or in both of these ways, in ac­
cordance with the customs and usages of the court in which the 
j udgment is rendered. 
In the case at bar the February j udgment was pronounced { 
i n  writing only in and by the signed memoranda of  the j udge. 
There is no finding that it was ever otherwise pronounced or 
made known. Before that entry was made the judgment had 
no existence ; when it was made , the judgment first came into 
being. The entry of it was thus the only express ion of it, the only 
declaration of it ,  ever made by the j udge. It was both pronounced 
and entered up, so to speak , in the same words and at the same 
moment. Of necessity, then, the judgment "entered up" was the 
same as the j udgment actually pronounced. It thus clearly ap­
pears from the record , outside of the find ing now under consid­
erat ion ,  that the entry of the judgment made by the j udge 
is a true  record of the judgment actually rendered , and 
cannot, in the nature of th ings , be other than a true record : and 
we think there is nothing in that find ing absolutely inconsi stent 
with this conclusion . \\Then read in the l ight of the other facts 
found, all that the finding can fai rly be said to mean is ,  that tht" 
court, by mistake. accidentally fai led to include interest in its 
signed memoranda : and that is equivalent to saying- that the 
court failed to include interest in its judgment. and al so in its 
record of it. \Ve think anv other view of the find ing- is tmtenahk 
in view of the other facts �et forth in the record. [ * 1 18]  It fol-
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lows that the court in March had no power to correct, amend, or
change the February judgment.
There is error, the Marcl1 judgment is set aside, and the
cause is remanded that judgment may be entered up as of Feb-
ruary 26th, 1903, for $300 and costs.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
BARNES v. GROVE, Circuit Judge, in Mich. Sup. Ct., Oct. 24, 1893-
97 Mich. 212, 56 N. W. 599.
Mandamus by Mahala Barnes to restrain Grove from vacat-
ing a decree in her favor.
- Hoomza, C. J. Relator obtained a decree upon a bill F213]
filed by her in the Kent county circuit court, in ehancery, which
decree was entered upon the 1st day of April, 1892. At the same
time a similar decree was made in a cause between Urial Barnes
and the same defendants, being heard upon the same proofs, and
in all respects similar to said first—mentioned cause. One case
was made, settled, signed, and filed in both causes, and separate
certificates were made, one entitled in each case. The appeal fee
of five dollars was not paid in this case until October I 3, 1892.
Costs were taxed, and paid to prevent a threatened levy and sale
on execution. The case of Urial Barnes was heard and reversed
by the Supreme Court, whereupon a petition for rehearing was
filed by defendants. This petition was made promptly after the
decision of the Supreme Court was announced, but not until 14
months had expired after the entering of the decree. The cause
had not been enrolled.
It is contended by relator that the time during which the de-
fendants could apply for a rehearing was limited to the time with-
in which an appeal might have been taken. This is the rule laid
down in Benedict v. Thompson, \Valk. Ch. 446. The English
practice seems to have made enrollment the termination of the
period within which a rehearing could be granted. Danl. Ch. Pl.
& Pr. 1475. Until that time the decree was not considered a rec-
ord of the court, and might be altered upon rehearing. Id. 1019,
I475. The same rule appears to have prevailed in New York.
I Barb. Ch. Pr. 352. In some cases rehearings have been al-
lowed several years after the decrees were rendered. Danl. Ch.
Pl. & Pr. 1476, and cases cited. And the fact that the decree has
been carried into execution does not prevent a rehearing. Id.
1467, 1476.
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lows that the court in l\Iarch had no power to correct, amend, or 
change the February j udgment. 
There is error, the March j udgment is set aside, and the 
cause is remanded that j udgment may be entered up as of Feb­
ruary 26th , 1903,  for $300 and costs .  
Jn this opin ion the other j udges concurred. 
BARNES v. GROVE, Circuit Judge, in Mich. Sup. Ct., Oct. 24, 18<)3-
97 Mich. 212, 56 N. W. 599. 
l\Iandamus by Mahala Barnes to restrain Grove from vacat­
ing a decree in her favor. 
· HooKER, C. J. Relator obtained a decree upon a bill [*213]  
filed by her in  the Kent county circui t  court, in chancery, which 
decree was entered upon the l st day of April, 1892. At the same 
time a similar decree was made in a cause between Urial Barnes 
and the same def enclants, being heard upon the same proofs, and 
in all respects similar to said first-mentioned cause. One case 
was made, settled, signed, a11d filed in both causes, and separate 
certificates were made, one entitled in each case. The appeal fee 
of five dollars was not paid in this case until October l 3, 1892. 
Costs were taxed, and paid to prevent a threatened levy and sale 
on execution. The case of U rial Barnes was heard and reversed 
by the Supreme Court, whereupon a petition for rehearing was 
filed by defendants. This petition was made promptly after the 
decision of the Supreme Court was announced, but not until 14 
months had expired after the entering of the decree. The cause 
had not been enrolled. 
It is contended by relator that the time during which the de­
fendants could apply for a rehearing was limited to the time with­
in which an appeal might have been taken. This is the rule laid 
down in Bei: cdict v. Thompson-, \Valk. Ch. 446. The English 
practice seems to have made enrollment the termination of the 
period within which a rehearing could be granted . Danl. Ch. Pl . 
& Pr. 1475 . Lntil that t ime the decree was not consi<lered a rec­
ord of the court, and m ight be altered upon rehearing. Id. 1 0 19, 1475. The same rule appears to have prevailed in New York. 
I Darb. Ch.  Pr. 352. In some cases rehearings have been al­
lowccl several vcars after the decrees were rendered. Danl.  Ch. 
Pl. & Pr. 1 476� and cases cited. And the fact that tl�c decree has 
heen carried into execution does not prevent a rehearing. Id. 
1467, 1 476. 
But departures have been made from this pract ice under 
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rules of court. Thus, by a rule of the English court of [*214,}
chancery, "a petition for a rehearing must be presented within a
fortnight after the order pronounced.” \Valk. Ch. 447. And the
decision in \Valker is based upon rule 105 of the court of chan-
cery of l\Iichigan, adopted to take effect January 1, I839. The
following is a copy of that rule:
“On filing a bill of review, or other bill in the nature of a
bill of review, the complainant shall make the like deposit, or give
security to the adverse party in the same amount, which is or
would be required on an appeal from an order or decree com-
plained of; and no such bill shall be filed, either upon the dis-
covery of new matters or otherwise, without special leave of the
court first obtained, nor unless the same is brought within the
time allowed for bringing an appeal.” See “Rules and Orders of
the Court of Chancery of the State of Michigan, Revised and Es-
tablished by the Chancellor in January, 1839.”
Under the settled doctrine that a bill of review was the rem-
edy, to the exclusion of a petition for rehearing, after enrollment,
it logically followed that the latter must be limited by this rule,
which was accordingly so held in the case of \Valker. Nine years
after this case was decided the rigor of this rule was mitigated,
an exception being added as follows, viz., “except upon newly-
discovered facts or evidence.” In such cases it would seem that
bills of review could again be filed as before. And in the “New
Rules,” adopted in 1858 by this court, the rule is still further
amended by adding the words, “unless upon reasons satisfactory
to the court.” See Chancery Rule No. IOI. This seems to have
restored the practice of permitting bills of review to be filed in
proper cases after the time for appeal has passed. The limitation
being removed restores the old practice in relation to review and
rehearing, except as limited by the existing rule. Accordingly
we find that in Warner v. Juif, 38 Mich. 667, this court notices
the want of excuse for delay in passing upon an application {*2I5]
for rehearing, which it would have had no occasion for doing
had the rule of 1839 been in force.
The respondent having the power to grant a rehearing, we
cannot interfere with his discretion, unless clearly abused. we
think this a proper case for its exercise.
The writ of mandamus will be denied.
The other justices concurred.1
1The petition for rehearing stated that the appeal fee was not paid
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rules of court. Thus, by a rule of the English court of  [ *2 14] 
chancery, "a petition for a rehearing must be presented within a 
fortnight a fter the order pronounced ." \Valle Ch. 4-1-7. And the 
deci sion in \\Talker is based upon rule 105 of the court of chan­
cery of l\Iichigan , adopted to take effect January 1 ,  1 839. The 
following is  a copy of that rule : 
"On filing a bill of review, or other bill in the nature of a 
bil l  of review, the complainant shall make the l ike deposi t ,  or give 
security to the adverse party in the same amount, which is  or 
would be required on an appeal from an order or decree com­
plained of ; and no such bill shall be filed, either upon the d is­
covery of new matters or otherwise, without special leave of the 
comt first obtained, nor unless the same is brought within the 
time allowed for bringing an appeal. "  See "Rules and Orders of 
the Court of Chancery of the State of Michigan, Revised and Es­
tabl ished by the Chancellor in January ,  1839." 
Cndcr the settled doctrine that a bill of review was the rem­
edy, to the exclusion of a petition for rehearing, a fter enrollment ,  
it  logically followed that the latter must be l imited by this rule, 
which was accordingly so held in the case of \Valker. N ine years 
after this case was decided the rigor of this rule was mit igated, 
an exception being added as follows, viz. ,  "except upon newly­
d iscovered facts or evidence."  In such cases it would seem that 
bills of review could again be filed as before. And in the "New 
Rule!'," adopted in 1 858 by this court ,  the rule is still further 
amended by adding the words, "unless upon reasons sat is factory 
to the court."  See Chancery Rule No. I O I . This seems to have 
restored the practice of permitting bills of review to be filed in 
proper cases after the time for appeal has passed. The limitation 
being removed restores the old pract ice in relation to review and 
rehea ring, except as limited by the existing rule. Accordingly 
\Ve find that in 1¥arn er v. Jui{, 38 Mich. 667, this court notices 
the want of excuse for delay in pass ing upon an application { *2 1 5 ]  
for rehearing, which i t  would have had n o  occasion fo r  doing 
had the rule of 1 839 been in force. 
The respondent having the power to grant a rehearing, we 
cannot interfere with his di scretion , unless clearly abused. \Ve 
think this a proper case for its exercise. 
The writ of  mandamus will be denied. 
The other justices concurred .1 
1 The petition for rehearing stated that the appeal fee was not paid 
within 30 days for the reason that defendants' sol icitor des ired that one 
• 
200 CASES ON JUDGMENTS, ETC.
WALKER v. MOSER, in U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, July 28,
19o2—54 C. C. A. 262, 117 Fed. 230.
LOCHREN, D. J. That an order granting or refusing a new
trial rests in the discretion of the trial court, and is not review-
abl.e, has been the uniform holding of the federal courts. It is
needless to cite authorities, but many will be found in I Desty,
Fed. Proc. (9th Ed.) 661.
The argument that the decision of the motion for new trial
came too late, because made after the term had ended at which
the verdict was rendered, is not sound. A cause, and the parties
to it, are before the court until the end of the term at which the
final judgment of the court is entered; and the juris-
diction of the court over the cause and the parties con-
tinues after such term, if during the term a motion respect-
ing the judgment is entertained or allowed, and held open
for further consideration. “It is a general rule of the law
that all judgments, decrees, or other orders of the courts, however
conclusive in their character, are under the control of the court
which pronounces them during the term at which they are ren-
dered or entered of record, and they may then be set aside, va-
cated, modified or annulled by that court. But it is a rule, equally
well established, that after the term has ended all final judgments
and decress of the court pass beyond its control, unless steps be
taken during that term, by motion or otherwise, to set aside, mod-
ify, or correct them.” Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410, 415,
26 L. Ed. 997. “VVhatever parties are bound to take notice of at
one term they must follow to the next, if they are not, in some
appropriate form, dismissed from further attendance. In this
case the motion to allow a reargument went over as unfinished
business, and carried the parties with it. The proceeding was in all
material respects like a motion for a new trial filed in time at one
term and not disposed of until the next. Under such circum-
stances a judgment or decree, although entered in form, does not
discharge the parties from their attendance in the cause. They
appeal should decide both cases, thus saving costs to the parties, and that
he believed that no advantage would be taken of this fact by eomplainant’s
solicitors until execution for costs issued: that thereupon such appeal fee
was paid, and defendants applied to the Supreme Court for leave to per-
fect the appeal, which was denied because of a want of authority to grant
such leave where the appeal fee was not paid within the statutory time;
and that since such denial no action has been taken, except the payment
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WALKER v. MOSER, in U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, July 28, 
1902-54 C. C. A. 262, 117 Fed. 230. 
LocHREN, D. J. That an order granting or refusing a new 
trial rests in the discretion of the trial court, and is not review­
able, has been the uniform holding of the federal courts. It is 
needless to cite authorities, but many will be found in I Desty, 
Fed. Proc. (9th Ed. )  661. 
The argument that the decision of the motion for new trial 
came too late, because made after the term had ended at which 
the verdict was rendered, is not sound. A cause, and the parties 
to it, are before the court until the end of the term at which the 
final judgment of the court is entered ; and the juris­
diction of the court over the cause and the parties con­
tinues after such term, if during the term a motion respect­
ing the judgment is entertained or allowed, and hel<l open 
for further consideration. "It is a general rule of the law 
" that all judgments, decrees, or other orders of the courts, however 
conclusive in their character, are under the control of the court 
which pronounces them during the term at which they are ren­
dered or entered of record, and they may then be set aside, va­
cated, modified or annulled by that court. But it is a rule, equally 
well established, that after the term has ended all final judgments 
and decress of the court pass beyond its control, unless steps be 
taken during that term, by motion or otherwise, to set aside, mod­
i fy, or correct them." Bronson. v. Schultcn, 104 U. S. 4rn, 415 ,  
26 L. Ed. 997. "\Vhatever parties are bound to take notice of at 
one term they must follow to the next, if they are not, in some 
appropriate form, dismissed from further attendance. In this 
case the motion to allow a reargument went over as unfinished 
business, and carried the parties with it. The proceeding was in all 
material respects l ike a motion for a new trial filed in time at one 
term and not disposed of until the next. Under such circum­
stances a judgment or decree, although entered in form, does not 
dic;charge the parties from their attendance in the cause. They 
appeal should decide both cases, thus saving costs to the parties, and that 
he believed that no advantage would be taken of this fact by complainant's 
sol ic itors until execution for costs issued : that thereupon such appeal fee 
was paid, and defendants appl ied to the Supreme Court for leave to per­
fect the appeal ,  which was denied because of a want .of authority to grant 
such leave where the appeal fee was not paid within the statutory time ; 
and that since such denial no action has been taken, except the payment 
o f  costs, defendants waiting to ascertain the result in the appealed case. 
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must remain until all questions as to the finality of what has been
done are settled. The motion when entertained prolongs the suit,
and keeps the parties in court until it is passed upon and disposed
of in the regular course of proceeding.” Godda/rd v. Ordway,
IOI U. S. 745, 751, 24 L. Ed. 237.
The November term is fixed by act of congress to begin on
the second Monday of that month. In 1900 it began on Novem-
ber 12th. The order entered at the October term, permitting the
motion for new trial to be filed by November 15th, and the fact
that such motion was not disposed of at the October term, caused
it to go over as unfinished business to the November term, carry-
ing over the cause and the parties. Such would have been its
effect had judgment been entered at the October term upon the
verdict. But no judgment in the cause was entered at that term,
and the cause necessarily, and irrespective of the pending motion
for new trial, passed over to the November term for the entry of
judgment, and any other action that might be taken in the case.
[*233] The order granting a new trial, as entered of record
in this case, shows upon its face that it was made “at the Novem-
ber, A. D I900, term of said court, and on the 12th day of April,
I901.” Counsel for plaintiffs in error argue that April 12, 1901,
could not have been in the November, I900, term because a term
fixed by statute to be held at another place in the district on the
third Monday in January would intervene. But, if the business
of the November term made such course desirable, that term
might have been continued to a|date beyond the January term.
This court will not presume that the circuit court has committed
errors not made to appear, nor that it has falsified its records.
The court having at the proper time allowed the motion for new
trial to be filed, it would pass from term to term as unfinished
business in the cause, until disposed of. It is unnecessary to con-
sider the effect of plaintiffs’ participation in the subsequent trials.
















































































































































\'ACA Tl � G  A.ND l\IOr>U 'YI.NG T H E  J t:DG:\-l E NT 20 1 
must remain until all questions as to the finality of what has been 
done are settled. The motion when entertained prolongs the suit, 
and keeps the parties in court until it is passed upon and disposed 
of in the regular course of proceeding." Goddard v. Ord·way, 
IOI u. S . 745, 75 1 ,  24 L. Ed. 237. 
The I'\ ovember term is fixed by act of congress to begin on 
the second l\fonday of that month . In 1900 it began on Novem­
ber 12th. The order entered at the October term, permitting the 
motion for new trial to be filed by November 1 5th, and the fact 
that such motion was not di sposed of at the October term� caused 
it to go over as unfinished business to the November term, carry­
ing over the cause and the parties. Such would have been its 
effect had judgment been entered at the October term upon the 
verdict. But no judgment in the cause was entered at that term, 
and the cause necessarily, and i rrespective of  the pending motion 
for new trial, passed over to the November term for the entry of 
j udgment, and any other action that might be taken in the case. 
[*233] The order granting a new trial, as entered o f  record 
in this case, shows upon its face that it was made "at the Novem­
ber, A. D 1900, term of said court, and on the 12th day of April, 
1g>I ." Counsel for plaintiffs in error argue that April 1 2 , 190 1 ,  
could not have been i n  the November, 1900, term because a term 
fixed by statute to be held at another place in the district on the 
third Monday in January would intervene. But, if the business 
of the November term made such course desirable, that term 
might have been continued to a .  date beyond the January term. 
This court will not presume that the circuit court has committed 
errors not made to appear, nor that it has falsified its records. 
The court having at the proper time allowed the motion for new 
trial to be filed, it  would pass from term to term as unfinished 
business in the cause, until disposed of. It is unnecessary to con­
sider the effect of plaintiffs' participation in the subsequent trials. 
The j udgment is affirmed. 
THE EFFECT OF THE JUDGMENT AS
AN ESTOPPEL OR BAR
BAR TO ANOTHER ACTION FOR THE SAME CAUSE.
ROBINSON'S CASE, in Common Pleas of England, Easter Term, I
Jae. I, A. D. I604—5 Coke 33.
Robinson and others, executors of J. Robinson, brought an
action of debt on a bond against Robinson; the defendant pleaded
that before the purchase of this writ, one of the plaintiffs, as ad-
ministrator of J. R., brought an action of debt on the same bond
in this same court against the defendant, who then pleaded, that
_I. R. made executors who administered, and traversed that he
died intestate; then the plaintiffs replied, that administration was
committed to him [wndente lite between the executors of the said
will; on which the defendant demurred; and it was adjudged for
the plaintiffs. And this plea was pleaded by way of estoppel and
judgment demanded, if he as executor should have an action of
debt against the defendant on the same bond. The plaintiffs re-
plied and showed the repeal of the letters of administration, and
that the plaintiffs are executors; on which the defendant did
demur, he pretending that forasmuch as one of the plaintiffs was
barred by the former action, that they should be barred forever.
And the cause was well debated at the bar and bench; and a‘
last judgment was given for the plaintiffs. For it was unani-
mously agreed, that by the former judgment the plaintiffs were
barred as to the action of the writ, scil. to have any action as ad-
ministrator; but although he then in truth was executor, yet the
mistaking of his action is no bar nor estoppel to bring his true
action; as if an heir bring a formedon in the descender, and be
barred therein, yet he may have a formedon in the remainder or
reverter. See 3 Ed. III, 21; 4 Ed. III [Fitz. Abr.], Estoppel
133; 19 Ed. III, [Fitz. Abr.], Estoppel 227; 18 Ed. III, 31: 40
Ed. III, 21; 2 Ric. II [Fitz. Abr.], Estoppel 210; 6 Hen. IV. 4;

















































































































































THE EFFECT OF THE JUDGMENT AS 
AN ESTOPPEL OR BAR 
BAR TO AN OTHER ACTION FOR THE SAME CAUSE. 
ROB I N SO N ' S  CA SE, in Common Picas of England, Easter Term, 1 
Jae. I, A. D. 16<>4-s Coke 33. 
Robinson and others, executors of J. Robinson, brought an 
action of debt on a bond against Robinson ; the defendant pleaded 
that before the purchase of this writ, one of the plaintiffs, as ad­
ministrator of J. R., brought an action of debt on the same bond 
in this same court against the defendant, who then pleaded, that 
J.  R. made executors who administered, and traversed that he 
died intestate ; then the plaintiffs replied, that administration was 
committed to him p cndente lite between the executors of the said 
will ; on which the defendant demurred ; and it was adj udged for 
the plaintiffs. And this plea was pleaded by way of  estoppel and 
j udgment demanded, if he as executor should have an action of 
debt against the defendant on the same bond . The plaintiffs re­
plied and showed the repeal of the letters o f  administration, and 
that the plaintiffs are executors ; on which the defendant did 
<lemur, he pretending that forasmuch as one of the plaintiffs was 
barred by the former action , that they should be barred forever. 
And the cause was well debated at the bar and bench ; and a '  
last judgment was given for the plaintiffs. For i t  was unani­
mously agreed, that by the former j udgment the plaintiffs were 
barred as to the action of the \\'fit, sci!. to have any action as ad­
ministrator ; but although he then in truth was executor, yet the 
mistaking of his action is no bar nor estoppel to bring his true 
action ; as i f  an heir bring a formedon in the descender, and be 
barred therein, yet he may have a formeclon in the remainder or 
reverter. See 3 Ed. I I I ,  2 1 ; 4 Ed. I I I  [ Fitz. Abr. ] , Estoppel 
1 3 � ; 19 Ed. I I I ,  [Fitz. Abr. ] ,  Estoppel 227 ; 18 Ed . III ,  3 1  : 40 
Ed. I I I .  2 1 ; 2 Ric. I I  [ Fitz. Abr. ] ,  Estoppel 2 10 ; 6 Hen. IV. 4 ;  
I I Hen. IV, 30 ; 2 Ric. I I I ,  14 ; 2 1  Hen. VII ,  24 ; 7 Ed. VI [ Fitz. 
Ahr. ] ,  Estoppel 162. 
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UNITED S'I‘>.-\TES v. PARKER. in U. S. Sup. Ct., Jan. 24, 1887—12o
U. S. 89, 7 S. Ct. 454, 30 L. Ed. 601.
Action by U. S. against Parker as principal and \V. M.
Stewart as surety on the official bond of Parker as superintend-
ent of Indian affairs for Nevada, to recover $6,184.14, received
by him by virtue of his office, and not accounted for. Defendants
answered that plaintiff commenced an action on said bond in the
circuit court of the United States for the district of Nevada.
Nov. 27, 1871, to recover $15,108.62, with interest and costs, to
which defendant had appeared and denied indebtedness, and upon
the hearing of said cause defendant presented to the court a duly
certified account with the treasury department of said plaintiff,
showing that he was not indebted in any sum; whereupon the fol-
lowing order was entered in open court: “Upon motion of Ellis &
King, attorneys for defendant, and it appearing to the court that
the subject matter in this suit has been adjusted and settled by the
proper parties in \-Vashington, it is therefore ordered that this
cause be, and the same is hereby. dismissed.” And defendants
aver that the pretended claim of $6,184.14 is founded on a pre-
tended re-adjustment of said account by the second comptroller
of the treasury of plaintiff on June 21, 1884, without authority
of law. To this answerplaintiff demurred, that it did not state
facts to constitute a bar. The demurrer was overruled, plain-
tiff rested, judgment was entered for defendant, and plaintiff
now prosecutes error to reverse the judgment.
l\Ii\'r'1‘H13\vs, J. * * * The/second question is whether
the judgment rendered in the first action was final. It is claimed
to be equivalent only to a non—suit, and therefore not res jildicala.
A judgment of non—suit, whether rendered because of the failure
of the plaintiff to appear and prosecte his action, or because upon
the trial he fails to prove the particulars necessary to make good
his action, or when rendered by consent upon an agreed statement
of facts, is not conclusive as an estoppel, because it does not deter-
mine the rights of the parties. Homer v. Brown, 16 How. 354;
]i’[(I1lh(1'H(1')l Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 10o U. S. 121, 3 S. Ct. 99;
Haldcman cu U. S., 91 U. S. 584. But a non-suit is to be dis-
tinguished from a retnm-it. Mirior v. Mecham'cs Bank, I Peters
45. Blackstone defines the difference as follows: “A retraxit
differs from a non-suit in this; one is negative and the other
positive. The non-suit is a mere default or neglect of the plain-
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UNITED ST-ATES v. PARKER. in U. S. Sup. Ct., Jan. 24, 1887-120 
U. S.  8g, 7 S. Ct. 454, 30 L.  Ed. 601. 
Action by U. S. against Parker as principal and \V. M. 
Stewart as surety on the official bond of Parker as superintend­
ent of Indian affairs for Nevada, to recover $6, 184. 1 4, received 
by him by virtue of h is office, and not accounted for. Defendants 
answered that plaintiff commenced an action on said bond in the 
circuit court of the United States for the district of .Nevada. 
Nov. 27, 1 87 1 ,  to recover $ 1 5, ro8.62, with interest and costs, to 
which defendant had appeared and denied indebtedness, and upon 
the hearing of said cause defendant presented to the court a duly 
certified account with the treasury department of said plaintiff, 
showing that he was not indebted in any sum ; whereupon the fol­
lowing order was entered in open court : "Upon motion of Ellis & 
King, attorneys for defendant, and it appearing to the court that 
the subj ect matter in this suit has been adjusted and settled by the 
proper parties in \Vashington, it  is therefore ordered that this 
cause be, and the same is  hereby. dismissed." And defendants 
aver that the pretended claim of $6, 1 84. 14 is founded on a pre­
tended re-adjustment of said account by the second comptroller 
of the treasury of plaintiff on June 2 1 ,  1 884, without authority 
of  law. To this answer plaintiff demurred, that it did not state 
facts to constitute a bar. The demurrer was overruled, plain­
tiff rested, j udgment was entered for defendant, and plaintiff 
now prosecutes error to reverse the j u<lgment. 
M ATT HEWS, J. * * * The'° second question is whether 
the judgment rendered in the first action was final. It i s  claimed 
to be equivalent only to a non-suit, and therefore not res judiwta . 
A judgment of non-suit, whether rendered because of the failure 
of the plaintiff to appear and prosecte his action , or because upon 
the trial he fails to prove the particulars necessary to make good 
his action, or when rendered by con sent upon an agreed statement 
of facts, is  not conclusive as an cstoppel, because it  does not deter­
mine the rights of the parties. Homer v. Brown, 1 6  How. 354 ; 
.Manhattan Ins. Co. v. Broughton,  IO<) U. S. 1 2 1 ,  3 S. Ct. 99 ; 
H aldcman 'l..'. U. S., 9 1  C'. S. 584. But a non-suit is to be dis­
tinguished from a retra.rit. 1\Iinor v. M echatiics Ban k, I Peters 
45. Blackstone defines the difference as follows : "A retraxit 
d iffers from a non-suit in th is ; one is negative ar.d the other 
positive. The non-su it is  a mere default or neglect o f  the plain­
tiff, and therefore he is allowed to begin his suit again upon pay-
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ment of costs; but a retraxit is an open, voluntary renunciation of
his claim in court and by this he forever loses his action.” 3
Comm. 296. And it has been held that a judgment of dismissal.
when based upon and entered in pursuance of the agreement of
the parties, must be understood, in the absence of anything to
the contrary expressed in the agreement, and contained in the
' judgment itself, to amount to such an adjustment of the merits
of the controversy, by the parties themselves, through the judg-
ment of the court, as will constitute a defense to another action
afterwards brought upon the same cause of action. Bank of
Commonwealth v. Hqbkins, 2 Dana 395; Merritt v. Campbell,
47 Cal. 542. It is clearly so when, as here, the judgment recites
that the subject-matter of the suit had been adjusted and settled
by the parties. This is equivalent to a judgment that the plain-
tiff had no cause of action, because the defense of the defendant
was found to be sufficient in law and true in fact. Upon general
principles of the common law regulating the practice of courts
of justice, it must be held that the judgment here in question was
rendered upon the merits of the case, is final in its form and
nature, and must have the effect of a bar to the present action
upon the same cause.
If its effect is to be determined by the statutes of Nevada,
the same conclusion will be reached. The civil practice act of
that state, passed March 8, 1869 (Gen. St. Nev.. 1885, § 3I73)
is as follows: “An action may be dismissed, or a judgment of
non-suit entered, in the following cases: I, By the plaintiff him-
self at any time before trial, upon the payment of costs, if a
counterclaim has not been made (If provisional remedy has been
allowed, the undertaking shall thereupon be delivered by the
clerk to the defendant, who may have his action thereon) ; 2, By
either party upon written consent of the other; 3, By the court
when the plaintiff fails to appear on the trial, and the defendant
appears and asks for a dismissal; 4, By the court when upon the
trial and before the final submission of the ease the plaintiff aban-e
dons it; 5, By the court upon motion of the defendant when upon
the trial the plaintiff fails to prove a sufficient case for the jury.
The dismissal mentioned in the first two subdivisions shall be
made by an entry in the elerk’s register. Judgment may there-
upon be entered accordingly. In every other case the judgment
shall be rendered on the merits."
It thus appears that there are five instances in which the
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ment of costs ; but a rctraxit is an open, voluntary renunciation of 
his claim in court and by this he forever loses his  ac tion." 3 
Comm. 296. And it has been held that a j udgment of dismissal , 1 
when based upon and entered in pursuance of the agreement of 
the parties , must be understood, in the absenct of anything to 
the contrary expressed in the agreement, and contained in the 
· j udgment itsel f, to amount to such an adjustment of the merits 
of the controversy, by the parties themselves, through the judg­
ment of the court, as will  constitute a defense to another action 
afterwards brought upon the same cause of action. Ban k of 
Commouwealth v. Hopkins, 2 Dana 395· ; J.f erritt v. Campbell, 
47 Cal. 542. It is clearly so when , as here, the j udgment recites l 
that the subj ect-matter of the suit had been adjusted and settled 
by the parties. This is equivalent to a judgment that the plain­
t iff had no cause of action , because the defense of the defendant 
was found to be sufficient in law and true in fact. Upon general 
principles of the common law regulating the practice of courts 
of j ustice , it  must be held that the j udgment here in question was 
rendered upon the merits of the case, is final in its form and 
nature, and must have the effect of  a bar to the present action 
upon the same cause. 
If  its effect is to be determined by the statutes of Xevada , 
the same conclusion wil l  be reached. The civil practice act of 
that state, passed March 8, 1 869 ( Gen. St. Nev., 1 885, § 3 1 73 )  
i s  a s  follows : "An act ion may be dismissed, or a j udgment of  
non-suit entered , i n  the follow ing cases : I ,  By the plaintiff him­
sel f at any time before trial , upon the payment of cos ts. i f  a 
counterclaim has not been made ( I f  provisional remedy has been 
allowed, the undertaking shall thereupon be del ivered by the 
cl erk to the defendant, who may have his action thereon ) ; 2 ,  By 
either party upon wrHten consent of the other ; 3 ,  By the court 
when the plaintiff fai ls to appear on the trial, and the defendant 
appears and asks for a dismissal ; 4, By the court when upon thf 
tr ial and before the final submission of the case the pla intiff ab�n·· 
dons it ; 5 ,  By the c�mrt upon motion of  the defendant when upon 
the trial the plaintiff fails to prove a sufficient case for the jury. 
The dismi ssal mentioned in the first hvo subd ivisions shal l he 
made by an entry in the clerk 's register. Judgment may there­
upon he entered accordingly. In  every other case the j udgment 
shall he rendered on the merits." 
It thus appears that there are five in stances in which the 
d i smissal of  an action has the force only of a jurlgment of nonsuit. 
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“In every other case,” the statute provides, “the judgment shall
be rendered on the merits.” If the case at bar is not included
among the enumerated cases in which a dismissal is equivalent to
a non-suit, it must therefore be a judgment on the merits. In
the present case the suit was not dismissed by the plaintiff him-
self before trial, nor by one party upon the written consent of the
other, nor by the court for the plaintiff's failure to appear at the
trial, nor by the court at the trial for an abandonment by the
plaintiff of his cause. Neither was it a dismissal by the court
upon motion of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff
had failed to prove a sufficient case for the jury at the trial. The
judgment was rendered upon the evidence offered by the de-
fendants, which could only have been after the plaintiff had made
out a [wima fade case. That evidence was passed upon judicially
by the court who determined its effect to be a bar to the cause of
action. this was an ascertainment judicially that the defense re-
lied upon was valid and sufficient and consequently was a judg-
ment upon the merits, finding the issue for the defendants. Being,
as already found, for the same cause of action as now sued upon,
it operates as a bar to the present suit by way of estoppel.
The judgment is affirmed.
Judgment on verdict directed for defendant (when the plaintiff
rested), for want of proof of a cause of action, was held no bar to new
action on the same cause. Denver 65* R. G. R. Co. v. Iles (I898), 25 C01.
19, 53 Pac. 222. .
Suit dismissed on motion of defendant because complaint failed to
state a cause of action was held to be a bar to a new action. Hang v.
Great Northern Ry. Co. (1900), 102 Fed. 74, 42 C. C. A. 167.
GRAFF v. BERNARD, in Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Oct. I9, 1884—162 Mass.
300, 38 N. E. 503.
Graef sued Bernard on the same cause in New York and
Massachusetts on the same day, attaching Barnard’s goods in
both cases. He took judgment in New York, which was pleaded
;‘>m's darrien continuance in bar of the action in Massachusetts,
wherefore defendant had judgment. Later plaintiff obtained
vacation of the judgment in New York, and on re—hearing show-
ing that fact, had judgment herein re-opened and entered in his
favor. Defendant excepts.
MASON, J. The rights of the parties are generally determined

















































































































































EFFECT OF J UDGM ENT AS DAR OR F.STOPPEI. 205 
"In every other case," the statute provides, "the j udgment shalJ 
be rendered on the merits ." I f  the case at bar is not included 
among the enumerated cases in which a dismissal is equivalent to 
a non-suit, it must therefore be a judgment on the merits. In 
the present case the suit was not dismissed by the plaintiff him­
sel f before trial, nor by one party upon the writ ten consent of the 
other, nor by the court for the plaintiff's failure to appear at the 
trial, nor by the court at the trial for an abandonment by the 
plaintiff of his cause. Neither was it a dismissal by the court 
upon motion of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff 
had failed to prove a sufficient case for the jury at the trial. The 
j udgment was rendered upon the evidence offered by the de­
fendants, which could only have been after the plaintiff had made 
out a prima facie case. That evidence was passed upon j udicially 
by the court who determined its effect to be a bar to the cause of 
action, this was an ascertainment judicially that the defense re­
lied upon was valid and sufficient and con sequently was a j udg­
ment upon the merits, finding the issue for the defendants. Being, 
as already found, for the same cause of action as now sued upon, 
it operates as a bar to the present suit by way of estoppel. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Judgment on verdkt di rected for defendant ( when the plaintiff v 
rested ) ,  for want o f  proof o f  a cause of action, was held no bar to new -"' 
action on the same cause. De•wer & R. G. R. Co. v. Iles ( 1898) , 25 Col . 
1 9, 53 Pac. 222.  X 
Suit  dismissed on motion o f  defendant because complaint failed to 
state a cause of action was held to be a bar to a new action. Haug v. 
Great Northern R3•. Co. ( 1 900 ) ,  1 02 Fed. 74, 42 C. C. A. 167. 
GRAFF v. BERNARD, in Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Oct. 19, 1 884-162 M ass. 
300, J8 N.  E. 503. 
Graef sued Bernard on the same cause in New York and 
Massachusetts on the same day, attaching Barnard's goods in 
both cases. He took judgment in New York ,  which was pleaded 
p1iis darrien contiuuance in bar of the action in Massachusetts, 
wherefore defendant had j udgment. Later plaintiff obtained 
vacation of the j udgment in New York, and on re-hearing show­
i ng that fact, had judgment herein re-opened and entered in his 
favor. Defendant excepts. 
MASON, J. The rights of the parties are generally determined 
.as of the time when the action is begun. And it is necessary 
106 e.\sr.s ox ]UDG.\fEN’l‘S, me.
that it should be so. That the rule is not an invariable one, how-
ever, is shown by the numerous instances in which, by plea of
/>z_n's darrien continuance, facts occurring after the commencement
of the action are set up. and allowed to operate in bar of it. And
it is expressly provided by §26 c. 167, Pub. St., that “an answer
or replication may allege facts which have occured since the in-
stitution of the suit.” If a declaration, answer, or replication,
has been filed, a supplemental one may be made by leave of court,
alleging material facts that have occured since the former de-
claration, answer, or replication. Id. The statute is wider in its
scope than the plea of [mis darrim con-lilmance. Strictly speak-
ing, that can only be availed of in regard to matters occurring
since the last continuance. The statute is not so limited. The
suit in New York, on the judgment in which the defendant relies,
was begun on the same day as this action, viz., June 27, I893.
judgment in that suit was entered in the plaintiff’s favor on
July 15, 1893, after the commencement of these proceedings.
There can be no doubt that the defendant had the right to set up
the judgment so obtained in bar of the plaintiff's right to recover
in this action. It is equally clear, we think, that it was competent
for the court, upon the plaintiff’s application, to reopen this case
after hearing and before the finding, and allow him to file a replica-
tion setting up that the judgment had been vacated and was no
longer in force, and to introduce evidence of that fact, and to
find, if the evidence warranted it, that the judgment in that case
had been vacated, and that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment
in this action.
E.rc'e/vtions 0-rcrrulcd.
WATERHOUSE v. LEVINE, in Mass. Sup. Ind. Ct., Jan. 6, 1903-182
Mass. 407, 65, N. E. 822.
BARKER, J. The defendant contends that the plaintiffs can-
not maintain this action because judgment was rendered for the
defendant upon a trial in a previous action between the same
parties and for the same cause of action. Evidence was admit-
ted in this action against the defendant’s exception that the
former judgment was upon the ground that the first suit was
prematurel_v brought, the goods for the price of which both suits
were brought having been sold upon a credit which had not ex-
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that it shoul cl be so. That the rule is not an invariable one, how­
ever, i s  shown by the numerous instances in which, by p lea o f  
puis da rrieii co11 tin ua11ce, facts occurring after the commencement 
of the action arc set up, and a l lowed to operate in bar of  it. And 
it is expressly provided by §26 c. 167, Pub. St., that "an answer 
or replication may allege facts which have occured since the in­
stitution of  the suit ." If a declaration , answer , or rep l ica tion, 
has been filed , a supplemen tal one may be made by leave of court, 
alleging material facts that have occurcd si nce the former de­
claration, answer, or repl icat ion . Id.  The statute i s  wider in its 
scope than the plea of  puis darrien co nti11 11ance. Strict ly speak­
ing, that can on ly be availed of in regard to matters  occurring 
s ince the last continuance. The statute is not so limited. The 
su it  in New York , on the j udgment in wh ich the defendant rel ies , 
was begun on the same day as this action , viz . ,  June 27, 1893 . 
Judgmen t in that suit was en tered in the plaintiff's favor on 
July 1 5 ,  1893, after the commencement of these proceedings. 
Th('f'c can be no doubt that the defendant had the right to set up 
the j udgment so obta i ned in bar of the plain t iff's right to recover 
in this act ion . I t  is equally clear , we think, that it was competent 
for the court, upon the plaintiff's appl ication , to reopen this  case 
a fter hearing and before the finding, and allow him to file a repl ica­
tion set ting up that the judgment had been vacated and was no 
longer in force , and to introduce evidence of  that fact, and to 
find, i f  the evidence warranted i t ,  that the j udgment in that case 
had been vacated, and that the piaintiff was ent i tled to judgmen t 
in  this action. 
Exaptio 11s ourruled. 
WATERHOUSE v. LEVINE, in l\fass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Jan . 6, 1903-182 
Mass. 407, 65, N. E. 822. 
B.\RKI::R, J. The defendant contends that the plaintiffs can­
not main tain th is act ion because judgment was rendered for the 
defendant upon a trial in a previous act ion between th<.> same 
parties and for the same cause o f  action . Evidence was adm it­
ted in th is action against the defendant's except ion that the 
former j r nlg-ment was upon the ground that the first su i t  was 
p rc111aturely brought, the goods for the price of wh ich both suits 
were brought hav ing been sold upon a cred it which had not ex­
pi red when the first action was begun. The j udge found as a 
F.FFl{C’l‘ OF JUDGMENT AS BAR OR IIS'l'OI‘PEL 207
fact that the only issue decided in the for_mer action was whether
that action was prematurely brought, and that the former judg-
ment was entered because the action was prematurely brought
and for that reason alone.
The only answer in the former action was a general denial.
But under that answer the defence that the goods were bought
upon a credit not expired when the suit was begun was open.
ll/ildcr v. Colby, 134 Mass. 377, 380, distinguishing Reed v.
Scituatc, 7 Allen 141. See also Fcls v. Raymond, 134 Mass.
376; Franklin Sasuings Institution v. Reed, I25 Mass. 365; Ben-
thall v. Hildrcth, 2 Gray 288; Morrison v. Clark, 7 Cush. 213.
\\'hether oral evidence would be admissible to show that a for-
mer judgment went solely upon an issue which strictly could not
have been tried upon the pleadings as they stood, but was in fact
tried with the assent of all parties, is a question upon which we
express no opinion.
[*4o9] It is only when rendered upon the merits that a judg-
ment constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action for the
same cause and the parties are concluded upon all issues which
might have been tried. Foye v. Patch, 132 Mass. 105, no; Tracy
v. Merrill, 103 Mass. 280; lllaxzecll v. Clarke, 139 Mass. I12,
29 1\'. E. 224; Cobb v. Fogg, I66 Mass. 466, 477, 44 N. E. 534.
In the absence of proof that an issue actually was tried and de-
termined in arriving at a former judgment, it is conclusive by way
of estoppel only as to those facts which necessarily were involved,
and without proof of which it could not have been rendered.
Burlru V. Shannon, 99 Mass. 200; Eastman v. Symonds, I08 Mass.
567. See Morse v. Elms, 131 Mass. 151, 152; Watts v. Watts.
160 L\Iass. 466, [post I95].
\\"hen the question whether a certain issue was in fact deter-
mined in a former suit is to be tried, oral evidence is competent
upon that question. White v. Chase, 128 Mass. I58; Beans v.
Clo/>[v, 123 Mass. 165; Dalton v. Woodman, 9 Cush. 255, 261;
MrDo:cell v. Langdon, 3 Gray 513, 514.
E:rce1>t1'0ns ozxcrrulod.
Judgment for defendant in an action on the contract because (as
appeared by parol proof in the second action) the plaintiff had not fully
performed. was held no bar to an action on quantum mrruit for the same
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fact that the only issue <lecide<l in the for.mer action was whether 
tha t  act ion was prematurely brought, and that the former judg­
ment \\·as  entered because the action was prematurely brought 
and for that reason alone. 
The only answer in the former action was a general denial. 
Hut under that answer the de fence that the goods were bought 
upon a credit not expi red when the suit ,.,.·as begun was open . 
fVildcr v. Colby, 1 34 l\Iass. 377, 380, distinguishing Recd v. 
Scituate, 7 Allen q . 1 .  Sec also Fels v. Ray111 01 1d, 1 34 l\Iass.  
376 ; Fra11kli1i Sm!ings !11stit11 tion v. Recd, 1 25 l\fass. 365 ; Bcn­
tlzall v. Hildreth, 2 Gray 288 ; Morrison v. Clark, 7 Cush. 2 1 3 . 
\\'hether oral evidence would be admissible to show that a for­
mer j udgment went solely upon an issue which strictly cou ld not 
have been tried upon the pleadings as they stood, but was in fact 
tried with the assent of all parties, is a question upon which we 
express no opinion. 
[*409 ] It is only when rendered upon the merits that a j udg­
ment constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action for the 
same cause and the parties are concluded upon all issues which 
might have been tried. Fo3•c v. Patch, 1 32 Mass. 1 05,  l ro ; Tracy 
v. Merrill, 103 Mass. 28o ; J!a:rt.r.:e/l v. Clm·kc, 1 39 Mas� . 1 1 2,  
29 1\ .  E. 224 ; Cobb v.  Fogg, 1 66 Mass. 466, 477, 44 N.  E .  534. 
In the absence of proof that an issue actualty was tried and de­
termined in arriving at a former judgment, it is conclusive by way 
of estoppel only as to those facts which necessarily were invoh·ed , 
and without proof of which it could not have been rendered. 
B11rlc11 v. Slram1on, 99 ).fass. 200 ; Eastman v. Sym onds, rn8 l\fass. 
567. See "�forsc v. iilms, 1 3 1  l\fass. 1 5 1 ,  1 52 ; lVatts v. l Vatts. 
1 60 ::\fass. 466, [post 1 9 5 ] . 
\\'hen the quest ion whether a certain i ssue was in fact deter­
mined in  a fom1er suit is to be tried, oral evidence is competent 
upon that question . fVliite v. Chase, 1 28 Mass. 1 58 ; E1·a11s v. 
Clapp , 1 23 Mass. 165 ; Dutto n v. Woodman, 9 Cush. 255 ,  �6 1 ; 
lifrD01.cell v. La11gdou, 3 Gray 5 1 3 ,  5 1 4. 
E.-rceptions O'Vcrrulcd. 
Judgment for defend ant in  an action on the contract bC'c:rnse (as  
appC'ared by parol proof in the SC'cond action ) the plaint i ff  had not fu lly 
pC'rformecl .  was held no bar to an action on q11antum mrrrtit for the same 
services. Ros.snran v. Tille11y, 8o :M inn. 16o, 83 N. W. 42, 81 Am. St. 
Rep. 2-17· 
• 
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RUCKMAN v. UNION AILWAY, in Oregon Sup. Ct., Dec. 12, 19o4—
45 Ore. Q, , 78 Pac. 748, 69 L. R. A. 480.
BEAN, J. Upon the record, we have substantially this state
of facts: A party commenced a suit against another to compel
the surrendering up for cancellation of negotiable instruments on
the ground that they were never issued for value. Issue was
joined, the suit tried on the merits, and a decree rendered in
favor of the defendant. At the time the suit was commenced,
the plaintiff therein had two other grounds upon which he might
have recovered, neither of which, however, he set up or alleged
in the complaint. Thereafter, when the defendant in the former
suit, or the party who had succeeded to his interest with knowl-
edge, brought an action to enforce the payment of the instruments,
and to foreclose the lien given as security [*581] therefor, the
defendant therein and the plaintiff in the former suit pleads as
a defense the two matters which he might have relied upon for
relief in his first suit. The question for decision is whether he
is estopped by the former decree against him from pleading such
defenses.
It is settled law in this state, as elsewhere, that a judgment
or decree rendered upon the merits is a final and conclusive de-
termination of the rights of the parties, and a bar to a subsequent
proceeding between them upon the some claim or cause of suit,
not only as to the matter actually determined but as to every
other matter which the parties might have litigated and had_de‘-
cid d incident to or essentia ' therewith either a
a matter of claim r defense (Neil v. Tolman, 12 Or. 289, 7 Pac.
1o§;—_7ll0rrill v. Morrill <9 Killcn, 20 Or. 96, 25 Pac. 362, 11 L.
R. A. 155, 23 Am. St. Rep. 95; Belle v. Bro-zen, 37 Or. 588, 61
Pac. 1024; White v. Ladd, 41 Or. 324. 68 Pac. 739 93 Am. St.
Rep. 732), but that when the action is 11)on a or
demand the former ju< n can onl' rate as a bar or an
estoppEl'a?a—g'aiiis‘t matters actuallv litigated_;1r_q_uestiQn§_di_regtlv
ii1_;is'§1,1e1n‘t_____1er_act1on be M (Barrett v. Failing, 8 Or. 152;
Aflilegate v. Dowcll, 15 Or. 513, 16 Pac. 651; La Follett v.
Mitchell, 42 Or. 465, 69 Pac. 916, 95 Am. St. Rep. 780; Caseday
v. Lindstrom, 44 Or. 309, 75 Pac. 222; Gentry v. Pacific Lire
Stock C 0., 45 Or. 233, 77 Pac. 1 I 5). This distinction should always
be kept in mind in considering the effect of a former judgment or
decree or demand, the__forme.L_j.ud.g=ment-is__a__b§‘__ilo_t__on y as to matter?
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RUCKMAN v. UNION�AIL\YAY, in Oregon Sup. Ct., Dec. 12, 1904-
45 Ore. � . i8 Pac. 148, 6g L. R. A. 4&>. 
BE.\X, J. Upon the record, we have substantially this state 
of facts : A party commenced a suit against another to compel 
the surrendering up for cancellation of negotiable instruments on 
the ground that they were never issued for value. Issue was 
j oined, the suit tried on the merits, and a decree rendered in 
favor of the defendant. At the time the suit was commenced, 
the plaint iff therein had two other grounds upon which he might 
have recovered, neither of  which , however, he set up or alleged 
in the complaint. Thereafter, when the defendant in the former 
snit, or the party who had succeedecl to his in terest with knowl­
edge, brought an action to en force the payment of the instruments, 
and to foreclose the lien given as securit
.
y [ *581 ] therefor, the {defendant therein and the plaintiff in the former suit pleads as 
a defeme the two matters which he might have relied upon for 
rel ief in his first suit. The question for decision is  whether he 
is estoppcd by the former decree against him from pleading such 
defenses. 
It is settled law in thi s state, as elsewhere, that a judgment 
or decree rendered upon the merits is a final and conclusive de­
termination o f  the rights of the parties, and a bar to a subsequent 
proceeding between them upon the some claim or cause of suit, 
not only as to the· matter actually determined, but as to every 
other matter which the arties mi hthave l it i  ated and had de­
cid d incident to or essentia therewith · eithe; a
' 
a matter of claim or defense (Seil v. Tolman, 1 2 Or. 289, 7 Pac. 
103 ;  -�lorrill v. Morrill & Killen, 20 Or. ¢, 25 Pac. 362, I I  L. 
R. A. 1 55, 23 Am. St. Rep. 95 ; Belle v. Rro·wn, 37 Or. 588, 6 1  
Pac. 1 024 ; �Vliitc v. Ladd, 41  Or. 324, 68 Pac. 739 93 Am. St. 
Rep. 732 ) ,  but that when the action is u on a 
· · 
or 
demand the former J UC n can on · rate as a b __ ar or an 
estoppc! as agalriSt matters actuallv l it igate�t nr questions gj__r�ctly 
i�uc in the former action ( Barrett V. Failiug, 8 Or. 1 52 ; 
A pplt'gate v. Don·ell, 1 5  Or. 5 1 3 , 1 6  Pac. 6 5 1 ; La Follett v. 
M itchell, 42 Or. 465, 6c) Pac. 9 1 6 ,  95 Am. St. Rep. 78o ; Caseday 
v. Lindstrom, 44 Or. 309, 75 Pac. 222 ; Gen try v. Pacific Li'l ·e 
Stock Co., 45 Or. 233, 77 Pac. I I 5 ) .  This distinction should always 
be kept in mind in considering the effect of a former judgment or 
decree. If the second ac · or defense is upon the same claim 
or demand , the __ .former judg:JR@Rt iii a bar __ t_!�t on y as to matters 
actually det�rmine<l,  but such as_ c;oul_g __ haye_
-.been]iiiga.R:<II__but, 
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if it is upQ_n _another claim or demand, thegforme-_jndgment_is
not aibar, except as to questions actuzdly determmeel-—<-:'r-+l-irect.l_)g_
.,___1sS.11€in>‘.”Tl1is' case comes within the principle first stated. It
is a suit between the same parties and upon the same claim or
[*58z] demand as the former suit. The claim or demand in the
first suit brought by the defendant Union Street Railway against
the bank was the validity of the bonds, and the right of the bank "~ '
to enforce them as against it. Th~1ues_t_inn
presented, and_t_lle_qi_1ly one for adjudicatigg, in the present suit.
It“‘=i¢___[____._w is
a Q§£_t(&1Yti1eI"'fl%1ti0I1___.L_tE'?ar<?_01:_Ef_£L‘3§Il_lhfi-‘flint; parties, 31-
though the laintiff therem d1 not allege or urge all the reasons_
he law_r_eguires_ a_party to ’
try his whole suit or action at,one‘_ti[ng,_@cl_ he cannot separate
his clann or divide his grounds of §e_c_oye_ry_or_de£ense. The
application of this principle is illustrated by two federal cases.
In Patterson v. Wold (C. C.) 33 Fed. 791, the plaintiff, a receiver
of an insolvent estate, brought a suit to set aside a deed from the
insolvent to his son, and a mortgage given by the son to certain
creditors of the insolvent; alleging the deed to be without con-
sideration, and the mortgage a fraudulent preference. Judgment
was rendered for the defendants. Thereafter the plaintiff brought
another suit to avoid the same deed, alleging that the son was
a creditor of the father to the amount of $1,200, and that the-
land was conveyed to him in payment of this debt, and was a
fraudulent preference under the statute, and therefore void. The
court (Mr. Justice Brewer presiding) held that the first judg-
ment was a bar to the second, although the grounds of recovery
were different. After quoting Mr. Pomeroy’s analysis of the ele-
ments which constitute “a cause of action” (Pomeroy, Rem. &
Rem. Rights, § 519), he says: “Now what is the plaintiff's pri-
mary right, as alleged in these cases? Obviously, in each the
same-the right to have the land ; and the defendant’s correspond-
ing primary duty is to let him have the land; and the defendant's
delict or wrongful act is the [*583] failure to let him have the
land. These exist in each case, and in each case alike. It is
true, the basis of complainant's primary right is, as alleged,
different in one case from that in the other; but this is mere
difference, in the language of the Supreme Court, in ‘the ground
of recovery.’ The mere fact that different testimony would be
necessary to sustain the different allegations in the two bills does
not of itself necessarily make two distinct causes of action. Take
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this illustration: Suppose a party bring suit to recover possession
of real estate, and alleges in his complaint that he is the owner
by virtue of a patent from the government. After a judgment
against him, would he be permitted to maintain a second action,
alleging that he was the owner by virtue of certain tax proceedings
or by virtue of a judicial sale? Yet different testimony would
be requirred to sustian his allegations in the two actions. In
both of such actions plaintiff’s right—that of possession based
on ownership—would be the same, the only difference being in
the ground of recovery. All the grounds of recovery, all the‘,
basis of plaintiffs title, must be present in the first action, or they
are lost to him fo actly the same as when a artv sued
upon a note, and_havi_ng several defenses l —t e
balance are as thou h The party _who has
his ay in court must make his entire showmg. He cannot
support a claim or defense‘fTdTfl‘§r_ent;i§t_i§_)_rL$_Qn_diifeIent
gr_o_u11ds_.’_’ THéTéEEfi? case of United States V. California Land
Co., 192 U. S. 355, 24 Sup. Ct. 266, 48 L. Ed. 476, was a suit by
the government for the purpose of having a certain patent of land
declared void on the ground that the land was in Klamath Indian
Reservation, and therefore not within the provisions of the grant
to the company. One plea of the land company was that the
plaintiff had field an earlier bill against it to avoid the same
patent, that it had pleaded [*584] matter showing the patent to
be valid, and that it was an innocent purchaser, and that a final
decree on the merits had been rendered in its favor. The circuit
court held the plea to be bad, but upon an appeal the Supreme
Court reversed the case; holding that the former decree was a
bar, although the grounds of recovery were essentially different,
and it was urged that the plaintiff was suing in a different
capacity from that in which it brought the first suit. The court,
by Mr. Justice Holmes, said: “On the general principle of our
law, it is tolerably plain that the decree in the suit, under the
foregoing statute, would be a bar. The parties, the subject-mat-
ter, and the relief sought all were the same. * * * Here the
plaintiff is the same person that brought the former bill, whatever
the difference of the interests intended to be asserted. The best
that can be said, apart ‘from the act just quoted, to distinguish
the two suits, is that now the United States puts forward a new
ground for its prayer. Formerly it sought to avoid the patents
by way of forfeiture. Now it seeks the same conclusion by a
















































































































































2 1 0  CASES O� J l.'DCMENTS, ETC. 
this illustration : Suppose a party bring suit to recover possession 
of real estate, and alleges in his complaint that he is the owner 
by virtue of a patent from the government. After a judgment 
against him, would he be permitted to maintain a second action, 
alleging that he was the owner by virtue of certain tax proceedings 
or by virtue of a j udicial sale ? Yet different testimony would 
be requirred to sustian his allegations in the two actions. In 
both of such actions plaintiff's right-that of possession based 
on ownership----would be the same, the only difference being in 
the ground of recovery. All the grounds of recovery, all the< 
ba�is of plaintiff's title, must be present in the first action. or they' 
are. lost to him foreyer, e?Cactly the same as when a party sued 
upon a note, a11:.q_payi_ng several defem��s. pleads only one-tlie 
balance are as though they never exist@d, The party who has 
his day m court must make his entire showmg. He cannot 
support aclalm- Or defense m drffer��f aCtions on drrterent 
grounds_.�' The recent case of United States v. California Land 
Co., 192 U. S. 355, 24 Sup. Ct. 266, 48 L. Ed. 476, was a suit by 
the government for the purpose of having a certain patent of land 
<...... declared void on the ground that the land was in Klamath Indian 
Reservation, and therefore not within the provisions of the grant 
to the company. One plea of the land company was that the 
plaintiff had field an earlier bHl against it to avoid the same 
patent, that it had pleaded [ *584] matter showing the patent to 
be valid, and that it was an innocent purchaser, and that a final 
decree on the merits had been rendered in its favor. The circuit 
court held the plea to be bad, but upon an appeal the Supreme 
Court reversed the case ; holding that the former decree was a 
bar, although the grounds of recovery were essentially different, 
and it was urged that the plaintiff was suing in a different 
capacity from that in which it brought the first suit. The court, 
by Mr. Justice Holmes, said : "On the general principle of our 
law, it is tolerably plain that the decree in  the suit, under the 
foregoing statute, would be a bar. The parties, the subject-mat­
ter, and the relief sought all were the same. * * * Here the 
plaintiff is the same person that brought the former bill, whatever 
the difference of the intere!'\ts intended to be asserted. The best 
that can be said, apart from the act just quoted, to distinguish 
the two suits, is that now the United States puts forward a new 
ground for its prayer. Formerly it sought to ayoid the patents 
by way of forfeitu re. Xow it seeks the same conclusion by a 
different means ; that is to say, by evidence that the lands originally 
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were excepted from the grant. But in this as in the former suit
it seeks to establish its own title to the fee. It may be the law
in Scotland that a judgment is not a bar to a second attempt to
reach the same result by a different medium concludend-1'. * * *
But the whole tendency of our decisions is to require a plaintiff
6£E£I3FL§:L(2_§2__j@_h1Md3llU, * * * and a fortiori he
cannot (1v1 e the grounds of recovery. Unless the statute of
1889 put the former suit upon a peculiar footing, the United
States was bound then to bring forward all the grounds it had
for declaring the patents void, and, when the bill was dismissed,
was barred as to all by the decree.” These two cases and the
[*585] principles applied are decisive of the present suit. The
claim or demand of the defendant Union Street Railway Com-
pany in the suit brought by it was that the bank had no interest/,
in, the bogds, and they should be surrendered up for cancellation.
The reasons why this should be done were not the cause of action
or primary subject of inquiry. There may have been many
reasons why the bonds should have been surrendered up and
cancelled, and why the bank could not enforce them as against
the property of the railway company; i)tll;,£ll__C_],)l_£1i[1I,ifi_111__t11fi,t_
suit was content to rel u on] one of such reasons as
ground for recovery, the ot_h~p_letely_ a_s
they never existed.
‘The/p'o.sEi_on that the decree in the former suit is a bar to
the right of the plaintiff to foreclose the mortgage given to secure
the payment of the bonds is untenable, because that matter was
not germane to or connected with the cause of action or suit, and
did not in any way affect the merits of the controversy then be-
fore the court for determination. The bank was not the owner
f the onds, but held them as collateHl_s_eE1_ritfl_'_’_—-_ yforthedebtof
persons not parties to the suit. It was bound by the terms of
thehc6iftr—act’beti\'een it and the pledgors, and no decree of fore-
closure could have been made in the former suit. because the
proper parties were not before the court. Union St. Ry. Co. v.
First .\"atioual Bank, 42 Or. 606, 72 Pac. 586, 73 Pac. 341.
The decree of the court below will therefore be reversed,
and one entered here as prayed for in the complaint.
Reversed.
“Parties cannot try title to real estate by piecemeal in separate and
independ(nt actions upon separate deeds or claims of title, when they
have in their possession during the trial separate and different deeds."
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were excepted from the grant. But in this as in  the former suit 
it seeks to establ ish its own title to the fee. It may be the law 
in Scotland that a j udgment is not a bar to a second attempt to 
reach the same result by a different mediu m concludctid·i. * * * 
Ilut the whole ti::�£1t:n�v o f  our decisions is to reguire a plaintiff 
tOlfy hts whole cau�c of action and his whole case at on · 
e...._cannot even spl it up bjs claim, * * * and a fortio ri he cannot chv1de the grounds of recovery. Unless the statute of 
1889 put the former suit upon a pecul iar footing, the United 
States was bound then to bring forward all the grounds it had 
for declaring the patents void,  and, when the bill was dismissed, 
was barred as to all by the decree." These two cases and the 
[ *585 ] principles applied are decisive of the present suit. The 
claim or demand of the defendant Union Street Railway Com­
pany in the suit brought by it W1lS that the bank had no interest � 
in...the bonds. and they should be surrendered up for cancellation. 
The reasons why this should be done were not the cause of action 
or primary subject of inqu iry. There may have been many 
reasons why the bonds should have been surrendered up and 
cancelled, and why the bank could not enforce them as against 
the property of the railway company ; but, if the plaintiff in that 
suit was content to rel u onl ne of  such reasons as 
gr�und or recovery, the others are lost to it as complet�!.Y_ '!_s_jf_ 
they never existed. 
" 'I he position that the decree in the former suit i s  a bar to 
the right of the plaintiff to foreclose the mortgage given to secure 
the payment of  the bonds is untenable, because that matter was 
not germane to or connected with the cause of action or suit, and 
did not in any way affect the merits of the controversy then be­
fore the court for determination. The bank was not the owner 
of the bonds, but held them as collate?at security for the debt of  
perrnns not  parties to the  suit .  It was bound by the terms of  
thecor1tracCbefo·een it and the pledg-ors, and no decree of fore­
closure could have been made in the former suit. because the 
proper parties were not before the court. Union St. Ry. Co . v. 
First National Bmzk, 42 Or. 6o6, 72 Pac. 586, 73 Pac. 34 1 .  
The decree of  the court below will  therefore be reversed, 
and one entered here as prayed for in the complaint. 
RC"i. ·crsed. 
" Parties cannot try tit le to n?al estate by p i ecemeal in sepa rate and 
independ e n t  actions upon s eparate deeds or c la ims o f  tit le ,  when they 
have in their posse�' i0n during t h e  trial separate and di fferent deeds ."  
He11 tig , .. Rcddct1 ( 1891 ) ,  46 Kan.  23 1 ,  26 Pac, 7or .  26 Am. St. 9 r .  
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“The question presented in that case was the validity of the tax-deed
sought to be set aside. Six grounds were predicated in the petition,
upon which it was asked that it might be declared invalid. Five only
of these reasons were urged in this court, and, none of them being found
tenable, the deed was held to be valid. The defendants in this action
now rise precisely the same question, by attacking the validity of the
same deed, and ask in effect that it be set aside upon the sixth ground of
the petition, not urged in the former case; and this the trial court per-
mitted to be done. Surely it committed error in so doing, unless the
maxim, nemo bis I/exari pro eadem cause, be entirely disergandecl. If the
reasoning of counsel in support of this second attack be sound, then he
would have been in a better position if he had only urged one of the vices
charged against the deed in the first suit, and reserved the other five for
subsequent use, as occasion might demand. * * "‘ The mistake con-
sists in re ar ' ' cas arate and 1ndependenf_
cause 0 action. The settled law is that a final deer o e hit '
upon a sub troversy et-ween art1es to a suit therein is as rbin -
BLEAKLEY v. BARCLAY, in Kansas Sup. Ct., April 6, 19o7—75 Kan.
462, 89 Pac. 906, 10 L. R. A. (n. s.) 230.
Appeal from the judgment of the district court of Douglas
county awarding custody of a child to petitioners (Barclay) on a
writ of habeas corpus charging that appellant acquired possession
of the child by a decree of the circuit court of Rock Island county,
Illinois, and obtained such judgment by fraud and perjury in then
testifying that she was the mother of the child, when she knew
such was not the case; and “these petitioners direct the court’s at-
tention to the fact that circumstances are here presented unknown
to the said circuit court of Rock Island county and unknown to
these petitioners at the time of the hearing upon said writ of
habeas corpus, viz., that the child is not the child of the appellant.
Four errors are assigned: 1, denying the motion to quash the.
writ; 2, denying full faith and credit to the Illinois judgment;
3, permitting that judgment to be collaterally impeached; 4, per-
mitting testimony to be introduced under the petition.
PORTER, J. * * * The various assignments of error are all
predicated upon the force and effect of the Illinois judgment. If
that judgment is res judicata the motion to quash should have
been allowed, provided it sufiiciently appeared by the petition for
the writ that a court of competent jurisdiction had decided the
cause of action [*469] adversely to the petitioners. Obviously
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"The question presented in that case was the val idity of the tax-deed 
sought to be set aside. Six grounds were predicated in the petition, 
t?pon which it was asked that i t  might be declared invali.d. Five only 
of these rea:;ons  were urged in th is court, and, none of them being found 
tenable, the deed was held to be valid. The de fendants in this action 
now rise precisely the !'ame quest ion, by attacking the validity of the 
same deed , and ask in effect that it be set aside upon the si :-..1:h ground of 
the petition, not urged in the former case ; and this the trial court per­
mitted ·to be done. Su rely it committed error i n  so doing, unless the 
maxim , tiemo bis vexari pro eadem causa, be entirely disergar<led. I f  the 
reasoning of  counsel in support o f  th is second attack be sound, then he 
wou ld have been in a better position if he had only urged one of the vices 
ch arged against the deed in the first suit , and resoe rved the other five for 
subsequent use, as occasion might demand. * * * The mistake con-' sists in  re a · · : cas arate • and mdcpendent 
cause o action. The settled law is that a final de o e -uit :-upon-asublecr 1 troversy etween art1es to a su it therein is as bin -
:n a wou d oe a j U  men a ' Donnell v. Wrig It ( 1898 ' 147 Mo. 
' 49 . . 74. 
BLEAKLEY v. BARCLAY, in Kansas Sup. Ct., April 6, 1907-75 Kan. 
462, 8c) Pac. go6, 10 L. R. A. ( n. s. ) 230. 
Appeal from the j udgment of the district court of Douglas 
county awarding custody of a child to petitioners ( Barclay ) on a 
writ of habeas corpus charging that appellant acquired possession 
of the child by a decree of the circuit court of Rocle Island county, 
I ll inois, and obtained such judgment by fraud and perj ury in then 
• 
test ifying that she was the mother of the child, when she knew 
such was not the case ; and "these petitioners direct the court's at­
tention to the fact that ci rcumstances are here presented unknown 
to the said circuit court of Rock Island county and unknown to 
these petitioners at the time of the hearing upon said writ of 
habeas corpus, viz . ,  that the child is  not the child of the appellant. 
Four errors are assigned : I ,  denying the motion to quash the 
writ ; 2,  denying full faith and credit to the I llinois  j udgment ; 
3, permitting that j udgment to be collaterally impeached ; 4, per­
mitting test imony to be introduced under the petition. 
PORTER, J. * * * The various ass ignments of error are all 
pred icated upon the force and effect- of the Illinois j udgment. I f  ! that j udgment is res judicata the motion t o  quash should have 
been al lowed, provided it sufficiently appeared by the petition for 
the wri t  that a court of competent j urisdiction had decided the 
cause of action [*469] adversely to the petitioners. Obviously 
the petition was drawn upon the theory that the averments to the 
1"Il-'FI£C’l' OF Jl.'lIG.\II-I.\"l‘ AS BAR OR ESTOPPEI. 2I3
effect that the Illinois judgment was obtained by means of per-
jured testimony permitted a collateral attack upon the judgment.
It recites the name of the Illinois court and declares that it is a
court of competent jurisdiction; it alleges that the respondent ob-
tained a judgment of that court awarding her the custody of the
child, and the only ‘excuse alleged for invoking the aid of the
Kansas court is that the respondent procured the judgment by
false and perjured testimony. But fraud only inheres in the
judgment when it affects the jurisdiction; I10__0£l1_€l£fl(_L_Qfl11_b€
relied upon in a collateral attack. It is conceded that the Illinois
court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter.
This is elementary.' Third parties may impeach a judgment col->
laterally, because they are not bound by it. “Judgments of any
court can be im eached b strangers to them for fraud or ol-
lusion ; but no 'ud ment can be im eached for fraud by a party or
privy to it.” 2 Freeman, Judg. § 334. See, also, Field V. Sander-
s0n’s Adm’:e, 34 M0. 542, 86 Am. Dec. 124; Greene v. Greene,
68 Mass. 361, 61 Am. Dec. 454 ;El Capitan Land 6* Cattle Co. v.
Lees, 13 N. M. 487, 86 Pac. 924.
In Peck v. Woodbridge, 3 Day (Conn.) 30, false testimony
and forgery were alleged as grounds to impeach the former judg-
ment, but the foregoing rule was enforced because it was said to
be necessary to the administration of justice that when a case is
once finally decided it must be held to end the litigation between
the parties. The consequences of permitting such an attack are
apparent when we consider that if the Barclays could, in this pro-
ceeding, set aside the former judgment for the reason that it was
obtained by means of perjured testimony, it must follow that the
respondent would be entitled in still another proceeding [*47o]
to set up the same grounds to defeat the judgment in this. “l‘_he_
p3£tifiS_t0_811itiQu_cannOt-impeach-or1et—aLnanghLthe-judgment
in anv collateral prgceeding on the ggoungl that it was obtained
through fraud Q; collusion./lLis-tlaei~r-husiness__to_s_ee that it is
not so Qbtaiged.” 2 Freeman, Judg., § 334. See, also, Dilling v.
Murray, 6 Ind. 324, 63 Am. Dec. 385 ; Boston and Worcester Rail-
road Corporation v. Sparhawk <5‘ Wife, 83 Mass. 448, 79 Am.
Dec. 751 ;Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 25 Pac. 970, 27 Pac. 537, 13
L. R. A. 336, 25 Am. St. Rep. I59;Um'ted States v. Throckmorton,
98 U. S. 61, 25 L. Ed. 93. All courts are likely to be deceived by
perjured testimony, and 19 permit a defgated partito go to an-
















































































































































2I4 CASES ON JUDGMENTS, ETC.
same issues on the ground that the successful party had fraudu-
lently procured the former judgment upon false testimony would
make litigation endless and judgments as unsubstantial as the
stuff that dreams are made of. .
The respondent objected to the introduction of any testimony
under the pleadings, on the ground that all the issues had been
determined by the Illinois judgment. This was overruled, the
court holding that the question of motherhood was not an issue in
the former proceeding and that the only question involved was
the validity of the deed of adoption. It is one of the principal
contentions of the petitioners that the motherhood of the child
was not an issue in the former proceeding, but was excluded there-
from by a ruling of the court of Illinois. It appears that the Bar-
clays, after setting up the deed of adoption executed by Mrs.
Bleakley as the mother, attempted in another allegation of the
return to deny that she is the child’s mother, and a motion to strike
out the latter allegation as inconsistent with the former was al-
lowed. It therefore becomes necessary to inquire whether the
motherhood of this child was determined by the Illinois court. It
is elementary that the judgment rendered [*47I] and not the
opinion must be looked to in order to find the thing adjudged.
The reasoning of the court forms no part of the judgment. H 0p-
per v. Arnold, 74 Kan. 250, 86 Pac. 469. At the same time, the
inquiry is not always confined to the formal issues as defined by
the pleadings, nor to the formal parts of the judgment. In Redden
v. M etsger, 46 Kan. 285, 289, 26 Pac. 689, 26 Am. St. Rep. 97, the
following language from Burlen v. Shannon, 99 Mass. 200, 96
Am. Dec. 733, is quoted with approval: “The estoppel is not
confined to the judgment, but extends to all facts involved in it
as necessary steps or the groundwork upon which it must have
been founded. It is allowable to reason back from a judgment
to the basis on which it stands, ‘upon the obvious principle that,
where a conclusion is indisputable and could have been drawn
only from certain premises, the premises are equally indisputable
with the conelusion’."’ See, also, State Bank v. Rude, Adm’;r,
23 Kan. I43; Whitaker v. Han-Icy, 30 Kan. 317, 1 Pac. 508';
Shejmrd v. Stockham, 45 Kan. 244. 25 Pac. 559.
Mrs. Bleakley’s petition for the writ alleged that she was
the ehild’s mother. The return and answer alleged that as the
mother she had executed a deed of adoption. The court, b_v strik-
ing out as inconsistent the allegation that she was not the mother,
















































































































































CA SES o :o.;  J U DG :\I E N T S ,  ETC. 
I same issues on the ground that the successful party had fraudu­lently procured the fom1er j udgment upon false testimony would make litigation endless and j udgments as unsubstantial as the stuff that dreams are made of. The respondent obj ected to the introduction of any testimony 
under the pleadings, on the ground that all the issues had been 
determined by the Illinois judgment. This was overruled, the 
court holding that the question of motherhood was not an issue in 
the former proceeding and that the only question involved was 
the validity of the deed of adoption . It is one of the principal 
contentions of the petitioners that the motherhood of the child 
was not an issue in the former proceeding, but was excluded there­
from by a ruling of the court of I llinois. It appears that the Bar­
clays, after setting up the deed of adoption executed by Mrs. 
Bleakley as the mother, attempted in another allegation of the 
return to deny that she is the child's mother, a_nd a motion to strike 
out the latter allegation as inconsistent with the former was al­
lowed. It therefore becomes necessary to inquire whether the 
motherhood of this child was determined by the Illinois court. It  
i s  elementary that the judgment rendered [*47 1 ]  and not the 
opinion must be looked to in order to find the thing adjudged. 
The reasoning of the court forms no part of the judgment. Hop­
per v. Amold, 74 Kan. 250, 86 Pac. 469. At the same time, the 
inquiry is not always confined to the formal issues as defined by 
ihe pleadings, nor to the formal parts of the j udgment. In Redden 
v. 'Af et:;ger, 46 Kan. 285 , 289, 26 Pac. 689, 26 Am. St. Rep. 97, the 
fol lowing language from Burien, v. Shannon, 99 Mass. 200, 96 
Am. Dec. 733, i s  quoted with approval : "The estoppel is not 
confined to the j udgment, but extends to all facts involved in it 
as necessary steps or the groundwork upon which it must have 
been founded. It  is allowable to reason back from a j udgment 
to the basis on which it stands, 'upon the obvious principle that, 
where a conclusion is indisputable and could have been drawn 
only from certain premises, the premises are equally indisputable 
with the conclusion' ." See, also, State Bank v. Rude .. A dm'.i-, 
23 Kan. 143 ; iVhitaker v. Hawley, 30 Kan. 3 1 7, r Pac. 508" ; 
Shepard v. Stockham, 45 Kan. 244, 25 Pac. 559. 
l\frs.  Bleakley's petition for the writ alleged that she was 
the child's mother. The return and answer al leged that a s  the 
mother she had executed a deed of adoption. The court, by strik­
ing out as incon �i stent the allegation that she was not the mother, 
held that the other allegations admi tted the contrary to he true .  
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At the close of the evidence the Barclays filed a motion for judg-
ment. on the ground, among others, that “it is not shown that the
said infant is the child of the relator,” recognizing clearly that
the motherhood of the child was involved as a primary fact. The
court denied this motion, and after holding the deed of adoption
void for the reason that it did not conform to the laws in relation
to the adoption of children in force in Illinois, where the Barclays
resided when they executed it, nor to those in force in Missouri,
where the child was at the time, nor to the laws of Kansas, where
the mother of the child resided when she executed [*472] it, also
made as a part of the judgment the following: “The court fur-
ther finds that the said Edith Bleakley is the daughter of the said
Charlotte E. Bleakley and J. J. Bleakley, and that she was born
on the 15th day of February, A. D. 1904.”
It is said in volume 2 of the second edition of Black on
Judgments, section 614: “The doctrine of res judicata does not
rest upon the fact that a particular proposition has been affirmed
and denied in the pleadings, but upon the fact that it has been
fully and fairly investigated and tried—that the parties have had
an adequate opportunity to say and prove all that they can in rela-
tion to it, that the minds of court and jury have been brought to
bear upon it, and so it has been solemnly and finally adjudicated.
‘‘ * * For these reasons, the more correct doctrine is that the
estoppel covers the point which was actually litigated, and which
actually determined the verdict or finding, whether it was statedly
and technically in issue or not.” How can it be said that the fact
that the respondent is the mother was not essential to that part of
the judgment holding the deed of adoption void because it failed
to comply with the laws of Kansas, where the mother of the child
resided, or that, in determining the invalidity of the deed, the mind
of the court was not brought to bear upon it so that it has been
judicially decided? In addition, there is the adjudication in the
judgment itself that Mrs. Bleakley is the child's mother. True, it
was not presented by the pleadings as an issue in the sense of
being affirmed on the one side and denied on the other. for the
Barclays admitted it by seeking to establish their claims upon the
basis of its truth. They claimed through and under Mrs. Bleak-
ley as the mother, and cannot now, after submitting their claims
upon that theory, be permitted to set up the contrary. “It is not
necessary to the conclusiveness of the former judgment that issue
should have been taken [*473] upon the precise point which it is
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At the close of the evidence the Barclays filed a motion for j udg­
ment. on the ground, among others, that "it is not shown that the 
said infant is the child of the relator," recognizing clearly that 
the motherhood of the child was involved as a primary fact. The 
court denied this motion, and after holding the deed of adoption 
void for the reason that it did not conform to the laws in relation 
to the adoption of children in force in Illinois, where the Barclays 
resided when they executed it, nor to those in force in Missouri, 
where the child was at the time, nor to the laws of Kansas, where 
the mother of the child resided when she executed [*472]  it, also 
made as a part of the j udgment the following : "The court fur­
ther finds that the said Edith Bleakley is the daughter of the said 
Charlotte E. Bleakley and J .  J .  Bleakley, and that she was born 
on the 1 5th day of February, A. D. 1904." 
It is said in  volume 2 of the second edition of Black on 
J u<lgments, section 614 : "The doctrine of res judicata does not 
rest upon the fact that a particular proposition has been affirmed 
and denied in the pleadings, but upon the fact that it has been 
fully and fairly investigated and tried-that the parties have had 
an adequate opportunity to say and prove all that they can in rela­
tion to it, that the minds of court and jury have been brought to 
bear upon it, and so it has been solemnly and finally adj udicated. 
* * * For these reasons, the more correct doctrine is that the 
estoppel covers the point which was actually litigated , and which 
actually determined the verdict or finding, whether it was statedly 
and technically in issue or not." How can it be said that the fact 
that the respondent is the mother was not essential to that part of 
the j udgment holding the deed of adoption void because it failed 
to comply with the laws of Kansas, where the mother of the chil<l 
re5ided, or that, in determining the invalidity of the deed, the mind 
of the court was not brought to bear upon it so that it has been 
j udicially decided ? In addition, there is the adj udication in the 
j udgment itsel f that l\frs. Bleakley is the child's mother. True, it 
was not presented by the pleadings as an issue in the sense o f  
being affirmed on  the one side and denied on  the other, for the 
Barclays admitted it by seek ing to establ ish their claims upon the 
basis of its truth. They claimed through and under Mrs .  Bleak­
ley as the mother, and cannot now, after submitting their  claims 
upon that theory, be permitted to set up the contrary. "I t  is not 
necessary to the conclusiveness of the former j udgment that issue 
should have been taken [ *473] upon the precise point which it is 
proposed to controvert in the collateral action. It is  sufficient i f  
' 
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that point was essential to the former judgment.” Lee v. Kings-
bury, 13 Tex. 68, 71, 62 Am. Dec. 546.
The contention of the Barclays that the deed of adoption
was valid could only have been sustained upon the theory that it
was executed by the mother. On the other hand, the judgment
in favor of Mrs. Blcakley could not have been rested upon any
other ground than that her claim to be the child’s mother was
found by the court to be true. VVithin the rule approved in
Reddcn v. M etsger, 46 Kan. 285, 26 Pac. 689, 26 Am. St. Rep. 97,
it is apparent that by reasoning back from the judgment to the
basis on which it stands we find the judgment could only be based
upon the premise of motherhood, and this premise is as much a
thing adjudicated as the conclusion itself. \V e have no hesitation
in reaching the conclusion that the question of motherhood was
inscparably interwoven with the proceedings in Illinois and was
judicially determined therein. The action of that court in allow-
ing the motion to strike out inconsistent allegations in the return
did not have the effect which is now claimed. The ground upon
which relief is sought in this proceeding is that Mrs. Bleakley
procured that judgment by falsely swearing to a fact which it is
now said was never in issue.
The petitioners contend that the decree of the Illinois court
did not deprive the Kansas court of jurisdiction to hear and de-
termine another habeas corpus proceeding, for the reason that the
record discloses a change in the situation and conditions sur-
rounding the child from what was disclosed to the Illinois court.
The changed conditions which it is argued are sufiicient to war-
rant the interference of the Kansas court are said to consist of
certain facts which it is urged are disclosed for the first time upon
the trial of this case, and which it is claimed establish beyond
question that the respondent is a perjurer and [*474] an abor-
tionist, and therefore morally unfit to have the custody of the
child. These facts, it is argued, make it the solemn duty of the
Kansas courts to take the child from her and give it to the peti-
tioners. The charge of perjury is based upon the claim that she is
not the child’s mother, and that therefore her testimony in
Illinois was false. The respondent brings up none of the evidence,
and, while it is true that the petitioners are entitled to every pre-
sumption that the evidence was sufiicient to support the j udgment,
that presumption only goes to the extent of covering such facts
as the pleadings would warrant evidence upon. There is no in-
















































































































































2 16 CASES ON J t:DG M ENTS, ETC. 
that point was essential to the former judgment." Lee v. Kings­
bur3•, 1 3  Tex. 68, 7 1 ,  62 Am. Dec. 546. 
The contention of the Barclays that the deed of adoption 
was valid could only have been sustained upon the theory that it  
was executed by the mother. On the other hand, the j udgment 
in favor of Mrs. Bleakley could not have been rested upon any 






























' J' as1s on w 1c 1t stan s we n t e J U  gment cou on y e ase upon the premise of motherhood, and this premise is as much a thing adj udicated as the conclusion itself. We have no hesitation 
in reaching the conclusion that the question of motherhood was · \ 
inseparably interwoven with the proceedings in Illinois and was -� 
j udicially determined therein. The action of that court in allow- \ 
ing the motion to strike out inconsistent allegations in the return • ( 
did not have the effect which is now claimed. The ground upon K 
which relief is sought in this proceeding is that Mrs. Bleakley ,,.,:� 
procured that j udgment by falsely swearing to a fact which it is • 
now said was never in issue. 
The petitioners contend that the decree of the Illinois court 
did not deprive the Kansas court of j urisdiction to hear and de­
termine another habeas corp1's proceeding, for the reason that the 
record discloses a change in the situation and conditions sur­
rounding the child from what was disclosed to the Illinois court. 
The changed conditions which it is argued are sufficient to war­
rant the interference of the Kansas court are said to consist o f  
certain facts which it i s  urged are disclosed for the first time upon 
the trial of this case, and which it is claimed establish beyond 
question that the respondent is a perj urer and [*474] an abor­
tionist, and therefore morally unfit to have the custody of the 
child. These facts, it is argued, make it the solemn duty of the 
Kansas courts to take the child from her and give it to the peti­
tioners. The charge of perj ury is based upon the claim that she is 
not the child's mother, and that therefore her testimony in 
Illinois was false. The respondent brings up none of the evidence, 
and, while it is true that the petitioners are entitled to every pre­
sumption that the evidence was sufficient to support the judgment, 
that presumption only goes to the extent of covering such facts 
as the pleadings would warrant evidence upon. There is no in­
ference from the j udgment that there was evidence that Mrs. 
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Bleakley is or ever was an abortiotiist. We would have as much
right to infer from the judgment that she was an ex-convict or a
shoplifter; for there is no word or charge in the pleadings inti-
mating that she is or ever has been guilty of any immoral con-
duct, except the allegation‘ that on the former trial she com-
mitted perjury. It must be admitted that even this charge was
not made for the purpose of showing a change in the conditions
surrounding the child, but solely for the purpose of furnishing
grounds upon which to attack the validity of the former judgment.
If Mrs. Bleakley is the mother, then she was not guilty of perjury
or abortion; so that the charges of immorality are interwoven
with the question whether in fact she is the mother, which we
have seen was decided in her favor. * * * [*476] Having de-
termined that the former judgment cannot be attacked on the
ground of fraud in obtaining it by means of false testimony, that
the question of the motherhood of the child was determined by
that judgment, and that the judgment also found Mrs. Bleakley
to be a suitable person to have, and that she is entitled to, the
child's custody, there remains the single question, \'Vhat effect
shall be given here to that judgment? This question can have
but one answer. Section I of article 4 of the constitution of the
United States requires that full faith and credit be given to the
judgments of sister states. This court will take judicial notice
that the circuit court of Illinois is a superior court of general
original jurisdiction. Butcher v. The Bank of Brozwm-ille, 2 Kan.
7o, 83 Am. Dec. 446; Dodge v. Cofiin, I5 Kan. 277; Poll v. Hicks,
67 Kan. I91, 72 Pac. 847. A judgment of a superior court of one
state must be given the same effect in all respects in another state
as in the state where it was rendered. Barnes 6' Drake v. Gibbs
et al., 31 N. J. Law 317, 86 Am. Dec. 210; Cook v. Tlzornhill,
13 Tex. 293, 65 Am. Dec. 63; Bank of North America v. Wheeler,
28 Conn. 433, 73 Am. Dec. 683; Ambler v. Whipple, 139 I1]. 311,
28 N. E. 841, 32 Am. St. Rep. 202, and note; Welch et al. v. Sykes,
8 I11. 197, 44 Am. Dec. 689; Renaud v. Abbott, 116 U. S. 277, 6
Sup. Ct. 1194, 29 L. Ed. 629. _* * * [*477] The petitioners con-
tend, however, that a judgment in habeas corlms for the custody
of a child is not res judicata, and rely upon the case of In re King,
66 Kan. 695, 72 Pac. 263, 67 L. R. A. 783, 97 Am. St. Rep. 399.
In Bleakley v. Smart, 74 Kan. 476, 87 Pac. 76, it was said, how-
ever, that the decision in In re King is not in conflict with the
doctrine declared in the case In re Hamilton, 66 Kan. 754, 71
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Bleakley i s  o r  ever was an abortioriist. W e  would have a s  much 
right to infer from the j udgment that she was an ex-convict er a 
shoplifter ; for there is no word or charge in the pleadings inti­
mating that she is or ever has been guilty of any immoral con­
duct, except the allegatior. that on the former trial she com­
mitted perjury. I t  must be admitted that even this chargt. '' a ·  
not made for the purpose o f  showing a change i n  the conditiom 
surrounding the child, but solely for the purpose of furnishing 
grounds upon which to attack the valid ity of the former judgment. 
If Mrs. Bleakley is the mother, then she was not guilty of perj ury 
or abortion ; so that the charges of immoral ity are interwoven 
with the question whether in fact she is the mother, which we 
have seen was decided in her favor. * * * [*476] Having de­
termined that the former judgment cannot be att�cked on the 
ground of fraud in obtaining it by means of false testimony, that 
the question of the motherhood of the child was determined by 
that j udgment, and that the j udgment also found Mrs. Bleakley 
to be a suitable person to have, and that she is entitled to, the 
child's custody, there remains the single question , \Vhat effect 
shall be given here to that j udgment ? This question can have 
but one answer. Section I of article 4 of the constitution of the 
Un ited States requires that full faith and credit be given to the 
judgments of sister states. This court will take j udicial notice 
that the circuit court of Ill inois is a superior court of general 
original juri sdiction. Bu tcher v. The Bank of Bror.m1s1.tillc, 2 Kan. 
70, 83 Am. Dec. 446 ; Dodge v. Coflln, 1 5  Kan. 277 ; Poll v. Hicks, 
67 Kan. 1 9 1 ,  72 Pac. 847. A judgment of a superior court of one 
state must be given the same effect in all respects in another state 
as in the state where it was rendered. Barnes & Drake v. Gibbs 
et al., 3 1  N. J. Law 3 1 7, 86 Arn. Dec. 2 1 0 ; Cook v. Tlrornhill, 
1 3  Tex. 293, 65 Am. Dec. 63 ; Bank of North A merica v. 1¥h ecler, 
28 Conn. 433, 73 Am. Dec. 683 ; A mbler v. �Vhipple, 1 39 Ill . 3 1 1 ,  
28 N .  E .  84 1 ,  3 2  Am. St. Rep. 202, and note ; Welch e t  al. v .  Sykes, 
8 Il l .  1 97, 44 Am. Dec. 689 ; Renaud v. A bbott, I I 6 U. S. 277, 6 
Sup. Ct. 1 194, 29 L. Ed. 629 . .  * * * [ *477] The petitioners con­
tend , however, that a j udgment in habeas corpus for the custody 
of a child is not res judica.fa, and rely upon the case of In re King, 
66 Kan . 6<)5, 72 Pac. 263 , 67 L. R. A.  783, 97 Am. St. Rep. 399. 
In Bleakley v. Smart, 74 Kan. 476, 87 Pac. 76, it was said, how­
ever, that the decision in In re King is not in conflict with the 
doctrine declared in the case In re Hamilton, 66 Kan. 754, 7 r  
Pac. 8 1 7, nor opposed to the following statement o f  the law in 
2i8 cnsas on JUDGMENTS, ETC.
volume I of the fourth edition of Freeman on judgments, section
324: “The principle of res judicata is also applicable to proceed-
ings on habeas corfms, so far at least as they involve an inquiry
into and a determination of the rights of conflicting claimants to
the custody of minor children.” Vi/e are satisfied that the weight
of authority and sound reasoning support the doctrine that where
the rights of conflicting claimants to the custody of a child are
involved and determined in habeas corfms proceedings the judg-
ment is binding and conclusive, and bars subsequent proceedings
by the same parties upon the same state of facts. ,(To the same
effect see Cormach v. .’lIar.rhaIl, 211 I11. 519, 71 N. E. 1077, 67
L. R. A. 787, and Mahon v. The People, 218 Ill. 17!, 75 N. E.
768.) The trial court erred in refusing to give to the Illinois judg-
ment the faithand credit required by the constitution and the laws
made in pursuance thereof. * * * The judgment is reversed and
the cause remanded, with directions to enter judgment for the
respondent for costs.
That a judgment was obtained by fraud is ground for injunction in
the same or any other state to restrain enforcing it, and where the law of
the state where the judgment is -sued on permits such defenses to a suit on
a domestic judgment, it may equally be interposed in defense of a judg-
ment of a court of a sister state. Some courts permit such defenses
even in justice courts. Levin v. Gladstein (1906), 142 N. Car. 482, 55
S. E. 371, [I5 Am. St. Rep. 747.
ESTOPPEL IN ANOTHER ACTION FOR ANOTHER
CAUSE.
In General.
JOHN BROKE‘/S CASE; in Common Pleas of England, Hilary term 9
Henry VI, A. D. I43I—Yearb0ok 9 H. VI, pl. 67.
In a writ of trespass against one John Broke. Newton:
This same J. Broke and A. his wife were seized of the manor of
B as of the right of A to which manor this same plaintiff is
villain rrgardant; and the said J. B., and A., his wife, and all
those whose estates they had in the said manor had been seized
of the plaintiff and his ancestors as villains rcgardant of the same
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volume I of the fourth edition of Freem�n on Judgments , section 
324 : "The principle of res judicata is also applicable to proceed ­
ings on lzabcas corpus, so far at least as they involve an inqu iry 
into and a determination of the rights of conflicting claimants to 
the custody of minor children." \Ve are satisfied that the weight 
of  author i ty and sound reason ing support the doctrine that where 
the rights of conflicting claimants to the custody of a child are 
involved and determined in habeas corpus proceedings the j udg­
ment i s  binding and conclusive, and bars subsequent proceedings 
by the same parties upon the same state of facts. . (To the same 
effect see Corm ach v . •  Uarslzall, 2 1  I Il l .  5 19, 7 1  N. E. 1077, 67 
L. R. A. 787 , and .Mahon v. The People, 2 1 8  I ll. 1 7 1 , 75 N .  E. 
768. ) The trial court erred in refusing to give to the Illinois j udg­
ment the faith and credit required by the constitution and the laws 
made in pursuance thereof. * * * The judgment is reversed and 
the cause remanded, with directions to enter judgment for the 
respondent for costs. 
That a j udgml'nt was obtained by fraud i s  ground for injunction in 
the same or any other state to restrain en forcing i t, and where the Jaw of 
the state where the judgment i s  ·sued on permits such de fenses to a suit on 
a domestic j udgment, it may equally be interposed in  defense of  a judg­
ment o f  a court of a sister state. Some courts permit such defenses 
even in  justice cou rts. Levin v. Gfodstein ( 19o6) , 142 N. Car. 482, 55 
S. E. 371, 1 15 Am. St. Rep. 747. 
ESTOPPEL IN ANOTHER ACTION FOR ANOTHER 
CAUSE. 
In General. 
JOHN BROKE'S CASE, in Common Pleas of England, Hilary term 9 
Henry VI, A. D. 1431-Yearbook 9 H. VI, pl. 67. 
In a writ of  trespass against one John Broke. Newton : 
This same J. Broke and A. his wife were seized of the manor of 
B as of the right of A to which manor this same plain tiff is 
7.•illcin rcgardant; and the said J. B., and A., his wife, and all 
those whose estates they had in the said manor had been seized 
of the plaintiff and his ancestors as 7.iillcins re gardant of the same 
manor from the time &c. * * * Rolf said that this same plain-
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tiff heretofore brought a writ of trespass against one A who
was then seized of the said manor in his demesne as of fee; and
the said A claimed that the said plaintiff was his villain to the
same manor; and he pleaded free, &c., which was found for him;
and afterwards the said A brought attaint of this, whereon the
first inquest was affirmed ; which estate the defendant has. And
he demanded judgment if he should be allowed to say the plain-
tiff is cfllcin rcgardant of the said manor; and he produced the
record exemplified. BABINGTON [C.J.]: This may not estop
in any manner; for you have not made him that is now defendant
nor his wife heir of said A who was party to the record. Rolf:
But we have shown that he that is now defendant has the estate
of said A; and in whatever manner he should be estopped, in the
same manner shall each be who is in through him. MARTIN [J.]
(to Rolf): This is a stronger case against you because he is a
stranger to the record. PASTON [J.] :To my mind it is reason
that he who has the manor should be estopped by this record, or
otherwise each who is in- such case after this that his riilleiii is
found free may make a feoffment, and the feoffee would not be
estopped to claim him that was found free as his villain, &c. * * *
To which Newton said that the said A was not seized of the said
manor in his demesne as of fee at the time of the said writ of tres-
pass purchased nor at any time pending the record: ready, and
the other to the contrary.
DUCHESS OF KINGSTON’S CASE, in House of Lords of England,
April 15-22, 16 Geo. III, A. D. 1776-Howell's State Trials No.
551, 2 Smith's Leading Cases *424, 1 Leach's Crown Cases 173, Am-
bler 756, 763.
Trial by the House of Lords, for bigamy. Elizabeth, calling
herself duchess dowager of Kingston, the defendant herein, was
indicted at Hicks hall, Middlesex, at the general session in oyer
and terminer, for that, being the lawful wife of Augustus John
Hervey, now Earl of Bristol, she feloniously married Evelyn
Pierrepont, late Duke of Kingston. She was granted a removal of
the prosecution to the House of Lords, there to be tried; and
Henry, Earl of Bathurst, chancellor, was specially appointed lord
high steward to preside at the trial. Upon being arraigned before
the assembled lords in VVestminster hall, Monday, April I 5, she
pleaded not guilty, asked trial by her peers, and, without waiting
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tiff heretofore brought a writ o f  trespass against one A who 
was then seized of the said manor in his demesne as of fee ; and 
the said A claimed that the said plaintiff was his villei1i to the 
same manor ; and he pleaded free, &c., which was found for him ; 
and afterwards the said A brought attaint of this, whereon the 
first inquest was affirmed ; which estate the defendant has. And 
he demanded j udgment if  he should be allowed to say the plain­
tiff is -.:illein rcgardant of the said manor ; and he produced the 
record exemplified. BABINGTON [C.J . ] : This may not estop 
: n  any manner ; for you have not made him that is now defendant 
:ior his wife heir of said A who was party to the record. Rolf : 
But we have shown that he that is now defendant has the estate 
of said A ;  and in whatever manner he should be estopped,  in the 
same manner shall each be who is in through him. MARTIN [J .]  
( to Rolf)  : This is a stronger case against you because he is a 
stranger to the record. PASTON []. ] :To my mind it is reason 
that he who has the manor should be estopped by this record , or 
otherwise each who is in· such case after this that his villein is  
found free may make a feoffment, and the feoffee would not be 
estopped to claim him that was found free as his villei11,, &c. * * * 
To which N C'"&ton said that the said A was not seized of the said 
manor in his demes11e as of fee at the time of the said writ of tres­
pass purchased nor at any time pending the record : ready, and 
the other to the contrary. 
DUCHESS OF KI NGSTON'S CASE, in House of Lords of England, 
April 15-22, 16 Geo. I I I, A. D. 1776-Howe1l's State Trials No. 
55 1,  2 Smith's Leading Cases *424. I Leach's Crown Cases 173, Am­
bler 756, 763. 
Trial by the House of  Lords, for bigamy. Elizabeth, calling 
herself duchess dowager of Kingston, the defendant herein, was 
indicted at Hicks hall, l\:I iddlesex, at the general session in oyer 
and terminer, for that, being the lawful wife of Augustus John 
Hervey, now Earl of Bristol, she feloniously married Evelyn 
Pierrepont, late Duke of Kingston. She was granted a removal of 
the prosecution to the House of Lords, there to be tried ; and 
Henry, Earl of Bathurst, chancellor, was specially appointed lord 
high steward to preside at the trial . Upon being arraigned before 
the assembled lords in \Vestminster hall, Monday, April I 5,  she 
pleaded not guilty, asked trial by her peers , and, without waiting 
for the attorney general to open the case for the prosecution, ad-
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dressed the lords; saying, that she had brought a suit in the con-
sistory court of the bishop of London against said.Hervey for
boasting that they were married; to which he had appeared and
affirmed his claim; and that by the sentence of said court it was
decreed that she was free from all matrimonial contracts or
espousals with the said Hervey; and that she was advised that the
said decree, still in force and unimpeached, which she then asked
leave to offer in evidence, was conclusive, and that no other evi-
dence ought to be offered or stated respecting such pretended mar-
riage. Thereupon the lords listened for three days to elaborate
arguments on both sides by the ablest counsel in England as to
the admissibility and effect of the proposed evidence. The fol-
lowing are selected passages from these arguments.
The principal points argued were put into the following two
questions to the judges, framed by Sir Francis Hargrave, who
assisted the prosecution.
Friday, A pril 19th, 1776. ORDERED by the lords spiritual and
temporal in parliament assembled, that the following questions be
put to the judges, viz. :—
I. Vl/hether a sentence of the spiritual court against a mar-
riage in a suit for jactitation of marriage is conclusive evidence so
as to stop the counsel for the crown from proving the said mar-
riage in an indictment for polygamy?
2. VVhether, admitting such sentence to be conclusive upon
such indictment, the counsel for the crown may be admitted to-
avoid the effect of such sentence, by proving the same to have been
obtained by fraud or collusion?
April 15. Mr. Wallace for the prisoner: It is for me to submit to-
your lordships, that this sentence is conclusive as long as it remains in
force. and that of necessity it must be received in evidence in all courts
and in all places where the subject of that marriage can become matter
of dispute. I shall beg to refer your lordships to Bunting v. Le[u'ngwe[
(28 Eliz.), 4 Coke 29. Bunting libeled against the wife of Tweede,
claiming under a prc-contract, and the spiritual court enforced that con-
tract. Afterwards, on the death of Bunting, a question arose between
the issue of the second marriage and the collateral relations of Bunting,
the collateral relations insisting that the second marriage was utterly
void because there had existed a first marriage. The resolution of the
court was, that he being then de facto -the husband, though he was not a
party to the suit nor in the ecclesiastical court, yet the sentence against
the wife should bind the ‘husband de facto. My Lord Coke has also re-
ported Kenn’.r Case (40 Eliz.), 7 Coke 42. Kenn married E. Stowell and
had issue; after-wards the ecclesiastical court passed sentence of divorce
between Keen and the lady, who were not of the age of consent at the
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dressed the lords ; saying, that she had brought a suit in the con­
sistory court of the bishop of London against said . Hervey for 
boasting that they were married ; to which he had appeared and 
affirmed his claim ; and that by the sentence of said court it was 
decreed that she was free from all matrimonial contracts or 
espousals with the said Hervey ; and that she was advised that the 
said decree, still in force and unimpeached, which she then asked 
leave to offer in evidence, was conclusive, and that no other evi­
dence ought to be offered or stated respecting such pretended mar­
riage. Thereupon the lords li stened for three days to elaborate 
arguments on both sides by the ablest cou.nsel in England as to 
the admissibility and effect of the proposed evidence. The fol­
lowing are selected passages from these arguments. 
The principal points argued were put into the following two 
questions to the judges, framed by Sir  Francis Hargrave, who 
assisted the prosecution. 
Friday, April 19th, 1776. ORDERED by the lords spiritual and 
temporal in parliament assembled, that the following questions be 
put to the judges, viz. :-
I .  \Vhether a sentence of the spiritual court against a mar­
riage in a suit for jactitation of marriage is conclusive evidence so 
as to stop the counsel for the crown from proving the said mar­
riage in an ipdictment for polygamy ? 
2. \Vhether, admitting such sentence to be conclusive upon 
such indictment, the counsel for the crown may be admitted to 
avoid the effect of such sentence, by proving the same to have been 
obtained by fraud or collusion ? 
April 15 .  Mr. Wallace for the prisoner : It i s  fo r me to submit to 
your lordships, that this sen tence is conclusive as long as it remain s in 
force, and that o f  necessity it must be received i n  evidence in all courts 
anrt in all p.laces where the subj ect of that marriage can become matter 
of dii;pute. I shall beg to re fer your lordships to Bun ting v. LepingweT 
(28 Eliz. ) ,  4 Coke 29. Bunting libeled agai n st the wife  o f  Tweede, 
claiming under a pre-contract, and the spiritual court en forced that con­
tract. Afte rwards,  on the death of Bunting, a q uestion arose he tween 
the issue of the second marriage and the col lateral relations of Bunting, 
the collate ral relations insisting th at the second marriage was utterly 
void  ·because there had exis.ted a first marriage. The resolution of the 
court v; a c;, that he be ing then de facto the husband, th ough he was not a 
party to the suit  nor in the eccl esiastical court, yet the sentence agai nst 
th e w i fe shoul d bind the ·h usband de facto. My Lord Coke has also re­
ported Kenn's Case (40 Eliz. ) ,  7 Coke 42. Kenn married E. Stowdl and 
had issue ; a fterwards th e ecclesfastical court pa ssed sentence of d ivorce  
between Keen and the  lady, who were not o f  the age of  consent at the 
t ime of the marriage ; and in consequence of  this sentence he married" 
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a second wife. The issue of the first wife claiming the inheritance, ex-
hibited a bill in the count of -wards of that day, in or-der to have the
benefit of the succession. ' It was urged that the question related to an
inheritance of which the ecclesiastical court had no jurisdiction; but the
court then conceived themselves so far bound by the decision of the
ecclesiastical court, though founded on false suggestion, that they held
the plaintiff in that cause not entitled to any relief. My lords, the same
doctrine is laid down by my Lord Chief Justice Holt in BIaclcl1am’s Case
(7 Anne), I Salk. 290. It turns upon the claim of property of a woman
deceased. Plaintiff proved -the goods to have been in his possession and
to have been taken away by the defendant. Defendant showed that he
had taken out letters of administration to her and so entitled to the
goods. Upon this plaintiff proved that some days before her death she
was actually married to him. In answer it was insisted that the spiritual
court had determined the right to be in the defendant; for they could
not have granted administration to the defendant but upon supposition
that there was no such marriage, and that this sentence, being a matter
within their jurisdiction, was conclusive. My Lord Holt said: “A matter
which has been directly determined by their sentence cannot be gainsaid;
their -sentence is conclusive in such cases, and no evidence shall be ad-
mitted to prove the contrary; but it must be in a point directly tried."
My lords, it is not pecul-iar to the case of marriage. It is so in the
granting of letters of administration it is so in the probate of wills;
if a will is forged, if a will is fraudulently obtained of a personal estate,
of which the ecclesiastical court has the jurisdiction, if that court has
granted a probate, it is not open to a court of common law, it is not
open to a court of equity, to enter into the fraud made use of in ob-
taining the will, or to the forgery committed upon a testator. I shall
refer your lordships to a case or two upon that ‘head. Noel v. Wells,
I Lev. 235, was an action brought by the executrix of the husband, and
upon the trial the plaintiff produced the probate of the will in evidence.
The defendant insisted that the will was forged; and the chief justice
before whom it was tried was of the opinion that he could not give
such evidence directly against the seal of the ordinary in any things
within his jurisdiction. My lords, the same doctrine is to be found in
the case of Barnsby v. Kendrick, which was determined by the house
of lords Barnsby filed a bill to set aside a will for fraud and imposi-
tion. The chancellor decreed that the executor stand as trustee for the
next of kin. The House of Lords reversed the decree upon the ground
that it was not competent for a court of c-hancery to examine into fraud
and imposition in a will touching personal estates; that the court of
ecclesiastical jurisdiction had decided that point; that it was no longer
open to discussion. King v. Vincent, I Strange 481, was an indictment
for forging a will of personal estate. On the trial the forgery was
proved; but the defendant producing a probate, that was held to be
conclusive evidence to support the will, and the defendant was acquitted.
Dr. l/Vyimc, also for the prisoner: My lords, not to rest the matter
merely upon authority, however strong, if your lords-hips consider the
grounds upon which -these determinations were made, I apprehend they
will be founded not only in justice, but in absolute necessity; and that
the confusion would have been so infinitely great, if, admitting difierent
courts to take cognizance of different matters, their sentences should‘
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a second wife. The issue of the fi rst w i fe claiming the inheritance, ex­
hibited a bill in the court of wards of that day, in order to have the 
benefi t  o f  the succession. · It  was urged that the question related .to an 
inheritance of which the ecclesiastical court had no j urisdiction ; but the 
court then conceived themselves so far bound by the decision of the 
eccl esiastical court, though founded on false suggestion, that they h eld 
the plaintiff in that cau se not entitled to any rel ief .  My lords, ·the same 
doctrine is laid down by my Lord Chief  Justice Hoht in Blackham's Case 
( 7 Anne ) ,  1 Salk. 290. It turns upon the claim of propeTty of a woman 
deceased. Plaintiff  proved the goods to have been in his possession and 
to have been taken away by the de fendant. Defend'ant showed- that he 
had taken out letters of administration to her and so entided to ·the 
goods. Upon this plaintiff proved that some days before her death she 
was actually married· to him. In answer it was insisted that the spiritual 
court had determined the right to be in the defendant ; for they could 
not have granted administration to th e defendant but upon supposi.tion 
that there was no such marriage, and that this sentence, being a .matter 
within their  j u risdiction� was conclusive. My Lord Holt  said : "A matter 
which has been di rectly determined by their sentence cannot be gainsaid ; 
the i r  sentence is conclusive in such cases, and no evidence shall be ad­
mitted to prove the contrary ; but it must be in a point directly tried." 
My lords, it is not peculiar to the case o f  marria.ge. .Jt is so in the 
granting o f  l'etters o f  administration i-t i s  so in the probate of wills ; 
i f  a wil l  i s  forged, j.f a will is fraudulently obtained o f  a personal estate, 
of which the ecclesiastical court has the j urisdiction, if that court has 
granted a probate, it is not open to a court of common Jaw, it is not 
open to a court of equity, to enter into the f raud made use of in ob­
taining the wm, or to the forgery commit ed upon a testator. I shaU 
refer your lordships to a case or two upon that head. Noel v. Wells, 
I Lev. 235, was an action brought by the executrix o f  the husband, and 
upon the trial the plainti ff p roduced the probate of the will in evidence. 
The de fendant insisted that the wi l l  was forged ; and the chief j ustice 
before whom it wGs cried was ('If the opin ion that h e could not give 
such evi cence dirertly against the seal of .the ordinary in any things 
within h i s  j uri sdiction. My lords, the same doctrine is to be found in 
the case o f  Barnsby v. Kend1 ick, which was determined by the house 
of lords Barns-by filed a ·b ill to set a.!t;de a wi l l  for fraud and imposi­
tion. The chancellor decreed that the executor stand as trustee for the 
next o f  kin. The House of Lords reversed the decree upon the ground 
that it was not competent for a court of chancery to examine into fraud 
and  �mposition in a will  touching personal estates ; that the court o f  
ecclesiastical j urisd iction had decided that point ; that i t  was no lon�r 
open to discussion. King v. Vincent, 1 Strange 481, was an indictment 
for forging a wi l l  of  personat estate. On the trial .the forgery was 
proved ; but the defendant producing a probate, that was held  to be 
conclusive evidence to support the wi.U, and the defendant was acquitted. 
Dr. W:vnne, also fo r the prisoner : My lords, not to rest the matter 
merely upon authority, however strong, i f  your lordships conside r  the 
ground·s upon v.-h iC'h these dete rminations were made, I apprehend they 
will be founded not only in justice, but in absolute necessity ; and that 
the con fusion would have been so infinitely great, i f, admitting different l 
courts to take cognizance o f  di fferent matters, their sentences should 
not be al lowed to take effect when they were given, but the matte r  might ' 
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he examined over again, and a different sentence given in another court,
the former sentence remaining unrepealed, that there would be no
possibility of enduring such a practice. Consider for a moment what
effect it would have.‘ Suppose a man to have brought a suit for jactita-
tion of marriage against a woman in the proper eccelesiastical court; that
she should plead her marriage by way of justification, and obtain a
sentence for it; the man dies intestate after that, and she applies to the
prerogative court for an administration as the -widow; the next of kin
of the deceased appears there, and denies her to be the lawful widow;
in proof of which she produces the sentence; is the prerogative court
to give credit to this sentence or-not? It it is to give credit to it (as
it daily does) the reason is because it binds universally as long as it
is in force; for, though they are both ecclesiastical courts, there is no
more privity between the prerogative court and the consistory court of
any diocese, than between the prerogative and the court of king’s bench.
There is probability that the prerogative court in this case might agree
with the judges of the consistory in opinion that the marriage was a
good one, and consequently decree the administration to the party
praying it as -the widow. What would be the consequence of that? Why,
the party would have had two law-suits instead of one, and have got by
them two pieces of paper called sentences for her marriage, and letters of
administration; but she would not be a bit the nearer getting the pos-
session of the deceased’s effects. For these she must apply to a court
of common law; and there, according to this doctrine, the first person
she is obliged to bring an action against would be at liberty -to say: Who
are _vou? 'I\he administratrix and widow? No, I deny that: it is true,
you have obtained a sentence for your marriage and an administration
from the prerogative court as the widow; but those sentences were
founded upon false facts; therefore, I object to them, and desire there
may be a third suit to have it inquired into in this court, whether there
was a real marriage or not.’ Now suppose in this third suit a jury should
be of different opinion from the two former courts, what would be the
consequences‘? Why, that the party who brought -the suit -for the debt
would be non-suited; so that here would be a legal administration sub-
sisting (unless the court in which the action was brought could repeal
it and grant a new one—a power which I believe no temporal court -has
yet exercised) but the hands of the administrator would be absolutely
tied up, the effects could never be administered, the debts of the testator
could never ‘be called in, the estate could never be distributed. Your
lordships see plainly that the confusion would ‘be so extreme, if this
doctrine was to prevail. that no error in a sentence, however great, can
be a sufficient cause for any court to examine into the merits of a
sentence given in a matter of which itself has no legal cogizance; and
that there is the utmost wisdom in those resolutions which declare that
there is an implicit credit due from all other courts to the sentences of
courts having the proper jurisdiction over the matter in which the sent-
ence has been pronounced.
-My lords, the cases that I have hitherto mentioned and alluded to
have been all in civil causes. “till it be said, that the question now be-
fore your lordships, being in a criminal cause, that varies the case?
* * * I cannot conceive that to be possible; in pacnalibus musis
bem'_qnius intrr]~retandum est. * * * My lords, another case was that
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be exam ined over again,  and a d ifferent sentence given in  another court, 
the former sentence remaining unrepealed, that there would be no 
possibil i ty of enduring such a practice. Consider for a moment what 
effect it would have. · Suppose a man to have brought a suit for j actita­
tion of marriage against a woman in the proper eccelesia6tical court ; that 
she should plead her marriage by way of j ustification., and obtain  a 
sentence for it ; the man dies intestate afte r that, and sh e applies to the 
prerogative court for an administration as the widow ; the next of kin 
of the deceased appears there, and denies her to be the lawful widow ; 
in p roof of which she produces the sentence ; is the prerogative court 
to give credit to th is sentence or · not ? It it is to give credit to it (as  
it daily does) the reason is  beca11se it binds universally as long as i t  
is in  force ; for, though they are both ecclesiastical courts, there is  no 
more privity between the prerogative court and the consistory court of 
any diocese, than ·between the prerogative and the court o f  king's bench. 
There is  probability that the prerogative court in this case might agree 
with the j udges of the consistory in opinion that the marriage was a 
good one, and consequently d�ree the administration to the party 
praying it as the wi.dow. What would be the consequence of that ? Why, 
the party would nave had two law...,c;uits instead o f  one, and have got by 
them two pieces of paper called sentences for her marriage, and letters of 
administration ; but she would not be a bit ·the nearer getting t·he pos­
session of the deceased's effects. For these she m ust apply to a court 
of common law ; and there, according to th� s doctrine, tihe first person 
she is  obliged to bring an action against would be at liberty ·to say : Who 
are you ? 'fihe administratrix and widow ? No, I deny that : it is true, 
you have obtai ned a sentence for your marriage and an admin istration 
from the prerogative court as the widow ; but those sentences were 
founded upon false facts ; th ere fore, I obj ect to them, and des ire there 
may be a third suit  to have it inquired into in this court, whether there 
was a real marriage or not.' Now suppose in this third suit a jury should 
be of different opinion from the two former courts, what would be the 
consequences ? Why, t·hat the party who brought the suit ·for the debt 
would be non-suited ; so that here would be a legal a(l,ministration sub­
sisting ( unless the court i n  which the action was brought could repeal 
it and grant a new one-a power which I believe no tempora·l· court has 
yet exercised ) but the hands of the administrator would be absolutely 
tied up, the effects could never be administered·, th e debts of the testator 
could never ibe called in, the e state could never be distributed. Your 
lordships see plainly that the con fusion would be so extreme, if this 
doctrine was to prevail, that no error in  a sentence, howeve.r great, can 
he a sufficient cause for any court to examine into the merits o f  a 
sentence given in a matter of which itseH has no legal cogizance ; and 
that there i s  the utmost wisdom i n  rhose resolutions wih ich dec lare that 
there is an implicit credit due from all other courts to the sen tence s of  
courts having the  proper j urisdiction over  the matter in  w.h ich the sent­
ence has been p.ronounced . 
.My lords, the cases that I have hitherto mentioned and alluded to 
have been at: i n  civil causes. \Vii i  it be said, that the question now be­
fore your lordships, being in a criminal cause, that varies the case ? 
• • * I cannot conceive that to be possible ; fo paena libus causis 
bl'lli.<Jll ius iii tcrpre tat1d11m est. * • * My lords,  another c a s e  was that 
of Fursma n  and Fursman, which began in the consistory court of Exete r ; 
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it was a cause for restitution of conjugal rights, brought by the woman.
The libel was admitted; and then there was an appeal to the court of
arches. The judge pronounced for the appeal, and_was proceeding upon
the merits of the cause; but upon the 4th of November 1727, he was
served with a prohibition. And the ground for obtaining prohibition was,
that Sarah Fursman, pretending to be the lawful wife of the said Furs-
man, had indicted him for bigamy in marrying another wife and failed
in proof of her own marriage; whereupon the said Fursman was ac-
quitted; and therefore it was said the ecclesaistical court should not pro-
ceed. Now, my lords, if a prior judgment given by a court, in a matter
in which it can have only an incidental partial jurisdiction, is a sufficient
cause for stopping all subsequent proceeding in the same case, even in the
court which ‘has the entire ordinary jurisdiction over the question, on
account of the ill consequence that would ensue from the interference
of the authority of the two courts; surely, by all parity of reasoning,
in a case where it appears that the court, which the law and constitution
have entrusted with the entire jurisdiction over the matter in question,
has already taken cognizance of it, and pronounced its sentence, the court
of incidental jurisdiction will give credit to such sentence, and con-
form its own sentence to it. * * *
April 16. Thurlow, Atty. Gen.: My lords, I find myself engaged in
a very singular debate; upon a point perfectly new in experience, ana-
logous to no known rule of proceeding in similar cases, founded on no
principle, none at least which ha-s been stated. The prisoner, being
arraigned upon an indictment for felony, pleaded not guilty; upon which
issue was joined-. In this state of the business she has moved your lord-
ships. that no evidence shall be given or stated to prove that guilt upon
her which she has denied and put in issue. * * * My lords, to say
that this is wholly unprecedented, goes a great way to conclude against
it. To say that such a rule would be inconsistent with the plea. and
repugnant to the record as it now stands, seems decisive. * * * Be-
fore I go into particular topics, I cannot help observing with some aston-
ishment, the general ground which is given us to debate upon. Every
species and color of guilt within the compass of the indictment is nec-
essarily admitted. So much more prudent it is thought to leave the
worst to be imagined than to hear the actual state of her offense. Your
lorclships will therefore take the crime to be proved in the broadest ex-
tent of it, with every base and hateful aggravation it may admit--the
first marriage solemnly celebrated, perfectly consumated; the second
wickedly brought about by practising a concerted fraud upon a court of
justice, to obtain a collusive sentence against the first, a circumstance of
great aggravation. When Farr and Chadwick (Kelyng 43) defended a
burglarious breaking and entering under a pretence of an execution upon
a judgment fraudulently obtained against the casual ejector, it was thought
to aggravate their crime, and they suffered accordingly. * * *
The doctors have been at the pains to write (says my learned friend)
some wagon-l_oa-ds of volumes to prove, that these matrimonial causes
proceed to no end and terminate in nothing. Here all the world shall
be bound by that judgment which the court who pronounced it holds for
no judgment, and will suffer to bind nobody. But such was the necessity
of -the argument, to give it any effect, they were forced to assume that
this sort of sentence is the judgment of a civil judicature upon a civil
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it was a cause for restitution of conj ugal rights,  brought by the woman. 
The libel was admitted ; and then there was an appeal to the court of 
arches. The judge pronounced for the appeal, and was proceeding upon 
the merits of the cause ; but upon the 4th of November I i27, he was 
served with a prohibition. And the ground for obtaining prohibition was, 
that Sarah Fursman. pretending to be the lawful wife of the said Furs­
man, •had indicted him for bigamy in marrying another wife and failed 
in proo f o f  her own marriage ; whereupon the said Fursman was ac­
quitted ; and there fore it was said tihe ecclesai stical court should not pro­
ceed. Now, my lords, i f  a prior judgment given by a court, in a matter 
in which it can have only an incidental partial j urisdiction, is a sufficient 
cause for stopping all  subsequent proceeding in the same case, even in the 
court which ·has the entire ordinary jurisdiction over the question, on 
accotmt of the ill consequence that would ensue from the interference 
of the authority of the two courts ; surely, by all parity of reasoning, 
in a case where it appears that the court, which the law and constitution 
have entrusted with . the entire jurisdiction over the m atter in  question, 
has already taken cognizance of it, and pronounced its sentence, the court 
of incidental j urisdiction will give credit to such sentence, and con­
form its own sentenc� to it. * • * 
April 16. Thurlow, A tty. Gen. : My lords, I find• mysel f engaged in 
a very singular debate ; upon a point perfectly new in experience, ana­
logous to no known rule of proceeding in similar cases, founded on no 
principle, none at least which has been stated. The prisoner, being 
arraigned upon an indictment for felony, pleaded not guilty ; upon which 
issue was joined. :In this state of the business she has moved your lord­
ships, that no evidence shall be given or stated to prove that guilt upo11 
her which she has denied and put in issue. * * * My l'Ords, to say 
that this is wholly unprecedented, goes a great way to conclude against 
it. To say that such a rule would be inconsistent with the plea, and 
repugnant to the record as it n ow stands, seems decisive. * * * Be­
fore I go into particular topics, I cannot help observing with some aston­
is'hfnent, the general ground which is given us to debate upon. Every 
species and color of guilt within the compass of the indictment is nec­
essarily admitt�d. So much more prudent it is thought to leave the 
worst to be imagined than to hear the actual state of her offense. Your 
lordships will therefore take the crime to be proved in the broadest ex­
tent of it, with every base and hateful aggravation it may admit-the 
first marriage solemnly celebrated, per fectly consumated ; the second 
wickedly brought about by practising a concerted fraud upon a court o f  
justice, t o  obtain a col lusive sentence against t1h e first, a circumstance of  
great aggravation. When Farr and Chadwick (Kelyng 43 )  defended a 
burglarious breaking and entering unde r a pretence o f  an execution upon 
a judgment fraudulently obtained against the casual ejector, it was thought 
to aggravate t11e i r  crime, and they suffered accordingly. * * * 
The doctors have been at the pains to write ( says my learned friend) 
some wagon-lpads o f  volumes to prove, that these matrimonial causes 
proceed to no end and terminate in noth ing. Here aH t1te world shall 
be hound hy that judgment which the court who pronounced it  lwlds for ,. 
no j udgment, and wil l  suffer to bind nobody. But such was the necessity 
o f  the argument, to give it any effect, they we re forced to assume that 
th i s  sort o f  sentence is t he  j u<lgment of  a civi l  j u d icature upon a civi l  
subject, which is not true .  And to give it  e ffect against others vhan 
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parties they were forced to admit that such others may set it aside; which
is true only because it is no such judgment. * * *
The general peace and ‘happiness require that there should be some
resort to hear and determine upon rights; and the same peace and
happiness require that litigation should have some en-d. The line seems
to be fairly drawn, Where every claim to every right has lhad a full
opportunity of being -heard. Eut among all the cases cited or referred
to, I believe none is to be found where a sentence has been taken for
conclusive against persons who neither had nor could possibly have
agitated it.
It is not enough, therefore to establish the proposition, that such
sen-tences bind all who have or could have interposed, unless it had been
shown that the king could have interposed for the public good, in order
to see that no fraud should be prictised, which might tend -to defeat the
execution of his laws or police. But it is not pretended that the king
can inter-pose in such causes. It is not enough that a court of exclusive
civil jurisdiction, pronouncing upon the principal right, binds all the
derivative or incidental interests. It should -be shown that such a court
binds also to criminal conclusions. Now this I take to be impossible,
because, on the very state of the proposition, the court has no criminal
jurisdiction. A judgment upon a deed after verdict on non est factum
pleaded, is no bar to an -indictment for forging. or publishing, or swear-
ing to, the deed. The case would be the same in respect to a will of lands
established by verdict, or to a will of per-sonalty after probate. "‘ “ *
One Sterling was convicted and Ihanged f:or forging a will; and, so
little were either prosecutor or court apprised of this notion of law,
the probate made part of the evidence against him. {He had registered
it (as it was necessary) in the South-Sea-house. I am not anxious to
state these cases with more particularity; because I cannot bring -myself
to imagine it‘ will be entertained as a serious opinion that the mere per-
petration of a crime may be pleaded in bar to a prosecution for it. * * *
A court of direct, complete, and exclusive jurisdiction, is to be
bound and governed by one of no jurisdiction, either direct or indirect,
on the matter. The sentence remains open for further examination; let
it therefore be adopted without examination in order that it may never be
examined. * * * . - . ‘
Wedderburn, Solicitor General: * * * -The plea which is the de-
fense upon the record, denies the charge; but the argument contends,
that the charge ought neither to be stated or proved. * * * Counsel
contend: I, that it is a universal rule, that the decrees of courts having
competent jurisdiction bind all persons, and conclude on all cases in
-any manner touching the matter decided; 2, they maintain, that the
sentence of the ecclesiastical court in question is a decision; 3, they
urge that the rule first laid down admits of no exceptions, ‘but applies
with more force to criminal than to civil cases; 4, in the last place
they insist, that supposing this sentence to be the efiect of fraud, collu-
sion. and agreement between the parties to the supposed suit in the
spiritual court, it is notwithstanding conclusive upon all other courts,
and the fraud can only be examined in that court whose justice has been
thus ensnared. * * *
It is a general maxim of the law, that the sentence of a competent
court binds the parties, and all persons deriving any right under them;
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parties  they were forced to admit that such others may set i t  aside ; which 
is true only because it is no such judgment. • • • 
T':1e general peace and 'happiness require that there S'hould be some 
resort to hear and determine upon rights ; and the same peace and 
happiness require that litigation should have some end. The l ine  seems 
to be fairly drawn, where every claim to every right has ihad a full  
opportunity o f  being ·h eard. Eut among all the cases ci te'd or refrrred 
to, I believe none i s  to be found where a sentence has been taken for 
conclusive against persons who neither had nor could possibly have 
agitated it. 
I t  i s  11ot enough, th erefore to establ ish the proposition, that such 
sentences bind alt who have or could have interposed, unless i t  had been 
shown that the king could have interposed for the public good, i n  order 
to see that no fraud should be prictised, which might tend to de feat the 
execution of  his laws or police. But i t  is not pretended that the king 
can interpose in such causes. I t  is  not enough that a court of exclusive 
civil j u risdiction, pronouncing upon the p rincipal right, binds all the 
derivative or incidental interests. It should be shown Vhat such a court 
binds also to criminal conclt•i-ions. Now this  I take to be imµossiblc, 
because, on the very state of the proposition, the court ·has no criminal 
j urisdiction. A j udgment upon a deed a fter verdict on no n ut factum 
pleaded, is no bar to an .indictment for forgi ng, or publishing, or swear­
ing to, the deed. The case would be the same in respect to a will of lands 
established by verdict, or to a will  of per·sonalty after probate. • • • 
One Sterling was convicted and hanged f:or forging a witl ; and, so 
l ittle were either prosecutor or court apprised of thi s  notion o f  law, 
the probate made part o f  the evidence against him. He had regi stered 
it (as it was necessary) in the South- Sea-house. I am not anxious to 
state these cases with more particularity ; because •I cannot bring mysel f 
to imagine it will  be entertained as a serious opinion that the mere per­
petration of a crime may be pleaded in bar to a prosecution for it. • • * 
A court of d i rect, complete, and exclusive j urisdiction, is to be 
bound an d governed by one of no j uri sdiction, either direct or indirect, 
on th e matter. The sentence remains  open for further examination ;  let 
it therefore be adopted without examination in order that it may never be 
examined. * • • 
Wedderburn, Solicitor Ge11eral : • * * ·The plea which i s  the de­
fense upon the record, denies the charge ; but the argument contends, 
that the charge ougllt neither to ·be stated or proved. * * • Counsel 
contend : 1, that i t  is a universal rule, that the decrees of cou rts having 
competent j u risdiction bind all persons, and conclude on all cases in 
· any manner tooch ing the matter decided ; 2, they maintain,  that the 
sentence of the ecclesiastical court in q.uestion is a decision ; 3, they 
urge that the rul e  first laid down admits of no exceptions, but applies 
with more force to criminal tha n  to civil cases ; 4, in t'hc last place 
th ey in sist, t hat supposing t h i s  sentence to be the cffe.ct of fraud, collu­
sion, and agreement between the parties to the supposed -suit  i n  the 
spi ritual court, it  is  not w ithstanding conclusive upon all other courts, 
and the fraud can only be examined i n  that court whose jus,tice has been 
thus ensnared. * • * 
It is a general maxim of the law, that the sentence of a competent 
court binds the parties, and al l  person s deriving any rig•ht under t·hem ; 
as to third persons, it neither prej udices nor benefits  them. 'Another 
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maxim, equally true, is, that a sentence of a court having competent
jurisdiction, if it comes collaterally before another court in another
suit, shall be presumed just till the contrary appears. One court has
no authority to direct the judgment of another; but it is a presump-
tion, and in most cases it obtains only till the contrary is proved. I
admit at the same time, that there are cases in which that presumption
may amount to a conclusion. \Vhere the sentence has been pronounced
in rem, by a judicature having a peculiar and exclusive jurisdiction over
the subject-matter, the effect of such a decision is not to be controverted
in any other civil suit. * * *
1f there is a universal proposition of law, I take this to be so, that
no determination between party and part_v can preclude public justice
from inquiring into the criminal tendency of their actions. Daily ex-
perience proves this in t'he most trivial instances. An acton is brought
for an assault, the party fails in it, there is a verdict against him; it
does not prevent a prosecution by indictment upon the very same fact
against the very same party. In such an indictment was it ever pleaded
that an action had been brought against the party for that alledged
trespass and beating, and that he had been acquitted upon that action?
The learned and reverend judges will inform your lordships, that there
is not a sitting or an assize without some instance of this sort. A
question -may arise in an action upon property, to which of two persons.
a thing, a horse for example, belongs; it is decided to belong to A and
not to B. \Vould that decision bar an indictment against A for steal-
ing the horse? It is no answer to public justice, that he has acquired
that property, when the object of the criminal inquiry is whether he has
committed a crime in acquiring it. The proposition advanced on the
other side, that :1 sentence in a civil suit is conclusive in a criminal pro-
ceeding, was not so much pressed upon any deduction of argument, as
asserted on the authority of a case cited from Strange’s reports; in which
it was said to -have been determined, that the grant of the probate of a
will by the ccclesaistical court was a bar to an indictment for felony in
forging that will. * * * I conceive it to be impossible at any period,
at any ti-me of the day, by negligence of any judge who might happen
to be present at the Old Bailey, that a prisoner could have been acquitted
of a charge of forgery upon such a defense. * * *
The attorney general quoted to your lordships the case of King V. Mur-
phy. The prisoner ‘there had the double villainy to turn the charge upon
his prosecutor. The trial was attended by counsel who do not usually
go to the Old Bailey; it is stated very fully by a short--hand writer in
19 Howell's State Trials 694. The case of the King and Sterling was
also mentioned; it is very manifest that that unfortunate person was unjust-
ly hanged if the case in Strange is law. Sterling's case was this: he was
indicted for {having forged a will, of which will he obtained a probate,
and under that title ‘had transferred some stock. The person whose
will he said it was was alive and produced as a witness against him, and
of course to impeach the probate of her own will. Absured as it may
seem to doubt whether that evidence was competent, if the case of the
King and Vincent was law undoubtedly that witness ought not to have been
permitted to prove her own existence—she was dead by irrefragible
legal argument; but the event was different, and Mr. Sterling notwith-
standing the probate suffered for his crime. * * *
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maxim, equally true, is,  that a sentence of a court having competent 
jurisdiction, i f  it comes collaterally befure another court in another 
suit, shall be presumed just ·ti l l  the contrary appears. One court bas 
no authority to direct the judgment of another ; but j,t is a presump­
tion, and in most cases it obtains only till the rontrary is proved. I 
adm it at the same time, that there are cases in which that presumption 
may amount to a conclusion. Where t'he sentence has been pronounced 
in rem, by a judicature having a peculiar and exclusive jurisdiction over 
the subject-matter, the effect of such a decision is not to he controverted 
in any other civH suit. * * * 
l f  there is a universal proposition of law, I take this to be so, that 
no determination between party and party can preclude public j ustice 
from inqui ring into the criminal tendency of their actions. Daily ex­
pel'ieoce proves this in t'he most trivial instances. An acton is brouglht 
for an assault, the party fails in it, there is a verdict against •him ; it 
does not prevent a prosecution by indictment upon the very same fact 
against the very same party. In such an indictment was it ever pleaded 
that an action had been brought against the party for that aHedged 
trespass and beating, and t'hat he had been acquitted upon that action ? 
The learned and reverend j udges will inform your lordships, that there 
is not a sitting or an assize without some instance of this sort. A 
question may arise in an action upon property, to which of two persons, 
a thing1 a horse for example, belongs ; it is decided to !belong to A and 
not to B. W ouid that decision bar an indictmen t against A for steal­
ing the horse ? It is no answer to public justice, tha.t he has acqui red 
that property, when the obj ect of the criminal inquiry i-s whether he �as 
committed a crime in acquiring it. The proposi.tion advanced on the 
other side, t'hat a sentence in a civil suit is conclusive in a criminal pro­
ceeding, was not so much pressed upon any deduction of argument, as 
asserted on the authority of a case cited from Strange's reports ; in which 
it was said to ·have been determined, that the grant of tlhe probate of a 
wil l by the ecclesaistical court was a bar to an indictment for felony in 
forging ·that w ill. * * * I conceive it to be impossible at any period, 
at any tnne of t'he day, by negligeoce of any judge :who might happen 
to be present at the Old Ba iley, that a prisoner could have been acquit·ted 
of a dharge of forgery upon such a defense. * * * 
The attorney general quoted to your lord&hips the case of King v. Mur­
phy. The prisoner there had the double vi llainy to turn the oharge upon 
his prosecutor. The trial was attended by counsel wiho do not usually 
go to tihe Old Bailey ; it is stated very folly •by a short....lJand writer in 
19 Howell 's State Trials 694. T·he case of the King and Sterling was 
also mentioned ; it i s  very manifest that that un fortunate ·person was unjust­
ly hange d  i f  the case in Strange is law. Sterl ing's case was this : 1he was 
in d ict ed for having forged a wi l l , of whkh will he obtained a prdbate, 
and under that title 'had transferred some stock. The person '\V'hose 
will he -said it was was alive and produced as a witness against him, and 
of course to impeach · the probate of her own will. Absured as it may 
seem to doubt whether that evidence was competent, if tJhe case of th e 
Ki11g and Vincent was law undoubtedly that witness ougtht rrot to ·have been 
perrni·rted to prove her own existen ce-she was dead by irre fragible 
legal argument ; but the eveni was di fferent, and Mr. Sterling notwith.­
standing the probate suffered for his crime. * * * 
After tihis se ntence, so gravely pronounced, your lordships are told 
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by all the learned doctors, and all the books of practice agree. that
this injunction of perpetual silence continues no longer than till the
party chooses to talk again; and the person to whom ‘he ‘may with the
most_perfect safety repeat his assertions is the judge who injoined him
silence; for, it is a-greed on all hands, that the party may at any time
inform the court that though it did not appear formerly that he was
married, he can make it appear now; and such proof is admissible. * * *
Nothing can be further from the temper of my mind upon the present
occasion than to use a lidicrous argument; but when the uncontrolable
effect of such sentences as these, so contrived and framed for fraud,
was urged yesterday (and while to lessen the objection to them it was
gravely argued that no great michief could happen from the decision,
because you may reverse this sentence tomorrow, that the next day, and a
third after that, and that the suit was in its nature eternal) an ingenious
person among the bystanders was calculating how many wives a man
that had a taste for polygamy might marry wi-th im-punity; and I think
he made it out, according to the probable duration of such a suit, that
a man between twenty-one and thirty-five might, with good industry,
marry seventy-five wives by sentences of the ecclesaistical court. each
sentence standing good till‘ reversed, and all reversible by that judica—
ture. * * *
My lords, after the indulgence with Which your lordships have been
so good as to hear me so long upon this subject, I am sorry to be
obliged still to trespass a little longer upon your patience, when I con-
sider the fourth proposition, which certainly is not the least material—-
that is, that a sentence infected with fraud, to which collusion may be
objected is no bar to any cause. * * * A sentence obtained by fraud
and collusion is no sentence. What is a sentence? It is not an instru-
ment with a -bit of wax and a seal of a court put on it; it is not an
instrument with the signature of a person calling himself a register;
it is not such a quantity of ink bestowed upon such a quantity of stamped
paper: A sentence is a judicial determination of a cause agitated be-
tween real parties, upon which a real interest -has been settled. In
order to make a sentence there must be a real interest, a real argument,
a real prosecution, a real defense, a real decision. Of all these qualities
not one takes place in the case of a fraudulent and collusive suit: There
is no judge; but a person invested with the ensigns of a judicial olhce
is misemployed in listening to a ficticous cause proposed to him; there
is no party defendant, no real interest brought into question. * * *
In Prudham a_qain.rt PIlilli[1.r it was determined by Wiles, L. C. 1., that
a fraudulent and collusive sentence against Mrs. Phillips was binding
upon her; but he concludes it was binding upon no other party. The
fraud was a matter of fact which if used in obtaining judgment -was a
deceit upon the court, a fraud upon strangers, who. as they could not
come in to reverse it, they could only allege it was fraudulent. * * *
Friday, April 19. Lord High Steward: Mr_ \Nal1ace, you may pro-
ceed with your reply.
Mr. Wallace: * * * Your lordshipshave been told, that by the
general rules of evidence in civil cases, no sentence or judgment can
be received, unless in a cause between the same parties, or who derive
under them. The candor of the gentlemen on the other side has admitted
two exceptions to the rule: 1, sentences or judgments where the proceed-
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by all the learned doctors, and all tlhe books of practice agree, that 
this injunction of perpetual s ilence continues no longer than till the  
party chooses to talk again ; and the person t o  whom ·he ·may w ith th� 
most _ perfect safety repeat his assertions is the judge who injoined him 
silence ; for, it is agreed on all hands, that the party may at any time 
inform the court that though it di d not appear formerly that h e  was 
married, he can make it appear now ; and such proo f is admissible. * * • 
Nothing can be further from the temper of my mind upon bhe present 
occasion t'han to use a l id icrous argument ; but when the uncoutrolable 
effect of such sentences as these, so contrived and framed for fraud, 
was urged yesterday ( and while to lessen the Olbj ection to them it was 
gravely argued that no great michief could happen from the decision, 
because you may reverse this sentence tomorrow, that the next day, and a 
third after that, and that the su it was in its nature eternal ) an ingen ious 
person among the bystanders was calculating how many wives a man 
llhat had a taste for polygamy migiht marry with impunity ; and I think 
he made it out, according to the probable duration of suclt a suit, that 
a man between twenty-one and thirty-five might, w ith good industry, 
marry seventy-five wives by sentences of the ecclesaistical court, each 
sentence standing good till' reversed, and alt
" 
reversible by that j udica­
ture. • * • 
My lords, after the indulgence w ith which your lordships have been 
so good as to hear me so long upon this subject, I am sorry to be 
obl iged still to trespass a little longer upon your patience, wtien I con­
s ider the fourth proposition, which certain ly is not the least material­
t1hat is, that a sentence infected with fraud , to which collusion may be 
obj ('cted is no har to any cause. * * * A sentence obtained by fraud 
and collusion is no sen•tence . What is a sentence ?  It is not an instru­
ment with a bit of wax and a seal of a court put on it ; it is not an 
instrument with the signature o f  a person call ing h imsel f a register ; 
it is not such a quantity o f  i nk bestowed upon such a quantity of stamped 
paper : A senteriee is  a judicial determination of a cause agi tated be­
tween real parties, upon which a real interest has been settled. In 
order to make a sentence there must be a real interest, a real argument , 
a real prosecution , a real de fense, a real deci sion. O f  all these qual ities 
rot one takes place in t<he case of  a fraudulent and col lusive suit : There 
is no j udge ; but a person investtd with the ensigns of a j udic ial office 
is misemployed in  listen ing to a ficticous cause proposed to him ; t1here 
is  no party defendant, no real interest brought into question. * * * 
In Prudlram a_qainst Phillips it was determined by Wil es, L. C. J. ,  that 
a fraudulent and col lusive sen tence against Mrs. Ph ill ips was binding 
upon her ; but he conclude s it was binding upon no other party. 'f!he 
fraud was a matter of fact which i f  used in obtain ing j udgment was a 
dece it upon the court, a fraud upon strangers, wh o. as they cou l d  not 
come in  to reverse it, tihey could only allege it was fraudulent. * * • 
Friday, April 19. Lord High Steu:ard : M r. Wallace, you may pro­
ceed with your reply. 
Mr. Wallace : * * • Your lordships · have been to ld , that by the 
general ru les of cvidC11ce in civil cases, no sentence or j udgment can 
be received, unless  in a cause between the same part ies, or who derive 
under them. The candor of the gentlemen on the other side has admitted 
two exceptions to the rule : 1,  sentences or judgmen ts where the proceed­
ing is in rem; and 2, in causes where th e court has exclusive jurisd ic-
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tion. I will not state to your lordships other exceptions; the two ad-
mitted are sufiicient; the present case falls within -both exceptions,
though eitherwould be enough. In the first place, it is a proceeding in
rem; marriage or no marriage is the point to be determined. It does
not come collaterally or incidentally, but directly, in question; and the
decision of which was the sole object of the suit. In the next place,
it is a sentence of a court having exclusive jurisdiction upon the sub-
ject. It is admitted that the ecclesiastical courts have exclusive jurisdic-
tion in probates of wills, in all testamentary disputes respecting per-
sonal estates; and having decided the question, whether rigl1t or wrong,
upon true or upon false grounds, it is not competent to any other court,
unless in a legal way by appeal, to enter into the matter; but faith and
credit is to be given to the decision of the ecclesiastical court. It is
also admitted, that, till the statute upon which the present indictment is
founded, the ecclesiastical courts had the sole and exclusive jurisdiction
in matrimonial causes. * * * But, my lords, though sentences of
the ecclesiastical courts have been received as conclusive evidence in
civil causes, yet it is contended, they are not admissible in criminal
prosecutions. Is it the genious of this country to attend more to the
punishment of crimes than to the administration of justice between the
parties in civil rights? Is the distinction founded in good sense or sound
policy that the sentences of ecclesiastical courts should not only be re-
ceived but be conclusive in one case, and be no evidence at all in the
other? Your lordships will expect very strong authorities before you
listen to such a distinction. * * * I troubled your lordships with a
case from Sir John Strange’s reports (King v. Vincent) to prove that the
sentence of the ecclesiastical court was admissible and conclusive in
criminal cases. * * * Your lordships have -been told that the authority
of this case, if it ever had any, was soon put an end to in the year
1753 in the case of the King v. Murphy. * * "‘ Mimphy, who was
prosecuted at the Old Bailey, knowing Wilkinson's title to prize-money,
had forged a will of \Vilkinson, -had got it proved, and had received
from one Noades, the agent, part of the prize—money of Wilkinson.
All went off very well. Murphy spent the money. But a few months
after, Mr. \Vilkinson was restored to life. He appeared before the
agent and demanded his money. Says the agent: ‘We have paid your
executor.’ Says be: ‘That is pretty odd! I will satisfy you that I have
not been dead, and nobody can prove my will till I am dead. I insist
upon my money.’ The fraud was detected; Murphy was apprehended,
prosecuted, and convicted. \V0uld the gentlemen have had Ihim set up
the will at the Old Bailey? \Vould they have told Wilkinson to go to
the ecclesaistical court to repeal it? What would Wilkinson, ignorant
as -he was, say? ‘I have heard of probates of wills of dead men, but
never heard of probates of rwills of living men before.’ The jurisdiction
of the ecclesiastical court is to grant probates of the wills of the dead,
not of the living; and therefore the question could not arise. Another
case of one Sterling was mentioned. Sterling found out that a Mrs.
Shutter had property in the South-Sea stock,-and his scheme -to possess
it was like Murphy's; he forged a will, got it proved, went to the South-
Sea house; there he exhibited the probate; they gave credit to the death
of the party, and to his being executor and they paid the money. The
woman who had nothing else to live upon, came to receive lher dividend.
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tion. I will not state to your lord9hips otlher exceptions ; the two ad� 
mitted are sufficient ; the present case falls w ith in both exceptions, 
though either ·woukl be enough. In the first place, it is a proceeding in 
rem ; marr iage or no marriage is the point to be determined . It does 
not come co l laterally or incidentally, but directly, in question ; and the 
decision of which was the sole obj ect of the suit. In the next place, 
it is a sentence of a court 'having exclusive jurisdiction upon the sub­
j ect. It is admitted that the ecclesiastical courts have exclusive jurisdic­
tion in probates of wills, in all testamentary disputes respecting per­
sonal estates ; and having decided tbe question, Whether right or wrong, 
upon true or upon false grounds, it is not competent to any ot1her court, 
unless in a legal way by appeal , to enter into rlte matter ; but faith and 
credit is to be given to the decision of the ecclesiastical court. ·It is 
also admitted, that, till the statute upon which ·the present indictment is 
founded, the ecclesiastical courts had the sole and exclusive j urisdktion 
in matrimonial causes. * * * But, my lords, thougih sentences of 
the ecclesiastical courts 'have been received as conclusive evidence in 
civil causes, yet it is contended, they are not �dmissible in criminal 
prosecutions. Is it the genious of this country to attend more to the 
punishment of crimes than to the administration of j ustice between the 
parties in civil rights ? Is the distinction founded in good sense or sound 
policy that t'he sentences of ecclesiastical courts 9hould not on ly be re­
ceived but he conclusive in one case, and be no evidence at all in the 
other ? Your lordships will e'Xpect very strong authorities before you 
l isten to such a d istinction . * * * I troubled your lordships with a 
case from Sir John Strange's reports (King v. Vincen t) to prove that the 
sentence of the eccles iastical court was admissible and conclusive in 
criminal cases. * * * Your lordships have been told that the authority 
o f  -this case, if it ever had any, was soon put an end to in the year 
I753 in tihe case of the King v. Murphy. * * * M\ir.phy, wiho was 
prosecuted at the Old Bailey, knowing Wilkinson's title to prize-money, 
had forged a will of Wilkinson, had got it proved, and had received 
from one Noades, the agent, part of the prize-money of Wilkinson. 
All went off very well. Murphy spent the money. But a few monlihs 
after, Mr. Wilkinson was restored to life. He appeared before the 
agent and demanded �is  money. iSays the agent : 'We ·have paid your 
executor.' Says he : 'That is pretty odd ! I will  satis fy you that I have 
not been dead, and nobody can prove my wi l l  till I am dead. I insist 
upon my money.' The fraud was detected ; Murphy was apprehended., 
prosecuted, and convicted. Would the gentlemen have had 1h im set up 
the will at the Old Bailey ? Would they have told Wilkinson to go te> 
tthe ecclesaistical court to repeal it ? What would Wilkinson, ignorant 
as ·he was, say ? 'I have heard of probates of wills of dead men, but 
never 'heard of probates of wills of  liv-ing men before.' ·  The j urisdiction 
of the ecclesiastical court is to grant probates of the wills of  the dead. 
not of the l iving ; and therefore the question could not arise . Another 
case of one Sterling was mentioned. Sterling found out that a Mrs. 
Shutter ·had property in t!he South-Sea stock, · and h is scheme to possess 
it was like Murphy's ; he forged a will, got it proved, went to the South­
Sea house ; there he exhibited the probate ; they gave credit to the death 
of the party, and to •his  being executor and they pa id  the money. The 
woman who had nothing else to live upon, came to receive •her dividend. 
The clerk says : 'Your executor has proved your w ill ; you must be the 
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ghost of Mrs. ‘Shutter, not Mrs. Shutter herself.’ She was not to be
put ofi in that way. The company found out Sterling and brought him
to justice. He did not say to the count on his trial: ‘Do not believe
her; no law says you must take the evidence of a ghost; she must go
into the doctors’ commons and rescind this before you believe her evi-
dence.’ No court would bear such an insult. The jurisdiction of the
ecclesiastical court does not attach till the party is dead; there is no such
thing as a will for the prerogative court to give etfect to While the testa-
tor is living. * * *
I am now, my lords, arrived at that point to which the whole artillery
seems to be directed; that the sentence was obtained by collusion. Your
lordships have been told that a judgment by collusion is fabula non
judicium—was, paper, ink, anything you will, but not a judgment; the
judge does not act, the judge is imposed upon, it is of no effect what-
ever. " * * I must lbeg leave to deny the doctrine in the extent it is
contended for. * * * By the principles of the connnon law the person
permitted to rescind on the score of fraud or collusion must -have an
interest at the time. This is expressly laid down -by the court in Twyne':
Case, 3 Coke 80. "‘ * * Your lordships have been told that the crown
cannot get at the collusion; that the ecclesiastical courts will not attend
to the application of the crown. * * * No application has been made
to the ecclesiastical court either on the part of the crown, or by the real
prosecutor in this case, or by any other person, though the Duke of
Kingston and the noble lady at the bar lived together live years under
the sanction of a marriage solemnized with the arch»bishop's license, in
the presence of friends, and known to t-he world. Does the prosecutor
say that he is actuated -by motives of justice, and allege the supposed
collusion newly discovered? * * *
LORD DE ‘GRAY (chief justice of the court of common pleas) :
My Lords: My Lord Chief Baron [Sir Sidney Stafford Smythe]
and the rest of my brethren, have desired me to deliver their
answer to the questions your lordships have been pleased to pro-
pound to us.
That our opinion may be the better understood, it is necessary
to make some observations on what has passed in argument upon
the subject.
VV hat has been said at the bar is certainly true, as a general
principle, that a transaction between two parties, in judicial pro-
ceedings, ought not to be binding upon a third; for it would be
unjust to bind any person who could not be [*425] admitted to
make a defense, or to examine witnesses, or to appeal from a judg-
ment he might think erroneous; and therefore the depositions of
witnesses in another cause in proof of a fact, the verdict of a jury
finding the fact, and the judgment of the court upon facts found,
although evidence against the parties, and all claiming under them,
are not in general, to be used to the prejudice of strangers. There
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gih ost of 'M rs. ·Shutter, not Mrs. Shutter he rself. '  She ·was not to be 
put off in that way. The company found out Sterl ing and brought him 
to j ustice. He did not say to the court. on his  trial : 'Do not believe 
her ; no law says you must take the evidence of a ghost ; she must go 
into the doctors' commons and rescind this before you believe her evi­
dence.' N o  court woulc.l bear such an insult. The jurisdiction o f  the 
ecclesiastical coort does not attach till the party is  dead ; there i s  no such 
thing as a will for the prerogative court to give effect to while tih e testa­
tor is living. * * * 
I am now, my lords, arrived at that point to .which the whole artillery 
seems to be directed ; that the sentence was obtained by collusion. Your 
lordships have been told that a j udgment by collusion is fabula n o n  
judicium-was, paper, ink, anything you will, ·but not a j udgment ; the 
j udge does not act, .the judge is imposed upon, it is of no effect what­
ever. * * "' I must •beg leave to deny the doctrine in the extent it i s  
contended for. * * * By the principles of the common law the person 
permitted to rescind on the score of fraud or collusion must have an 
interest at the time. This i s  expressly laid down hy the coort in Twyne's 
Case, 3 Coke 8o. * * * Your lordships ohave been told that the crown 
cannot get at the collusion ; that the ecclesiastical courts will not attend 
to the app lication of the crown. * * * No application has been made 
to the ecclesiastical cour.t either on the part of tihe crown, or by the real 
prosecutor in this case, or by any other person, thoogih the D1,1ke of 
Ki ngston and the noble lady at the bar lived together five years under 
the sanction of a marriage solemnized wrbh the arch�bishop's license, in 
the presence of friends, and known to the world. Does the prosecutor 
say that he is actuated by motives of j ustice, and allege the supposed 
collusion newly discovered ? * * * 
LoRD DE CRAY (chief j ustice of the court of  common pleas) : 
My Lords : My Lord Chief Baron [ Sir Sidney Stafford Smythe] 
and the rest of my brethren, have d esired me to deliver their 
answer to the questions your lordships have been pleased to pro­
pound to us. 
That our opinion may be the better understood, it is necessary 
to make some observations on what has passed in argument upon 
the subj ect. 
What has been said at the bar is certainly true, as a general 
principle, that a transaction between two parties, in j udicial pro­
ceedings, ough� not to be binding upon a third ; for it would be 
unj ust to bind any person who could not be [*425 ] admitted to 
make a defense, or to examine witnesses, or to appeal from a j udg­
ment he might think erroneous ; and therefore the deposi tions of 
witnesses in another cause in proof of a fact, the verdict of a j u ry  
finding the fact, and the j udgment o f  the court upon facts found , 
although evidence against the parties, and all claiming under them, 
are not in general, to be used to the prej udice of strangers. There 
are some exceptions to this general rule, founded upon particular 
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reasons, but not being applicable to the present subject, it is un-
necessary to state them.
From the variety of cases relative to judgments being given
in evidence in civil suits, these two deductions seem to follow as
generally true: first, that the judgment of a court of concurrent
jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is as a plea, a bar, or as
evidence conclusive, between the sameparties, upon the same mat-
ter, directly in question in another court; secondly, that the judg-
ment of a court of exclusive jurisdiction, directly upon the point,
is, in like manner, conclusive upon the same matter, between the
same parties, coming incidentally in question in another court,
for a dilterent purpose. But neither the judgment of a concurrent
or exclusive jurisdiction is evidence of any matter which came col-
laterally in question, though within their jurisdiction, nor of any
matter incidentally cognizable, nor of any matter to be inferred by
argument from the judgment.
Upon the subject of marriage, the spiritual court has the sole
and exclusive cognizance of questioning and deciding, directly, the
legality of marriage; and of enforcing, specifically, the rights and
obligations respecting persons depending upon it ; but the temporal
courts have the sole cognizance of examining and deciding upon
all temporal rights of property; and, so far as such rights are con-
cerned, they have the inherent power of deciding incidentally,
either upon the fact, or the legality of marriage, where they lie
in the way to the decision of the proper objects of their jurisdic-
tion; they do not want or require the aid of the spiritual courts.
* * * VVhere in civil causes they [the common law courts] found
the question of marriage directly determined by the ecclesiastical
courts, they received the sentence, though not as a plea, yet as a
proof of the fact; it being an authority accredited in a judicial
proceeding by a court of competent jurisdiction; but still they
received it upon the same principles, and subject to the same rules,
by which they admit the acts of other courts. Hence a sentence
of nullity, and a sentence in afiirmance of a marriage, have been
received as conclusive evidence on a question of legitimacy arising
incidentally upon a claim to a real estate. A sentence in a case of
jactitation has been received upon a title in ejectment, as evidence
against a marriage, and, in like manner in personal actions, imme-
diately founded on a supposed marriage. So a direct sentence in
a suit upon a promise of marriage, against the contract. has been
admitted as evidence against such contract, in an action brought
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reasons, but not being applicable to the present subj ect, it is un­
necessary to state them. 
From the variety of cases relative to judgments being given 
in evidence in civil suits, these two deductions seem to follow as 
generally true : first, that the j udgment of a court of concurrent 
j urisdiction, directly · upon the point, is as a plea, a bar, or as 
evidence conclusive, between the same.parties, upon the same mat­
ter, directly in question in another court ; secondly, that the j udg­
ment of a court of exclusive j urisdiction, directly upon the point, 
is, in like manner, conclusive upon the same matter, between the 
same parties, coming incidentally in question in another court, 
for a different purpose. But neither the judgment of a concurrent 
or exclusive j urisdiction is evidence of any matter which came col­
laterally in question, though within their j urisdiction, nor of any t 
matter incidentally cognizable, nor of any matter to be inferred by 
argument from the j udgment. 
Upon the subject of marriage, the spiritual court has the c;ole 
and exclusive cognizance of questioning and deciding, directly, the 
legality of marriage ; and of enforcing, specifically, the rights and 
obligations respecting persons depending upon it ; but the temporal 
courts have the sole cognizance of examining and deciding upon 
all temporal rights of property ; and, so far as such rights are con­
cerned, they have the inherent power of deciding incidentally, 
either upon the fact, or the legality of marriage, where they lie 
in the way to the decision of the proper objects of their jurisdic­
tion ; they do not want or require the aid of the spiritual courts. 
* * * Where in civil causes they [the common law courts] found 
the question of marriage directly determined by the ecclesiastical 
courts, they received the sentence, though not as a plea, yet as a 
proof of the fact ; it being an authority accredited in a judicial 
proceeding by a court of competent jurisdiction ; but still they 
received it upon the same principles, and subject to the same rules, 
by which they admit the acts of other courts. Hence a sentence 
of nullity, and a sentence in affirmance of a marriage, have been 
received as conclusive evidence on a question of legitimacy arising 
incidentally upon a claim to a real estate. A sentence in a case of 
jactitation has been received upon a title in ejectment, as evidence 
against a marriage, and,  in like manner in personal actions, imme­
diately founded on a supposed marriage. So a direct sentence in 
a suit upon a promise of marriage, against the contract, has been 
admitted as evidence against such contract, in an action brought 
upon the same promise for damages, it being a direct sentence of a 
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competent court, disproving the ground of the action. So a
sentence of nullity is equally evidence in a personal action against
a defense founded upon a supposed coverture. [*428] But in all
these cases, the parties to the suits, or at least the parties against
whom the evidence was received, were parties to the sentence,
and had acquiesced under it; or claimed under those who were
parties and had acquiesced.
But although the law stands thus with regard to civil suits,
proceedings in matters of crime, and especially of felony, fall
under a different consideration: First, because the parties are not]
the same; for the king, in whom the trust of prosecuting public’
offenses, is vested, and which is executed by his immediate orders,
or in his name by some prosecutor, is no party to such proceed-
ings in the ecclesiastical court, and cannot be admitted to defend,
examine witnesses, in any manner intervene or appeal. Secondly,
such doctrines would tend to give the spiritual courts, which are
not permitted to exercise any judicial cognizance in matters of
crime, an immediate influence in trials for offenses, and to draw
the decision from the course of the common law, to which it solely
and peculiarly belongs. Y
The ground of the judicial powers given to ecclesiastical
courts is, merely, of a spiritual consideration, “pro correctione
morum, ct pro salute am'mae.” They are therefore addressed to
the conscience of the party. But one great object of temporal
jurisdiction is the public peace; and crimes against the public
peace are wholly, and in all their parts, of temporal cognizance
alone. A felony by common law was also so. A felony by statute
becomes so at the moment of its institution. The temporal courts
alone can expound the law, and judge of the crime, and its proofs;
in doing so, they must see with their own eyes, and try by their
own rules, that is, by the common law of the land; it is the trust
and sworn duty of their office.
When the acts of Henry VIII first declared what marriages
should be lawful, and what incestuous, the temporal courts, though
they had before no jurisdiction, and the acts did not by express
words give them any upon the point, decided, incidentally, upon
the construction, declared what marriage came within the Levitical
degree, and prohibited the spiritual courts from giving or proceed-
ing upon any other construction. Whilst an ancient statute sub-
sisted (2 H. 4, c. I 5), by which personal punishment was incurred
on holding [*42g] heretical doctrines, the temporal courts took
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competent court, disproving the ground of the action. So a 
sentence of nullity is equally evidence in a personal action against 
a defense founded upon a supposed coverture. [*428J But in all 
these cases, the parties to the suits, or at least the parties against 
whom the evidence was received, were parties to the sentence, 
and had acquiesced under it ; or claimed under those who were 
parties and had acquiesced. · 
But although the law stands thus with regard to civil suits, 
proceedings in matters of crime, and especially of felony, fall 
under a different consideration : First, because the parties are not 
the same ; for the king, in whom the trust of prosecuting public 
offenses, is vested, and which is executed by his immediate orders, 
or in his name by some prosecutor, is no party to such proceed­
ings in the ecclesiastical court, and cannot be admitted to defend, 
examine witnesses, in any manner intervene or appeal. Secondly, 
such doctrines would tend to give the spiritual courts, which are 
not permitted to exercise any judicial " cognizance in matters of 
crime, an immediate influence in trials for offenses, and to draw 
the decision from the course of the common law, to which it solely 
and peculiarly belongs. 
The ground of the judicial powers given to ecclesiastical 
courts is, merely, of a spiritual consideration, "pro correctione 
morum, et pro salu-te animae." They are therefore addressed to 
the conscience of the party. But one great obj ect of temporal 
jurisdiction is the public peace ; and crimes against the public 
peace are wholly, and in all their parts, of temporal cognizance 
alone. A felony by common law was also so .  A felony by statute 
becomes so at the moment of its institution. The temporal courts 
alone can expound the law, and judge of the crime, and its proofs ; 
in doing so, they must see with their own eyes, and try by their 
own rules, that is, by the common law of the land ; it is the trust 
and sworn duty of their office. 
\Vhen the acts of Henry VIII  first declared what marriages 
should be lawful, and what incestuous, the temporal courts, though 
they had before no jurisdiction, and the acts did not by express 
words give them any upon the point, decided, incidentally, upon 
the construction, declared what marriage came within the Levitical 
degree, and prohibited the spiritual courts from giving or proceed­
ing upon any other construction. Whilst an ancient statute sub­
sisted ( 2 H. 4, c. 1 5 ) , by which personal punishment was incurred 
on holding [*429] heretical doctrines, the temporal courts took 
notice, incidentally, whether the tenet was heretical or not ; for 
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“the king’s court will examine all things ordained by statute.”
W’ hen the statute of Wm. III. made certain blasphemous doctrines
a temporal crime, the temporal courts alone could determine,
whether the doctrine complained of was blasphemous so as to
constitute the crime.
If a man should be indicted for taking a woman by force and
marrying her, or for marrying a child without her father's con-
sent; or for a rape where the defense is, that "the woman is his
wife ;" in all these cases, the temporal courts are bound to try the
prisoner by the rules and course of the common law, and inci-
dentally to determine what is heretical, and what is blasphemous;
and whether it was a marriage within the statute—a marriage
without consent; and whether, in the last case, the woman was his
wife: but if they should happen to find that sentences, in the re-
spective cases, had been given in the spiritual court upon the
heresy, the blasphemous doctrines, the marriage by force, the mar-
riage without consent, andthe marriage on the rape, and the court
must receive such sentences as conclusive evidence, in the first
instance, without looking into the case: it would vest the substan-
tial and effective decision, though not the cognizance of the crimes.
in the spiritual court, and leave to the jury, and the temporal
courts, nothing but a nominal form of proceeding, upon what
would amount to a predetermined conviction or acquittal; which
must have the efl‘ect of a real prohibition, since it would be in vain
to prefer an indictment, where an act of a foreign court shall at
once seal up the lips of the witnesses, the jury, and the court, and
put an entire stop to the proceeding.
And yet it is true, that the spiritual courts have no jurisdic-
tion, directly or indirectly, in any matter not altogether spiritual:
and it is equally true, that the temporal courts have the sole and
entire cognizance of crimes, which are wholly and altogether tem-
poral in their nature.
And if the rule of evidence must be, as it is often declared to
be, reciprocal; and that in all cases in which sentences favorable
to the prisoner, are to be admitted as conclusive evidence for him;
the sentences, if unfavorable to the prisoner, are in like manner
conclusive evidence [*43o] against him; in what situation must
the prisoners be, whose life, or liberty, or property, or fame rests
on the judgments of courts, which have no jurisdiction over them '
in the predicament in which they stand? and in what situation are
the judges of the common law, who must condemn, on the word
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"the king's court will examine all things ordained by statute. " 
\\Then the statute of Wm. III .  made certain blasphemous doctrines 
a temporal crime, the temporal courts alone could determine, 
whether the doctrine complained of was blasphemous so as to 
constitute the crime. 
If a man should be indicted for taking a woman by force and 
marrying her, or for marrying a child without her father's con­
sent ; or for a rape where the defense is, that "the woman is his 
wife ;" in all these cases, the temporal courts are bound to try the 
prisoner by the rules and course of the common law, and inci­
dentally to determine what is heretical, and what is blasphemous ; 
and whether it was a marriage within the statute-a marriage 
without consent ; and whether, in the last case, the woman was his 
wife : but i f  they should happen to find that sentences, in the re­
spective cases, had been given in the spiritual court upon the 
heresy, the blasphemous doctrines, the marriage by force, the mar­
riage without consent, and· the marriage on the rape, and the court 
must receive such sentences as conclusive evidence, in the first 
instance, without looking into the case : it  would vest the substan­
tial and effective decision, though not the cognizance of the crimes. 
in the spiritual court, and leave to the jury, and the temporal 
courts, nothing but a nominal form of proceeding, upon what 
would amount to a predetermined conviction or acquittal ; which 
must have the effect of a real prohibition , since it would he in vain 
to prefer an indictment, where an act of a foreign court shall at 
once seal up the l ips of the witnesses, the jury, and the court, and 
put an entire stop to the proceeding. 
And yet it is true, that the spiritual courts have no jurisdic­
tion,  directly or indirectly, in any matter not altogether spiritual : 
and it is equally true, that the temporal courts have the sole and 
entire cognizance of crimes, which are wholly and altogether tem­
poral in their nature. 
And if the rule of evidence must be, as it is often declared to 
be� reciprocal ; and that in a11 cases in which sentences favorable 
to the prisoner, are to be admitted as conclusive evidence for him ; 
the sentences, i f  unfavorable to the prisoner, are in like manner 
conclusive evidence [*430] against him ; in what situation must 
the prisoners be, whose l ife, or liberty, or property, or fame rests 
on the judgments of courts, which have no jurisdiction over them 
in the pred icament in which they stand ? and in what situation are 
the judges of the common law, who must condemn, on the word 
of an ecclesiastical judge, wi thout exercising any j udgment of 
their own ? 
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The spiritual court alone can deprive a clergyman. Felony
is a good cause of deprivation: yet in Lord Hobart’s reports it is
held, that they cannot proceed to deprive for felony, before the
felon has been tried at law; and although, after conviction, they
may act upon that, and make the conviction a ground of depriva-
tion, neither side can prove or disprove anything against the ver-
dict: because, as that very learned judge declares, “it would be to
determine, though not capitally, upon a capital crime, and thereby
judge of the nature of the crime, and the validity of the proofs; '
neither of which belongs to them to do.”
If, therefore, such a sentence, even upon a matter within their
jurisdiction, and before a felony committed, should be conclusive
evidence on a trial for felony committed after, the opinion of a
judge, incompetent to the purpose, resulting (for aught appears)
from incompetent proofs (as suppose the suppletory oath), will
direct or rule a jury and a court of competent jurisdiction, without
confronting any witnesses, or hearing any proofs: for the ques-
tion supposes, and the truth is, that the temporal court does not
and cannot examine, whether the sentence is a just conclusion
from the case, either in law or fact; and the difl-iculty will not be
removed by presuming that every court determines rightly, be-
cause it must be presumed too, that the parties did right in bring-
ing the full and true case before the court; and if they did, still
the court will have determined rightly by ecclesiastical laws and
rules, and not by those laws and rules by which criminals are to
stand or fall in this country.
If the reason for receiving such sentence is, because it is the
judgment of a court competent to the inquiry then before them;
from the same reason, the determination of two justices of the
peace upon the fact or validity of a marriage, in adjudging a place
of settlement, may hereafter be offered as evidence, and give the
law to the highest court of criminal jurisdiction. [*43r]
But if a direct sentence upon the identical question, in a
matrimonial cause, should be admitted as evidence (though such
sentence against the marriage has not the force of a final decision,
that there was none), yet a cause of jactitation is of a different
nature; it is ranked as a cause of defamation only, and not as a
matrimonial cause, unless where the defendant pleads a marriage;
and whether it continues a matrimonial cause throughout, as some
say, or ceases to be so on failure of proving a marriage, as others
have said, still the sentence has only a negative and qualified I
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The spiritual court alone can deprive a clergyman. Felony 
is a good cause of deprivation : yet in Lord Hobart's reports it is 
held, that they cannot proceed to deprive for felony, before the 
felon has been tried at law ; and although, after conviction, they 
may act upon that, and make the conviction a ground of depriva­
tion, neither side can prove or disprove anything against the ver­
dict : because, as that very learned judge declares, "it would be to 
determine, though not capitally, upon a capital crime, and thereby 
j udge of the nature of the crime, and the validity of the proofs ; · 
neither of which belongs to them to do." 
I f, therefore, such a sentence, even upon a matter within their 
j urisdiction, and before a felony committed, should be conclusive 
evidence on a trial for felony committed after, the opinion of a 
j udge, incompetent to the purpose, resulting ( for aught appears) 
from incompetent proofs ( as suppose the suppletory oath) , will 
direct or ntle a jury and a court of competent j urisdiction , �ithout 
confronting any witnesses, or hearing any proofs· : for the ques­
tion supposes, and the truth is, that the temporal court does not 
and cannot examine, whether the sentence is a j ust conclusion 
from the case, either in law or fact ; and the difficulty will not be 
removed by presuming that every court determines rightly, be­
cause it must be presumed too, that the parties did right in bring­
ing the full and true case before the court ; and i f  they did, still 
the court will have determined rightly by ecclesiastical laws and 
rules, and not by those laws and rules by which criminals are to 
stand or fall in this country. 
If the reason for receiving such sentence is ,  because it is the 
judgment of a court competent to the inquiry then before them : 
from the same reason, the determination of two justices of the 
peace upon the fact or validity of a marriage, in adjudging a place 
of settlement, may hereafter be offered as evidence, and give the 
law to the highest court of criminal jurisdiction. [*43 1 ]  
But i f  a direct sentence upon the identical question, i n  a 
matrimonial cause, should be admitted as evidence ( thoug-h such 
sentence against the marriage has not the force of a final decision, 
that there was none) , yet a cause of jactitation is of a different } 
nature ; i t  i s  ranked as a cause o f  defamation only, and not as a 
matrimonial cause, unless where the defendant pleads a marriage ; 
and whether it conti nues a matrimonial cause throughout, a!' some 
sa�r, or ceases to be so on failure of provjng a marriage , as others 
have said, sti ll the sentence has only a negative and qualified 
effect , viz. , "that the party has failed in his proof, and that th� 1 
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libellant is free from all matrimonial contract, as far as yet ap— ‘
pears ;” leaving it open to new proofs of the same marriage in
the same cause, or to any proofs of that or any other marriage in
another cause; and if such sentence is no plea to a new suit there,
and does not conclude the court which pronounces, it cannot con-
clude a court which receives the sentence from going into new
proofs to make out that or any other marriage.
So that, admitting the sentence in its full extent and import,
it only proves, that it did not yet appear that they were married, L
and not that they were not married at all; and, by the rule laid
down by Holt, L. C. J., such sentence can be no proof of anything
to be inferred by argument from it; and therefore it is not to be
inferred, that there was no marriage at any time or place, because
the court had not then sufficient evidence to prove a marriage at a
particular time and place. That sentence, and this judgment may
stand well together, and both propositions be equally true: it may .
be true, that the spiritual court had not then sufficient proof of the
marriage specified, and that your lordships may now, unfortun-
ately, find sufficient proof of some marriage.
But if it was a direct and decisive sentence upon the point,
and, as it stands, to be admitted as conclusive evidence upon the
court, and not to be impeached from within; yet, like all other acts
of the highest judicial authority, it is impeachable from without;
although it is not permitted to show that the court was mistaken,
it may be shown that they were misled. Fraud is an extrinsic, col- '
lateral act; which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of courts
of justice. Lord Coke says, it avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical
or temporal. [*432] In civil suits all strangers may falsify, for
covin, either fines, or real or feigned recoveries; and even a recov-
ery by a just title, if collusion was practiced to prevent a fair
defense; and this, whether the covin is apparent upon the record,
as not essoining, or not demanding the view, or by suffering judg-
ment by confession or default: or extrinsic, as not pleading a
release, collateral warranty, or other advantageous pleas. In
criminal proceedings, if an offender is convicted of felony on con-
fession, or is outlawed, not only the time of the felony, but the
felony itself, may be traversed by a purchaser, whose conveyance
would be affected as it stands; and, even after a conviction by
verdict, he may traverse the time. In the proceedings of the
ecclesiastical court the same rule holds. In Dyer there is an in-
stance of a second administration, fraudulently obtained, to defeat
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J ibellant is free from all matrimonial contract, as far as yet ap- I 
pears ;" leaving it open to new proofs of the same marriage in 
the same cause, or to any proofs of that or any other marriage in 
another cause ; and if such sentence is  no plea to a new suit there, 
and does not conclude the court which pronounces, it cannot con­
clude a court which receives the sentence from going into new 
proofs to make out that or any other marriage. 
So that, admitting the sentence in its full extent and impm t, 
it only proves, that it did not yet appear that they were married , 
and not that they were not married at all ; and, by the rule laiJ 
down by Holt, L. C. J ., such sentence can be no proof of anything 
to be inferred by argument from it ; and therefore it is not to be 
inferred, that there was no marriage at any time or place, because 
the court had not then sufficient evidence to prove a marriage at a 
particular time and place. That sentence, and this judgment may 
stand well together, and both propositions be equally true : it may 
be true, that the spiritual court had not then sufficient proof of the 
marriage specified, and that your lordships may now, unfortun­
ately, find sufficient proof of some marriage. 
But i f  it was a direct and decisive sentence upon the point, 
and, as it stands, to be admitted as conclusive evidence upon the 
court, and not to be impeached from within ; yet, like all other act� 
of the highest judicial authority, it is impeachable from witho� 
although it is not permitted to show that the court was mistaken� 
it may be shown that they were misled. Fraud is an extrinsic, col­
lateral act ; which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of court� 
of justice. Lord Coke says, it avoids all j udicial acts, ecclesiastical 
or temporal. [*432] In civil suits all strangers may falsify, for 
covin, either fines, or real or feigned recoveries ; and even a recov­
ery by a just title, if collusion was practiced to prevent a fair 
defense ; and this, whether the covin is apparent upon the record, 
as not essoining, or not demanding the view, or by suffering judg­
ment by confession or default : or extrinsic, as not pleading a 
release, collateral warranty, or other advantageous pleas. In 
criminal proceedings, if an offender is convicted of felony on con­
fession, or is outlawed, not only the time of the felony, but the 
felony itsel f, may be traversed by a purchaser, whose conveyance 
would be affected as it stands ; and, even after a conviction by 
verdict, he may traverse the time. In the proceedings of the 
ecclesiastical court the same rule holds. In Dyer there is an in­
stance of a second administration , fraudulently obtained, to defeat 
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_ by demurrer, the court pronounced against the fraudulent admin-
istration. In another instance, an administration had been fraud-
ulently revoked; and the fact being denied, issue was joined upon
it; and the collusion being found by a jury, the court gave judg-
ment against it. In the more modern cases, the question seems to
. have been, whether the parties should be permitted to prove col-
lusion ; and not seeming to doubt but that strangers might. So
~ that collusion, being a matter extrinsic of the cause, may be im-
aputed by a stranger, and tried by a jury, and determined by the
-._'courts of temporal jurisdiction. And if a fraud will vitiate the
judicial acts of the temporal courts, there seems as much reason
to prevent the mischiefs arising from collusion in the ecclesiastical
courts, which, from the nature of their proceedings, are at least
as much exposed, and which we find have been, in fact, as much
exposed, to be practiced upon for sinister purposes, as the courts
in \Vestminster hall.
\'Vc are therefore unanimously of opinion: First, that a
sentence in the spiritual court against a marriage in a suit of
jactitation of marriage is not conclusive evidence, so as to stop the
counsel for the crown from proving the marriage in an indictment
for polygamy. But secondly, admitting such sentence to be con-
clusive [*433] upon such indictment, the counsel for the crown
may be admitted to avoid the effect of such sentence, by proving
the same to have been obtained by fraud or collusion.
A decree denying a husband's bill for divorce is not competent evi-
dence against him in a criminal prosecution for failure to support his
wife, in which he alleges in defense the same adultery as charged in his
bill for divorce. State v. Bradneck (1897), 69 Conn. 212, 37 At]. 402,
43 L. R. A. 620.
UNITED STATES v. BUTLER, in U. S. D. Ct. for E. D. Michigan,
April 29, 1889-~38 Fed. Rep. 498.
Defendant was indicted for selling malt liquors without pay-
ment of the special tax required by law, and also for perjury, in
swearing before .a United States commissioner, upon his prelim-
inary examination that he did not so sell. Upon his trial for sell-
ing liquor he was acquitted, and thereupon pleaded to the indict-
ment for perjury autrcfois acquit.
BROWN, ]. It certainly strikes one as an anomaly that, after
an acquittal for a criminal offense, a party may be put upon tr1al
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• by demurrer, the court pronounced against the fraudulent admin­
istration . In another instance, an administration had been fraud­
ulently revoked ; and the fact being denied, issue was joined upon 
it ; and the collusion being found by a jury, the court gave j udg­
ment against it. In the more modern cases, the question seems to 
• have been, whether the parties should be permitted to prove col­
lusion ; and not seeming to doubt but that strangers might. So 
' that collusion, being a matter extrinsic of the cause, may be im­
•puted by a stranger, and tried by a j ury, and determined by the 
" •courts of temporal jurisdiction. And if a fraud will vitiate the 
· judicial acts of the temporal courts, there seems as much reason 
to prevent the mischiefs arising from collusion in the ecclesiastical 
courts, which, from the nature of their proceedings, are at least 
as much exposed, and which we find have been, in fact, as much 
exposed, to be practiced upon for sinister purposes, as the courts 
• 
in \Vestminster hall . 
vVe are therefore unanimously of opinion : First, that a 
sentence in the spiritual court against a marriage in a suit of 
j actitation o f  marriage is not conclusive evidence, so as to stop the 
counsel for the crown from proving the marriage in an indictment 
for polygamy. But secondly, admitting such sentence to be con­
clusive [*433 ] upon such indictment, the counsel for the crown 
may be admitted to avoid the effect of such sentence, by proving 
the same to have been obtained by fraud or collusion .  
A decree denying a husband's bill  for divorce is  not competent evi­
dence against him in a criminal prosecution for failure to support ·his 
wi fe, in which he alleges in  defense the same adultery as charged in his 
bHI for divorce. State v. Bradneck ( 1897) ,  (J9 Conn. 212, 37 Atl . 492, 
43 L. R. A. 620. 
UNITED ST ATES v. BUTLER, in U. S. D. Ct. for E. D. Michigan, 
April 29, 188<)-38 Fed. Rep. 498. 
Defendant was ind icted for selling malt liquors without pay­
ment of the special tax required by law, and also for perj ury, in 
swearing before .a United States commissioner, upon his prelim­
inary examination that he did not so sell. Upon his trial for sell­
ing liquor he was acquitted, and thereupon pleaded to the indict­
ment for perj ury autrefois acquit .  
BROWN, J. It certainly strikes one as an anomaly that, after 
an acquittal for a criminal offense, a party may be put upon trial 
for perj ury, in swearing that he w�s net guilty of that offense. 
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* * * [*499] \/Vhenever the same fact has been put in issue be-
tween the same parties, the verdict of the jury upon such issue is
a complete estoppel. This case contains all the elements of a plea
of res judicata; and the parties are the same; the point in issue,
viz., whether he did in fact sell liquor, is the same, and the quan-
tum of proof requisite in both cases is also the same. Had he
sworn before the commissioner that he had paid his tax and had
been acquitted by the jury upon the ground that he did not sell
liquor, the issue would have been different, and perhaps such
difference might have been shown by parol, but in this case the
two issues were identically the same. * * * While I do not fin'd"
the doctrine of res judicata discussed in criminal cases, I see no
reason why the general rule regarding estoppels should not applv,
especially where the quantum of proof required in the two pros-
ecutions is the same. If this party could be convicted of perjury
in swearing to a state of facts which a jury in another [*5oo] case
against him has found to be true, it would result that every crim-
inal case in which the defendant takes the stand and is acquitted
could be practically retried upon an indictment for perjury. This
never could have been the contemplation of congress in allowing
a defendant to be sworn in his own behalf.
I express no opinion as to whether, if he had been convicted,
such conviction would act as an estoppel against him in a prose-
cution for perjury, as the question is not involved in this case.
‘ Points not Essential to Prior Judgment or not Contested.
OUTRAM v. MORE\VOOD, in Court of King’s Bench of England,
Hilary Term, 43 Geo. III, A. D. I803-—3 East 346.
Lonn ELLENBOROUGH, C.]. [*35z] This was an action of
trespass for digging and getting the coals out of a coal mine, al-
leged by the plaintiff to be within and under his close called the
Cow Close. The defendants plead, and show title regularly
brought down to them in right of the wife, by fine, recovery, bar-
gain and sale, releases, and descents, from one Sir John Zouch,
who in the 39th of Elizabeth. was seized in fee of the manor of
Alfreton, and of certain messuages and lands within the manor,
under which title they claim all the coals under those lands ex-
cept such as were within * * * [a certain conveyance made by
said Zouch] ; and the defendants aver, that the coals in question
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* * * [*499] Whenever the same fact has been put in issue be­
tween the same parties, the verdict of the jury upon such issue is 
a complete estoppel. This case contains all the elements of a plea 
of res judicata; and the parties are the same ; the point in issue, 
viz., whether he did in fact sell liquor, is the same, and the quan­
tum of proof requisite in both cases is also the same. Had he 
sworn before the commissioner that he had paid his tax and had 
been acquitted by the jury upon the ground that he did not sell 
liquor, the issue would have been different, and perhaps such 
difference might have been shown by parol, but in this case the 
two issues were identically the same. * * * \Vhile I do not fin';t­
the doctrine of res judicata discussed in criminal cases, I see no 
reason why the general rule regarding estoppels should not applv, 
especially where the quantum of proof required in the two pros­
ecutions is the same. If this party could be convicted of perjury 
in swearing to a state of facts which a jury in another [*500] case 
against him has found to be true, it would result that every crim­
inal case in which the defendant takes the stand and is acquitted 
could be practically retried upon an indictment for perjury. This 
never could have been the contemplation of congress in allowing 
a defendant to be sworn in his own behalf. 
I express no opinion as to whether, if he had been convicted, 
snch conviction would act as an estoppel against him in a prose­
cution for perjury, as the question is not involved in this case. 
· Points not Essential to Prior Judgment or not Contested. 
OUTRAM v. MOREWOOD, in Court of King's Bench of England, 
Hilary Term, 43 Geo. I I I, A. D. 18o3-3 East 346. 
LoRn Er.LF.N DOROUGH, C.J. [ *352] This was an action of 
trespass for digging and getting the coals out of a coal mine, al­
leged by the plaintiff to be within and under his close called the 
Cow Close. The defendants plead, and show title regularly 
brought down to them in right of the wife, by fine, recovery, bar­
gain and sale, releases, and descents, from one Sir John Zouch, 
who in the 39th of Elizabeth. was seized in fee of the manor of 
Alfreton, and of certain messuages and lands within the manor, 
under which title they claim all the coals under those lands ex­
cept such as were within * * * [a certain conveyance made by 
said Zouch] ; and the defendants aver, that the coals in question 
were under the lands of that former owner Sir J. Zouch, and 
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were derived by bargain and sale to certain immediate bargainees,
and from them to the defendant the wife, and were not within
or under any of the messuages, buildings, orchards, and gardens
which are the subject of the exception. To this plea the plaintiff
replies, and relies by way of estoppel upon a former verdict ob-
tained by him in an action of trespass brought by him against one
of the defendants, Ellen the wife of the other defendant, Henry
Case Morewood, she being then sole; in which he declared for
the same trespass as now, to which the wife pleaded and derived
title in the same manner as now done by her and her husband,
and alleged that the coal mines in question, in the declaration
‘mentioned, were at the time of making the before-mentioned bar-
.gain and sale by Sir John Zouch part and parcel of the coal mines
‘by that indenture bargained and sold; [*353] upon which point
\ (viz., whether the coal mines claimed by the plaintiff, and men-
1 tioned in his declaration, were parcel of what passed under Zouch’s
‘bargain and sale to the persons under whom the wife claimed)
tan issue was taken, and found for the plaintiff against the wife,
‘one of the now defendants, her husband being the other defendant
iwith her in the present action. JAnd the question is, whether the
ldefendants, the husband and \ ife, are estopped by this verdict
land judgment thereupon from now averring (contrary to the
Ititle so there found against the wife) that the coal mines now in
question are parcel of the coal mines bargained and sold by the
indenture above mentioned?
The operation and effect of this finding, if it operate at all,
as a conclusive bar, must be by way of estoppel. If the wife
were bound, by this finding as an estoppel, and precluded from
averring the contrary of what was then so found, the husband,
in respect of his privity, either in estate or in law, would be
equally bound, according 40 what is said in Coke Lit. 352 a:
“Privies in estates, as the feoffee, lessee, &c.; privies in law, as
the lords by escheat, tenant by the curtesy, tenant in dower, the
incumbent of a benefice, and others that come in by act in law
in the post, shall be bound by and take advantage of estoppels.”
The question then is: Is the wife herself estopped by this former
finding to aver the contrary? In Brooke Abr. t. Estoppel, pl. 15
(who cites 33 Hen. VI, 7, I9, 50; and see also to same effect
Brooke Abr. t. Estates 158, 2 Ed. IV, 17) it is said to be “agreed
that all the records in which the freehold comes in debate shall
be estopped with the land and run with the land; so that a man
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were derived by bargain and sale to certain immediate bargainees, 
and from them to the defendant the wife, and were not within 
or under any of the messuages, buildings, orchards, and gardens 
which are the subj ect of the exception. To this plea the plaintiff 
replies, and relies by way of estoppel upon a former verdict ob­
tained by him in an action of trespass brought by him against one 
of the defendants, Ellen the wife of the other defendant, Henry 
Case Morewood, she being then sole ; in which he declared for 
the same trespass as now, to which the wife pleaded and derived 
title in the same manner as now done by her and her husband, 
and alleged that the coal mines in question, in the declaration 
· mentioned, were at the time of making the before-mentioned bar­
. gain and sale by Sir John Zouch part and parcel of the coal mines 
• by that indenture bargained and sold ; [*353] upon which point 
' (viz., whether the coal mines claimed by the plaintiff, and men-
1 tioned in his declaration, were parcel of what passed under Zouch's 
1 bargain and sale to the persons under whom the wife claimed) 
I an issue was taken, and found for the plaintiff against the wife, 
, one of the now defendants, her husband being the other defendant 
1 with her in the present action.JAnd the question is, whether the tdefendants, the husband and ife, are estopped by this verdict 
rand j udgment thereupon from now averring (contrary to the 
ftitle so there found against the wife) that the coal mines now in 
question are parcel of the coal mines bargained and sold by the 
indenture above mentioned ? 
The operation and effect of this finding, i f  it operate at all, 
as a conclusive bar, must be by way of estoppel . If the wife 
were bound, by this finding as an estoppel, and precluded from 
averring the contrary of what was then so found, the husband, 
in respect of his privity, either in estate or in law, would be 
equally bound, according .to what is said in Coke Lit. 352 a :  
"Privies in estates, as the feoffee, lessee, &c. ; privies in law, as 
the lords by escheat, tenant by the curtesy, tenant in dower, the 
incumbent of a benefice, and others that come in by act in law 
in the post, shall be bound by and take advantage of estoppels." 
The question then is : Is the wi'fe herself estopped by this former 
finding to aver the contrary ? In Brooke A br. t .  Estoppel, pl. l 5 
( who cites 33 Hen. VI, 7, 19, 50 ; and see also to same effect 
Brooke Ahr. t. Estates 1 58, 2 Ed. IV, 17 )  it is said to be "agreed 
that all the records in which the freehold comes in debate shall 
be estopped with the land and run with the land ; so that a man 
may plead this, as party or as heir, as privy or by que e�tate." 
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But if it be said, that by the freehold coming in [*354] debate
must he meant a question respecting the same in a suit in which
the freehold was immediately recoverable, as in an assize or writ
of entry, I answer that a recovery in any one suit upon issue
joined on matter of title is equally conclusive upon the subject
matter of such title; and that a finding upon title in trespass not
only operates as a bar to the future recovery of damages for a
trespass founded on the same injury, but also operates by way of
estoppel to any action for an injury to the same supposed right
of possession. In trespass for breaking the plaintiffs close (re-
ported in 3 Leon. 194), the defendant pleaded “that heretofore
he himself brought an ejections firmae against the plaintiff of the
same land in which the trespass is supposed to be done, and had
judgment to recover; and demanded judgment if against, &c.
It was moved that the bar was not good, because that the defend-
ant had not averred his title; and the recovery in one action of
trespass is no bar in another,” &c. :Qu0d curia concessit. But as
to the matter the court was clear that the bar was good. And,
by Periam, whoever pleaded it, it was well pleaded; for, as by
recovery in assize the freehold is bound, so by recovery in ejec-
tione firmae the possession is bound. And, by Anderson, a recov-
ery in one ejectione firmae is a bar in another; especially, as Per-
iam said, if the party relieth upon the estoppel. And afterwards
judgment was given that the plaintiff should be barred. This,
it will be recollected, was an action of ejectione firmac, and not
an ejectment moulded and regulated by rules of court as it is at
present. The court very properly distinguished there between
what operates by way of bar to a future recovery for the same
thing, and what by way of estoppel. That was the case of a
mere recovery in ejections firmae, without title alleged; and the
plaintiff might, in respect of [*355] possession or other varying
circumstances of title, be well entitled to recover at one time and
not be so at another. And it is not the recovery, but the matter al-
leged by the party, and upon which the recovery proceeds which Q
creates the estoppel. The recovery of itself in an action of trespass
is only a bar to the future recovery of damages for the same in-
jury: but the estoppel precludes parties and privies from contend-
ing to the contrary of that point or matter of fact, which having
been once distinctly put in issue by them or by those to whom‘
they are privy in estate or law, has been on such issue joined sol-
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But if it be said, that by the freehold coming in [ *354] debate 
must be meant a question respecting the same in a suit in which 
the freehold was immediately recoverable, as in an assize or writ 
of entry, I answer that a recovery in any one suit upon issue 
joined on matter of title is equally conclusive upon the subj ect 
matter of such title ; and that a finding upon ti tle in trespass not 
only operates as a bar to the future recovery of damages for a 
trespass founded on the same injury, but also operates by way of 
estoppel to any action for an injury to the same supposed right 
of possession. In trespass for breaking the plaintiff's close ( re­
ported in 3 Leon. 194) , the defendant pleaded "that heretofore 
he himself brought an ejectione nrmae against the plaintiff of the 
same land in which the trespass is supposed to be done, and had 
j udgment to recover ; and demanded judgment if against, &c. 
It was moved that the bar was not good, because that the defend-
ant had not averred his title ; and the recovery in one action of 
trespass is no bar in another," &c. :Quod curia concessit. But as 
to the matter the court was clear that the bar was good. And, 
by Periam, whoever pleaded it, it was well pleaded ; for, as by 
recovery in assize the freehold is bound, so by recovery in ejec­
tione firmae the possession is bound. And, by Anderson, a recov-
ery in one ejectione nrmae is a bar in another ; especially, as Per-
iam said, if the party relieth upon the estoppel . And afterwards 
judgment was given that the plaintiff should be barred. This, 
it will be recollected, was an action of ejectione nrmae, and not 
an ejectment moulded and regulated by rules of court as it is at 
present. The court very properly distinguished there between 
what operates by way of bar to a future recovery for the same 
thing, and what by way of estoppel. That was the case of a 
mere recovery in ejectione firmae, without title alleged ; and the 
plaintiff might, in respect of [*355 ] possession or other varying 
circumstances of title, be well entitled to recover at one time and 
not be so at another. And it is not the recovery, but the matter al­
leged by the party, and upon which the recovery proceeds which I 
creates the estoppel. The recovery of  itself in an action of trespass I i s  only a bar to the future recovery of damages for the same in­
jury : but the estoppel precludes parties and privies from contend- : 
ing to the contrary of that point or matter of fact, which havingl 
been once distinctly put in i ssue by them or by those to whom 
they are privy in estate or law, has been on such issue joined sol­
emnly found against them. 
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The authorities upon which a contrary doctrine has been en-
deavored to be maintained are the opinions of Lord Coke, as col-
lected from his preface to his 8th Report, the resolution and doc-
trinc in the case of Ferrers, 6 Coke 7, the case of Incle-
don ct al. v. Burgess, I Shower 27, Comb, 166, to which may be
added what passed in court in the case of Basset v. Bennett upon a
motion for a new trial in this court in I767, and the case of Sir
Frederick Evelyn v. Haynes (Surrey summer assizes 1782 before
Lord Mansfield), and the decision against the estoppel endeavored
to be maintained in Kinnersiey v. Or1>e (Douglass 517). As to
the first of these supposed authorities on the subject (viz. Lord
Coke’s preface to the 8th Report, he there laments the multiplic-
ity of suits in one and the same cause; whereon he says: HOften-
times there are divers verdicts on the one side, and divers on the
other, and yet the plaintiff or defendant can come to no finite
end, nor can hold the possession in quiet, though it be often tried
and adjudged for [*356] either party.” And he adds: “In per-
sonal actions concerning debts, goods, and chattels, a recovery
or bar in one action is a bar in another; and there is an end of
the controversy. In real actions for freehold and inheritance,
being of a higher and worthier nature and standing upon a great-
er variety of titles and difficulties in law, there could not be above
two trials or at the most (and that very rarely) three; and in
the meantime after one recovery the possession rested quiet.”
The complaint of Lord Coke is perhaps without much foundation,
and it is certainly misapplied to the present subject. There must
necessarily be a greater or less multiplicity of suits, according to
the nature of the suit, and the subject on which it operates. The
possession of land is changed much more frequently. and the right
to it is capable of an infinitely greater number of modifications
and interests, than the right to the freehold. The species of ac-
tion accommodated to the right of possession, however acquired,
and to injuries in whatever manner done thereto, must be of
course more frequently called into use than other species of ac-
tion which respect rights of property, either founded on entails
or descents from different descriptions of ancestors, and the var-
ious acts of wrong by which such special rights are interrupted
or destroyed. The judgment, which is the fruit of the action,
can only follow the nature of the particular right claimed, and the
injury complained of; and can conclude no further than the ex-
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The authorities upon which a contrary doctrine has been en­
deavored to be maintained are the opinions of Lord Coke, as col­
lected from his preface to his 8th Report, the resolution and doc­
trine in the case of Ferrers, 6 Coke 7, the case of Incle­
don et al. v. Burgess, l Shower 27, Comb, 166, to which may be 
added what passed in court in the case of Basset v. Bennett upon a 
motion for a new trial in this court in 1767, and the case of Sir 
Fredericli E·velyn v. Haynes ( Surrey summer assizes 1 782 before 
Lor<l Mansfield ) ,  and the decision against the estoppel endeavored 
to be maintained in Kinnersley v. Orpe (Douglass 5 1 7) . As to 
the first of these supposed authorities on the subject (viz. Lord 
Coke's preface to the 8th Report, he there laments the multipl ic­
ity of  suits in one and the same cause ; whereon he says : "Often­
times there are divers verdicts on the one side, and divers on the 
other, and yet the plaintiff or defendant can come to no finite 
end, nor can hold the possession in quiet, though it be often tried 
and adj udged for [*356] either party." And he adds : "In per­
sonal actions concerning debts, goods, and chattels, a recovery 
or bar in one action is a bar in another ; and there is an end of 
the controversy. In real actions for freehold and inheritance, 
being of a higher and worthier nature and standing upon a great­
er variety of titles and difficulties in law, there could not be above 
two trials or at the most ( and that very rarely ) three ; and in 
the meantime after one recovery the possession rested quiet." 
The complaint of Lord Coke is perhaps without much foundation, 
and it is certainly misapplied to the present subj ect. There must 
necessarily be a greater or less multiplicity of suits, according to 
the nature of the suit, and the subject on which it operates. The 
possession of land is changed much more frequently, and the right 
to it is  capable of an infinitely greater number of modifications 
and interests, than the right to the freehold. The species of ac­
tion accommodated to the right of possession, however acquired, 
and to inj uries in whatever manner done thereto, must be of 
course more frequently called into use than other species of ac­
tion which respect rights of property, either founded on entails 
or descents from different descriptions of ancestors, and the var­
ious acts of wrong by which such special rights are interrupted 
or destroyed. The j udgment, which is the fruit of the action, , 
can only follow the nature of the particular right claimed, and the 
inj ury complained of ; and can conclude no further than the ex- 1 
i stence of  the right, the injury thereto, and the compensation due , 
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for the same. In trespass, damages for an injury to possession
are the only thing demanded by the declaration; the judgment
can only give the plaintiff an ascertained right to his damages
and the means of obtaining them; it concludes nothing upon the
ulterior [*357] right of possession, much less of property. in the
land (unless a question of that kind be raised by the plea and a
traverse thereon), and does not even give him the means of obtain-
ing that possession for the disturbance of which he has obtained
damages. Neither, however, would a verdict and judgment in a .
real action operate by way of bar to future actions of trespass or
bring the parties “to the finite end” wished for by Lord Coke;
because there may be, notwithstanding the verdict and judgment
in the real action, even i11 that which is most conclusive upon
the right (I mean a writ of right itself), a right of possession
derived under the owner of the inheritance in fee simple, or ‘
those under whom he claims, which may enable a plaintiff in
trespass to recover for an injury to his possession done by the
very person in whose favor the absolute right of property shall
have been so affirmed in a real action. A judgment therefore in
each species of action is final only for its own proper purpose‘
and object and no further. The judgment in trespass affirms a'
right of possession to be, as between the plaintiff and defendant.
in the plaintiff at the time of the trespass committed. In the real
action, it affirms a right to the freehold of the land to be in the ‘
demandant at the time of the writ brought. Each species of judg-
ment, from one in an action of trespass to one upon a writ of
right, is equally conclusive upon its own subject matter by way
of bar to future litigation for the thing thereby decided. Only
the matter of the one judgment is in its nature, and according to
its class and degree in the order of actions, more conclusive upon
the general right of property in the land than the other. What,
therefore, Lord Coke says (that in personal actions concerning
debts, goods, and effects, by way of distinction from other ac-
tions, a recovery in one [*358] action is a bar to another), is not
true of personal actions alone, but is equally and universally true
as to all actions whatsoever, quoad their subject matters. And,
besides, this doctrine has no material bearing on the present ques-
tion, which, it must be recollected, is: Whether an allegation on
record upon which issue has been once taken and found is be-
tween the parties taking it and their privies conclusive according
to the finding thereof so as to estop the parties respectively from
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for the same. In trespass, damages for an injury to possession 
are the only thing demanded by the declaration ; the j udgment 
can only give the plaintiff an ascertained right to his damages 
and the means of obtaining them ; it concludes nothing upon the 
ulterior [*357] right of possession, much less of property. in the 
land ( unless a question of that kind be raised by the plea and a 
traverse thereon ) ,  and does not even give him the means of obtain-
ing that possession for the disturbance of which he has obtained 
damages. Neither, however, would a verdict and judgment in a 1 
real action operate by way of bar to future actions of trespass or 
bring the parties "to the finite end" wished for by Lord Coke ; 
because there may be, notwithstanding the verdict and judgment 
in the real action, even in that which is most conclusive upon 
the right ( I  mean a writ of right itsel f ) , a right of possession I derived under the owner of  the inheritance in fee simple, or 
those under whom he claims, which may enable a plaintiff in 
trespass to recover for an injury to his possession done by the 
very person in whose favor the absolute right of property shall r 
have been so affirmed in a real action. A judgment therefore in 
each species of action is final only for its own proper purpose 1 • 
and obj ect and no further. The j udgment in trespass affirms a '  
right of possession to be, as between the plaintiff and defendant. 
in the plaintiff at the time of the trespass committed. In the real 
action, it affirms a right to the freehold of the land to be in the ' 
demandant at the time of the wri t  brought. Each species of judg-
ment, from one in an action of trespass to one upon a writ of • 
right, is equally conclusive upon its own subj ect matter by way 
of bar to future litigation for the thing thereby decided. Only 
the matter of the one judgment is in its nature, and according to 
its class and degree in the order of actions, more conclusive upon 
the general right of property in the land than the other. What, 
therefore, Lord Coke says ( that in personal actions concerning 
debts, goods, and effects, by way of distinction from other ac-
tions, a recovery in one [*358] action is a bar to another) ,  is not 
true of personal actions alone, but is equally and universally true 
as to all actions whatsoever, quoad their subject matters. And, 
besides, this doctrine has no material bearing on the present ques-
tion, which, it must be recollected, is : Whether an allegation on I record upon which issue has been once taken and found is be- I tween the parties taking it and their privies conclusive according to the finding thereof so as to estop the parties respectively from again litigating that fact once so tried and found ? 
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As to Fcrrer’s Case, 6 Coke 7, and which is to be found also
reported in Cro. Eliz. 668 under the name of Sir Henry Ferrers
and two others against Arden with a statement of the facts upon
which the resolutions reported by Lord Coke are founded: it was
an action of trover for an ox, brought by the plaintiffs and an-
other person then deceased, against the defendant, who pleaded
a former recovery in trespass for the same cause of action, brought
by the now plaintiffs and the deceased person, against three
persons, who were, jointly with the defendant, guilty of the
conversion complained of: but in which former action the present
defendant had not been joined. To this plea the plaintiffs de-
murred. The court, upon argument, was divided whether the bar
was good or not, and no judgment was given; but the matter
was ended by arbitration, according to the report in Cro. Eliz.
The effect of the resolutions in that case, as reported
in 6 Coke 7, was: “that the law has provided greater
safety and remedy for matters of freehold and inheritance than
» for debts and chattels; for there, once barred, always barred ;”
but that in matters of freehold the party may bring an action of
a higher nature, and therein try the matter again. Now, although
it be true, that the same matter may be [*359] thus tried again,
yet the former judgment is no less conclusive upon the immediate
right then in demand, as far as that former judgment purports
to bind, and as against all such parties as it is competent by law
to bind. Upon the complaint made by Lord Coke in his preface
to the 8th Report, and which is referred to and again repeated in
this report, I have observed already, and again observe, that
neither the one nor the other of these authorities at all touch the
present question, which is that of the effect of a precise allegation
made in pleading on record and tried and found between the
parties. '
The case of Incledon V. Burgess, I W. & M., as re-
ported in I Shower 27, Comb. I66, and Carth. 65, was
an action for trespass for breaking a close; plea, a pre-
scriptive right of common of turbary, &c.; replication tra-
versing such prescription. The rejoinder by way of estoppel
was, that in such a term one of the plaintiffs brought
an action of trespass against the defendant wherein he pleaded
the same prescription, and issue tried upon it and found for the
defendant. And demurrer to the rejoinder. According to Show-
er the argument in favor of the demurrer against the estoppel
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As to Ferrer's Case, 6 Coke 7, and which is to be found also 
reported in Cro. Eliz. 668 under the name of Sir Henry Ferrer� 
and two others against Arden with a statement of the facts upon 
which the resolutions reported by Lord Coke are founded : it was 
an action of trover for an ox, brought by the plaintiffs and an­
other person then deceased, against the defendant, who pleaded 
a former recovery in trespass for the same cause of action, brought 
by the now plaintiffs and the deceased person, against three 
persons, who were, jointly with the defendant, guilty of the 
conversion complained of : but in which former action the present 
defendant had not been joined. To this plea the plaintiffs de­
murred. The court, upon argument, was divided whether the bar 
was good or not, and no judgment was given ; but the matter 
was ended by arbitration, according to the report in Cro. Eliz. 
The effect of the resolutions in that case, as reported 
in 6 Coke 7, was : "that the law has provided greater 
safety and remedy for matters of freehold and inheritance than 
· for debts and chattels ; for there, once barred, always barred ;" 
but that in matters of freehold the party may bring an action of 
a higher nature, and therein try the matter again. Now, although 
it be true, that the same matter may be [*359] thus tried again, 
yet the former judgment is no less conclusive upon the immediate 
right then in demand, as far as that former j udgment purports 
to bind, and as against all such parties as it is competent by law 
to bind. Upon the complaint made by Lord Coke in his preface 
to the 8th Report, and which is referred to and again repeated in 
this report, I have observed already, and again observe, that 
neither the one nor the other of these authorities at all touch the 
present question, which is that of the effect of a precise allegation 
made in pleading on record and tried and found between the 
parties. 
The case of Inc/edon v. Bu.rgess, I W. & M.,  as re­
ported in 1 Shower 27, Comb. 166, and Carth. 65, was 
an action for trespass for breaking a close ; plea, a pre­
scriptive right of common of turbary, &c. ; replication tra­
versing such prescription. The rejoinder by way of estoppel 
was, that in such a term one of the plaintiffs brought 
an action of trespass against the defendant wherein he pleaded 
the same prescription, and issue tried upon it and found for the 
defendant. And demurrer to the rejoinder. According to Show­
er the argument in favor of the demurrer against the estoppel 
was, that the parties were different, that there was another plain-
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tiff who was not a party to the former suit. And finally they took
exception to the declaration for not concluding against the peace
of both kings. And on this last objection the court determined
it, and not on the estoppel. The court according to Shower gave
no judgment on the estoppel, but only said: “An estoppel upon
a verdict goes a great way: issue in tail shall never falsify it;
but if one man is estopped and he joins another with him, whether
this shall avoid the estoppel is a quaere.” The report in Carthew
only says the court gave no opinion as to the matter in law, the
estoppel, but [*36o] judgment was given as to the objection taken
to the declaration of contra [mcem domini regis; and it does not
appear to have been argued that it would not have been an estop-
pel if clear of other objections. In the report in Comberbach
166 the argument on the estoppel turned on there being another
plaintiff joined. Lord Holt says, the meaning “of Ferrefs Case
is, that it is a bar for the same individual thing; but here is a new
cause of action: 13 Ed. IV, 2, 3, 4. There one trespass is a bar
to another by way of estoppel; that is for taking a villein; but
that isgrounded perhaps on the reason of the favor of liberty:
7 Hen. VI, 8. In trespass, on an issue whether such an one died
seized, a verdict was a bar to another action of trespass, by way
of estoppel, because there issue was joined on a matter in the
realty. As to the section of Littleton before cited, the joining
cannot privilege, as a release by one who afterwards joins with
another; that release is pleadable to both. If this had been in a
real action, where there might be summons and severance, there
it is admitted it would be an estoppel." Dolben, justice, said:
“Ferrer’s Case is not like this; for here is a new cause of action,
a new trespass; but in Ferrer’s Case it was another action for the
same trespass. And the court was certainly against Tremain.”
It must certainly be admitted that the present question in sub-
stance arose and might have been decided, but was not decided
in the above case of lnclea'0n v. Burgess, and that the decision
proceeded on another ground. It appears that Holt, C.]., was
aware of the case in 13 Ed. IV, 2, 3, 4, of the estoppel pleaded in
the action of trespass for taking a villein; and also of the case in 7
Hen. VI, 8: but he certainly is not warranted by any thing to be
found in the report of I3 Ed. IV in suggesting that the decision
in that [*36r] case was grounded on any reason in favor of lib-
erty; nor as to 7 Hen. VI, 8, in saying that the estoppel in that
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tiff who was not a party to the former suit. And finally they took 
exception to the declaration for not concluding against the peace 
of both kings. And on this last obj ection the court determined 
it ,  and not on the estoppel . The cou�t according to Shower gave 
no j udgment on the cstoppel, but only said : "An estoppel upon 
a verdict goes a great way : issue in tail shall never falsi fy it ; 
but if one man is estopped and he j oins another with him, whether 
this shall avoid the estoppel is a quacre." The report in Carthew 
only says the court gave no opinion as to the matter in law, the 
estoppel , but ( *360) judgment was given as to the objection taken 
to the declaration of con tra pacem dvmiu i  re gis; and it does not 
appear to have been argued that it would not have been an estop­
pel if clear of other obj ections. In the report in Comberbach 
1 66 the argument on the estoppel turned on there being another 
plaintiff joined. Lord Holt says, the meaning "of Ferrer's Case 
is, that it is a bar for the same individual thing ; but here is  a new 
cause of action : 13 Ed. IV, 2,  3 ,  4. There one trespass is a bar 
to another by way of estoppel ; that is for tak ing a villein ; but 19 
that is ·grounded perhaps on the reason of  the favor of liberty : 
7 Hen. VI ,  8. In trespass, on an issue whether such an one died ' /.r� 
seized, a verdict was a bar to another action of trespass, by way y _J)' . 
of estoppel, because there issue was joined on a matter in the · 
realty. As to the section of Littleton before cited, the j oining 
cannot privilege, as a release by one who afterwards joins with 
another ; that release is pleadable to both. I f  this had been in a 
real action, where there might be summons and severance, there 
it is admitted it would be an estoppel ." Dolben , j ustice, said : 
"F crrer' s Case is not like this ; for here is a new cause of action, 
a new trespass ; but in Ferrer's Case it was another action for the 
same trespass. And the court was certainly against Tremain." 
I t  must certainly be admitted that the present question in sub­
stance arose and might have been decided, but was not decided 
in the acovc case of /ncledon v. Burgess, and that the decision 
proceeded on another ground. It appears that Holt, C.J. ,  was 
aware of the case in I 3 Ed. IV, 2, 3 ,  4, of the estoppel pleaded in 
the action of trespass for taking a villein ; and also of the case in 7 
Hen. VI ,  8 :  but he certainly is not warranted by any thing to be 
found in the report of 13 Ed. IV in suggesting that the decision 
in that [ *361 ] case was grounded on any .reason in favor of lih­
erty ; nor as to 7 Hen . V I ,  8, in saying that the estoppel in that 
case was sustained because there the issue ( which was on the <i y-
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ing seized of a certain person) was joined on a matter in the
realty.
The only question in the case 13 Ed. IV, was that which was
made by Catesby, 1'. e., upon the identity of the matter in issue.
There, by partition, the villein who had been regardant to a manor
was allotted with certain lands to one sister in gross, and the
manor to the other sister. The ancestor of the villein had an-
swered in the former suit, in which it had been alleged that he
was a villein regardant, that he was free and not a villein in man-
ner and form as alleged, and it was so found; and the effect of
this finding as an estoppel, which was relied upon by the plaintiff
in that suit (the son of the supposed villein in the former), was
rested in argument not on the ground that it would be no estoppel
if the issue were the same but on the ground of the issue being
different; thereby admitting that it would have been an estoppel
if the issue had been the same; and of that opinion Brian and the
rest of the court seem to have been. The case in the Year-book,
7 Hen. VI, 8, 9, was this: Assize was brought against Popham
and others, and the plaint was of mill with other lands and tene-
ments: and Popham said that assize ought not to be, for one I.
Popham was seized of the tenements now put in view and plaint
in his demesne as of fee and died so seized, after whose death
plaintiff claimed as by force of a lease made to him by the said
J. Popham for term of life (whereas nothing passed by the deed)
and demanded judgment; the plaintiff said that the father of the
tenant had nothing but by the disseizin done to the plaintiff, and
he made continual claim and [*36z] could not enter for fear of
death; to which the tenant said that at another time he brought
trespass against the plaintiff, in which the plaintiff justified be-
cause the father of the tenant leased to him for life and the tenant
said that his father died seized, and this was found for the tenant
and he recovered damages, judgment if he shall be received to
defeat this issue once found. Rolfe, who argued for the plaintiff
that he should not be estopped, said, “he knew well that the plain-
tiff should not be received to say that the tenant's father did not
die seized which had been tried in the writ of trespass; but to
aver a thing which stands well with the first issue it seems he
shall be received; because it does not follow that if he died seized,
therefore he died seized of a good estate, but we have shown how
he died seized.” So that it seems clearly admitted by those who
argued against the estoppel that the party was estopped as to the
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ing seized of a certain person ) was j oined on a matter in the 
realty. 
The only question in the case 13 Ed. IV, was that which was 
made by Catesby, i. e., upon the identity of the matter in issue. 
There, by partition, the villein who had been regardant to a manor 
was allotted with certain lands to one sister in gross, and the 
manor to the other sister. The ancestor of the villein had an­
swered in the former suit, in which it had been alleged that he 
was a villein regardant, that he was free and not a villein in man­
ner and form as alleged, and it was so found ; and the effect of 
this finding as an estoppel, which was relied upon by the p!aintiff 
in that suit ( the son of the supposed villein in the former) ,  was 
rested in argument not on the ground that it would be no estoppel 
if the issue were the same but on the ground of the issue being 
different ; thereby admitting that it would have been an estoppel 
if the issue had been the same ; and of that opinion Brian and the 
rest of the court seem to have been. The case in the Year-book, 
7 Hen. VI, 8, 9, was this : Assize was brought against Popham 
and others, and the plaint was of mill with other lands ap.d tene­
ments : and Popham said that assize ought not to be, for one J. 
Popham was seized of the tenements now put in view and plaint 
in his demesne as of fee and died so seized, after whose death 
� plaintiff claimed as by force of a lease made to him by the said 
J. Popham for term of l ife ( whereas nothing passed by the deed) 
and demanded judgment ; the plaintiff said that the father of the 
tenant had nothing but by the disseizin done to the plaintiff, and 
he made continual claim and [ *362 ] could not enter for fear of 
death ; to which the tenant said that at another time he brought 
trespass against the plaintiff, in which the plaintiff justified be­
cause the father of the tenant leased to him for life and the tenant 
said that his father died seized, and this was found for the tenant 
and he recovered damages, j udgment if he shall be received to 
defeat this issue once found. Rol fe, who argued for the plaintiff 
that he should not be estopped, said, "he knew well that the plain­
tiff should not be received to say that the tenant's father did not 
die seized which had been tried in the writ of trespass ; but to 
aver a thing which stands wetl with the first issue it seems he 
shall be received ; because it does not follow that if  he died seized, 
therefore he died seized of a good estate, but we have shown how 
he died seized ." So that it seems clearly admitted by those who 
argued against the estoppel that the party was estopped as to the 
very issue found against him , but not as to other matters consist-· 
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ent therewith, that is consistent with the fact of dying seized,
but avoiding the effect thereof in point of law (that is, avoiding
its effect as a descent to toll an entry), by the disseizin, continual
claim, and non-entry for fear of death as alleged. Cottesmore
then says: “In writ of trespass of close broken, the issue trenches
well enough in the realty; as if the defendant justify his entry by
reason of inheritance which he has in the freehold; if this be tra-
versed this shall be peremptory; and so it was in our case. Pop-
ham brought trespass, the then defendant pleaded in bar because
of a lease made to him for life, and the plaintiff made title by
descent of the inheritance, which was traversed and found with the
plaintiff; which issue was merely in the realty. W'herefore it
seems to me that the now plaintiff shall not be received now to
disturb it.” Martin says: “As my companion has said, the issue
is as high in a writ of trespass, if taken in the [*363] realty, as
in an assize; and if the present plaintiff in the writ of trespass
had traversed the descent as he did and it has been found with
the plaintiff and the plaintiff had also brought trespass, should he
be permitted to avoid the descent by such descent as he has now
done? I say not. No more shall he be received in this assize
where the plaint is of the same tenements.” The case came on
again, 7 Hen. VI, 20, when Martin said he thought the plaintiff
should be estopped to avoid the descent, for this was found once
against him with the now tenants, upon which they recovered
their damages; and for this the descent, which was the cause of
the judgment and upon which judgment was given, ought to be
understood to be a good descent, and especially per ent. Primes.
And there was a like case, where a release was pleaded in bar,
and the plaintiff said it was made by duress of imprisonment,
and was afterwards nonsuit, and brought a new writ, and the re-
lease was again pleaded in bar; and he would have avoided the
deed because it was made at a time when he was within age, and
he was not received so to do: for that when he had said that the
deed was made by duress, &c., he acknowledged it to be good in
all points but that. Likewise in this case, when the descent is
found against the plaintiff, it shall be holden as acknowledged
by him; and if so, it is to be understood as well acknowledged,
as at this time other matter was not shown. Cokain contended,
that the continual claim was contrary to the issue; wherefore the
averment could not be received. But Strangways (who was a
judge) said it was not contrary, and that the averment might be
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ent therewith, that is  consistent with the fact of dying seized, 
but avoiding the effect thereof in point of law ( that is, avoiding 
its effect as a descent to toll an entry) , by the disseizin, continual 
claim, and non-entry for fear of death as alleged. Cottesmore 
then says : "In writ of trespass of close broken, the issue trenches 
well enough in the realty ; as i f  the defendant j ustify his entry by 
reason of inheritance which he has in the freehold ; if this be tra­
versed this shall be peremptory ; and so it was in our case. Pop­
ham brought trespass, the then defendant pleaded in bar because 
of a lease made to him for l ife, and the plaintiff made title by 
descent of the inheritance, which was traversed and found with the 
plaintiff ; which issue was merely in the realty. Wherefore it 
seems to me that the now plaintiff shall not be received now to 
disturb it." Martin says : "As my companion has said, the issue 
is as high in a writ o f  trespass, if taken in the [*363] realty, as 
in an assize ; and if the present plaintiff in the writ of trespass 
had traversed the descent as he did and it has been found with 
the plaintiff and the plaintiff had also brought trespass, should he 
be permitted to avoid the descent by such descent as he has now 
done ? I say not. No more shall he be received in this assize 
where the plaint is of the same tenements." The case came on 
again, 7 Hen. VI, 20, when Martin said he thought the plaintiff 
should be estopped to avoid the descent, for this was found once 
against him with the now tenants, upon which they recovered 
their damages ; and for this the descent, which was the cause of 
the j udgment and upon which j udgment was given, ought to be 
understood to be a good descent, and especially per ent. primes. 
And there was a l ike case, where a release was pleaded in bar, 
and th_e plaintiff said it was made by duress of imprisonment, 
and was afterwards nonsuit, and brought a new writ, and the re­
lease was again pleaded in bar ; and he would have avoided the 
deed because it was made at a time when he was within age, and 
he was not received so to do : for that when he had said that the 
deed was made by duress, &c. ,  he acknowledged it to be good in 
al l  points but that. Likewise in this case, when the descent is 
found against the plaintiff, it shall be holden as acknowledged 
by him ; and if so, it is to be understood as well acknowledged , 
as at this time other matter was not shown. Cokain contended , 
that the continual claim was contrary to the i ssue ; wherefore the 
averment could not be received. But Strangways (who was a 
judge) said it was not contrary, and that the averment might be 
received. And he thought that the inquest had only to inquire 
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if J. Popham the father died seized in fact, which they had done;
but the matter of law arising from the continual claim was not
in charge to them; and that [*364] it seemed to him a marvelous
thing_ to intend a matter upon a verdict necessarily of which, nev-
ertheless, the inquest had not power to inquire.” So that it
seems clear that Strangways, who differed from Martin, thought
the finding was an estoppel as far as it went. Brooke (tit. Estop-
pel 77) says, in his abridgement of this case, which was not de-
cided: “Optima opinio was that it was a good estoppel,” and con-
cludes, "sic vide, issue tried in action of trespass and judgment
given upon this is a good estoppel in a real action.” By this case
it appears to have been on all sides then admitted in argument,
that an issue taken and found upon a traverse of a precise fact
material to the right in question, in an action of trespass, is
equally peremptory by way of conclusion as to that same fact,
and upon the same right, between the same parties in an assize
The authorities, therefore, which Lord Holt referred to in Incle-
don v. Burgess, would, if further examined, have warranted the
court (supposing the- difference of parties to have opposed no
objection to their so doing) in then giving a judgment upon the
point now in question, as well as upon the other point of contra
jmcem, &c., on which it was actually given.
As to the case of Bassett_v. Bennett, in which a new trial was
moved for, because a verdict was taken for the defendant, both
on the general issue and on the plea of Iiberum tcnemcntzun,
whereas there was only evidence to support the finding for the
defendant on the general issue, and where the new trial is said
to have been refused because the court held that the finding on
the Iibcrum tencmentum would not prejudice the plaintiff, as a
judgment in a possessory action was not conclusive on real rights.
If it were indeed so laid down by the court, the doctrine must
certainly be received with some degree [*365] of qualification
and allowance. The plea would be conclusive that at the time
of pleading the plea the soil and freehold were in the defendant;
and if properly pleaded by way of estoppel, it would estop the
plaintiff, against whom it was found, from again alleging the
contrary. But if not brought forward by plea as an estoppel, but
only ofifered in evidence, it would be material evidence indeed
that the right of freehold was at the time as found; but not con-
clusive between the parties, as an estoppel would be. In that case
the proper course would certainly have been for the judge at
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if J .  Popham the father died seized in fact, which they had done ; 
but the matter of law arising from the continual claim was not 
in charge to them ; and that [*364] it seemed to him a marvelous 
thing_ to intend a matter upon a verdict necessarily of which, nev­
ertheless, the inquest had not power to inquire." So that it 
seems clear that Strangways, who differed from .Martin, thought 
the finding was an estoppel as far as it went. Brooke ( tit. Estop­
pcl 77) says, in his abridgement of this case, which was not de­
cided : "Optima opinio was that it was a good estoppel," and con­
cludes, "sic vide, issue tried in action of trespass and judgment 
given upon this is a good estoppel in a real action." By this case 
i t appears to have been on all sides then admitted in argument, 
that an issue taken and found upon a traverse of a precise fact 
material to the right in  question, in an action of trespass, is 
equally peremptory by way of conclusion as to that same fact, 
and upon the same right, between the same parties in an assize 
The authorities, therefore, which Lord Holt referred to in btcle­
don v. Burgess, would, if further examined, have warranted the 
court ( supposing the. difference of parties to have opposed no 
t obj ection to their so doing) in then giving a j udgment upon the 
point now in question, as well as upon the other point of contra 
pacem, &c., on which i t  was actually given. 
As to the case of Bassett.v. Bennett, in which a new trial was 
moved for, because a verdict was taken for the defendant, both 
on the general issue and on the plea of libern m teuementum; 
whereas there was only evidence to support the finding for the 
defendant on the general issue, and where the new trial is said 
to have been refused because the court held that the finding on 
the liberum tenementum would not prej udice the plaintiff, as a 
judgment in a possessory action was not conclusive on real rights. 
If it were indeed so laid down by the court, the doctrine must 
certainly be received with some degree [*365] of qualification 
and allowance. The plea would be conclusive that at the time 
of pleading the plea the soil and freehold were in the defendant ; 
and i f  properly pleaded by way of estoppel, it would estop the 
plaintiff, against whom it was found, from again alleging the 
contrary. But if not brought forward by plea as an estoppel, but 
only offered in evidence, it would be material evidence indeed 
that the right of freehold was at the time as found ; but not con­
clusive between the parties, as an estoppel would be. In that case 
the proper course would certainly have been for the judge at 
the trial to have discharged the jury from finding any verdict on 
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the plea of libermn tenementum, on which no evidence was given.
As to the other case relied upon by the plaintiff, of Sir Fred-
erick Ewlyn v. Haynes, which was a second action for obstruct-
ing a water-course, tried before Lord Mansfield upon a plea of
not guilty, and where a verdict for the plaintiff in another action
brought against the defendant for another obstruction to the
same water-course was given in evidence; Lord Mansfield held
very properly that the plaintiff had not obtained such a deter-
mination of his right by the former verdict as the law considered
as conclusive. It could only be conclusive upon the right if it
could have been used, and were actually used, in pleading by way
of estoppel, which it could not be in that case: First, because
no issue was taken in the first action upon any precise point,
which is necessary to constitute an estoppel thereupon in second
action; Secondly, it was not even pleaded by way of estoppel in
the second action, but only offered as evidence on the general is-
sue; and in order to be an estoppel, it must have been, as already
observed, pleaded as such by apt averments. [*366]
As to the case of Kimzersley v. Orpe, Doug. 517, it is extra-
ordinary that it should ever have been for a moment supposed
that there could be an estoppel in such a case. It was not pleaded
as such; neither were the parties in the second suit the same with
those in the first. The doubt seems‘ rather to be whether the for-
mer record in the action of trespass was at all admissible in evi-
dence upon the subsequent action for penalties for fishing (under
statute 5 Geo. III, c. 14, §§ 3, 4), against the defendant who was
no party to the former action, than as to any conclusive effect it
could have had if pleaded by way of estoppel, which, however,
it was not in that case.
None of the cases, therefore, cited ‘on the part of the plain-
tiff, negative the conclusiveness of a verdict found on any pre-
cise point once put in issue between the same parties or their
privies. The cases adverted to by Lord Holt, and which have-
been fully explained and enforced by the defendant’s counsel, to--
gether with the other authorities on the subject of protestation-
and estoppel, cited from Brooke Abr. Protestation, pl. 9, Fitz-
herbert Estoppel pl. 20, are, in our opinion, as well as upon the
reason and convenience of the thing, and the analogy to the rules
of law in other cases, decisive that the husband and wife, the.
defendants in this case are estopped by the former verdict and
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the plea of libermn tenementum, on which no evidence was given. 
As to the other case relied upon by the plaintiff, of Sir Fred­
erick Evelyn v. Haynes, which was a second action for obstruct­
ing a '"·ater-course, tried before Lord :Mansfield upon a plea of 
not guilty, and where a verdict for the plaintiff in another action 
brought against the defendant for another obstruction to the 
same water-course \\'.as given in evidence ; Lord Mansfield held 
very properly that the plaintiff had not obtained such a deter­
mination of his right by the former verdict as the law considered 
as conclusive. I t  could only be conclusive upon the right if i t  
could have been used, and were actually used, in pleading by way 
of estoppel, which it could not be in that case : First, because 
no issue was taken in the first action upon any precise point, 
which is necessary to constitute an estoppel thereupon in second 
action ; Secondly, it was not even pleaded by way of estoppel in 
the second action, but only offered as evidence on the general is­
sue ; and in order to be an estoppel, it  must have been, as already 
observed, pleaded as such by apt averments. [ *366] 
As to the C3:Se of Kinnersley v. Orpe, Doug. 5 1 7, it is extra­
ordinary that it should ever have been for a moment supposed 
that there could be an estoppel in such a case. It was not pleaded 
as such ; neither were the parties in the second suit the same with 
those in the first. The doubt seems· rather to be whether the for­
mer record in the action of trespass was at all admissible in evi­
dence upon the subsequent action for penalties for fishing ( under 
statute 5 Geo. III,  c. 14, §§ 3,  4) , against the defendant who was 
no party to the former action, than as to any conclusive effect it 
could have had if pleaded by way of estoppel, which, however1 
it was not in that case. 
None of the cases, therefore, cited "on the part of the plain­
tiff, negative the conclusiveness of a verdict found on any pre­
cise point once put in issue between the same parties or their­
privies. The cases adverted to by Lord Holt, and which have· 
been fully explained and enforced by the defendant's counsel , to­
gether w ith the other authorities on the subject of protestation· 
and estoppel , cited from Brooke Ahr. Protestation ,  pl. 9, Fitz-. 
herbert Estoppel pl. 20, are, in our opinion, as well as upon the 
reason and convenience of the thing, and the analogy to the rules 
of law in other cases, decisive that the husband and wife, the 1 
defendants in this case are estopped by the former verdict and 
judgment on the same point in the action of trespass, to which the. 
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wife was a party, from averring that the coal mines now in ques-
tion are parcel of the coal mines bargained and sold by Sir John
Zouch; and consequently that the plaintiff ought to recover.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
WATTS v. WATTS, in Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Feb. 26, 1894, 160 Mass. 464,
36 N. E. 479, 39 Am. St. 509, 32 L. R. A. 187.
LIBEL for divorce on the ground of adultery, alleged to have
been committed with one Ford. 011 the trial it was either proved
or admitted that the parties were legally married, and that they
lived together as husband and wife at Rockland until June 4,
1892. At that time the libellee committed adultery with Ford,
and was discovered by the libellant, who thereupon ejected her
from his house. On June 6, 1892, the present libellee filed a peti-
tion in the probate court for separate support and maintenance.
At the hearing, the husband appeared and defended against it,
but offered no evidence of the wife’s adultery. On August 22,
1892, the probate court entered a decree in favor of that libellant,
which recited that she, “for justifiable cause, was actually living
apart from her said husband.” No appeal was taken from this
decree, and at the time of the filing of this libel, and at the hear-
ing thereon, it was in full force. The libellant asked the judge
to rule that, as matter of law, he was entitled to a decree, but the
judge refused to so rule, and ruled that the decree of the pro-
bate court was a bar to this libel, and ordered it dismissed. The
libellant alleged exceptions. [*465]
KNOWLTON, J. In regard to subjects of which the probate
court has jurisdiction, and upon parties brought within its juris-
diction, a decree of that court, like a judgment of other courts,
is conclusive. Laughton v. Atkins, I Pick. 535; Pierce v. Pres-
cott, 128 Mass. 140; McKim v. Dome, 137 Mass. 195; Miller v.
Miller, 150 Mass. III, 22 N. E. 765.
The decree introduced at the trial, being between the same
parties as those in the present action, is binding and conclusive
upon them in this suit in regard to all matters shown to have
been put in issue or to have been necessarily involved in the for-
mer suit, and actually tried and determined in it. In regard to
matters not then in controversy and not heard and determined,
although it is conclusive so far as the final disposition of that
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wife was a party, from averring that the coal mines now in ques­
tion are parcel of the coal mines bargained and sold by Sir John 
Zouch ; and consequently that the plaintiff ought to recover. 
Judgment for the plaintiff . 
. WATTS v. WATTS, in Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Feb. 26, 1894, 16o Mass. 464, 
36 N. E. 479, 39 Am. St. 509, 32 L. R. A 187. 
LIBEL for divorce on the ground of adultery, alleged to have 
been committed with one Ford. On the trial it was either proved 
or admitted that the parties were legally married, and that they 
l ived together as husband and wife at Rockland until June 4, 
1892. At that time the libellee committed adultery with Ford, 
and was discovered by the libellant, who thereupon ejected her 
from his house. On June 6, 1892, the present l ibellee filed a peti­
tion in the probate court for separate support and maintenance. 
At the hearing, the husband appeared and defended against it, 
but offered no evidence of the wife's adultery.  On August 221 
1892, the probate court entered a decree in favor of that libellant, 
which recited that she, "for j ustifiable cause, was actually living 
apart from her said husband." No appeal was taken from this 
decree, and at the time of the filing of this libel, and at the hear­
ing thereon, it was in full force. The libellant asked the j udge 
to rule that, as matter of law, he was entitled to a decree, but the 
j udge refused to so rule, and ruled that the decree of the pro­
bate court was a bar to this libel, and ordered it dismissed. The 
libellant alleged exceptions. [ *465] 
KNOWLTON, J. In regard to subjects of which the probate 
court has jurisdiction, and upon parties brought within its juris� 
diction, a decree of that court, like a judgment of other courts, 
is conclusive. Laughton v. Atkins, I Pick. 535 ; Pierce v. Pres­
cott, 128 Ma:ss. 140 ; McKim v. Doane, 137 Mass. 195 ; Miller v. 
Miller, 1 50 Mass. 1 1 1 , 22 N. E. 765 . 
The decree introduced at the trial, being between the same 
parties as those in the present action, is binding and conclusive 
upon them in this suit in regard to all matters shown to have 
been put in issue or to have been necessarily involved in the for­
mer suit, and actually tried and determined in  it. In regard to 
matters not then in controversy and not heard and determined, 
although it  is conclusive so far as the final disposition of that 
cause of action is concerned, it is not conclusive to prevent a 
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determination of them according to the truth if they are subse-
quently controverted in a different case. Burlen V. Shannon, 14
Gray, 433, 437; Thurston v. Thurston, 99 Mass. 39. Burlen v.
Shannon, 99 Mass. 200; Lea v. Lea, 99 Mass. 493, 496; Hawks
v. Truesdell, 99 Mass. 557; C ommonzvealth v. Ewns, IoI Mass.
25; Lewis v. Lewis, I06 Mass. 309; Faye v. Patch, I32 Mass
I05, III; Cromwell v. Sac, 94 U. S. 35I. It would be a harsh
and oppressive rule which should make it necessary for one sued
.on a trifling claim to resist it, and engage in costly litigation in
order to prevent the operation of a judgment which would be
held conclusively to have established against him every material
fact alleged and not denied in the declaration, so as to preclude
him from showing the truth if another controversy should arise
between the same parties. There might be various reasons why he
would prefer to submit to a claim rather than to defend against
it. For the purpose of defending that suit, he would have his
day in court but once, and if he chose to let the case go by
default, or with a trial upon some of the defenses which might
be made and not upon others, he would be obliged forever after
to hold his peace. But a plaintiff can claim no more than to be
given what he asks in his writ. He cannot justly complain that
the defendant has not seen fit to set up [*466] defenses and raise
issues for the purpose of enabling him to settle facts for future
possible controversies. In subsequent proceedings which are in-
dependent of the original suit,‘ the judgment in that suit is con-
clusive as evidence, or may be pleaded as an estoppel only as to
those matters which were put in issue and determined; but it is
not necessary that these should be particularly mentioned in the G“
pleadings if they are involved in the issue made up, and if the
case is determined upon the trial of that issue. The bill of ex-
ceptions in this case shows nothing in regard to the pleadings in
the probate court, further than that there was a petition brought
under the Pub. Sts. c. I47, § 33, and that the respondent appeared
and defended against it. It appears that no evidence was offered
of the act of adultery on June 4, I892, and we infer that it was
not set up in answer to the petition. We must assume that the
respondent’s pleading was a general denial. \Vas the question
whether the petitioner had committed adultery, as now appears.
necessarily involved in the issue made up by an aflirmation and I
denial that she was living apart from her husband for justifiable
cause? The grounds of the decree do not appear. Could such ‘
















































































































































E FFECT OF J UDGM E N T  AS BAR OR F.S'fOPPF.I. 247 
determination of them according to the truth if they are subse­
quently controverted in a different case. Burien v. Shannon, 14  
Gray, 433, 437 ; Thurston. v .  Thurston, 99 Mass. 39. Burien v. 
Shamron, 99 Mass. 200 ; Lea .v. Lea, 99 Mass. 493, 496 ; Hawks 
v. Truesdell, 99 Mass. 557 ; Commonwealth v. Evans, 101 Mass. 
25 ; Lcu�s v. Lewis, 1o6 Mass. 309 ; Foye v. Patch, 132 Mass. 
rn5, 1 1 1  ; Cromwell v. Sac, 94 U. S. 35 I .  It would be a harsh 
and oppressive rule which should make it necessary for one sued 
. on a trifling claim to resist it, and engage · in costly litigation in 
order to prevent the operation of a j udgment which would be 
held conclusively to have established against him every material 
fact alleged and not denied in the declaration, so as to preclude 
him from showing the truth if another controversy should arise 
between the same parties. There might be various reasons why he. 
would prefer to submit to a claim rather than to defend against 
it. For the purpose of defending that suit, he would have his 
day in court but once, and if  he chose to let the case go by 
default, or with a trial upon some of the defenses which might 
be made and not upon others, he would be obliged forever after 
to hold his peace. But a plaintiff can claim no more than to be 
given what he asks in his writ. He cannot justly complain that 
the defendant has not seen fit to set up [*466] defenses and raise 
issues for the purpose of enabling him to settle facts for future 
possible controversies. In subsequent proceedings which are in­
dependent of the original suit,' the j udgment in that suit is con­
clusive as evidence, or may be pleaded as an estoppel only as to 
those matters which were put in issue and determined ; but it ic; 
not necessary that these should be particularly mentioned in the 'P-< 
pleadings i f  they are involved in the issue made up, and if the 
case is determined upon the trial of that issue. The bill of ex­
ceptions in this case shows nothing in regard to the plea<lings in 
the probate court, further than that there was a petition brought 
under the Pub. Sts. c. 1 47, § 33, and that the respondent appeareJ 
and defended against it. It appears that no evidence was offered 
of the act of a<lultery on June 4, 1892, and we infer that it was 
not set up in answer to the petition. We must assume that the 
respondent's pleading was a general denial. Was the question 
whether the petitioner had committed adultery, as now appears, } 
necessarily involved in the issue made up by an affirmation and 
denial that she was living apart from her husband for justifiable 
cause ? The grounds of the decree do not appear. Coul<l such 1 
a decree have been made upon any possible state of facts if the • 
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petitioner had been known to have committed adultery on June 4,
1892? If soI the decree could not be held t a '\_-Qrce,
unless the only facts \\'>l1iCh__\1!LO1.1l.Ll__@Q€_I'>ii18 decree ‘
.s_u'ch as would_of7_t‘heTnselves reclude the libellant from obtai_n-_
mmmmmé Wit from her
‘husband for a justifiable cause, made upon a hearing between
them on the general issue, conclusively shows that she has not
utterly deserted him. Miller v. Miller, 150 Mass. III, 22 N. E.
765. Living apart from a husband under such circumstances as
to constitute utter desertion, for which a divorce may be granted,
is a marital wrong, and cannot be legally justifiable. But facts
may be supposed upon which the decision of the probate court
might have been made in the present case, even if it were known
that the wife was guilty of adultery of which the husband had
nowledge. If he had for a long time been guilty of extreme
ruelty towards her, and had inflicted serious bodily injury upon
ier when he ejected her from his house, and then had asked her
‘o return to his home and had offered to forgive the adultery if
she would [*467] come back, she would have been justified in
refusing to return on the ground that she had reason to fear great
mjury from his cruelty if she continued to live with him. If
such facts appeared the court might well decide that she was jus-
tifiably living apart from him on account of his cruelty, notwith-
standing her adultery which he was willing to forgive. It is ob-
vious, therefore, that the decision in her favor on the question
whether she was living apart from him for a justifiable cause is
not necessarily a finding that she was not guilty of adultery, and
upon the record before us it cannot be said that her guilt or inno-
cence was necessarily involved in the issue then tried. * * *
It follows that the judgment of the probate court is not
conclusive against the libellant in the present action, and there
must be a new trial. Exceptions sustained.
KITSON v. FARWELL, in Ill. Sup. Ct., March 29, I89o—I32 Ill. 327.
23 N. E. I024.
Motion by Samuel Kitson in the county court of Cook Co.
to be discharged from imprisonment on execution on a judgment
in favor of J. V. Farwell et al. The motion was opposed on the
ground that malice was the gist of the cause for which the judg-
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petitioner had been known to have committed adultery on June 4, 
1 892 ? _Jj_so. the decree could not be held to be a bar to a dinm:.e, 





oCiliCl�selves preclude ti1e libellant from obtain­
ing a divorce. The decision that a wife is l iving apart from her­
husban<l for a justifiable cause, made upon a hearing between 
them on the general issue, conclusively shows that she has not 
utterly deserted him. Miller v . . Miller, I 50 l\Iass. I I  I ,  22 N. E. 
765 . Living apart from a husband under such ci rcumstances as 
to constitute utter desert ion, for which a divorce may be granted, 
is a marital wrong, and cannot be legal ly justifiable. But facts 
may be supposed upon which the decision of the probate court 
might have been made in the present case, even if it were known 
that the wife was guilty of adultery of  which the husband had 
now ledge. If he had for a long time been guilty of extreme 
ruelty towards her, and had inflicted serious bodily inj ury upon 
ter when he ejected lier from his house, and then had asked her 
·o return to his home and had offered to forgive the adultery i f  
she would [ *467]  come back, she would have been j ustified in 
efusing to return on the ground that she had reason to fear great 
mjury from his cruelty if she continued to live with him. If 
such facts appeared the court might well decide that she was jus­
tifiably living apart from him on account of his cruelty, notwith­
standing her adultery which he was willing to forgive. It i s  ob­
vious, therefore, that the decision in her favor on the question 
whether she was living apart from him for a j ustifiable cause is 
not necessarily a finding that she was not guilty of adultery, and 
upon the record before us it cannot be said that her guilt or inno­
cence was necessarily involved in the issue then tried. * * * 
I t  follows that the judgment of the probate court is not 
conclusive against the libel lant m the present act ion, and there 
must be a new trial. Exceptions sustained. 
KITSON v. FARWELL, in Ill. Sup. Ct., March 29, 18go-132 Ill .  327, 
23 N. E. 1024. 
:Motion by Samuel Kitson in the county court of Cook Co. 
to be discharged from imprisonment on execution on a j udgment 
in favor of  J. \'. Farwell et al. The mot ion was opposed on the 
ground that malice was the gist of the c�use for which the judg- • 
ment was rendered. From an order denying the motion Kitson 
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appealed to the circuit court of Cook Co. A jury being there
impaneled to try the question, the petitioner offered evidence to
prove that the judgment under which he was imprisoned was for
a debt contracted bona fide. Thereupon the respondents offered
in evidence the declaration and files in the original action, and the
court refused to hear the petitioner’s evidence, on the ground that
the declaration and files in the original action showed that the
question now made was then tried and found against the peti--
tioner. The circuit court then entered an order affirming the
judgment of the county court. On appeal to the appellate court
this judgment was affirmed, and the petitioner again appeals.
SHOPE, C. J. * * * [*336] The declaration offered in evi-
dence contained three counts, to which the plea of the general
issue was filed, and on the trial of the issue thus made a general
verdict was rendered finding the defendant guilty and assessing
the plaintiffs’ damages. If it be conceded, which may be done for
the purposes of this case, that the first count of the declaration
states a good cause of action in case, as for deceit, it can not be
said, under the rulings of this court, that the second and third
counts present a good cause of action. * * [*34o] The
judgment necessarily follows the nature of the right claimed
in the declaration, or the injury complained of, and, gen-
erally speaking, can conclude nothing beyond such right
or injury. As we have seen, the judgment is not evi-
dence of any matter which is only to be inferred there-
from by argument, and which probably did, but might or
might not, constitute the true ground of recovery. If the rule
were otherwise, it would operate harshly and unjustly; for to ad-
mit a presumption that a fact is established by the judgment, and
not allow that assumption to be rebutted by proof that it is with-
out foundation, would be to reverse the rule applicable to all pre- ‘
sumptions of fact. The authorities are, therefore, that a judg-’
ment is conclusive only of what it necessarily and directly de—k
cides. It is manifest, that it by no means follows that by the
judgment in this case the defendant therein was found guilty
of having made any false representations, or of having practiced
any deceit, or resorted to any artifice, to obtain possession of the
goods in the declaration mentioned, for which an action on the
case, as for deceit, would lie. Nor does it militate against this
conclusion that the judgment, if rendered under the second and
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appealed �o the circuit court of Cook Co. A j ury being there 
impaneled to try the question, the petitioner offered evidence to 
prove that the j udgment under which he was imprisoned was for 
a debt contracted bo11a fide . Thereupon the respondents offered 
in evidence the declaration and files in the original action, and the 
court refused to hear the petitioner's evidence, on the ground that 
the declaration and files in the original action showed that the 
question now made was then tried and found against �he peti-· 
tioner. The circuit court then entered an order affirming th<.· 
judgment of the county court. On appeal to the appellate court 
this judgment was affirmed, and the petitioner again appeal s. 
SHOPE, C. J .  * * * [ *336] The declaration off�red in evi­
dence contained three counts, to which the plea of the general 
issue was filed , and on the trial of the issue thus made a general 
verdict was rendered finding the defendant guilty and assessing 
the plaintiff's' damages. If it  be conceded, which may be done for 
the purposes of this case, that the first count of the declaration 
states a good cause of action in case, as for deceit , it can not be 
said. under the rulings of this court, that the second and third 
counts present a good cause of action. * * * [*340] The 
j udgment necessarily follows the nature of the right claimed 
in the declaration, or the inju ry complained of, and, gen­
erally speaking, can conclude nothing beyond such right 
or m1 ury. As we have seen , the j udgment is not evi­
dence of any matter which is  only to be inferred there­
from by argument, and which probably did, but mig-ht or 
might not, constitute the t rue ground of recovery. If the rule 
were otherwise, it would operate harshly and unjustly ; for to ad- i 
mit a presumption that a fact is  establ ished by the judgment, and 
not allow that assumption to be rebutted by proof that it is with­
out foundation, would be to reverse the rule applicable to all pre- '� 
smnptions of fact. The authorities are, therefore, that a judg-"\ 
ment is conclusive only of what it necessarily and directly de­
cides. It is mani fest, that it by no means follows that by the 
j udgment in this case the defendant therein was found guilty 
of having made any false representations, or of having practiced 
any deceit, or resorted to any artifice, to obtain possess ion of the 
goods in the declaration mentioned, for which an action on the 
case, as for deceit ,  would l ie. Nor does it militate against this 
conclusion that the judgment, i f  rendered under the second and 
third counts, would be upon an immaterial issue. For some pur-
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poses the judgment would be referable to the good count in the
declaration, as, upon motion in arrest, or upon error; but where
the doctrine of res judicata is sought to be applied, it must con-
clusively appear that the matter was so in issue that it was nec-
essarily determined by the court rendering the judgment inter-
posed as a bar. It may also be that the matters set up in the sec-
ond and third counts of the declaration, by means of which it is
alleged the petitioner obtained the credit, were in a sense immoral;
but as we have already seen, they formed no proper basis for a
recovery in the action [*34I] in which the judgment was ob-
tained. It may also be true, that if the first count had not been
in the declaration, the judgment might, on motion, have been
arrested; that it may have been the duty of the defendant to have
demurred, as suggested by counsel, and of the court to have sus-
tained the same, to said second and third counts; but that con-
sideration can not affect the question being considered. It is ap-
parent that the jury may just as well have found for the plaintiffs
in that action, upon evidence tending to support the second and
third counts, only, which would form no basis for or right of
recovery for fraud or injury committed by the petitioner in that
action, as upon the first count. The finding of the jury, we may
argue, was predicated upon the allegation of the first count of the
declaration; but it is manifest, under the rule, that will not suffice.
If predicated upon the second and third counts of the declaration,
alone, it was by no means such as would have authorized a recov-
ery in the suit where malice is the gist of the action.
But it is said that no motion in arrest was entered by the
defendant because of the defect in the declaration. Manifestly,
such motion would have been unavailing had it been entered while
the first count remained.
It follows, that we are of opinion that this judgment, under
the pleadings, was not necessarily conclusive of the question as
to whether malice was the gist of the action. * * *
Judgment rc~zmrsed.
AETNA LIFE INS. CO., v. BOARD OF COM‘RS. of HAMILTON
COUNTY, KAN., in U. S. Circuit Ct. of App., Eighth Circuit} Aug.
4, 1902-54 C. C. A. 468, 117 Fed. 82.’
SANBORN, C. I. The defenses interposed and the issues
raised in this case are identical with those presented in the former
action, in which judgment was rendered for the defendant upon
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poses the j udgment would be referable to the good count in the 
declaration
.
, as, upon motion in arrest, or upon error ; but where\ 
the doctrine of res judicaJa is sought to be applied, it must con­
clusively appear that the matter was so in issue that it was nec­
essarily determined by the court rendering the j udgment inter­
posed as a bar. It may also be that the matters set up in the sec­
ond and third counts of the declaration, by means of which it is 
alleged the petitioner obtained the credit, were in a sense immoral ; 
but as we have already seen, they formed no proper basis for a 
recovery in the action [ *341 ] in which the j udgment was ob­
tained. I t  may also be true, that if  the first count had not been 
in the declaration, the judgment might, on motion, have been 
arrested ; that it may have been the duty of the defendant to have 
demurred, as suggested by counsel, and of the court to have sus­
tained the same, to said second and third counts ; but that con­
sideration can not affect the question being considered. It is ap­
parent that the jury may just as well have found for the plaintiffs 
in that action, upon evidence tending to support the second and 
third counts, only, which would form no basis for or right of 
recovery for fraud or injury committed by the petitioner in that 
actiou , as upon the first count. The finding of the jury, we may 
argue, was predicated upon the allegation of the first count of the 
declaration ; but it is manifest, under the rule, that will not suffice. 
If predicated upon the second and third counts of the declaration, 
alone, it was by no means such as would have authorized a recov­
ery in the suit where malice is the gist of the action . 
But it is said that no motion in arrest was entered by the 
defendant because of the defect in the declaration. Manifestly, 
such motion would have been unavailing had it been entered while 
the first count remained. ' 
It follows, that we are of opinion that this judgment, under 
the pleadings, was not necessarily conclusive of the question as 
to whether malice was the gist of the action . * * * 
Judgment re·versed. 
AETNA LIFE INS. CO., v. BOARD OF COM'RS. of HAMILTON 
COUNTY, KAN., in U. S. Circuit Ct. of App., Eighth Circuit:' Aug. 
4t 1902-54 C. C. A. 468, I I 7  Fed. 82.'-
SANBORN, C. J. The defenses interposed and the issues 
raised in this case are identical with those presented in the former 
action, in which judgment was rendered for the defendant upon 
coupons cut from the same bonds as were those in this suit. The 
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only new allegation in this action is that the plaintiff was induced
to buy the bonds and coupons by the certificate of the county clerk
that the indebtedness of the county, including that evidenced by
the bonds in question, did not exceed $80,000; and this averment
is immaterial, because the county clerk had no statutory or other
authority to make such a certificate for the county. City of Huron
v. Second W aed Sac-. Bank, 86 Fed. 272, 282, 30 C. C. A. 38, 48,
49 L. R. A. 534. The fact that the issues of demand and refusal
of payment in the two actions differ because they must have been
made at different times, since the coupons in this action were not
due until after the former action was commenced, is [*84] of no
consequence, because a demand and refusal were not essential
to the maintenance of either action, and the legal presumption is
that the former judgment was based on a sufficient defense, and
not upon an immaterial issue. Spear V. Board, 88 Fed. 749, 753,
754, 32 C. C. A. 101, 105 ; Hughes Co. v. Liz/ingston, 43 C. C. A.
541, 556, 104 Fed. 306, 321. The only real question in the case,
therefore, is this: Is a former judgment upon a general finding
in favor of the defendant which does not disclose which one of
several defenses was sustained, an estoppel of the plaintiff therein
from maintaining a second action upon different causes of action
against the same defendant in which the same defenses are inter-
posed and the same issues are presented that -,were made in the
earlier action? Counsel for the plaintiff arg With great force
and persuasiveness that this question must e answered in the
negative. They plant themselves upon the declaration of the su-
preme court in Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 606, 608, 24 L. Ed. 214,
that “it is undoubtedly settled law that a judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a question directly involved in one
suit is conclusive as to that question in another suit between the
same parties. But to this operation of the judgment it must ap-
pear, either upon the face of the record or be shown by extrinsic
evidence, that the precise question was raised and determined in
the former suit. If there be any uncertainty on this head in the
record,——as, for example, if it appear that several distinct matters
may have been litigated, upon one or more of which the judg-
ment may have passed, without indicating which of them was
thus litigated, and upon which the judgment was rendered,—the
whole subject-matte of the action will be at large, and open to a
new contention, ufiéss this uncertainty be removed by extrinfllt
evidence showing the preci oint involved and determined. To
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only new allegation in this action is that the plaintiff was induced 
to buy the bonds and coupons by the certificate of the county clerk 
that the indebtedness of the county, including that evidenced by 
the bonds in question, did not exceed $&>,ooo ; and this averment 
is immaterial, because the county clerk had no statutory or other 
authority to make such a certificate for the county. City of Huron 
v. Second WCNd Sav. Bank, 86 Fed. 272, 282, 30 C. C. A. 38, 48, 
49 L. R. A. 534. The fact that the issues of demand and refusal 
of payment in the two actions differ because they must have been 
made at different t imes, since the coupons in this action were not 
due until after the former action was commenced, is ( *84 l of no 
consequence, because a .demand and refusal were not essential 
to the maintenance of either action, and the legal presumption is 
that the former judgment was based on a sufficient defense, and 
not upon an immaterial issue. Speer v. Board, 88 Fed. 749, 753, 
754, 32 C. C. A. IOI ,  105 ; Hughes Co. v. Livings#on, 43 C. C.  A. 
541 ,  556, 104 Fed. 3o6, 32 1 .  The only real question in the case, 
therefore, is this : Is a former judgment upon a general finding 
in favor of the defendant which does not disclose which one of  
several defenses was sustained, an estoppel of  the plaintiff therein 
from maintaining a second action upon different causes of action 
against the same defendant in which the same dsfenses are inter­
posed and the same issues are presented that -.:ere made in the 
earlier action ? Counsel for the plaintiff argwaltith great force 
and persuasiveness that this question must 8'e answered in the 
negative. They plant themselves upon the declaration of the su­
preme court in Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 6o6, 6o8, 24 L. Ed. 2 14, 
that "it is undoubtedly settled law that a judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction upon a question directly involved in one 
suit is conclusive as to that question in another suit between the 
same parties. But to this operation of the judgment it must ap­
pear, either upon the face of the record or be shown by extrinsic 
evidence, that the precise question was raised and determined in 
the former suit. If there be any uncertainty on this head in the 
record,-as, for example, if it appear that several distinct matters 
may have been lit igated, upon one or more of which the judg­
ment may have passed, without indicating which of them was 
thus litigated, and upon which the judgment was rendered,-the 
whole subject-matt�•of the action will be at  large, and open to a 
new contention, u�s this uncertainty be removed by extrin!tt 
evidence showing the pre�oint involved and determined. T. o 
apply the judgment, an� effect to the adjudication actually 
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made, when the record leaves the matter in doubt, such evidence
is admissible.” They cite in support of their contention C ronm-ell
v. Sac. Co., 94 U. S. 351, 24 L. Ed. 195; Board v. Sutliff, 38 C.
C. A. 167, 97 Fed. 270; Packet C 0. v. Sicklcs, 5 Wall. 580, 18 L.
Ed. 550; Nesbit v. Independent Dish, 144 U. S. 610, 12 Sup. Ct.
746, 36 L. Ed. 562; Railway Co. v. Lcathc, 84 Fed. 103, 28 C. C.
A. 279; and Bank v. Williams (Wash.) 63 Pac. 511,--and they
insist that, because the general finding and judgment in the first
action do not indicate which one of the several defenses pleaded
in both actions was litigated, nor upon which one the judgment
was based, that judgment cannot constitute an estoppel upon any
one of these defenses or issues, and that every defense there pre-
sented may be again litigated in this action, unless the defendant
proves by extrinsic evidence which one or more of them were ac-
tually litigated and determined in the former suit. The proposi-
tions that there is nothing in the record in the former action nor
in the pleadings in this action that discloses which one of the
several defenses interposed in both actions was sustained in the
earlier one, and that, if it is essential to the estoppel in this case
to determine this fact, this judgment cannot stand, must be con-
ceded. But how is the determination of the question whether one
or another of these defenses was sustained in the earlier action
essential to the establishment of the estoppel? The pleadings
upon which the judgment [*85] stands show that the same issues
are made and that the same defenses are interposed here that
were made and interposed in the former action. The judgment
in the earlier action is conclusive evidence that at least one of
these defenses was sustained, and that at least one of these is-
sues was determined in favor of the defendant. By that judgment
the plaintiff is estopped from again litigating that defense or that
issue, and an estoppel from litigating one of many defenses or
issues that are equally fatal to his case would seem to be as con-
clusive and as fatal as an estoppel from litigating them all. The
quotation from Russell v. Place, and the general declarations of
the courts in the other cases cited, must be read in the light of the
facts then under consideration by those courts. In that class of
cases in which the second action presents;-material issue or mat-
ter which may not have been raised, litigated, and decided in the
former action it is undoubtedly essential to the estoppel to show
W issue was litigated and decided and \Lhgt question was de-
termined in the earlier case, in order to determine whether or
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made, when the record leaves the matter in doubt, such evidence 
is admissible."  They cite in support of their contention Cromwell 
v. Sac. Co., 94 U. S.  35 1 ,  24 L. Ed. 195 ; Board v. Sutliff, 38 C. 
C. A. 167, 97 Fed. 270 ; Packet Co. v. Sickles, 5 \Vall. 58o, 18 L. 
Ed. 550 ; Nesbit v. J11depc11de11t Dist., 144 lJ. S. 610, 12 Sup . Ct.  
746, 36 L. Ed . 562 ; Rail·way Co .  v .  Lcathc, 84 Fed. 103, 28 C. C.  
A. 279 ; and Bank v. iVi/ljams ( \Vash. ) 63 Pac. 5 1 1 ,-and they 
insist that, because the general finding and j udgment in the first 
action do not indicate ·which one of the several defenses pleaded 
in both actions was litigated, nor upon which one the j udgment 
was based, that j udgment cannot constitute an estoppel upon any 
one of these defenses or issues, and that every defense there pre­
sented may be again l it igated in this action, unless the defendant 
proves by extrinsic evidence which one or more of them were ac­
tually litigated and determined in the former suit. The proposi­
tions that there is nothing in the record in the former action nor 
in the pleadings in this action that discloses which one of the 
several defenses interposed in both actions was sustained in the 
earlier one, and that, if it is essential to the estoppel in this case 
to determine this fact, this j udgment cannot stand, must be con­
ceded. But how is the determination of the question whether one 
or another of these defenses was sustained in the earlier action 
essential to the establishment of the estoppcl ? The pleadings 
upon which the j udgment [ *85 ] stands show that the same issues I 
are made and that the same defenses are interposed here that 
were made and interposed in the former act ion . The j u<lgment 
in the earlier action is conclusive evidence that at least one of  
these defenses was sustained , and that at  least one of these is­
sues was determined in favor of the defendant. By that judgment 
the plaintiff is estopped from again l i t igating that defense or that 
issue, and an estoppel from lit igating one of many defenses or ' 
issues that are equally fatal to his case would seem to be as con­
clusive and as fatal as an estoppel from l itigat ing them all. The 
quotation from Russell v. Place, and the general declarations of 
the courts in the other cases cited, must be read in the l ight of the 
facts then under consideration by those courts. In that class of 
cases in which the second action presents..iJTiaterial issue or  mat­
ter which may not have been raised, litigated , and decider) in the 
former act ion it is undoubtedly essential to the cstoppel to show 
'� issue was litig-ated and decided and what question was de­
term ined in the earlier case, in order to determ ine whether or 
• not the issue there determined embraced the matter in l itigation 
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in the second action. But where, as in the case at bar, the plead-
ings conclusively show that all the defegses made and all the
issues joined are identical in the two actions, it is difficult to per-
ceive how it can make any difference to which one of the defenses’
or issues the estoppel applies, because the mere fact that it does
apply to one defense and to one issue is as fatal to the mainten-
ance of the second action as it would be if it applied to all. \\/hen
the opinions which have been cited by counsel for the plaintiff
are carefully read, analyzed, and considered, they will not be
found to be inconsistent with this distinction. The decisions
which they cite all fall within the first class of cases to which we
have adverted and fail to rule the question which is presented in
the case in hand.
In Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 606, 609, 24 L. Ed. 214, the
question was whether a judgment at law against a defendant for
damages for the infringement of a patent which contained two
claims estopped the defendant in a subsequent suit against it for
an injunction against the infringement from litigating the issues
of the novelty, the prior public use, and the infringement of the
invention, which had been pleaded in the action at law. The
court answered this question in the negative, because there were
two claims to the patent, one of which might be valid and the
other void, and the judgment at law did not disclose whether it
rested on a finding that both or only one of the claims was in-
fringed, and, if but one, it did not show which one. In other
words, the judgment in the action at law might have been founded
upon the determination of an issue which would not have entitled
the complainant to an injunction restraining the defendant from
the use of both of the inventions described in the two claims of
the patent. .
In Packet C 0. v. Sickles, 5 VVall. 580, I8 L. Ed. 550, the ac-
tion was brought upon a contract to pay three-fourths of the fuel
saved by the use of Sickles’ cut—ofi' on a steamboat for a certain
length of time. The plaintiff, for the purpose of estopping the
defendant from questioning the validity of this contract, offered
in evidence the record of a former judgment in an action of like
character for the fuel saved during an earlier term, together
with the testimony of witnesses that the contract [*86] involved
in the earlier action was the same as that upon which the second
action was founded. The supreme court decided that in this
state of the case it was competent for the defendant to introduce
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in the second action. But where, as in the case at bar, the plead­
ings conclusively show that all the defenses made and all the 
issues joined are identical in the two actions, it is difficult to per­
ceive how it can make any difference to which one of the defenses i 
or issues the estoppel applies, because the mere fact that it does 
apply to one defense and to one issue is as fatal to the mainten­
ance of the second action as it would be if  it applied to all. \Vhen 
the opinions which have been cited by counsel for the plaintiff 
are carefully read, analyzed, and considered, they will not be 
found to be inconsistent with this distinction. The decisions 
which they cite all fall within the first class of cases to which we 
have adverted and fail to rule the question which is presented in 
the case in hand. 
In Russell v. Place, 94 U. S.  6o6, 609, 24 L. Ed. 2 1 4, the 
question was whether a j udgment at law against a defendant for 
damages for the infringement of a patent which contained two 
claims estopped the defendant in a subsequent suit against it for 
an inj unction against the infringement from litigating the issues 
of the novelty, the prior public use, and the infringement of the 
invention, which had been pleaded in the action at law. The 
court answeted this question in the negative, because there were 
two claims to the patent, one of which might be valid and the 
other void, and the j udgment at law did not disclose whether it 
rested on a finding that both or only one of the claims was in­
fringed, and, if but one, it did not show which one. In other 
words, the judgment in the action at law might have been founded 
upon the determination of an issue which would not have entitled 
the complainant to an injunction restraining the defendant from 
the use of both of the inventions described in the two claims of 
the patent. 
In Packet Co. v. Sickles, 5 \Vall. 580, 18 L. Ed. 5 50, the ac­
tion was brought upon a contract to pay three-fourths of the fuel 
saved by the use of Sickles' cut-off on a steamboat for a certain 
length of time. The plaintiff, for the purpose of estopping the 
defendant from questioning the validity of this contract, offered 
in evidence the record of a former judgment in an action of l ike 
character for the fuel saved during an earlier term, together 
with the testimony of witnesses that the contract [*86] involved 
in the earlier action was the same as that upon which the second 
action was founded. The �upreme court decided that in this 
state of the case it was competent for the defendant to introduce 
the testimony of witnesses to prove that the contract involved in • 
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the former action was in writing, while that in question in the
latter suit was a parol agreement, and therefore void under the
statute of frauds. In other words, the defendant was permitted
to show that the former judgment was not an estoppel, because
it had a new defense in the second action, which was not pleaded,
tried, or ruled upon in the for1ner case.
In Cronm-ell v. Sac Co., 94 U. S. 351, 359, 24 L. Ed. 195,
the findings in the former action upon which the judgment for
the defendant was based disclosed the fact that the bonds and the
coupons that had been cut from them upon which the action was
based were fraudulently issued, and they contained no finding
that the holder of the bonds paid value for them. The supreme
court held that a judgment upon this finding did not estop the
holder of the bonds from maintaining a second action on other
coupons taken from bonds of the same issue upon proof that he
had purchased and paid value for them in good faith in reliance
upon the recitals which they contained, before their maturity. In
other words, it held that the earlier judgment did not estop the
plaintiff from maintaining a second action upon different causes
of action, and upon a state of facts which presented an issue of
law and of fact that was not raised or litigated in the earlier suit.
To the same effect is the decision in Board v. Sntlitf, 07 Fed.
270, 274, 38 C. C. A. 167, 171.
In Nesbit v. Independent Dist., 144 U. S. 610, 619, I2 Sup.
Ct. 746, 36 L. Ed. 562, the converse of this proposition is main-
tained. It is there held that the litigation and defeat, in a prior
action upon coupons by a purchaser for value without notice. of
the defense that the debt of the district exceeded its constitutional
limit when the bonds were issued did not estop the district in a
subsequent action upon the bonds themselves from maintaining
the defense that the debt was in excess of the constitutional limit
against the same plaintiff who was there proved to have received
notice of this fact before he bought the bonds.
In the case of Railreay Co. v. Leathe, 84 Fed. I03, 105, 28
C. C. A. 279-281, holds only that, where one of several defenses
to a prior suit was that the defendant had assumed and was liable
for the debts of a railroad company, and that suit was dismissed,
the judgment of dismissal did not estop the defendant from liti-
gating the question of his liability in a subsequent action against
him, for the reason that the record of the former suit did not show
that all the defenses there pleaded were sustained, and hence did
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the former action was in writing, while that in question in the 
latter suit was a parol agreement, and therefore void under the 
statute of frauds. In other words, the defendant was permitted 
to show that the former j udgment was not an estoppel, because 
it had a new defense in the second action, which was not pleaded, 
tried, or ruled upon in the former case. 
In Crom'U..'ell v. Sac Co., 94 U. S. 35 1 ,  359, 24 L. Ed. 195 , 
the findings in the former action upon which the judgment for 
the defendant was based disclosed the fact that the bonds and the 
coupons that had been cut from them upon which the action was 
based were fraudulently issued, and they contained no finding 
that the holder of the bonds paid value for them. The supreme 
court held that a j udgment upon this finding did not estop the 
holder of the bonds from maintaining a second action on other 
coupons taken from bonds of the same issue upon proof that he 
had purchased and paid value for them in good faith in reliance 
upon the recitals which they contained, before their maturhy. In 
other words, it held that the earlier judgment did not estop the 
plaintiff from maintaining a second action upon different causes 
of action, and upon a state of facts which presented an issue of 
law and of fact that was not raised or litigated in the earlier suit. 
To the same effect is the decision in Board v. Stdliff, 97 Fed. 
270, 274, 38 C. C. A. 167, 17 1 .  
In  Nesbit v. Independent Dist., 144 U.  S. 610, 619, 1 2  Sup. 
Ct. 7461 36 L. Ed. 562, the converse of this proposition is main­
tained. It is there held that the litigation and defeat, in a prior 
action upon coupons by a purchaser for value without not ice, of 
the defense that the debt of the district exceeded its constitutional 
limit when the bonds were issued did not estop the district in a 
subsequent action upon the bonds themselves from maintaining 
the defense that the debt was in excess of the constitutional limit 
against the same plaintiff who was there proved to have received 
notice of this fact before he bought the bonds. 
In the case of Rctil'l.vay Co. v. Leathe, 84 Fed. 103, 105, 28 
C. C.  A. 279-281 1  holds only that, where one of several defenses 
to a prior suit was that the defendant had assumed and was liable 
for the debts of a railroad company, and that suit was dismissed, 
the judgment of dismissal did not estop the defendant from liti­
gating the question of his liability in a subsequent action against 
him, for the reason that the record of the former suit did not show 
that all the defenses there pleaded were sustained, and hence did 
not establish the fact that the court had decided that the defend-
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ant had assumed and had become liable for the debt of the railroad
company.
In Bank v. Williams (Vt’ash.) 63 Pac. 511, the holder of
bonds filed a petition for a mandate to compel the county commis-
sioners of Pacific county and the school district to levy a tax to
pay the interest upon the bonds of the district. The school dis-
trict answered (I) that its debt was in excess of its constitutional
limit when the bonds were [*87] issued; (2) that the bonds were
fraudulently issued; (3) that since the issue of the bonds a large
portion of the district had been cut off and made a part of other
districts; and (4) that the moneys then in the hands of the county
treasurer were not applicable to the payment of the interest on
the bonds. The petitioner demurred to this answer. The court
overruled the demurrer, and dismissed the petition. Afterwards
the plaintiff brought an action against the same defendants upon
the coupons cut from these bonds, and the defendants answered
that the plaintiff was estopped from maintaining the second action
by the record and judgment in the first. To this the plaintiff
replied that the judgment in the former action was rendered on
the sole ground that none of the moneys then in the hands of
the county treasurer were applicable to the payment of the bonds,
and that no other defense or issue was decided or determined in
that case. He established the truth of the averments of this reply
by parol testimony. The court held that in this state of facts the
former judgment did not estop the plaintiff from litigating the
three defenses which were not tried or determined in the earlier
action, and sustained the judgment below for the plaintiff.
This brief analysis of the controlling facts of the cases upon
which the plaintiff places its chief reliance discloses the fact that
in every one of them the record was such that the former judg-
ment either was or might have been rendered without a litiga-
tion and decision of the crucial and determinative issue presented
sented some controlling issue, which either was not or might not
in the second action. In every case cited the second action pre-I2 _
have been litigated and decided in the former suit. It is not so
in the case in hand. This case is presented upon the petition, an-
swer, and reply. There is no averment or statement in any of
these pleadings that any issue or defense, any right, question,
matter, or fact, that is or can be determinative of this action, was i
not raised, presented, litigated, and decided in the former suit.
On the other hand, these pleadings admit that the same issues
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ant had assumed and had become liable for the debt of the railroad 
company. 
In Bank v. Williams ( Wash.)  63 Pac. 5 u ,  the holder of 
bonds filed a petition for a mandate to compel the county commis­
sioners of Pacific county and the school district to levy a tax to 
pay the interest upon the bonds of the district. The school dis­
trict answered ( I )  that its debt was in excess of its constitutional 
limit when the bonds were [*87] issued ; (2)  that the bonds were 
fraudulently issued ; ( 3 )  that since the issue of the bonds a large 
portion of the district had been cut off and made a part of other 
districts ; and (4) that the moneys then in the hands of the county 
treasurer were not applicable to the payment of the interest on 
the bonds. The petitioner demurred to this answer. The court 
overruled the demurrer, and dismissed the petition. Afterwards 
the plaintiff brought an action against the same defendants upon 
the coupons cut from these bonds, and the defendants answered 
that the plaintiff was estopped from maintaining the second action 
by the record and j udgment in the first. To this the plaintiff 
replied that the judgment in the former action was rendered on 
the sole ground that none of the moneys then in the hands of 
the county treasurer were applicable to the payment of the bonds, 
and that no other defense or issue was decided or determined in 
that case. He established the truth of the averments of this reply 
by parol testimony. The court held that in this state of facts the 
former judgment did not estop the plaintiff from litigating the 
three defenses which were not tried or determined in the earlier 
action, and sustained the judgment below for the plaintiff. 
This brief analysis of the controlling facts of the cases upon 
which the plaintiff places its chief reliance discloses the fact that 
in every one of them the record was such that the former judg­
ment either was or might have been rendered without a litiga­
tion and decision of the crucial and determinative issue presented 
in the second action . In every case cited the second action pre-l, • 
sented some controlling issue, which either was not or might not � 
have bl!en litigated and decided in the former suit. It is not so 
in the case in hand . This case is presented upon the petition, an­
swer, and reply. There is no averment or statement in any of 
these pleadings that any issue or defense, any right, question, 
matter, or fact, that is  or can be determinative of this action, was f 
not raised, presented, litigated , and decided in the former suit. 
On the other hand, these pleadings admit that the same issues 
have been raised, that the same defenses have been interposed , in 
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both actions, that in the former action evidence was introduced
in support of all the allegations of the petition, that the earlier
action was duly tried, and that a judgment was rendered for
defendant upon due consideration. lt is true that the defendant
interposed several defenses to that action, and that it is impossi-
ble to determine from the pleadings which one was sustained.
Nor is that fact material. One of the defenses which the county
has presented in both of the actions was necessarily sustained in ,
the earlier suit, and all the bonds from which the coupons in both
actions were taken and the coupons themselves were held to be
void in view of that defense. The doctrine of res adjmiicata is
that the same parties are conclusively estopped from again liti-
gating any issue, question, right, or matter which they have once
lawfully raised and litigated, and which the court has once de-
cided. This second action upon coupons cut from the same bonds
as those involved in the first action cannot be sustained without
a second litigation and an overruling of the very defense which
the court sustained in the former action. Concede that all the
other issues and defenses may be tried and decided in this suit
without again litigating any issue presented before, yet there re-
mains that one defense which was sustained [*88] in the former
action which was fatal to the plaintiff’s case then, and which is
fatal to it now, unless the plaintiff can again in this action raise
the issue which that defense presents, and can here obtain a de-
cision and judgment upon it which shall be the converse of those
which were rendered in the former action. This it may not do.
The very purpose of the establishment and maintenance of civil
courts is to finally determine controversies between the parties
who present them. If the decisions of these courts upon ques-
tions lawfully submitted to and tried by them were not conclusive.
if the courts left the questions which they decided open to re-
peated litigation and decision, their usefulness would immediately
cease, and litigants would no longer invoke their aid to protect
their rights or redress their wrongs. It is essential to the peace
and repose—nay, it is essential to the very existence—of civilized
society that the decisions and judgments of the courts invoked
for the protection of the rights of person and of property should
be final and conclusive between the parties and their privies upon
every question of fact and of law which they properly put in issue
and the courts actually try and decide. The maintenance and
application of this salutary principle have evoked these established
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both actions, that in the former action evidence was introduced 
in support of all the allegations of the petition, that the earlier 
action was duly tried, and that a j udgment was rendered for 
defendant upon due consideration. It is true that the defendant 
• interposed several defenses to that action, and that it is impossi­
ble to determine from the pleadings which one was sustained. 
Nor is that fact material. One of the defenses which the county 
has presented in both of the actions was necessarily sustained in 
the earlier suit, and all the bonds from which the coupons in both 
actions were taken and the coupons themselves were hel<l to be 
void in view of that defense. The doctrine of res adjud-icata. i:; 
that the same parties are conclusively estopped from again liti­
gating any issue, question, right, or matter which they have once 
lawfully raised and litigated , and which the court has once de­
cided. This second action upon coupons cut from the same bonds 
as those involved in the first action cannot be sustained without 
a second l itigation and an overruling of the very defense which 
the court sustained in the former action. Concede that all the 
other issues and defenses may be tried and decided in this suit 
without again l itigating any issue presented before, yet there re­
mains that one defense which was sustained [ *88] in the former 
action which was fatal to the plaintiff's case then, and which is 
fatal to it now, unless the plaintiff can again in this action raise 
the issue which that defense presents, and can here obtain a de­
ci sion and judgment upon it which shall be the converse of those 
which were rendered in the former action. This it  may not do. 
The very purpose of the establ ishment and maintenance of  civil 
courts i s  to finally determine controversies between the partie� 
who present them. If  the decisions of these courts upon ques­
tions law fully submitted to and tried by them were not conclusive, 
if  the courts left the questions which they decided open to re­
peated l it igat ion and decision, their usefulness would immediately 
cease, and l itigants would no longer invoke thei r aid to protect 
thei r rights or redress their wrongs. It is essential to the peace 
and repose-nay, it is essential to the very existence--of civilized 
society that the decisions and j udgments of the courts invoked 
for the protection of the rights of person and of property shouM 
be final and conclusive between the parties and their privies upon 
every quest ion of fact and of law which they properly put in issue 
and the courts actually try and decide. The maintenance and 
application of this salutary principle have evoked these established 
ru les for the administration of cstoppel by j udgment : 
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\Vhen the second suit is upon the same cause of action, and
7 between the same parties as the first, the judgment in the former
is conclusive in the latter as to every question which was or might
have been presented and determined in the former.
VVhen the second suit is upon a different cause of action,
but between the same parties, as the first, the judgment in the
former action operates as an estoppel in the latter as to every
point and question which was actually litigated and determined
in the first action, but it is not conclusive as to other matters
which might have been, but were not, litigated or decided. Lin-
ton v. Insurance Co., 104 Fed. 584, 587, 44 C. C. A. 54, 57;
Commissioners v. Platt, 79 Fed. 567, 571, 25 C. C. A. 87, 91,
49 U. S. App. 216, 223; Board v. Sutliff, 38 C. C. A. 167, 171,
97 Fed. 270, 274; Southern Pac. R. Co. v. U. S., 168 U. S. 1,
48, 18 Sup. Ct. 18, 42 L. Ed. 355; Southern Minnesota Ry Ex-
tension Co. v. St. Paul <5“ 5. C. R. Co., 55 Fed. 690, 5 C. C. A. 249.
Where the record is such that there is or may be a material
issue, question, or matter in the second suit upon a different cause
of action which may not have been raised, litigated, and decided
in the former action, the judgment therein does not constitute an
estoppel from litigating this issue, question, or matter, unless by
pleading or proof the party asserting the estoppel establishes the
fact that the issue, question, or matter in dispute was actually
and necessarily litigated and determined in the former action.
Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 606, 608, 24 L. Ed. 214.
A former judgment, based upon a general finding for the
defendant, which does not disclose which one of several defenses
therein was sustained, constitutes an estoppel of the plaintiff
therein from maintaining a second suit against the same defend-
ant upon different causes of action in which the same defenses .
are interposed and the same issues are presented that were made
in the earlier action, unless the party denying the estoppel makes
it appear by pleading or proof that some (*89] new and material
issue, question, or matter is involved in the second action, which
was not or may not have been litigated or decided in the first
Bissell v. Spring Valley Tp., 124 U. S. 225, 236,
8 Sup. Ct. 495, 31 L. Ed. 411 ; Pittsburgh, C., C. 61* St. L. Ry. Co.
v. Keolmk & H. Bridge Co., 46 C. C. A. 639, 644, 107 Fed. 781,
786, ~87.
Where the same issues are made and the same defenses are
interposed in both actions, and there is no pleading or proof that
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When the second suit is upon the same cause of action, and 
between the same parties as the first, the j udgment in the former l 
is conclusive in the latter as to every question which was or might 
have been presented and determined in the former. 
When the second suit is upon a different cause of action, 
but between the same parties, as the first, the judgment in the { 
former action operates as an estoppel in the latter as to every 
point and question which was actually litigated and determined 
in the first action, but it is not conclusive as to other matters 
which might have been, but were not, litigated or decide<! . Lin­
ton v. Insurance Co., 104 Fed. 584, 587, 44 C. C. A. 54, 57 ; 
Commissioners v. Platt, 79 Fed. 567, 57 1 ,  25 C. C. A. 87, 9 1 , 
49 U. S. App. 2 16, 223 ; Boo.rd v. Sutliff, 38 C. C. A. 167, 17 1 ,  
97 Fed. 270, 274 ; Southern Pac. R. Co. v. U. S., 168 U.  S. l ,  
48, 1 8  Sup. Ct. 18, 42 L. Ed. 355 ; Southern Minnesota Ry Ex­
tension Co. v. St. Paul & S. C. R. Co., 55 Fed. 6c)o, S C. C. A. 249. 
Where the record is such that there is or may be a material 
issue, question, or matter in the second suit upon a different cause 
of action which may not have been raised, l itigated, and decided 
in the former action, the judgment therein does not constitute an 
estoppel from litigating this issue, question, or matter, unless by 
pleading or proof the party asserting the estoppel establishes the 
fact that the issue, question, or matter in dispute was actually 
and necessarily litigated and determined in the former action. 
Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 6o6, 6o8, 24 L. Ed. 2 1 4. 
A former j udgment, based upon a general finding for the \ 
defendant, whi<;h does not disclose which one of several defenses 
therein was sustained, consti tutes an estoppel of the plaintiff l 
therein from maintaining a second suit against the same defend- l 
ant upon different causes of action in which the sarpe defenses : 
are interposed and the same issues are presented that were made 
in the earlier action, unless the party denying the estoppel makes 
it appear by pleading or proof that some (*89] new and material 
issue1 question, or matter is involved in the second action, which 
was not or may not have been litigated or <lecided in the first 
· action. Bissell v. Spring Valley Tp., 124 U. S. 225, 2J6, 
8 Sup. Ct. 495,  31 L. Ed. 41 l ;  Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. 
v. Keokuk & H. Bridge Co., 46 C. C. A. 639, 644, 107 Fed. 78 1 .  
786, 787. 
Where the same issues are made and the same defenses are 
interposed in both actions, and there is no pleading or proof that 
any new determining issue, question, or matter is or may be in-
. \  
v 
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/
volved in the second action, it is not material upon which defense
or issue the former judgment was based, because an opposite
judgment cannot be rendered without relitigating at least one de-
fense and issue determined in the former action, and overruling
the decision upon that defense which was there rendered.
The pleadings in this case leave no avenue of escape from
the conclusion that at least one of the defenses pleaded in this
action was actually and necessarily litigated and sustained in the
for1ner action between these parties, wherein there was a judg-
ment for the defendant. That defense proved fatal to the valid-
ity of the bonds and coupons in that earlier action. In the ab-
sence of pleading or proof that this action presents some deter-
mining issue which might not have been litigated and decided in
the former action, the defense which was there sustained is as
conclusively established in this action by the judgment in that ac-
tion. and is as fatal here as it was in the earlier suit.
The judgment below must be affirmed, and it is so ordered.
Scope of the Prior Court’s Jurisdiction.
SHURTE v. FLETCHER, Michigan Supreme Court, Dec. 9th, 1896,
111 Mich. 84, 69 N. W. 233.
Bill by VVm. Shurte against Fletcher and others praying
that certain “ ' " ment 1nade by and between him and
the other heirs of his father be annulled for fraud and that the
land of the estate be partitioned and his share decreed to him in
severalty, with prayer for general. relief. The defendants an-
swered that the complainant had filed a petition in the probate
court praying that an adminis r’ ' ' sai >< e e ‘ ted;
that the other h*' ' * rrrantin of said
letters on the ground that the estate has been settled by said
agpegnents; that the roba cour s ' ‘ 1e pe-
titjpp; and that by such decision the matters now attempted to
be litigated are res judicata. The trial court found the averments
in the bill true and decreed the relief prayed for. The defend-
ants appeal.
Moomz, j. * * * It is urged that the court in chan-
cerv ou h ' ' ' ' ' . it is rcs
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volved in the second action , i t  is not material upon which dcfens� 
or issue the former j udgment was based, because an opposite 
j udgment cannot be rendered w ithout relitigating at least one de­
fense and issue determined in the former action, and overruli ng 
the decision upon that defense which was there rendered. 
The pleadings in this case leave no avenue of escape from 
the conclu ion that at least one of the defenses pleaded in this 
action was actually and necessarily l itigated and sustai ned in the 
former action between these parties, wherein there was a j udg­
ment for the defendant. That defense proved fatal to the valid­
ity of the bonds and coupons in that earlier action. In the ab­
sence of pleading or proof that this action presents some deter­
mini ng i ssue wh ich might not have been l it ig-ated and decided in 
the former action, the defense which was there sustained is as 
conclusively established in this action by the j udgment in that ac­
tion, and is as fatal here as it was in the earl ier suit .  
The j udgment below must be affirmed, and i t  is  so ordered. 
Scope of the Prior Court's Jurisdiction. 
S i fURTE v. FLETC H ER, Michigan Supreme Court, Dec. 9th, i8¢, 
r n  Mich. 84, 69 N. W. 233. 
Bill  by Wm. Shurte against Fletcher and others praying 
that certain deeds qf adjustment made by and between him and 
the other heirs of his father be annulled for fraud and that the 
land of the estate be partitioned and his  share decreed to him in 
severalty, with prayer for general . relief. The de fendants an­
swered that the complainant had filed a pet ition in the probate • 
court prqying that an aclmini r sai · tcd ; 
that the other heirs £Jppenccl wd apposed the �ranting o f  said 
letters on the ground that the estate has been cttlcd by said 
a,g:ments ; tJ1at the probate court so decided, and denied the pc­
ti� ; and that by such decision the matters now attempted to 
he l i t igated are res j11dicata. The trial court found the averments 
in the bill tru e  and decreed the relief prayed for. The defend­
ants appeal. 
MoORF., J. * * * It  is u rged that the court in chan­
cery ought not ta tdlce j1:1ri6dictioA ef this eare because it is res 
;";uiicatCJ., This claim is based upon the fact that, subsequent to 
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~
the execution of Exhibits A and B, the complainant petitioned
the probate judge for the appointment of an administrator; that
a hearing was had, one witness sworn, and Exhibits A, B, and C
offered in evidence; that, upon the hearing, the probate judge re-
fused to a oint an admin' r want of 'f1risdiction, and
because the estate had been settled. VVe 1m
of-r?.f_'Zr___5_-____d-. Zulcataoanesustaine. There was ngthjjjg in the plead
ings to indicate that the probate judge was called upon to con-
strue the effect of the alleged settlement. [*g9] e probate
court would not have power to decre ific erformance of
the agreement made b the arties if if-if/if-e:;mm_-h-,mI(lte:y
aS1d.fl_Lh!;agLflflm-flDL3D.lLC2.n£flLLL_1£_11JbLi§_iQX§1id- S86 Perkins
v. Ol'ie'er, IIo Mich. 402; also, Bush v. M erriman, 87 Mich. 260.
The decree of the court below is affirmed, with costs.
Lone, C. ]., MONTGOMIQRY and HOOKER, ]]., concurred.
GRANT, ]., did not sit.
JOHNSON STEEL STREET RAIL CO. v. WILLIAM WHARTON,
JR. 8: CO., in U. S. Sup. Ct. March 5, I894—-I52 U. S. 252, 14
S. Ct. 608.
\
Action for royalties. The affidavits of defense were held
insufficient and judgment entered for plaintiff. Defendant sues
error.
I-IARI,AN, J. The uestion n the merits, which the de-
fendan ’ ‘ ' ' s whether the Ir er
old b it were covered b the
Wharton patent and by the license granted by the agreement of
November 24, 1885. But that precise question, it is admitted,
was presented and determinedln _the former suit between the
san ' And we are to inquire, on this writ of error,
w'lg:_th§r_LhLcouFt—beJow—e¥red-i:Llmlding_.thaLthe_jndgment in
the former suit concluded that question between the parties. The
learned counsel for the defendant insists that it did not, and bifs?
his contention solely upon ffie ground that the former judgment
was not, bv reason of the limited amount mvolved, subject to
review by this gpurt.
Is it true that a defeated suitor in a court of general juris-
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adversary, in the same, or in any other court, to relitigate a matter
directly put in issue and actually determined in the first suit, upon
its appearing that the judgment in the first suit, by reason of the
small amount in dispute, could not be reviewed by a, mug; Q
a ellate ‘urisdiction? Does the principle of res jndicata, in its
application to the~.judgments of courts of general jurisdiction,
depend, in any degree, upon the inquiry whether the law subjects
such judgments to re-examination by some other court? Upon
principle and authority [*257] these questions must be answered
in the negative. VV e have not been referred to, nor are we aware
of, any adjudged case that would justify a different conclusion.
The object in establishing judicial tribunals is that contra-
versies between parties, which may be the subject of litigation,
shall be finally determined. The peace and order of society de-
mand that matters distinctly put in issue and determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction as to parties and subject-matter,
shall not be retried between the same parties in any subsequent
suit in any court. The exceptions to this rule that are recognized
in cases of judgments obtained by fraud or collusion have no
application to the present suit.
In Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. I09, 113, it was held that a
fact directly presented and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction cannot be contested again between the same parties
in the same or any other court. “In this,” the court said. “there
is and ought to be no difference between a verdict and judgment
in a court of common law and a decree of a court of equity. They
both stand on the same footing and may be offered in evidence
under the same limitations, and it would be difficult to assign a
reason why it should be otherwise. The rule has found its way
into every system of jurisprudence, not only from its obvious
fitness and propriety, but because without it an end could never
be put to litigation. It is, therefore, not confined in England or in
this country to judgments of the same court or to the decisions
of courts of concurrent jurisdiction, but extends to matters liti-
gated before competent tribunals in foreign countries. -* * * On
a reference to the proceedings at law, and in chancery, in the case
now before‘ us, the court is satisfied that the question which
arose on the trial of the action of covenant was precisely the
same, if not exclusively so (although that was not necessary),
as the one which had already been directly decided by the court
of chancery.” And in Smith v. Kernochen, 7 How. 198. 217:
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adversary, in the same, or in any other court, to relitigate a matter 
directly put in issue and actually determined in the first suit, upon 
its appearing that the judgment in the first suit, by reason of the 
small amount in dispute, could not be reyiewed b;y a court of 
apPellate jurisdigion ? Does the principle of res judicata, in its 
application to thee.jJ.tdgments of courts of general jurisdiction, 
depend, in any degree, upon the inquiry whether the law subjects 
such j udgments to re-examination by some other court ? Upon 
principle and authority [*257] these questions must be answered 
in the negative. We have not been referred to, nor are we aware 
of, any adj udged case that would j ustify a different conclusion. 
The object in establishing j udicial tribunals is that contra­
versies between parties, which may be the subject of litigation, 
shall be finally determi·ned. The peace and order of society de­
mand that matters distinctly put in issue and determined by a 
court of competent j urisdiction as to parties and subject-matter, 
shall not be retried between the same parties in any subsequent 
suit in any court. The exceptions to this rule that are recognized 
in cases of j udgments obtained by fraud or collusion have no 
application to the present suit. 
In H opki11s v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109, I 13,  it was held that a 
fact directly presented an4 detennined by a court of competent 
j urisdiction cannot be contested again between the same parties 
in the same or any other court. "In this," the court said. "there 
is and ought to be no difference between a verdict and j udgment 
in a court of common law and a decree of a court of equity. They 
both stand on the same footing and may be offered in evidence 
under the same limitations, and it would be difficult to assign a 
reason why it should be otherwise. The rule has found its way 
into every system of jurisprudence, not only from its obvious 
fitness and propriety, but because without it an end could never 
be put to litigation. It is, therefore, not confined in England or in 
this country to j udgments of the same court or to the decisions 
of courts of concurrent jurisdiction, but extends to matters liti-
gated before competent tribunals in foreign countries. - * * * On I 
a reference to the proceedings at law, and in chancery, in the case ;a 
now before· us, the court is satisfied that the question which • 
arose on the trial of the action of covenant was precisely the 
same, if  not exclusively so ( although that was not necessary) ,  
as the one which had already been directly decided by the court 
of chancery." And in Smith v. Kcrnochen, 7 How. 198. 2 1 7 : 
"The case, therefore, falls within the general rule, that a j u<lg-
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ment Q1 3, cgurt of concurrent jurisdiction directly upon the point
‘is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence conclusive between the same
parties or privies upon the same matters when [*258] directly in
question in another court.” To the same effect are Pennington v.
Gibson, 16 How. 65, 77; Stockton v. Ford, 18 How. 418; and
Lessee of Parish v. Farris, 2 Black 606, 609.
The whole subject was carefully considered in Cromwell V.
County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 352, where it is said: “There is a
difference between the effect of a judgment as a bar or estoppel
against the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim
or demand, and its effect as an estoppel in another action be-
tween the same parties upon a different claim or cause of action.
In the former case, the judgment, if rendered upon the merits,
constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a finality
as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and
those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was
offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but
as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered
for that purpose. Thus, for example, a judgment rendered upon
a promissory note is conclusive as to the validity of the instru-
ment and the amount due upon it, although it be subsequently
alleged that perfect defenses actually existed, of which no proof
was offered, such as forgery, want of consideration, or payment.
If such defenses were not presented in the action, and established
by competent evidence, the subsequent allegation of their exist-
ence is of no legal consequence. The judgment is as conclusive,
so far as future proceedings at law are concerned, as though the
defenses never existed.”
The doctrines of the latter case were applied in Lumber Co.
v. Buchtel, IOI U. S. 638, 639, which case is like this in some
respects. That was an action for the recovery of the last instal-
ments of money due on a contract for the purchase of timber
lands, the plaintiff having in a previous action against the same
defendant obtained a judgment for the first instalment. In the
first action the sole defense was that the defendant had been
induced to make the contract of guaranty by false and fraudulent
representations. The same defense was made in the second action,
and an additional one was interposed to the effect that the repre-
sentations made as to the quantity of timber, and which induced
the execution of ["‘259] the contract. amounted to a warranty
upon which defendant could sue for damages. Both grounds of
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ment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction directly upon the point 
is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence conclusive tween the same 
P-arties or pnv1es upon t e same matters when [*258] directly in 
question in another court." To the same effect are Pennington v. 
Gibson, 16 How. 65 , 77 ; Stockton v. Ford, 18 How. 418 ; and 
L essee of Parish v. Ferris, 2 Black 6o6, 6og. 
The whole subject was carefully considered in Cromwell v. 
County of Sac, 94 U. S. 35 1 ,  352, where it  is  said : "There is a 
difference between the effect of a judgment as a bar or estoppel 
against the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim· 
or demand, and its effect as an estoppel in another action be-
tween the same parties upon a different claim or cause of action. 
In the former case, the j udgment, if rendered upon the merits , 
constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a finality 
as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and 
those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was 
offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but 
as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered 
for that purpose. Thus, for example, a j udgment rendered upon 
a promissory note is conclusive as to the validity of the instru-
ment and the amount due upon it, although it be subsequently 
alleged that perfect defenses actually existed, of which no proof � �· was offered, such as forgery, want of consideration, or payment. � I f  such defenses were not presented in the action, and established 
by competent evidence, the subsequent allegation of their exist- � 
ence is of no legal consequence. The judgment is as conclusive, 
so far as futl;lre proceedings at law are concerned, as though the 
defenses never existed." 
The doctrines of the latter case were applied in Lumber Co. 
v. Buchtel, I O I  U. S. 638, 639, which case is like this in some 
respects. That was an action for the recovery of the last instal­
ments of money due on a contract for the purchase of timber 
lands, the plaintiff having in a previous action against the same 
defendant obtained a j udgment for the first instalment. In the 
first actio
-
n the sole defense was that the defendant had been 
induced to make the contract of guaranty by false and fraudulent 
representations. The same defense was made in the second action, 
and an additional one was interposed to the effect that the repre­
sentations made as to the quantity of timber, and which induced 
the execution of [ *259] the contract. amounted to a warranty 
upon which defendant could sue for damages. Both grounds of 
defense, rel ied on in the second action, were held to be concluded 
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by the judgment in the prior action. In respect to the second
ground, it was said: “The finding of the referee, upon which
the judgment [in the first action] was rendered—and this finding,
like the verdict of a jury, constitutes an essential part of the rec-
ord of a case—shows that no representations as to the quantity
of timber on the land sold were made to the defendant by the
plaintiff, or in his hearing, to induce the execution of the contract
of guaranty. This finding, having gone into the judgment, is con-
clusive as to the facts found in all subsequent controversies be-
tween the parties on the contract. Every defense requiring the
negation of this fact is met and overthrown by that adjudication.”
In Stout v. Lye, 103 U. S. 66, 71, in which one of the ques-
tions was as to the conclusiveness of a judgment in a state court
upon the same parties to a suit in the federal court—the two
suits involving the same subject-matter, and the suit in the state
court having been first commenced—this court, observing that the
parties instituting the suit in the federal court, being represented
in the state suit, could not deprive the latter court of the juris-
diction it had acquired, said: “The two suits related to the same
subject matter, and were in fact pending at the same time in two
courts of concurrent jurisdiction. The parties also were, in legal
effect, the same, because in the state court the mortgagor repre-
sented all who, pending the suit, acquired any interest through
him in the property about which the controversy arose. By elect-
ing to bring a separate suit the Stouts voluntarily took the risk
of getting a decision in the Circuit Court before thestate court
settled the rights of the parties by a judgment in the suit which
was pending there. Failing in this, they must submit to the same
judgment that has already been rendered against their represen-
tative in the state court. That was a judgment on the merits of
the identical matter now in question, and it concluded the ‘parties
and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which
was offered and [M60] received to sustain or defeat the claim or
demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have
been offered for that purpose.’ Cromrecll v. County of Sac, 94
U. S. 351, 352. It is true the mortgagor did not set up as a de-
fense that the bank had no right to take the mortgage, or that he
was entitled to certain credits because of payments of usurious
interest, but he was at liberty to do so. Not having done so, he
is now concluded as to all such defenses, and so are his privies.”
In all of these cases, it will be observed, the question consid-
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by the j udgment in the prior action. In respect to the second 
ground, it was said : ' 'The finding of the referee, upon which 
the j udgment [ in the first action] was rendered-and this finding, 
like the verdict of a j ury, constitutes an essential part of the rec­
ord of a case-shows that no representations as to the quantity 
of timber on the land sold were made to the defendant by the 
plaintiff, or in his hearing, to induce the execution of the contract 
.. of guaranty.  This finding, having gone into the j udgment, is  con­
clusive as to the facts found in all subsequent controversies be­
tween the parties on the contract. Every defense requiring the 
negation of this fact is met and overthrown by that adj udication." 
In Stout  v. Lye, 103 U. S. 66, 7 1 ,  in which one of the ques­
tions was as to the conclusiveness of a judgment in a state court 
upon the same parties to a suit in the federal court-the two 
suits involving the same subj ect-matter, and the suit in the state 
court having been first commenced-this court, observing that the 
parties instituting the suit in the federal court, being represented 
in the state suit, could not deprive the latter court of the juris­
diction it had acquired, said : "The two suits related to the same 
subj ect matter, and were in fact pending at the same time in two 
courts of concurrent jurisdict ion. The parties also were, in legal 
cff ect, the same, because in the state court the mortgagor repre­
sented all who, pending the suit, acquired any interest through 
him in the property about which the controversy arose. By elect­
ing to bring a separate suit the Stouts voluntarily took the risk 
of getting a decis ion in the Circuit Court before the . state court 
settled the rights of the parties by a j udgment in the suit which 
was pending there. Fail ing in this, they must submit to the same 
j udgment that has already been rendered against their represen­
tative in the state court. That was a judgment on the merits of 
the identical matter now in question, and it concluded the 'parties 
and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which 
was offered and [ *260] received to sustain or defeat the claim or 
demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have 
been offered for that purpose. ' Crom1.ccll v. County of Sac, 94 
V. S .  35 1 ,  352.  It is true the mortgagor did not set up as a de-r 
fensc that the hank had no right to take the mortgage, or that he 
was enti tled to certain credits because of 
.
payme?ts of usurious 
in terest, but he was at liberty to do so. N ot havmg done so, he 
is now concluded as to all such defenses, and so are his privies." 
In all of these cases, i t  will be observed, the question consid­
ered was as to the effect to be given by the court of original 
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jurisdiction to the judgment in a previous case between the same
parties or their representatives, and involving the same matters
brought up in a subsequent suit. In no one of them is there
a suggestion that the determination of that question by the court _
to which it was presented should be controlled by the inquiry
whether the judgment in the first action could be reviewed upon
appeal or writ of error. '
The counsel for the plaintiff in error, in support of his posi-
tion, referred to the clause of the constitution declaring that the
judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Su-
preme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish, and to the clause pro-
viding that the judicial power of the United States shall extend
to all cases in law or equity mentioned in that instrument. But.
except in the cases specially enumerated in the constitution and
of which this court may take cognizance, without an enabling act
of Congress, the distribution of the judicial power of the United
States among the courts of the United States is a matter entirely
within the control of the legislative branch of the government.
And it has never been supposed that Congress, when making this
distribution, intended to change or modify the general rule, hav-
ing its foundation in a wise public policy, and deeply imbedded
in the jurisprudence of all civilized countries, that the final judg-
ment of a court—at least, one of superior j urisdiction—competent
under the law of its creation to deal with the parties and the sub-
ject-matter, and having acquired jurisdiction of the parties,
[*z61] concludes those parties and their privies, in respect to
every matter put in issue by the pleadings and determined by
such court. This ruleI so essential to an orderly and effective a -
minist ' ' ' " its value if it were
he] ' 1 ents in the Circuit urts
he Uni e ' ' reason of the limited amount in-
volved, could not be reviewed by this court.
he inquiry as to the conclusiveness of a judgment in a prior
suit between the same parties can only be whether the court
rendering such judgment whatever the nature of the question
decided, or the value of the matter in dispute—had jurisdiction
of the parties and the subject-matter, and whether the question.
sought to be raised in the subsequent suit, was covered by the
pleadings and actually determined in the former suit. The exist-
ence or non-existence of a right, in either party, to have the judg-
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jurisdiction to the j udgment in a previous c.ase between the same 
parties or thei r  representatives, and involving the same matters 
brought up in a subsequent suit. In no one of them is there 
a suggestion that the determination of that question by the court � ) 
to which it was presented should be controlled by the inquiry 
whether the judgment in the first action could be reviewed upon 
appeal or writ o f  error. 
The counsel for the plaintiff in error, in support of his posi­
tion , referred to the clause of the constitution declaring that th� 
judicial power of the L'nited States shall be vested in one Su­
preme Court, and in such in ferior courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish, and to the clause pro­
viding that the judicial power of the United States shall extend 
to all cases in law or equity mentioned in that instrument. But, 
except in the cases specially enumerated in the constitution and 
of which this court may take cognizance, without an enabling act 
of Congress, the distribution of the j udicial power of the United 
States among the courts of the United States is a matter entirely 
within the control of the legislative branch of the government. 
And it has never been supposed that Congress, when making this 
distribution , intended to change or modify the general rule, hav­
ing its foundation in a wise public policy, and deeply imbedded 
in the j urisprudence of all civilized countries, that the final judg­
ment of a court-at least, one of superior j urisdiction-competent 
under the law of its creation to deal with the parties and the sub­
j ect-matter, and having acquired j urisdiction of the parties, 
[*26 1 ]  concludes those parties and their privies, in respect to 
every matter put in issue by the pleadings and determined by 
such court. This rule, so essential to an orderly and effective ad­
ministration of j 11stice: \vonlc] lose nmch of its value i f  it were 
held to he inapplicable to those judgments in the Circuit Courts 
oi the United States which by reason of the limited amount in-­
valved , could not be reviewed by this court. 
The inquity as to the conclusiveness o f  a judgment in a prior 
su it between the same parties can only be whether the court 
rendering such j udgment-whatever the nature of the question 
decidecl , or the val ue o f  the matter in dispute-had ju risfliction 
o f  the parties and the subj ect-matter, and whether the q uestion . 
sought to be rai sed in the subseq uent su it , was covered by the 
plead ings and actually determined in the former su it . The exist­
ence or non-existence of a right, in either party , to have the j udg­
ment in the prior sui t  reexamined , upon appeal or writ of error .  
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cannot, in any case, control this inquiry. Nor can the possibility
that a party may legitimately or properly divide his causes of ac-
tion, so as to have the matter in dispute between him and his ad-
versary adjudged in a suit that cannot, after judgment, and by
reason of the limited amount involved, be carried to a higher
‘court, affect the application of the general rule. \Vhatever mis-
chiefs or injustice may result from such a condition of things,
must be remedied by legislation regulating the jurisdiction of the
courts, and prescribing the rules of evidence applicable to judg-
ments. Looking at the reasons upon which the rule rests, its op-
eration cannot be restricted to those cases, which, after final judg-
ment or decree, may be taken by appeal or writ of error to a court
of appellate jurisdiction.
Vt/'e are of opinion that the question whether the rails man-
ufactured by the Johnson Company were covered by the Whar-
ton patent, having been made and determined in the prior action
between the same parties--which judgment remains in full force
—could not be relitigated in this subsequent action.
There is no error in the judgment, and it is
Aflirmed.
Action for Damages or Rescission After Recovery of Price.
JORDAHL v. BERRY, in Minn. Sup. Ct., April 29, 1898—72 Minn. I19,
75 N. W. I0 45 L. R. A. 541, 71 Am. St. Rep. 469.
MITCHELL, J. This was an action to recover $5,000 dam-
ages for malpractice by the defendants in the performance for
plaintiff of professional services as physicians and surgeons. Af-
ter the action was commenced and at issue, each of the defend-
ants brought an action against the plaintiff, in justice's court, to
recover the value of his services, alleged in one case to be some
$22, and in the other $7. The present plaintiff neither answered
nor appeared in those actions, and the present defendants. respec-
tively, recovered judgment for the full amounts claimed. They
then set up these judgments, by supplemental answers, as a bar
or estoppel to plaintiff’s recovery in this action. The plaintiff
demurred on the ground that the answers did not state facts con-
stituting a defense. From an order sustaining the demurrers,
the defendants appealed.
\/Vhile the doctrine of estoppel by a former adjudication is
as old as the law, few questions have given rise of late years to
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cannot, in any case, control this inquiry. Nor can the possibility 
that a party may legitimately or properly divide his causes o f  ac­
tion, so as to have the matter in dispute between him and his ad-
' versary adjudged in a suit that cannot, after judgment, arid by 
reason of the limited amount involved, be carried to a higher 
i court, affect the application· of the general rule. Whatever mis­
chiefs or injustice may result from such a condition of things, 
must be remedied by legislation regulating the jurisdiction of the 
courts, and prescribing the rules of evidence applicable to judg­
ments. Looking at the reasons upon which the rule rests, its op­
eration cannot be restricted to those cases, which, after final j udg­
ment or decree, may be taken by appeal or writ of error to a court 
of appellate jurisdiction. 
We are of opinion that the question whether the rails man­
ufactured by the Johnson Company were covered by the Whar­
ton patent, having been made and determined in the prior action 
between the same parties-which judgment remains in full force 
-could not be relitigated in this subsequent action. 
There is no error in the judgment, and it is 
Affirmed. 
Action for Damages or Rescission After Recovery of Price. 
J ORDAHL v. BERRY, in Minn. Sup. Ct., April 29, 1898--72 Minn. I I9, 
75 N. W. 10 45 L. R. A. 541, 71  Am. St. Rep. 469. 
MITCHELL, J. This was an action to recover $s,ooo dam­
ages for malpractice by the defendants in the performance for 
plaintiff of professional services as physicians and surgeons. Af­
ter the action was commenced and at issue, each of the defend­
ants brought an action against the plaintiff, in justice's court, to 
recover the value of his services, alleged in one case to be some 
$22, and in the other $7. The present plaintiff neither answered 
nor appeared in those actions, and the present defendants, respec­
tively, recovered j udgment for the full amounts claimed . They 
then set up these j udgments, by supplemental answers, as a bar 
or estoppel to plaintiff's recovery in this action. The plaintiff 
demurred on the ground that the answers did not state facts con­
stituting a defense. From an order sustaining the demurrers, 
the defendants appealed. 
vVhile the doctrine of estoppel by a former adjudication is 
as old as the law, few questions have given rise of late years to 
more discussion [ * 1 2 1 ]  and conflict of opinion than the applica-
EFFECT or JUDGMENT as I3.-\R on ESTOPPI-ll. 265
bility of the doctrine to a state of facts the same or similar to
that presented by this case.
In Bell-inger v. Craigue, 3I Barb. 534; Gates v. Preston, 41
N. Y. I13, and Blair v. Bartlett, 75 N. Y. 150, 31 Am. Rep. 455,
it was held that a judgment in justice’s court in favor of a sur-
geon for professional services was a bar to any action against
him for malpractice in the performance of such services. In the
first and last of these cases the defendants appeared and an-
swered, but afterwards withdrew their answers. In the other the
defendant did not answer, but consented in writing to the entry
of the judgment. Vt/’e do not refer to this as distinguishing in
principle those cases from the present, but it may have had some
influence upon their decision. See Bascom v. M amu'ng, 52 N. H.
I32. Neither do we lay any stress on the fact that an action for
services is brought in justice’s court, except so far as it illustrates
the inconvenience and practical injustice of what we may call the
New York doctrine. In Dun-ha/m v. Bower, 77 N. Y. 76, 33 Am.
Rep. 570, the court applied the same rule to a state of facts not
differing in principle.
A directly opposite conclusion was arrived at upon the same
state of facts in Ressequie V. Byers, 52 VVis. 650, 9. N. W. 779,
38 Am. Rep. 775; Lawson v. Conaway, 37 VV. Va. I59, I6 S. E.
564, 38 Am. Rep. I7; Gable v. Dillon, 86 Ind. 327, 44 Am. Rep.
308; and Sykes V. Bonner, I Cin. R. 464,—in most of which cases
the courts reviewed the New York cases, and refused to follow
them.
This conflict of opinion among the courts gave rise to an ex-
tended and somewhat energetic dispute among text writers.
Mr. Bigelow discusses the subject at some length. and earn-
estly insists that the New York doctrine is wrong. Bigelow, Es-
top. (5th Ed.) I74 et seq. Mr. Van Fleet takes the same side of
the question. Van Fleet, Former Adj. § I68 et seq. Mr. Black,
while not discussing the matter at any great length, indorses the
doctrine opposed to that of New York, as being much better sup-
ported by legal reason, and the best considerations of convenience
and justice. 2 Black, Judgm. § 769. Mr. Browne, in his note to
Ressequie v. Byers, supra, in 38 Am. Rep. 778, says, of the New
York doctrine, that, while unquestionably right in theory, it may
well be doubted whether it is convenient or safe in practice; that
such estoppels are [*I22] odious at best, and are founded on a
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bility of the doctrine to a state of facts the same or similar to 
that presented by this case . 
In Bellt"nger v. Craigue, 3 1 Barb. 534 ; Gates v. Preston, 41 
N. Y. l 13 ,  and Bia.fr v. Bartlett, 75 N. Y. 1 50, 31  Am. Rep. 455, 
it was held that a j udgment in justice's court in favor of a sur­
geon for professional services was a bar to any action against 
him for malpractice in the performance of such services. In the 
first and last of these cases the defendants appeared and an­
swered, but afterwards withdrew their answers. In the other the 
defendant did not answer, but consented in writing to the entry 
of the j udgment. We do not refer to this as distinguishing in 
principle those cases from the present, but it may have had some 
influence upon their decision. See Bascom v. Manning, 52 N. H. 
1 32. Neither do we lay any stress on the fact that an action for 
services is brought in justice's court, except so far as it illustrates 
the inconvenience and practical injustice of what we may call the 
New York doctrine. In Dunham v. Bower, 77 N. Y. 76, 33 Am. 
Rep. 570, the court applied the same rule to a state of facts not 
differing in principle. 
A directly opposite conclusion was arrived at upon the same 
state of facts in Ressequie v. Byers, 52 Wis. 650, 9. N. W. 779, 
38 Am. Rep. 775 ; Lawson v. Conaway, 37 W. Va. 1 59, 16 S. E. 
564, 38 Am. Rep. 17 ; Goble v. Dillon, 86 Ind. 327, 44 Am. Rep. 
3o8 ; and Sykes v. Bonner, I Cin. R. 464,-in most of which cases 
the courts reviewed the New York cases, and refused to follow 
them. 
This conflict of opinion among the courts gave rise to an ex­
tended and somewhat energetic dispute among text writers. 
Mr. Bigelow discusses the subject at some length. and earn­
est!y insists that the New York doctrine is wrong. Bigelow, Es­
top. ( 5 th Ed. ) 174 et seq. Mr. Van Fleet takes the same side of 
the question. Van Fleet, Former Adj . § 168 et seq. Mr. Black, 
while not discussing the matter at any great length, indorses the 
doctrine opposed to that of New York, as being much better sup­
ported by legal reason, and the best considerations of convenience 
and justice. 2 Black, Judgm. § 76g. Mr. Browne, in his note to 
Ressequie v. Byers, s1tpra, in 38 Am. Rep. 778, says, of the New 
York doctrine, that, while unquestionably right in theory, it may 
well be doubted whether it is convenient or safe in practice ; that 
such estoppels are [*122]  odious at best, and are founded on a 
technicality, and probably promote more inj ustice than they 
prevent. 
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On the other side, Mr. Herman urges with great earnest-
ness that the New York doctrine is sound, and that the courts
which -have come to an opposite conclusion violate every princi-
ple upon which the doctrine of res adjudicata is founded. Her-
man, Estop. § 231 et seq. We do not find that Mr. Freeman, in
his work on Judgments, anywhere discusses this precise question;
but in view of the fact that, in support of certain general propo-
sitions laid down in his text, he cites the New York cases without
any intimation of disapproval, it may perhaps be inferred that he
approves of their doctrine. See Freeman Judgm. § 282.
On this state of the authorities, we feel at liberty to adopt
whichever rule (permissible on principle) we think the safest,
most convenient and equitable in practice; keeping in mind that
it is more important -to work practical justice than to preserve the
logical symmetry of a rule, provided this can be done without de-
stroy1ng all rules, and leaving the law on the subject all at sea.
The foundation principle upon which the doctrine of res ad-
judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate
the same issue more than once ; that, when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion, the judgment thereon, so long as it remains unreversed, shall
be conclusive upon the parties, and those in privity with them in
law. or estate. Rightly understood, no doctrine of the law is more
in accord with justice and public policy. The difficulty which
has always confronted the courts is to determine the extent of
the application of that doctrine. VVhere an issue has been ac-
tually litigated and determined on its merits, there can be no
doubt, upon either reason or authority, that the judgment is, as
between the parties and their privies, conclusive in relation to
that point in any other suit. though the purpose and subject-mat-
ter of the two suits be different. The difficulty is to determine
what points were in issue and determined by the judgment, or,
rather, what issues were necessarily involved in the judgment,
although not directly and expressly made and litigated.
The American authorities seem to have generally gone some-
what [*I23] further in applying the doctrine of res adjudicata in
that respect than the English courts, whose general tendency is
to confine the estoppel of a judgment to matters actually dis-
putcd.
Looking at the subject from a practical standpoint, there is
certainly great danger of working injustice, unless great caution
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On the other side, Mr. Herman urges with great earnest­
ness that the New York doctrine is sound, and that the courts 
which have come to an opposite conclusion violate every princi­
ple upon which the doctrine of  res adjudicata is founded. Her­
man, Estop. § 23 1 et seq. \Ve do not find that l\Ir. Freeman, in 
his work on Judgments, anywhere discusses this precise question ; 
but in view o f  the fact that, in support of certain general propo­
s itions laid down in his text, he cites the New York cases without 
any intimation of disapproval, it may perhaps be inferred that he 
approves of their doctrine. See Freeman J udgm. § 282. 
On this state of the authorities , we feel at liberty to adopt 
whichever rule (permissible on principle ) we think the safest, 
most convenient and equitable in practice ; keeping in minrl that 
it is more important to work practical j ustice than to preserve the 
logical symmetry of a rule, provided this can be done without de­
stroying all rules, and leaving the law on the subj ect all at sea. 
The foundation principle upon which the doctrine of res ad­
judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate 
the same issue more than once ; that, when a right or fact has been 
j udicially tried and determined by a court of competent j urisdic­
t ion, the j udgment thereon, so long as it remains unreversc<l, shall 
be conclusive upon the parties, and those in privity with them in 
law. or estate. Rightly understood, no doctrine of the law is more 
in accord with j ustice and public policy. The clifficult_v which 
has always con fronted the courts is to determine the extent of 
the application of that doctrine. \.Vhcre an issue has been ac­
tually litigated and determined on its merits, there can be no 
doubt , upon either reason or authority, that the j udgment is, as 
between the parties and their privies, conclusive in relation to 
that point in any other suit .  though the purpose and subj ect-mat­
ter of the two suits be different. The d ifficulty is to determine 
what points were in issue and determined by the j udgment, or, 
rather, what issues were necessarily involved in the j udgment, 
although not directly and expressly made and litigated . 
The American authorities seem to have generally gone some­
what [ * 1 23 ]  further in applying the doctrine of res adjudicata in 
that respect than the English courts, whose general tendenc�· i s  
to confine the estoppel of a j udgment to matters actually clis­
putccl .  
I ,ook ing at the subj ect from a practical standpoint, there i s  
certa in ly great danger of  \\"Orking inj ustice, tmle�s great caution 
is use<l , in holding that a j udgment is an estoppel upon a certain 
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point, on the ground that it was necessarily involved in the judg-
ment, although the issue was not expressly tendered and litigated.
Frequently one learned in the law can reason out, to his satisfac-
tion, that a particular point was necessarily involved in a judg-
ment, when such a thing would never occur to the ordinary lay-
man. The present case is an illustration of the fact. Whatever
conclusion hard logic would require, every one knows that, as a
matter of fact, the question of defendants’ malpractice was not
determined in their suits for services, and that the judgments
were in fact for the value of the services, irrespective of, and dis-
connected from, any claim for malpractice.
The inconvenience of the New York rule, and its liability to
work injustice, is further illustrated by the present case. It fur-~
nishes an opportunity to create an estoppel by what may not un-
fairly be called a snap judgment. It is perhaps not unchantable
to surmise that this may have been the very object of defendants
in bringing their actions in justice court. But, this aside, if
plaintiff had appeared and defended those actions, he would have
been put to the alternative of alleging the malpractice as a mere
defense, or of setting it up as a cross claim‘. In either case the
judgment would be a bar or estoppel on that issue. If he had
adopted the latter course, he could only have recovered $100, the
limit of the justice’s jurisdiction, and could never have recovered
any more in another suit, because he would not be allowed to
split a single cause of action. On the other hand, had he set up
the malpractice merely as a defense, and the claims of the defend-
ants for services were less than $15, the issue, involving a claim
of $5,000, would have been conclusively determined by the judg-
ment of the justice, from which neither party could appeal on
facts. \Ve concede that such considerations are not, in them-
selves, of any force, except as illustrating the inconvenience of
such a rule; but where it is open to the [*I24] court, upon princi-
ple, to choose between two rules, they are entitled to weight.
After starting out with the conceded proposition that a judg-
ment is conclusive of every fact necessary to uphold it, whether
the final determination is the result of litigation, or of a default
of one of the parties, the reasoning of those who advocate the
New York doctrine may be all summed up as follows: If the
services were of value, they could not have been useless; and. if
of use, they could not have been harmful; and, if not harmful,
there could not have been malpractice in the performance of
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point, on the ground that it was necessarily involved in the j udg- 1 
ment, although the issue was not expressly tendered and litigated .  
Frequently one learned in the law can reason out, to  h is  satisfac­
tion, that a particular point was necessarily involved in a j udg- f 
ment, when such a thing would never occur to the ordinary lay­
man. The present case is an illustration of the fact. \Vhatever 
conclusion hard logic would require, every one knows that, as a f 
matter of fact, the question of defendants' malpractice was not 
determined in their suits for services, and that the j udgments 
were in fact for the value of the services, irrespective of, and dis­
connected from, any claim for malpractice. 
The inconvenience of the New York rule, and its liability to 
work injustice, is further illustrated by the present case. It for·· 
n ishes an opportunity to create an estoppel by what may not un­
fairly be called a snap judgment. It is perhaps not uncharitable 
to surmise that this may have been the very object of defendants 
in bringing their actions in j ustice court. But, this aside, i f 
plaintiff had appeared and defended those actions, he would have 
been put to the alternative of alleging the malpractice as a mere 
defense, or of setting it up as a cross claim. In either case the 
j udgment would be a bar or estoppel on that issue. If he had 
adopted the latter course, he could only have recovered $100, the 
limit of the justice's jurisdiction, and could never have recovered 
any more in another suit, because he would not be allowed to 
split a single cause of action . On the other hand, had he set up 
the malpractice merely as a defense, and the claims of the defend­
ants for services were less than $ 1 5 , the issue, involving a claim 
of $s,ooo, would have been conclusively determined by the j udg­
ment of the j ustice, from which neither party could appeal on 
facts. \Ve concede that such considerations are not, in them­
selves, of any force, except as illustrating the inconvenience of  
such a rule ; but where it is open to the [ * 124]  court, upon princi­
ple, to choose between two rules, they are entitled to weight. 
A fter starting out with the conceded proposition that a j udg­
ment is conclusive of every fact necessary to uphold it, whether 
the final determination is the result of litigation, or of a default 
of one of the parties, the reasoning of those who advocate thf 
New York doctrine may be all summed up as follows : If tht 
services were of value, they could not have been useless ; and, i f  
of  use, they could not have been harmful ; and, i f  not harmful,  
there could not have been malpractice in the performance of 
them : therefore a j udgment that the services were of value nee· 
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essarily involved a determination that they were properly per-
formed ; and that such an adjudication is necessarily inconsistent
with the existence of a claim by the patient for damages for mal-
practice in their performance. See Blair v. Bartlett, supra, and
Dunham v. Bower, supra.
VVe cannot avoid feeling that this line of reasoning is more
technical and theoretical than practical. And, even if technically
‘sound, the doctrine of many of the adjudicated cases certainly
does not conform to it, as is illustrated in numerous suits between
vendor and vendee and employer and employee. The decisions
are too numerous to require citation, to the effect that in the case
of a sale of personal property, with a warranty of its quality, a
judgment in favor of the vendor for the purchase money (the
breach of warranty not having been interposed by way of defense
or counter—claim) is no bar to an action by the vendor for dam-
ages for breach of the warranty. We fail to see why the reason-
ing adopted in favor of the New York doctrine is not equally ap-
plicable to such a case; for, if the property was not as warranted.
the contract was broken, and the vendor was never entitled to
the full purchase price. It is no sufficient answer to say that the
warranty was itself a contract collateral to the contract of sale.
There is but one contract, and the warranty is one of its terms,
and not a separate and independent contract. Thompson. v. Lib-
b_v,.34 Minn. 374, 26 N. VV. I.
There are also numerous cases holding that a recovery by
an employee on a complaint for services rendered will not estop
the defendant employer from recovering damages sustained by
him through [*r25] the negligent or unskillful performance of
such services; such negligent acts not having been set up or liti-
gated in the action for the services. The following are a few of
the many cases which might be cited to that effect: Mandel v.
Steel, 8 M. & \-V. 858; Riggs v. Burbridge, 15 M. & VV. 598;
Davis v. Hedges, L. R. 6 Q. B. 687; Davenport v. Hubbard, 46
Vt. 200, 14 Am. Rep. 620; Mz'nmaugh v. Partlin-, 67 Mich. 391,
34 N. W. 717; Robinson v. Crownnzshield, I N. H. 76. Mr.
Freeman himself lays down this doctrine, and cites some of those
cases in its support. Freeman, Judgm. § 282.
In Schwinger v. Raymond, 83 N. Y. 192, 38 Am. Rep. 415,
the New York court of appeals held the same thing. It is true,
the court attempted to distinguish that case from Dunlzam V.
Bower, supra, on the ground that in the latter the carrier had
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essarily involved a determination that they were properly per-
. formed ; and that such an adjudication is necessarily inconsistent 
with the existence of a claim by the patient for damages for mal­
practice in their performance. See Blair v. Bartlett, supra, and 
Dunham v. Bower, supra. 
We cannot avoid feeling that this line of reasoning is more 
technical and theoretical than practical. And, even if technically -� sound, the doctrine of many of the adjudicated cases certainly 
does not conform to it, as is illustrated in numerous suits between 
vendor and vendee and employer and employee. The decisions 
are too numerous to require citation, to the effect that in the case 
of a sale of personal property, with a warranty of its quality, a 
j udgment in favor of the vendor for the purchase money ( the 
breach of warranty not having been interposed by way of defense 
or counter-claim) is no bar to an action by the vendor for dam­
ages for breach of the warranty. We fail to see why the reason­
ing adopted in favor of the New York doctrine is not equally ap­
plicable to such a case ; for, if the property was not as warranted, 
the contract was broken, and the vendor was never entitled to 
the full purchase price. It is no sufficient answer to say that the 
warranty was itself a contract collateral to the contract of sale. 
There is but one contract, and the warranty is one of its terms, 
and not a separate and independent contract. Thompson v. Lib­
b.'.\', · 34 Minn. 374, 26 N. W. I .  
There are also numerous cases holding that a recovery by 
an employee on a complaint for services rendered will not estop 
the defendant employer from recovering damages sustained by 
him through [ * 1 25 ]  the negligent or unskillful performance of 
such services ; such negligent acts not having been set · up or liti­
gated in the action for the services. The following are a few of 
the many cases which might be cited to that effect : Mom/el v. 
Steel, 8 M. & W. 858 ; Rigge v. Burbridge, 1 5  M. & \V. 5g8 ; 
Denis v. Hedges, L. R. 6 Q. B .  687 ; Davenport v. Hubbard, 46 
Vt. 200, 14 Am. Rep. 620 ; Mimna:re.gh v. Partlin, 67 Mich. 39 1 ,  
34 N.  W. 717 ; Robinson v. Crowninshield, 1 N.  H .  76. Mr. 
Freeman himself lays down this doctrine, and cites some of those 
cases in its support. Freeman , J udgm. § 282. 
In Sch'winger v. Raymond, 83 N. Y. 192, 38 Am. Rep. 415 ,  
the New York court of  appeals held the same thing. I t  is true, 
the court attempted to distinguish that case from Dunham v. 
Bo·wcr, supra, on the ground that in the latter the carrier had 
never performed his contract by transporting and delivering the 
. . 
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goods, which were wholly destroyed en route, while in the former
the carrier had performed by transporting and delivering the
goods, which were only damaged en route. But it is respectfully
suggested that the distinction is untenable on principle. In both
cases the contract was safely to carry and deliver the property,
and in neither was the contract performed. The difference in
breach was one of degree merely. '
The reasoning adopted in support of the New York doctrine
is equally applicable to all these cases; for it could be argued
that an adjudication that the employee was entitled to recover
for his services necessarily implied that he had performed them
properly, and according to the contract, which would be incon-
sistent with the existence of a claim in favor of the employer for
damages for the improper or negligent performance of the ser-
vices.
The reasoning usually adopted in opposition to the New York
doctrine is substantially as follows: That negligence or want of
skill in the performance of services, resulting in damages to the
employer, creates an affirmative cause of action in his favor, the
moment the negligent or unskillful act is committed; that this
cause of action, like every other one, carries with it the right of
the party to sue on it and put it into judgment in his own way;
that one cause of action cannot, in and of itself, when merged
in judgment, carry with it another cause of action, however
closely the two may be connected; that, where a defendant
has a cross claim, [*126] he may set it up as a defense or coun-
terclaim, but is not bound to do so, although the two causes of
action grow out of the same contract.
It would be impracticable, as well as unsafe, to define the pre-
cise limits of this doctrine, or to lay down any rule of universal
application; but, as applied to the present case (which was one in
tort, arising on contract), and others strictly analogous, we have
concluded that this doctrine is permissible on principle, and much
the safer, more convenient, and more equitable in practice.
Order afiirmcd.
Accord: Conly v. Scanlon (1906), Iowa, 109 N. W. 300; Lawson
v. Conaway (1892), 37 W. Va. 159, 16 S. E. 564, 18 L. R. A. 627; 38
Am. St. Rep. 17.
Recovery in an action for the price of a kitchen range was held
no bar to an action for negligent construction of it. Rigge v. Burbridge,
15 Meas. & Wels. 598, a leading case.
Recovery and satisfaction of a judgment for damages for malfeas-
ance of a contract to cut and stack hay, from which negligence the hay
spoiled, was held no bar to a suit for the contract price. Minnaugh v.
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goods, which were wholly destroyed en route, while in the former 
the carrier had performed by transporting and delivering the 
goods, which were only damaged en route. But it is respectfully 
suggested that the distinction is untenable on principle. In both 
cases the contract was safely to carry and deliver the property, 
and in neither was the contract performed. The difference in 
breach was one of degree merely. 
The reasoning adopted in support of the New York doctrine 
is equally applicable to all these cases ; for it could be argued � 
that an adjudication that the employee was entitled to recover 
for his services necessarily implied that he had performed them 
properly, and according to the contract, which would be incon- Afi.. 
sistent with the existence of a claim in favor of the employer for - r Q 
damages for the improper or negligent performance of the ser-
vices. 
The reasoning usually adopted in opposition to the New York 
doctrine is substantially as follows : That negligence or want of 
skill in the performance of services, resulting in damages to the 
employer, creates an affirmative cause of action in his favor, the 
moment the negligent or unskillful act is commiUed ; that this 
cause of action, like every other one, carries with it the right of 
the party to sue on it and put it into j udgment in his own way ; 
that one cause of action cannot, in and of itself, when merged 
in judgment, carry with it another cause of action, however 
closely the two may be connected ; that, where a defendant 
has a cross claim, [* 126] he may set it up as a defense or coun-
terclaim, but is not bound to do so, although the two causes of 
action grow out of the same contract. 
It would be impracticable, as well as unsafe, to define the pre­
cise limits of this doctrine, or to lay down any rule of universal 
application ; but, as applied to the present case (which was one in 
tort, arising on contract) ,  and others strictly analogous, we have 
concluded that this doctrine is permissible on principle, and much 
the safer, more convenient, and more equitable in practice. 
Order affirmed. 
Accord : Conly v. Scanlon ( 1906) , Iowa, 109 N. W. 300 ; Lawson 
v. Conaway ( 1�2) ,  37 W. Va. 159, 16 S. E. 564, 18 L. R. A. 627 ; JS 
Am. St. Rep. 17. 
Recovery in an action for the price of a kitchen range was held 
no bar to an action for negligent construction of it. Rigge v. Burbridge, 
15 Meas. & Weis. 598, a leading case. 
Recovery and satisfaction of a judgment for damages for malfeas­
ance of a contract to cut and stack hay, from which negligence the hay 
spoiled, was held no bar to a suit for the contract price. M innaugh v. 
Part/in ( 1887) ,  67 Mich. 391, 34 N. W. 717. 
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SCHWAN v. KELLY, in Pa. Sup. Ct., Jan. 6, 1896-173 Pa. St. 65, 33
At]. I107.
Bill by Schwan and others to have rescision of a mortgage
and other relief. Decree for defendants and plaintiffs appeal.
FELL, J. The vendees in a contract for the purchase of
land. claiming the right to rescind on the ground of fraud, ten-
dered a deed of reconveyance and demanded the repayment of
the part of the purchase money which they had paid. ‘The right
was denied by the vendors, who then caused a scire facias to issue
on the mortgage which had been given them by the vendees for
the unpaid balance of the purchase money. At the trial no de-
fense was interposed, and under the judgment obtained the prop-
erty was sold by the sheriff, and purchased by the plaintiffs in
that action. A bill subsequently filed by the vendees to rescind
the contract and to require the return of the purchase money was
dismissed by the court of common pleas on the ground that the
judgment on the scire facias was an adjudication of all matters
set up by the bill, and a bar to the proceedings.
The rule that what has been judicially determined shall not
again be made the subject of controversy extends to every ques-
tion in the proceedings which was legally cognizable, and applies
where a party has neglected the opportunity of trial, or has failed
to present his cause or defense in whole or in part under the mis-
taken belief that the matter would remain open and could be
made the subject of another proceeding. A verdict and the judg-
ment in a suit on a mortgage establish the fact that the debt is
due and preclude the defendant from setting up fraud as a de-
fense in an action on the bond, and are conclusive on this ground
in an action of ejectment for the land sold under the judgment:
Lewis v. Ncnscl, 38 Pa. 222. As are a former verdict and judg;
ment for plaintiff in replevin on an issue of rent in arrears con-
clusive in a subsequent action in assumpsit for the same rent:
Cist v. Zciglcr, 16 S. & R. 282, I6 Am. Dec. 573. So will the
failure in an action to recover for the nondelivery of goods pur-
chased estop the defendant in a suit for the price from denying
[*72l the delivery: White v. Reynolds, 3 P. & \V. 97. So also
a jiiflginent recovered against a physician for malpractice is a
bar to a subsequent action by him for services in the course of
which the malpractice occurred: I5 Barb. 67. The same princi-
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SCHWAN v. KELLY, i n  Pa. Sup. Ct., Jan. 6, 1896-173 Pa. St. 65, 33 
Atl. 1 107. 
Bill  by Schwan and others to have rescision of a mortgage 
and other relief. Decree for de fendants and plaintiffs appeal. 
FELL, J. The vendees in a contract for the purchase n f  
land .  d;\ iming the right to rescind on the ground of fraud,  ten­
dered a deed of reconveyance and demanded the repayment of 
the part of the purchase money which they had oaid . · ThP riP"ht 
was nf':nied by the vendors, who then caused a scire f acias to issue 
on the mortgage which had been given them by the vendees for 
the unpaid balance of the purchase money. At the trial no de­
fense was interposed, and under the judgment obtained the prop­
erty was sold by the sheriff, and purchased by the plaintiffs in 
that action. A bill subsequently filed by the vendees to rescind 
the contract and to require the return of the purchase money was 
d ismissed by the court of common pleas on the ground that the 
j udgment on the scire facias was an adjud ication of all matters 
set up by the bill, and a bar to the proceedings . 
The rule that what has been j udicially determined shall not 
again be made the subject of controversy extends to every ques­
tion in the proceedings which was legally cogn izable , and appl ies 
where a party has neglected the opportun i ty of trial , or  has failed 
to present his cause or defense in whole or in  part under the mis­
taken belief that the matter would remain open and could be 
made the subj ect of another proceeding. A verdict and the j udg­
ment in a suit on a mortgage establ ish the fact that the debt i:; 
due and preclude the defendant from sett ing up fraud as a de­
fense in an action on the bond, and are conclusive on th is  ground 
in an action of ej ectment for the land sold under the j udgment : 
Lc·u.:is v. N cn::cl, 38 Pa. 222.  As are a former verdict and j udi�­
ment for plaint iff in replevin on an issue of rent in arrears co1 1-
cl usivc i n  a subsequent action in assumpsit for the same rem : 
Cist v. Zeigler, 1 6  S. & R. 282, 16  Am. Dec . 573. So wil l  the 
fai lure in an action to recover for the nondelivery of goons pur­
chased estop the defendant in a suit for the price from denyiug 
[ * 72 l the del ivery : TVhite v. Reynolds, 3 P. & \V. 97. So al:;o 
a j tictgment recovered against a phys ician for malpractice is  a 
har to a subsequent action by him for serv ices i n  the course uf 
which the malpractice occurred : I 5 Barb . 67. The same princi­
ple controlled the decisions in H a11cma11  v. Pile, 1 6 1  Pa. 599 ; 
v 
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Bicrer v. Hurst; 162 Pa. I, and Wilson v. Buchanan, I70 Pa. 14,
where questions which had been decided on the merits at law
were presented on the same grounds in equity.
In these cases and many others depending upon the same
principle the precise question had either been decided by a court
of competent jurisdiction or the judgment in the first suit had
negatived by implication the foundation of the second. Gener-
ally the estoppel extends to any allegation which was at issue and
determined in the course of the proceedings which went to estab-
lish or disprove either the plaintiff’s case or that set up by the
defendants Stevens v. Hughes, 31 Pa. 381; Beloit v. Morgan, 7
W’ all. 618.
But a judgment is not evidence of any matter which comes
collaterally into question, or which is incidentally cognizable, or’
which is to be inferred by argument from it: Duchess of Kings-
t0n’s Case, II State Trials, 261. The conclusive effect of a judi-
cial decision cannot be extended by argument or implication to
matters not actually heard and determined, nor to collateral ques-
tions which arise but do not become part of the case: Hibshman
v. Dulleban, 4 Watts, 183; Martin v. Gernandt, 19 Pa. I24; Kel-
sey v. Murphy, 26 Pa. 78; Tams v. Lewis, 42 Pa. 402; Schriver
v. Ecleenrode, 87 Pa. 2I3. The estoppel of a former adjudication
will extend only so far as the subject-matter of the second suit
is substantially the same as that of the first, and may be binding
on some points while leaving others open to controversy. Notes
to Doe v. Oliver, 2 Smith’s Leading Cases, 763. In order to ren-
der a judgment effectual as a bar it must appear that the cause
of action is the same in substance and can be sustained by the
same evidence; and as between courts of law and courts of equity
the rule does not apply to cover the whole ground, nor where
questions falling within the exclusive province of equity are in-
volved.
The learned editors of \Vhite and Tudor’s Leading Cases in
Equity in.the notes to the Earl of O.rford’s Case, p. I372, 4th
[*73] Am. ed. citing Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Peters 240, say: “To
render the adjudication of one court conclusive in another the
jurisdiction of the former tribunal must be broad enough to cover
the whole ground and leave no essential point untouched and open
for consideration. Hence, even when a defense is legally cogniz-
able and might have been received in a court of law. it may be
requisite to consider whether it could have been made fully and

















































































































































F.ffl!CT OF J UDGMENT AS n,\n OR ESTOPPT•:r. 27 r 
B ierer v. Hltrst; 162 Pa. 1 ,  and W£/soii v. Buchanan, 1 70 Pa. 14, 
where quest ions which had been decided on the merits at law 
were presented on the same grounds in equity. 
In these cases and many others depending upon the same 
principle the precise question had either been decided by a court 
o f  competent j urisdiction or the j udgment in the first suit had 
negatived by implication the foundation of the second. Gener­
ally the estoppel extends to any allegation which was at issue and 
determined in the course of the proceedings which went to estab­
l ish or disprove either the plaintiff's case or that set up by the 
defendants Stevens v. Hughes, 3 1  Pa. 38 1 ; Beloit v. Morgan, 7 
\-Vall. 6 1 8. 
But a j udgment is not evidence of any matter which comes 
collaterally into question, or which i s  incidentally cognizable, or � 
which is to be inferred by argument from it : Duchess of Kings­
ton's Case, I I  State Trials, 26 1 .  The conclusive effect of a j udi­
cial d<:cision cannot be extended by argument or impl ication to 
matte r;;  not actually heard and determined, nor to collateral ques­
tions which arise but do not become part of the case : Hibshman 
v. D11l!cban, 4 vVatts, 1 83 ; .Martin v. Gerna11dt, 1 9  Pa. 1 24 ;  Kel­
sey v. ;.\furphy, 26 Pa. 78 ;  Tams v. LC7.vis, 42 Pa. 402 ; Schriver 
v. Eckenrode, 87 Pa. 2 1 3. The estoppel of a former adjudication 
will extend only so far as the subject-matter of the second suit 
is  substantially the same as that of the first, and may be binding 
on some points while leaving others open to controversy. Notes 
to Doe v. Oli7.•cr, 2 Smith's Leading Cases, 763. In order to ren­
der a judgment effectual as a bar it must appear that the cause 
oi action is the same in substance and can be sustained by the • 
same evidence ; and as between comts of law and courts of equity 
the rule does not apply to cover the whole ground, nor where 
questions falling within the exclusive province of equity are in­
volved. 
The learned editors of \Vhite and Tudor's Leading Cases in 
Equity in . the notes to the Earl of Oxford's Case, p. 1 372, 4th 
[*73] Am. ed. citing Bo3•cc v. Grund31, 3 Peters 240, say : "To 
render the adj udication of one court conclusive in another the 
j urisdiction of the former tribunal must be broad enough to cover 
the whole ground an<l leave no essential point untouche<l and open 
for consideration. Hence, even when a defense i s  legally cogniz­
able and might have heen received in a court of law, i t  may be 
req uisite to consider whether it could have been made folly and 
effectually : and if it could not. recourse mav still be had to chan-.. 
� 
... 
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cery for a larger measure of relief than the law affords. That
an action has been brought on a contract for the sale of land, and
a judgment recovered against the vendee for an installment of
the purchase money, will not therefore necessarily preclude him
from filing a bill to have the execution of the judgment stayed
and the amount paid or collected under it refunded, and the whole
contract set aside as fraudulent; because although the fraud
might have been pleaded or given in evidence as a defense to the
action it would have only been an answer to the stipulation or
covenant on which the suit was brought, and the defendant
would still have been obliged to seek relief in chancery.” In
Boyce v. Gmnd-_v, supra, a bill was filed to enjoin the collection
of a judgment at law for the purchase money of land and to re-
scind the contract on the ground of fraud. In the opinion of the
court it is said that the defense of fraud might have been resorted
to, yet it was obviously not an adequate remedy because it was a
partial one, and the defendant would still have been left to re-
new the contest upon a series of suits.
The proceeding on the mortgage was after notice by the
vendees of the intention to rescind the contract on the ground
of misrepresentation, and after the necessary steps preliminary
to a resort to equity had been taken, by the tender of a deed and
a demand for repayment. There was no ground consistent with
this position on which a defense could have been made at the trial.
The verdict and judgment on the scire facias determined the
amount due on the mortgage, but left untouched matters in dis-
pute which were not, and could not have been, adjudicated. __A____
(ljfi-1l$L2.L_Lh§_L1§Ll!L0lJlLLllflyLl£3_Il_li11]ll§f_Cl _¥9lll";_q1_19$t.i0n at .
issue, and if successfully’ made could not have resulted in_m'ore
than relief to the mortgagors from the pay_ment_ of the balance of
thE"1>'FY'CE'_5T<1_€;.@_<1“b5' _ 31¢ '_fl<_)_r.t_g_ég§s '1;1_@_rcme<1y V [i“.Zetl__ §O1.1ght
by_th‘e#‘bil1 is distinct from this and of a much wider scope. 1t/
i§’tl_1e_cance_ll_atjon_of the agreement .and._1'.he_repayme11t of the
money paid. These are matters which come within the peculiar
pro_v‘ific’e‘T)f equity. Ih_ey_were not cogni_zab_le in the former ac-
tion, and they are now open for adjudicationin a tribunal which
alfords 'a"wider measure of ‘relief aingd where an adequate remedy .
-may be Obtained.
Some complications which may arise hereafter would have
been avoided if the bill had been filed before the trial and a stay
of proceedings had until the question of rescission had been de-
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the judgment obtained on the scire facias is a bar to the equitable
relief sought by the bill. Vl/e are of opinion that it is not.
The assignments of error are sustained and the order dis-
missing the bill is reversed and set aside, and the record is re-
mitted to the court of common pleas for further proceedings.
Who Are Privies and How Far Bound.
SCHULER v. FORD, in Idaho Sup. Ct., March 11, I9o5—1o Idaho 739,
80 Pac. 219, 109 Am. 'St. Rep. 233.
Action by Schuler et al. against Ford et al. for a mining
claim. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs appeal.
A1Ls111E, J. The only question necessary for our determina-
tion in this case is whether or not the defendant Ford was bound
by the judgment of the \Vashington court of February 16, 1900,
in the case of Toklas et al. v. Wirtz et al. Before considering
that question, it should be observed that the contract under which
Ford acquired his interest in the property was entered into prior
to the commencement of the action in the Washington court,
and his entry into possession of the property was also prior to that
date. It is also a conceded fact in this case that the plaintiffs
in the action commenced in the \~’Vashington court had actual no-
tice of the interest claimed in the property by Ford as well as the
constructive notice which was imparted by his [*746] possession
of the property at that time. It is admitted, on the other hand, by
Ford’s counsel, that he is not a bona fide purchaser within the
meaning of the law of the interest claimed by him, for the rea-
son that he had not made full payanent of the purchase price prior
to the commencement of that action. '
The general rule of law applicable to a case of this kind is
stated by Black on Judgments, vol. 2, § 549 as follows:-“It is
well settled that a judgment is conclusive not only upon those who
were actual parties to the litigation, but also upon all persons
who are in privity with them.” This we understand to be the
correct rule of law upon the subject. There is no question in this
case but that the appellant Ford was~not a party to the action
wherein the judgment and decree was obtained in the \Nashington
court. The only question therefore remaining to be determined
is, was he a privy to the judgment or in privity with the defend-
ant VVirtz in that action? Freeman on Judgments, vol. I, § 162
(4th ed.), in discussing the question as to who are parties privy,
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the j udgment obtained on the scire facias is a bar to the equitable 
relief sought by the bill .  \Ve are of opinion that it is not. 
The assignments of error are sustained and the order dis· 
missing the bill is reversed and set aside, and the rec:ord is re­
mitted to the court of common pleas for further proceedings. 
Who Are Privies and How Far Bound. 
SCHULER v. FORD, in Idaho Sup. Ct., March 1 1, 1905-10 Idaho 739, 
8o Pac. 219, 109 Am. •St. Rep. 233. 
Action by Schuler et al. against Ford et al. for a mining 
claim. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. 
AILSH IE, J. The only question necessary for our determina­
tion in this case is  whether or not the defendant Ford was bound 
by the judgment of the Washington court of February 16, 1goo, 
in the case of Toklas et al. v. Wirtz et al. Before considering 
that question, it should be observed that the contract under which 
Ford acquired his interest in the property was entered into prior 
to the conunencement of the action in the Washington court, 
and his entry into possession of the property was also prior to that 
<late. It is also a conceded fact in this case that the plaintiff's 
in the action commenced in the Washington court had actual no­
tice of the interest claimed in the pr.operty by Ford as well as the 
constructive notice which was imparted by his [*746] possession 
of the property at that time. I t  is admitted, on the other hand, by 
Ford's counsel, that he is not a bona fide purchaser within the 
meaning of the law of the interest claimed by him, for the rea­
son that he had not made full payment of the purchase price prior 
to the commencement of that action: · 
The general rule of law applicable to a case of this kind is 
stated by Black on Judgments, vol . 2, § 549 as follows : ·  "It is r 
well settled that a j udgment is conclusive not only upon those who 
were actual parties to the l i tigation , but also upon all persons 
who are in privity with them." This we understand to be the 
correct rule of law upon the subject. There is no question in this 
case but that the appellant Ford was - not a party to the action 
wherein the j udgment and decree was obtained in the Washington 
court. The only question therefore remaining to be determined 
is, was he a privy to the j udgment or in privity with the defend­
ant \Virtz in that action ? Freeman on Judgments, vol. I ,  § 162 
(4th ed . ) , in discussing the question as to who are parties privy, 
says : "It is well understood, though not usu?.l ly stated in ex-
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press terms in works upon the subject, that no one is privy to a
judgment whose succession to the rights of property thereby
affected occurred previously to the institution of the suit.” In
24 A. 8: E. Enc. Law (2d ed.) 746, it is said: “Every person is
privy to a judgment or decree who has succeeded to an estate or
interest held‘ by one who was a party to such judgment or decree,
if the succession occurred after the bringing of the action. But '
in order that privity shall exist, the succession must have occurred
after the institution of the suit. One who succeeded to the right
of property of a party prior to that time is not in privity with him,
and is not concluded by the judgment.” Dull v. Blackman, 169
U. S. 243 18 S. Ct. 333. In Shay v. McNamara, 54 Cal. 174, the
court in determining whether certain parties were privy to a
judgment which had been introduced against them, said: “This
was the origin of whatever interest the Johnsons acquired under
the Kellys, and having originated before the commenement of the
suit of [*747] Morgans v. Kelly, it follows that they are un-
affected by the judgment in that case, for only those are privies
whose interest in the subject-matter of the suit originated sub-
sequent to its commencement.” ‘Weed Seteirzg-machine CO. V.
Baker, 40 Fed. 56, was an action in some respects similar to the
one under consideration, and it was there held that: “A party in
possession of land, claiming an interest as purchaser under a
contract to purchase, is not in privity with his grantor. On the
contrary, his claim is adverse to his grantor, and it must follow
that he is not bound by a decree against the latter in a case to
which he was not made a party, and rendered in a suit commenced
after he purchased and took possession.” In Seymour v. Wallace,
121 Mich. 402, 80 N. VV. 242, the supreme court of Michigan, in
determining to what extent a party was bound by a judgment to
which he was not made a party, quoted with approval from C ales
v. Allen, 64 Ala. 105, the following language: “No alignee,
grantee, or assignee is bound or affected by a judgment or ‘de-
cree rendered in a suit commenced against the alienor, grantor,
or assignor subsequent to the alienation. grant, or assignment,
for the plain reason that otherwise his rights of property could be
devested without his consent, and the fraud or laches of the
grantor could work a forfeiture of estates he had created by
the most solemn conveyances. VVhatever may be the force and
effect of the judgment or decree against the grantor, if it is
sought to be used to the prejudice of the grantee, there must
be independent, distinct evidence of the facts which authorized
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press terms · in works upon the subject, that no Me is privy to a 
1 j udgment whose succession to the rights of property thereby 
affected occurred previously to the institution of the suit." In 
24 A. & E. Enc. Law (2d ed. ) 746, it is said : "Every person i� 
privy to a judgment or decree who has succeeded to an estate or 
interest held by one who was a party to such judgment or decree, 
if the succession occurred after the bringing of the action. But 
in order that privity shall exist, the succession must have occurred ' 
after the institution of the suit. One who succeeded to the right 
of property of a party prior to that time is not in privity with him, 
and is not concluded by the j udgment." Dull v. Blackman: 169 
U. S. 243 1 8  S. Ct. 333. In SIUJty v. McNomara, 54 Cal. 174, the 
court in determining whether certain parties were privy to a 
j udgment which had been introduced against them, said : "This 
was the origin of whatever interest the Johnsons acquired under 
the Kellys, and having originated before the commenement of the 
suit of [*747] Morgans v. Kelly, it follows that they are un­
affected by the j udgment in that case, for only those are privies 
whose
· 
interest in the subject-matter of the suit originated sub­
sequent to its commencement." ·Weed Sewing-machine C(). v. 
Raker, 40 Fed. 56, was an action 1n some respects similar to the 
one under consideration , and it was there held that : "A party in 
possession of land, claiming an interest as purchaser under a 
contract to purchase, is not in privity with his grantor. On the 
contrary, his claim is adverse to his grantor, and it must follow 
that he is not bound by a decree against the latter in a case to 
which he was not made a party, and rendered in a suit commenced 
after he purchased and took possession." In Seymour v. Wallace, 
1 2 1  Mich. 402, 8o N. W. 242 , the supreme court of Michigan , in 
determining to what extent a party was bound by a judgment tc 
wh ich he was not made a party, quoted with approval from Coles 
v. Allen, 64 Ala. 1 05 , the following language : " No ali£nee, 
grantee, or assignee is bound or affected by a judgment or .de­
cree rendered in a suit commenced against the alienor, grantor, 
or assignor subsequent to the alienation, grant, or assignment, 
for the plain reason that otherwise his rights of property could be 
devested without his consent, and the fraud or !aches of the 
grantor could work a forfeiture of estates he had created by 
the most solemn conveyances. Whatever may be the force and 
effect of the j udgment or decree against the grantor, if it is 
sought to be used to the prej udice of the grantee, there must 
be independent, distinct evidence of the facts which authorized 
its rend ition. " Stone v. Stone, 1 79 Mass. 555, 61 N. E. 268 ; 
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Hart v. Moulton, 104 Wis. 349, 80 N. W. 599; Cypreanson v.
Barge, 112 Wis. 260, 87 N. W. I081; Sorenson v. So-renson,
(Ncb.), 98 N. \V. 837.
The judgment in Toklas v. W'irtz et al., having been rendered
by a court which had no jurisdiction over the property situated
in this state, became merely a judgment in personam, and was
only binding upon those reached by personal service. Freeman
v. Anderson, 119 U. S. 185, 7 S. Ct. 165; Dull v. Blackman, 169
U. S. 243, 18 S. Ct. 333; Pe‘nn0_ver v. Neff, 95 U. S. 723
[*748] The plaintiff in the.Washington court, appreciating this
fact, dismissed his suit as to Ford and all other defendants on
whom he failed to get personal service. The “full faith and
credit” commanded by section I of article 4 of the federal con-
stitution to be given by each state to the judicial proceedings of
every other state does not mean that such proceedings shall be
given any greater faith and credit in a sister state than they
would be accorded in the state where taken. If the judgment
of Toklas v. \Virtz had been rendered in this state, and the in—
terest claimed by Ford had been acquired subsequent to the entry
of that judgment, or subsequent to the filing of a lis pendens in
the proper office, then Ford would be a party privy to VVirtz his
grantor, and bound by the judgment. The judgment, we appre-
hend would have had the same effect in \Vashington had the
property been situated in that state. But when Ford secured his
contract and entered into the possession of the premises, no action
was pending. After \/Virtz had contracted to part with his
title, he might have lost interest in defending a title which he had
agreed to part with; and especially would this be true where but
little remained due on the contract price, and the grantor was
thriftless and execution proof against any possible judgment for
damages. In the latter case the law will not leave open so wide
a door for fraud and injustice but will allow the party acquiring
such property right his day in court to contest the claim on
which a recovery is sought. The right acquired by Ford under
his contract of July 17, 1897, became a property right; but under
the contract for purchase, Ford did not become a party privy to
an action subsequently instituted against his grantor, and to
which he was not made a party.
There was no error in the conclusion reached by the trial
judge, and the judgment will therefore be afiirmed. Costs
awarded to respondents.
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/fart v. Jf ou/ton, 1 04 vVis. 349, 8o N. W. 599 ; Cypreanson v .  
Berge, r 1 2 Wis.  200, 87 N. W. r n8 r ; Sorenson v .  Sorenson, 
( Neb. ) ,  g8 N. W. 837. 
The judgment in Toklas v. \Virtz et al. , having been rendered 
hy a court which had no jurisdiction over the property situated 
in this state, became merely a judgment in personam, and was 
only binding upon those reached by personal service. Freeman 
v. Anderson, r 19 U. S. 185 ,  7 S. Ot. 1 65 ; Dull v. Blackman, 1 69  
U .  S.  243, 18  S .  Ct. 333 ; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95  U. S. 723 
[*748] The plaintiff in the Washington court, appreciating this 
fact, d ismissed his suit as to Ford and all other defendants on  
whom he  failed to get personal service. The "full faith and 
credit" commanded by section I of article 4 of the federal con­
stitution to be given by each state to the judicial proceedings of 
every other staote does not mean that such proceedings shall be 
given any greater faith and credit in a sister state than they 
would be accorded in the state where taken. If the judgment 
of Toklas v. \Virtz had been rendered in this state, and the in­
terest claimed by Ford had been acquired subsequent to the entry 
of that j udgment, or subsequent to the filing of a lis pendens in 
the proper office, then Ford would be a party privy ·to Wirtz his 
grantor, and bound ·by the judgment. The judgment, we appre­
hend would have had the same effect in \Vashington had the 
property been s ituated in that state. But when Ford secured his� 
contract and entered into the possession of the premises, no action 
was· pending. After vVirtz had contracted to part with his 
title, he might have lost interest in defending a title which he had 
agreed to part with ; and especially would this be true where but 
little remained due on the contract price, and the grantor wa::, 
thriftless and execution proof against any possible j udgment for 
damages. In the latter case the law will not leave open so wide 
a door for fraud and inj ustice but will allow the party acquiring 
such property right his day in court to contest the claim on 
\Vhich a recovery is sought. The right acquired by Ford under 
his contract of July 17, 1 897, became a property right ; but under 
the contract for purchase, Ford did not become a party privy to 
an action subsequently instituted against his grantor, and to 
which he was �ot made a party. 
There was no error in the conclusion reached by the trial 
judge, and the j udgment will therefore be affirmed. Costs 
awarded to respondents. 
STOCKSLAGF.R_. c. J. , and SULLIVAN', J. ,  concur. ' 
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RODINI v. LYTLE, in Mont. Sup. Ct., Jan. 27, I896—17 Mont. 448, 43
Pac. 501, 52 L. R. A. 165.
Action against a constable and the sureties on his official
bond. Demurrer by defendants sustained, and complainant ap-
peals.
D13 VVITT, J. The question raised upon this appeal is. what
is the effect, upon the sureties on the official bond, of a judgment
[*45o] rendered against their principal? There is a direct conflict
in the authorities upon this question. (2 Black on Judgments,
§ 588; Mechem on Public Officers, § 290; Brandt on Suretyship
and Guaranty, § 637, and cases collected and reviewed in these
text books. It is held by many courts that, when a bond is given
to the effect that a principal will do a certain act,—as, for instance,
pay a certain sum of money, or satisfy a judgment,—then the
sureties are bound that he shall do such act; and the judgment
against the principal is conclusive against the sureties. But that
is not this case, and that question need not here be treated. The
bond here was not for the performance of a specific act, but it
was for general good and faithful conduct. It is as to judgments
against principals who have given bonds of this nature—that is,
official bonds of sheriffs and constables—that the difference of
opinions among the authorities exists, and which difference we
shall now note.
One line of authorities holds that the judgment against the
principal is conclusive against the sureties. The courts holding
this view are very few, although among them is one wholly re-
spectable tribunal. The second view held is that the judgment
against the principal is prima facie evidence against the sureties.
The third rule laid down by the authorities is that the judgment
against the principal is no evidence at all against the sureties, and
that, to hold the sureties for the misfeasance of the principal, the
facts of the misfeasance must be proved in an action in which the
sureties are defendants. These two latter rules are sustained by
probably a nearly equal number of respectable courts.
The question being a new one with us, and the authorities
being divided, we shall proceed to decide the matter upon what
appears to us to be the most reasonable principle. '
The case of Pico v. Webster, 14 Cal. 203, is a leading case.
VV e find it cited by all text writers, and in many_ of the opinions.
Its reasoning appeals to us so strongly that we quote from it
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ROD I N I  v. LYTLE, in Mont. Sup. Ct., Jan. 27, 18g6-17 Mont. 448, 43 
Pac. 501, 52 L. R. A. 165. 
Action against a constable and the sureties on his official 
bond. Demurrer by defendants sustained, and complainant ap­
peals. 
DE \V1TT, J. The question raised upon this appeal is. what 
is the effect, upon the sureties on the official bond, of a j udgment 
[ * 450] rendered against their principal ? There is a direct conflict 
in the authorities upon this question. (2 Black on Judgments, 
§ 588 ; Mechem on Public Officers, § 290 ; Brandt on Suretyship 
and Guaranty, § 637, and cases collected and reviewed in these 
text books. It  is held by many courts that, when a bond is given 
to the effect that a principal will do a certain act,-as, for instance, 
pay a certain sum of money, or satisfy a j udgment,-then the 
sureties are bound that he shall do such act ; and the judgment 
against the principal is conclusive against the sureties. But that 
is not this case, and that question need not here be treated. The 
bond here was not for the performance of a specific act, but it 
was for general good and faithful conduct. It is as to j udgments 
against principals who have given bonds of this nature-that is, 
official bonds of sheriffs and constables-that the difference of 
opinions among the authorities exists, and which difference we 
shall now note. 
One l ine of authorities holds that the j udgment against the 
principal is conclusive against the sureties. The courts holding 
this view are very few, although among them is one wholly re­
spectable tribunal. The second view held is that the judgment 
against the principal is prima f acie evidence against the sureties. 
The third rule laid down by the authorities is that the judgment 
against the principal is no evidence at all against the sureties, and 
that, to hold the sureties for the misfeasance of the principal , the 
facts of the misfeasance must be proved in an action in which the 
sureties are defendants. These two latter rules are sustained by 
robably a nearly equal number of respectable courts. 
The question being a new one with us, and the authorities 
being divided, we shall proceed to decide the matter upon what 
appears to us to be the most reasonable principle. · 
The case of Pico v. Webster, 14  Cal. 203, is a leading case. 
\Ve find it cited by all text writers, and in many. of the opinions. 
Its reason ing appeals to us so strongly that we quote from it 
somewhat at length : "This suit was brought on the official bond 
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of the defendant, WVebster, who was sheriff of San Joaquin coun-
ty, against Webster and his sureties. The [*451] suit was brought
to recover damages for the levy by VVebster on property of plain-
tiff, which levy was made under color of process. Suit was
brought against Webster for the trespass involved in this levy
and seizure, and judgment recovered against him before the in-
stitution of this suit. The record of this recovery was offered as
evidence by the plaintiff on the trial. The defendants offered to
prove, on their part, that Webster was not guilty of the trespass
complained of, and that the property seized was not the property
of the plaintiff here. But the court refused to admit the testi-
mony, upon the ground that the judgment against the sheriff was
conclusive of all the facts passed upon and decided by the record.
To this ruling the defendants excepted, and now present it for
review here on appeal. There is no little conflict in the cases
on this subject. There can be no doubt that, when a surety
undertakes, for the principal, that the principal shall do a specific
act, to be ascertained in a given way,-—as, that he will pay a judg-
ment,—that the judgment is conclusive against the surety; for
the obligation is express that the principal will do this thing, and
the judgment is conclusive of the fact and extent of the obliga-
tion. As the surety in such cases stipulates without regard to
notice to him of the proceedings to obtain the judgment, his lia-
bility is, of course, independent of any such fact. Train v. Gold,
5 Pick 380; Lincoln v. Blanchard, I7 Vt. 474. See, also, Riddle
v. Baker, I3 Cal. 295. It is upon this ground that the liability of
a bail is fixed absolutely by the judgment against the principal.
But this rule rests upon the terms of the contract. In the case of
oflicial bonds, the sureties undertake, in general terms, that the
principal will perform his official duties. They do not agree to
be absolutely bound by any judgment obtained against him for
official misconduct, nor to pay every such judgment. They are
only held for a breach of their own obligations. It is a general
principle that no party can be so held without an opportunity to
be heard in defense. This right is not divested by the fact that
another party has defended on the cause of action and been unsuc-
cessful. As the sureties did not stipulate [*452] that they would
abide by the judgment against the principal, or permit him to con-
duct the defense and be themselves responsible for the result of
it, the fact that the principal has unsuccessfully defended has no
effect on their rights. They have a right to contest with the
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of the defendant, Webster, who was sheriff of San Joaquin coun-
ty, against Webster and his sureties. The [*45 1 ]  suit was brought 
to recover damages for the levy by Webster on property of plain-
tiff, which levy was made under color of process. Suit was 
brought against Webster for the trespass involved in this levy 
and seizure, and j udgment recovered against him before the in­
stitution of this suit. The record of this recovery was offered as 
evidence by the plaintiff on the trial. The defendants offered to 
prove, on their part, that Webster was not guilty of the trespass 
complained of, and that the property seized was not the property 
of  the plaintiff here. But the court refused to admit the testi­
mony, upon the ground that the judgment against the sheriff was 
conclusive of all the facts passed upon and decided by the record. 
To this ruling the defendants excepted, and now present it for 
review here on appeal. There is no little conflict in the cases 
on this subj ect. There can be no doubt that, when a surety 
undertakes, for the principal, that the principal shall do a specific ....., 
act, to be ascertained in a given way,-as, that he will pay a j udg­
ment,-that the judgment is conclusive against the surety ; for 
the obligation is express that the principal will do this thing, and 
the judgment is conclusive of the fact and extent of the obliga­
tion. As the surety in such cases stipulates without regard to 
notice to him of the proceedings to obtain the judgment, his lia­
bility is, of course, independent of any such fact. Train v. Gold, 
5 Pick 38o ; Lincoln v. Blanchard, 17  Vt. 474. See, also, Riddle 
v. Baker, 1 3  Cal. 295. It is upon this ground that the liability of 
a bail is fixed absolutely by the judgment against the principal. 
But this rule rests upon the terms of the contract. In the case of 
official bonds, the sureties undertake, in general terms, that the 
principal will perform his official duties. They do not agree to 
be absolutely bound by any judgment obtained against him for 
official misconduct, nor to pay every such judgment. They are 
only held for a breach of their own obligations. It is a general 
principle that no party can be so held without an opportunity to 
be heard in defense. This right is not divested by the fact that 
another party has def ended on the cause of action and been unsuc­
cessful. As the sureties did not stipulate [*452] that they would 
abide by the j udgment against the principal , or permit him to con� 
duct the defense and be themselves responsible for the result of 
it, the fact that the principal has unsuccessfully defended has no 
effect on their rights. They have a right to contest with the 
plaintiff the question of their liability, for to hold that they are 
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concluded from this contestation by the suit against the sheriff
is to hold that they undertook, for him, that they would be re-
sponsible for any judgment against him which might be rendered
by accident, negligence, or error, instead of merely stipulatin
that they would be responsible for his official conduct. The au
thorities which sustain this view are numerous. In MrKell
Bowel], 4 Hawks 34, a decree against the administrator of
guardian was held not to be evidence against the sureties of the
guardian, to charge them with the amount which was recovered
against the estate for unfaithful administration of the trust. Mun-
ford v. Overseers, 2 Rand. (Va.) 313, went a little further hold-
ing that a judgment against the sheriff was no estoppel against
him in an action on the bond against him and his sureties. It
seems to be held there that no recovery could be had against the
principal, because he was not liable jointly with the sureties, and
that the record of the judgment would be only Prima facie evi-
dence against the sureties. Beall v. Beck, 3 Har. & McH. 242,
is to the same effect. Douglass v. Howlwnd, 24 Wend. 35, is a
leading case. The authorities are reviewed by Mr. Justice Cowan
with his usual learning. That case was covenant, brought by the
plaintiff against the surety on an obligation, by the principal, to
account and pay over such sum as shall be found to be owing by
him, and the surety covenanted that the party thus agreeing ‘shall
perform the agreement.’ A decree in chancery against the prin-
cipal was offered. The decree was on a bill filed to compel an
account. Held, that it was no evidence against the surety, unless
he had notice of the suit, and an opportunity to defend in the
name of the principal. Many authorities are cited by the learned
judge, who concludes that the surety’s obligation was to pay over
a balance due, not that he should abide by a judgment at law, or
decree in chancery, for not accounting.” [*453]
The doctrine of this case is reafiirmed in Irwin V. Backus,
25 Cal. 214, in which case, however, it was also held, as in I4
Cal. 203, that administrators’ bonds are exceptions to the rule an-
nounced. See, further, in the opinion in Pica v. Webster, for a
review of the cases. The rule was also originally held in Pennsyl-
vania in Carmack v. Com., 5 Bin. 184. A departure from the rule
was made in that state in Masscr v. Strickland, 17 Serg. 82 R. 354.
This departure, however, was in the face of an able protest on the
part of Chief Justice Gibson, as noted in Pico v. I/Vcbstcr, ‘[4 (‘al.,
at page 206. See dissenting opinion of Gibson, C. ]., I7 Serg. &
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concluded from this contestation by the suit against the sheriff 
is to hold that they undertook, for him, that they would be re­
sponsible for any j udgment against him which might be rendered 
by accident, negligence, or error, instead of merely stipulatin 
that they would be responsible for his official conduct. The au 
thorities which sustain this view are numerous. In Af cKell 
Bowell, 4 Hawks 34, a decree against the administrator of 
guardian was held not to be evidence against the sureties of the 
guardian, to charge them with the amount which was recovered 
against the estate for unfaithful administration of the trust. Mun­
f ord v. O·vcrscers, 2 Rand. ( Va.) 313, went a little further hold­
ing that a judgment against the sheriff was no estoppel against 
him in an action on the bond against him and his sureties. It 
seems to be held there that no recovery could be had against the 
principal, because he was not liable jointly with the sureties, and 
that the record of the judgment would be only prima facie evi­
dence against the sureties. Beall v. Beck, 3 Har. & McH. 242, 
is to the same effect. Do1iglass v. Howlatid, 24 Wend. 35, is a 
leading case. The authorities are reviewed by Mr. Justice Cowan 
with his usual learning. That case was covenant, brought by the 
plaintiff against the surety on an obligation, by the principal, to 
account and pay over such sum as shall be found to be owing by 
him, and the surety covenanted that the party thus agreeing 'shall 
perform the agreement.' A decree in chancery against the prin­
cipal was offered. The decree was on a bill filed to compel an 
account. Held, that it was no evidence against the surety, unless 
he had notice of the suit, and an opportunity to def end in the 
name of the principal. Many authorities are cited by the learned 
judge, who concludes that the surety's obligation was to pay over 
a balance due, not that he should abide by a judgment at law, or 
decree in chancery, for not accounting." [*453] 
The doctrine of this case is reaffirmed in Irwin v. Backus, 
25 Cal. 214, in which case, however, it was also held, as in 14 
Cal. 203, that administrators' bonds are exceptions to the rule an­
nounced. See, further, in the opinion in Pico v. Webster, for a 
review of the cases. The rule was also originally held in Pennsyl­
vania in Carmack v. Com., 5 Bin. 184. A departure from the rule 
was made in that state in �Hasser v. Strickland, 17 Serg. & R. 354. 
This departure, however, was in the face of an able protest on the 
part of Chief Justice Gibson, as noted in Pico v. Webster, 14 Cal., 
at pae-e 2o6. See dissenting opinion of Gibson, C. J., 17  Serg. & 
R. 358. See, also, generally, Littleton v. Richardsotr, 34 N .  H. 
179. 
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In this state, a principal and sureties may be sued together.
Wibaux v. Live-Stock Co., 9 Mont. 154; Hoskins v. White, 13
Mont. 72; Woodmen v. Calk-ins, 13 Mont. 365; Nelson v. Dono-
run, 16 Mont. 85.
There is no reason, in the case at bar, why the principal and
sureties were not originally sued in one action. It therefore seems
to us that it is not within the spirit of the practice in this state
to allow one to sue the principal first, and then make that judg-
ment either conclusive or pr-ima facie evidence against the sure-
ties, who were not made parties to that action. It seems that to
allow such practice would be an invasion of the principle that
every man is entitled to his day in court. Another principle is
that, when a defendant is sought to be charged with a liability,
there is not a presumption of his liability to commence with. If
we hold that a judgment against the principal is conclusive or
prima facie evidence against the sureties, the sureties are obliged
to start into the action with a presumption of liability against
them. The ordinary rule of law is that the plaintiff must prove
his case by evidence; but, if a judgment against the principal is
evidence against the sureties, the affirmative of the case is thrown
upon the defendants. They must take the burden of proof. In-
stead of the plaintiff proving his case, the defendants are placed
in a position of being obliged to prove their nonliability. In anal-
ogy to a criminal case, the defendants would be obliged to prove
their [*454] own innocence. Defendants, in such a position.
would be required to prove that their principal, the constable,
had not been guilty of misconduct in his ofiice. They would be
obliged to prove that he had faithfully performed the duties of
his office. It appears to us, however, that the proof should
come from the other side; that the plaintiff should be
required to prove, against the sureties, that the constable had not
faithfully performed the duties of his office. This seems to us
to be within the ordinary rules of practice and pleading. If the
other rule is to be adopted, then the sureties would be obliged
to go back, perhaps several years in time (three years, as it ap-
pears, in this case), and find the witnesses who were able to testi-
fy as to whether the constable had committed a trespass upon
the goods of plaintiff. By that time the witnesses may be scat-
tered or dead. The principal himself may be dead. The sureties
would be obliged to collect a mass of evidence, the knowledge of
which would be peculiarly within the possession of the plaintiff,
and perhaps only by accident within the reach of the defending
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In this state, a principal and sureties may be sued together. 
Wiba.itx v. Li:ve-Stock Co., 9 Mont. 1 54 ; Hoskins v. iVlzite, 13  
Mont. 72 ; Hloodmen v .  Cal.kins, 1 3  :Mont. 365 ; Nelson v. Dono­
·rnn� 16  l\font. 85. 
There is no reason, in the case at bar, why the principal and 
sureties were not originally sued in one action. It therefore seems 
to us that it is not within the spirit of the practice in this state 
to allow one to sue the principal first, and then make that j udg- \ 
ment either conclusive or prima facie evidence against the sure- 1 
ties, who were not made parties to that action. It seems that to 
allow such practice would be an invasion of the principle that 
every man is entitled to his day in court. Another principle is , 
that, when a defendant is sought to be charged with a liability, 
there is not a presumption of his liability to commence with. I f  
we  hold that a judgment against the principal is  conclusive or 
prim.a facie evidence against the sureties, the sureties are obliged ' 
to start into the action with a presumption of  liability against 
them. The ordinary rule of law is that the plaintiff must prove 
his case by evidence ; but, if  a j udgment against the principal i5 
evidence against the sureties, the affirmative of the case is thrown 
upon the defendants. They must take the burden of proof. In­
stead of the plaintiff proving his case, the defendants are placed 
in a position of being obliged to prove their nonl iabil ity. In anal­
ogy to a criminal case, the defendants would be obliged to prove 
their [ *454] own innocence. Defendants, in such a position, 
would be required to prove that their principal, the constable, 
had not been guilty of misconduct in his office. They would be 
obliged to prove that he had faithfully performed the duties of 
his office. I t  appears to us, however, that the proof should 
come from the other side ; that the plaintiff should be 
required to prove, against the sureties, that the constable had not 
fa ithfully performed the duties of his office. This seems to us 
to be within the ordinary rules of practice and pleading. I f  the 
other rule is to be adopted , then the sureties would be oblig.ed 
to go back, perhaps several years in time ( three years, as i t  ap­
pears, in this case ) ,  and find the witnesses who were able to testi­
fy as to whether the constable had committed a trespass upon 
the goods of plaintiff. By that time the witnesses may be scat­
tered or dead. The principal himself may be dead. The sureties 
would be obl iged to collect a mass of evidence, the knowledge of 
which would be peculiarly within the possession of  the plaintiff, 
and perhaps only by accident within the reach of the defending 
sureties. We cannot countenance such practice. 
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\Ve believe by far the best of the three rules above noticed
is that which denies to the judgment against the principal any
effect as against the sureties. VVe think the sureties should not
be compelled to face a judgment, with all its presumptions, and
one which was rendered in an action to which the sureties were
not parties, and of which they had no notice whatever, and to de-
fend which they had no opportunity.
This action being upon the judgment, as plaintiff’s counsel
has insisted in his brief and argument, we are of opinion that the
district court was correct in holding that the judgment could not
bind these sureties. The court was therefore correct in sustain-
ing the demurrers to the complaint.
PEMBERTON, C.J., concurs. HUNT, ]., absent. \/
BRAIDEN v. MERCER, in Ohio Sup. Ct., June 1, 1886-44 Ohio St.
339. 7 N- E 155-
OWEN, C. In October, 1873, Milton \V. Junkins was ap-
pointed guardian of the estates of two of his minor children. He
gave bond, with Samuel Braiden, plaintiff in error, as surety, con-
ditioned that his principal should “faithfully discharge all his
duties as such guardian, as is required by law.” He entered upon
the discharge of his trust. A considerable sum of money be-
longing to his wards came into his hands as guardian, which he
neglected to account for. He thereafter died, and in February,
1880, D. \V. Cooper was appointed his administrator, and in Feb-
ruary, I88I, as such administrator, and as required by section
6291, Revised Statutes, filed in the probate court of Belmont
county an account of the doings of his intestate as such guardian.
In June, 1881, the court passed upon this account and found that
in his life-time the guardian, as such, had received of his wards’
money $953.48, which, with the interest thereon, amounted to
the sum of $1,384.06, which was adjudged against the estate of
the late guardian, and ordered to be paid by the administrator to
the then and present guardian, the defendant in error. There
being no assets in the hands of the administrator, the action below
was brought in the court of common pleas by the present guard-
ian of the wards, [*34o] against Braiden and the administrator
of his principal upon the bond of the latter for the recovery of
the amount found due from the estate of the guardian, and inter-
est. To the petition, Braiden made answer as follows:
“That the said Milton W. Iunkins, as guardian. did not file
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\Ve believe by far the best of the three rules above noticed 
is that which denies to the judgment against the principal any 
effect as against the sureties. We think the sureties should not 
be compelled to face a j udgment, with all its presumptions, and 
one which was rendered in an action to which the sureties were 
not parties, and of  which they had no notice whatever, and to de­
fend which they had no opportunity. 
This action being upon the judgment, as plaintiff's counsel 
has insisted in his brief and argument, we are of opinion that the 
district court was correct in holding that the j udgment could not 
bind these sureties. The court was therefore correct in sustain­
ing tne demurrers to the complaint. J PEMBERTON, C.J., concurs. HUNT, J. ,  absent. 
BRAIDEN v. MERCER, in Ohio Sup. Ct, June 1 ,  1886-44 Ohio St. 
339, 7 N. E. 155. 
OWEN, C. J. In October, 1873, Milton W. Junkins was ap­
pointed guardian of the estates of two of his minor children. He 
gave bond, with Samuel Braiden, plaintiff in error, as surety, con­
ditioned that his principal should " faithfi.tlly discharge all his 
duties as such guardian, as is required by law." He entered upon 
the discharge of his trust. A considerable sum of money be­
longing to his wards came into his hands as guardian, which he 
neglected to account for. He thereafter died, and in February, 
188o, D. W. Cooper was appointed his administrator, and in Feb­
ruary, 188 1 ,  as such admini strator, and as required by section 
6291 1  Revised Statutes, filed in the probate court of Belmont 
county an account of the doings of his intestate as such guardian. 
In June, 1881 ,  the court passed upon this account and found that 
in his li fe-time the guardian, as such, had received of his wants' 
money $953.48, which, with the interest thereon, amounted to 
the sum of $r ,384.o6, which was adjudged against the estate of 
the late guardian, and ordered to be paid by the administrator to 
the then and present guardian, the defendant in error. There 
being no assets in the hands of the administrator, the act ion below 
was brought in the court of common pleas by the present guard­
ian of the wards, [ *340] against Braiden and the administrator 
of his principal upon the bond of the latter for the recovery of 
the amount found due from the estate of the guardian, and inter·­
est. To the petition , Braiden made answer as follO\\•s : 
"That the said Milton W. Junkins ,  as guardian, did not file 
any account of his trust as guardian ; that 
.
the account filed by his 
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administrator was filed without the knowledge of this defendant,
and this defendant was no party thereto. The defendant further
says, that'for many years prior to the death of the said Junkins,
he, the said Junkins, was a man of intemperate habits; that he
was for a very long time unable to work; that he had no real or
personal estate, and no income except what he derived from
his practice as a physician when able to practice and from an
estate by curtesy he had in certain real estate; that at the time
he was appointed guardian his wards were infants of tender years,
requiring great care and attention; that they had in addition to
the moneys claimed to have been received by their guardian the
remainder in fee-simple of a piece of real estate in the city of
Bellaire, Ohio, of the value of at least forty-five hundred ($4500)
dollars; that while they were possessed of an estate as aforesaid,
and their father and guardian unable to provide for himself, he,
the guardian, did, at great cost to himself, support, clothe, and
educate said children, and on them and in their behalf did ex-
pend large sums of money exceeding in the aggregate the amount
this defendant is sought to be charged with, and that the said
real estate of said wards is still held and possessed by them free
of incumbrance. The defendant, Samuel Braiden, further says,
that for a long time previous to the death of the said Iunkins,
he, the said Junkins, was not in condition to transact business;
that on that account he did not, in his life-time, claim or ask an
allowance for the maintenance of his wards, nor did his admin-
istrator for him in the final settlement of his accounts.
“The defendant further says, that the said Junkins was en-
titled to an allowance for maintaining, clothing, and educating
his wards; that his failure to do so was owing to [*34I] his con-
dition as aforesaid; and that said guardian was not in fact in-
debted to his wards in any sum at the time of his death, and
that the said claim against him is not valid or equitable.”
The plaintiff’s demurrer to this answer was sustained, the
defendant excepted, and, on his failure to answer further, judg-
ment was rendered against him for the amount demanded in the
petition. The district court on error afiirmed this judgment. To
reverse the judgments below the present proceeding is prose-
cuted. If Braiden was entitled to the relief demanded in his
answer, the judgments below are erroneous and should be re-
versed.
The single proposition to which we address our consideration l
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administrator was filed without the knowledge of this defendant, 
and this defendant was no party thereto. The defendant further 
says, that · for many years prior to the death of the said J unkins, 
he, the said J tmkins, was a man of intemperate habits ; that he 
was for a very long time unable to work ; that he had no real or 
personal estate, and no income except what he derived from 
his practice as a physician when able to practice and from an 
estate by curtesy he had in certain real estate ; that at the time 
he was appointed guardian his wards were infants of tender years, 
requiring great care and attention ; that they had in addition to 
the moneys claimed to have been received by their guardian the 
remainder in fee-simple of a piece of real estate in the city of 
Bellaire, Ohio, of the value of at least forty-five hundred ($4500) 
dollars ; that while they were possessed of an estate as aforesaid, . 
and their father and guardian unable to provide for himself, he, 
the guardian, did, at great cost to himself, support, clothe, and 
educate said children, and on them and in their behalf did ex­
pend large sums of money exceeding in the aggregate the amount 
this defendant is sought to be charged with, and that the said 
real estate of said wards is still held and possessed by them free 
of incumbrance. The defendant, Samuel Braiden, further says, 
that for a long time previous to the death of the said Junkins, 
he, the said Junkins, was not in condition to transact business ; 
that on that account he did not, in his life-time, claim or ask an 
allowance for the maintenance of his wards, nor did his admin­
istrator for him in the final settlement of his accounts. 
"The defendant further says, that the said Junkins was en­
titled to an allowance for maintaining, clothing, and educating 
his wards ; that his failure to do so was owing to [ *341 ] his con­
dition as aforesaid ; and that said guardian was not in fact in­
debted to his wards in any sum at the time of his death, an<l 
that the said claim against him is not valid or equitable." 
The plaintiff's demurrer to this answer was sustained , the 
defendant excepted, and, on his failure to answer further, j udg­
ment was rendered against him for the amount demanded in the 
petit ion . The district court on error affirmed this judgment. To 
reverse the judgments below the present proceeding is prose­
cuted . If Braiden was entitled to the relief demanded in bi's 
answer, the judgments below are erroneous and should be re­
versed. 
The single proposition to which we address our consideration J is the right of Braiden to a review, in the action below, of the 
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finding and order of the probate court upon the settlement of
the guardian’s dealings by his administrator. Braiden was not
made a party to, and it is assumed that he had no actual knowl-
edge of, the settlement proceeding in the probate court. That
the settlement was final as between the wards and their guardian’s
administrator, in the absence of an appeal from it or a proceed-
ing to open it in accordance with the statutes, will be conceded.
Section 6289, Revised Statutes; Woodmansie v. -,W00dmansie, 32
Ohio St. 18.
Vtlhether a surety upon a guardian’s bond is concluded by a
settlement in the probate court of his principal’s accounts has not,
heretofore, been determined by this court. In,.S‘tate v. Hum[>h-
reys, 7 Ohio (1 pt.) 224, it was held that an action against the
sureties in a guardian’s bond was sustainable without previous
liquidation of the amount due from the principal. This case was
explained in Newton V. Hammond, 38 Ohio St. 435, and the
principle established that a right of action against the sureties
first accrues to the ward for the amount remaining in the hands
of the guardian when such amount is ascertained by the [*342]
probate court on the settlement of the guardian’s final account.
It is said in that case by Mcllvaine, J.: “The statement of ac-
counts in the probate court must be verified by the oath of the
guardian—a requirement alike important to the sureties and the
ward.” If the liability of the sureties is not fixed, nor they con-
cluded, by the settlement, it is not apparent why the verification
of the accounts is of equal importance to them and the wards.
The principle that a final settlement of a guardian’s accounts
and the determination by the probate court of the amount due
his wards should, in the absence of fraud and collusion, conclude
the sureties in an action against them upon the guardian’s bond,
finds strong support in both reason and authority. The sureties
undertake that their principal will faithfully discharge his duties
as guardian. Section 6259, Revised Statutes. With other duties
the law requires him to render on oath to the proper court an
account of his receipts and expenditures, verified by vouchers or
proof, etc. * * * At the expiration of his trust fully to account
for and-pay over to the proper person all of the estate remaining
in his hands. * * * To obey and perform all the orders and
judgments of the proper courts touching the guardianship. Sec-
tion 6269, Revised Statutes.
By their bond the sureties contract with reference to the
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finding and order of the probate court upon the settlement of \ 
the guardian's dealings by his administrator. Braiden was not ( 
made a party to, and it is assumed that he had no actual knowl­
edge o f, the settlement proceeding in the probate court. That 
the settlement was final as between the wards and their guardian's 
administrator, in the absence of an appeal from it or a proceed­
ing to open it in accordance with the statutes, will be conceded. 
Section 6289, Revised Statutes ; Woodmansie v. ,Woodmansie, 32 
Ohio St. 18. 
\iVhether a surety upon a guardian's bond is concluded by a 
,;. settlement in the probate court of his principal 's accounts has not, 
heretofore, been determined by this court. In .  State v. Humph­
reys, 7 Ohio ( I  pt. ) 224, i t  was held that an action against the 
sureties in a guardian's bond was sustainable without previous 
liquidation of the amount due from the principal. This case was 
explained in Newton v. Hammond, 38 Ohio St. 435, and the 
principle establi shed that a right of action against the sureties 
first accrues to the ward for the amount remaining in the hands 
of the gliardian when such amount is ascertained by the [ *342] 
probate court on the settlement of the guardian's final account. 
It is said in that case by Mcllvaine, J. : "The statement of ac­
counts in the probate court must be verified by the oath of the 
guardian-a requirement alike important to the sureties and the 
ward." If the liability o f  the sureties is not fixed, nor they con­
cluded, by the settlement, it is not apparent why the verification 
of the accounts is of equal importance to them and the wards. 
The principle that a final settlement of a guard ian's accounts 
and the determination by the probate court of the amount due 
his wards should, in the absence o f  fraud and collusion, conclu<le 
the sureties in an action against them upon the guardian's bond, 
finds strong support in both reason and authority. The sureties 
undertake that their principal will faithfully discharge his duties 
as guardian . Section 6259, Revised Statutes. With other duties 
the law requires him to render on oath to the proper court an 
account of his receipts and expenditures, verified by vouchers or 
proof, etc. * * * At the expiration of his trust fully to account 
for and . pay over to the proper person all of the estate remaining 
in his hands. * * * To obey and perform all the orders and 
j udgmcnts of the proper courts touching the guardianship. Sec­
tion 6269, Revised Statutes. 
Bv their bond the sureties contract with reference to the\ 
action of a court and that their principal w ill obey its orders and 
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conform to such action. Can they say they are strangers to such\
proceedings? Upon their principal's failure to obey the orders
of the court there is clearly a breach of the bond. The relation
they assume to such court and its action so far makes them privy
to the proceedings affecting their principal as to deny to them
the right, when called upon to answer for the breach of the bond,
to call in question the grounds upon which the court based its
action, and to have the same cause retried. \’Ve find in our law
numerous illustrations of this principle. The sureties in an un-
dertaking in attachment contract to pay the defendant all dam-
ages sustained by reason of the [*343] attachment if the order
prove to have been wrongfully obtained. Has it ever been doubt-
ed that the determination by the court in the attachment proceed-
ing that the order was wrongfully obtained concluded the sure-
ties upon that question in an action upon the undertaking? By
an undertaking in replevin the sureties contract that their prin-
cipal will duly prosecute the action and pay all costs and dam-
ages which may be awarded against him. Nobody will claim
that the award of damages in the replevin suit is not final against
the sureties in an action against them upon the undertaking. An
undertaking in an injunction proceeding is conditioned to secure
the party enjoined the damages he may sustain if it be finally
decided that the injunction ought not to have been granted. It
has never been supposed that the sureties in an action against
them could be heard to say that they were strangers to the in-
junction proceeding and that the decision of the court that the
injunction ought not to have been granted should be disregarded
and that question again litigated.
It is not easy to distinguish the principle involved in these
proceedings from the one we are considering. Indeed it may
well be considered an established principle that whenever a sure-
ty has contracted with reference to the conduct of one of the
parties in some suit or proceeding in court, he is, in the absence
of fraud and collusion, concluded by the judgment. Shepard v.
Pebbles, 38 Wis- 373; Lothrop v. Southzoorth, 5 Mich. 436, 448;
Towle v. Towle, 46 N. H. 434; Willey v. Panlk, 6 Conn. 74;
Stovall v. Banks, I0 Wall. 588; Heard v. Lodge, 20 Pick. 58;
Sturgis v. K no”), 33 Vt. 52I ; Black v. Caruthers, 6 Humph. 87;
Doruling v. Polack, I8 Cal. 625; Warner v. Matthews, I8 Ill. 86;
Evans v. Commonwealth, 8 Watts (Pa.), 398, 34 Am. Dec. 477;
Garber v. Commonwealth, 7 Pa. St. 266: Watts v. Gayle, 2o Ala.
8T7; Casoni v. Jerome, 58 N. Y. 322; Douglass v. Houland, 24
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conform to such action. Can they say they are strangers to such \ 
proceedings ? Upon their principal's fai lure to obey the orders 
of the court there is clearly a breach of the bond. The relation 
they assume to such court and its action so far makes them privy 
to the proceedings affecting their principal as to deny to them 
the right, when called upon to answer for the breach of the bond, 
to call in question the grounds upon which the court based its 
action, and to have the same cause retried. We find in our law 
numerous illustrations of this principle. The sureties in an un­
dertaking in attachment contract to pay the defendant all dam­
ages sustained by reason of the [ *343] attachment if the order 
prove to have been wrongfully obtained. Has it ever been doubt­
ed that the determination by the court in the attachment proceed­
ing that the order was wrongfully obtained concluded the sure­
ties upon that question in an action upon the undertaking ? By 
an undertaking in replevin the sureties contract that their prin­
cipal will duly prosecute the action and pay all costs and dam­
ages which may be awarded against him. Nobody wi!l claim 
that the award of damages in the replevin suit is not final against 
the sureties in an action against them upon the undertaking. An 
undertaking in an inj µnction proceeding is conditioned to secure 
the party enjoined the damages he may sustain if it be finally 
decided that the injunction ought not to have been granted. It 
has never been supposed that the sureties in an action against 
them could be heard to say that they were strangers to the in­
junction proceeding and that the decision of the court that the 
injunction ought not to have been granted should be disregarded 
and that question again litigated. 
It is not easy to distinguish the principle involved in these 
proceedings from the one we are considering. Indeed it may 
well be considered an established principle that whenever a sure­
ty has contracted with reference to the conduct of one of the 
parties in some suit or proceeding in court, he is ,  in the absence 
of fraud and collusion, concluded by the j udgment. Shepard v. 
Pebbles, 38 Wis. 37J ; Lothrop v. Southworth, 5 Mich. 436, 448 ; 
Towle v. Ton.t/e, 46 N .  H. 434 ; Willey v. Paulk, 6 Conn. 74 ; 
Stovall v. Banks, 10 Viall. 588 ; Heard v. Lodge, 20 Pick. 58 ; 
Sturgis v. Knapp, 33 Vt. 52 1 ; Black v. Carittliers, 6 Humph. 87 : 
D owling v. Polack, 1 8  Cal. 625 ; Warner v. Matthez.(,is, 1 8  Ill . 86 :  
Evans v. Co mmon·wealth, 8 Watts ( Pa . ) , 398, 34 Am. Dec. 477 ; 
Garber v. Common·wealth, 7 Pa. St. 266 : Watts v. Gayle, 20 Ala. 
8 1 7 : Casoni v. Jerome, 58 N. Y. 322 ; Douglass v. Howlam/, 24 
\Vend. 35 :Brandt Suretyship , �& 5��.  5�4. 
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This principle was applied in an action on an injunction
["‘344] bond in Lolh-rop v. Southworth, 5 Mich. 448, where it was
held that a surety was bound by a decree against his principal
and could raise no question of its correctness. It was said in this
case that the surety undertook that his principal should abide the
judgment of the court. “He can, therefore, raise no question
of the correctness of the decree, nor impeach it in this collateral‘
proceeding.” The same holding was made in a similar case-
Towle v. Towle, supra, where the court say: “By signing the
bond in suit with Towle, the plaintiff in the suit in equity, the
sureties voluntarily assumed such a connection with that suit
that they are concluded by the decree in it in the present suit
upon the bond so far as the same matters are in question.”
The supreme court of the United States applied the same-
rule to the sureties upon an administration bond, in Stow]! v.
Banks, 10 Wall. 583. It is there said that the surety “can not
attack collaterally a decree made against an administrator for
whose fidelity to his trust he has bound himself.” The same ap-
plication of this principle was made in Heard v. Lodge, 20 Pick.
53, 32 Am. Dec. I97, where the court say: “To most purposes,
it seems to us, that the sureties in an administration bond are, as
well as the principal, estopped from controverting the validity of
a judgment ascertaining the amount of a debt to be paid by the
administrator. They are, in many respects, like the sureties in a
bail bond, and equally bound by the proceeding against the prin-
cipal. The duty they have assumed is that the principal will pay
on demand all debts ascertained by judgment of a court of law
against him in his capacity as administrator, if the estate be sol-
vent. His failure to make payment is a breach of the adminis-
tration bond.” In the case of an administrator's bond, the court
say, in Casoni v. Jerome, 58 N. Y. 322: “Sureties are bound by
the decree of the surrogate in such a case. because by their con-
tract they have made themselves privy to the proceedings against
their principal, and when the principal is concluded, [*345] the
surety, in the absence of fraud or collusion, is concluded.”
In S/iepard v. Pebbles, 38 Wis. 373, it was held that the sure-
ties on a guardian’s bond are concluded by the order of the coun-
ty court on the guardian’s accounting, as to the amount due from-
= him to the ward. Cole, _I., said: “The general rule of course is,
that a judgment is conclusive only as against parties and privies;
but to this there are exceptions. And it is conceded that when-
ever the surety has contracted in reference to the conduct of one-
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This principle was applied in an action on an injunction 
[*344] bond in Lothrop v. Southworth, 5 Mich. 44-8, where it was. 
held that a surety was bound by a decree against his principal 
and could raise no question of its correctness. It was said in this 
case that the surety undertook that his principal should abide the 
judgment of the court. "He can, therefore, raise no question 
of the correctness of the decree, nor impeach it in this collateral" 
proceeding." The same holding was made in a similar case­
Towle v. Towle, Stipra, where the court say : "By signing the­
bond in suit with Towle, the plaintiff in the suit in equity, the 
sureties voluntarily assumed such a connection with that suit 
that they are concluded by the decree in it in the present suit 
upon the bond so far as the same matters are in question." 
The supreme court of the United States applied the same· 
rule to the sureties upon an administration bond, in Stovall v. 
Banks, IO Wall . 583. It  is there said that the surety "can not 
attack collaterally a decree made against an administrator for 
whose fidelity to his trust he has bound himself." The same ap­
plication of this principle was made in Heard v. Lodge, 20 Pick. 
53, 32 Am. Dec. 197, where the court say : "To most purposes, . 
it seems to us, that the sureties in an administration bond are, as 
well as the principal, estopped from controverting the validity of 
a judgment ascertaining the amount of a debt to be paid by the· 
administrator. They are, in many respects, l ike the sureties in a 
bail bond, and equally bound by the proceeding against the prin­
cipal . The duty they have assumed is that the principal will pay 
on demand all debts ascertained by judgment of a court of law 
against him in his capacity as administrator, if the estate be sol­
vent. His failure to make payment is a breach of the adminis­
tration bond." In the case of an administrator's bond,  the court 
say, in Casoni v. Jerome, 58 N. Y. 322 : "Sureties are bound by 
the decree of the surrogate in such a case. because by their con­
tract they have made themselves privy to the proceedings against· 
their principal , and when the principal is concluded, [*345] the 
!'uret�·, in the absence of fraud or collusion, is concluded ." 
In Shepard v. Pebbles, 38 Wis. 373, it was held that the sure­
ties on a guardian's bond are concluded by the order of the coun­
tv court on the guardian's accounting, as to the amoun t due from 
h i m  to the ward. Cole, J., said : "The genei:al rule of course is, 
that a j udgment is conclusive only as against parties and privies ; 
hut to this there are exceptions .  And it is conceded that when­
ev('r the surety has contracted in reference to the conduct of one­
nf the parties in some suit or proceeding in the courts, he is con- · 
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cluded by the judgment. * * * In the case before us, the order
of the county court fixed the amount of the proceeds of the sale
in the hands of the guardian, and directed its payment to the ward.
’The sureties had contracted that the guardian should and would
justly account for the proceeds, and dispose of them according
- to law, and would perform all orders of the county court by him
-to be performed. There was a breach of the obligation on the
default of the guardian to pay over as he was ordered to do;
and the sureties, as well as the principal, are estopped from con-
troverting the correctness of the order ascertaining the amount.
They occupy, in many respects, a position like that of sureties in
a replevin or bail bond, and are equally concluded by the pro-
ceedings against the principal.” The strong analogy of this case
to the one at bar is apparent. The settlement by the adminis-
trator of the deceased guardian is the same in effect as if made
by the guardian himself. Section 6291, Revised Statutes. The
amount due the wards was ascertained by the court and its pay-
ment to the plaintiff below ordered. In this default has been
made. No fraud or collusion is alleged in the settlement, but a
rehearing of the matter of the account is asked, as if no settle-
ment had been made.
The only case cited by the plaintiff in error to support the
claim that the surety may be heard to have a new accounting
and settlement, is Dawes v. Howard, 4 Mass. 97. This was an
action of debt on a bond of a guardian, the [*346] wards being
minor children of the gnardiatn-. The guardian had made 'no
claim in his life—time, but the court allows it to the sureties.
There is no intimation in the report of the case that there ever
had been a settlement of the guardian’s accounts prior to the ac-
tion upon the bond. The question we have considered was not
suggested by court or counsel, and did not arise upon the record.
The more recent case of Heard v. Lodge, 20 Pick. 53, supra,
presents the view of the same court upon this question, and fully
supports the conclusion we have reached, which is, that in an ac-
tion upon a guardian’s bond for the recovery of the amount
found due the wards upon a final settlement of the guardian’s
accounts in the probate court, the sureties are concluded by the
settlement, and will not be heard, in the absence of fraud and
collusion, to question its correctness or to demand a rehearing of
the accounts. There was no error in sustaining the demurrer to
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eluded by the j udgment. * * * In the case before us, the order 
of the county court fixed the amount of the proceeds of the sale 
in the hands of the guardian, and directed its payment to the ward. 
IThe sureties had contracted that the guardian should and would 
j ustly account for the proceeds, and dispose of them according 
· to law, and would perform all orders of the county court by him 
· to be performed. There was a breach of the obligation on the 
-default of the guardian to pay over as he was ordered to do ; 
and the sureties, as well as the principal, are estopped from con­
troverting the correctness of the order ascertaining the amount. 
They occupy, in many respects, a position like that of sureties in 
a replevin or bail bond, and are equally concluded by the pro­
ceedings against the principal." The strong analogy of this case 
to the one at bar is apparent. The settlement by the adminis­
trator of the deceased guardian is the same in effect as if made 
by the guardian himself. Section 6291 ,  Revised Statutes. The 
amount due the wards was ascertained by the court and its pay- , 
ment to the plaintiff below ordered. In this default has been ' 
made. No fraud or collusion is alleged in the settlement, but a � 
rehearing of the matter of  the account is asked, as if no settle- 1 
ment had been made. 
The only case cited by the plaintiff in error to support the 
claim that the surety may be heard to have a new accounting 
and settlement, is D<rwes v. H O'W<Jrd, 4 Mass. 97. This was an 
action of debt on a bond of a guardian, the [ *346] wards being 
minor children of the guardian. The guardian had made · no 
claim in his life-time, but the court allows it to the sureties. 
There is no intimation in the report of the case that there ever 
had been a settlement of the guardian's accounts prior to the ac­
tion upon the bond. The question we have considered was not 
suggested by court or counsel, and did not arise upon the record. 
The more recent case of Heard v. Lodge, 20 Pick. 53, supra, 
presents the view of  the same court upon this question, and fully 
supports the conclusion we have reached, which is, that in an ac­
tion upon a guardian's bond for the recovery of the amount 
found due the wards upon a final settlement of the guardian's 
accounts in the probate court, the sureties are concluded by the 
settlement, and will not be heard , in the absence of fraud and 
collusion, to question its correctness or to demand a rehearing of 
the accounts. There was no error in sustaining the demurrer to 
the answer. Judgment affirmed. 
286 C/\SF.S ON JUDGMENTS, ETC.
When Parties not Adversaries.
KOELSCH v. MIXER, in Ohio Sup. Ct., Dec. 18, 1894-52 Ohio St. 207.
39 N. E. 417.
Action by Koelsch for contribution for money claimed to
have been paid by him as co-surety on a school district treasurer’s
bond with B. A. Mecum, of whose estate defendant is sought
to be charged as administrator; and plaintiff alleges that he paid
and was compelled to pay the amount sued for on a judgment
recovered against him on the bond. Defendant answered that in
the action alleged in which judgment was recovered against
plaintiff on said bond this defendant was also sued, and by the
verdict and judgment found not liable and discharged, and judg-
ment rendered against plaintiff only. Plaintiff demurred to this
answer. The demurrer was sustained. On error the circuit court
reversed this judgment; and from this judgment plaintiff sues
error here.
MINSHALL, J. * * * Vt/'hat the issues [in the former ac-
tion] between the obligee and the defendants or either of them,
were, is [*21I] not stated. Hence, the ground of the defense
must be, that, as both were parties to that action, the judgment
irrespective of what the issues were, releasing one of the defend-
ants, is conclusive of his liability upon the bond as against the
other, and of any liability to contribute as a co-surety to the one
who was held and compelled to pay the judgment. We do not
regard this as the law. Whilst the exact limits of the doctrine
of res judicata in its application to some cases, are not definitely
settled, it is accepted as generally true, that the judgment relied
on for that effect in subsequent litigation, must have been pro-
nounced upon the same issues, between the same parties, or their
privies, standing in an adversary character to one another. By
this is not meant that they should l1ave stood upon the record as
plaintiff and defendant, but that this should have been their real
attitude upon the issues tried and determined. As before ob-
served, the defendant does not state what the issues were in the
former action. If any were joined between himself and the
plaintiff in this action, the determination of which may be relied
on as conclusive of the rights of the parties, they should have
been pleaded. They cannot be left to conjecture. The mere fact
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When Parties not Adversaries. 
KOELSCH v. M IXER, in Ohio Sup. Ct., Dec. 18, 18g4-52 Ohio St. 207. 
39 N. E. 417. 
Action by Koelsch for contribution for money claimed to 
have been paid by him as co-surety on a school district treasurer's 
bond with B. A. Mecum, of whose estate defendant is sought 
to be charged as administrator ; and plaintiff alleges that he paid 
and was compelled to pay the amount sued for on a j udgment 
recovered against him on the bond. Defendant answered that in 
the action alleged in which judgment was recovered against 
plaintiff on said bond this defendant was also sued, and by the 
verdict and judgment found not liable and discharged, a,nd judg­
ment rendered against plaintiff only. Plaintiff demurred to this 
answer. The demurrer was sustained. On error the circuit court 
reversed this judgment ; and from this judgment plaintiff sues 
error here. 
MINSHALL, J. * * * What the issues [ in the former ac­
tion] between the obligee and the defendants or either of them, 
were, is [ *2 I I ]  not stated. Hence, the ground of the defense 
must be, that, as both were parties to that action, the j udgment 
irrespective of  what the issues were, releasing one of the defend­
ants, is conclusive of his liability upon the bond as against the 
other, and of any liability to contribute as a co-surety to the one 
who was held and compelled to pay the judgment. We do not 
regard this as the law. Whilst the exact limits of the doctrine 
of res judicata in its application to some cases, are not definitely 
settled, it is accepted as generally true, that the j udgment relied 
• on for that effect in subsequent litigation, must have been pro· 
nounced upon the same issues, between the same parties, or their 
privies, standing in an adversary character to one another. By 
this is not meant that they should have stood upon the record as 
1 plaintiff and defendant, but that this should have been their real 
attitude upon the issues tried and determined. As before ob­
served, the defendant does not state what the issues were in the 
former act ion. If any were joined between himself and the 
plaintiff in this action, the determination of which may be relied 
on as conclusive of the rights of the parties, they should have 
been pleaded. They cannot be left to conj ecture. The mere fact 
that it was there determined that he was not l iable on the bond 
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to the obligee, cannot conclude the plaintiff in this action from
demanding contribution from the estate of his deceased co-surety.
if, as a matter of fact, they were co-sureties on the bond, and the
plaintiff has been compelled to discharge all, or more than his
just proportion, of the common liability. The subject matter of
the two actions is different. The former was a suit on a treas-
urer’s bond by the obligee against the [*2I2] makers as co-de-
fendants to recover for a breach of it. The present is a suit by
one surety on the bond against the estate of another for contri-
bution; and had not accrued at the time of the former suit. It
is not based upon the bond. In the language of MCILVAINE, ].,
in Camp v. Bostwick, 20 Ohio St., 337: “It,” the right to con-
tribution, “is an equity which springs up at the time the relation
of co—sureties is entered into, and ripens into a cause of action
when one surety pays more than his proportion of the debt. From
this relation the common law im[>Iic.r a promise to contribute in
case of unequal payments by co-sureties.” And he adds, “Neither
the creditor, the principal, the statute of limitations, nor the death
of a party, can take it away.” And so, it was there held, that
though the estate was, by the statute of limitations, released from
its direct liability to the creditor, it, nevertheless, remained liable
to contribute to a co-surety who had paid more than his moiety
of the debt. See also, Kinkead’s Code Pleading, section 457.
It is not enough that an issue may have been joined between
the obligee and the defendant,' as to the liability of the latter on
the bond. \Vhatever that issue may have been, it was not an
issue between himself and his co-defendant, the plaintiff in this
action, and could not therefore conclude the latter; though parties
to the suit they were not such in an adversary character, being
simply co-defendants to the suit on the bond. The plaintiff in
this suit could not in the former suit, as a matter of right, have '
insisted on the admission or rejection of evidence on the trial of
the issue; had no right to move for a new trial, nor prosecute
error if aggrieved by the rulings of the court; [*2I3] and hence
he cannot be held bound by the judgment in any subsequent liti-
gation to which he may be a party. Vase v. Morton, 4 Cush. 27, 31.
It is the general rule that parties to a judgment are not
bound by it, in a subsequent controversy between each other, un-
less they are adversary parties in the original action. Freeman
on Judgments, § 158 ; Black on Judgments, § 599; 2I Am. & Eng.
Enc. Law, 151; McMahon v. Geiger, 73 M0. 145; Gardner v.
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to the obligee, cannot conclude the plaintiff in this action from 
demanding contribution from the estate of his deceased co-surety. 
i f, as a matter o f  fact, they were co-sureties on the bond, and the 
plaintiff has been compelled to discharge all, or more than his 
j ust proportion, of the common liability. The subject matter of 
the two actions is different. The former was a suit on a treas­
urer's bond by the obligee against the [*2 1 2 ]  makers as co-de­
fendants to recover for a breach of it. The present is  a suit by 
one surety on the bond against the estate of another for contri­
bution ; and had not accrued at the time of the former suit. It 
is not based upon the bond. In the language of McILVA J N�, J.,  
in Camp v. Bostwick, 20 Ohio St. ,  337 : "It," the right to con­
tribution, "is an equity which springs up at the time the relatim·.r: 
of co-sureties is entered into, and ripens into a cause of action 
when one surety pays more than his proportion of the debt. From 
this relation the common law implies a promise to contribute in 
case ·of unequal payments by co-sureties." And he adds, "Neither 
the creditor, the principal , the statute of limitations, nor the death 
of a party, can take it away." And so, it was there held, that 
though the estate was, by the statute of limitations, released from 
its d irect liability to the creditor, it, nevertheless, remained liable 
to contribute to a co-surety who had paid more than his moiety 
of the debt. See also, Kinkead's Code Pleading, section 457. 
It is  not etiough that an issue may have been joined between • 
the obligee and the defendant,· as to the liability of the latter on 
the bond. Whatever that issue may have been, it was not an 
issue between himself and his co-defendant, the plaintiff in this 
action, and could not therefore conclude the latter ; though parties 
to the suit they were not such in an adversary charactt>r, being 
simply co-defendants to the suit on the bond. The plaintiff in 
this suit could not in the former suit, as a matter of right, have · 
insisted on the admission or rejection of evidence on the trial of 
the iss�te ; had no right to move for a new trial, nor prosecute 
error if aggrieved by the rulings of the court ; [*213]  and hence 
he cannot be held bound by the j udgment in any subsequent liti­
gation to which he may be a party. Vose v. Morton, 4 Cush . 27, 3 1 .  
It  i s  the general rule that parties to a judgment are not 
bound by it, in a subsequent controversy between each other, un­
less they are adversary parties in the original action. Freeman 
on Judgments, § r 58 ; Black on Judgments, § 599 ; 2 1  Am. & Eng. 
Enc. Law, r 5 1 ; l'vfcMahau v. Geiger, 73 Mo. 145 ; Gardner v. 
Raisbeck, 28 N. J. Eq., 7 1 ; Buffingt01i v. Cook, 3 5  Ala. , 3 1 2 : Har-
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vey v. Osborn, 55 Ind., 535; C0.r’s Adm’r v. Hill, 3 Ohio, 412,
424.
The case of McCrory v. Parks, 18 Ohio St., I, is much in
point. There the action below was a suit by one surety on a
sheriPf’s bond against his co-sureties for contribution. The question
arose on a cross-petition filed by one of them, and the reply of
the plaintiff. In the cross-petition the allowance of a claim of
money paid on the amercement of the sherifi, to which all had
been made parties, was asked. The reply controverted the jus-
tice of the judgment, and claimed that it should not have been
rendered—that the amercement had been for the alleged failure
of the sheriff to pay over moneys made on an execution against
the cross petitioner; that, though the court found and adjudged
in the former action that the money had been paid, yet as a
matter of fact it had not been paid and the judgment
was wrongly entered; and the question arose, whether hav-
ing been a party to the former judgment, the plaintifi was not
concluded by it. The court held not, for the reason that the par-
ties to this suit were not adversary parties in the former suit, and
that their respective rights against each other were not in contro-
versy [*214] in that suit. The only difference between this case
and the one under review is, that in the former case a judgment
was pleaded in which the opposite party was held to an obliga-
tion, and here he was released. But this can make no difierence
in the application of the principle; the conclusiveness of the judg-
ment, in either case, must depend on the same question—whether
an issue was joined between the parties and determined~ i1ft'he
former case,_materia1 to their respective rights in the subsequent
shrfior, as shown by the authorities above cited, and they are
Eistaitied by reason, when such is not the case, there is no ground
for the application of the doctrine of res judicata; which rests
upon the principle of public policy, which requires that where a
matter has once been tried and determined on issues joined be-
tween the parties in interest in a court of competent jurisdiotkbn,
there should in the interest of society, be an end of litigation. It,
however, reaches and concludes only parties to the issue; and does
not afiect persons who, though parties to the suit, were not par-
ties to the issue upon which the judgment was rendered. The
latter being strangers to the issue, are, in a legal sense, strangers
to the judgment.
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vey v. Osborn, 55 Ind., 535 ; Cox's A dm'r v. Hill, 3 Ohio, 4 1 2, 
424. 
The case of }.f cCrory v. Parks, 18 Ohio St., 1 ,  is much in 
point. There the action below was a suit by one surety on a 
sheriff's bond against his co-sureties for contribution. The question 
arose on a cross-petition filed by one of them, and the reply of 
the plaintiff. In the cross-petition the allowance of a claim of 
money paid on the amercement of the sheriff, to which all had 
been made parties, was asked. The reply controverted the j us­
tice of the judgment, and claimed that it should not have been 
rendered-that the amercement had been for the alleged failure 
of the sheriff to pay over moneys made on an execution against 
the cross petitioner ; that, though the court found and adjudged 
in the former action that the money had been paid, yet as a 
matter of fact it had not been paid �nd the j udgment 
was wrongly entered ; and the question arose, whether hav­
ing been a party to the former judgment, the plaintiff was not 
concluded by it. The court held not, for the reason that the par­
ties to this suit were not adversary parties in the former suit, and 
that their respective rights against each other were not in contro­
versy [*214]  in that suit. The only difference between this case 
and the one under review is, that in the former case a judgment 
was pleaded in which the opposite party was held to an obliga­
tion, and here he was released. But this can make no difference 
in the application of the principle ;· the conclusiveness of the j udg­
ment, in either case, must depend on the same question-whether 
an issue was joined between the parties and determinedintne 
-
ronner cas�material to their respective rights in the subsequent 
smt ; -ror--; as shown by the authorities above cited, and they are 
"SU-stained by reason, when such is not the case, there is no ground 
for the application of the doctrine of res judicata; which rests 
upon the principle of public policy, which requires that where a 
matter has once been tried and determined on issues joined be­
tween the parties in interest in a court of competent jurisdictjdn, 
there should in the interest of society, be an end of litigation. It, 
however, reaches and concludes only parties to the issue ; and does 
not affect persons who, though parties to the suit, were not par­
ties to the issue upon which the judgment was rendered. The 
latter being strangers to the issue, are, in a legal sense, strangers 
to the j udgment. 
Judgmen t of the circuit court rn!ersed, and tha.t of the com­
m o n  picas aflirm ed. 
\VI LLI .HI S, J. , dissents. 
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Accord: Butfington v. Cook, 35 Ala. 312, 73 Am. Dec. 491; Bulkley
v. House, 62 Conn. 459, 26 At]. 352, 21 L. R. A. 247; Jones v. Vert, 121
Ind. 140, 22 N. E. 882, 16 Am. St. Rep. 379; Montgomery v. Road, 34
Kan. 122, 8 Pac. 253; Pioneer Sat/ings Ass’n. v. Bartsch, 51 Minn. 474,
53 N. W. 764, 38 Am. St. Rep. 511; St. Joseph 21. Union Ry. Co., 116 M0.
636, 22 S. \V. 794, 38 Am. St. Rep. 626; Gardner v. Raisbeck, 28 N. J.
Eq. 71; Ostrander 1/. Hart, 130 N. Y. 406, 29 N. E. 744.
“If two persons are sued on a note, and judgment taken without
cross-pleadings, the question of who shall pay the debt as between them-
selves is left open; but that both are liable to the creditor is adjudicated,
and can no longer be disputed even as between themselves.” ll/estfield
Gas <9 M. Co. v. Nobles:/ille 6' E. G. Co., 13 Ind. App. 481, 41 N. E. 955,
55 Am. St. Rep. 244.
WALDO v. WALDO, in Mich. Sup. Ct., Dec. 20, 1883—52 Mich. 91, 17
N. W. 709.
Srnzawooo, ]. * * * The purpose and object of the bill of
complaint in this case is to obtain a decree establishing the title
in fee to the lands therein mentioned, in complainant and Mary
Allen as children and heirs at law of deceased. It appears from
the record that Mary Allen, in May, 1881, filed her bill of com-
plaint, making the parties to this suit defendants therein, for the
purpose of accomplishing the same object sought by the bill in
this case; that the case was finally heard on appeal in this court
on the merits, and the complainant's bill dismissed. See Allen v.
Waldo, 47 Mich.-516.
From the facts as they now appear before us, the complain-
ant should have joined with his sister as a party complainant in
the first suit, but failing to do so, he was properly made a party
defendant therein, and as such, is subject to all the legal [*93]
consequences necessarily resulting therefrom. The complainant
was not only a party to that suit and the adjudication therein,
but privy in blood and estate with the complainant in the same.
Both were alike interested in the subject-matter of the litigation;
both claimed under {he same conveyance and as heir-s at law of
the same ancestor. They each claimed, not separate and distinct
moieties, but equal, undivided interests in the entire property;
and we think that if one is concluded by the final decision made
in this court in the former case, then equally so is the other.
Prentiss v. Holbrook, 2 Mich. 376; Hale v. Chandler, 3 Mich.
535: Cooley’s Const. Lim. 47-51, and cases cited; 1 Greenl. Ev.
§§ 180, 322, 323, 535, 536; Herm. on Estoppel §§ 46-49, 59.
The right now claimed by complainant could have been as
fully asserted and maintained in the former suit as in this. It
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Accord : Buffington v. Cook, 35 Ala. 3 12, 73 Am. Dec. 491 ; Bulkley 
v. House, 62 Conn. 459. 26 Atl. 352, 21  L. R. A. 247 ; Jones v. Vert, 121 
Ind. 140, 22 N. E. 882, 16 Am. St. Rep. 379 ;  Montgomery v .  Road, 34 
Kan. 122, 8 Pac. 253 ; Pioneer Savings Ass'n. v. Bartsch, 5 1  Minn. 474. 
53 N. W. 764, 38 Am. St. Rep. 5 1 1 ; St. Joseph v. Union Ry. Co., 1 16 Mo. 
636, 22 S. W. 794, JS Am. St. Rep. 626 ; Gardner v. Raisbeck, 28 N. J. 
Eq. 71 ; Ostrander v. Hart, 130 N. Y. 4o6, 29 N. E. 744-
"If two persons are sued on a note, and j udgment taken without 
cross-pleadings, the question of who shall pay the debt as between them­
selves is left open ; but that both are liable to the creditor is adjudicated, 
and can no longer be disputed even as between themselves." Westfield 
Gas & M. Co. v. Noblesville & E. G. Co., 13 Ind. App. 481, 41 N. E. 955, 
55 Am. St. Rep. 244-
WALDO v. WALDO, in Mich. Sup. Ct., Dec. 20, 1883-52 Mich. 91, 17 
N. W. 709. 
SHERWOOD, J. * * * The purpose and object of  the bill of 
complaint in this case is to obtain a decree establishing the title 
in fee to the lands therein mentioned, in complainant and Mary 
Allen as children and heirs at law of deceased. It appears from 
the record that Mary Allen, in May, 1 88 1 ,  filed her bill of com­
plaint, making the parties to this suit defendants therein, for the 
purpose of accomplishing the same obj ect sought by the bill in 
this case ; that the case was finally heard on appeal in this court 
on the merits, and the complainant's bil l dismissed. See Allen v. 
Waldo, 47 Mich. · 516. 
From the facts as they now appear before us, the complain­
ant should have joined with his sister as a party complainant in 
the first suit, but failing to do so, he was properly made a party 
defendant therein, and as such, is subj ect to all the legal [*93] 
consequences necessarily resulting therefrom. The comp!ainant 
was not only a party to that suit and the adjudication therein , 
but privy in blood and estate with the complainant in the same. 
Both were alike interested in the subject-matter of the litigation ; 
both claimed under ihe same conveyance and as heirs at law of 
the same ancestor. They each claimed, not separate and distinct 
moieties, but equal, undivided interests in the entire property ; 
and we think that if one is concluded by the final decision made 
in this cour:t in the former case, then equally so is the other. 
Prentiss v. Holbrook, 2 Mich . 376 ; Hale v. Chandler, 3 Mich. 
s:�s : Cooley's Const. Lim. 47-5 1 ,  and cases cited ; I Greenl. F.v. 
§§ 18o, 322, 323, 535, 536 ; Herm. on Estoppel §§ 46-49, 59. 
The right now claimed by complainant could have been as 
fully asserted and maintained in the former suit as in this. It 
was competent for the court in that case, upon the plead ings and 
-� 
. 
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such proofs as were proper in the case, to make a decree deter-
mining and establishing the rights and interests of each of the
parties without the necessity of a cross—bill or other proceeding
for afiirmative relief. 1 Barb. Ch. Pr. 339; Thurston v. Prentiss,
I Mich. I94; Elliott v. Pell, I Paige 262; Jones v. Grant, 10 Paige
348. The complainant was a necessary party in the first suit-—
see Story’s Eq. Plead. (6th ed.) §§ 72, I50 and cases there cited
-and being such party he was a party to every issue joined and
litigated in it that could in any way affect his interests or his
rights, and must be concluded by the decree upon those issues,
and if he did not maintain his rights the decree is no less bind-
ing so long as he had the opportunity and neglected to do so.
We think the first suit and decree are clearly a bar to the
present action, and that the decree of the circuit judge sustain-
ing defendant‘s plea and dismissing complainant's bill was right
and must be affirmed with costs.
The other Justices concurred.
Accord: Lewis v. Brown Townsliip, 109 U. S. 163, 3 S. Ct. 92, 27
L. ed. 892; Georgia R. <9 B. Co. v. Wright, 124 Ga. 596, 53 S. E. 25!;
Devin v. Ottumwa, 53 Iowa 461, 5 N. W. 552; Bougert v. Blades, II7
N. C. 221, 23 S. E. 179.
Effect of Judgment as to Strangers.
RUFF v. RUFF, in Pa. Sup. Ct.,‘ Jan. 7, I878—85 Pa. St. (6 Norris) 333.
Debt on a judgment note sued by C. P. Ruff for use of \Vm.
Hillis against Michael Ruff in W estmoreland common pleas. The
note was executed by Michael to C. P., August I, 1868, and as-
signed by C. P. to Hillis, Feb. 20, 1874. Defendant pleads that
before this action was commenced and before the assignment of
the note to Hillis, this defendant was summoned as garnishee in
an action by Thos. ]. Barclay against C. P. Ruff, and upon issue
formed and tried between said Barclay as plaintiff and this de-
fendant as garnishee, he was found not liable on said note, and
judgment entered in his favor; which judgment is a bar to this
action. To this special plea plaintiff demurred. The demurrer
was held bad, and judgment given for the defendant. Plaintiff
brings error.
Gonnou, ]. * * * The one question for us to resolve is,
















































































































































CASES ON J U DGM E NTS, ETC. 
such proofs as were proper in the case, to make a decree deter­
mining and establ ishing the rights and interests of each of the 
parties without the necessity of a cross-bi ll or other proceeding 
for affirmative relief. I Barb. Ch. Pr. 339 ; Thurston v. Prentiss, 
1 Mich. 194 ; Elliott v. Pell, 1 Paige 262 ; Jones v. Grant, 10 Paige 
348. The complainant was a necessary party in the first suit­
see Story's Eq. Plead. (6th ed. ) §§ 72, 1 50 and cases there cited 
-and being such party he was a party to every issue joined and 
litigated in it that could in any way affect his interests or his 
rights, and must be concluded by the decree upon those issues, 
and if he did not maintain his rights the decree is no less bind­
ing so long as he had the opportunity and neglected to do so. 
We think the first suit and decree are clearly a bar to the 
present action, and that the decree o f  the circuit j udge sustain­
ing defendant's plea and dismissing complainant's bill was right 
and must be affirmed with costs. 
The other Justices concurred. 
Accord : Lewis v. Brown Township, 109 U. S. 163, 3 S. Ct. 92, 27 
L. ed. 8g2 ;  Georgia R. & B. Co. v. Wright, 124 Ga. 596, 53 S. E. 25 1 ; 
Devin v. Ottumwa, 53 Iowa 46 1,  5 N. W. 552 ; Bougert v. Blades, 1 17 
N. C. 221, 23 S. E. 179. 
Effect of Judgment as to Strangers. 
RUFF v. RUFF, in Pa. Sup. Ct.; Jan. 7, 1878-85 Pa. St. (6 Norris ) 333. 
Debt on a judgment note sued by C. P. Ruff for use of Wm. 
H i llis against Michael Ruff in Westmoreland common pleas. The 
note was executed by M ichael to C. P., August I ,  1868, and as­
signed by C. P. to Hillis, Feb. 20, 1874. Defendant pleads that 
before this action was commenced and before the assignment of 
the note to Hillis, this defendant was summoned as garnishee in 
an action by Thos. J. Barclay against C. P. Ruff, and upon issue 
formed and tried between said Barclay as plaint iff and this de­
fendant as garn ishee , he was found not liable on said note, and 
j udgment entered in his favor ; which judgment is a bar to this 
action. To th is spec ial plea plaintiff demurred. The demurrer 
was held bad: and judgment given for the defendant. Pla intiff 
brings error. 
GORDON ,  J. * * '* The one question for us to resolve is, 
was C. P. Ruff, by reason of his having been served with the 
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writ of attachment, such a party or privy to this issue as would
make the judgment therein binding on him? If he is so bound,
the demurrer to the defendant’s plea in bar was well ruled by
the court below; if not, that ruling was erroneous. But if he was
such a party, then should he have been included in the issue and
the jury should also have been sworn as to him; this, however,
was not done; and why not? The answer is, because he had no
standing as a party against the garnishee, and was, therefore,
properly excluded from a participation in the trial. If he had
ought to say against the judgment, from which the attachment
issued, he might have pleaded and had issue; it is, that he might
have such opportunity, that the act of assembly directs that notice
be given the debtor, if he is in the county. \~Vith such trial, how-
ever, the garnishee has no concern, neither is it a prerequisite to
a trial against him: llIcCormac v. Hancock, 2 Pa. St. (2 Barr)
[*336] 310. It is thus apparent that the two issues are quite dis-
tinct, and that whilst in the latter, the garnishee has no interest,
in the former the debtor has none, and so may not intervene either
to direct or control it. So completely does his interest antagonize
that of both the contending parties that, even before the Act of
1869, he might have been a witness for either: Gemmill V. Butler,
4 Pa. St. (4 Barr) 232. Again, it is not correct to assume that
the attaching creditor stands, in all respects, in the place of the
debtor as to the goods and credits attached; for, if such were the
case, then would a judgment, for or against the garnishee, be con-'
elusive, not only as to the debtor, but also as to his creditors.
Such, however, is not the case as to creditors or trustees in in-
solvency: Breading V. Siegworth, 29 Pa. St. (5 Casey) 396;’
Tams v. Bullett, 35 Pa. St. (11 Casey) 308.
What shall we say, then: that the debtor is concluded by the-
result of an issue in which he has no interest; from which by legal'
rule he is excluded ; in which he cannot be heard, except as a wit-
ness, and which does not conclude his creditors? This proposi—-
tion contains in itself its own answer. If one is to be concluded‘.
by a judgment he must have his day in court: some say in, and
control over, the trial. But C. P. Ruff had neither control over
nor say in the issue between Barclay and the garnishee. Bare].-iv
might have permitted the case to go by default; he might havie
discontinued, or he and the garnishee might have compromised.
and C. P. Ruff could not have intervened to prevent either. He
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writ of attachment, such a party or privy to this i ssue as would 
make the judgment therein binding on him ? I f  he is so bound, 
the demurrer to the defendant's plea in bar was well ruled by 
the court below ; if not, that ruling was erroneous. But if he was 
such a party, then should he have been included in the issue and 
the jury should also have been sworn as to him ; this, however, 
was not done ; and why not ? The answer is, because he had no 
standing as a party against the garnishee, and was, therefore, 
properly excluded from a participation in the trial . If  he had 
ought to say against the judgment, from which the attachment 
issued, he might have pleaded and had issue ; it is, that he might 
have such opportunity, that the act of assembly directs that notice 
be given the debtor� if he is in the county. With such trial, how­
ever, the garnishee has no concern, neither is it a prerequisite to 
a trial against him : McCormac v. Hancock, 2 Pa. St. ( 2  Barr) 
[ *336] 3 10. It is thus apparent that the two issues are quite dis­
tinct, and that whilst in the latter, the garnishee has no interest, 
in the former the debtor has none, and so may not intervene either 
to direct or control it. So completely does his interest antagonize 
that of both the contending parties that, even before the Act of 
186<), he might have been a witness for either : Gemmill v. Butler, 
4 Pa. St. ( 4 Barr ) 232. Again, it is not correct to assume that 
the attaching creditor stands, in all respects, in the place of the 
debtor as to the goods and credits attached ; for, i f  such were the 
case, then would a j udgment, for or against the garnishee, be con-
' 
elusive, not only as to the debtor, but also as to his creditors. 
Such ,  however, is not the case as to creditors or trustees in in­
solvency : Breading v. Sie g'l.t'Orth, 29 Pa. St. { 5 Casey) 396 ; , 
Tam.s v. Bullett, 35 Pa. St. ( I I  Casey) 3o8. 
What shall we say, then ; that the debtor is concluded by the-­
result of an issue in which he has no interest ; from which by legatr 
ntle he is excluded ; in which he cannot be heard, except as a wit-­
ness, and which does not conclude his creditors ? This proposi- ­
tion contains in itself its own answer. I f  one is to be concluded' 
by a judgment he must have his day in court ; some say in , and 
control over, the trial . But C .  P. Ruff had neither control over 
nor say in the issue between Barclay and the garnishee. Barc!�v 
mig-ht have permitted the case to go by default ; he mig-ht hav� 
discontinued, or he and the garnishee might have compromised 
and � · P. Ruff could not have intervened to prevent either. H� 
was literally barred out of the case, and for the sufficient reason 
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that he was no party to it; hence, by all rule, he is not concluded
by the judgment resulting from its trial.
The judgment of the court below is reversed.
Exce/rtions to Rule that Strangers are not Bound.
Whenever the fact that a verdict or judgment has been rendered or
the consequences of that mere fact become material, the official record
of that judgment is always competent and conclusive evidence to prove
that such verdict or judgment has been rendered and to prove the facts
that result as a necessary legal conclusion from such verdict or judg-
ment; and such evidence is conclusive, not only against parties to the
proceeding, but against strangers as well. This record, when so put in
evidence by or against strangers, establishes the fact of the verdict and
judgment as recorded, but is no evidence of the facts on which the judg-
ment was based. Black on Judgments, § 603.
“In creating debts, or establishing the relation of debtor and credi-
tor, the debtor is accountable to no one unless he acts mala fide. A judg-
ment, therefore, obtained against the latter without collusion, is con-
clusive evidence of the relation of debtor and creditor against others:
I, because it is conclusive between the parties to the record, who in the
given case have the exclusive right to establish it; and, 2, because the
claims of other creditors upon the debtor's property are through him, and
subject to all previous liens, preferences, or conveyances made by him in
good faith. Any deed, judgment, or assurance of the debtor, so far at
least as they conclude him, must estop his creditors and all others. Con-
Sequently, neither a creditor nor stranger can interfere in a bona fide
litigation of the debtor, or retry his cause for him, or question the effect
of the judgment as a claim upon his estate. A creditor’s right, in a word,
to impeach the act of his debtor, does not arise till the latter has violated
the tacit condition annexed to the debt, that he has done and will do noth-
ing to defraud his creditors. Where, however, fraud is established, the
creditor does not claim through the debtor, but adversely to him and by
a title paramount, which overreaches and annuls the fraudulent convey-
ance or judgment, by which the latter himself would be estopped.” Can-
dee v. Lord, 2 N. Y. 269, 66 Am. Dec. 294. Accord: Pabst Brewing Co.
v. Jensen, 68 Minn. 293, 71 N. W. 384, and cases cited.
“Where a fact may be established by proof as general reputation,
such as custom, prescription, pedigree, or the like, the record of a judg-
ment or decree finding the same fact is prima facie evidence thereof against
third persons. The solemn adjudication of a court upon testimony is
justly regarded as stronger proof of the fact than mere evidence of gen-
eral reputation.” Pile v. McBratney, 15 Ill. 314, 3I9; I Greenleaf Ev. 555
BRIGHAM v. FAYERWEATHER, in Mass, Sup. Jud. Ct., Jan. 5
1886-440 Mass. 411, 5 N. E. 265.
. \_
Bill in equity to set aside a mortgage deed executed by one
l'Azubah Brigham, plaintiff’s testator, on the ground that, at the
1date of the execution of _the deed, she was not of sufficient mental
,capacity to execute it.
At the trial in the superior court the following issue was
4‘-cubmitted to the jury: “\/Vas Azubah Brigham of sufficient mental
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that he was no party to it ; hence, by all rule, he is not concluded 
by the judgment resulting from its trial. 
The judgment of tlie court below is reversed. 
Excep tions to Rule that StraKgers are not Bound. 
Whenever the fact that a verdict or j udgment has been rendered or 
the consequences of that mere fact become material, the official record 
of that j udgment is always competent and conclusive evidence to prove 
that such verdict or j udgment has been rendered and to prove the facts 
that result as a necessary legal conclusion from such verdict or j udg­
ment ; and such evidence is conclusive, not only against parties to the 
proceeding, but against strangers as well. This record, when so put in 
evidence by or against strangers, establishes the fact of the verdict and 
j udgment as recorded, but is no evidence of the facts on which the judg­
ment was based. Black on Judgments, § 6o3. 
"In creating debts, or establishing the relation of debtor and credi­
tor, the debtor is accountable to no one unless he acts mala fide. A j udg­
ment, therefore, obtained against the latter without collusion, is con­
clusive evidence of the relation of debtor and creditor against others : 
r, because it is conclusive between the parties to the record, who in the 
given case have the exclusive right to establish it ; and, 2, because the 
claims of other creditors upon the debtor's property are through him, and 
subj ect to all previous liens, preferences, or conveyances made by him in 
good faith. Any deed, judgment, or assurance of the debtor, so far at 
least as they conclude him, must estop his creditors and all others. Con­
sequently, neither a creditor nor stranger can interfere in a bona fide 
litigation of the debtor, or retry his cause for him, or question the effect 
• of the j udgment as a claim upon his estate. A creditor's right, in a word, 
to impeach the act of his debtor, does not arise till the latter has violated 
the tacit condition annexed to the debt, that he has done and will do noth­
ing to defraud his creditors. Where, however, fraud is established, the 
creditor docs not claim through the debtor, but adversely to him and by 
a title paramount, which overreaches and annuls the fraudulent convey­
ance or j udgment, by which the latter himself would be estopped." Can-
dee v. l,ord, 2 N. Y. 269, 66 Am. Dec. 294- Accord : Papst Brewing Co. 
v. Jensen, 68 Minn. 293, 71 N. W. 384, and cases cited. 
"Where a fact may be established by proof as general reputation, 
such as custom, prescription, pedigree, or the like, the record of a judg­
ment or decree finding the same fact is prima/acie evidence thereof against 
third persons. The solemn adj udication o a court upon testimony is 
justly regarded as stronger proof of the fact than mere evidence of gen­
eral reputation." Pile v. M cBralnty, 15 Ill 314. 319 ;  1 Greenleaf ·Ev. 555 
BRIGHAM v. FAYERWEATHER, in Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Jan. 5 
1886-140 Mass. 411, 5 N. E. 265. 
' -... ' 
,I Bill in equity to set aside a mortgage deed executed by one 
l'Azubah Brigham, plaintiff's testator, on the ground that, at the 
i ·date of the execution of .the deed, she was not of sufficient mental 
,·capacity to execute it. 
· 
At the trial in the superior court the following issue was 
/ cubmitted to the jury : ''Was Azubah Brigham of sufficient mental 
t ·capacity, at the time the mortgage deed referred to in the bill 
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was executed, to transact the business of executing such a deed?”
The deed was executed on June I5, 1882. The mortgager died
on December 6, I883, leaving a will executed on October II,
1882, by the provisions of which the plaintiff was made residuary
devisee and legatee, and also one of the executors of the will.
The defendants offered evidence tending to show that the mental
capacity of the mortgagor was no less on June I 5, I882, than on
October II, I882; and also offered in evidence a petition to the
Worcester county probate court, by the plaintiff, for the pro-
bate of the will, as evidence of the mental capacity of the mort-
gagor at the date of the will, and they offered the decision of the
probate court, admitting the will to probate. This evidence was
excluded. \/Villiam Curtis, a physician, and one of the executors
of the will, testified, for the plaintiff, that he was the family
physician of the mortgagor to the time of her heath; and he also
testified that in his opinion she was disqualified, by reason of her
mental condition, from doing such business as the execution of
said deed at the time she executed it. The defendants offered
to show, by the defendant Fayerweather, that in a talk which he
had with Dr. Curtis about the deed in question, in April or in May,
1884, after the appointment of the latter as executor, the latter
did not claim then, nor had ever claimed, that the mortgagor
was incompetent to execute the mortgage. This evidence was
excluded. The jury found that the deceased was of unsound
mind at the time the deed referred to was executed, and the de-
fendants alleged exceptions.
HoI,MEs, J. A judgment in rem is an act of the sovereign
power; and, as such, its effect cannot be disputed, at least within
the jurisdiction. If a competent court declares a vessel forfeited
or orders it sold free from all claims, or divorces a couple, or
establishes a will under statutes like our Pub. St. c. 127, § 7, a
paramount title is passed, the couple is divorced, the will is estab-
lished as against all the world, whether parties or not, because
the sovereign has said that it shall be so. Hughes V. Cornelius,
2 Show. 232; S. C. Raym. 473, Skin. 59, and Beak v. Tyrell,
Carth. 32; Noell v. Wells, 1 Lev. 235: Scott v. Shearman, 2 VV.
B1. 977; The Helena, 4 Rob. Adm. 3; Leonard v. Leonard, I4
Pick. 280; McClurg v. Terry, 2I N. J. Eq. 225. But the same is
true when the judgment is that A recover a debt from B. The
public force is pledged to collect the debt from B, and no one with-
in the jurisdiction can oppose it. And it does not follow in the
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was executed , to transact the business of executing such a deed ?" 
The deed was executed on June 15 ,  1882. The mortgager died 
on December 6, 1883, leaving a will executed on October I I , 
1882, by the provisions of which the plaintiff was made residuary 
devisee and legatee, and also one of the executors of the will . 
The defendants offered evidence tending to show that the mental 
capacity of the mortgagor was no less on Ju�e 15 ,  1882, than on 
October 1 1 , 1882 ; and also offered in evidence a petition to the , 
Worcester county probate court, by the plaintiff, for the pro-
' 
\.: 
bate of the will, as evidence of the mental capacity of the mort­
gagor at the date of the will, and they offered the decision of the 
probate court, admitting the will to probate. This evidence was \ '­
excluded. William Curtis, a physician, and one of the executors 
of the will, testified, for the plaintiff, that he was the family 
physician of the mortgagor to the time of her heath ; and he also 
testified that in his opinion she was disqualified, by reason of her 
mental condition, from doing such business as the execution of 
said deed at the time she executed it. The defendants offered 
to show, by the defendant Fayerweather, that in a talk which he 
had with Dr. Curtis about the deed in question, in April or in May, 
1884, after the appointment of the latter as executor, the latter 
did not claim then, nor had ever claimed, that the mortgagor 
was incompetent to execute the mortgage. This evidence was 
excluded. The jury found that the deceased was of unsound 
mind at the time the deed ref erred to was executed, and the de­
fendants alleged exceptions. 
Hor.MES, J. A judgment in rem is an act of the sovereign 
power ; and , as such, its effect cannot be disputed, at least within 
the jurisdiction . If a competent court declares a vessel forfeited 
or orders it sold free from all claims, or divorces a couple, or 
establishes a will under statutes like our Pub. St. c. 127, § 7, a 
paramount title is passed, the couple is divorced, the will is estab­
lished as against all the world, whether parties or not, because 
the sovereign has said that it shall be so. Hie.ghes v. Corneliu.s, 
2 Show. 232 ; S. C. Raym. 473, Skin. 59, and Beak v. Tyrell, 
Carth . 32 ; Noell v. Wells, I Lev. 235 : Scott v. Shearman, 2 Vt/. 
Bl. 977 ; The H clena, 4 Rob. Adm. 3 ;  Leonard v. Leonard, 14  
Pick. 28o ; AfcClurg v .  Terry, 2 1  N. J. Eq. 225. But the same i s  
true when the  judgment is that A recover a debt from B. The 
public force is pledged to collect the debt from B, and no one with­
in the j u risdiction can oppose it. And it does not follow in the 
former case any more than in the latter, nor is it true, that the 
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judgment, because conclusive on all the world in what we may
call it legislative effect, is equally conclusive upon all as an ad-
judication of the facts upon which it is grounded. On the con-
trary, those judgments, such as sentences of prize courts, to
which the greatest effect has been given in collateral proceedings,
are said to be conclusive evidence of the facts upon which they
proceed only against parties who were entitled to be heard be-
fore they were rendered. The Mary, 9 Cranch, I26, I46; Salem
v. Etlstern R. Co., 98 Mass. 431, 449; Baxter v. New England
Ins. C 0., 6 Mass. 277, 286; Wh>it‘ncy v. Walsh, I Cush. 29. \Ve
may lay on one side, then, any argument based on the misleading
expression that all the world are parties to a proceding in rem
This does not mean that all the world are entitled to be heard;
and, as strangers in interest are not entitled to be heard, there is
no reason why they should be bound by the findings of fact,
although bound to admit the title or status which the judgment
establishes. [*4I4] Still the cases last cited show that some
judgments in rem are conclusive eviden_<:t:_~of ti? facts adjudi-
cated in favor of a stranger, as against a party; and if the analogy
is to be applied to all judgments which create or change a status
or a title, it would apply here; for the plaintiff was a party to the
decree establishing the will, and that decree necessarily proceeded
on the ground that the testator possessed sufficient capacity to
make the will. _
But these cases cannot be taken to lay down a general princi-
ple. The reasons given for the decisions are not that the con-
clusion follows as a necessary effect of judgment in rem merely
as such, but are special reasons of convenience or construction.
In The Mary, 9 Cranch, I26, 145, the doctrine as to sentences of
prize courts is said to rest on “the propriety of leaving the cogni-
zance of prize questions exclusively to courts of prize jurisdiction;
the very great inconvenience amounting nearly to an impossi-
bility of fully investigating such cases in a court of common law;
and the impropriety of revising the decisions of the maritime
courts of other nations, whose jurisdiction is co-ordinate through-
out the world.” In Ba-xter v. Neg; England Ins. Co., 6 Mass.
277, 300, and Robinson v. Jones, 8 Mass. 536, 540, the effect of
a sentance, in a subsequent action, on a policy of insurance is
referred to the settled construction of mercantile contracts. In
Lothian v. Henderson, 3 Bos. 8: P. 499, 545, the doctrine seems
to be thought to stand on practice and authority, rather than on
















































































































































CASES ON J UDGMEN TS, ETC. 
j udgment, because conclusive on all the world in what we may 
call it legislative effect, is equally conclusive upon all as an ad­
j udication of the facts upon which it is grounded. On the con­
trary, those judgments, such as sentences of prize courts, to 
which the greatest effect has been given in collateral proceedings, 
are said to be conclusive evidence o f  the facts upon which they 
proceed only against parties who were entitled to be beard be­
fore they were rendered. The .M ar'y, 9 Cranch, 126, 146 ; Salem, 
v. Eastern R. Co., 98 Mass. 43 r ,  449 ; Baxter v. New England 
Ins. Co., 6 l\lass. 277, 286 ; Whitney v. JtValsli, l Cush. 29. We 
may lay on one side, then, any argument based on the misleading 
expression that all the world are parties to a proceding in rem 
I This does not mean that all the world are entitled to be heard ; and, as strangers in interest are not entitled to be heard, there is no reason why they should be bound by the findings of fact, although bound to admit the title or status which the j udgment establishes. [ *414]  Still the cases last cited show that soine 
judgments in rem are conclusive evidence--of "the facts adj udi- . 
cated in favor of a stranger, as against a party ; and if the analogy 
is to be applied to all judgments which create or change a status 
or a title, it would apply here ; for the plaint1ff was a party to the 
decree establishing the will, and that decree necessarily proceeded 
on the ground that the testator possessed sufficient capacity to 
make the \vill . _ 
But these cases cannot be taken to lay down a general princi­
ple. The reasons given for the decisions are not that the con­
clusion follows as a necessary effect of j udgment in rem merely 
as such, but are special reasons of convenience or construction. 
In The Al ary, 9 Cranch, 1 26, 145,  the doctrine as to sentences of 
prize courts is said to rest on "the propriety of leaving the cogni­
zance of prize questions exclusively to courts of prize jurisdiction ;  
the very great inconvenience amounting nearly to an impossi­
bil ity of fully investigating such cases in a court of common law ; 
and the impropriety of revising the decisions of the maritime 
courts of other nations, whose jurisdiction is  co-ordinate through­
out the world." In  Baxter v. New' England Ins. Co ., 6 Mass. 
277, 300, and Robinson v. Jones, 8 Mass. 536, 540, the effect of 
a scntance, in a subsequent action, on a policy of insurance is 
ref erred to the settled construction of mercantile contracts. In 
Lothian v. Hender son, 3 Bos. & P. 49CJ, 545, the doctrine seems 
to be thought to stand on practice and authority, rather than on 
principle. See Ca.strique v. Imrie, L. R. 4 H. L. 4 1 4, 434. The 
. 
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ship as a prize,” and some other judgments of a kindred nature. l
general principle is stated with substantial correctness by Sir
James F. Stephen in his work on Evidence, (article 42:) “State-
ments contained in judgments, as to the facts upon which the
judgment is based, are deemed to be irrelevant as betweeni
strangers, or as between a party or privy and a stranger, exceptl
in the case of judgments of courts of admiralty condemning a‘
\
Apart from precedent, there seems to be no satisfactory
ground for treating the probate of a will as evidence of the testa-
tor’s mental capacity on a collateral issue. For, except in the
comparatively small number of cases where the probate of the will
is opposed, the investigation of the fact is necessarily only
formal. Still less do we see why, if the probate is not evidence
[*415] against a party who had no right to be heard, he should
hold the executor bound by it when he himself is free. Ordina-
rily, estoppels by judgment are mutual. The fact can be tried in
the superior court as well as in the probate court, and was actu-
ally tried in this very case. Thus the chief reason offered for the
effect of prize sentences is removed. .
One or two cases cited by the defendant may need a word
of explanation. It has been held, in a suit by an administrator,
that letters of administration are conclusive proof of the intes-
tate’s death, unless the defendant pleads in abatement. Newman
v. Jenkins, 10 Pick. 515. And elsewhere it has been decided, in
a suit where the plaintiff's title was derived from an adminis-
trator’s sale, that the letters are prima facie evidence of the death.
Jeffers v. Radclifi”, IO N. H. 242; Tisdale v. Conmwticut Ins. Co..
26 Iowa, 170: S. C. 28 Iowa, 12. But in these cases the letters
are not introduced as evidence on a collateral issue. They are
not put in to prove the death, but the death is denied in order to
invalidate the letters. The fact of death is immaterial, except
as bearing on the jurisdiction of the court to issue them. It may
well be held that, where the question comes up in this way, such
a decree will be presumed [wima facic to have been within the jur-
isdiction of the court that made it, so far as this fact is concerned,
although it has been held otherwise in England. Moons v. De
Bcrnalcs, I Russ. 301, 307. See Thompson v. Donaldson, 3 Esp.
63. But it is entirely consistent with the New Hampshire and
Iowa decisions to hold that, in collateral proceedings, the issue
of letters of administration is not even flrima facle evidence of
death. Carroll v. Carroll, 60 N. Y. I2I ; ll/Iutual Benefit Ins. Co.
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general principle is stated with substantial correctness by Sir 
James F. Stephen in his work 0n E v idence, ( article 42 : ) "State­
ments contained in judgments, as to the facts upon which the J 
j udgment is based, are deemed to be irrelevant as between 1 
strangers, or  as between a party or privy and a stranger, except \ 1\ 
in the case of j udgments of courts of admiralty condemning a I ship as a prize," and some other judgments of a kindred nathre. 
Apart from precedent, there seems to be no sati sfactory l 
ground for treating the probate of a will as evidence of  the testa- · \ 
tor's mental capacity on a collateral issue. For, except in the 
comparatively small number of cases where the probate of the will 
is opposed, the investigation of the fact is  necessarily only " 
formal. Still less do we see why, i f  the probate is not evidence t 
[ *415]  against a party who had no right to be heard, he should 
hold the executor bound by it when he himself is free. Ordina­
rily, estoppels by judgment are mutual. The fact can be tried in 
the superior court as well as in the probate court, and was actu­
ally tried in this very case. Thus the chief reason offered for the 
effect of prize sentences is removed. 
One or two cases cited by the defendant may need a word 
of explanation. It has been held, in a suit by an administrator, 
that letters of administration are conclusive proof of the intes­
tate's death, unless the defendant pleads in abatement. N en.-mati 
v. I enkins, 10 Pick. 5 I 5.  And elsewhere it  has been decided, in 
a suit where the plaintiff's title was derived from an adminis­
trator's sale, that the letters are prima facie evidence of the death. 
Jeffers v. Radcliff, IO N. H. 242 ; Tisdale v. Connecticut Ins. Co., 
26 Iowa, 1 70 ;  S. C.  28 Iowa, 1 2. But in these cases the letters 
are not introduced as evidence on a collateral i ssue. They are 
not put in to prove the death, but the death is denied in order to 
invalidate the letters. The fact of death is immaterial, except 
as bearing on the jurisdiction of the court to issue them. It may 
well be held that, where the question comes up in this way, such 
a decree will be presumed prima facic to have been withjn the jur­
isdiction of the court that made it, so far as this fact is  concerned, 
although it has been held otherwise in England. .Moons v. De 
Berna/cs, I Russ. 30 1 ,  307. See Thompson v. Donaldson, 3 Esp. 
63. But it is  entirely consistent with the X ew Hampshire and 
Iowa decisions to hold that, in collateral proceed ings, the issue 
of letters of admini stration is not even prima facic evidence of 
death. Carroll \'. Carroll, 6o X. Y. 1 2 1 ; Mutual Benefit brs. Co. 
v. Tisdale, 91 C. S. 238. See Blackham' s Case, 1 Salk . 290 ; 
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French v. French, I Dick. 268; Sjwencer v. ‘Williams, L. R. 2
Prob. & Div. 230. These cases very strongly sustain the con-
clusion which we have reached.
In the case at bar the plaintiff’s title under the will was
admitted by the answer; and if it had not been, the testator's
sanity or insanity did not affect it, because it did not affect the
jurisdiction of the court. If the defendant, as well as the plain-
tiff, had been a party to the probate of the will, a different question
would arise. See Barrs V. Jackson, I Phil. Ch. 582, (reversing
S. C. I Younge 8: C. Ch. 585;) [*416] Doglioni v. Crislbin, L. R.
I. H. L. 301, 311, 314; Bnrlen V. Slmnizon, 99 Mass. 200, 203;
Morse v. Elms, 131 Mass. 151, 152. But the defendant was not
a party in the sense that he was entitled to be heard, or to take
an appeal, and, unless he had that right, he was not concluded
by the adjudication of facts, as has been shown.
It is suggested that the plaintitf’s petition presenting the
will for probate was competent as an admission; but we do not
think that any question, except the effect of the adjudication,
appears by the exceptions to have been presented to the court,
or to have been ruled upon by it, even if the petition would have
been admissible on that ground, which we do not intimate. See
Page v. Page, 15 Pick. 368.
The bill of exceptions does not show that the testimony of
Fayerweather was improperly rejected. The mere fact that Dr.
Curtis had had a talk about the mortgage does not show that the
talk was of such a nature as to call for a denial of the mortgagor’s
capacity, and therefore the fact that he did not deny it, would not
tend to contradict or impeach his testimony at the trial that the
mortgagor was incompetent. Exceptions overruled.
MAYALL v. MAYALL, in Minn. Sup. Ct., Ian. 24, I896—63 Minn. 511,
65 N. W. 942.
Action by Ada Mayall as trustee under a conveyance of
Mary A. Mayall, against the other living beneficiaries under the
said conveyance, alleging that the gross rentals from the trust
property were insufficient to pay the annual taxes and mainten-
ance charges, and by reason of the dilapidated condition of the
buildings the returns would continue to decrease; but that the
property could be sold for about $100,000 or mortgaged for a
sum sufficient to put such improvements on it as would rent at
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French v. French, I Dick. 268 ; Spencer v. •Willia.ms, L. R. '2 
Prob. & Div. 230. These cases very strongly sustain the con� 
clusion which we have reached. 
In the case at bar the plaintiff's title under the will was 
admitted by the answer ; and i f  it had not been, the testator's 
sanity or insanity did not affect it, because it did not affect the 
j urisdiction of the court. If the defendant, as well as the plain-, 
tiff, had been a party to the probate of the will, a different question 
would arise. See Barrs v. Jackson, I Phil. Ch. 582, ( reversing ' S. C. 1 Younge & C.  Ch. 585 ; ) [*416] Dogliom v. Crispin, L. R. 
I .  H. L. 301 ,  3 1 1 ,  314 ; Burien v. Shannon, 99 Mass. 200, 203 ; 
Morse v. Elms, 1 3 1  Mass. 1 5 1 ,  1 52 . But the defendant was not 
.. a party in the sense that he was entitled to be heard, or  to take 
an appeal , and, unless he had that right, he was not concluded 
by the adjudication of facts, as has been shown. 
It is suggested that the plaintiff's petition presenting the 
will for probate was competent as an admission ; but we do not 
think that any question, except the effect of the adj udication, 
appears by the exceptions to have been presented to the court, 
or to have been ruled upon by it, even if the petition would have 
been admissible on that ground, which we do not intimate. See 
Page v. Page, 1 5  Pick. 368. 
The bill of exceptions d.oes not show that the testimony of  
Fayerweather was improperly rejected. The mere fact that Dr. 
Curtis had had a talk about the mortgage does not show that the 
talk was o f  such a nature as to call for a denial of the mortgagor's 
capacity, and therefore the fact that he did not deny it, would not 
tend to contradict or impeach his testimony at the trial that the 
mortgagor was incompetent. Exceptions overruled. 
MAYALL v. MAYALL, in Minn. Sup. Ct., Jan. 24. 18¢----03 Minn. 511 ,  
65 N. W. 942. 
Action by Ada Mayall as trustee under a conveyance of 
Mary A. Mayall, against the other l iving beneficiaries under the 
said conveyance, alleging that the gross rentals from the trust 
property were insufficient to pay the annual taxes and mainten­
ance charges, and by reason of the dilapidated condition of the 
buildings the returns would continue to decrease ; but that the 
property could be sold for about $100,000 or mortgaged for a 
sum sufficient to put such improvements on it as would rent at 
a profit. The complaint prayed that plaintiff be authorized to 
EFFECT OF JUDGMENT AS BAR OR ESTOPPEL 297
sell or mortgage and improve the property. From a decree grant-
ing the authority prayed, the infant defendants, by their guardian,
appeal.
NIITCHICLL, J. * * * [*514] It will be observed that the declara-
tion of trust contains no power or authority for selling, mortgag-
ing, or otherwise disposing of the property; also that, according
to the terms of the declaration, other persons may hereafter come
into being who will be beneficiaries of the trust. These two facts
raise the two principal questions presented by this appeal, to-wit:
I. Has the court, for the purpose of preserving the trust, power
to order a sale, mortgage, lease, or other disposition of the trust
property when _the trust instrument contains no power or author-
ity for so doing? 2. Has the court power, in such a case, to
bind by its judgment or decree parties not yet in being who may
hereafter become beneficiaries of the trust? Both questions must
be answered in the affirmative. The inherent power of a court
of equity to do these things in such a case rests upon the para-
mount consideration of necessity and “high expediency.” Neith-
er statutory authority nor express authority in the deed nor other
instrument of trust is necessary. At common law a court of
equity had the inherent power to do what was necessary to be
done to preserve the trust from destruction. The district -court,
as a court of general jurisdiction both at law and in equity, has
the same inherent powers, in that respect, as was possessed by a
court of chan'cery. The authorities are all one way on this ques-
tion. Hale v. Hale, 146 I11. 227, 33 N. E. 858; United States
Trust Co. v. Roche, 116 N. Y. 120, 22 N. E. 265; Anderson v.
M other, 44 N. Y. 249. The power of the court is exercised, not
to defeat or destroy the trust, but to preserve it. Even in case
of an absolute sale, the trust is not destroyed. There is merely
a change in the form of the trust property. The proceeds are
impressed with the trust, and are to be administered in accordance
with its terms, under the direction of the court. The distinction
must be kept in mind between the power to sell or mortgage
merely for the benefit of the cestul qui trust, and the power to
sell or mortgage in order to preserve the trust from complete de-
struction. The court will always exercise the power for the lat-
ter purpose, while it might not, and usually would not, for the
former. In re Roe, II9 N. Y. 509, 23 N. E. 1063. That there
is a necessity to either sell, mortgage, or lease this property in
order to preserve the trust is established by the findings of the
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sell or mortgage and improve the property. From a decree grant­
ing the authority prayed, the infant defendants, by their guardian, 
appeal. 
M1TCHELI., J. * * * [*5 14] It will be observed that the declara­
tion of trust contains no power or authority for selling, mortgag­
ing, or otherwise disposing of the property ; also that, according 
to the terms of the declaration, other persons may hereafter come 
into being who will be beneficiaries of the trust. These two facts 
raise the two principai questions presented by this appeal, to-wit : 
I .  Has the court, for the purpose of  preserving the trust, power 
to order a sale, mortgage, lease, or other disposition of the trust 
property when .the trust instrument contains no power or author­
ity for so doing ? 2. Has the court power, in such a case, to 
bind by its j udgment or decree parties not yet in being who may 
hereafter become beneficiaries of the trust ? Both questions must 
be answered in the affirmative. The inherent power of a court 
of equity to do these things in such a case rests upon the para­
mount <;onsideration of necessity and "high expediency." Neith­
er statutory authority nor express authority in the deed nor other 
instrument of trust is necessary.  At common law a court of 
equity had the inherent power to do what was necessary to be 
done to preserve the trust from destruction. The district .court, 
as a court of general jurisdiction both at law and in equity, has 
the same inherent powers, in that respect, as was possessed by a 
court of chan·cery. The authorities are all one way on this ques­
tion. Hale v. Hale, 146 Ill. 227, 33 N. E. 858 ;  United States 
Trust Co. v. Roche, I I6 N. Y. 120, 22 N. E. 265 ; Anderson v. 
Mather, 44 N. Y. 249. The power of the court is exercise<\ not 
to defeat or destroy the trust, but to preserve it. Even in case 
of an absolute sale, the trust is not destroyed. There is merely 
a change in the form of the trust property. The proceeds are 
impressed with the trust, and are to be administered in accordance 
with its terms, under the direction of the court. The distinction 
must be kept in mind between the power to sell or mortgage 
mere1y for the benefit of  the cestui qui trust, and the power to 
sell or mortgage in order to preserve the trust from complete de­
struction. The court will always exercise the power for the lat­
ter purpose, while it might not, and usually would not, for the 
former. In re ·Roe, I I9 N. Y. 509, 23 N. E. 1o63. That there 
is  a necessity to either sell, mortgag-e, or lease this property in 
order to preserve the trust is established by the findings of the 
court. By its judgment it has retained control of the whole mat-
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ter in its own [*5r5] hands, and it must be presumed that it will
do its full duty, and not approve of any disposition of the property
that is not necessary to preserve the trust. None of the cases
cited by appellants’ counsel seem to us to be in point. Many of
them are cases which deny the inherent power of a court of
chancery to sell an infant's real estate. But this is in no proper
sense a judgment ordering a sale of an infant’s estate for the
supposed benefit of the infant. If it was, the matter would be
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the probate court. The in-
fants’ interest here is a mere contingency, and it is not merely
this contingent interest that is to be sold, mortgaged, or leased.
but is the entire trust property; and this is done solely for the
purpose of preserving the trust from destruction, and the infants
are made parties merely because they have a contingent interest
in the trust.
2. The power of the court to bind parties not in being, but who
may hereafter come into being and have an interest in the trust.
rests upon the same ground of necessity and “high expediency.”
. All persons in being who have any interest in the trust have been
made parties. Of course, those not in being cannot be made par-
ties; and if the court cannot bind them by its decree or judgment.
its inherent power to do with the property whatever is necessary
to preserve the trust would be so hamp red and limited as to be
in a great measure rendered nugatory. The rule that only those
who are parties to a suit are affected by the decree is subject to
certain well-recognized exceptions in equity.‘ Thus, where there
is real estate in controversy which is subject to an entail, it is
generally suficient, all parties having antecedent estates being
before the court, to make the first tenant in csse in whom an estate
of inheritance is vested a party with those claiming the prior es-
tates, without making any persons parties who may claim in re-
mainder or reversion after such vested estate of inheritance. Story
Eq. Pl. § I44. The rule is stated thus in Gifiard V. Hort, I
' Schoales 8: L. 386, 408:] “Where all parties are brought before
-' the court that can be brought before it, and the court acts on the
property according to the rights that appear, without fraud, its
decision must of necessity be final and conclusive.\_i It has been
repeatedly determined that, if there be a tenant for life, remainder
[*516] to his first son in tail, remainder over, and he is brought
before the court before he has issue. the contingent remainderman
is barred. * * * Courts of equity have determined, on grounds
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ter in its own [*515 ]  hands, and it must be presumed that it will 
do its full duty, and not approve of any disposition of the property 
that is not necessary to preserve the trust. None of the cases 
cited by appellants' counsel seem to us to be in point. Many of 
them are cases which deny the inherent power of a court of 
chancery to sell an infant's real estate. But this is  in no proper 
sense a judgment ordering a sale of an infant's estate for the 
supposed benefit of the infant. If it was, the matter would be 
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the probate court. The in­
fants' interest here is a mere contingency, and it is not merely 
this contingent interest that is to be sold, mortgaged, or leased, 
but is the entire trust property ; and this is done solely for the 
purpose of preserving the trust from destruction, and the in fants 
are made parties merely because they have a contingent interest 
in the trust .  
2. The power of the court to bind parties not in being, but who 
may hereafter come into being and have an interest in the trust, 
rests upon the same ground of necessity and "high expediency." 
. All persons in being who have any interest in the trust have been ) made parties. Of course, those not in being cannot be made par­
ties ; and if the court cannot bind them by its decree or judgment. 
�· its inherent power to do with the property whatever is  necessary 
to preserve the trust would be so hamp1�red and li,mited as to be in a great mea�ure rendered nugatory. \lThe rule that only those 
I who are parties to a suit are affected by the decree is subj ect to certain well-recognized exceptions in equity. i Thus, where there is real estate in controversy which is subj ect to an entail , it is 
generally sufficient, all parties having antecedent estates being 
before the court, to make the first tenant in esse in whom an estate 
of inheritance is vested a party with those claiming the prior es­
tates, without making any persons parties who may claim in re­
mainder or reversion after such vested estate of inheritance. Story 
Eq. Pt. § 144. The rule is stated thus in Giffard v. Hort, I 
; Schoales & L. 386, 4o8 : ) "Where all parties are brought before 
: the court that can be brought before it, and the court acts on the 
property accord ing to the rights that appear, without fraud,  its 
deci sion must of necessity be final and conclusive.\ ; It has been 
repeatedly determined that, if there be a tenant for l ife, remainder 
f*516]  to his first son in tai l ,  remainder over, and he is brought 
before the court before he has issue, the contingent remainderman 
is barred. * * * Courts of equity have determined, on grounds 
of high expediency that it is sufficient' to bring before the 
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court the first tenant in tail in being; and if there be no
tenant in tail in being, the first person entitled to the inher-
itance, and if no such person, then the tenant for life.” Id. 407.
If several remainders are limited by the same deed, this
creates a privity between the person in remainder and all
those who may come after him; and a verdict and judgment
for or against the former may be given in evidence for or against
the latter. If there are never so many contingent limitations of a
trust, it is sufficient to bring the trustees before the court, to-
gether with him in whom the first remainder of inheritance is
vested; and all that may come after him will be bound by the
decree, though not in esse, unless there is fraud and collusion be-
tween the trustees and the first person in whom the remainder
of inheritance is vested. Freem. Jndg. § I72 and cases cited.
In Miller v. Texas <9 P. Ry. Co., 132 U. S. 662, 10 Sup. Ct. 206,
the court cited Gifiord v. Hort with approval, and held that a
contingent interest in real estate or an executory devise is bound
by judicial proceedings afi‘e'cting the real estate where the court
has before it all the parties that can be brought before it, and
the court acts upon the property according to the rights that ap-
pear, without fraud. The court also quoted from Lord Redes-
dalds treatise on Pleading I73-4, (to which we have not had
access), to the effect that “contingent limitations and executory
devises to persons not in being may be bound by a decree against
a person claiming a vested estate of inheritance; but a person in
being claiming under a limitation by way of executory devise,
not subject to any preceding vested estate of inheritance by
which it may be defeated, must be made a party to a bill affect-
ing his rights.” These authorities fully cover this case. The
trustee and every person having any vested interest in the trust
property, as well as every one in being who has any contingent
interest in it, were before the court. It is also to be noted, al-
though perhaps not material, that every class of possible parties
not in being who may become interested in the trust property
were represented before the court by one or more of the parties
to the [*5I7] action. See, also, Hale v. Hale, supra; Anderson
v. M other, sn[>ra; Clarke v. C ordis, 4 Allen 466; EZ'ans v. Wall,
I59 Mass. 164, 34 N. E. 183, 38 Am. St. Rep. 406; Townshend v.
Frommer, 125 N. Y. 446, 26 N. E. 805. The same principle was
applied in Ladd v. ~.Weiskopf, 62 Minn. 29, 64 N. W. 99. It is
true that in the last case the decree under consideration was in
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court the first tenant in tail in being ; and i f  there be no 
tenant in tail in being, the first person entitled to the inher­
itance, and if no such person, then the tenant for l ife." Id. 407. 
I f  several remainders are limited by the same deed, this 
creates a privity between the person in remainder and all 
those who may come after him ; and a verdict and j udgment 
for or against the former may be given in evidence for or against 
the latter. If there are never so many contingent limitations of...a 
trust, it is sufficient to bring the trustees before the court, to­
gether with him in whom the first remainder of inheritance is 
vested ; and all that may come after him will be bound by the 
decree, though not in esse, unless there is fraud and collusion be­
tween the trustees and the first person in whom the remainder 
of inheritance is vested. Freem . Judg. § 172 and cases cited. · 
In Miller v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 1 32 U. S. 662, 10  Sup. Ct. 2o6, 
the court cited Gifford v. Hort with approval, and held that a 
contingent interest in real estate or an executory devise is bound 
by j udicial proceedings affecting the real estate where the court 
has before it all the parties that can be brought before it, and 
the court acts upon the property according to the rights that ap­
pear, without fraud. The court also quoted from Lord Redes­
dale' s treatise on Pleading 173-4, ( to which we have not had 
access ) ,  to the effect that "contingent limitations and executory 
devises to persons not in being may be bound by a decree against 
a person claiming a vested estate of inheritance ; but a person in 
being claiming under a limitation by way of executory devise, 
not subject to any preceding vested estate of inheritance by 
which it may be defeated, must be made a party to a bill affect­
ing his rights." These authorities fully cover this case. The 
trustee and every person having any vested interest in the trust 
property, as well as every one in being who has any contingent 
interest in it, were before the court. It is also to be noted, al­
though perhaps not material, that every class of possible parties 
not in being who may become interested in the trust property 
were represented before the court by one or more of the parties 
to the [*517]  action . See, also, Hale v. Hale, supra; A nderson 
v. !.Uather, supra; Clarke v. Cordis, 4 Allen 466 ; Evan..s v. Wall, 
I 59 Mass. 164, 34 N. E. 183,  38 Am. St. Rep. 4o6 ; Townshend v. 
From nier, 1 25 N. Y. 446, 26 N. E. 8o5. The same principle was 
applied in Ladd v. �Weiskopf, 62 Minn. 29, 64 N. W. 99. It is 
true that in the last case the decree under consideration was in 
probate proceedings, which are in rem, while the present action 
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is in form in personam; but the judgment is in effect in rem, act—
ing as it does directly on the res, viz., the trust property.
There is nothing in the contention that the probate court, and
not the district court, has jurisdiction of the matter so far as the
interest of the infant defendants is concerned. The subject-mat-
ter of controversy is between infants and third parties. It might
as well be claimed that the district court has no jurisdiction in
partition, foreclosure, or any other recognized head of equity
jurisdiction, ivhenevgr a minor chances to be interested.
Judgment afiirmed.
See also to the same effect: Doremus v. Dunham, 55 N. J’. Eq. 511,
37 At]. 62; Watson v. Watson, 3 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 400; Rutledge v.
Fishburne, 66 S. Car. 155, 44 S. E. 564; Ridley v. Halliday, 106 Tenn.
607, 61 S. W. 1025, 82 Am. St. 902; Miller v. Foster, 76 Texas 479. 13
S. VV. 529; Faulkner v. Davis, 18 Grat. (Va.) 690, 98 Am. Dec. 718; Gray
v. Smith. 76 Fed. 525; Finch v. Finch, 2 Ves. 491; Hopkins v. Hopkins,
1 Atk. 581; Luring v. Hildreth, 170 Mass. 653, 49 N. E. 652, 40 L. R. A.
727, 64 Am. St. Rep. 301.
















































































































































300 CASES ON JUDG M E N TS, ETC. 
is in form in personam; but the j udgment is in effect in rem, act­
ing as it does directly on the res, viz., the trust property. 
There is nothing in the contention that the probate court, and 
not the district court, has jurisdiction of the matter so far as the 
interest of the infant defendants is concerned. The subj ect-mat­
ter of controversy is between infants and third parties. It might 
as well be claimed that the district court has no jurisdiction in 
partition, foreclosure, or any other recognized head of equity 
j urisdiction, whenm'r a minor chances to be interested. 
Judgment afflrmed. 
See also to the same effect : Doremus v. Dunham, SS N. J. Eq. 5u, 
37 Atl. 62 ;  Watson v. Watson, 3 Jones Eq. ( N. Car. ) 400 ; Rt1tled�e v. 
Fi.rhburne, (i6 S. Car. 155, 44 S. E. s64_; Ridley v. Hallidciy, 1o6 Tenn. 
6o7, 61 S. W. 1025, 82 Am. St. 902 ;  Miller v. Foster, 76 Texas 479, 13 
S. W. 529 ; Faulkner v. Davis, 18 Grat. (Va.) 69<>. 98 Am. Dec. 718 ; Gray 
v. Smith, 76 Fed. 525 ; Finch v. Finch, 2 Ves. 491 ; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 
I Atk 581 ; Loring v. Hildreth, IiO Mass. 653, 49 N. -E. 652, 40 L. R.  A. 
727, 64 Am. &. Rep. 301.  
But see DeLeon's Estate, 102 Cal. 537, 36 Pac. 86.t. 
SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
NATURE OF WRITS TO MAKE SATISFACTION.
STATUTE or \VESTMINSTER SEcom> [13 F.
TER 18.—Cum debitum fuerit recuperatum, v
vel damna adjudicata sit de caetero in elect qui sequitur pro
hujusmodi debito, aut damnis, sequi breve qu om’ fieri faciat de
terris et catallis debitoris, quod vicecom' liberet ei onmia catalla debitoris
(exceptis bobus et afris carucae), et medietatem terrae suae quousque
debitum fuerit levatum per rationabile percium et extentum. Et si
ejiciatur de illo tenemento, habeat recuperare per breve nova: disseis-
inze, et postea per breve de redisseisina, si necesse fuerit.
TRANSLAT10N.—-\'VhCI‘I debt is recovered, or acknowledged in the
king’s court, or damages awarded, it shall be from henceforth in the
election of him that sues for such debt or damages, to have a writ of
fieri facias to the sheriff to levy the debt of the lands and goods; or that
the sheriff shall deliver to him all the chattels of the debtor (saving only
his oxen and beasts of his plough) and half of his land, until the debt
is levied upon a reasonable price or extent. And if he be put out of that
tenement, he shall recover by a writ of novel disseisin, and after by a
writ of redisseisin, if need be. .
~\. D._ 1285], CHAP-
regis recognitum,
BARDORF v. HUMFREY, Mich. 31, Edw. I, A.D. 13o3—Horwood’s
Year Books 30 and 31, Edw. I, p. 440.
\Valter, the son of Humfrey, was bound in 4ol. to Sir Robert
Bardorf, by a recognizance in the court, &c.; by virtue of which,
after the day fixed for payment, he sued to have by statute, a
moiety of Walter’s lands until, &c.; and seizin was delivered to
him, &c. Afterwards Vt/alter came and sued out of the rolls a
scire facias against Sir Robert to compel him to account to him,
&c.; and by the extent and by the account it appears that there
were five years’ arrears, &c. Waller: Here are the arrears and
we pray that the land may be delivered to us. Tondebyz The
land was delivered to us by virtue of the statute to be holden as
freehold until, &c.; and we do not understand, &c., that, &c.,
until we have levied our debt. I-IENCIIAM [_I.] : This statute was
submitted to the consideration of the king and his council, who
agreed that whenever the debtor came prepared with the debt,
the lands should be redelivered to him; therefore, will you take
your money? Tondcby: VVe pray our damages and our ex-
penses besides. HENGHABI, [I.] You shall have nothing except
















































































































































SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS 
NATURE OF WRITS TO MAKE SATISFACTION. 
STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER SECOND [ 13 E . D. 1285] , CHAP-
TER 18.-Cum debitum fuerit recuperatum, v regis recognitum, 
vel damna adjudicata sit de c;etero in elect qui sequitur pro 
huj usmodi debito, aut damnis, sequi breve qu om' fieri faciat de 
terris et catallis debitoris, quod vicecom' liberet ei omnia catalla debitoris 
(exceptis bobus et afris carucre ) ,  et medietatem terrae suae quousque 
debitum fuerit levatum per rationabile percium et extentum. Et si 
ejiciatur de illo tenemento, habeat recuperare per breve novre disseis­
inre, et postea per breve de redisseisina, si  necesse fuerit. 
TRANSLA'fION.-When debt is recovered, or acknowledged in the 
king's court, or damages awarded, it shall be from henceforth in the 
election of him that sues for such debt or damages, to have a writ of 
fieri facias to the sheriff to levy the debt of the lands and goods ; or that 
the sheriff shall deliver to him all the chattels of the debtor (saving only 
his oxen and beasts of his plough ) and half of his land, until the debt 
is levied upon a reasonable price or extent. And if he be put out of that 
tenement, he shall recover by a writ of novel disseisin, and after by a 
writ of redisseisin, if need be . .  
BARDORF v. H U MFREY, Mich. 31,  Edw. I, A.D. 1303-Horwood's 
Year Books 30 and 3 1 ,  Edw. I, p. 440. 
vValter, the son of Humfrey, was bound in 4ol. to Sir Robert 
Bardorf, by a recognizance in the court, &c. ; by virtue of which, 
after the day fixed for payment, he sued to have by statute, a 
moiety of Walter's lands until, &c. ; and seizin was delivered to 
him, &c. Afterwards Walter came and sued out of the rolls a 
scire fa6as against Sir Robert to compel him to account to him, 
&c. ; and by the extent and by the account it appears that there 
were five years' arrears, &c. Walter : Here are the arrears and 
we pray that the land may be delivered to us. Ton-deby : The 
land was delivered to us by virtue of the statute to be holden as 
freehold until, &c. ; and we do not understand, &c., that, &c. , 
until we have levied ou r debt. HENGHAM [J. ]  : This statute was 
submitted to the consideration of the king and his council, who 
agreed that whenever the debtor came prepared with the debt, 
the lands should be redelivered to him ; therefore, will you tak� 
your money ? Tondeby : We pray our damages and our ex­
penses besides. HENGHAM, [J.]  You shall have nothing- except 
the amount of the recognizance, &c. ; wherefore, &c. And Walter 
302 CASES 0.‘? EXIICUTIONS, ETC.
sued out a writ to have back the lands; and because the land had
been sown by Robert, &c., it was ordered that \Valter should
repay the cost of the seed, and the amount of money laid out on
the land, &c.
SIR VVILLIAM HARBERT'S CASE, in the English Court of Exchequer
Chamber Mich. Term, 27 8: 28 Eliz., A. D. 1585—3 Coke, 11b.
This was a ias issued out of the court of exchequer
in the 18th year ., on a recognizance acknowledged to the
king in the court 0 augmentation in the fourth year of Edward
VI., by Matthew Harbert. Said Harbert having died, the scire
facias was directed against the executors of his will and the heirs
of his land, and the sheriff made return that said Harbert had no
executors within his bailiwick and that he had summoned Sir
VVilliam Harbert, the son and heir of said Matthew, etc. On the
return day said Sir William made default, upon which the barons
gave judgment in favor of the Queen against him generally for
said 30001. And thereupon said Sir \/Villiam brought the case
here on writ of error, and assigned three errors: 1 on the sc-ire
facias; 2 on the return; and 3 on the judgment.1 And this term
the errors were moved by Plozvden, being of counsel with Sir
William Harbert, before Sir Thomas Bromley, Lord Chancellor
of England, and the Baron of Bnrleigh, Lord Treasurer of Eng-
land, and the two chief justices, l/Vray and Anderson, in the ex-
chequer chamber. And in this case divers points were resolved.
First, that at the common law, where a common person sues
a recognizance or a judgment for debt or damages, he shall not
have the body of the defendant, nor his lands (unless in special
case) in execution. But at the common law he shall have execu-
tion in such case only of his goods and chattels, and of corn, and
the like present profit which shall grow upon the land, to which
purpose the common law gave him two several writs: [*I2] I. A
lerari facias, by which writ the sheriff was commanded, qn-0d do
‘THE ERROR ALLEGED of the seire faeias was that it was against the
heir of the land and not against the heir simply. The error alleged of
the return was that it was not responsive to the writ in that it specified
no land. The error alleged of the judgment was that it should have
been special. because defendant's own land, not acquired by descent
from his father, would be liable on this general judgment, whereas he
was liable only as terra tenant. These are the questions which the
reporter says were not resolved by the court. The case is given here
because it is generally cited as a leading case on the matters here re-

















































































































































NATURE OF WRITS TO .\l./\KE SATISFACTION 303
tcrris 6' catallis ipsius A. &c. levari facias, <51‘. ; and another
writ called fieri facias, which was only de bonis (‘§‘ catallis, both
which writs ought to be sued within the year after the judgment,
or the recognizance acknowledged; and if he had not the one or
the other within the year, the plaintiff or the conusee was put to
his action of debt. And now by the statute of \\/'estminster 2d,
cap. 45, a scire facias is given; and by the statute of Westminster
2d, cap. 18, cunt debitum fuerit recupera=t.i, &c., the elegit is
given of the moiety of the land, which was the first act which
subjected land to the execution of a judgment, or of a recog-
nizance which is in the nature of a judgment, and therewith
agreeth Fitzherbert’s Natura BT€‘Z'fIt)It 265, g. And by the stat-
ute of 13 Edw. 1. de mercatoribus, 27 Edw. 3, cap. 9, and 23
Hen. 8, cap. 6, it is provided, that in case of a statute merchant or
statute staple, all the lands which the conusor had at the day of
the conusance shall be extended in whose hands soever they after
come, either by feoffment or other manner. But in debt against
the heir upon an obligation made by his ancestor, the plaintiff
by the common law should have all the land which descended to
him in execution against him, and yet he should not have execu-
tion of any part of the land against the father himself; but the
reason thereof was, because the common law gave an action of
debt against the heir; and in such case, if he should not have
execution of the land against the heir, he could have no fruit of
his action; for the goods and chattels of the debtor do belong to
his executors or administrators, and so for necessity in such case,
only land was liable to execution of the debt of a common per-
son at the common law. A_ls9_t_l_1_e_l_)ody of the defendant was not
liable to execution for debt at the common law, 2/ide I3_H'6l-1. 4. i.
But the common law, which is the preservef of the common
peace of the land, did abhor all force as a capital enemy to it;
and therefore, against those who committed any force, the com-
mon law did subject their bodies to imprisonment, which is the
highest execution, by which he loses his liberty till he agree with
the party, and pay a fine to the king; and therefore it is a rule
in law, that in all actions quore vi 6’ arrnis, capias ad responden-
dum lies, and where ca[>ias lies in process, there, after judgment,
ea[>ias ad sath-fac1'endmn lies, and there the king shall have ca_t:1'as
[>ro fine. VVith that agreeth 8 Hen. 6, 9; 35 Hen. 6, 6: 22 Edw.
4, 22; 40 Edw. 3, 25 ; 49 Edw. 3, 2, and many other books. Then
by the statutes of Marlebridge, cap. 23, and ‘Westminster, 2, cap.
















































































































































NATURE OF WRITS TO MAKE SATISFACT IO:-.l' JOJ 
tcrris & catallis ipsius A. &c. levari facias, &c. ;  and another 
writ called fieri f acias, which was only de bonis & catallis, both 
which writs ought to be sued within the year after the judgment, 
or the recognizance acknowledged ; and if he had not the one or 
the other within the year, the plaintiff or the conusee was put to 
his action of debt. And now by the statute of Westminster 2d, 
cap. 45 , a scire facias is given ; and by the statute of Westminster 
2d, cap. 18, cum debitum frurit rernperat., &c., the elegit is 
given of the moiety of the land, which was the first act wh!ch 
subj ected land to the execution of a j udgment, or of a recog­
nizance which is in the nature of a judgment, and therewith 
agreeth Fitzherbert's Natura Bre-i-ium 265, g. And by the stat­
ute of 1 3  Edw. I . de mercatoribus, 27 Edw. 3, cap. 9, and 23 
Hen. 8, cap. 6, it is provided, that in case of a statute merchant or 
statute staple, all the lands which the conusor had at the day of 
the conusance shall be extended in whose hands soever they after 
come, either by feoffment or other manner. But in debt against 
the heir upon an obligation made by his ancestor, the plaintiff 
by the common law should have all the land which descended to 
him in execution against him, and yet he should not have execu­
tion of any part of the land against the father himself ; but the 
reason thereof was, because the common law gave an action of 
debt against the heir ; and in such case, if he should not have 
execution of the land against the heir, he could have no fruit of  
his action ; for the goods and chattels of  the debtor do  belong to 
his executors or administrators, and so for necessity in such case, 
only land was liable to execution of the debt of a common per­
son at the common law. AJ��-�E_e_ �o� ?_f �he ��fendant was not 
Jiable to execution for debt at the common law, vide rj" He11 . 4. i .  
But  the common law, which i s  the preserver of  the common 
peace of the land, did abhor all force as a capital enemy to it ; 
and therefore, against those who committed any force, the com­
mon law did subject their bodies to imprisonment, which is the 
highest execution , by which he loses his liberty till he agree with 
the party, and pay a fine to the king ; and therefore it is a rule 
in law, that in all actions quare ·vi & armis, capias ad respomlc1i­
du m lies, and where capias lies in process, there, after judgment, 
capias ad satisfaciendmn lies, and there the king shall have capias 
pro ·ffrie. 'Vith that agreeth 8 Hen. 6, 9 ;  35 Hen. 6, 6 :  22 Edw. 
4, 22 ; 40 E<lw. 3,  25 ; 49 E<lw. 3, 2,  and many other books. Then 
by the statutes of Marlebridg-e, cap. 23 , and \Vestminster, 2, cap. 
1 1 , capias was given in account, for at the common law process 
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in account was distress infinite; and afterwards by the statute of
25 Edw. 3, cap. 17, the like process was given in debt as in ac-
count, for before that statute the body of the defendant was not
liable to execution for debt, for the reason and cause aforesaid;
but it was resolved, that at the common law, the body, the land,
and the goods of the accountant, or the king's debtor, were liable
to the king’s execution, for thesaurus regis est facts vinculum et
bellorum nervi. Anflherefore the law gave the king full remedy
for it; and therewith agrees 5 Eliz. Dyer 224, and Plowden’s
Comm. 321; Sir William Cavendish’s Case, who was treasurer
of the chamber, 24 Edw. 3; Walter de (,‘h~irt0n’s Case; and in-
finite precedents in the exchequer, to prove, that for the king’s
debt, the body and the land of the debtor shall be liable by the
common law before the statute of 33 Hen. 8, cap. 39. * * *
[*I5] * * *
But these [omitted] points were not resolved by the court,
but afterwards, on a petition made to the queen, Sir \Villiam
compounded with her. Plowden and Coke were of counsel with
Sir \Villiam Harbert. * * *
THOMPSON v. CLERK, in Queen's Bench, Mich. Term, 38 & 39 Eliz.,
A. D. 1597—Cro. Eliz. 504.
Trover and conversion of goods at D. in the county of Not-
tingham. The defendant saith that he recovered against the plain-
tiff a debt of 2ol. by bill in the queen’s bench, and thereupon had
a fieri fa-eias directed to the sheriff of York, who, at Wakefield
in the county of York seized those goods and delivered them
unto him in satisfaction of this execution, and so justifies the
conversion. It was thereupon demurred, and without argument
ruled, that the pleading was ill: I, because * * * 3. The sheriff
upon a writ of fieri facias cannot deliver the defendant’s goods to
the plaintiff in satisfaction of his debt. VVherefore it was ad-
judged for the plaintiff.
SUYDAM v. SMITH, in Y. Sup. Ct., Albany, Special Term, April,
1845—7 Hill 182.
Appeal by Suydam, Sage & Co. from an order vacating on ar-
rest and order of arrest on capias with bail fixed at $30,000, for
failure of defendants to deliver on demand 3000 barrels of mess
pork and 300 barrels of prime pork according to their warehouse
















































































































































CASES ON EXECUTION S, �TC. 
in account was distress infinite ; and afterwards by the statute of 
25 Edw. 3, cap. 17, the like process was given in debt as in ac­
count, for before that statute the body of the defendant was not 
liable to execution for debt, for the reason and cau.se aforesaid ; 
but it was resolved, that at the common law, the body, the land, 
and the goods of the accountant, or the king's debtor, were liable 
to the king's execution, for thesaurus regis est pacis vi11culum et 
bellorum nervi. An•herefore the law gave the king full remedy 
for it ; and therewith agrees 5 Eliz. Dyer 224, and Plowden's 
Comm. 32 1 ; Sir William Cavendish's Case, who was treasurer 
of the chamber, 24 Edw. 3 ;  Walter de Chirton's Case ; and in­
finite precedents in the· exchequer, to prove, that for the king's 
debt, the body and the land of the debtor shall be liable by the 
common law before the statute of 33 Hen. 8, cap. 39. * * * 
[ * 15 ]  * * * 
But these [omitted] points were not resolved by the court, 
but afterwards, on a petition made to the queen, Sir William 
compounded with her. Plowden and Coke were of counsel with 
Sir William Harbert. * * * 
THOMPSON v. CLERK, in Queen's Bench, Mich. Term, J8 & 39 Eliz., 
A. D. 1597-Cro. Eliz. 504. 
Trover and conversion of goods at D. in the county of Not­
tingham. The defendant saith that he recovered against the plain­
tiff a debt of 2ol. by bill in the queen's bench, and thereupon had 
a fieri f acias directed to the sheriff of York, who, at Wakefield 
in the county of York seized those goods and delivered them 
unto him in satisfaction of this execution, and so justifies the 
conversion. It was thereupon demurred, and without argument 
ntled, that the pleading was ill : 1 , because * * * 3. The sheriff 
upon a writ of fieri facias cannot deliver the defendant's goods to 
the plaintiff in satisfaction of his debt. Wherefore it was ad­
judged for the plaintiff. 
SUYDAM v. SMITH, in t'J. Y. Sup. Ct., Albany, Special Term, April, 
1845-7 Hill 182. 
Appeal by Suydam, Sage & Co. from an order vacating on ar­
rest and order of arrest on capias with bail fixed at $30,000, for 
failure of defendants to deliver on demand 3000 barrels of mess 
pork and 300 barrels of prime pork according to their warehouse 
receipt which had been duly assigned to plaint iffs . 
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BRONSON, Ch. I. The defendant may be held to bail, of
course, in the action of trover. (2 R. S. 348, § 7.) But it is
said, that this law has been modified by the non-imprisonment
act; and that now a defendant who received the property as a
bailee, and might be sued on the contract of bailment, [*184]
can no longer be held to bail where the plaintiff elects to bring
trover: that the cases for holding to bail in that action are those
where the defendant either came to the possession of the prop-
erty by finding, or took it tortiously. If there be such a distinc-
tion, it must be matter of positive law; for there is no principle
upon which it can be maintained. The man who wrongfully
converts to his own use the property which another has en-
trusted to his care, is chargeable with a deeper shade of moral
guilt than the one who converts property which he has either
found, or tortiously taken; for in addition to the wrongful ap-
propriation of another man's goods, which is common to all of
the cases, the bailee is also guilty of a breach of trust.
Let us now see whether the non—imprisonment law reaches
the case. It provides, that no person shall be arrested or im-
prisoned on civil process, in any suit or proceeding instituted
“for the recovery of any damages for the non-performance of
any contract.” (Stat. 1831, p. 396, § I.) The bailor cannot sue
in trover unless there has been a wrongful conversion of the prop-
erty; and when he does sue in that form, it is not to recover dam-
ages “for the non-performance of any contract," but to obtain
redress for the tort. The contract of bailment may be given in
evidence for the purpose of proving the plaintifi"'s title, and show-
ing that the property was in the possession of the defendant; but
the contract is not the foundation of the action. It is true that
the bailor may sue on the contract expressed in or implied from
the bailment. But he may waive that remedy, and sue for the
tort; and when that is done, I see nothing either in the non—im-
prisonment law, or the reason of the thing, which forbids that the
defendant should be held to bail. .
It is understood that the judge revoked the order to hold to
bail on having his attention called to the case of Brown v. Treat,
(1 Hill, 225,) which was not in his mind at the time the order
was made. It must be admitted that the language of Cowen, J.
in that case strongly favors the argument that the defendant can-
not, be held to bail where the original relation between the parties
was that of bailor and bailee, and where the plaintiff might sue
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BRONSON, Ch. J. The defendant may be held to bail, of 
course, in the action of trover. (2 R. S. 348, § 7. ) But it is 
said, that this law has been modified by the non-imprisonment 
act ; and that now a defendant who received the property as a 
bailee, and might be sued on the contract of bailment, [*184] 
can no longer be held to bail where the plaintiff elects to bring 
trover : that the cases for holding to bail in that action are those 
where the defendant either came to the possession of the prop­
erty by finding, or took it tortiously. I f  there be such a distinc­
tion, it must be matter of positive law ; for there is no principle 
upon which it can be maintained. The man who wrongfully 
converts to his own use the property which another has en­
trusted to his care, is chargeable with a deeper shade of moral 
guilt than the one who converts property which he has either 
found, or tortiously taken ; for in addition to the w rongful ap­
propriation of another man's goods, whic_h is common to all of 
the cases, the bailee is also guilty of a breach of trust. 
Let us now see whether the non-imprisonment law reaches 
the case . It provides, that no person shall be arrested or im­
prisoned on civil process, in any suit or proceeding instituted 
"for the recovery of any damages for the non-performance of ' 
any contract." ( Stat. 183 1 ,  p. 396, § 1 . )  The bailor cannot sue 
in trover unless there has been a wrongful conversion of the prop- \ 
erty ; and when he does sue in that form, it is not to recover dam­
ages "for the non-performance of any contract," but to obtain ( 
redress for the tort. The contract of bailment may be given in 
evidence for the purpose of proving the plaintiff's title, and show- � 
ing that the property was in the possession o f  the defendant ; but 
the contract is not the foundation of the action. It  is  true that 
the bailor may sue on the contract expressed in or implied from 
the bailment. But he may waive that remedy, and sue for the 
tort ; and when that is done, I see nothing either in the non-im­
prisonment law, or the reason of the thing, which forbids that the 
defendant should be held to bai l.  
I t  is understood that the judge revoked the order to hold to 
bail on having his attention called to the case o f  Brown v. Treat, 
( I  Hill,  225 , )  which was not in his mind at the time the order 
was made. It must be admi tted that the language of Cowen, J. 
in that case strongly favo rs the argument that the defendant can­
not. be held to bail where the original relation between the parties 
was that of bailor and bailee, and where the plaintiff might sue 
on the contract implied from the bailment. But the f * 185l case 
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did not necessarily call for the decision of that question; for
there, in addition to a count in trover for the tort, the declara-
tion contained two counts in assumpsit for a breach of the im-
plied contract of the bailee. On this strange declaration, to which
there was a plea of not guilty, the plaintiff had obtained a verdict
and judgment, and issued a ca. sa. on which the defendant was
arrested. The plaintiff had recovered upon all of the counts;
and it was enough to say, that where the bailor sues upon the
contract—although there may be a misjoinder of other counts—
the bailee cannot be imprisoned on the judgment. It was on
that ground that the defendant was discharged from the arrest:
and Brown v. Treat, like other cases, should only be considered
as settling the question which was necessarily presented for ad-
judication.
There is another plain distinction between that case and the
one now before us. There, the action was between the original
parties to the bailment, and the plaintiff might have sued on the
contract. But it is not so here. The plaintiffs purchased the
property after the defendants had received it in store from Mc-
Kay, and they could not sue in their own names on the contract
of bailment. The only injury which they have sustained is the
wrongful conversion of the property, and their only remedy is
an action sounding in tort. As between these parties, I do not
see how the case can be distinguished from any other action of
trover.
But it is not necessary to rest the case upon this distinction.
We think it should be put upon the broader ground, that wher-
ever there has been a wrongful conversion of the goods, for
which trover will lie, the defendant may be held to bail, in what-
ever way the property came to his possession.
The result is, that the motion of the plaintiffs must be
granted; and that of the defendants denied.
Ordered accordingly.
Contra: Southern Express Co. v. Lynch, 65 Ga. 240.
Fraudulent contrivance of a mortgagor to deprive mortgagee of part
of property is ground for capias. In re Hicks, 20 Mich. 280.
See also Ex Imrte Clark, 20 N. J. L. (1 Spencer) 648, 45 Am. Dec. 394.
In Ohio there can be imprisonment on civil process only in the cases
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did not necessarily call for the decision of that question ; for 
there, in addition to a count in trover for the tort, the de-clara· 
tion contained two counts in assumpsit for a breach of the im­
plied contract of the bailee. On this strange declaration, to which 
there was a plea of not guilty, the plaintiff had obtained a verdict 
and judgment, and issued a ca. sa. on which the defendant was 
arrested. The plaintiff had recovered upon all of the counts ; 
and it was enough to say, that where the bailor sues upon the 
contract-although there may be a misjoinder of other counts­
the bailee cannot be imprisoned on the judgment. It was on 
that ground that the defendant was discharged from the arrest : 
and BrO'lt'n v. Treat, like other cases, should only be considered 
as settling the question which was necessarily presented for ad­
judication. 
There is another plain distinction between that case and the 
one now before us. There, the action was between the original 
parties to the bailment, and the plaintiff might have sued on the 
contract. But it is not so here. The plaintiffs purchased the 
property after the defendants had received it in store from Mc­
Kay, and they could not sue in their own names on the contract 
of bailment. The only injury which they have sustained is the 
wrongful conversion of the property, and their only remedy is 
an action sounding in tort. As between these parties, I do not 
see how the case can be distinguished from any other action of 
trover. 
But it is not necessary to rest the case upon this distinction. 
We think it should be put upon the broader ground, that wher­
ever there has been a wrongful conversion of the goods, for 
which trover will lie, the defendant may be held to bail, in what­
ever way the property came to his possession. 
The result is, that the motion of the plaintiffs must be 
granted ; and that of the defendants denied. 
Ordered accordingly. 
Cnn tra : Southern Express Co. v. Lynch, 65 Ga. 240. 
Fraudulent contrivance of a mortgagor to deprive mortgagee of part 
of property is ground for capias. In re Hicks, 20 Mich. 28o. 
See also Ex partc Clark, 20 N. J. L. ( 1  Spencer)  648, 45 Am. Dec. 394-
/n Ohio there can be imprisonment on civil process only in the cases 
expressly provided by statute. Sp ice v. Steinruck, 14 Ohio St. 213. 
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MOORE v. GREEN, in N. Car. Sup. Ct., June Term, 1875—73 N. C. 394.,
21 Am. Rep. 470.
Appeal from an order refusing a motion to vacate an order
of arrest on a ca-Pias ad rcspondendum for libel.
RODMAN, J. * * * It is contended that an arrest in an action
for a libel, is in violation of section 16, of the Bill of Rights of this
state, which says, “there shall be no imprisonment for debt in
this state, except in cases of fraud.” The argument is this, The
[*397] moment a judgment shall be obtained, the claim for dam-
ages is converted into a debt; the person of the defendant is
thereupon liberated, and his bail discharged. For what purpose
then require bail, who are to be discharged at the first moment
when their liability can be of any value? It is an oppression
to the defendant and of no possible benefit to the plaintiff. Del-
Ilnger v. Tweed, 66 N. C. Rep., 206, is cited as the authority for
the proposition that the claim for damages is converted into a
debt within the meaning of the constitution, by the recovery of
judgment. Undoubtedly, for some purpose, it is. An action of
debt may be maintained on it, and a ti. fa. may issue on it. But
to construe the above cited clause of the Bill of Rights, as forbid-
ding imprisonment for any cause of action which, by judgment
would become a debt, would make its prohibition extend to all
cases, as every cause of action becomes a debt in one sense when
a judgment is recovered on it. Chitty, in his standard book on
Pleading, divides all actions into two great classes: those which
arise ex contractu, and those which arise ex delicto. No doubt
the framers of the constitution had this familiar classification in
mind, and in forbidding imprisonment for debt, they referred
rather to the cause of action as being or contractu, than to the
form it would assume upon a judgment. If they had meant to
forbid imprisonment in every civil action, they would have said
so. But by forbidding it for debt, they plainly imply that it may
be allowed in actions, which are not for debt. In forbidding im-
prisonment for debt, as popularly understood, viz: for a cause
of action arising ex contractu, they responded to the general pub-
lic sentiment; but I know of no writer on the reform of law, who
has recommended the abolition of punishment for trespassers and
wrong doers. Such a provision might be humane to the injuring,
but it would not be so to the injured parties. It would withdraw
from the state its power to impose a wholesome check on violence
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MOORE v. GREEN, in N. Car. Sup. Ct., June Tenn, 1875-73 N. C. 394. 
21 Am. Rep. 470. 
Appeal from an order refusing a motion to vacate an order 
of arrest on a capias ad respondendum for libel. 
RooMAN, J. * * * It is contended that an arrest in an action 
for a libel, is in violation of section 16, of the Bill of Rights of this 
state, which says, "there shall be no imprisonment for debt in 
this state, except in cases of fraud." The argument is this, The 
[*397] moment a judgment shall be obtained, the claim for dam­
ages is converted into a debt ; the person of the defendant is 
thereupon liberated, and his bail discharged. For what purpose 
then require bail ,  who are to be discharged at the first moment 
when their liability can be of any value ? It is an oppression 
to the defendant and of no possible benefit to the plaintiff. Del­
linger v. TU"eed, 66 N. C. Rep.,  2o6, is cited as the authority for 
the proposition that the claim for damages is converted into a 
debt within the meaning of the constitution, by the recovery of 
judgment. Undoubtedly, for some purpose, it is. An action of 
debt may be maintained on it, and a n. fa. may issue on it. But 
to construe the above cited clause of the Bill of Rights. as forbid­
ding imprisonment for any cause of action which, by judgment 
would become a debt, would make its prohibition extend to all 
cases, as every cause of action becomes a debt in one sense when 
a judgment is recovered on it. Chitty, in his standard book on 
Pleading, divides all actions into two great classes : those which 
arise ex con tractu, and those which arise ex delicto. No doubt 
the framers of the constitution had this familiar classification in 
mind, and in forbidding imprisonment for debt, they ref erred 
rather to the cause of  action as being e:r contractu, than to the 
form it would assume upon a judgment. I f  they had meant to 
forbid imprisonment in every civil action , they would have said 
so. But by forbidding it for debt, they plainly imply that it may 
be allowed in actions, which are not for debt. In forbidding im­
prisonment for debt, as popularly understood, viz : for a cause 
of action arising ex con tractu, they responded to the general pub­
lic sentiment ; but I know of no writer on the reform of law, who 
has recommended the abolition of punishment for trespassers and 
wrong doers. Such a provision might be humane to the inj uring, 
but it would not be so to the injured parties. It would withdraw 
from the state its power to impose a wholesome check on violence 
and wrong, and would tend to l icense disorders and law-break-
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ings incompatible with the peace and welfare of society. [*398]
Dellinger v. Tweed has no application to the present case.
It is confined to a construction of the article of the constitution
respecting homesteads.
There is no error in the judgment below.
PER CURIAM. Judgment afiirmed.
HORMANN v. SHERIN, in S. Dak. Sup. Ct., Nov. 19, I895—8 S. Dak.
36, 65 N. W. 434, 59 Am. St. Rep. 744.
I\'ELL.\M, J. \Vhile this appeal is entitled as in the original
action to which it was supplementary, the matter now before the
court is an appeal from an order of the circuit court of Marshall
county, refusing to discharge appellant, on habeas corpus, from
arrest under an execution against his person. Upon the hearing
of the writ there were before the court the [*37] judgment roll,
including, besides the general verdict, what is termed in the ab-
stract a “special verdict.” The complaint alleged several dis-
tinct causes of action, the second of which was in effect for money
had and received. Appellant contends that, inasmuch as a body
execution could not be issued on a judgment upon such cause-
of action, it cannot issue upon a judgment in an action in which
such cause was one of several, the trial of which resulted in the
judgment. This is ordinarily true, but the reason is that it is
impossible to tell upon which or what particular cause of action
the judgment rests, and if the rule were otherwise, a judgment
debtor would be exposed to imprisonment on account of a
cause of action for which imprisonment is not allowed by law.
But here the special verdict distinctly shows upon which cause
of action, and upon what facts, the general verdict and the judg-
ments rests. It finds that defendant converted to his own use
certain enumerated promissory notes and county warrants of the
plaintiff. The aggregate amount of these notes and warrants. as
listed in the special verdict, make up just the amount of the gen-
eral verdict leaving no doubt that they found their general
verdict upon the first cause of action, and upon that alone.
The verdicts would not fit and could not reasonably follow either
of the other causes of action stated in the complaint, for that was
the only one alleging conversion of notes and warrants. We
think, with appellant, that upon this record such an execution
could not rest upon either of the conditions named in the second
subdivision of Sec. 4945, Comp. Laws, for the reason, among
















































































































































CASES ON EXECUT IONS, E1'C. 
ings incompatible with the peace and welfare of society. [*398] 
Dellinger v. Tweed has no application to the present case. 
It is confined to a construction of the article of the constitution · 
respecting homesteads. 
'fhere is no error in the j udgment below. 
PER CuRIAM. Judgment allinned. 
HORMANN v. SHERIN, in S. Dak. Sup. Ct., Nov. 19, 1895---8 S. Dale. 
36, 65 N. W. 434, 59 Am. St. Rep. 744-
KELLAM, J. While this appeal is entitled as in the original 
action to which it was supplementary, the matter now before the 
court is an appeal froi;n an order of the circuit court of Marshall 
county, refusing to discharge appellant, on habeas corpus, from 
arrest under an execution against his person. Upon the hearing 
of the writ there were before the court the [*37] j udgment roll, 
including, besides the general verdict, what is termed in the ab­
stract a "special verdict." The complaint alleged several dis­
tinct causes of action, the second of which was in effect for money 
had and received. Appellant contends that, inasmuch as a body) 
execution could not be issued on a judgment upon such cause
· 
of action, it cannot issue upon a judgment in an action in which 
such cause was one of several, the trial of which resulted in the 
judgment. This is ordinarily true, but the reason is that it is 
impossible to tell upon which or what particular cause of action 
the judgment rests, and if the rule were otherwise, a judgment 
debtor would be exposed to imprisonment on account of a 
cause of action for which imprisonment is not allowed by law. 
But here the special verdict distinctly shows upon which cause 
of action, and upon what facts, the general verdict and the judg-1 men ts rests. It finds that defendant converted to his own use 
· certain enumerated promissory notes and county warrants of the 
plaintiff. The aggregate amount of  these notes and warrants. as 
listed in the special verdict, make up just the amount of the gen­
eral verdict leaving no doubt that they found their general 
verdict upon the first cause of action , and upon that alone. 
The verdicts would uot fit and could not reasonably follow either 
of  the other causes of action stated in the complaint, for that was 
the only one alleging conversion of notes and warrants. We 
think, with appellant, that upon this record such an execution 
could not rest upon either of the conditions named in the second 
subdivision of Sec. 4945,  Comp . .Laws, for the reason, among 
others, that while it is alleged in the complaint that the property 
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claimed to be unlawfully converted by the defendant was received
by him as an attorney and agant of the plaintiff, the answer denies
such allegation, and the verdict does not find upon or settle that
issue. It simply finds the fact of conversion. Such verdict does
not establish any fiduciary relation between the parties, and so
does not bring the case within the scope of said second subdivi-
sion. The general verdict, however, explained by and [*38]
resting upon the special verdict, does establish the first cause of
action alleged—the wrongful conversion of notes and_ warrants
belonging to the plaintiff. By the first subdivision of said Sec.
4945, this is ground for arrest, and by Sec. 5115 an execution
may issue against the person, although there had been no previous
order of arrest, if “the complaint contains a statement of facts
showing one or more of the causes of arrest required by said
See. 4945.” The complaint does state all the facts necessary
to constitute a cause of action for conversion. The cause of ac-
tion stated in the complaint, and the cause for arrest as named
in the statute, are identical. Upon a judgment in such action,
execution against the person may issue. Winton v. Knoll, 7 S.
D. 179, 63 N. W. 783; Wesson v. Chamberlain, 3 N. Y. 331;
Richmeyer V. Remscn, 38 N. Y. 206; Lembk/s Case, II Abb.
Prac. (N. S.) 72.
Appellant further contends that, without an order of the
court or judge, there being none in this case, the clerk had no
authority to issue execution against the person, there having been
no previous order of arrest. VVhile we think that it might be a
safer practice to obtain an order in such case, we find nothing
in the statute indicating that such leave is necessary. In respect
to issuance by the clerk, the statute seems to make no distinction
between an execution against property and an execution against
the person. Under similar statutory provisions, the New York
courts have often held, though not without an occasional intima-
tion to the contrary, that no order or leave of court was necessary.
Gin-ochio v. Figari, 4 E. D. Smith, 227; Alden v. Sarson, 4 Abb.
Prac. I02; Kloppenburg v. Neefus, 4 Sandf. 655; Lockwood v.
Van Slyke, 18 How. Prac. 45. In the latter case, Marvin, J.
said: “The Code has made no provision for applying to the
court or judge for leave to issue a ca. so. If the right exists in
this case, it is without reference to any order, and the plaintiff
may exercise the right. He will act, however, at his peril.” VVe
find nothing in the. record that would justify a reversal of the
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daimed to be unlawfully converted by the defendant was received 
by him as an attorney and agant of the plaintiff, the answer denies 
such allegation, and the verdict does not find upon or settle that 
issue. It simply finds the fact of conversion. Such verdict does 
not establish any fiduciary relation between the parties, and so 
does not bring the case within the scope of said second subdivi­
sion. The general verdict, however, explained by and [*38] 
resting upon the special verdict, does establish the first cause of 
action alleged-the wrongful conversion of notes and. warrants 
belonging to the plaintiff. By the first subdivision of said Sec. 
4945, this is ground for arrest, and by Sec. 5 u 5  an execution 
may issue against the person, although there had been no previous 
order of arrest, if "the complaint contains a statement of facts 
showing one or more of the causes of arrest required by said 
Sec. 4945 ." The complaint does state all the facts necessary 
to constitute a cause of action for conversion. The cause of ac­
tion stated in the complaint, and the cause for arrest as named 
in the statute, are identical. Upon a judgr{ient in such action, 
execution against "the person may jssue. Wfoton v. Knott, 7 S.  
D. 179, 63 N. W. 783 ; Wesson v .  Chamberlain, 3 N. Y .  33 1 ; 
Richmeyer v. Remsen, 38 N. Y. 2o6 ; Lembke's Case, I I  Abb. 
Prac. ( N. S.)  72. 
Appellant further contends that, without an order of the 
court or judge, there being none in this case, the clerk had no 
authority to issue execution against the person , there having been 
1) no previous order of arrest. While we think that it might be a 
safer practice to obtain an order in such case, we find nothing 
' in the statute indicating that such leave is necessary. In respect 
to issuance by the clerk, the statute seems to make no distinction 
between an execution against property and an execution against 
the person. Under similar statutory provisions, the New York 
courts have often held, though not without an occasional intima­
tion to the contrary, that no order or leave of court was necessary. 
Ginochio v. Figari, 4 E. D. Smith, 227 ; A lden v. Sarson, 4 Abb. 
Prac. 102 ; Kloppenburg v. Neefus, 4 Sandf. 655 ; Lockwood v, 
Van Slyke, 18 How. Prac. 45. In the latter case, Marvin, J� 
said : "The Code has made no provision for applying to the 
court or judge for leave to issue a ca. sa.. If the right exists in 
this case, it is without reference to any order, and the plaintiff 
may exercise the right. He will act, however, at his peril ." We 
find nothing in the. record that would justify a reversal of th€! 
order appealed from, and it is affirmed. All concur, 
3IO CASES ON EXECUTIONS, F.TC.
ALLEN v. HALL, in Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Nov. Term, 1842-46 Mass. (5
Metc.) 263.
ct-s .-"'*‘('
SHAW, C. J. In scire facias against a trustee. The question
is, whether the defendant can set off demands, which he had at
the time he was summoned in the suit, against Joseph Tufts, the
principal defendant.
The trustee process, provided for by statute, manifestly con-
templates two distinct classes of cases, in which a creditor may
avail himself of its provisions to secure his debt, by attaching
property in the hands of a third person; the one, when the trustee
has in his custody, or under his control, goods or chattels, liable
by law to be attached on mesne process, by the ordinary writ of
attachment; the other, where the trustee is a debtor to the prin-
cipal defendant, and owes him money, either due and payable
presently, or existing as a debt at the time of the attachment,
though payable at a future day. Maine F. <8‘ M. Ins. Co. v.
Weeks, 7 Mass. 438; Swett v. Brown, 5 Pick. -178.
This distinction is founded on the statute rendering goods
and [*265] credits, respectively, liable to attachment. In the
former case, the attachment binds the goods specifically, creates
a lien upon them, of the same nature and to the same extent,
as an ordinary attachment on mesne process, although the goods
are to stand charged, in the hands of the trustee, so that the cus-
tody remains with the trustee, instead of being taken by the at-
taching officer, unless a subsequent attachment is made by an-
other creditor, which may be done, subject to the first attach-
ment. Parker v. Kinsman, 8 Mass. 486; Bnrlingante v. Bell, 16
Mass. 318. But in both cases, the goods thus charged are deemed
to be in the custody of the law, and they are made applicable to
the purpose for which they are attached and held, in the same
manner; that is, by being advertised and sold by the officer on
execution, and the proceeds applied to its satisfaction. The onl_v
difference is, that in the case of the trustee attachment, the goods
having remained in the custody of the trustee, must be by him
exposed and delivered over to the officer holding the execution;
whereas, in the case of an attachment by the ordinary process,
the goods are in the custody of the officer, ready to be sold on
the execution, when it comes into his hands for satisfaction.
But under the other clause of the statute, rendering credits
liable to be attached, the case is wholly different. It affects an-
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AL°LEN v. HALL, in Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Nov. Term, 1842-46 Mass. (S 
Mete. ) 263. 
..... ) :t � . (, � ! . "' 
SHAW, C. J. In scire facias against a frustee. The question 
is, whether the defendant can set off demands, which he had at 
the time he was summoned in the suit, against Joseph Tufts, the 
principal defendant. 
The trustee process, provided for by statute, manifestly con­
templates · two distinct classes of cases, in which a creditor may 
avail himself of its provisions to secure his debt, by attaching 
property in the hands of a third person ; the one, when the trustee 
has in his custody, or under his control, goods or chattels, liable 
by law to be attached on mesne process, by the ordinary writ of 
attachment ; the other, where the trustee is a debtor to the prin­
cipal defendant, and owes him money, either due and payable 
presently, or existing as a debt at the time of the attachment,. 
though payable at a future day. Ma4ne F. & M. Ins. Co. v. 
Weeks, 7 Mass. 438 ; Swett v. Brown, 5 Pick. 0178. 
This distinction is founded on the statute rendering goods 
and [*265] credits, respectively, liable to attachment. In the 
former case, the attachment binds the goods specifically, creates 
a J ien upon them, of the same nature and to the same extent, 
as an ordinary attachment on mesne process, although the goods 
are to stand charged, in the hands of the trustee, so that the cus­
tody remains with the trustee, instead of being taken by the at­
taching officer, unless a subsequent attachment is made by an­
other creditor, which may be done, subject to the first attach· 
ment. Parker v. Kinsman, 8 Mass. 486 ; Burlingame v. Bell, 16 
Mass. 3 18. But in both cases, the goods thus charged are deemed 
to be in the custody of the law, and they are made applicable to 
the purpose for which they are attached and held, in the same 
manner ; that is; by being advertised and sold by the officer on 
execution, and the proceeds applied to its satisfaction. The only 
difference is, that in the case of the trustee attachment, the goods 
having remained in the custody of the trustee, must be by him 
-exposed and delivered over to the officer holding the execution ; 
whereas, in the case of an attachment by the ordinary process, 
the goods are in the custody of the officer, ready to be sold on 
the execution, when it comes into his hands for satisfaction . 
But under the other clause of the statute, rendering credits 
1iable to be attached, the case is wholly different. It affects an­
-other species of property, and accomplishes its purposes in an en-
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tirely different mode. The great question then, the only ques-
tion, is, whether he owes the principal debtor any thing; and if
it appears that he does, he is held liable to pay it to his creditor’s
creditor, instead of paying it to the creditor himself. It is unnec-
essary here to consider the various questions which may arise,
as to the nature of such debts; whether absolute or con-
tingent, and the nature of such contingency; whether, if uncertain
at the time, it can be made certain at a future time, by sales, col-
lections of money or other proceedings, showing that in point of
fact~the trustee was a debtor to the principal at the time of the
attachment. In such cases, although the facts are subsequently
disclosed, and the accounts subsequently adjusted, in order to
[*266] charge the trustee, the result must show that the trustee
was a debtor to the principal, at the time of the attachment.
This distinction between the two classes of cases will go far
to show in what cases the trustee may or may not set off such
claims as he may have against the principal debtor, and to recon-
cile what may, without discrimination, be deemed to be conflicting
authorities.
On the provision, in which the trustee is charged as a debtor,
it is very obvious that as he is a mere third party, called in to pay
his debt, in a manner different from that in which he was bound
to pay it, and in which his own rights are not drawn into con-
troversy, he ought not to be placed in a worse situation than he‘
would be if he were called to make the settlement with his cred-
itor. The balance only, after all just allowances, is the sum for
which he ought to be held. He shall therefore have the benefit
of a set-off, legal or equitable, in his own right, or in the right '
of those with whom he is in privy, and in whose favor the debt
claimed to be due from the trustee could, in his hands, be made
available, by way of set-off in any of the modes provided by law.
Hathaway v. Russell, 16 Mass. 473; Picquet v. Swan, 4 Mason,
443, (Fed. Cas. No. 11133). .
But where the trustee has goods in his custody, the property
of the principal defendant, and in their nature liable to be attached
by the process of law, the question, whether the trustee has any
right to set off claims of his own, must depend upon the fact
whether he has any lien, legal or equitable, upon such goods, or
any right, as against the owner, as whose property they are at-
tached, by contract, by custom, or otherwise, to hold the goods,
or to retain the possession of them, in security of some debt or
















































































































































3I2 C.\5l£S ON EXECUTIONS, ETC.
a mere naked possession of the goods, without any special prop-
erty or lien; if the principal debtor is the owner, and has a pres-
ent right of possession, so that he might lawfully take them out
of the custody, or authorize another to take them out of the cus-
tody of the present holder; they would be liable to be attached as
the property of the general owner, by an officer, under the common
process of attachment, if he could have access [*267] to them,
and no right of the trustee would be violated. But if the officer
cannot have access to the goods, so as to take them into custody;
if they are secreted by the trustee, or if the trustee sets up pre-
tended claims and rights of possession, so that the creditor and
ofiicer cannot safely take them out of the custody of the trustee,
and require the answer and disclosure of the trustee, as to the
grounds of his claim to the property or possession; then he may
be summoned as trustee; and if it shall subsequently appear, on
his disclosures, that he had only such naked possession, without
any lien or right of possession, then the goods stand charged
in his hands, till judgment and execution; and he has no greater
right to charge these goods with a debt of his own, by way of
set-oft’, than he would have had, if the goods had been taken into
custody by the officer, at the time of the attachment. This, we
think. is the result of the laws on this subject. Allen v. Megguire,
I5 Mass. 490; Swett v. Brown, 5 Pick. I78; Brewer v. Pitkin,
II Pick. 298.
We are next to consider how these principles apply to the
facts of the present case. It appears that the respondent, Hall,
sued out a writ against his debtor, Joseph Tufts, and caused his
goods to be attached by an officer. Before judgment, without
the consent of the debtor, and without the appraisement and cer-
tificate required by law-to warrant a sale of goods attached on
mesne process, the defendant caused the goods to be sold, and
himself became the purchaser of the greater part of them, and,
for aught that appears in his answers, had them in his possession
at the time of the service of this trustee process. This sale, it is
manifest, was wholly void, being not conformable to the Rev.
Sts. c. ()0, and not authorized by law. H owe v. Sta/rkweather,
I7 Mass. 240; Russell v. Dudley, 3 Metc. 147.
The respondent obtained the bare custody of the goods, with-
out lawful possession or right of possession. If the respondent
could have the goods in security of his original debt against Tufts,
or set off that debt, under this process, he would in effect get pos-
















































































































































3 1 2  CASES ON' EXEC U T I O N S, ETC. 
a mere naked possession of the goods, without any special prop­
erty or lien ; i f  the principal debtor is the owner, and has a pres­
ent right of possession, so that he might lawfully take them out 
of the custody, or authorize another to take them out of the cus­
tody of the present holder ; they would be l iable to be attached as 
the property of the general owner, by an officer, under the common 
process of attachment, i f  he could have access [*267] to them, 
and no right of the trustee would be violated. But if the officer 
cannot have access to the goods, so as to take them into custody ; 
if they are secreted by the trustee, or i f  the trustee sets up pre­
tended claims and rights of possession, so that the creditor and 
officer cannot safely take them out of the custody of the trustee, 
and require the answer and disclosure of the trustee, as to the 
grounds of his claim to the property or possession ; then he may 
be summoned as trustee ; and if it shall subsequently appear, on 
his disclosures, that he had only such naked possession, without 
any lien or right of possession,  then the goods stand charg ed 
in his hands, till j udgment and execution ; and he has no greater 
right to charge these goods with a debt of his own, by way of 
set-off, than he would have had, i f  the goods had been taken into 
custody by the officer, at the time of the attachment. This, we 
think, is the result of the laws on this subj ect. Allen v. M egguire, 
1 5  Mass. 490 ; Swett v. Brown., 5 Pick. 1 78 ;  Brewer v. Pitkin, 
1 1  Pick . 2g8. 
VI/ e are next to consider how these principles apply to the 
facts of the present case. It appears that the respondent , Hall , 
sued out a writ against his debtor, Joseph Tufts, and caused his 
goods to be attached by an officer. Before judgment, without 
the consent of the debtor, and without the appraisement and cer­
tificate required by law · to warrant a sale of goods attached on 
mesne process, the defendant caused the goods to be sold, and 
himself became the purchaser of the greater part of them, and, 
for aught that appears in his answers, had them in his possession 
at the time of the service of this trustee process. This sale, it is 
manifest, was wholly void, being not conformable to the Rev. 
Sts. c. 90, and not authorized by law. Howe v. Starkweather, 
1 7  Mass. 240 ; Russell v. Dudley, 3 Mete. 147. 
The respondent obtainM the bare custody of the goods, with­
out lawful possess ion or rig-ht of possession. If the respondent 
could have the g-oods in security of his original debt against Tufts , 
or set off that debt, under this process, he would in effect get pos­
session of his debtor's goods, under color of legal process,  with-
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out conforming to the requisitions of law, and thus avail himself
of such unauthorized possession, to the same extent ["*'268] as
if he had taken and sold the goods on execution in conformity to
law; which he cannot do. The court are of opinion that upon
his answers, the respondent was chargeable for the goods of
Tufts, when they thus came into his possession, and that not hav-
ing exposed and delivered them over to be sold, when demanded
on the execution, he is now answerable on this scire farias, for
their value.
V.-uuous NAMES ron GARNISHMENT.-—In Massachusetts, Maine, New
Hampshire and Vermont garnishment is known as trustee process, and
the garnishee is called trustee. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, and
to some extent in other states, it is called foreign attachment or attach-
ment, and formerly in Connecticut it was called factorizing; but in all
















































































































































N ATURE OF WRITS TO MAKE SATISFACTION jIJ 
out conforming to the requisitions of law, and thus avail himself 
of such unauthorized possession, to the same extent [*268] as 
if he had taken and sold the goods on execution in conformity to 
law ; which he cannot do. The court are of opinion that upon 
his answers, the respondent was chargeable for the goods of 
Tufts, when they thus came into his possession, and that not hav­
ing exposed and delivered them over to be sold, when demanded 
on the execution, he is now answerable on this scire facias, for 
their value. 
VARIOUS NAMES FOR GARNISH MENT.-In Massachusetts, Maine, New 
Hampshire and Vermont garnishment is known as . trustee process, and 
the garnishee is called trustee. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, and 
to some extent in other states, it is called foreign attachment or attach­
ment, and formerly in Connecticut it was called factorizing ; but in all 
these states the stakeholders summoned are called garnishees. 
3r4 cases ON JUDGMENTS, ETC.
ISSUING WRITS OF EXECUTION, ATTACH-
MENT, ETC.
What is Issuing the Writ.
GOWAN v. FOUNTAIN, in Minn. Sup. Ct., June 22, 1892-50 Minn.
264, 52 N. W. 862.
volve the validity of the execution sale under which plaintiff
claims title to the real estate in controversy. judgment was ren-
dered and docketed in the district court in and for Swift cgugty
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Bensel. The
clerk of the court in that county “issued” (to use the language
of the findings) awa_cgtfigg_on the judgment directed to the
sheriff of Chippewa ', (in which the land in question is sit-
uat'ed,) in w 1ch the date of docketing the judgment in the latter
county was left blank, and at the same time “issued” a transcript
of the judgment, and delivered both to plaintiff’s attorney, with
directions to him to have the date when the judgment should be
docketed in Chippewa county inserted in the execution before it
vas delivered to the sheriff for service. The attorney transmitted
0th to the clerk of the court of Chippewa county, with instruc-i
ions, after the transcript was filed, and the judgment docketed in
hat county, to insert the date of such docketing in the execution_.
ursuant to these instructions, the clerk in Chippewa county
led the transcript, and [*266] docketed the judgment, and in-
erted the date thereof in the execution, and returned it to the at-_
torney, by whom it was thereafter delivered for service to the
sheriff of Chippewa county, who proceeded thereunder to levy
upon and sell the land in question. It will be observed from this
that the judgment had been docketed in Chippewa county before
the execution was delivered to the sheriff, and that the fact and
date of such docketing were then correctly stated therein.
The line of reasoning by which it is sought to establish the
proposition that this execution was void is substantially as fol-
lows: That at common law all process of courts is limited to the
territory over which their jurisdiction extends; that the territorial
jurisdiction of the district court in and for a particular county is
















































































































































CASES ON J UDGMr:NTS, £TC. 
ISSUING WRITS OF EXECUTION, ATTACH­
MENT, ETC. 
What is Issuing the Writ. 
GOWAN v. FOUNTAIN, in Minn. Sup. Ct., June 22, 1892-50 Minn. 
264. 52 N. W. 862. \ MITCHELL, J.  The only questions raised by this appeal in­
volve the validity of the execution sale under which plaintiff 
claims title to the real estate in controversy. Judgment was ren­
dered and docketed in the district court in and for �wift countx 
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Bensel. The 
clerk of the court in that county "issued" ( to use the language 
of the findings ) an -execution. on the j udgment directed to th2 _ 
sheriff of Chippewa connQ', ( in which the land in question is sit­
uated ,)  in which the date of docketing the j udgment in the latter 
county was left blank, and at the same time· " issued" a transcript 
o f  the j udgment, and delivered both to plaintiff's attorney, with 
directions to him to have the date when the j udgment should b<t 
docketed in Chippewa county inserted in the execution before it 
vas delivered to the sheriff for service. The attorney transmitted 
oth to the clerk of the court of Chippewa county, with instruc: 
ions, after the transcript was filed, and the j udgment docketed fo 
hat county, to insert the date of such docketing in the execution .. 
ursuant to these instructions, the clerk in Chippewa county 
led the transcript, and [*266] docketed the j udgment, and in­
erted the date thereof in the execution, and returned it to the at�. 
torney, by whom it was thereafter delivered for service to the 
sheriff of Chippewa county, who proceeded thereunder to levy 
lupon and sell the land in question. It will be observed from this 
that the judgment had been docketed in Chippewa county before 
the execution was delivered to the sheriff, and that the fact and 
date of such docketing were then correctly stated therein. 
The line of reasoning by which it is sought to establish the 
proposition that this execution was void is substantiallv as fol-
l lows : That at common law all process of  courts is limit�d to the 
territory over which their jurisdiction extends ; that the territorial 
jurisdiction of the district court in and for a particular county is 
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limited to the county in which it is held; that, therefore, the dis-
trict court has no authority to issue an execution to another coun-
ty, except that conferred by statute, which is limited to counties
where the judgment is docketed (1878 G. S. ch. 66, § 299) ; that
consequently such docketing is a condition precedent to the au-
thority to issue an execution, which jurisdictional fact must ap-
pear on the face of the execution when issued (Id. § 295) ; that
this execution, having been issued before the judgment was dock-
eted in Chippewa county, was absolutely void. This is substan-
tially the line of reasoning advanced by Justice Ryan, speaking
for the court, in Kenfslcr v. Chicago, M. 6' St. Paul Ry. Co., 47
\/Vis. 641, 3 N. \V. 369. \Ve do not find it necessary to determine
in this case whether it is sound or not. \V e may remark. how-
ever, that it seems to us more severely logical than practical, and
we are by no means clear that under our judicial system it is cor-
rect to say that the territorial jurisdiction of the district court is
limited fo the county in _which it sits, especially in view of the
provisions of 1878 G. S. ch. 64, § 3.
But, conceding the soundness of the doctrine, its applicabil-I
ity to the present case depends upon the assumption that this exe-
cution was issued at the date on which it was made out by the
clerk of the court of Swift county, and by him delivered to plain- '
tiff’s attorney. If this premise is false, of course the conclusion)
falls with it. The delivery to the attorney was not unqualified
but only provisional and conditional; the condition being that the)
judgment should be docketed [*267] in Chippewa county, and‘
the date thereof inserted in the execution before it was delivered-
to the sheriff for service. It was issued, in the sense of being
taken from the clerk’s office, before the judgment was docketed
in Chippewa county, but the judgment was docketed in
that county before the execution was issued in the sense of
being delivered to the sheriff for service; and this is, in legal con-
templation, the date of the issue of an execution. This was, in
substance, what was held in Mollison v. Eaton, 16 Minn. 426“,
(Gil. 383). It is true that in that case the levy was on personal
property, but, as respects the authority to issue an execution to
another county, we cannot see how that makes any difference.
The practice adopted in the present case has obtained in this state
from a very early date. It is an eminently convenient one and
injures nobody. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the execution

















































































































































ISSUING THE WRITS 3 1 5 
limited to the county in which it is held ; that, therefore, the dis­
trict court has no authority to issue an execution to another coun­
ty, except that conferred by statute, which is limited to counties 
where the judgment is docketed ( 1878 G. S. ch. 66, § 299) ; that 
consequently such docketing is a condition precedent to the au­
thority to issue an execution, which jurisdictional fact must ap­
pear on the face of the execution when issued ( Id. § 295 ) ; that 
th is execution, having been issued before the judgment was dock­
eted in Chippewa county, was absolutely void. This is substan­
tially the line of reasoning advanced by Justice Ryan, speaking 
for the court, in Kentzler v. Chicago, A1. & St. Paul Ry. Co., 47 
\Vis. 641 ,  3 N. W. 369. We do not find it necessary to determine 
in this case whether it is sound or not. We may remark. how­
ever, that it seems to us more severely logical than practical, and 
we are by no means clear that under our j udicial system it is cor­
rect to say that the territorial jurisdiction of the district court is 
l imited io the county in ,which it sits, especially in view of the 
provisions of 1878 G. S. ch. 64, § 3. 
But, conceding the soundness of the doctrine, its applicabil-1 
ity to the present case depends upon the assumption that this exe · l 
cution was issued at the date on which it was made out by the 
clerk of the court of Swift county, and by him delivered to plain- 1 
tiff's attorney. I f  this premise i s  false, of course the conclusion ) 
falls with it. The delivery to the attorney was not unqualified 
but only provisional and conditional ; the condition being that th) 
j udgment should be docketed [*267] in Chippewa county, and) 
the date thereof inserted in the execution before it was del ivered • 
to the sheriff for service. It was issued, in the sense of being 
taken from the clerk's office, before the judgment was docketed 
in Chippewa county, but the judgment was docketed in 
that county before the execution was issued in the sense of 
being delivered to the sheriff for service ; and this is, in legal con­
templation, the date of the issue of an execution. This was, in 
substance, what was held in Mollison v. Eaton., 1 6  Minn. 426, 
(Gil. 383) .  It is true that in that case the levy was on personal 
property, but, as respects the authority to issue an execution to 
another county, we cannot see how that makes any difference. 
The practice adopted in the present case has obtained in this state 
from a very early date. It is an eminently convenient one and 
injures nobody. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the execution 
and the sale under it were valid. * * * 
l ud gmcttl reversed. 
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This ruling and criticism of Kentzler v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.
are approved in McDonald v. Fuller, 11 S. Dak. 355, 77 N. W. 581, 74 Am.
St. Rep. 815. In a suit against the sheriff by one claiming by assignment
from the judgment debtor after the levy, to recover the value of the
goods, it was held that the irregularity in issuing the execution to and
levying it in another county before the transcript was filed there was
cured by subsequently filing it, the execution being fair on its face. Rogers
v. Cherrier, 75 VVis. 54, 43 N. VV. 828. This decision was followed in
giving judgment in favor of the purchaser at execution sale in an action
brought to try the title, though the facts appeared on the face of the
%\.‘(CCLlélOfl. Hoerr v. Meillofer, 77 Minn. 228, 79 N. \V. 964, 77 Am. St.
ep. 74. i
As in the above case, the extent of the court's territorial jurisdiction
may be debatable; but that judicial writs have no force beyond the bor-
ders of the court's territory is established beyond dispute. Needles v.
Frost, 2 Okl. 19, 35 Pac. 574; Rathbun v. Ramwy, 14 Mich. 382; Roads v.
Symmcs, 1 Ohio 281, 13 Am. Dec. 621. Compare, also, Lindley v. O’Reilly,
fltllf,
In Kentucky absence of the statutory ground for sending the writ
to another county is held to render the execution and sale theron “void-
able, but not void, and its validity is made to depend on the innocence
of the purchaser.” Sanders v. Ruddle, 2 T. B. Mon. 139, 15 Am. Dec. 148.
What is Issuing. An order was made staying execution for twenty
days. During this time the clerk signed, sealed, and delivered an execu-
tion to the creditor's attorney. After the stay expired the attorney deliv-
\ered it to the sheriff who levied it. Mandamus to compel the lower
court to vacate the levy was denied, because the writ was not issued till
\it reached the sheriff’s hands. Peterson v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 108-
“Mich. 608, 66 N. VV. 487.
The statute declared that judgments of courts of record should be
liens on the land of the debtor within the county, but should cease to be
such if execution thereon should not be issued within a year.‘ An exe-
cution was filled out, signed, sealed, and deposited by the clerk in a
pigeon—hole for the sheriff. These facts were held not to be issuing the
vrit, so as to preserve the lien. Pease v. Ritchie, 132 Ill. 638, 24 N. E. 433.
On What Demands the Writs May Issue.
FERRIS v. FERRIS, in Vt. Sup. Ct. Grand Isle County, Jan. Term, 1853-
25 Vt. 100.
‘ Trespass by Daniel \V. Ferris against George \\-’. Ferris in
which \V. H. Mosher was summoned as trustee. Defendant
pleaded in abatement that the writ was issued as an attachment
in an action of trespass. Plaintifi demurred. judgment for de-
fendant, and plaintiff appealed.
ISHAM, J. The present trustee act, Comp. Stat. 256, pro-
vides, that upon all contracts, express or implied, made since the-
first day of january, 1839, and upon all contracts where the prin-
















































































































































3 16 CASES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC. 
This ruling and cri ticism of Kent;sler v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. 
are approved in McDonald v. Fuller, I I  S. Dak. 355, 77 N. W. 581,  74 Am. 
I St. Rep. 815. In a suit against the sheriff by one claiming by assignment 
from the judgment debtor after the levy, to recover the value of the 
1 goods, it was held that the irregularity in issuing the execution to and 
levying it in another county before the transcript was filed there was I cured by subsequently filing it, the execution being fair on its face. Rogers­
v. Cherrier, 75 Wis. 54, 43 N. W. 828. This decision was followed in 
giving j udgment in favor of the purchaser at execution sale in an action 
brought to try the title, though the facts appeared on the face of the 
execution. Hoerr v. Meihofer, 77 Minn. 228, 79 N. W. 964. 77 Am. St. 
Rep. 674 · 
As in the above case, the extent of the court's territorial j urisdiction 
may be debatable ; but that judicial writs have no force beyond the bor­
ders of the court's territory is established beyond dispute. Needles v. 
Frost, 2 Okl. 19, 35 Pac. 574 ; Rathbun v. Ranney, 14 Mich. 382 ; Roads v. 
S)•mmes, 1 Ohio 281,  13 Am. Dec. 621. Compare, also, Lindley v. O'Reilly, 
a11 te, 75. 
In Kentucky absence of the statutory ground for sending the writ 
to another county is held to render the execution and sale theron "void­
able, but not void, and it9 validity is made to depend on the innocence· 
of the purchaser." Sanders v. Ruddle, 2 T. B. Mon. 139, 15 Am. Dec. 148. 
What is Issuing. An order was made staying execution for twenty 
days. During this time the clerk signed, sealed, and delivered an execu� 
tion to the creditor's attorney. After the stay expired the attorney deliv� 
\ered it to the sheriff who levied it. Mandamus to compel the lower 
\ court to vacate the levy was denied, because the writ was not issued till i t  reached the sheriff's hands. Peterson v. Wayne Circuit Judge, I08-
�Mich. 6o8, 66 N. W. 487. � The statute declared that j udgments of courts of record should be 
ens on the land of the debtor within the county, but should cease to be 
uch if execution thereon should not be issued within a year." An exe­
ution was filled out, signed, sealed, and deposited by the clerk in a 
igeon-hole for the sheriff. These facts were held not to be issuing the 
rit, so as to preserve the lien. Pease v. Ritchie, 132 III. 638, 24 N. E. 433. 
_on What Demands the Writs May Issue. 
FERRIS v. FERRIS, in Vt. Sup. Ct. Grand Isle County, Jan. Term, 1853-
25 Vt. IOO. 
• Trespass by Daniel W. Ferris against George \V. Ferris in 
which VI/. H. Mosher was summoned as trustee. Defendant 
pleaded in abatement that the writ was issued as an attachment 
in an action of trespass. Plaintiff demurred� Judgment for de­
fendant, and plaintiff appealed. 
ISHAM, J. The present trustee act, Comp. Stat. 256, pro­
vides, that upon all contracts, express or implied, made since the · 
first day of January, 1839, and upon all contracts where the prin­
cipal defendant [ * 102] has absconded from, or is resident out of 
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‘this state, or is concealed within it, a suit may be commenced
thereon by a trustee process. This mode of relief is unknown at
-common law. The remedy itself, the form of the process, and
mode of procedure, are given and prescribed by statuteI and
when adopted, its provisions are to be strictly pursued, and un-
less the case is expressly provided for by the act, it cannot be
-sustained. These principles are illustrated and confirmed by the
-case of Park et al. v. Trustees of W illiams, I4 Vt. 213. evi-_
-d£TiE,__tL€j§fOI‘6 that this suit cannot be sustained as a trustee
process, for the cau of action a ainst the rinci al defendant
toes not arise e.r contractu, It is only in cases of that character _
that this process is given by statute * *i * [*ro3] * * * The
result is, that the judgment of the county court, dismissing the
suit, must be Affirmed.
HAWES v. CLEMENT, in Wis. Sup. Ct. Oct. 13, 1885—64 Wis. 152, 25
N. W. 21.
Motion by Clement and five other execution creditors of
Boyd to vacate an attachment of Boyd’s property, levied in an
action by Hawes against Boyd, and a counter motion by Hawes
that the property be used in satisfaction of his judgment. The
circuit court denied the motion by Clement et al. and granted
Hawes’s motion. Clement et al. appeal. The principal ground
for the motion to vacate was that Hawes’s claim was of such a
nature that an attachment could not lawfully issue in an action
to enforce it.
LYON, J. The moneys in the hands of the sheriff, being the‘
proceeds of the sale of the attached property, are under the con-'
trol of the court, and doubtless the court may inquire and deter-
mine who is entitled thereto, and order the same paid over to thq
person or persons so entitled. The procedure to that end, in form,‘
is in the action of.Hart-es v. Boyd, [*I54] yet, in substance andi
effect, it is not strictly in that, or in either of the actions against ‘
Boyd, but is rather in the nature of a special proceeding grow- \
ing out of and founded upon all of those actions; to which pro- |
ceeding all the attaching creditors of Boyd (and perhaps Boyd I
also) are parties. If the respondent’s attachment was valid, he I
is entitled to have his judgment paid first out of such moneys.
If his attachment is not valid, the appellants, the other attaching
creditors of Boyd, are first entitled to have the moneys applied in
















































































































































ISSUI�G THE WRITS 
this state, or is concealed within it, a suit may be commenced 
thereon by a trustee process. This mode of relief is unknown at 
·common law. The remedy itself, the form of the process, and 
mode of procedure, are given and prescribed by statute0 and 
when adopted, its provisions are to be strictly pursued, and un­
less the case is expressly provided for by the act, it cannot be 
.sustained. These principles are illustrated and confirmed by the 
·case of Park et al. v. Trustees of Ulil/iams, 14 Vt. 2 1 3. It is evi­
·dent, therefore, that this suit cannot be sustained as atrustee
­
process, for the cau of action a ainst the rinci al defendant 
· oes not arise e.• contractu.. It  is only in cases of that character 
that this process is  given by statute * * .  * [* 103] * * * The 
result is, that the judgment of the county court, dismissing the 
suit, must be Affirmed. 
HA WES v. CLEMENT, in Wis. Sup. Ct. Oct. 13, 1885-64 Wis. 1�. 25 
N. W. 21. 
Motion by Clement and five other execution creditors of) 
Boyd to vacate an attachment of Boyd's property, levied in an 
action by Hawes against Boyd, and a counter motion by Hawes 
that the property be used in satisfaction of his judgment. The 
-circuit court denied the motion by Clement et al. and granted 
Hawes's motion. Clement et al. appeal. The principal ground} 
for the motion to vacate was that Hawes's claim was of such a 
nature that an attachment could not lawfully issue in an action 
to enforce it. 
LYON, J. The moneys in the hands of the sheriff, being the " 
proceeds of the sale of the attached property, are under the con-1 
trot of the court, and doubtless the court may inquire and deter-1 
mine who is entitled thereto, and order the same paid over to thC1 
person or persons so entitled. The procedure to that end, in form� 
is in the action of . Hait•es v. Boyd, [* 154] yet, in substance and • 
effect, it is not strictly in that, or in either of the actions against , 
Boyd, but is rather in the nature of a special proceeding grow- \ 
ing out of and founded upon all of those actions ; to which pro- 1 
cee<ling all the attaching creditors of Boyd ( and perhaps Boyd t 
also ) are parties. If the respondent's attachment was valid, he I 
is entitled to have his judgment paid first out of such moneys. 
If his attachment is not valid, the appellants, the other attaching 
creditors of Boyd, are first entitled to have the moneys applied in 
payment of their j udgments in due order of priority. Manifestly 
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the appellants may, in some proceeding, litigate and have deter-
mined the question of the validity or invalidity of such attach-
ment. Regarding substance rather than mere form, we think
they have adopted an effectual procedure to obtain an adjudica-
tion of that question. If authorities are required to a proposition
so reasonable and just, they may be found cited in the notes to
Sec. 275, Drake on Attachment. * * *
The cause of action stated by the respondent in his action
against Boyd is to the effect that in March, 1884, he delivered to
Boyd goods, wares, and merchandise of the value of $7,8I4.83 to
be sold by the latter for him at Janesville. * * * [*I55] * * *
The complaint concludes with the following avermeuts:
“This plaintiff further shows that he is unable to state what, if
any, portion of said goods so delivered by this plaintiff to said
defendant to be sold as aforesaid, remain unsold; and this plain-
tiff will be unable to state the exact amount till after he takes an
inventory of the goods remaining unsold and belonging to this
plaintiff; and this plaintiff further shows that the balance of said
goods so delivered to said defendant and remaining unsold, or
sold and unaccounted for, is the sum of $6,845.18, with interest
from the said 14th day of July, 1884.” Judgment is demanded
for the sum last named.
’ It is essential toa valid execution of a writ of attaclmignt
\ that the affidavit annexed thereto should state not Qnlv a statutory
cause for issuin the writ but also the amount of the defendant’s
‘indebtedness to the Jlaintiff “as ne r c
all legal set—offs.” R. S. § 2731. The statement of the amount of
\ such indebtedness is a most vital one. For the purposes of the
‘execution of the writ it imports absolute verity, because it is not
traversable in a proceeding by traverse to dissolve the attach-
\ment. R. S. § 2745. Such statement is the guide to the officer
‘executing the writ as to the amount of property he ought to
seize in order to secure the plaintiff. Hence it is required for
‘the protection of the debtor, and of his other creditors as well.
and logica y o lows that i the cause of action be of such a char-
l<@~2_anad1mr-1J1-i~mdsd-
upon it can be lawfully executed.
Taking the most favorable view for the respondent, H awes,
of the transactions between himself and Boyd, and we have this


















































































































































CASES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC. 
the appellants may, in some proceeding, l itigate and have deter­
mined the question of the validity or invalidity of such attach­
ment. Regarding substance rather than mere form, we think 
they have adopted an effectual procedure to obtain an adj udica­
tion of that question. If  authorities are required to a proposition 
so reasonable and j ust, they may be found cited in the notes to 
Sec. 275, Drake on Attachment. * * * 
'fhe cause of action stated by the respondent in his action 
again st Boyd is to the effect that in March, 1884, he delivered to 
Boyd goods, wares, and merchandise of the value of $71814.83 to 
be sold by the latter for him at Janesville. * * * [*155]  * * * 
The complaint concludes with the following averments : 
"This plaintiff further shows that he is unable to state what, i f  
any, portion of said goods so  delivered by this plaintiff to said 
defendant to be sold as aforesaid, remain unsold ; and this plain­
tiff will be unable to state the exact amount till after he takes an 
inventory of  the goods remaining unsold and belonging to this  
plaintiff ; and this plaintiff further shows that the balance o f  sai<l 
goods so delivered to said defendant and remaining unsold, or 
sold and unaccounted for, is the sum of $6,845 . 18, with interest 
from the said 14th day of July, 1884." Judgment is demanded 
for the sum last named. \ It is essential to a yalid execution of a writ of attachment 
that the affidavit anhe�ed thereto shout nl t u 
cause or issuin the writ but also the amount of the defendant's 
in e tedness to the plaintiff "as near as may he1 aver and ahpye 
all legal set-offs." R. S. § 273 1 .  The statement of the amount of 
\ such indebtedness is a most vital one. For the purposes of the 
' execution of the writ it imports absolute verity, because it is not 
traversable in a proceeding by traverse to dissolve the attach­
\ ment. R. S. § 2745. Such statement is the guide to the officer 
\ executing the writ as to the amount o f  property he ought to 
seize in order to secure the plaintiff. Hence it is  required for 
\ the protection of the debtor, and of his other creditors as well. 
Considering the im ortance of such statement · 'ly 
and log1ca y o lows that i the cause of action be of such a char; 
acter that it 1s 1mposs1ble for the laintiff or *1  · 
know e amoun o such indebtedness. no attachment foupded· 
upon it can be lawfully executed . •  
Taking the most favorable view for the respondent, Ha'll.res, 
of the transactions between himself and Boyd, and we have this 
state of facts : Hawes delivered his goods to Boyd, in trust that 
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Boyd would sell them and pay over to him the proceeds of the
sales, less one half the net profits. In stating the indebtedness,
Hawcs included nothing for profits. He merely claimed the value
of the goods delivered to Boyd, less payments. VVe may there-
fore exclude from consideration any question of the amount of
profits. But in order to ascertain the amount of Boyd's indebted-
ness to Hazves at any given time, it was necessary to know Qt
amount Boyd had realized for such of the goods as he had there-
tofore sold. It was not st'ii’ficient to Enow merely what goods he
had sold, for the value thereof is not the measure of his indebted-
ness. It is the amount realized which, under the contract men-
tioned in the complaint, measures the liability of Boyd. HenceI
before Hawes, or any one for him, could state the amount of
t e 00 s so and the prices realized therefor. Because the re-
‘_‘=[)_origclmt2=1_clnn—er_1'tT—_d__i'—_F21ssi1e()L1tzmw><<2cued before an such
Rc_()Tf1TgWlm1W_l5Ff(FE?:_oTEis—__—_—_2lg'(eru:l<iuew,m'Lco-tfd
know, t e amount 0 o d’s indebtedness al w 1ch sufiicientl
appears in the complaint in that action 2, it must be held that the
**>1<[*I59]*>i<>l<
It results from the views above expressed that the order of
the circuit court, that the respondent’s judgment and execution
be first paid out of the moneys in the hands of the sheriff, must
be reversed, and the cause remanded with directions that such
moneys be first applied in satisfaction of the appellants’ judgments
and executions in due order of priority.
By the Court. It is so ordered.
PARTNERSHIP ACCOUNTING.—<“ThiS, then, is a suit for the liquidation
and settlement of a partnership, the ascertainment of the balance and
decree therefor. It is true that the plaintiff professes to have calculated
and to his own satisfaction ascertained the balance; but it is quite obvious
that the partnership afiairs involve mutual items of debit and credit, nu-
merous and diversified in their nature. * * * It would seem impossible
under the showing of the petition itself, and especially as it does not
allege that any accounts have been rendered, nor any balance of account
actually struck by the partners. that the plaintiff should be able to declare
with certainty, the amount which, on a final liquidation and settlement of
these affairs, will be found due to him. * * * \Ve do not, however, wish
to be considered as laying down the rule that, in no case of joint adven—
ture can a partner proceed by attachment. Suits may occur in which the
business of the adventure may be so limited and simple in its features,
as to exhibit a case where the party might be considered as able to swear
to a positive and precise balance.” Decree dissolving the attaclnnent af-
firmed. Brinegar v. Grifiin, 2 La. An. 154. To same effect. Johnson v.

















































































































































ISSUI NG THE WRITS J H) 
Boyd would sel l them and pay over to him the proceeds of the 
!;ales, less one half the net profits. In stating the indebtedness, 
H a·wes included nothing for profits. He merely claimed the value 
of the goods delivered to Boyd, less payments. We may there­
fore exclude from consideration any question of the amount of 
profits. But in order to ascertain the amount of Boyd's indebted­
ness to Hawes at any given time, it was necessary to know what 
amount Boyd had realized for such of the goods as he had there­
tofore sold. It was not sufficient to know merely what goods he 
had sold, for the value thereof is not the measure of his indebted­
ness. It is the amount realized which, under the contract men­
tioned in the complaint, measures the liability of Boyd. Hence. 
before H au.V!s, or any one for him, could state the amount of 
Boyd's mdebtedness, 1t was necessar to h ' f 
t e goo s so and the prices realized therefor. Because the re­
spondent's attachment was sued out and executed before an suCh 
e ore e or 1s a ent knew, or could 
apPears in the complaint in that action), it must he held that the 
respondent obtained no lien u n the ro ertv attached as a inst 
t 1e 
* * * [*159] * * * 
It results from the views above expressed that the order of 
the circuit court, that the respondent's judgment and execution 
he first paid out of the moneys in the hands of the sheriff, must 
.he reversed, and the cause remanded with directions that such 
moneys be first applied in satisfaction of the appellants' judgments 
and executions in due order of priority. 
By the Court. It is so ordered . 
PAR'l'N:f:RSHIP AccouNTING.--''This, then, is a suit for the liquidation 
and settlement of a partnership, the ascertainment of the balance and 
decree therefor. It is true that the plaintiff professes to have calculated 
and to his own satisfaction ascertained the balance ; but it is quite obvious 
that the partnership affairs involve mutual items of debit and credit, nu­
merous and diversified in their nature. * * * It would seem impossible 
under the showing of the petition itself, and especially as it does not 
allege that any accounts have been rendered, nor any balance of account 
actually struck by the partners, that the plaintiff should be able to declare 
with certainty, the amount which, on a final liquidation and settlement of 
these affairs, will be found due to him. * * * We do not, however, wish 
to be considered as laying down the rule that, in no case of joint adven­
ture can a partner proceed by attachment. Suits may occur in which the 
business of the adventure may be so limited and simple in its features, 
as to exhibit a case where the party might be considered as able to swear 
to a positive and precise balance." Decree dissolving the attachment af­
firmed. Brinegar v. Grillin, 2 La. An. 1 54. To same effect. Johnson v. 
Short, 2 La. An. 277 ; Barrow v. McDonald, 12 La. An. no ; Tread·way 
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v. Ryan, 3 Kan. 437; Rice v. Beers, I Rice's Dig. of S. Car. Rep. 75;
Ackroyd v. Aclcroyd, 11 Abbott Prac. (N. Y.) 345, 20 How. Prac. 93. But
see Humphrey: v. Matthews, II Ill. 471. In Georgia and California the
point has been made, but the attachments were sustained on the ground
that the parties were not in fact partners. Wheeler v. Farmer, 38 Cal.
203; H0lIozea_v v. Brinklcy, 42 Ga. 226.
An excellent argument by Ewing, C. J., to the effect that attachment
does not lie if the amount is not sufficiently certain to enable the court
to fix the amount of bail which the defendant must give to dissolve the
attachment, will be found in Jcffcry v. Woolcy, IO N. J. L. (5 Halsted)
145. In that case the attachment in an action on a plea of covenant was
quashed because it did not appear from the attachment afiidavit or other
proceedings in the action that the covenant broken was of such a nature
that the plaintiff’s damages for the breach of it would be certain. “The
jurisdiction must be shown not presumed.”
ATTACHMENT HAS BEEN HELD AVAILABLE in an action for damages for
breach of contract to furnish tea of a certain quality, the tea furnished
being inferior. The measure of damages is the difference between the
market value of the tea furnished and that promised. FISHER v. CON-
SEQUA, 2 Wash. C. C. 382, Fed. Cas. No. 4816. This is the leading case
on this point. The same was held in a similar action for delivering flour
inferior to contract. Wilson v. Wilson, 8 Gill (Md.) I92, 50 Am. Dec.
685. And beans inferior to contract. Hacblcr v. Bcrnharth, 115 N. Y.
459, 22 N. E. 167. Machinery inferior to contract: Showen v. J. L. Owens
C0. 158 Mich. 321, 122 N. W. 640. Again it was held avail-
able in an action for damages for the non-delvery of goods
promised, Goldsborough V. Orr (lumber) 21 U. S. (8 Wheaton),
2I7; Hyman v. Newcll (cigars), 7 Col. App. 78, 42 Pac. I016;
Stifi v. Fislmr (cattle), 2 Tex. Civ. App. 346, 21 S. W. 291.
Again, though the goods promised were a specific stock of goods then in
store (Carland v. Cunningham, 37 Pa. St. 228), or a certain promissory
note, the measure of damages being the difference between the contract
price and the face of the note with interest. Dirickson v. Showcll, 79 Md.
49, 28 Atl. 896. Again the attachment was held available on a quantum
meruit for the use of vessels and for demurrage. Roclofson v. Hatch, 3
Mich. 277. Again in an action for damages for failure to sell as agreed
land purchased by plaintiff through defendant in consideration of such
agreement. “The amount to be paid is fixed by the terms of the contract,
or can be readily ascertained from the information it affords.” It is “the
difference between the value of the land at the end of the year and the
amount which the defendant bound himself to realize from it for the plain-
tiff.” Dunn v. Mackey, 80 Cal. 104, 22 Pac. 64. Aga_in__aLt;i£l_1mgm_w_as
h ilable in an action for damages for failure to tow a certain keel-
boat u Re '- . Jones v. Buzzard,
2 Ark. 415. Again, for failure to scale logs, thereby preventing plaintiff
cutting them and causing him expense by the delay. Messingcr v Dun-
ham, 62 Ark. 326, 35 S. W. 435. Again, attachment was held available
in covenant for failure to build a mill and pay $1,500 for a warranty deed
which had been tendered. Barber v. Robeson, 15 N. J. L. (3 Green), 17.
Again, in debt for goods sold and delivered and for failure to pay an
accepted draft including $25 attorney fees occasioned by such failure.
lVa[IIc’s P. G. Co. v. Basham, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 638, 29 S. W. I118. Again,
for accepting only 260 harmonists under a contract for the sale of 600,
















































































































































ISSUING THE \VRITS 321
Misc. (N. Y.) 509, 71 N. Y. S. 1080. Again for failure to accept marble
work for a building. Sullivan v. Moffat, 68 N. J. L. 211, 52 At]. 291.
IN LoL'1s1AN.\ it is said attachment is given to recover a debt and
an action may be in the debit or the dctinet, “which is on an express
agreement to deliver any specific property." Therefore attachment lies
in an action against a carrier for loss of oods; Hunt v. Norris, 4 Martin
lIIa.i 517; and in an action for failure to bind and return books. Turner
v. Collins, 1 Martin, N. S. 369.
Arracnuanr was HELD Nor AVAILABLE in action for damages for
not furnishing buggies to sell on commission as agreed whereby plaintiff
lost profits: Wilson v. Louis Cook Mfg. Co., 88 N. Car. 5; and
on facts much the same except that the contract was to sell cloth-
ing by sample. llocnsranran v. SAM. 73 Tex. 315, 11 S. W. 408. This is
also an excellent case for the student to read. Again, for refusing to
employ a ship according to charter party whereby the owner was to have
£670 per month as long as the voyage named should require. CLARK v.
WILSON, 3 Wash. C. C. 560, Fed. Cas. No. 2841. This is a leading
case. Again, for refusing to deed and deliver several parcels of land sub-
ject to separate incumbrances, and certain bonds and stocks in exchange
for others held by plaintiff. Hough v. Kugler, 36 Md. 186. Again, for
delay in selling a cargo of flour and failure to invest the proceeds in a
cargo of coffee as agreed. lVarwitk v. Chase, 23 Md. 154. Again, for
failing to mine at least 10,000 tons per annum and pay $2 per ton royalty.
Heclescher v. Trotter, 48 N. J. L. 419, 5 At]. 581. Again, for failure to
ship a stock of boots and shoes to plaintiffs, who had rented a store to
engage in business. Hoover v. Hathaway, 20 Dist. Col. (9 Mackey), 591.
Again, for value of iron defendant agreed to carry safely but lost. Hazard
v. Jordan, 12 Ala. 180. Again, for failure of title to a patent sold to plain-
tiff. Mills v. Findlay, 14 Ga. 230.
Vllhile the decisions above named are not all reconcilable the courts
rendering them claim to follow the rule announced in Fisher v. Consequa
above.
IF THE PENALTY NAMED IN‘ A noun is to cover such damages as the
party may become entitled to, and not to liquidate the damages, attach-
ment does not lie unless the damages are so certain in amount as to
comply with the rule announced above. B1’0‘lt'tl v. Hoy, 16 N. J. L.
157; Cheddirk v. Marsh, 21 N. J. L. 463; State v. Beall, 3 H. 8.: M. (Md.)
347; Hough v. Kugler, 36 Md. 185.
AMOUNT or FINAL RECOVERY.—“And though the defendant may
contest the demand upon him, or may show that no damage has in fact
been sustained by the plaintiffs, that does not affect the question whether
the contract supplies the plaintiff a measure of damages to which he can
make affidavit." Dirirkson v. Showell, 79 Md. 49, 28 At]. 896.
It has been said that the danger of oppression could and should
be avoided by the court exercising a sound discretion in controling the
writ and limiting the amount to be attached when the amount due is
uncertain, without impairing the usefulness of the writ. Roth v. Ameri-
can Piano M. Co., 35 N. Y. Misc. 509, 71 N. Y. Supp. 1080.
UNCERTAINTY IMMATERIAL.—IrI several cases it is declared that un-
certainty as to the amount of plaintiff’s demand is no objection and the
attachment sustained. See following. For negligently towing a raft of
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Misc. ( N. Y. ) 509, 71 N. Y. S. 1o8o. Again for failure to accept marble 
work for a building. Sullivan v. Moffat, 68 N. J. L. 2n, 52 Atl. 291. 
IN  Lm;1s1AN A it is said attachment is given to recover a debt and 
an action may be in the debit or the detinet, "which is on an express 
agreement to deliver any specific property." T r ore attachment lies 
in an action against a carrier for loss of oods ; Hun t v. Norris, 4 artm 
a. 5 1 7 ; an m an action or at ure to bin and return books. Turner 
v. Collins, l Martin, N. S. 369. 
ATTACHMENT WAS HEU> NO'I' AVAlt.ABU: in action for damages for 
not furnishing buggies to sell on commission as agreed whereby plaintiff 
lost profits : Wilson v. Louis Cook Mfg. Co., 88 N. Car. 5 ;  and 
on facts much the same except that the contract was to sell cloth­
ing by sample. HocHSTADLER. v. SAM . 73 Tex. 315, I I  S. W. 408. This is  
also an excellent case for the student to read. Again, for refusing to 
employ a ship according to charter party whereby the owner was to have 
i.670 per month as long as the voyage named should require. CLARK v. 
WILSON, 3 Wash. C. C. s6o, Fed. Cas. No. 2841. This is a leading 
case. Again, for refusing to deed and deliver several parcels of land sub­
ject to separate incumbrances, and certain bonds and stocks in exchange 
for others held by plaintiff. Hough v. Kugler, 36 Md. 186. Again, for 
delay in selling a cargo of flour and failure to invest the proceeds in a 
cargo of coffee as agreed. Warwick v. Chase, 23 Md. 154 Again, for 
failing to mine at least IO,ooo tons per annum and pay $2 per ton royalty. 
If eckscher v. Tro tter, 48 N. ]. L. 419, 5 Atl. 58 1. Again, for failure to 
ship a stock of boots and shoes to plaintiffs, who had rented a store to 
engage in business. Hoover v. Hathaway, 20 Dist. Col. (9 Mackey ) ,  591.  
Again, for value of iron defendant agreed to carry safely but lost. Hazard 
v. I ordan, 12 Ala. 18o. Again, for failure of title to a patent sold to plain­
tiff. Mills v. Findlay, 14 Ga. 230. 
While the decisions above named are not all reconcilable the courts 
rendering them claim to follow the rule announced in Fisher v. Con.sequa 
above. 
IF THE P£NAt.TY N ... MED IN A BOND is to cover such damages as the 
party may become entitled to, and not to l iquidate the damages, attach­
ment does not lie unless the damages are so certain in amount as to 
comply with the rule announced above. Brown v. Hoy, 16 N. J. L. 
1 57 ; Chcddick v . .  \larsh, 21 N. J. L. 463 ; State v. Beall, 3 H. & M. ( Md. ) 
347 ; Hough v. Kugler, J6 Md. 185. 
AMOUNT of' FINAL RECOVERY.-"And though the defendant may 
contest the demand upon him, or may show that no damage has in fact 
been sustained by the plaintiffs, that does not affect the question whether 
the contract supplies the plaintiff a measure of damages to which he can 
make affidavit." Dirickson v. Showell, 79 Md. 49. 28 Atl. 8g6. 
It has been said that the danger of oppression could and should 
be avoided by the court exercising a sound discretion in controling the 
writ and limiting the amount to be attached when the amount due is  
uncertain, without impairing the usefulness of the writ. Roth v .  A meri­
can Piano M. Co., 35 N. Y. Misc. 509, 71 N. Y. Supp. rn8o. 
UNCERTAINTY I M MATERIAL.-In several cases it is declared that un­
certainty as to the amount of plaintiff's demand is no obj ection and the 
attachment sustained. See following. For negligently towing a raft of 
logs ; N cw H avcn S. S. Co. v. Fowler, 28 Conn. 103 ; rregligently carrying 
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goods; Lenox v. Howland, 3 Caines, N. Y., 257, 323; or for a defect in
a grain drill sold and warranted to plaintiff; Baumgardner v. Dowagiac
Mfg. Co., 50 Minn. 381, 52 N. W. 964; or for refusing to accept and pay
for a stock of hardware at agreed price; Lord v. Gaddis, 6 Iowa 57; or
for damages on an attachment bond; Withers v. Britlain, 35 Neb. 436; 53
N. W. 375; or for breach of promise to marry, attachment being given
on "all money demands,” Morton v. Pearman, 28 Ga. 324; or for unpaid
duties on silks smuggled; U. S. v. Grail‘, 67 Barber (N. Y.) 304, for the
loss of profits from defendant's failure to furnish a machine to make
nails. Bates Mach. Co. v. Norton I. W. 113 Ky. 372, 68 S. W. 423. See
also Steen '0. Norton, 45 Wis. 418.
EMERSON v. DETROIT STEEL & SPRING CO., in Mich. Sup. Ct.,
April 17, 1894-—1oo Mich. 127, 58 N. \V. 659.
Eil_l by assignee for benefit of creditors to set aside attach-
ments against the assignor, for irregularities and for want of
grounds for attachment. Defendants appeal.
IVIONTGOMERY, J. * * * The defendants contended that the
court of chancery has no jurisdiction to set aside an attachment
at the suit of an assignee for the benefit of creditors. * * * [*13o]
It is settled that a subse uent attachin creditor ma ' f
in egmty agamst an unauthorized attachment by gggther. ' Hale
v. Chandler, 3 1c . 531 ; Hinchman v. Town, IO Id. 508; Edson
v. C umings, 52 Id. 52. And we are convinced that an assignee
for general creditors should have the same remedy. Any other
rule would result in this: That ro ert seized by an unauthor-
ized attachment may be reached by a subsequent attachin ' i-
It is suggested that the assignee has the right to intervene in the
suit at law, but the contrary was held in Gott v. Hoschna, 457
Mich. 413. See, also, Rowe v. Kellogg, 54 Mich. 206.
Numerous objections are made to the regularity of the at-
tachment proceedings.
The affidavits, after stating that defendant is justly indebted
to the plaintiff upon contract, etc., each state that the defendant
fraudulently contracted the debt or incurred the obligation re-
specting which the suit is brought, using the language of the
statute. It is contended that the use of the disjunctive “or” ren-
ders the affidavit invalid. We hold the afiidavit sufficient in this
respect. The incurring of -an obligation under the statute can
be nothing other than contracting an indebtedness, in a case
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goods ; Lenox v. Howland, 3 Caines, N. Y., 257, 323 ; or for a defect in 
a grain drill sold and warranted to plaintiff ;  Baumgardner v. Dowagiac 
Mfg. Co., 50 l\'linn. 381 ,  52 N. W. 964 ; or for refusing to accept and pay 
for a stock of hardware at agreed price ; Lord v. Gaddis, 6 Iowa 57 ; or 
for damages on an attachment bond ; Wit hers v. Britta in, 35 Neb. 436 ; 53 
N. W. 375 ;  or for breach of promise to marry, attachment being given 
on "all money demands," Morton v. Pearman, 28 Ga. 324 ; or for unpaid 
duties on silks smuggled ; U. S. v. Graff, 67 Barber ( N. Y. ) 304. for the 
loss of profits from defendant's failure to furnish a machine to make 
nails. Bates Mach. Co. v. Norton I. W. 1 13 Ky. 372, 68 S. W. 423. See 
also Steen ·v. N ortot1, 45 Wis. 418. 
EMERSON v. DETROIT STEEL & SPRING CO., in Mich. Sup. Ct., 
April 17, 1894-100 Mich. 127, s8 N. W. 659. 
lll!,! by assignee for benefit of creditors to set aside attach­
ments against the assignor, for irregularities and for want of 
grounds for attachment. Defendants appeal. 
MONTGOMERY, J. * * * The defendants contended that the 
court of chancery has no jurisdiction to set aside an attachment 
at the suit of an assignee for the benefit of creditors. * * * [ *1 30·1 
It  is settled that a subsequent attaching creditor may haye reljef 
m e mt a amst an unauthorized attachment b er. · Hale 
v. Chandler, 3 1c . 53 1 ; Hinchman. v. Town, IO Id. 5o8 ; Edson 
v. Cumings, 52 Id. 52. And we are convinced that an assignee 
for general creditors should have the same remedy. Any other 
rule would result in this : That property seized by an unauthor­
ized attachment may be reached by a subsequent attachin i­
tor but it cannot 
It is suggested that the assignee has the right to intervene in the 
suit at law, but the contrary was held in Gott v. Hoschna, · 57 
M ich . 413. Sec, also, Rowe v. Kellogg, 54 :rvlich. 2o6. 
Numerous obj ections are made to the. regularity of the at­
tachment proceedings . 
The affidavits, after stating that defendant is justly indebted 
to the plaint iff upon contract, etc . , each state that the defendant 
fraudulently contracted the debt or incurred the obligation re­
specting which the su it is brought, using the language of the 
statute. It i s  contended that the use of the d isjunct ive "or" ren­
ders the affidavit invalid .  We hold the affidavit sufficient in this 
respect. The incurring of -an obligation under the statute ca� 
be nothing other than contracting an indebtedness, in a case 
[ * 1 3 1 ]  where the suit is brought , as it must be under the statute, 
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upon contract, and where the affidavit shows that it is brought
upon contract. If the defendant incurred an obligation, it was
an obligation to pay money. Each phrase expresses the same
thing in a different way. ie istmction between the cases
where the use of the disjunctive renders the affidavit invalid and
those i11 which it does not is well stated in Drake on Attachments,
at section 102: “ /Vherg tlgg d1'5j“n£n'm=_ ‘Or! is “sad I _
nect two distinct facts of different natures but to characterize
and include two or more phases of the san1e fact, attended with_
the same results, the construction just mentioned (that is, ren-
dering the a ( avit v01 or uncertainty would be inapplicable.”
‘SEE a so, cases cited in note, and “lap. Attachm. p. .
It is suggested that an expression in one of the affidavits.
stating that the debt is due to plaintiffs from defendant “upon
express contract and implied contract,” is as indefinite as the use
of the word “or” would be. W' e do not see how this can be main-\
tained. The statement shows affirmatively the indebtedness, and
that the same is due upon express and upon implied contract,
The question is ruled by Buehler V. De Lcmos, 84 Mich. 554.
* * * [#132] * * *
The next question was whether there were grounds for at-
tachment. \Ve think there was sufficient to show that the indebt-
edness was fraudulently contracted. It sufficiently appears that
Dun’s reports were based upon the sworn reports of the company
to the secretary of state; that both the plaintiffs in attachment ex-
tended credit upon the strength of these reports; and we are sat-
isfied that these statements of the company were false, and could
have been made with no other purpose than that of establishing
a false credit. * * * [*I33] * * *
It is contended by the complainants that the defendants, by
including a demand not due, debarred themselves from priority
as to all of their demand. There is nothing to indicate any fraud-
ulent intent on the part of the plaintiffs in attachment in averring
the amount of their claims. There was certainly no collusion
between them and the debtor. \/Ve think, under the circum-
stances, the question is ruled by H inchman V. Town, 10 Mich. 508.
See, also, Dawson v. Brown, 12 Gill & J. (Md.) 53; Boarman v.
Patterson, I Gill (Md.) 372; and Gross v. Goldsmith, 4 Mackey
(D. C.) 126. It would render proceedings in attachment very
precarious if it should be held that, in averring the amount due,
the entire attachment should fail if, upon a subsequent trial of
















































































































































I SSU I N G  THE WRITS 
upon contract, and where the affidavit shows that it is  brought 
upon contract. If the defendant incurred an obligation, it was 
an obligation to pay money. Each ehrase expresses the ·same 
thing in a different way. '!'fie d1stmction between the cases 
where the use of the disjunctive renders the affidavit invalid and 
those in which it does not is well stated in Drake on Attachments, 
at section I02 : " Where the djsj1mctjye 'or' js used, nqt to con­
nect two distinct facts of different natures, but to characterize 
and include two or more phases of the same fact, attended wjtb 
the same results, the construction · ust mentioned that is ren­
dering the a av1t vo1 or uncertaint would be inapplicable. " 
'-See� a so, cases cited in note, and Wap. Attac m. p. 
It is  suggested that an expression in one of the affidavits, 
stating that the debt is due to plaintiffs from defendant "upon 
express contract and implied contract," is as indefinite as the use 
of the word "or" would be. We do not see how this can be main=­
tained. The statement shows affirmatively the indebtedness, an<l 
that the same is due upon express and upon implied contract 
The question is ruled by Buchler v. De Lemos, 84 Mich. 554. 
* * * [ * 132 ]  * * * 
The next question was whether there were grounds for at­
tachment. We think there was sufficient to show that the indebt­
edness was fraudulently contracted. It sufficiently appears that 
Dun's reports were based upon the sworn reports of the company 
to the secretary of state ;  that both the plaintiffs in attachment ex­
tended credit upon the strength of these reports ; and we are sat­
isfied that these statements of the company were false, and could 
have been made with no other purpose than that of establishing 
a false cred it . * * * [ * 133 ]  * * * 
It is contended by the complainants that the defendants , by 
including a demand not due, debarred themselves from priority 
as to all of  their demand. There is nothing to indicate any fraud­
ulent intent on the part of the pla intiffs in attachment in averring 
the amount of their claims. There was certain ly no collusion 
between them and the debtor. \Ve think, under the circum­
stances, the question is ruled by Hin chman v. Town, IO Mich.  5o8. 
See, also, Dawson v. Brown, 12 Gill & J.  ( Md.)  53 ; B oarman, v. 
Patterso 11, I Gill ( l\:1d. ) 372 ; and Gross v. Goldsmith, 4 Mackey 
( D. C. ) 1 26. It would render proceedings in attachment very 
precarious i f  it should be held that, in averring the amount due, 
the entire attachment shou ld fail if ,  upon a subsequent trial of 
the qnestion of fact, i t  should be determined , either as [ * 134] 
324 CASES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC.
a matter of law or a matter of fact, that the plaintiff in attach-
ment was mistaken.
The decree of the court below will in each case be modified.
The plaintiffs in attachment will be declared entitled to a lien
under their attachment. * * *
T111: racr THAT PLAINTIFF F.u1.s '10 Racovsa as Mucn as H1-: Swom-:
to be due is not ground for dismissing the attachment (Brewer v. Ains-
rvarth, 32 Ga. 487; Sackctt v. Partridge, 4 Iowa, 416; Mendes v. Freiters,
16 Nev. 393; Donnelly v. Elscr, 69 Tex. 282, 6 S. W. 563; Dirickson v.
S1102:/rll, 79 Md. 49, 28 Atl. 896); unless more is intentionally claimed
than he expected to be able to recover. Tucker v. Green, 27 Kan. 355;
Hale v. Clmndlcr, 3 Mich. 531, and cases cited therein.
It en ment obtai fo e
amount of several demands will be wholly dismissed if any one‘ of the
_ “ Willman v. Freid-
man, 3 Idaho 734, 35 Pac. 37; Esllow v. Hanna, 75 Mich. 219, 42 N. W.
812; fVils0n v. Harvey, 52 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 126; Meyer v. Evans, 27
Neb. 367, 43 N. W. 109; Stiff’ v. Fisher, 85 Tex. 556, 22 S. W. 577; Smith
Drug Co. v. Casper Drug Co., 5 Wyo., 510, 40 Pac. 979.
While recognizing the rule above stated as sound, it is said in Mackey
v. Hyatt, 42 Mo. App. 433, that an attach for the whole of an oen
account is roe ‘ . , 0 ' '| ' -
cause it is “a debt in solido agi_ng_t It is a run11in account for
demands was such as attachment could not is_sue on.
11\§L¢__a2_'_.c._. . iii‘ r
t1e _ _ . ff artp an 1ndi_v_isib e ehLmas
confrac’ge_d 1 fraud we ma s ' ' 5” See also Dawson
v. Brown, 12 Gill. & J. (Md.) 53; Gross v. Goldsmith, 4 Mackey (D. C.)
126; Roth v. American Piano Co., 35 N. Y. Misc. 509, 71 N. Y. Supp. 1080.
C011tracting__tlte debt and f11cnrrin_tL the Obligation are not necessarily
the same. The debt may be ‘honestlj__cont1-_ac_'t'e‘d‘and the obligation fraud-
uent ' 1ncurre ‘-7 ' e owin an honest debt,
' 1 Jrocures an extension of time for a'men n matur1t' nd
ives a new note for it. It is a new obligation for the old debt, which
is st1 unp
How Early the Writs May Issue.
HARGAN v. BURCH, in Iowa Sup. Ct. 1859—8 Iowa 309.
Action commenced by attachment on open account. From
judgment for plaintiff defendant brings error.
[*311] WOODWARD, J. The defendant’s motion to quash
the attachment was overruled, which is the first error assigned.
We do not think the objection substantial. Section 1717 of the
Code, directs the sheriff to note on the original notice the time ,
of its receipt, and § 1663 enacts that the delivery of the notice to
















































































































































CASES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC. 
a matter of law or a matter of fact, that the plaintiff in attach­
ment was mistaken . 
The decree of the court below will in each case be modified. 
The plaintiffs in attachment will be declared entitled to a lien 
under their attachment . * * * 
THE FACT THAT PuINTIFF FA1r.s To RECOVER AS Mucu AS HE SwoR£ 
to be due is not ground for dismissing the attachment ( Brr&er v. A ins­
worth, 32 Ga. 487 ; Sackett v. Partridge, 4 Iowa, 416 ; Mendes v. Freiters, 
16 Nev. 393 ; Do11nelly v. Elser, 69 Tex. 282, 6 S. W. 563 ; Dirickson v. 
Showell, 79 Md. 49, 28 Atl. 8¢) ; unless more is intentionally claimed 
than he expected to be able to recover. Tucker v. Green, 27 Kan. 355 ; 
Hale v. Chandler, 3 Mich. 53 1, and cases cited therein. 
It has been quite generally held that an attachment obtained for the 
amount of several demands will be wholly dismissed if any one 0£ tbe 
demands was such as attachment could not issue on. Willman v. Freid­
ma n, 3 Idaho 734, 35 Pac. 37 ; Est/ow v. Hanna, 75 Mich. 219, 42 N. W. 
812 ; Wilson v. Harvey, 52 How. Prac. ( N. Y.) 126 ; Meyer v. Evans, 27 
Neb. 367, 43 N. W. IO<J ; Stiff v. Fisher, 85 Tex. 556, 22 S. W. 577 ; Smith 
Drug Co. v. Casper Drug Co., 5 Wyo., 5 10, 40 Pac. 979. 
While recognizing the rule above stated as sound, it is said in Mackey 




How Early the Writs May Issue. 
HARGAN v. BURCH, in Iowa Sup. Ct. 1859---8 Iowa JO<J. 
Action commenced by attachment on open account. From 
j udgment for plaintiff defendant brings error. 
[ *3 1 1 ]  WOODWARD, J. The defendant's motion to quash 
the attachment was overruled , which is the first error assigned. 
We do not think the obj ection substantial. Section 17 17  of the 
Code, directs the sheriff to note on the original notice the time 
of its receipt, and § 1663 enacts that the delivery of the notice to 
the sheriff, with the intent that it be served immediately , is a 
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commencement of the action. But it will be noticed that this latter
provision is contained in the chapter, 99, which relates to the lim-
itation of actions. lT'lTCl;Frir1/t_el1tion here is, that when the precise
time of the comm ent of an action becomes material, the
fact referred to in § 1663, is made to define that time. The filing
the petition, or the issuing the notice, might have been made the
point, but these might take place without an intent to prosecute
the action immediately, so that delivering the notice with intent,
to be served, is made the time to which" t0'EH<Z>h‘,'é‘st5ééi‘=;11y in
m1_<Tq‘iH2~st'i6i1~of limitation. Q18 action may, however, be fairly‘
considered as begun, for other purposes, and, perhaps, to all com-
mon intents and purposes, when the petition is filed. At least,
it seems consistent and reasonable to consider it so far com-
menced, as that part of its own process—such as a writ of at-
tachment—may issue even before the notice. There is no harm,
no wrong, effected by this. In truth there is no possible reason]
why the attachment should not issue before the notice, save the
provision that the attachment may issue at the commencement,’
or during the progress of a suit. Section 1846. And the force
of this depends upon the construction to be given it. If sections
1663 and 1846 are to receive a rigid construction, so that there[
is no “commencement” of an action in any sense, nor to any pur-
pose, but in the delivery of the notice, with intent to be served,
then the writ of attachment cannot issue before the notice, and in
the case at bar, it is irregular, and must be quashed. But such
a construction does not appear to us necessary, and the attach-I
ment was well enough issued after the petition was filed, and be-
fore the notice. [*3I2] This course would compel the plaintiff to
serve his notice before the next term of the court; for, if this]
should not be done, the attachment would then be quashed, of
course, and the party suing out would render himself liable on
his bond for suing out and levying an attachment without prose-
cuting an action.
VVe do not intend to intimate here that there may be any un-
necessary delay, but the several steps should appear to be parts
of the same transaction and proceedings.
In the present case, there is another fact which strengthens
the position above taken. The attachment was sued on Sunday,I
and the afiidavit required by statute in such case is made. Those
things which were requisite for obtaining the attachment on that
















































































































































ISSUING THE WRITS 
commencement of the action. But it will be noticed that this latter 
provision is contained in the chapter, 99, which relates to the lim­
itation of actions. rhe intention here is, that when the precise 
time of the comm ntement of an action becomes material, the 
fact referred to in § 166,3, is made to define that time. The filing 
the petition, or the issuing the notice, might have been made the 
point, but these might take place without an intent to prosecute 
the action immediately, �o that delivering the notice with intent 
to be served, is made the time 1:0--whicnto reckon, especially in tneQuesHono( limitation: - \Qie action may, however, be fairly \ 
considered as begun, for other purposes, and, perhaps, to all com­
mon intents and purposes, when the petition is filed. At least, 
it seems consistent and reasonable to consider it so far com­
menced, as that part of its own process---such as a writ of at­
tachment-may issue even before the notice. There is no harm, 
no wrong, effected by this. In truth there is no possible reaso� 
why the attachment should not issue before the notice, save the 
provision that the attachment may issue at the commencement� 
or during the progress of a suit. Section 1846. And the force 
of this depends upon the construction to be given it. If sections 
1663 and 1846 are to receive a rigid construction, so that theref. 
is no "commencement" of an action in any sense, nor to any pur­
pose, but in the delivery · of the notice, w ith intent to be served, 
then the writ of attachment cannot issue before the notice, and in 
the case at bar, it is irregular, and must be quashed. But such 
a construction does not appear to us necessary, and the attach-I 
ment was we11 enough issued after the petition was filed, and be­
fore the notice. [*312] This course would compel the plaintiff to 
serve his notice before the next term of the court ; for, i f  this/  
should not be done, the attachment would then be quashed, of 
course, and the party suing out would render himself liable on 
his bond for suing out and levying an attachment without prose­
cuting an action . 
\Ve do not intend to intimate here that there may be any un­
necessary delay, but the several steps should appear to be parts 
of the same transaction and proceedings. 
In the present case, there is another fact which strengthens 
the position above taken. The attachment was sued on Sunday,1 
and the affidavit required by statute in such case is made. Those 
things which were requisite for obtaining the attachment on that 
zlay were done, and none others, the party probably supposing 
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Ithat the issuance of process, or notice, would be illegal. This
'was issued, and put into the officer's hands the next day, which
was as soon as was practicable. The case stands upon its own
(facts, and can scarcely serve as a precedent for one in other cir-
cumstances. * * * Afiirmed.
“No court can be opened, nor any judicial business transacted on
Sunday, except: * * * 4, and such other acts as are provided by law."
[Iowa Stat. Rev. 1860, § 2686.]
"\Nhere the petition states, in addition to the other facts required,
that the plaintiff will lose his claim unless the attachment issues and is
served on Sunday, it may be issued and served on that day.” [Ch. 14,
10 Gen. Assembly; Code, 1873, § 2952.] 7
This case is cited and followed in the following cases similar to it
except that the attachment was not on Sunday. Bell v. Olmstcad, 18 Wis.
75; Hoagland v. Wilcox, 42 Neb. 138, 60 N. W. 376. See also to the
same effect Schusfer v. Radar, 13 C010. 329, 22 Pac_. 505; Cash Murray
Co., v. Tuttich, 10 Wash. 449, 38 Pac. 1134; McDonald v. Alanson Mfg.
Co., 107 Mich. IO, 64 N. W. 730; Webb v. Bailey, 54 N. Y. 164; BIGCIZMIGH
v. Wheaten, I3 Minn. 326, Gil. 299. “The chief utility of an attachment
consists in the writ being served in time to prevent a delinquent debtor
from placing his property beyond the reach of the creditor. It would be
unfortunate, indeed, if the writ could not issue until the debtor should
have notice of the proceedings by service of summons." Schustcr v. Rader,
supra.
How Late the Writs May Issue.
MARINER v. COON, in \’\'is. Sup. Ct., Jan. Term, I863—I6 Wis. 465.
Action to recover real estate. Plaintiff claims under a judi-
cial sale on execution on a judgment against the defendant.
Plaintiff offered in evidence the execution and return indorsed
thereon and the marshals deed executed pursuant to such sale.
Defendant objected to the admission of them on the ground that
the execution was not issued within two years after the rendition
of the judgment. The circuit court sustained the objection, ex-
cluded the evidence, and directed a verdict for the defendant.
From the judgment entered thereon plaintiff appeals.
DIXON’, C. J. The question presented by this case is, wheth-
er an execution issued upon a dormant judgment, without leave
of court, is void or only voidable. If void, no sale can be made
under it, and the purchaser acquires no title; but if voidable, the
sale may be valid, notwithstanding the omission to obtain leave.
\Ve are of opinion that such an execution is merely voidable, and
therefore that no advantage can be taken of the irregularity, ex-
















































































































































CASES ON �XECUTIONS, ETC. 
, that the issuance of process, or notice, would be illegal. This 
· was issued, and put into the officer's hands the next day, which 
was as soon as was practicable. The case stands upon its own /facts, and can scarcely serve as a precedent for one in other cir-ls;umstances. * * * Aflirmed. 
"No court can be opened, nor any j udicial business . transacted on 
Sunday, except : * * * 4, and such other acts as are provided by law." 
[ Iowa Stat. Rev. 186o, § 2686. ] 
"Where the petition states, in addition to the other facts required, 
that the plaint iff will lose his claim unless the attachment issues and is 
served on Sunday, it may be issued and served on that day." [Ch. 14, 
10 Gen. Assembly ; Code, 1873, § 29s2. ] ' 
This case is cited and followed in the following cases similar to it 
except that the attachment was not on Sunday. Bell v. Olmstead, 18 Wis. 
7s ; Hoagland v. Wilcox, 42 Neb. 138, 6o N. W. 376. See also to the 
same effect Schuster v. Rader, 13 Colo. 329, 22 Pac. SOS ; Cosh Murray 
Co., v. Tuttich, IO Wash. 449, J8 Pac. n34 ; McDonald v. Alanson Mfg. 
Co., 107 Mich. IO, 64 N. W. 730 ; Webb v. Bailey, S4 N. Y. 164 ; Blackman 
v. Wheaton, 13 Minn. 326, Gil. 291). "The chief  utility of an attachment 
consists in the writ being served in time to prevent a delinquent debtor 
from placing his property beyond the reach of the creditor. It would be 
unfortunate, indeed, if the writ could not issue until the debtor should 
have notice of the proceedings by service of  summons.'' Schuster v. Rader, 
supra. 
How Late the Writs May Issue. 
MARINER v. COON, in Wis. Sup. Ct., Jan. Term, 1&53-16 Wis. 465. 
Action to recover real estate. Plaintiff claims under a . j udi:. 
cial sale on execution on a j udgment against the defendant. 
Plaintiff offered in evidence the execution and return indorsed 
thereon and the marshal 's deed executed pursuant to such sale. 
Defendant obj ected to the admission of them on the ground that 
the execution was not issued within two years after the rendition 
of the judgment. The circuit court sustained the objection, ex­
cluded the evidence, and directed a verdict for the defendant. 
From the j udgment entered thereon plaintiff appeals. 
D1xo�, C. J. The question presented by this case is, wheth­
er an execut ion issued upon a dormant judgment , without leave 
of court, is void or only voidable. I f  void, no sale can be made 
under it, and the purchaser acquires no title ; but if voidable ,  the 
sale may be valid, notwithstanding the omiss ion to obtain leave. 
\Ve are of opinion that such an execution is merely voidable, and 
therefore that no advantage can be taken of the irregularity, ex­
cept in a di rect proceeding to set it aside. 
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The rule at common law is well known. If the plaintiff
failed to take out execution within a year and a day, extended in
many of the states, by statute, to two years from the time the
judgment became final, it could not be regularly issued thereafter,
without reviving the judgment by scire facias. The rule was
founded upon a presumption that the judgment had been satis-
fied, which drove the plaintiff to a new proceeding to show that
it had not; and yet it was invariably held, that an execution taken
out after that time, and without scire facias or judgment of re-
vivor, was not null, but simply irregular. The defendant might,
if he desired, interpose and set it aside upon motion; but if he
neglected to do so, it was considered an implied admission that
the judgment was still in full force. He might waive the irreg-
ularity, and thus avoid the expense of a scire facias. See Erwin’s
Lessee v. Dundas, '4 How. 79; and Doe v. Ha-rtcr, 2 Carter (Ind.)
252, and the cases cited.
But the code (§§ 192 and 193 of the original act, now §§ I
and 2 of ch. 134, R. S.) prescribes a different practice, and it is
upon this that the counsel for the defendants chiefly relies. \Vhen
the execution in controversy [*469] was issued, the period was
fixed at two years from the entry of judgment. It is now en-
larged to five. Laws of 1861, ch. 140. After that period has
elapsed, “it is provided that “an execution can be issued only by
the leave of the court, upon motion,” etc.‘ This language is said
to take away all power, except it be acquired in the manner pre-
scribed, and to render every process issued in contravention of it
void for want of jurisdiction. \/Vere we to suppose the legisla-
ture to be speaking with reference to the question of power, then
there is nothing in their language inconsistent with the position
of counsel and we might adopt his views. But we are not at lib-
erty to act upon this supposition. Upon looking to the previous
state of the law, and to other provisions of the act, we see very
clearly that it was a matter of practice with which the legislature
were dealing, a question as to the form of proceeding which]
should thenceforth be pursued, and not one which necessarily af-
fected the jurisdiction in case the new practice was not complied
with. By § 33I of the original act (§ 1, ch 160, R. S.), the writ
of scirc facias is virtually abolished. The remedies heretofore ob-
tainable in that form may be obtained by civil action under the
provisions of the code. But by the particular provision of § 2,
ch. 134, above referred to, the remedy by motion to revive a judg-

















































































































































ISSU I N G  T H E;  WRITS 
The rule at common law is well known. If  the plaintiff 
failed to take out execution within a year and a day, extended in 
many of the states, by statute, to two years from the time the 
j udgment became final , it could not be regularly issued thereafter, 
without reviving the j udgment by scire facias. The rule was 
founded upon a presumption that the j udgment had been satis­
fied, which drove the plaintiff to a new proceeding to show that 
it had not ; and yet it was invariably held, that an execution taken 
out after that time, and without scire facias or judgment of re­
vivor, was not null, but simply irregular. The defendant might, 
if he desired, interpose and set it aside upon motion ; but if he 
neglected to do so, it was considered an implied admission that 
the j udgment was still in full force. He might waive the irreg­
ularity, and thus avoid the expense of a scire facia.s. See Erwin's 
LL•ssee v. Dundas, 4 How. 79 ; and Doe v. Harter, 2 Carter ( Ind. ) 
252, and the cases cited. 
But the code ( §§ 1 92 and 193 of the original act, now §§ I 
and 2 of ch. 134, R. S . )  prescribes a different practice, and it is  
upon this that the counsel for the defendants chiefly relies. When 
the execution in controversy [ *469] was issued, the period was 
fixed at two years· from the entry of j udgment. It is now en­
larged to five. Laws of 186 1 ,  ch. 140. After that period has 
elapsed, "it is provided that "an execution can be issued only by 
the lea ye of the court, upon motion," etc . ·  This language is said 
to take away all power, except it be acquired in the manner pre­
scribed, and to render every process issued in contravention of it 
void for want of jurisdiction. Were we to suppose the legisla­
ture to be speaking with reference to the question of power, then 
there is nothing in their language inconsistent with the position 
of counsel and we might adopt his views. But we are not at lib­
erty to act upon this supposition . "Cpon looking to the previous 
state of the law, and to other provisions of the act, we see very 
clearly that it was a matter of practice with which the legislature 
were dealing, a question as to the form of proceeding which J 
should thenceforth be pursued, and not one which necessarily af­
fected the juri sdiction in case the new practice was not complied 
with. Dy § 33  I of the original act ( § 1 ,  ch 1 6o, R.  S. ) ,  the writ 
of sci re f acias is virtually abolished. The remedies heretofore ob­
tainable in that form may be obtained by civi l  action under the 
provisions of the code. nut by the particular provision of § 2, 
ch . 1 34, above referred to, the remedy by motion to revive a jurlg­
ment which has become dormant by lapse of time, is substituted. 
\ 
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Hence the peculiar significance of the word “only,” upon which
the counsel insists so strongly to show a want of jurisdiction.
The execution shall be issued only upon motion; otherwise the
plaintiff might resort to the remedy by civil action. It appears,
therefore, that the consequences of a departure from the practice
prescribed by statute are the same as they were at common law.
It is a simple irregularity, which the execution debtor may waive,
and which it seems he did do in this case.
Judgment reversed, and a new trial awarded.
Effect of Death of a Party.
PARSONS v. GILL, in King’s Bench of England, 3 Will. 3, A. D. 1701-
I L. Raym. 695, I Comyns 117.
Mr. Broderick made a motion to refer the regularity of an
execution to be examined by the master, &c., alleging it to be
irregular for this, that the writ of execution bore teste of the first
day of Hilary term, returnable the Easter term following, and
the judgment was of Hilary term; so that the writ of execution
might have been sued perhaps before the judgment given. Be-
sides, that the judgment was signed after the death of the defend-
ant, for the defendant died the first of April, and the judgment
was signed the second of April, which being before the essoin
day of Easter term, related to Hilary term; and therefore alto-
gether irregular. But the motion was denied, because (Per
Curiam) the practice is always so and well enough.
PEOPLE FOR USE OF KELLY v. BRADLEY, in Ill. Sup. Ct., June
Term, 1856-17 Ill. 485.
SKINNER, ]. This was an action of debt against Bradley
and others, on the bond of Bradley as sheriff of Cook county.
The plaintiff assigned for breach of the conditions of the bond.
that Kelly and Blackburn, on the 30th day of October, 1854, in
the Cook county court of common pleas, recovered a judgment
against one Harper, upon which judgment, execution on the same
day issued against the goods and chattels of Harper, and which
execution was delivered to Bradley, as such sherifi, to execute,
on the 31st day of October, 1854; that Harper had goods and
chattels within said county, liable to be levied upon and sold in‘
satisfaction thereof, of sufficient value to satisfy the same, and
that Bradley refused to levy the execution of said goods and chat-
















































































































































328 CASES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC. 
Hence the peculiar significance of the word "only," upon which 
the counsel insists so strongly to show a want of jurisdiction. 
The execution shall be 4ssued only upon motion ; otherwise the 
plaintiff might resort to the remedy by civil action.  It appears, 
therefore, that the consequences of a departure from the practice 
prescribed by statute are the same as they were at common law. 
It is a simple irregularity, which the execution debtor may waive, 
and which it seems he did do in this case. 
Judgment reversed, and a n ew trial �ded. 
Effect of Death of a Party. 
PARSONS v. GILL, in King's Bench of England, J Will. 3, A. D. 1701-
1 L. Raym. 6g5, l Comyns 1 17. 
Mr. Broderick made a motion to refer the regularity of an 
execution to be examined by the master, &c., alleging it to be 
irregular for this, that the writ of execution bore teste of the first 
day of Hilary term, returnable the Easter 'term following, and 
the judgment was of Hilary term ; so that the writ of execution 
might have been sued perhaps before the judgment given . Be­
sides, that the judgment was signed after the death of the defend­
ant, for the defendant died the first of April, and the j udgment 
was signed the second of April, which being before the essoin 
day of Easter term, related to Hilary term ; and therefore alto­
gether irregular. But the motion was denied, because (Per 
Curiam) the practice is always so and well enough. 
PEOPLE FOR USE OF KELLY v.  BRADLEY, in Ill. Sup. Ct., June 
Term, 1856-17 111. 48s. 
SKINNER, J. This was an action of debt against Bradley 
and others, on the bond of Bradley as sheriff of Cook county. 
The plaintiff assigned for breach of the conditions of the bond, 
that Kelly and Illackburn , on the 30th day of October, 1854, in 
the Cook county court of common pleas, recovered a judgment 
against one Harper, upon which judgment, execution on the same 
day issued against the goods and chattels of Harper, and which 
execution was del ivered to Bradley, as such sheriff, to execute, 
on the 3 1 st day of October, 1854 ; that Harper had goods and 
chattels within said county, l iable to be levied upon and sold in 
satisfaction thereof, of sufficient value to satisfy the same, and 
that Bradley refused to levy the execution of said goods and chat­
tels. The plea denies the averment that there were goods and 
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chattels of Harper liable to be levied upon and sold under the
execution. The cause was submitted to the court for trial, upon
an agreed state of facts, from which itappears, that the execu-
tion issued and bore date the 30th day of October, 1854; that -
Harper, the defendant in execution, died on the evening of the
same day; that the execution was‘ delivered to Bradley to execute
on the 31st day of the same month, and that he refused to levy
the same of the goods and chattels of which Harper died pos-
sessed, on the ground that Harper was dead at the time the exe-
cution came to his hands.
If the goods and chattels, of which Harper died possessed,
were liable to be levied upon and sold to satisfy an execution
against him issued before his death, but which was delivered to
Bradley to execute on the day after his death, then the judgment
should have been for the plaintiff, otherwise for the defendants.
It seems that by the common law the goods of a defendant were
Fu1mEfiZ¢E-TlF{~sru1e—e»zem-
before the writ of execution caine to the hands of the sheriff, it
might have been levied of the goods of the defendant at the teste
of the writ, in the hands of third persons, or of the executor or
administrator. 4 Comyn’s Digest, title “Execution,” D. 2; And-
Iey v. Halsey, Cro. Car. 149; 1 R01. 893, 1. 23.
Qur statute p[oyid,es,.tba,1-, pg wpt Qf gaegution shall bind
the property of the goods and ghattels of my pgpsgn against
whom such writ shall be issued, until such writ shall be delivered
[*487] to the sherifiI Q: other QmQ§[| to he exegutgd_” R. S. 300,
§ 8; ibid. § I.
The common law is, therefore, changed, and neither the judg-
ment nor execution is a lien upon the goods of a defendant. until
execution is delivered to the officer whose duty it is to execute its
commands. In New York the statutory provision in this respect
is the same as ours, and it is there held. that executions only‘
bind the goods from the time of delivery of the writ to the sheriff.
Haggerty v. Wilber, 16 Johns. 287; Cresson v. Stout, 17 Id.
116; Lambert v. Paulding, 18 Id. 311; Beals v. Allen, Id. 363.
When the execution in this case came to the hands of Bra, -
let ther_e:_lat_s_no_§_uch_pe:s£nLin_heing.4'1s.Jh.1Lde£endantTnamed
therein‘ r was no existin lien u on the oods b virtue of
which they could be seized‘ a ' s ha interven ‘
could not“be affected by a subsequent delivery of the execution

















































































































































ISSUING THE WRITS 
chattels of Harper liable to be levied upon and sold under the 
execution. The cause was submitted to the court for trial, upon 
an agreed state of facts, from which it . appears, that the execu­
tion issued and bore date the 30th day of October, 1854 ; that 
Harper, the defendant in execution, died on the evening of the 
same day ; that the execution was delivered to Bradley to execute 
on the 3 l st day of the same month, and that he refused to levy 
the same of the goods and chattels of which Harper died pos­
sessed, on the ground that Harper was dead at the time the exe· 
cution came to his hands. 
If the goods and chattels, of which Harper died possessed, 
were liable to be levied upon and sold to satisfy an execution 
against him issued before his death, but which was delivered to 
Bradley to execute on the day after his death, then the judgment 
should have been for the plaintiff, otherwise for the defendants. / 
It seems that b the common law the goods of a defendant were 
from t e teste t at 1s t e ate o e 1ss 
tion ; and that although the defendant died after t e teste, and: 
before the writ of  execution caine to the hands of the sheriff, it 
might have been levied of the goods of the defendant at the teste 
of the writ, in the hands of third persons, or of the executor or 
administrator. 4 Comyn's Digest, title "Execution," D. 2 ;  Aud­
ley v. HaJsey, Cro. Car. 149 ; I Roi. 8g3, I . 23. 
Our statute proyjdes that "no writ of execution shall bind 
the property of the goods and chattels of any person against 
whom such writ shall be issued, until such writ shall be deliver¢ 
[ *487] to the sheriff. or other officer. to be executed "  R. S. 300, 
§ 8 ; ibid. § I . . 
The common law is, therefore, changed, and neither the judg­
ment nor execution is a lien upon the goods of a defendant, until 
execution is deli-uered to the officer whose duty it is to execute its 
commands. In New York the statutory provision in this respect\ 
is the same as ours, and it is there held that executions onl 
bind the oods from the time of del iver . of the writ.to e s eriff 
Haggerty v. Wi er,- - 1  Johns. 287 ; Cresson v. Stout, 17 Id. 
I 16 ; Lambert v. Paulding, 18 Id. 3 1 I ;  Beals v. Allen, Id. 363. 
When the execution in this case came to the hands of Brad­
le�re was no such person in being as the defendant named 
therein · r was no existin lien u n the oods b virtue of 
which they could be seized; and other ridtts ha interyened which 
could not be affected by a subsequent delivery of  the execution 
to the sheriff. Under our law, the widow had become entitled 
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to certain of the goods and chattels of the deceased, and the bal-
' ance was subject to be applied to the payment of his debts gen-
erally, according to a statutory rule wholly inconsistent with the
existence of any lien or priority in favor of the judgment or of
the execution. Welch v. ll/allace, 8 I11. (3 Gil.) 490; Judy v.
Kelley, 11 I11. 211.
We hold that Bradley could not lawfully have levied the exe-
cution, which came to his handsafter the death of Harper, upon
goods and chattels of which Harper died possessed, and, there-
fore, in refusing to do so, violated no official duty.
Iudgment affirmed.
lVrit of Possession Exce[1tional.—“The judgment bound the land of
which the writ directed possession to be delivered, and the office of the
writ was simply to carry the -judgment into effect with reference to that
particular piece of land. Formerly such a writ usually had no return
day. (Crocker on Sheriffs § 575.) The plaintiff had the right to take pos-
session of the land by virtue of the judgment, without any writ, if he
could peaceably do so. We think that in such a case the command to
return the writ within sixty days is merely directory. Such an execution
is not analogous to an execution against personal property, where a levy
is analogous to a proceeding to sell real estate under an execution, which
may be had without any previous levy, and which appellant’s counsel con-
cedes in his brief may be taken after the return day of the writ." Wit-
beck v. Van Rensselear, (1876), 64 N. Y. 27, 31.
CLERK v. WITHERS, in King’s Bench of England, Mich. Term, 3 Anne,
A. D. 17o5—1 Salkeld 322, 2 L. Raymond 1072, 6 Mod. 290, 11
Mod. 35.
Decided before Holt, C. _I., Gould, Powys, and Powell, J]. This re-
port is according to Salkeld. For arguments in full and opinions seria-
tin1, see 6 and 11 Modern.
An administrator recovered judgment, and sued out a fieri
facias, and delivered it to the sheriff the first of August; the
sheriff seized the defendant's goods, and afterwards the adminis-
trator died; the sheriff returned, that he had seized goods to
the value, sed qu-0a‘ remanent in manibus [W0 refectu em[>t0r-um;
and afterwards the said sheriff was removed, and a new sheriff
sworn in. And now the defendant sued a scire facias against the
old sheriff, to have his goods again; and judgment being against
him i11 common bench error was brought here. and objected for
the plaintiff in error, that the execution was abated, and nobody
could perfect it; not the executor of the administrator, because he
came in in autcr draft; and the administra‘tor dc bonis non could
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to certain of the goods and chattels of the deceased, and the bal­
ance was subject to be applied to the payment of his debts gen­
erally, according to a statutory rule wholty inconsistent with the 
existence of any lien or priori ty in favor of the j udgment or of  
the execution. Welch v. Wallace, 8 Ill. ( 3  Gil . )  490 ; Judy v. 
Kelley, 1 1  Ill .  21  I .  
We hold that Bradley could not lawfully have levied the exe­
cution, which came to his hands .  after the death of Harper, upon 
goods and chattels of which Harper died possessed, and , there­
fore, in refusing to do so, violated no official duty. 
Judgment aflirmed. 
Writ of Possession Exceptional.-"The judgment bound the land of 
which the writ directed possession to be delivered, and the office of the 
writ was simply to carry the ·j udgment into effect with referen� to that 
particular piece of land. Formerly such a writ usually had no return 
day. ( Crocker on Sheriffs § 575. ) The plaintiff had the right to take pos­
session of the land by virtue of the judgment, without any writ, if he 
could peaceably do so. We think that in such a case the command to 
return the writ within sixty days is merely directory. Such an execution 
is not analogous to an execution against personal property, where a levy 
is analogous to a proceeding to sell real estate under an execution, which 
may be had without any previous levy, and which appellant's counsel con­
cedes in his brief may be taken after the return day of the writ." Wit­
beck v. Va11 Rensselear, ( 1876 ) ,  64 N. Y. 27, 3 1 .  
CLERK v .  WITHERS, i n  King's Bench o f  England, Mich. Term, 3 Anne, 
A. D. 1 705-1 Salkeld 322, 2 L. Raymond 1072, 6 Mod. 290, I I 
Mod. 35. 
Decided before Holt, C. ]., Gould, Powys, and Powell, ]]. This re­
port is according to Salkeld. For arguments in full and opinions seria-
tim, see 6 and I I Modern. . 
An administrato r  recovered j udgment, and sued out a fieri 
facias, and delivered it to the sheriff the first of August ; the 
sheriff seized the defendant's goods, and afterward s  the adminis­
trator died ; the sheriff returned , that he had seized goods to 
the value, sec/ quad rcma11ent in ma11i'b11s pro ref ectu emptor-u m ; 
and a fterwards the said sheriff was removed, and a new sheriff 
sworn in .  And now the defendant sued a sci re f acias against the 
old sheriff, to have his goods again ; and judgment being against 
him in common bench error \Vas brought here. ancl objected for 
the plaintiff in error, that the execution was abated, and nobody 
cou ld perfect it ; not the executor of the administrator, because he 
came in i11 miler droit ; and the admin i strator de bo nis 11 0 1 i  could 
not, for he was paramount : and that this was not within the 1 7  
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Car. 2. c. I 3, for that only regarded the cases after verdict. But
Per Curiam. This scire facias is not maintainable; and these
points were resolved:
Ist. That the plaintifi’s death did not abate the exeeutign,
and that the sheriff, notwithstandin that, mi ht proceed in it;
- Because the sheriff has nothmg more to do with the plaintiff, for
the writ commands him to levy and bring the rggpey m.to_court.
which the plaintiffs death does no way hinder ', ]*323| bgsjdes,
an execution is an entire thing, and cannot be sup§:s.ed.ed._a.f.ter
_’t_iS_b;’££1IJ-
2dlyI That the old sheriff has not only authority, but is
bound and compellable to proceed in this execution; for the same
person that begins an execution shall end it, and a d'l.SlTl'Il_2‘(lS
nujmr 'v1'cec0;m'tem lies. Of these there be two sorts; one is to
distrain the old sheriff to sell and bring in the money; the other
to sell and deliver the money to the new sheriff to bring into
court; which plainly shows his authority continues by virtue of
the first writ. Vide Rastell Ent. 164; Thes. Brev. 90; 34 H. 6, 36.
/3/dly. That when the sheriff had seized, he was compellable
to return his writ, and made himself liable at all events (acts of
God excepted) to answer the value of the goods according to his
return; 3 Cro. 390; I Cro. 459; and by the seizure the property
was divested out of the defendant, and in abeyance.
/ffhly. They held, that the defendant was discharged; be-
cause the plaintiff having made his election,‘ andthe defendant’s
goods being taken, no farther remedy could be had against the
defendant, but against the sheriff only. He may be compelled
to return his writ: If it be a false return, an action lies; if he
returns a seizure and sale, he has the money; if he has seized
and not sold, that does not discharge but excuse the sheriff, and
therefore the plaintiff may have a -vendflioni expo-nus to the sher-
ifif, if he contin§s in oflice; if out of ofiice, a distringas nujrer
':'icec0mitem, and then he must sell.
5thly. That since by the IZ Car. 2I c. 13, an administrator
de lwnis Mn may c(A1w~m..ac.iJ.1s1g1nenLn-b1a-in£d/
bv an executor or administrator it is b
1 e e uitv of that act that an administrator de 01 '
be ermitted t ' '
.Q0_\\_I£mtt’.S_l-0-hi-m_ Judgment affirmed.
The third and fourth points were unnecessary to the decision, and

















































































































































ISSUING THE WRITS 33 1 
Car. 2. c. 1 3, for that only regarded the cases after verdict. But 
Per Curiam. This scire facias is not maintainable ; and these 
points were resolved : 
l st . That the plaintiff's death did not abate the execution, 
and that the sheriff, notwithstandin that, mi ht proceed in i t ; 
ecause e s en as not mg more to o wit t e p amt! , or 
the writ commands him to levy and bring the money jato ccwrt, 
which the plaintiff's qeath does no way hinder ; f *3:nl besides, 
an execution is an entire thing, and cannot be superseded after 
'tis begup. 
2dlY: That the old sheriff has not only authority, but is 
bound and compellable to proceed in this execution ; for the same 
person that begins an execution shall end it, and a distringas 
nu per vicecomitem lies. Of these there be two sorts ; one is to 
distrai� the old sheriff to sell and bring in the money ; the other 
to sell and deliver the money to the new sheriff to bring into 
court ; which plainly shows his authority continues by virtue of 
the first writ. Vide Rastell Ent. 164 ; Thes. Brev. 90 ;  34 H. 6, 36 . 
.....-fdly. That when the sheriff had seized, he was compellable 
to return his writ, and made himsel f liable at all events ( acts of 
God excepted ) to answer the value of the goods according to his 
return ; 3 Cro. 390 ;  l Cro. 459 ; and by the seizure the property 
was divested out of the defendant, and in abeyance. /41'hly. They held, that the defendant was discharged ; be- 1 
cause the plaintiff having made his election, and · the defendant's 
goods being taken, no farther remedy could be had against the 
defendant, but against the sheriff only. He may be compelled 
to return his writ : If it be a false return, an action lies ; if he 
returns a seizu re and sale, he has the money ; if he has seized 
and not sold, that does not discharge but excuse the sheriff, and 
there fore the plaintiff may have a ·venditioni  e:rponas to the sher­
iff, if he continls in office ; if out of office, a distringas tz.upcr 
't. ricecomitem, and then he must sell. 
5thly. That since by the IZ Car. 2, c. 13, an administrator 
de bo1 1 is non may commence an execution on a jude:ment obtained / 
by an executor or administrator, it is but reas<wahle, and mitbin 
the equity of that act, that an administrator de bonis non should 
be permitted to perfect an eye,.;utjpu thus hevm ; for the rjght 
11ow comes to him Judgment alhrmed. 
The third and fourth points were unnecessary to the decision , and 
were not well  resolved, as the student wil l  discover by consulting Green 
v. B11rkc, post. 
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Effect of Prior Arrest, Levy, Etc.
BODREUGAM v. ARCEDEKNE, in the Cornish Iter. 30 Edw. I, A. D.
13o2—Year Book, 30 8: 3r Edw. I, p. 106.
Henry de Bodreugam complained by bill, that Thomas le Arcedekne
tortuously and against the peace of our lord the king, came with force
and arms at a certain day, year, and place, and assailed, beat, and wounded
him, and his goods, &c.; and that tortuously and against the peace, he
took away William, son and heir of B., who was in his wardship, to his
damage, &c. Middleton denied the tort and force, and as to its being
against the peace of our lord the king, and the coming, &c. * * * The
inquest said that * * * strife arose between them, and Henry was beaten
and wounded as he complains of having been. * * * Middleton: Sir,
there are others who committed the trespass, and against whom the plain-
tiff can recover; we entreat you to take this into consideration. BRUMP-
TON [].]: Know that none of the others shall ever take exception by
reason of this judgment, for he has his action against each one, and each
one is liable to the whole, and he shall recover his damages against each
one severally, if he choose to sue him; and for as much as he was con-
victed of having gone armed in company with Sir Ralph, and his follow-
ers entered the house as before-mentioned, thereby it will appear that he
was an assenting party to what took place, and we consider him alto-
gether as a principal, and the court adjudges that Henry do recover his
damages which are assessed at I00 marks, and that Sir Thomas do go
to prison. * * * On another day Sir Thomas was brought from prison.
and he prayed mainpernoLS. BERREWICK [J.]: Have you arranged
with the plaintiff? Thomas: No, Sir. Then Sir Henry and Thomas
went out; and Henry gave Thomas a respite of a fortnight, provided
that he should in the mesne time abide by the judgment and remain
under the jurisdiction of the justices. BERREWICK (to the plaintiff):
Know that if by your consent he is once let out of prison, we shall never
send him back by virtue of this our present judgment; but as to the
recovery of damages, which is given by statute, if he remain continuously
in custody, you shall have execution whenever you please.
MILLER v. PARNELL, in Common Pleas of England, I8I5—2 Marsh.
78, 6 Taunt. 370, 1. Eng. Com. Law 658.
Before Gibbs, C.J., Heath, Chambre and Dallas, J].
Rule nisi to discharge Parnell out of custody, he having been
taken on ca-. so. after plaintiff had sued out and levied ti. fa-.
PER CURIAM. No doubt, a plaintiff having sued out a writ
of fieri facias, may, if he pleases, omit to execute the fieri facias,
and take out a writ of caftias ad satisfaciendum, and execute that
















































































































































332 C .. \ SES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC. 
Effect of Prior Arrest, Levy, Etc. 
BODREUGAM v. ARCEDEKNE, in the Cornish Iter. 30 Edw. I, A. D. 
1302-Year Book, 30 & 31 Edw. I, p. 106. 
Henry de Bodreugam complained by bill, that Thomas le Arcedekne 
tortuously and against the peace of our lord the king, came with force 
and arms at a certain day, year, and place, and assailed, beat, and wounded 
bim, and his goods, &c. ; and that tortuously and against the peace, he 
took away William, son and heir of B., who was in his wardship, to his 
damage, &c. Middleton denied the tort and force, and as to its being 
against the peace of our lord the king, and the coming, &c. * * * The 
inquest said that * * * strife arose between them, and Henry was beaten 
and wounded as he complains of having been. * * * Middleton :  Sir, 
there are others who committed the trespass, and against whom the plain­
tiff can recover ; we entreat you to take this into consideration. BRU M P­
'l'ON [J.] : Know that none of the others shall ever take exception by 
reason of this j udgment, for he has his action against each one, and each 
one is liable to the whole, .and he shall recover his damages against each 
one severally, if he choose to sue him ; and for as much as he was con­
victed of having gone armed in company with Sir Ralph, and his follow­
ers entered the house as before-mentioned, thereby it will appear that he 
was an assenting party to what took place, and we consider him alto­
gether as a principal, and the court adj udges that Henry do recover his 
damages which are assessed at 100 marks, and that Sir Thomas do go 
to prison. * * * On another day Sir Thomas was brought from prison, 
and he prayed mainpernocs. BERRtWICK [J.] : Have you arranged 
with the plaintiff ? Thomas : No, Sir. Then Sir Henry and Thomas 
went out ; and Henry gave Thomas a respite of a fortnight, provided 
that he should in the mesne time abide by the judgment and remain 
under the jurisdiction of the j ustices. BDJU:WICK (to the plaintiff) : 
Know that if by your consent he is once let out of prison, we shall never 
send him back by virtue of this our present j udgment ; but as to the 
recovery of damages, which is given by statute, if he remain continuously 
in custody, you shall have execution whenever you please. 
MILLER v. PARNELL, in Common Pleas of England, 1815-2 Marsh. 
78, 6 Taunt. 370, I.  Eng. Com. Law 6s8. 
Before Gibbs, C.J., Heath, Chambre and Dallas, JJ. 
Rule nisi to discharge Parnell out of custody, he having been 
taken on ca, sa. after plaintiff had sued out and levied fi. fa, 
Pr� C u RIA M .  No doubt, a plaintiff having sued out a writ 
of fieri facias, may, if he pleases, omit to execute the fieri facias, 
and take out a writ of capias ad satisfaciendmn., and execute that 
before the fieri f aci.as is returned or returnable. But there is, 
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also, no doubt that if the plaintiff does execute his fieri facias,
he cannot have a writ of ea[>ias ad satisfaeiendmn till the fieri
facias is completely executed and returned. This is a middle
case. So far as the defendant is concerned, the goods, to the ex-
tent of their value, have been levied; and the question is, whether
the plaintiff, after taking them, may change his mind, and sue
out a writ of eaibias ad satisfaciendum without returning his for-
mer writ. If [*37a] this might be, it would confer a power
that might be much abused. If the fieri facias be returned, there
is something to bind the plaintiff, and to limit for how much he
shall have the body, by showing how much he has already gotten.
If a plaintiff might take goods under a fieri facias, and hold them
a month, or the greater part of the long vacation, and then change
his mind, and say, “I will not sell, but will take the body of the
defendant under a ca[u'as ad satisfaciendmn," it might be the
engine of very great oppression. The plaintiff may, by the prac
tice of the court, sue out both these processes together, if he will,
and may use either the one or the other, as he sees advisable, bu
by using the /ieri facias, first, he makes his election, and afte
having so elected, he cannot use the other process, till after the
return of the first. We, therefore, think, that this writ of
capias ad satisfaciendum, being sued out after the fieri facias
had issued and after the sheriff had taken the goods under it, and
before its return, cannot be supported. Rule absolute, but on the
terms of bringing no action against the sheriff.
Very similar facts and ruling in Cutler v. Colver, 3 Cowen (N. Y.)
30.
COOPER v. BIGALOW AND SEARLS, in N. Y. Sup. Ct. New York,
l\-Iay, I823—I Cowen 56.
Motion by Cooper that so much of his judgment for $I24.68
against Bigalow and Searls as would be necessary to satisfy the
judgment of Bigalow for six cents and costs against said Cooper
and one Henry for assault and battery, be set off against said lat-
ter judgment. Both causes were in this court.
Foote, for Bigalow and Searls, objected that the first judg-
ment was satisfied by imprisonment of defendants therein.
PER CURIAM. The bodies of the defendants, Bigalow and
Searls, being in execution, this is, in judgment of law, a satisfac-
















































































































































ISSUING THE WRITS 333 
also, no doubt that · if the plaintiff does execute his fieri f acias, 
he cannot have a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum till the fieri 
f acias is completely executed and returned. This is a middle 
case. So far as the defendant is concerned, the goods, to the ex­
tent of their value, have been levied ; arid the question is, whether 
the plaintiff, after taking them, may change his mind, and sue 
out a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum without returning his for­
mer writ. I f  [ *372 ] this might be, it would confer a power 
that might be much abused. If the fieri facias be returned, there 
is something to bind the plaintiff, and to limit for how much he 
shall have the body, by showing how much he has already gotten. 
If a plaintiff might take goods under a fieri facias, and hold them 
a month, or the greater part of the long vacation, and then change 
his mind, and say, "I will not sell, but will take the body of the 
defendant under a capias ad satisfaciendum," it might be the 
engine of very great oppression. The plaintiff may, by the pracl 
tice of the court, sue out both these processes together, i f  he will, 
and may use either the one or the other, as he sees advisable, bu 
by using the fieri facias, first, he makes his election, and afte 
having so elected , he cannot use the other process, till after the 
return of  the first. We, therefore, think,  that this writ of 
capias ad satisfaciendum, being sued out after the fieri facias 
had issued and after the sheriff had taken the goods under it, and 
before its return, cannot be supported. Rule absolute, but on the 
terms of bringi"ng HO action against the sheriff. 
Very similar facts and ruling in Cutler v. Colver, 3 Cowen (N. Y. ) 
30. 
COOPER v. BIGALOW AND SEARLS, in N. Y. Sup. Ct. New York, 
May, 1823-1 Cowen 56. 
Motion by Cooper that so much of his judgment for $ 1 24.68 
against Bigalow and Searls as would be necessary to satisfy the 
judgment of Bigalow for six cents and costs against said Cooper 
and one Henry for assault and battery, be set off against said lat­
ter judgment. Both causes were in this court. 
Foote, for Bigalow and Searls, objected that the first judg­
ment was satisfied by imprisonment o f  defendants therein. 
PER CuRIAM .  The bodies of the defendants, Bigalow and 
Searls, being in execution, this is, in judgment of law, a satisfac­
tion of the debt. \Ve find this principle perfectly well settled, so 
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much so, that a commission of bankruptcy cannot issue, upon the
proof of a debt for which the bankrupt is in execution. Barnaby’s
Case, Strange 653. It is no answer to say that the plaintiff may
hereafter be entitled to a new execution, by the death of the
defendants. At common law, this could not be done. Foster v.
Jackson, Hobart 52. But the statute makes it an exception. And
the case mentioned of a discharge under the insolvent act. is also
by statute. We, therefore, deny the motion. Motion denied.
A motion similar to the above was denied, though the defendant
taken in execution had died in prison. Williams v. Evans, 2 MeCord (S.
Car.) 123. The motion in C00/ter v. Bigalow, above, was renewed at the
(next term of court. and granted on proof that the prisoners had obtained
their discharge from prison under the insolvent act. Cooper v. Bigalow,
I Cowen 206. In England on rule nisi a judgment debtor taken in ca.sa.
was released on crediting the amount of the judgment and costs on a
larger judgment against the opposite party who had previously been taken
and was still held in execution thereon. Peacock v. Jeffery, I Taunton
426. See also Simpson v. Hawley, I Maule & Sel. 696. But in a later
case, that defendant was in execution, was held, on demurrer, to be a
good replication to a plea of set-ofi on a judgment. Taylor v. Waters, 5
Maule 8: Se]. 103, 2 Chitty 303.
Defendant having died in execution, new execution against his exec-
utors on seire faeia: was denied. Foster v. Jackson, Hobart 52, Moore
857; Williams v. Culleris, Croke Jae. 136. These decisions induced the
statute, 21 Jae. I ch. 24, by which it was provided that if defendant die in
execution the plaintiff may have a new execution.
If the debtor taken in ca. :0, be discharged by agreement, the plaintiff
can have no further benefit of his judgment, though the discharge was ex-
pressly “without prejudice” to the plaintiff's rights. Magniac v. Th0m:on,,
2 Wallace Jr. 209, Fed. Cas. No. 8957; Calllin v. Kernot, 3 Com. Bench
(N. S.) 796, 91 Eng. Com. Law 796.
ROBERTHON v. NORROY, Hilary term, 6 & 7 Edw. VI, A. D. I553—
I Dyer 83a.
A man sued another before the mayor, and a third person
was indebted to the defendant, and judgment was given against
the other as garnishee under the custom of London. Notwith-
standing the judgment if no execution be sued out against the
third person, the plaintiff may resort back to have judgment and
execution against the defendant, who is his principal debtor, and
he may also sue the third person for his debt notwithstanding
the judgment unexecuted.
In overruling a demurrer to a declaration in debt on judgment be-
cause it appeared thereby that a judgment had been recovered thereon
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much so, that a commission of bankruptcy cannot issue, upon the 
proof of a debt for which the bankrupt is in execution. Barnaby's 
Case, Strange 653. It is no answer to say that the plaintiff may 
hereafter be entitled to a new execution, by the death of the 
defendants. At common Jaw, this could not be done. Foster v. 
Jackson, Hobart 52. But the sta.tute makes it an exception. And 
the case mentioned of a discharge under the insolvent act. is also 
by statute. We, therefore, deny the motion. Motion denied. 
A motion similar to the above was denied, though the defendant 
taken in execution had died in prison. Williams v. Evans, 2 McCord ( S. 
Car. ) 123. The motion in Cooper v. Bigalow, above, was renewed at the J next term of court, and granted on proof that the prisoners had obtained l their discharge from prison under the insolvent act. Cooper v. Bigalow, 
· 1 Cowen 306. In England on rule nisi a j udgment debtor taken in ca. sa, 
was released on crediting the amount of the judgment and costs on a 
larger judgment against the opposite party who had previously been taken 
and was still held in execution thereon. Peacock v. Jeffery, 1 Taunton 
426. See also Simpson v. Hawley, t Maule & Sel. 696. But in a later 
case, that defendant was in execution, was held, on demurrer, to be a 
good replication to a plea of set-off on a j udgment. Taylor v. Waters, 5 
Maule & Sel. 103, 2 Chitty 303. 
Defendant having died in execution, new execution against his exec­
utors on scire facias was denied Foster v. Jackson, Hobart 52, Moore 
857 ; Williams v. Cutteris, Croke Jae. 136. These decisions induced the 
statute, 21 Jae. I ch. 24. by which it was provided that if defendant die in 
execution the plaintiff may have a new execution. 
If the debtor taken in ca. sa, be discharged by agreement, the plaintiff l can have no further benefit of his judgment, though the discharge was ex­Q pressly "without prej udice" to the plaintiff's rights. M agniac v. Thom.son,, 
2 Wallace Jr. 209, Fed. Cas. No. 8957 ; Call Jin v. K ernot, 3 Com. Bench 
( N. S. ) 7¢, 91 Eng. Com. Law 7¢. 
ROBERTHON v. NORROY, Hilary term, 6 & 7 Edw. VI, A. D. 1553-
1 Dyer 83a. 
A man sued another befor� the mayor, and a third person 
was indebted to the detendant, and judgment was given against 
the other as garnishee under the custom of London. Notwith­
standing the judgment if no execution be sued out against the 
third person, the plaintiff may resort back to have judgment and 
execution against the defendant, who is his principal debtor, and 
he may also sue the third person for his debt notwithstanding 
the judgment unexecuted. 
In overruling a demurrer to a declaration in debt on j udgment be­
cause it appeared thereby that a judgment had been recovered thereon 
against garnishees, the court said : "The j udgment against Higgins (de-
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fendant) is separate from, and independent of, that against the garnishees.
It is true, both judgments are for the same demand, and if either is sat-
isfied the plaintiff would not be perrn‘ittedrto enforce the collection of the
other. But until one is satisfied, the plaintiff's remedy on each is as ample
as though no other judgment had been rendered.” Price v. Higgins, 11
Ky. (1 Litt.) 273.
BRICE v. CARR, in Iowa Sup. Ct.,]une 12, 1862—13 Iowa 599.
WRIGHT, J. Complainant segkg to restrain the collecti_on’o‘f_ 7
a-judgment. The gravamen_QLtl1Lbill is,\that the creditor gar-
jlished a [*6ooldebtor of the defendant in execution, and held
hm4Lbngu\ml(¢;Land by‘ virtue of that process, that he, in the
,meantkne, prove to be insoivent;’th‘at"corr1p‘laifiant'thereby' lost
'__i1is_d.eb_t_,Lhereby he was in equity discharged from all liability
on said judgment. ’ '4 M ‘ ”"‘t'_
VVe think the court was justified in concluding that there
was no such delay, on the part of plaintiff in the garnishee pro-
ceedings, as to entitle complainant to the relief asked. And if
unnecessary delay did occur, complainant could have prevented
this by paying his debt, as was his duty, and thus releasing the
garnishee. This proceeding did not absolve complainant from his
duty to discharge his debt. He had something to do. He could
not remain passive. Afifrmed.
To same effect see Dickinson v. Clement, 87 Va. 41, 12 S. E. 105;
McBride v. Farmers’ Bank, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 476; Starr \-'. Moore, 3 Mc-
Lean, 354, Fed. Cas. No. 13,315; McEIwee v. Jeffreys, 7 S. Car. 228;
Wade v. Watt, 41 Miss. 248.
Without mentioning Brice v. Carr, or any of the cases above cited,
the supreme court of Iowa, in a recent case, entered satisfaction of the
principal judgment, on petition of the judgment debtor showing that on
garnishments judgments had been rendered against the garnishees equal
in amount to the main judgment, saying that if the creditor could not
realize on the garnishment judgments he must prove it. Bowen v. Port
Huron E. 6* T. Co., 109 Iowa 255, 80 N. W. 345, 47 L. R. A. 131, 77 Am.
St. Rep. 539. And see: Cue v. Hinkley, 109 Mich. 608; Doughty v. Meek,
105 Iowa 16.
MOUNTNEY v. ANDRE\VS, in Queen's Bench, Trinity, 33 Eliz., A.D.
1591—Cr0. Eliz. 237.
Scire facias upon a judgment in debt. The defendant pleads,
that upon a fieri fwcias directed to the sheriff of the county of
Leicester, for levying the debt, he by force of it took divers sheep
















































































































































I SSUING THE W R I 1'S 33 5 
fend ant ) is separate from, and independent of, that against the garnishees. 
It is  true, both judgments are for the same demand, and if either is sat­
isfied the plaintiff would not be permitted to enforce the collection of the 
other. But until one is satisfied, the plaintiff's remedy on each is as ample 
as though no other j udgment had been rendered." Price v. Higgins, I I  
Ky. ( 1 Litt . )  273. 
BRICE v. CARR, in Iowa Sup. Ct., June 12, 1862-13 Iowa 599. 
WRIGHT, J. Complainant s_eeks to restrain the collecti_on_ � 
a jt.idgment. The gravameIL.Qf_the bill ist that the creditor gar-­
..nishec;I_ a [ *6<>Ql debtor of the defendant in execution, and held 
�nder and by
-
virtue Oflliat process, that he, in the 
�e_antime, proveato be insoivent-;-1tnn-·complaina:nrttiereby lost 
reby he was in equity discharged from all liability 
on said judgment. - - - - --- - - - - - - --
\Ve think the court was j ustified in concluding that there 
was no such delay, on the part of plaintiff in the garnishee pro­
ceedings, as to entitle complainant to the relief asked. And if 
unnecessary delay did occur, complainant could have prevented 
this by paying his debt, as was his duty, and thus releasing the 
garnishee. This proceeding did not absolve complainant from his 
duty to discharge his debt. He had something to do. He could 
not remain passive. Affirmed. 
To same effect see Dickinson v. Clement, 87 Va. 41 ,  12 S. E. 105 ; 
McBride v. Farmers' Barrk, 28 Barb. ( N. Y. ) 476 ; Starr v. Moore, 3 Mc­
Lean, 354. Fed. Cas. No. 13,3 1 5 ; McElwee v. Jeffreys, 7 S. Car. 228 ; 
Wade v. Watt, 41 Miss. 248. 
Without mentioning Brice v. Carr, or any of the cases above cited, 
the supreme court of Iowa, in a recent case, entered satisfaction of the 
principal j udgment, on petition of  the judgment debtor showing that on 
garni shments judgments had been rendered against the garnishees equal 
in amount to the main j udgment, saying that i f  the creditor could not 
realize on the garnishment judgments he must prove it. Bowen v. Port 
Huron E. & T. Co., 109 Iowa 255, 8o N. W. 345, 47 L. R. A. 1 3 1 ,  77 Am. 
St. Rep. 539. And sec : Coe v. H i11kley, 109 Mich. 6o8 ;  Doughty v. Meek, 
105 Iowa 16. 
MOU:-.l"TNEY v. ANDREWS, in Queen's Bench, Trinity, 33 Eliz. , A.D. 
1 591-Cro. Eliz. 237. 
Scire facias upon a j udgment in debt. The defendant pleads, 
that upon a fieri facia.s d i rected to the sheriff of the county of 
Leicester, for levying the debt, he by force of it took divers sheep 
of the defendant's for the debt, and yet detaineth them . And 
336 cases ON EXECUTIONS, etc.
this was ruled a good plea per curiam; although he doth not
allege that the writ is returned, and although the writ is condi-
tional, ita quad habias dena/rios, &c., for the plaintiff hath his
remedy against the sheriff, and the execution is lawful, which the
defendant cannot resist. [Rook V. Wilnzot] Cro. Eliz. 209.
GREEN v. BURKE, in N. Y. Sup. Ct., May, 184o—23 Wend. 490.
Replevin by Green against Burke for nine acres of wheat
purchased by Green on execution in favor of himself and another
against Burke. From judgment on verdict for defendant plain-
tiff appeals.
Defendant claimed that plaintiff acquired no title by virtue
of the purchase at the sale by constable Rood, because the judg-
ment was satisfied by reason of a levy on three colts under a pre-
vious execution thereon, which had been returned and the levy
abandoned by the constable Stevenson because he was under age.
COWEN, J. * * * There is no dispute that the title to the
wheat had been acquired by the plaintiff, in virtue of his pur-
chase under the execution held by Road, unless the previous levy
on, and abandonment of the colts by Stevenson, worked a satis-
faction of the judgment. The latter held a regular execution;
and made a levy which was sufficient in point of form, on proper-
ty of adequate value. It is supposed by the plaintiff’s counsel
that there was no levy, because no act was done which would.
but for the protection of the execution, have been such a takmg
of the colts as to amount to a trespass. This was spoken of as
the criterion of a levy, in Beekman v. Lansing, 3 Vi/'end. 446, 450;
a11d it was there said the court were inclined to consider it an es-
sential criterion. Vt/e are not disposed to deny that it is so. The
court there also said that the officer must take actual possession
where it is in his power; but he need not remove the goods.
They may be left with the defendant; nor did the court insist
that an inventory was necessary. The case cited was well con-
sidered; and on the question of what acts of the ofiicer alone
shall constitute a levy, highly authoritative. * * * The acts of
the sheriff were all summed up in his going to the house of the
judgment [*493] debtor with the execution in his pocket, but
omitting even to apprise him that he had come to make a levy.
The court says that he should have done some definite act in re-
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this was ruled a good plea per curiam; although he doth not 
allege that the writ is returned, and although the writ is condi­
tional, ita quod habias demwios, &c. ,  for the plaintiff hath his 
remedy against the sheriff, and the execution is lawful, which the 
defendant cannot resist. [Rook v. Wilmot] Cro. Eliz. 209. 
GREEN v. BURKE, in N. Y. Sup. Ct., May, 184�23 Wend. 490. 
Replevin by Green against Burke for nine acres of wheat 
purchased by Green on execution in favor of himself and another 
against Burke. From j udgment on verdict for defendant plain­
tiff appeals. 
- Defendant claimed that plaintiff acquired no title by virtue 
of the purchase at the sale by constable Rood, because the j udg­
ment was satisfied by reason of a levy on three colts under a pre­
vious execution thereon, which had been returned and the levy 
abandoned by the constable Stevenson because he was under age. 
COWEN, J .  * * * There is no dispute that the title to the 
wheat had been acquired by the plaintiff, in virtue of his pur­
chase under the execution held by Rood, unless the previous levy 
on, and abandonment of the colts by Stevenson., worked a satis­
faction of the j udgment. The latter held a regular execution ; 
and made a levy which was sufficient in point of form, on proper­
ty of adequate value. It is supposed by the plaintiff's counsel 
that there was no levy, because no act was done which would. 
but for the protection of the execution, have been such a takmg 
of the colts as to amount to a trespass. This was spoken of as 
the criterion of a levy, in Beekman v. Lansin.g, 3 Wend. 446, 450 ; 
and it was there said the court were inclined to consider it an es­
sential criterion. We are not disposed to deny that it is so. The 
court there also said that the officer must take actual possession 
where it is in his power ; but he need not remove the goods. 
They may be left with the defendant ; nor did the court insist 
that an inventory was necessary. The case cited was well con­
sidered ; and on the question of what acts of the officer alone 
shall constitute a levy, highly authoritative. * * * The acts of 
the sheriff were all summed up in his going to the house of the 
j udgment [*493]  debtor with the execution in his pocket, but 
omitting even to apprise him that he had come to make a levy. 
The court says that he should have done some definite act in re­
spect to the goods ; something which could be known to the debt-
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or and communicated to his landlords. That the latter, at least,
were not to be affected by a mere mental levy. Id. 451. This
question is well considered by Taylor, C.]., in Doe, ex, dam. Bar-
den, v. .lI’Kium'e, 4 Hawks (N. Car.), 279, 280. In short, as be-
tween the sheriff and third persons, he shall not be allowed to
proceed in so secret a manner, as to cut off all probable means of
their knowing how to deal with the debtor in respect to his goods,
whether as purchasers from him, or as his landlords claiming
rent, or as subsequently levying creditors. Vid. Bliss v. Ball, 9
Johns. (N. Y.) 132. Haggcrty v. Wilber, 16 Id. 287. As it re-
spects the defendant himself, too, the proceeding should be such
as to apprise him of the step; and if he be not informed of it, at
least a reasonable time before the sale, yet the sheriff’s acts should
be such as not to leave the inference of intentional concealment.
The defendant should have a fair opportunity to make the proper
arrangements for preventing a sacrifice of his property. The
proceedings of the ofiicer being such as are naturally calculated
to avoid injurious consequences, the form in which he chooses to
make the levy is totally immaterial: Holding the process, having
the goods in his power, and directly declaring his intent, or doing
what is equivalent, as taking an inventory, or making a memo-
randum of the levy, satisfy that branch of the rule which directs
a change of possession.~ Speaking is always an important part
‘of the res gestac which constitute such a change. In Wood v.
Vanarsdale, 3 Rawle (Pa.), 401, the sheriff merely entered a
store of goods, and declared his intention to levy; and although
the defendant expressed his dissatisfaction, and did not act to
waive formality, the seizure was held to be complete, notwith-
standing the ofiicer returned nulla bona. He had put no one in
possession, taken no inventory, and never, after declaring the
levy, interfered with the goods in the least. The court held
' distinctly, citing the New York cases, that none of these acts were
necessary; and the sheriff [*494] having returned the execution
and abandoned the levy, by consent of the plaintiffs assignee,
the judgment was declared to have been satisfied. In Trovillo v. _
Tilford, 6 VVatts ( Pa.) 498, the sheriff did not see the goods at
all, nor did he go near them; but the defendant gave him a sched-
e, by arrangement, which he agreed should be considered a levy;
_ d that was held sufficient, even against a third person, claiming
-as the defendant's vendee. Gilkey v. Dickerson, 3 Hawks (N.
Car.), 293, is not incompatible with Trovillo v. Tilford, nor with
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or and communicated to his landlords. That the latter, at least, 
were not to be affected by a mere mental levy. Id. 45 1 .  This 
question is well considered by Taylor, C.J . ,  in Doc, ex, dem. Bar­
den, v. Jl'Ki11nie1 4 Hawks ( N. Car. ) ,  279, 28o. In short, as be­
tween the sheriff and third persons, he shall not be allowed to 
proceed in so secret a manner, as to cut off all probable means of 
their knowing how to deal with the debtor in respect to his goods, 
whether as purchasers from him, or as his landlords claiming 
rent, or as subsequently levying creditors. Vid. Bliss v. Ball, 9 
Johns.  ( N . Y. )  1 32. Haggerty v. Wilber, 16  Id. 287. As it re­
spects the defendant himself, too, the proceeding should be such 
as to apprise him of the step ; and if  he be not informed of it, at 
least a reasonable time before the sale, yet the sheriff's acts should 
be such as not to leave the inference of intentional concealment. 
The defendant should have a fair opportunity to make the proper 
arrangements for preventing a sacrifice of his property. The 
proceedings of the officer being such as are naturally calculated 
to avoid inj urious consequences, the form in which he chooses to 
make the levy is totally immaterial .• Holding the process, having 
the goods in his power, and directly declaring his intent, or doing 
what is equivalent, as taking an inventory, or making a memo- ' 
randum of the levy, satisfy that branch of the rule which directs 
a change of possession . •  Speaking is always an important part 
of the res gestae which constitute such a change. In Wood v. 
Vanarsdale, 3 Rawle ( Pa. ) ,  40 1 ,  the sheriff merely entered a 
store of goods, and declared his intention to levy ; and al though 
the defendant expressed his dissatisfaction, and did not act to 
waive formality, the seizure was held to be complete, notwith­
standing the officer returned nulla bona. He had put no one in 
possession, taken no inventory, and never, after declaring the 
levy, interfered with the goods in the least. The court held 
distinc.tly, citing the New York cases, that none of these acts were 
neces�ry ; and the sheriff [ *494] having returned the execution 
and abandoned the levy, by consent of the plaintiff's assignee, 
the judgment was declared to have been satisfied. In Trovillo v. 
Tilford, 6 \\T atts ( Pa. ) 498, the sheriff did not see the goods at 
all, nor did he go near them ; but the defendant gave him a sched-
, ie, by arrangement, which he agreed should be considered a levy ; 
. d that was held sufficient, even against a third person , claiming 
. as the defendant's vendee. G ilkey v. Dickerson, 3 Hawks (N .  
Car. ) ,  293,  i s  not incompatible with Trovillo v .  Tilford, nor with 
the common notion of what acts constitute a levy. There the coro-
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ner merely called on the defendant and asked him for a list of
goods which he might sell to satisfy the execution; and the de-
fendant gave him a list of negroes, sufficient in value; but the
coroner never saw them, and the defendant afterwards took them
out of the county and sold them. The coroner therefore levied
again on two other negroes, which the defendant afterward sold
to Gilkey, who insisted on his right as vendee, because the judg-
ment had been satisfied by what he called the first levy. Held
that it had not; and Taylor, C.J., gave the reason. He said: “Had
the property been present when the list was delivered, and the
coroner had signified that he held it bound to answer the execu-
tion, and there was no opposition to his possessing himself of it,
had he so desired, it would have amounted to a levy.” It will be
perceived that no evidence was given whether the negroes were
anywhere within miles of the coroner; and he did nothing and
said nothing indicating that he considered the list a levy. Be-
side, according to our cases, the eloignment and sale of the ne-
groes by the defendant would have warranted the second levy
irrespective of the question whether the first had been regular
or not. .
An actual taking of possession, therefore, does not necessar-
ily imply an actual touching of the goods; but merely such a
course of action as, in effect, is calculated to reduce them to the
dominion of the law. They are then considered as in the custody
of the law; and a degree of constructive force is imputed which
at once entitles the party whose goods are thus seized to his action
of trespass, if the officer [*495] be destitute of authority. Wheth-
er the rule requiring that to be done which may amount to a tres-
pass, is thus satisfied, we have examined more at large in the case
of Connah v. Hale, 23 Wend. 462. I have said more upon the
point now, because Bailey v. Adams, 14 Wend. 201, has been
pressed upon us as implying that the property must in some way
be manually interfered with. There the constable went with his
execution to the man who had possession of the property, a
wagon, claimed to levy on it as belonging to the defendant in the
execution, making a note of the levy, and leaving the wagon,
with directions that the man should take care of it. Ten or twelve
days after, becoming satisfied that the execution debtor had no
title, he offered to relinquish his claim to the plaintiff, who was
the real owner; but the latter refused to accept the wagon, and
brought trover against the creditor who had directed the levy.
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ner merely called on the defendant and asked him for a list of 
goods which he might sell to satisfy the execution ; and the de­
fendant gave him a list of negroes, sufficient in value ; but the 
coroner never saw them, and the defendant afterwards took them 
out of the county and sold them. The coroner therefore levied 
again on two other negroes, which the defendant afterward sold 
to Gilkey, who insisted on his right as vendee, because the judg­
ment had been satisfied by what he called the first levy. Helrl 
that it had not ; and Taylor, C.J., gave the reason. He said : "Had 
the property been present when the list was delivered, and the 
coroner had signified that he held it bound to answer the execu­
tion, and there was no opposition to his possessing himself of it, 
had he so desired, it would have amounted to a levy." It will be 
perceived that no evidence was given whether the negroes were 
anywhere within miles of the coroner ; and he did nothing and 
said nothing indicating that he considered the list a levy. Be­
side, according to our cases, the eloignment and sale of the ne­
groes by the defendant would have warranted the second levy 
irrespective of the question whether the first had been regular 
or not. 
An actual taking of possession, therefore, does not necessar­
ily imply an actual touching o f  the goods ; but merely such a 
course of action as, in effect, is calculated to reduce them to the 
" dominion of the law. They are then considered as in the custody 
of the law : and a degree of constructive force is imputed which 
at once entitles the party whose goods are thus seized to his action 
of trespass, if the officer [*495] be destitute of  authority. Wheth­
er the rule requiring that to be done which may amount to a tres­
pass, is thus satisfied, we have examined more at large in the case 
o f  Comiah v. Hale, 23 Wend. 462. I have said more upon the 
point now, because Bailey v. Adams, 14  Wend. 201 ,  has been 
pressed upon us as implying that the property must in some way 
be manually interfered with. There the constable went with his 
execution to the man who had possession of the property, a 
wagon, claimed to levy on it as belonging to the defendant in the 
execut ion , making a note of  the levy, and leaving the wagon, 
with directions that the man should take care of it. Ten or twelve 
days after, becoming satisfied that the execution debtor had no 
title, he o ffered to relinquish his claim to the plaintiff, who was 
the real owner ; but the latter refused to accept the wagon, and 
brought trover against the creditor who had directed the levy. 
The acts of the constable were held not to have been a conver-
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sion; the court remarking that the actual possession of the prop-
erty was not changed, and the plaintiff had been put to no charge
concerning it. The learned judge who delivered the opinion of
the court, referred in a general way to Reynolds v. Shuler, 5
Cowen, 323, and Bristol v. Burt, 7 johns. R. 254. The question
was considered in those cases ; but, with deference, I understand
them both to hold that such acts as were proved in Bailey V.
Adams, would clearly amount to a conversion; and that even an
actual acceptance of the goods by the owner, much less a mere
offer to deliver them, could no farther qualify the wrong, than
by reducing the damages. Wintringham v. -Lafoy, 7 Cowen, 735,
was not cited. That case held the ofiicer liable in trespass de
bonis asjwrtatis, though he merely claimed to have levied, tak-
ing an inventory and receipt. The decision was also incompatible
with the rule laid down in Allen v. Crary, I0 Wend. 349; Fonda
v. Van Home, 15 Id. 631, 633, and many other cases. The injury
being complete, it is clear that a tender of the property will not
affect the plaintiffs rights. Clark v. Halloek, 16 \Vend. 607;
Hanmer v. Wflsey, 17 Id. 9!. It is said in the latter case, and so
are all the authorities, that even an acceptance by the plaintiff,
[*496] goes to the question of damages only. There is no such
thing as waiving a cause of action after it has once arisen. And
in the case at bar, there is no question that either trespass or
trover would have lain by Burke against Stevenson, the minor,
notwithstanding his abandonment of the levy, unless he was pro-
tected by the process. * * * In short, there was no such thing
as Stevenson purging his own wrong by merely omitting to fol-
low up the trespass he had committed. He went to the field with
the defendant, for the purpose of levying on the colts; and made
a note of the levy on the back of the execution. He not only had
the goods in view, and the intention to levy, but the defendant,
the execution debtor, had notice, and co-operated in, and sub-
mitted to the act.
Prima facie, then, the debt was, or might have been, accord-
ing to the event, satisfied by the levy. And many cases are cited
by the defendant’s counsel to show that, although the constable
gave it up, and returned the execution to the justice, utterly re-
fusing to proceed, yet the plaintiffs were concluded and could not
sue out a new execution. The ground taken is, that the judgment
was unqualifiedly satisfied by the levy. Admitting that the con-
stable had the power to levy, then, so long as he kept the act
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sion ; the court remarking that the actual possession of the prop­
erty was not changed , and the plaintiff had been put to no charge 
concerning it. The learned j udge who delivered the opinion of 
the court, re ferred in a general way to Reynolds v. Shuler, 5 
Cowen , 323, and Bristol v. Bu rt, 7 Johns. R. 254. The question 
was considered in those cases ; but, with deference, I understand 
them both to hold that such acts as were proved in Bailey v. 
Adams, would clearly amount to a conversion ; and that even an 
actual acceptance of the goods by the owner, much less a mere 
offer to deliver them, could no farther qualify the wrong, than 
by reducing the damages. Wintringham v. °Lafoy, 7 Cowen, 735,  
was not cited. That case held the officer liable in trespass de 
bom's asportati"s, though he merely claimed to have levied , tak­
ing an inventory and receipt. The decision was also incompatible 
with the rule laid down in Allen v. Crar3•, 10 Wend. 349 ; Fonda 
v. Van. Horne, 1 5  Id. 63 1 ,  633, and many other cases. The inj ury 
being complete, it is clear that a tender of the property will not 
affect the plaintiff's rights. Clark v. H al/ock, 16 \Vend. 6o7 ; 
Hanmer v. 1Vilsey, 1 7 Id. 9 1 .  I t  i s  said i n  the latter case, and so 
are all the authorities, that even an acceptance by the plaintiff, 
[*496] goes to the question of damages only. There is no such 
thing as waiving a cause of action after it has once arisen. And 
in the case at bar, there is no question that either trespass or 
trover would have lain by Burke against Stevenson, the minor, 
notwithstanding his abandonment of the levy, unless he was pro­
tected by the process. * * * In short, there was no such thing 
as Stevenson purging his own wrong by merely omitting to fo]­
low up the trespass he had committed. He went to the field with 
the defendant, for the purpose of leyying on the colts ; and made 
a note of the levy on the back of the execution. He not only had 
the goods in view, and the intention to levy, hut the defendant,  
the execution debtor, had notice, and co-operated in, and sub­
mitted to the act. 
Prima facie, then , the debt was, or might have been, accord­
ing to the event, satisfied by the levy. And many cases are cite<l 
by the defendant's counsel to show that, although the constable 
gave it up, and returned the execution to the justice, utterly re­
fusing to proceed , yet the plaintiffs were concluded and could not 
sue out a new execution. The ground taken is, that the judgment 
was unqualifiedly satisfied by the levy. Admitting that the con-
� stable had the power to levy, then , so long as he kept the act 
good , and followed it up, something near the consequence con-
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tended [*4g7] for undoubtedly followed; but he withdrew, with-
out the consent or knowledge of the plaintiffs, and I am not pre-
pared to admit that, in such a case, the creditor is bound to look
to the officer alone for his remedy. I know that learned judges
use language in the cases cited, which is very strong. They say
a levy is a satisfaction of the debt; but every book they cite, and
every case they decide, show under what qualifications they
speak. They all go back to Mountney v. And-rews, Cro. Eliz.
237 [ante]. There the plaintiff brought a seire faeias qaere are-
eutionem non, and the plea was, not simply that the sheriff had
levied, but that he had taken divers sheep of the defendant for
the debt, and yet detaineth them. The reason given was, that
“the plaintiff has his remedy against the sheriff, and the execu-
tion is lawful which the defendant cannot resist.” The value of
the sheep was not mentioned; and surely it cannot be pretended
that such a step shall be taken as a satisfaction Per se. Suppose
the sheep had been sold, bringing only half the judgment; was
the remedy by action, seire faeias, or execution gone for the resi-
due? I need not cite authorities to show that such a consequence
would not follow. It would be absurd, and contrary to all prac-
tice. The doctrine laid down in Clerk v. Withers, I Salk. 322
[ante], the case commonly relied on, is, that “the defendant’s
goods being taken, no further remedy could be had against the
defendant, but against the sheriff only.” The reason given is that
“he may be compelled to return his writ; if it be a false return,
an action lies; if he returns a seizure and sale, he has the money;
if he has seized and not sold, that does not discharge, but excuse
the sheriff, and therefore, the plaintiff may have a venditioni e.r-
ponas,” &c. The doctrine thus laid down was not material, at
least not essential to the decision; and on referring to the same
case in 2 Ld. Raym. 1072, a contemporary report, the whole will
be found to lie in a dictum of Gould, 1., founded on a curtailed
statement of M ountney v. Andrews. In this he does not present
the plea there as one of detainer, but of levy only. It is impos-
sible to say that a verdict for the defendant would have operated
as more than a temporary bar of execution. The [*498] seizure
works no change of interest beyond vesting a special property in
the ofiicer. The general property still remains in the debtor. Wil-
braham v. Snow, 2 Keble 588, I Siderfin, 438; and aid. Ayer
v. Aden, Yelverton 44, (Cro. Jac. 73). The goods are but a col-
lateral security; and the seizure is, per se, neither a payment nor
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tended [ *497 ] for undoubtedly followed ; but he withdrew, with­
out the consent or knowledge of the plaintiffs, and I am not pre-
pared to admit that, in such a case, the creditor is bound to look 
to the officer alone for his remedy. I know that learned judges 
use language in the cases cited, which is very strong. They say 
a levy is a satisfaction of the debt ; but every book they cite, and 
every case they decide, show under what qualifications they 
speak. They all go back to Mountncy v. A ndrews, Cro. Eliz. 
237 [ ante ] . There the plaintiff brought a sci re facias qaere e:re­
critionem non, and the plea was, not simply that the sheriff had 
levied, but that he had taken divers sheep of the defendant for 
the debt, and yet detaineth them. The reason given was, that 
"the plaintiff has his remedy against the sheriff, and the execu­
tion is lawful which the defendant cannot resist." The value of 
the sheep was not mentioned ; and surely it cannot be pretended 
that such a step shall be taken as a satisfaction per .se. Suppose 
the sheep had been sold, bringing only half the judgment ; was 
the remedy by action, scire facias, or execution gone for the resi­
due ? I need not cite authorities to show that such a consequence 
would not follow. It would be absurd, and contrary to all prac­
tice. The doctrine laid down in Clerk v. Withers, I Salk . 322 
[ante] , the case commonly relied on, is, that "the defendant's 
goods being taken, no further remedy could be had against the 
defendant, but against the sheriff only." The reason given is that 
"he may be compelled to return his writ ; if it be a false return, 
an action lies ; if he returns a seizure and sale, he has the monev ; 
if he has seized and not sold, that does not discharge, but excuse 
the sheriff, and therefore, the plaintiff may have a venditioni e:r­
ponas," &c. The doctrine thus laid down was not material, at 
least not essential to the decision ; and on referring to the same 
case in 2 Ld. Raym. rn72, a contemporary report, the whole will 
be found to lie in a dictum of Gould, J. ,  founded on a curtailed 
statement of Mow1 tnC)' v. Andreu•s. In this he does not present 
the plea there as one of detain.er, but of levy only. It is impos­
sible to say that a verdict for the defendant would have operated 
as more than a temporary bar of execution. The [ *4g8] seizure 
works no change of interest beyond vesting a special property in 
1 the officer. The general property still remains in the debtor. Wil­
braham v. Sn ow, 2 Keble 588, I Siderfin, 438 ; and vid. A:yer 
v. A den, Yelverton 44, ( Cro. Jae. 73) .  The goods are but a col­
lateral security ; and the seizure is, per se, neither a payment nor 
satisfaction absolute, but only sub 111 odo. Yet from Clerk v. 
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{I/l/itlzers, comes a progeny of dicta couched in the same general
language. Parsons, Ch. J., in Ladd v. Blunt, 4 Mass. 402, puts
it that when sufficient goods are seized the debtor is discharged,
even if the sheriff waste the goods, &c.; for, by lawful seizure
the debtor has lost his property in the goods.” None of this was
necessary, for he was merely examining whether a levy on land
would satisfy the debt, and held it would not, and in such case,
he concludes it is no satisfaction, because till the land is delivered
to the plaintiff, the title of the defendant is not divested, and the
judgment is unsatisfied. VVe have held the same thing. Shepard
v. Rome, 14 Wend. 260, 262. And yet we have often taken it
for granted that the sheriff may, nay must levy on land as well as
goods; Jackson ex Dem. Sternberg v. Shaffer, 11 Johns. 513,
517; Jackson en: Dem. Cannon 1). Rosevelt, 13 Johns. 97, 102;
and we have, in several cases, allowed him fees for such levy,
which implies that we consider it an incipient execution of the
process, the same as a levy on goods. Parsons V. Bowdoin-, 17
Wend. 14, I5, and the cases there cited. Are these cases all
wrong? If not, a levy on land is more than a levy on goods,
for the lien of the judgment conspires with that of the execution.
In neither case is the debtor's property absolutely divested till a
sale; but in both it is partially displaced, though the sheriff ac-
quire no interest in the land. Take it that the sheriff holds a
mere naked power in respect to the land, like a tax collector;
Catlin v. Jackson, 8 Johns. 520, 546; take it that the power or
levy dies with him, or expires when he goes out of office, or is
gone with the return day of the if. fa. according to the cases in
North Carolina; Doe, er dent. Borden v. M’Kinnie, 4 Hawks
(N. Car.), 279; Frost V. Etheridge, 1 Dev. (N. Car.) 30; Den,
ex dent. Tayloe v. Fen, I Dev. 295; Tarkinton v. Alexander, 2
Dev. & Batt. 87, and the cases cited by Gaston, J .; yet you have
a lien by virtue of the judgment, surer in its effect than can arise
from a mere levy on personal property; and the distinction be-
tween the effect of discharging the lien in one or the other case.
is merely technical. The goods levied on are a pledge for the-
debt, like a distress for rent in the hands of the landlord. That-
too works a suspension of all other remedy; and may mature:
into a satisfaction. V id. Wallis v. Sarxill, 2 E. Lutw. (Eng.) folio
p. 1532, Eng. Ed. 649; Hutchins v. Chambers, 1 Burr. 589;
Bradby on Distresses, 130. A voluntary relinquishment of a
sufficient distress would probably bar all further remedy by the
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fVithcrs, comes a progeny of dicta couched in the same general 
language. Parsons, Ch. J., in Ladd v. Blunt, 4 Mass. 402, puts 
it that when sufficient goods are seized the debtor is discharged, 
even if  the sheriff waste the goods, &c. ; for, by lawful seizure 
the debtor has lost his property in the goods." None of this was 
necessary, for he was merely examining whether a levy on land 
would satisfy the debt, and held it would not, and in such case, 
he concludes it is no satisfaction, because till the land is delivered 
to the plaintiff, the title of the defendant is not divested, and the 
j udgment is unsatisfied. We have held the same thing. Shepard 
v. R<ru!e, 14 Wend. 26o, 262. And yet we have often taken it 
for granted that the sheriff may, nay must levy on land as well as 
goods ; Jackson ex Dem. Sternberg v. Shaffer, I I  Johns. 5 1 3, 
5 1 7 ; Jackson ex Dem. Carman v. Rose·vclt, 13 Johns. 97, 102 ; 
and we have, in several cases, allowed him fees for such levy, 
which implies that we consider it an incipient execution of the 
process, the same as a levy on goods. Parsons v. Bowdoin, 17  
Wend. 14 ,  1 5, and the cases there cited. Are these cases all 
wrong ? I f  not, a levy on land is more than a levy on goods, 
for the lien of the j udgment conspires with that of the execution. 
In neither case is the debtor's property absolutely divested till a 
sfile ; but in both it is partially displaced, though the sheriff ac­
quire no interest in the land. Take it that the sheriff holds a 
mere naked power in respect to the land, like a tax collector ; 
Catlin v. Jackson, 8 Johns. 520, 546 ; take it that the power or 
levy dies with him, or expires when he goes out of office, or is 
gone with the return day of the fi. fa. according to the cases in 
North Carolina ; Doe, ex dem. Barden v. Jr!' Kinnie, 4 Hawks 
( N. Car. ) ,  279 ; Frost v. Etheridge, 1 Dev. ( N. Car. ) 30 ; Den,. 
e:r dem. Tayloe v. Fen, 1 Dev. 295 ; Tarki11 ton v. Alexander, 2' 
Dev. & Batt. 87, and the c<JSes cited by Gaston,, I. ; yet you have 
a lien by virtue of the j udgment, surer in its effect than can ari se 
from a mere levy on personal property ; and the distinction be­
tween the effect of discharging the lien in one or the other case� 
is merely technical. The goods levied on are a pledge for the· 
debt, like a distress for rent in the hands of the landlord. That 
too works a suspension of all other remedy ; and may mature. 
into a satisfaction . V id. Wallis v. Sare.Jill, 2 E. Lutw . ( Eng. ) folio 
p. 1 532, Eng. Ed. 649 ; Hu tchins v. Chamb ers, I Burr. 589 ; 
Bradby on Distresses, 1 30. A voluntary rel inquishment of a 
sufficient distress would probably bar all further remedy by the 
act of the landlord, if not an action for the rent. And yet in al� 
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most every other point of view, the goods are regarded as no
more than a collateral security.
Our cases appear to have drawn various consequences from
Clerk v. Withers [ante]; but I apprehend none of them admit
the levy to operate as an absolute satisfaction. Reed v. Pruyn,
7 Johns. R. 426, was where the sheriff had paid the money. The
court there cite Ward v. Hauchet, 1 Keble, 551, to show that the
sheriff taking security for the debt, would discharge it: but in that
case the plaintiff consented to the sheriff taking a bond. Nothing
is said of a levy, and the rule there, as stated by counsel and
agreed to by the court, is clearly not law. Merely taking security
by bond will not discharge a judgment, though I admit that se-
curity taken in due course of execution, even without the plain-
tiff’s assent, will l1ave the same effect as a levy—for instance, if
it be taken by way of a receiptor or by bond in place of tlie goods
seized. Bank of Orange County v. Wakeman, I Cowen, 46, and
note. In Hoyt v. Hudson, 12 Johns. 207, the action was against
the constable, who had seized the goods and taken a receiptor.
It was held that he could not levy again. That was like a sheriff
suffering a voluntary escape. He cannot make recaption of his
own head. In E.r [mrte Lawrence, 4 Cowen, 417, the levy on
personal property still pending was held to take away the lien of
the judgment on the debtor's real estate, and so the creditor
could not redeem. The court say the levy extinguished the judg-
ment, citing the previous cases. In Jackson, ex dem. [*50o]
Merritt v. Bowen, 7 Cowen, 13, the same point was decided; the
fi. fa. having been returned by direction of the creditor, and the
levy thus discharged. Cornell v. Cook, id. 310, 315, is a mere
recognition of the general doctrine by Savage, Ch. J. In the case
of Wood V. Torrey, 6 Wend. 562, the assignee of the judgment
himself stood receiptor to the sheriff; yet he was allowed to make
a second levy as against the defendant, because the latter had
caused the eloignment of the goods. * * * An actual payment
to the sheriff would probably be deemed a payment of the debt.
The judge seems to concede this in Ontario Bank V. Hallett, 8
Cowen, 192. That a payment to the sheriff is a good discharge
of the immediate defendant was agreed both in Dyke v. Mercer,
2 Shower ( Eng.) 394, and Clerk v. Withers. [So held in Matter
of Dawson, 110 N. Y. 114, 17 N. E. 668.]
Thus, after all that has been said, we are to this day desti-
tute of any direct adjudication that levy alone absolutely extin-
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most every other point of view, the goods are regarded as no 
rr.ore than a collateral security. 
Our cases appear to have drawn various consequences from 
Clerk v. W£thers [ante] ; but I apprehend none of them admit 
the levy to operate as an absolute satisfaction. Reed v. Pruyn, 
7 Johns. R. 426, was where the sheriff had paid the money. The 
court there cite 1'Vard v. Hauchet, I Keble, 55 1 ,  to show that the 
sheriff taking security for the debt, would discharge it : but in that 
case the plaintiff consented to the sheriff taking a bond. Nothing 
is said of a levy, and the rule there, as stated by counsel and 
agreed to by the court, is clearly not law. Merely taking security 
by bond will not discharge a j udgment, though I admit that se­
curity taken in due course o f  execution, even without the plain­
tiff's assent, will have the same effect as a levy-for instance, i f  
it be  taken by way of a receiptor or by bond in place of the goods 
seized. Bank of Orange Cou11 ty v. 1Vakematr, 1 Cowen, 46, and 
note. In Hoyt v. Hudson, 12 Johns. 207, the action was against 
the constable, who had seized the goods and taken a receiptor. 
It was held that he could not levy again. That was like a sheriff 
suffering a voluntary escape. He cannot make recaption of his 
own head. In Ex parte L<J'Wrence, 4 Cowen, 417, the levy on 
personal property still pending was held to take away the lien of 
the judgment on the debtor's real estate, and so the creditor 
could not redeem. The court say the levy extingit4shed the judg­
ment, citing the previous cases. In Jackson, ex dem. [*500] 
Merritt v. Bowen, 7 Cowen, 13, the same point was decided ; the 
fi. fa. having been returned by direction of the creditor, and the 
levy thus discharged. Cornell v. Cook, id. 3 10, 31 5, is a mere 
recognition of the general doctrine by Savage, Ch. J. In the case 
of Wood v. Torrey, 6 Wend. 562 , the assignee of the j udgment 
himsel f stood receiptor to the sheriff ; yet he was allowed to make 
a second levy as against the defendant, because the latter had 
caused the eloignment of the goods. * * * An actual payment 
to the sheriff would probably be deemed a payment of the debt. 
The judge seems to concede this in Ontario Bank v. Hallett, 8 
Cowen, 1 92. That a payment to the sheriff is a good discharge 
of the immediate defendant was agreed both in D'yke v. Mercer, 
2 Shower ( Eng . ) 394, and Clerk v. Withers. [ So held in Matter 
of Dawson , 1 10 N. Y. I I4, 17 N. E. 668.] 
Thus, after all that has been said, we are to this day desti­
tute of  anv direct adjudication that lev'j' alone absolutely extin­
guishes or
. 
satisfies a judgment, as payment of the money would 
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do. The levy on a single sheep, according to the dicta in Salkeld
and Raymond, would satisfy a thousand pounds; and so per-
haps of several detached dicta since that time. The gross ab-
surdity of such a rule has led the judges, in all the later cases,
to speak in more qualified terms; such as that the goods must
be of sufifrient wine to satisfy the debt; and again, if the debtor
eloign them, the levy is not a satisfaction. Nor do I believe any
judge would, at the present day, hold the plea in Croke to be
more than a temporary [*5OI] bar of further execution; a mere
ground for setting it aside on motion. VVould the judgment for
the defendant on that plea have barred an action of debt? Might
not the plaintiff have replied that the sheep sold for less than the
judgment; and so recover the balance? To an action of debt,
the plea could have been nothing more in effect than a plea in
abatement.
\Vhat then, after all, does the rule amount to? Merely this:
that the levy is a satisfaction sub modo. It may operate as a sat-
isfaction, and must be fairly tried; but if it fail, in whole or in
part, without any fault of the plaintiff, he may go to his farther
execution. He must fairly exhaust the first; and while that is
going on, he can neither sue on the judgment, nor have another
if. fa., nor a ca. sa., nor can he redeem lands sold on another judg-
ment. The plaintiff may, by tampering with the levy himself,
lose his debt—as if he release property from arrest, which is
sufficient to pay the debt. Even a distress which answers only
part of the rent may generally be followed up by distraining
again; and might, I apprehend, by the common law. V id. Brad-
by, and cases before cited in connection rvith, him. In the still
higher remedy by ca];-ias ad safisfacicndiinz, if the sheriff allowed
the debtor to escape without the previous consent of the plaintiff.
the latter might always, even before the declaratory statute of
.8 and 9 VVm. 3, sue out a second ca-. sa:., though the sheriff could
not retake on the first. Buxton 7,-. Home, I Show. 174; Scott v.
Peacock, I Salk. 271. And, on an escape against the will of the
sheriff, either he or the flarintiff might retake. Alanson v. Butler,
Siderfin (Eng.) 330. Thus it will be seen the law has never
adopted a harsh and blind rule, which will not yield to diversities
and exigencies as they arise. Indeed there are so many ways in-
vented by which goods may be got from the sheriff, sometimes b_v
fraudulent claims, sometimes by prior liens, and even by his own
negligence, that it behooves the courts to look into the rule now
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do. The levy on a single sheep, according to the dicta in Salkeld 
and Raymond, would satisfy a thousand pounds ; and so per­
haps of several detached dicta since that time. The gross ab­
surdity of such a rule has led the j udges, in all the later cases, 
to speak in more qualified terms ; such as that the goods must 
be of sufficient value to satisfy the debt ; and again, if the debtor 
eloign them, the levy is not a satisfaction. Nor do I believe any 
j udge would, at the present day, hold the plea in Croke to be 
more than a temporary [*501 ] bar of further execution ; a mere 
ground for setting it aside on motion. Would the j udgment for 
the defendant on that plea have barred an action of debt ? Might 
not the plaintiff have replied that the sheep sold for less than the 
j udgment ; and so recover the balance ? To an action of debt, 
the plea could have been nothing more in effect than a plea in 
abatement. 
\Vhat then, after all, does the rule amount to ? Merely this : 
that the levy is a satisfaction sub modo. It may operate as a sat­
isfaction, and must be fairly tried ; but if it fail, in whole or in 
part, without any fault of the plaintiff, he may go to his farther 
execution. He must fairly exhaust the first ; and while that is 
going on, he can neither sue on the j udgment, nor have another 
fi. fa., nor a ca. sa., nor can he redeem lands sold on another j udg­
ment. The plaintiff may, by tampering with the levy himself, 
lose his debt-as if he release property from arrest, which is 
sufficient to pay the debt. Even a distress which answers only 
part of the rent may generally be followed up by distraining 
again ; and might, I apprehend, by the common law. Vid. Brad­
by, and cases before cited in connection itoith him. In the still 
higher remedy by capias ad satisfaciendmn, if the sheriff allowed 
the debtor to escape without the previous consent of the plaintiff, 
the latter might always, even before the declaratory statute of 
8 and 9 \Vm. 3, sue out a second ca. sa., though the sheriff could ·
not retake on the first. Buxton ·v. Home, I Show. 174 ; Scott v. 
Peacock, 1 Salle. 271 .  And, on an escape against the will of the 
sheriff, either he or the plaintiff might retake. A lanson v. Butler, 
Siderfin ( Eng. ) 330. Thus it will be seen the law has never 
adopted a harsh and blind rule, which will not yield to diversities 
and exigencies as they arise. Indeed there are so many ways in­
vented by which goods may be got from the sheriff, sometimes by 
fraudulent claims, sometimes .by prior liens, and even by his own 
negligence, that it behooves the courts to look into the rule now 
urged upon us as working by a sort of magic to cut a man off 
344 cases ON EXECUTIONS, are.
from his debt without the show or pretence of satisfaction. It is
severe enough on plaintiffs who are without fault, to require that
they should get their executions [*5o2] returned, without their
debts being held satisfied, because in the mean time the sheriff
may have relinquished goods levied on. Doing so the debtor
has them to himself. In the case at bar, Burke had his colts again.
Sometimes goods are so covered up by previous liens that it does
no good to sell them, for none will buy. And shall the party, in
such case, be driven to an attempt which must be idle? \/Vhy
may he not have his execution returned and resort to his creditor's
bill. Indeed, we have been obliged to hold that he may. Evatns .
v. Parker, 20 VVend. 622. \-V110 will say that if the plaintiff hap-
pen to commit a mistake, and relinquish a levy upon a_modic1mz,
he must therefore lose his debt? If he have fairly and in good
faith closed his proceeding on execution, why not give him his
ulterior remedy?
But was not the levy in question void by reason of Steven-
son’s non-age? It appears that the town had elected him to the
office of constable; and the justice had placed the execution in
his hands. The plaintiffs then directed him to go on and collect
as soon as might be. He levied; but becoming satisfied that he
had already committed a trespass, he was too prudent to go any
farther; he returned the process to the justice, and gave up the
colts to the defendant. The latter offered to pay him the money,
but he would not take it. Now it is said he was an officer de
fade; and that his acts bound the defendant and plaintiff. He
may indeed have been an officer de facto (People, ex rel. Dobbs
v. Dawn, 3 “lend. 438); and had be gone on and collected the
money, the defendant never disturbing him, nor the creditors
in their possession of it, the thing would have been well enough.
But his acts were valid only in respect to such third persons as
were affected by them. Viner’s Abr. tit. Officer, G. 3, Id. G. 4,
vol. 16, p. I13, Lond. ed. 8vo. 1793. I know the cases have gone
a great way. But they have stopped with preventing mischief to
such as confide in officers who are acting without right. People,
0.1‘ rel. Bush v. Collins, 7 Iohns. R. 549. The officer himself can-
not be protected, except in some such case as Wood v. Peake, 8
~lohns. 69. There he was appointed by the judicial act of magis-
trates having jurisdiction [*5o3] in cases of vacancies happen-
ing; and it was held that the ofiic,er’s power could not be im-
peached collaterally by showing that a vacancy had not hap-
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from his debt without the show or pretence of satisfaction. It is 
severe enough on plaintiffs who are without fault, to require that 
they should get their executions [*502 ] returned, without their 
debts being held satisfied, because in the mean time the sheriff 
may have relinquished goods levied on. Doing so the debtor 
has them to himself. In the case at bar, Burke had his colts again. 
Sometimes goods are so covered up by previous liens that it does 
no good to sell them, for none will buy. And shall the party, in 
such case, be driven to an attempt which must be idle ? Why 
may he not have his execution returned and resort to his creditor's 
bi11. Indeed, we have been obliged to hold that he may. Evans 
v. Parker, 20 Wend. 622. Who will say that if the plaintiff hap­
pen to commit a mistake, and relinquish a levy upon a .  modicum, 
he must therefore lose his debt ? If he have fairly and in good 
faith closed his proceeding on execution, why not give him his 
ulterior remedy ? 
But was not the levy in question void by reason of Steven­
son's non-age ? It appears that the town had elected him to the 
office of constable ; and the justice had placed the execution in 
his hands.  The plaintiffs then directed him to go on and collect 
as soon as might be. He levied ; but becoming satisfied that he 
had already committed a trespass, he was too prudent to go any 
farther ; he returned the process to the justice, and gave up the 
colts to the defendant. The latter offered to pay him the money, 
but he would not take it. Now it is said he was an officer de 
facto ; and that his acts bound the defendant and plaintiff. He 
may indeed have been an officer de facto ( People, ex rel. Dobbs 
v. Dean, 3 \Vend. 438) ; and had he gone on and collected the 
money, the defendant never disturbing him, nor the creditors 
in their possession of it, the thing would have been well enough. 
But his acts were valid only in respect to such third persons as 
were affected by them. \liner's Ahr. tit. Officer, G. 3, Id. G. 4, 
vol. 1 6, p. 1 1 3 ,  Lond. ed. 8vo. 1 793. I know the cases have gone 
a great way. But they have stopped with preventing mischief to 
such as confide in officers who are acting without right. People, 
ex rel. Bush v. Collins, 7 Johns. R. 549. The officer himself can­
not be protected, except in some such case as Wood v. Peake, 8 
Johns. 69. There he was appointed by the judicial act of magis­
trates having j urisdiction [ *503] in cases of vacancies happen­
ing ; and it was held that the offic.er's power could not be im­
peached collateral ly by showing that a vacancy had not hap­
pened . * * * [*504] 
ISSUING THE WRITS
The result is plain. Stevenson was a trespasser. And, after
the plaintiffs in the execution had been informed that he was an
infant, they, by urging him on, would have brought themselves
to participate in his peril. Then, taking the rule of satisfaction
by levy in all its general strictness, as contended for by the de-
fendant’s counsel, what were the constable and plaintiffs to do?
Most obviously, they stood within an exception to the rule. Had
the money been collected by a sale of the colts, Burke might have
recovered their value in trespass or trover; and in this might,
most probably, have joined the plaintiffs, if he could show notice
to them of their constable’s disability. Such a circuity would
clearly have nullified the credit, and brought down a new execu-
tion on the defendant. The upshot is, that this young man pru-
dently chose to do beforehand what the law would have forced
him to do in another form; and, however stringent the rule of
satisfaction by levy, this case made a plain exception. Suppose
the sheriff to make an irregular arrest even on a ca. sa.; is the
plaintiff to be cut off from-his debt because the oflicer lets the man
go? Goods of a third person are levied on and discharged; no
one would pretend that this discharges the debt. There can be
no doubt that in such and the like cases the creditor may relin-
quish the arrest, or levy, without prejudice.
It follows that the second execution in the case at bar was
regular. The sale of the wheat on the ground, under that exe-i
cution, was not impeached. Evidence was given “of a dispropor-
tion in value between the wheat as it turned out and the sum due
on the execution. Admit this, and that the plaintiffs directed the
constable to sell it in preference to other property; Burke should
have paid the debt. The sacrifice, if it be one, seems to have
been of his own seeking. He sought to avail himself of a sup-
posed technical advantage, derivable from the levy on the colts.
The verdict should, therefore, be set aside; at least so modi-
fied as to find the property of the wheat in the plaintiffs. * * *
New trial granted.
Judge Cowen’s masterly argument in this case has been cited with
approval by almost every court in America. If it did not establish a
new rule, it caused the old one laid down in Mountney V. Andrews to be
better understood. The supreme court of Arkansas (Whiting v. Beebe,
12 Ark. 538), in speaking of this subject said: “The rule laid down in
Clerk v. Withers, was recognized by most of the American courts for a
long while. Thus in New York, Kent, C.I., in Denton v. Livingston, as
early as I812 recognized and approved the decision in that case, after
which for 27 years, in a series of uniform decisions, it was adhered to,
















































































































































ISS U I NG T H E  W RITS 345 
The result is plain. Stevenson was a trespasser. And, after 
the plaintiffs in the execution had been informed that he was an 
. in fant, they, by urging him on, would have brought themselves 
to participate in his peril. Then, taking the rule of satisfaction 
by levy in all its general strictness, as contended for by the de­
fendant's counsel, what were the constable and plaintiffs to do ? 
Most obviously, they stood within an exception to the rule. Had 
the money been collected by a sale of the colts, Burke might have 
recovered their value in trespass or trover ; and in this might, 
most probably, have joined the plaintiffs, if he could show notice 
to them of their constable's disability. Such a circuity would 
clearly have nullified the credit, and brought down a new execu­
t ion on tl}e defendant. The upshot is, that this young man pru­
dently chose to do beforehand what the law would have forced 
him to do in another form ; and, however stringent the rule of 
satisfaction by levy, this case made a plain exception. Suppose 
the sheriff to make an irregular arrest even on a ca.. sa. ; is the 
plaintiff to be cut off from·his debt because the officer lets the man 
go ? Goods of a third person are levied on and discharged ; no 
one would pretend that this discharges the debt. There can be 
no dou.ht that in such and the like cases the creditor may relin­
quish the arrest, or levy, without prejudice. 
It follows that the second execution in the case at bar was 
regular. The sale of the wheat on the ground, under that exe- �� 
cution, was not impeached. Evidence was given _of a dispropor­
tion in value between the wheat as it turned out and the sum due 
on the execution. Admit this, and that the plaintiffs directed the 
constable to sell it in preference to other property ; Burke should 
have paid the debt. The sacrifice, if it be one, seems to have 
been of his own seek ing. He sought to avail himself of a sup­
posed technical advantage, derivable from the levy on the colts . 
The verdict should, therefore, be set aside ; at least so modi­
fied as to find the property of the wheat in the plaintiffs. * * * 
New trial gran ted. 
Judge Cowen's masterly argument in this case has been cited with 
approval by almost every court in America. If it did not establish a 
new rule, it caused the old one laid down in }.fountney v. Andrews to be 
better understood. The supreme court of Arkansas ( Whiting v. Beebe, 
12 Ark. 538) , in speaking of this subject said : "The rule laid down in 
Clerk v. Withers, was recognized by most of the American courts for a 
long wh ile. Thus in New York, Kent, C.J., in Denton v. Livingston, as 
early as 1812 recognized and approved the decision in that case, after 
which for 27 years, in a series of uni form decisions, it  was adhered to, 
until, in Green v. Burke, Cowen, J., for the first time in that st:lte, ques� 
346 cases on EXECUTIONS, arc.
tioned the propriety of the rule in its unqualified sense, after which
Bronson, C.]., in People v. Hofrson, I Denio, 574, distinctly announced a
change in the rule, which has since been generally acquiesced in by most.
indeed by all the courts of the United States, so far as we are advised.”
In that case, Bronson, C.]., said, “If the broad ground has not yet been
taken, it is time it should be asserted, that a mere levy on sufficient per-
sonal property, without more, never amounts to a satisfaction of the
judgment. So long as the property remains in legal custody the remedies
of the creditor will be suspended. He cannot have a new execution
against the person or property of the debtor, nor maintain an action on
the judgment, nor use it for the purpose of becoming a redeeming cred-
itor." For further discussion of the question see Farmers <9’ Mecl1am'cs'
Bank v. Kingsley, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 379; Kersl:aw v. Merchants’ Bank,
7 How. (Miss) 386; Fry v. Manlove, 60 Tenn. (1 Baxter) 256; Reynolds
v. Rogers, 5 Ohio 174.
ABANDONMENT or LEVY.——It has been held that a sale under fi. fa.
was not void by reason of a levy under a prior ti. fa. in the same suit
on other property, which was released with the creditor's consent, and
the writ returned without anything further being done with it. ll/right
v. Young, 6 Ore. 87. \Vithout proof of release of the first levy the pur-
chaser under the second writ was held to have no title, the right of the
creditor to abandon the levy and have a second writ, on returning the
first, being assumed. Friyer v. Mc.\langht0n, no Mich. 22, 67 N. W. 978.
The supreme court of Pennsylvania refused to set aside a tcstatum
fi. fa. issued after return of a fi. fa. showing levy and release. The court
say: “The hogs were levied on by the sheritf, and were released, for
what cause does not, nor is it necessary to appear, by the plaintifi"s attor-
ney, with directions, that the writ should not be executed.” Duncan v.
Harris, 17 Scrg. & R. 436.
Yet the rule as generally stated is that if the creditor order a re-
lease tvithoummmmebior his cmmhe
EH___E£c>__n__fTF:’_EmW.—C2_l_|—_FE_fiTF___lH'_F‘B___" ram 2 gcreiorwounoe pernntted
to arass the debtor by seizing and releasin on thin a tcr anot er.
nmarr.-na?r¢s7wnrmaTn1mrT'1;7m#,;fisgsT1W-1>a.37,
14 Am. Dec. 665.
The right of the creditor to have a new writ upon return of the
first, on which a levy has been made and nothing further done, must be
conceded, provided the return shows, or it is otherwise proven, that any
of the following facts exist:
® That the first writ or levy was void, as in Green v. Burke; or
@that defendant had no leviable interest in the property, either because
it was exempt from process or because it belonged to a stranger; for
neither the plaintiff nor the ofiicer is bound to persist in a mistaken
course, but only have the burden to prove the fact (Dixon v. l/l/hite Sew-
ing M. Co., 128 Pa. St. 397; Bliz/en v. Bleakley, 23 How. Prac. N. Y. 124) ;
or@that defendant had rescued the property, or the ofiicer had allowed
it t escape or had abandoned it without plaintiffs consent, no loss there-
by accruing to defendant (cases cited in Green v. Burke; also, Littlefield
v. Ball, 103 Mich. 17; Howard v. Bennett, 72 Ill. 297); or, that the
plaintiff had ordered the release at defendant’s request or W1 his con-
sen (Walker v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. (Va.) 13, 98 Am. Dec. 631);
















































































































































ISSUING THE WRITS 347
‘\
>
of Pe 1s_\'lt'ania v. Winger, 1 Rawle (Pa.) 295, 18 Am. Dec. 633; or, prob-
ably, that the property had been destroyed by ovcrwhelming calamity
(compare Brice v. Carr, ante, ..., but see cases cited in above opinion);
and probably in many other cases.
Who May Have and Control Writ.
STEELE v. THOMPSON, ADM’R., in Ala. Sup. Ct., 1878—-62 Ala. 323.
Action by Elijah S. Thompson, admr., against John D. Steele
and others. From judgment for the plaintiff defendants appeal.
This is an action against Steele and the sureties on his official
bond, as clerk of the circuit court for Greene county, for his re-
fusal to issue an alias execution.
BRICKELL, C. J. * * * The first question is, whether it is
the duty of the clerk of a court in which a judgment has been
rendered to issue execution thereon, at the verbal request of an
attorney of the assignee of the judgment, the assignment not ap-
pearing of record in the court, and no written evidence of it being
shown him, nor the attorney having entered himself of record,
as an attorney for the plaintiff in the judgment. Judgments, as
well as choses in action, are assignable. The assignment may not
clothe the assignee with the legal title, but if it is unqualified, it
passes the entire equitable interest, and is an irrevocable authority
to employ the name of the assignor in enforcing it, and collect-
ing and -receiving the money due thereon. The court in which
the judgment was rendered will protect the rights of the assig11ee,
and will prevent the assignor from interfering with his contract
over it. No payment made to the assignor after notice of the
assignment is valid, and by no release or admission can he im-
pair the equity of the assignee.—Holland v. Dale, Minor (Ala.),
265; Gayle v. Benson, 3 Ala. 234; 2 Brick. Dig. 153, § 312; Free-
man on Executions, § 21. The assignment may be by writing,
or by parol, and either, when founded on a sufficient considera-
tion, passes the same rights, and confers the same authority. No
entry of it on the records' of the court is essential to its validity
and operation, nor is there any statute, or rule of the common
law, requiring that such entry shall be made.
An execution in civil actions, is the process by which the debt,
or damages, or other things recorded, and the costs adjudged, are

















































































































































I SSUING THE WRITS 347 
of Pwsylvan ia v. Winger, I Rawle ( Pa. ) 295, 18 Am. Dec. 633 ; or, prob­
ably,l2/ that the property had been destroyed by overwhelming calamity 
( compare Brice v. Carr, ante, . . .  , but see cases cited in above opinion ) ; 
and probably in many other cases. 
Who May Have and Control Writ. 
STEELE v. THOM PSON, ADM'R., in Ala. Sup. Ct., 1878---62 Ala. 323. 
Action by Elij ah S. Thompson, admr., against John D. Steele 
and othen. From judgment for the plaintiff defendants appeal. 
This is  an action against Steele and the sureties on his official 
bond, as clerk of the circuit court for Greene county, for his re­
fusal to issue an alias execution. 
BRICKELL, C. J. * * * The first question is, whether it is 
the duty of the clerk of a court in which a judgment has been 
rendered to issue execution thereon, at the verbal request of an 
attorney of the assignee of the j udgment, the assignment not ap­
pearing of record in the court, and no written evidence of it being 
shown him, nor the attorney having entered himself of record, 
as an attorney for the plaintiff in the j udgment. Judgments, as 
well as choses in action, are assignable. The assignment may not 
clothe the assignee with the legal title, but if it is unqualified, it 
passes the entire equitable interest, and is an irrevocable authority 
to employ the name of the assignor in enforcing it, and collect­
ing and -receiving the money due thereon. The court in which 
the judgment was rendered will protect the rights of the assignee, 
and will prevent the assignor from interfering with his contract 
over it. No payment made to the assignor after notice of the 
assignment is valid, and by no release or admission can he im­
pair the equity of the assignee.-Holland v. Dale, Minor (Ala. ) ,  
265 ; Gayle v. Benso n, 3 Ala. 234 ; 2 Brick. Dig. 1 53 ,  § 3 1 2 ; Free­
man on Executions, § 2 1 .  The assignment may be by writing, 
or by parol , and either, when founded on a sufficient considera­
tion , passes the same rights, and confers the same authority. No 
entry of it on the records of the court is essential 'to its validity 
and operation, nor is there any statute, or rule of the common 
law, requiring that such entry shall be made. 
An execution in civil actions, is the process by which the debt, 
or damages, or other things recorded, and the costs adj udged, are 
obtained. The clerk of the court is charged with the duty of 
Lo 
CASES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC.
issuing the original, within a certain number of days after the
adjournment of the court. If satisfaction is not obtained by the
original, the party interested has the rigl1t to an alias, and a [flu-
ries, until satisfaction is obtained. These writs it is the duty of
the clerk to issue on application; and his failure is a breach of
his official bond, which binds him to the performance of all the
duties required of him by law. The application may be oral or
written. If the clerk deems it necessary for his protection, he
may require that it be reduced to writing. But if it is oral, and
[*328] he makes no objection on that ground when it is made,
he cannot subsequently excuse his failure to comply with it, on
the ground that it was not in writing. If he had objected, the
cause of objection would have been easily removed; but not then
objecting, and tacitly accepting the application as sufficient, it
would be gross injustice to suffer him to excuse his failure from
which injury has resulted, because of the manner of the applica-'
tion. So, if the application is made by a party having the real
interest in the judgment, entitled to control it, though his interest
and authority may not appear of record, he may demand some
evidence of the interest or authority, if he doubts it. But if he
makes no such demand—if by his silence he recognizes the inter-
est and authority, it would approach 2 fraud, if he was heard
subsequently to say in excuse for his failure to issue the writ,
when injury had resulted, that no evidence of the interest or au-
thority was shown him. As assignee of the judgment against
Kirksey, the appellee had full authority over it. It was his right
to demand execution thereon in the name of the plaintiff, and it
was the duty of the clerk to comply with the demand when it
was made.’ There is no particular form required, in which the-
demand should be communicated to the clerk, and if there had
been, the form could have been waived by the clerk, and it was
waived when he did not object to the form in which it was made.
The assignee may control the judgment through an attorney, or
an agent, and the demand or instructions of the attorney or agent,
are of the same force as if they had proceeded from him person-
ally.
It is enough to say in reference to the remaining question,
there was no evidence the judgment was satisfied before the de-
mand of the issue of execution. On the contrary, the evidence
seems to us, undisputable, that it was unpaid,.and the just infer-
ence is, the clerk knew the fact.
















































































































































CASES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC. 
issuing the original, within a certain number of days after the 
adjournment of the court. If satisfaction is not obtained by the 
original, the party interested has the right to an alias, and a plu­
ries, until satisfaction is obtained. These writs it is the duty of 
the clerk to issue on application ; and his failure is a breach of 
his official bond, which binds him to the performance of all the 
duties required of him by law. The application may be oral or ' written. I f  the clerk deems it necessary for his protection, he 
may require that it be reduced to writing. But if it is oral, and ·
[ *328] he makes no objection on that ground when it is made, 
he cannot subsequently excuse his failure to comply with it, on 
the ground that it was not in writing. If he had obj ected, the 
cause of objection would have been easily removed ; but not then 
obj ecting, and tac itly accepting the application as sufficient, it 
would be gross injustice to suffer him to excuse his failure from 
which injury has resulted, because of the manner of the applica..:. 
tion. So, if the application is made by a party having the real 
interest in the judgment, entitled to control it, though his interest 
and authority may not appear of record, he may demand some 
• evidence of the interest or authority, if he doubts it. But if he 
' makes no such demand-if  by his silence he recognizes the inter­
est and authority, it would approach .a fraud, i f  he was heard 
subsequently to say in excuse for his failure to issue the writ� 
when inj ury had resulted, that no evidence of the interest or au­
thority was shown him . As assignee of the judgment against 
Kirksey, the appellee had full authority over it. It was his right 
to demand execution thereon in the name of  the plaintiff, and it 
was the duty of the clerk to comply with the demand when it 
was made. · There i s  no particular form required, in which the 
demand should be communicated to the clerk, and if there had 
been , the form could have been waived by the clerk ,  and it was 
waived when he did not obj ect to the form in which it was made. 
The assignee may control the j udgment through an attorney, or 
an agent,  and the demand or instruct ions of the attorney or agent, 
are of the same force as if they had proceeded from him person­
ally. 
It is enough to say in reference to the remaining question ,  
there was no evidence the judgment was satisfied before the de­
mand of the i ssue of execution. On the contrary, the evidence 
seems to us, ttndisputable, that it was unpaid, .and the j ust infer­
ence is, the clerk knew the fact. 
Let the judgmen t be aflirmed. 
ISSUING THE WRITS
That an assignee may have execution in the name of judgment cred-
itor, but cannot have execution in his own name, see: Reid v. Ross, 15
Ind. 265; Fiskc v. Lamoreaux, 48 Mo. 523—Owens v. Clark, 78 Tex. 547.
Intimated that clerk should indorse on the execution, that it is for ben-
efit of assignee, Reid v. Ross, supra; Gardner v. Mobile <9’ N. IV. Ry. C0.,
102 Ala. 635, 15 So. 471, 48 Am. St. Rep. 84; but see Owens v. Clark, supra.
That the purchaser may have execution without first bringing a scire facias,
see Corricll v. Doolittle, 2 G. Greene (Iowa) 385.
In Louisiana it has been held that one purchasing a judgment on
execution could not have execution on it, but only had a right to sue the
judgment debtor. Fluker v. Turner, 5 Martin, N S. (La.) 707.
As a general rule, assignees of demands may make use of any rem-
edy to collect them that would be available to the assignor, including
attachment and garnishment. Fuller v. Smith, 58 N. C. (5 Jones Eq.)
I92; Crippcn v. Fletcher, 56 Mich. 388, 23 N. W. 56; White v. Simpson,
107 Ala. 386, 18 South 151.
Held that assignee of a claim could not attach on the ground that
the obligation was fraudulently contracted, for that is a personal matter
between the original parties. Clwslzire Provident Inst. v. Johnston, Fed.
C215. No. 2659.
MORGAN v. PEOPLE, in Ill. Sup. Ct., June Term, 1371-59 Ill. 58.
Debt by the People of the State of Illinois for the use of '
Thomas Lewis against Joel G. Morgan et al. on the official bond
of Morgan as sheriff of Alexander county. The defendant plead-
ed: 1, non est factum; 2, that the sale was not ordered sus-
pended; 3, that he sold the property according to law by virtue
of an execution against Lewis; 4, thgt the attorney for the judg-
ment creditor directed him to sell. A demurrer to the third and
fourth pleas was sustained, and judgment found for the plaintiff
on issue and trial on the other pleas. Defendant brings error.
THORNTON, J. * * * [*6o] The declaration avers that the
sheriff had an execution in favor of Boyer against Lewis, by vir-
tue of which he levied upon certain shares of stock, and advertised
a sale on the 29th of October, 1867; that the defendant in the
execution paid off and satisfied the same on the 28th of October,
except the costs, and that prior to the sale, the plaintiff in the
execution ordered a suspension thereof, and that the sheriff re-
fused to suspend, and sold stock of the value of $5,000. * * *
, An officer might proceed strictly in accordance with the law
governing the conduct of an execution in his hands, and yet be
guilty of the breach assigned. He may have an execution in due
form; levy it upon property liable to seizure; make proper adver-
















































































































































!SSUING THE WRITS 349 
That an assignee may have execution in the name of judgment cred­
itor, but cannot have execution in his own name, see : Reid v. Ross, 1 5  
Ind. 265 ; Fiske v .  Lamoreaux, 48 Mo. 523-0wens v. Clark, 78 Tex. 547. 
Intimated that clerk should indorse on the execution, that it is for ben­
efit of assignee, Reid v. Ross, supra ; Gardner v. M obi/e & N. W. Ry. Co., 
J02 Ala. 635, 15 So. 47 1, 48 Am. St. Rep. 8.t ;  but see Owens v. Clark, supra. 
That the purchaser may have execution without first bringing a scire facias, 
see Corriell v. Doolittle, 2 G. Greene ( Iowa ) 385. 
In Louisiana it has been held that one purchasing a j udgment on 
execution could not have execution on it, but only had a right to sue the 
judgment debtor. Fluker v. Turner, 5 Martin, N S. ( La. ) 707. 
As a general rule, assignees of demands may make use of any rem­
edy to collect them that would be available to the assignor, including 
attachment and garnishment. Fuller v. St11itlt, sS N. C. (5 Jones Eq. ) 
192 ; Crippen v. Fletcher, 56 Mich. J88, 23 N. W. 56 ; White v. Simpson, 
107 Ala. 386, 18 South 151 .  
Held that assignee of a claim could not attach on the ground that 
the obligation was fraudulently contracted, for that is a personal matter 
between the original parties. Cheshire Provident Inst. v. Johtislon, Fed. 
Cas. No. 2659. 
MORGAN v. PEO PLE, in Ill. Sup. Ct., June Term, 1871-59 Ill. sS. 
Debt by the People of the State of Illinois for the use of · 
Thomas Lewis against Joel G. Morgan et al. on the official bond 
of Morgan as sheriff of Alexander county. The defendant plead­
ed :  I, non est factum; 2, that the sale was not ordered sus­
pended ; 3, that he sold the property according to law by virtue 
of an execution against Lewis ; 4, �the attorney for the j udg­
ment creditor directed him to sell. A demurrer to the third and 
fourth pleas was sustained, and judgment found for the plaintiff 
on issue and trial on the other pleas. Defendant brings error. 
THORNTON, J. * * * [*6o] The declaration avers that the 
sheriff had an execution in favor of Boyer against Lewis, by vir­
tue of which he levied upon certain shares of stock, and advertised 
a sale on the 29th of October, 1867 ; that the defendant in the 
execution paid off and satisfied the same on the 28th of October, 
except the costs, and that prior to the sale, the plaintiff in the 
execution ordered a suspension thereof, and that the sheriff re­
fused to suspend, and sold stock of the value of $s,ooo. * * * 
An officer might proceed strictly in accordance with the law 
governing the conduct of an execution in his hands, and yet be 
guilty of the breach assigned. He may have an execution in due 
form ; levy it upon property liable to seizure ; make proper adver­
tisement of a sale, and fully comply with the formal requirements 
350 CASES on EXECUTIONS, ETC.
of the law; yet, if he should sell in utter disregard of the instruc-
tions of the plaintiff, he incurs a liability to the defendant in the
execution. The third plea does not then traverse the material
portion of the breach. The fourth is no better than the third
plea. The breach is, that the plaintiff suspended the sale; the
plea is, that the attorney directed it; but non constat that he may
not have violated the orders of the plaintiff. The execution is
the process of the plaintiff, and he has a right to control it with-
out any interference on the part of attorney or officer. Rcddick
V. Admrs. of Cloud, 7 Ill. (2 Gil.) 670. The demurrer was right-
ly sustained. * * * Judgment aflirmed.
That officers of court, or witnesses to whom fees are due, have not
the power to order execution on a judgment owned by another, see Ex
Parts Ham/1t0n, 2 G. Greene, (Iowa) 137.
What Court May Issue Writ.
CLARKE v. MILLER, in New York Sup. Ct., July II, I854—I8 Barbour
Sup. 269.
In the sixth judicial circuit at the Delaware general term; Crippen,
Shankland and Mason, J].
Ejectment by Miller against Clarke. From judgment for
plaintiff at a special term defendant appeals.
l\'IASON, J. This is an action of ejectment, and the plaintiff-
made his title through a judgment, execution and sheriff's deed.
The judgment was recovered on' the 7th day of May, 1846, in the
court of common pleas of Tompkins county, in favor of the
Tompkins County Bank, against Andrew \/V. Knapp and Birdsey
Clarke, for $116.23. In July, 1849, an execution was issued out
of the supreme court, upon said judgment, to the sheriff of Tomp-
kins, who sold the premises thereon; and the fifteen months hav-
ing expired, the sheriff, on the 1st day of January, 1851, gave to
the purchaser a deed, which recited that the execution issued out
of the supreme court. After the commencement of the present
action, the county court [*27o] of Tompkins granted an order
amending the execution, the sheriff’s certificate of sale, and the
sheriff's deed, so as to make the execution issue out of the county
court of Tompkins, instead of the supreme court; and the sheriff,
after his term of office had expired, in pursuance of said order.
















































































































































350 CASES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC. 
of the law ; yet, if he should sell in utter disregard of the instruc­
tions of the plaintiff, he incurs a liability to the defendant in the 
execution . The third plea does not then traverse the material 
portion of the breach. The fourth is no better than the third 
plea. The breach is, that the plaintiff suspended the sale ; the 
plea is, that the attorney directed it ; but non constat that he may 
not have violated the orders of the plaintiff. The execution is 
the process of the plaintiff, and he has a right to control it with­
out any interference on the part of attorney or officer. Reddick 
v. A dmrs. of Cloud, 7 Ill. ( 2  Gil . )  670. The demurrer was right-
ly sustained . * * * Judgmen t aflirmed. 
That officers of court, or witnesses to whom fees are due, have not 
the power to order execution on a j udgment owned by another, see Ex 
Parte Hampton, 2 G. Greene, ( Iowa) 137. 
What Court May Issue Writ. 
CLARKE v. MILLER, in New York Sup. Ct., July 1 1 , 1854-18 Barbour 
Sup. 26g. 
. 
Jn the sixth judicial circuit at the Delaware general term ; Crippen, 
Shankland and Mason, J]. 
Ej ectment by Miller against Clarke. From j udgment for 
plaintiff at a special term defendant appeals. 
MASON, J. This is an action of ejectment, and the plaintiff. 
made his title through a judgment, execution and sheriff's deed. 
The judgment was recovered ori the 7th day of l\fay, 1 846, in the 
court of common pleas of Tompkins county, in favor of the 
Tompkins County Bank , against Andrew 'v\T. Knapp and Birdsey 
Clarke, for $I I6.23. In July, 1 849, an execution was issued out 
of the supreme court, upon said judgment, to the sheriff of Tomp­
kins, who sold the premises thereon ; and the fifteen months hav­
ing expired , the sheriff, on the 1 st day of January.  1 85 1 ,  gave to 
the purchaser a deed, which recited that the execution issued out 
of the supreme court. After the commencement of the present 
action , the county court [ *270] of Tompkins granted an order 
amending the execution , the sheriff's certificate of sale, and the 
sheriff's deed, so as to make the execution issue out of the county 
court of Tompkins, in stead of the supreme court ; and the sheriff, 
after his term of office had expired , in pursuanc\'� of said order, 
erased the words, supreme court, and inserted Tompk ins county 
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court, in the reciting part of said deed, and after the deed had
been delivered, and without any new acknowledgment thereof.
These facts all appeared before the execution and sheriff's deed
were offered in evidence; and when offered, the defendant's
counsel objected to the execution and sheriff’s deed, in conse-
quence of such alterations. The judge at the circuit overruled
the objection and admitted them in evidence, and held the title
acquired by the purchaser under them to be good.
The judge at the circuit most clearly erred. A sheriff's sale
of land is within the statute of frauds, and requires a deed, to
pass the title to the purchaser. Jackson v. Catlin, 2 john. 248.
And a sheriff's deed is not admissible in evidence, without show-
ing the judgment and execution under which he sold. Bonen v.
Bell, 20 john. 338. The sheriff's deed not being admissible, with-
out producing the judgment and execution, I do not see upon
what principle it could be admitted at all. Th rule i ' '
one, that judgments must be__gxecuted in those courts jn which
g__ __.._ _ _ — ——__
they are rendered. 3 Bacon's Abr. 715, tit. Execution, E. I do
not see upon w at principle the supreme court could assume to
execute this judgment, recovered in the common pleas. The su-
preme court possessed no power to award a fieri facfas upon that
judgment, and every execution that is issued by the attorney is
regarded in law as awarded by the court out of which it issues.
just as much as if the award was made upon the record. It
strikes me as a strange proceeding, for the supreme court to
award an execution to the sheriff, commanding him to collect a
judgment of the county court: and I entertain no doubt but such
an execution is absolutely void. But what is more strange still,
after the sheriff has executed it and sold the lands of the defend-
ant and given a deed to the purchaser, the county court assume
to say: “We will interfere with [*a7r] the process of the su-
preme court, because that court has undertaken to execute our
judgment ;” and so, by an order, the county court change, I sup-
pose, an execution of the supreme court which has been fully exe-
cuted and returned, into a process of the county court, and de-
clare, in effect, that the child is theirs, although they had no hand
in begetting it. The rule is a familiar one, that every court can
amend its own process. It is said to be a power incidental to
every court. It is no more than assuming the power to correct
its own proceedings; but I am not aware of any power in the
county court to amend the process of the supreme court. This
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court, in the reciting part of said deed, and after the deed had 
been delivered , and \\r i thout any new acknowledgment thereof. 
These facts all appeared before the execution and sheriff's deed 
were offered in evidence ; and when offered , the defendant's 
counsel objected to the execution and sheriff's deed, in conse­
quence of such alterations. The j udge at the circuit overruled 
the obj ection and admitted them in evidence, and held the title 
acquired by the purchaser under them to be good. 
The judge at the circuit most clearly erred . A sheriff's sale 
of land is within the statute of frauds, and requires a deed, to 
pass the title to the pur<?haser. Jackson v. Catli11, 2 John. 248. 
And a sheriff's deed is not admissible in evidence, wi thout show­
ing the j udgment and execution under which he sold. Bowen v. 
Bell, 20 John. 338. The sheriff's deed not being admissible, with­
out producing the j udgment and execution , I do not see upon 
what principle it could be admitted at all. The.rule is a famWar 
ont;.. that judgm� .!!1�st b�ec�te<!Jl!_ thEs<:___co_.!Jrts jn_2Yhich 
they are rendered. 3 Bacon's Ahr. 7 1 5 , tit. Execution, E. I do 
not see upon wffiit principle the supreme court could assume to 
execute this j udgment ,  recovered in the common pleas. The su­
preme court possessed no power to award a fieri facias upon that 
judgment, and every execution that is issued by the attorney is  
regarded in law as awarded by the court out of which it issues, 
just as much as if the award was made upon the record . It 
strikes me as a strange proceeding, for the supreme court to 
award an execution to the sheriff, commanding him to collect a 
judgment of the county court : and I entertain no doubt but such 
an execution is absolutely void. But what is  more strange still, 
after the sheriff has executed it and sold the lands of the defend­
ant and given a deed to the purchaser, the county court assume 
to say : "We will interfere with [ *2 7 1 )  the process of the su­
preme court, because that court has undertaken to execute our 
j udgment ;" and so, by an order, the county court change, I sup­
pose, an execution of the supreme court which has been fully exe­
cuted and returned, into a process of the county court, and de­
clare, in effect,  that the child is theirs, although they had no hand 
in begetting it. The rule is a familiar one, that every court can 
amend its own process. It  is said to be a power incidental to 
every court. It is no more than assuming the power to correct 
its own proceedings ; but I am not aware of any power in the 
county court to amend the process of the supreme court. This 
process, being void ,  is not amendable. Bwrn v. Thomas, 2 John. 
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190; Burk \-'. Barnard, 4 Id. 309; Miller v. Gregory, 4 Cowen,
504; Chandler v. Bccknell, Id. 49. In Simon v. Gurney, (1
Marsh. 237, 5 Taunton, 605, I Petersdorf's Abr. 595), where a
fieri facias was issued upon a judgment in the common pleas, re-
turnable in the king's bench, but the writ was tested in the name
of the chief justice of the common pleas, the court allowed the
writ to be amended, by making it returnable in the common pleas‘
placing their decision upon the express ground that, as the writ
was, tested in the name of the chief justice of the common pleas,
there was something to amend by. The reason why void process
cannot be amended is, there is nothing to amend by. All the
cases hold the very sensible language, that, when there is nothing
to amend by, the court have no power of amendment. In this
case, the writ issuing out of the supreme court, and returnable in‘
that court, there is nothing in the county court to amend by. The
county court could not amend anything that has been done in
that court towards the execution of their judgment, for nothing
has been done in that court. The execution being void in the
hands of the sheriff, all that was done under it is of no effect.
As a consequence, the sheriH’s certificate is a mere nullity, and
so was his deed. * * * [*272] * * * I am of opinion that, for
these reasons, without considering the other questions in the case.
the judgment of the circuit court should be reversed and a new
trial granted; costs to abide the event.
Reversed.
RAHM v. SOPER, in Kan. Sup. Ct., July Term, 1882—28 Kan. 529.
Action commenced in justice court by Frank Rahm against
R. B. Soper, his tenant, to recover rent. Soper defends on the
ground that, after the rent accrued and before plaintiff purchased,
Soper was summoned as garnishee of plaintiffs grantor, Eliz. H.
Hook, on a judgment against her in favor of T. J. Stout. From
judgment for defendant by the district court on appeal, plaintiff
brings error.
HORTON, C.]. The judgment of T. J. Stout against Eliza-
beth H. Hook was rendered before a justice of the peace of
Leavenworth county in 1878, and in the same year an abstract of
that judgment was docketed in the district court of Leavenworth
county, under § 119 of the justices’ act. The garnishment pro-
ceedings against R. B. Soper were commenced on March 21,
















































































































































352 CASES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC. 
190 ; Burk v. Barnard, 4 Id. 309 ; Miller v. Gregory, 4 Cowen, 
504 ; Clta.ndler v. Becknell, Id. 49. In Simon v. Gurney, ( I  
Marsh. 237, 5 Taunton, 6o5, I Petersdorf's Ahr. 595 ) ,  where a 
fieri f acia.s was issued upon a j udgment in the common pleas, re­
turnable in the king's bench, but the writ was tested in the name 
of the chief j ustice of the common pleas, the court allowed the 
writ to be amended, by making it returnable in the c�mmon pleas · 
placing their decision upon the express ground that, as the writ 
was. tested in the name of the chief j ustice of the common pleas, 
there was something to amend by. The reason why void process 
cannot be amended is, there is nothing to amend by. All the 
cases hold the very sensible language, tnat, when there is nothing 
to amend by, the court have no power of amendment. In this 
case, the writ issuing out of the supreme court, and returnable in · 
that court, there is nothing in the county court to amend by. The 
county court could not amend anything that has been done in 
that court towards the execution of their j udgment, for nothing 
has been done in that court. The execution being void in the 
hands of the sheriff, all that was done under it is of nb effect. 
As a consequence, the sheriff's certificate is a mere nullity, and 
so was his deed . * * * [ *272] * * * I am of opinion that, for 
these reasons, without considering the other questions in the case, 
the judgment of the circuit court should be reversed and a new 
trial granted ; costs to abide the event. 
Reversed. 
RAHM v. SOPER, in Kan. Sup. Ct., July Term, 1882-28 Kan. 529. 
Action commenced in j ustice court by Frank Rahm against 
R. B. Soper, his tenant, to recover rent. Soper defends on the 
ground that, after the rent accrued and before plaintiff purchased, 
Soper was summoned as garnishee of plaintiffs grantor, Eliz. H. 
Hook , on a judgment against her in favor of T. ]. Stout. From 
j udgment for defendant by the district court on appeal, plaintiff 
brings error . 
HoRTo�, C.J. The j udgment of T. ]. Stout against Eliza­
beth H. Hook was rendered before a j ustice of the peace of 
Leaven worth county in i 878, and in the same year an abstract of 
that j udgment was docketed in the district court of Leavenworth 
county, under § I i 9  of the j ustices' act. The garnishment pro­
ceedings against R. B. S0per were commenced on :March 2 1 ,  
1 88 1 ,  before the just ice rendering the j udgment, and long subse-
ISSUING THE WRITS 353
quent to the docketing of the abstract in the district court. It
was held in Treptow v. Buse, IO Kas. 170, that the filing of an
abstract in the district court has the same force as the filing of
the transcript of a judgment. Comp. Laws of 1879, ch. 81, §
119; id., ch. 80, §5I8. The filing of an abstract of a judgment
rendered before a justice of the peace obviously contemplates a
transfer of the judgment from the justice’s court; and after the
judgment is so transferred to the district court, it becomes sub- '
ject to the same rules and vested with the same powers as
though originally rendered in that court. Trcplow v. Buse, supra;
Comp. Laws, 1879, ch. 8I, § 188. [*53I]
Section 138 of the justices’ act reads: “It shall be the duty
of the justice, if the case be not appealed, taken up on error,
docketed in the district court, or bail has not been given for the
stay of execution, at the expiration of ten days from the entry
of the judgment, to issue execution without a demand and pro-
ceed to collect the judgment, unless otherwise directed by the
judgment creditor.”
Within the express terms of this section, after a case has
been docketed in the district court, it no longer becomes the duty
of the justice to issue execution in the absence of a demand. As
the docketing of the judgment in the district court transfers the
judgment to that court, and as by such transfer it becomes sub-
ject to the same rules and vested with the same powers as though
originally rendered in that court, the judgment creditor after
such transfer must look to that court for the means of enforcing
the collection of the judgment, and cannot demand execution un-
der § 137 of the justices’ act. This certainly was the intention
of the legislature, and this construction of the statute renders the
provisions of the code and the sections of the justices’ act con-
cerning this subject-matter harmonious. If a different view were
entertained, a plaintiff would have the privilege of process on
the same judgment from two courts within the same county at
the same time. If the judgment creditor is not deprived of the
right to an execution before the justice after he has transferred
his judgment to the district court by filing an abstract, the pro’
visions relating to revivor in § 522 of the code are without much
significance, as the plaintiff might keep alive his judgment be-
fore the justice and from time to time file new abstracts. As in
our view the justice after the filing of the abstract of the judg-
ment in the district court had not jurisdiction to issue process in
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quent to the docketing of  the abstract in the district court. It  
was held in Treptow v .  Buse, IO Kas. 170, that the filing of an 
abstract in the district court ha� the same force as the filing of 
the transcript of a j udgment. Comp. Laws of I879, ch. 8I ,  § 
1 19 ;  id., ch. 80, §S I8. The filing of an abstract of a judgment 
rendered before a j ustice of the peace obviously contemplates a 
transfer of the judgment from the justice's court ; and after the 
j udgment is so transferred to the district court, it becomes sub­
j ect to the same rules and vested with the same powers as 
though originally rendered in that court. Treplow v. Buse, supra; 
Comp. Laws, �879, ch. 81 ,  § 1�. [*53 1 ]  
Section 1 38 of the justices' act reads : "It shall be the duty 
of the j ustice, if the case be not appealed, taken up on error, 
docketed in the district court, or bail has not been given for the 
stay of execution, at the expiration of ten days from the entry 
of the judgment, to issue execution without a demand and pro­
ceed to collect the j udgment, unless otherwise directed by the 
judgment creditor." 
Within the express terms of this section, after a case hac; 
been docketed in the district court, it no longer becomes the duty "' 
of the justice to issue execution in the absence of a demand. As 
the docketing of the j udgment in the district court transfers the 
j udgment to that court, and as by such transfer it becomes sub­
ject to the same rules and vested with the same powers as though 
originally rendered in that court, the j udgment creditor after 
such transfer must look to that court for the means of enforcing 
the collection of the judgment, and cannot demand execution un­
der § 137 of the justices' act. This certainly was the intention 
of the legislature, and this construction of the statute renders the 
provisions of the code and the sections of the justices' act con­
cerning this subj ect-matter harmonious. If a different view were 
entertained , a plaintiff would have the privilege of process on 
the same judgment from two courts within the same county at 
the same time. If the j udgment creditor is not deprived of the 
right to an execution before the justice after he has transferred 
his judgment to the district court by filing an abstract, the pro­
visions relating to revivor in § 522 of the code are without much 
significance, as the plaintiff might keep alive his j udgment be­
fore the justice and from time to time file new abstracts. As in 
our view the justice after the filing of the abstract of the judg­
ment in the district court had not jurisdiction to issue process in 
the case, all of the garnishment proceedings after the transfer of 
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the judgment to the district court must be regarded as nullities.
* * * [*532] * * *
The judgment of the district court must be reversed, and the
case remanded with direction to the court below to enter judg-
ment upon the agreed statement of facts for plaintiff in error.
Reversed.
Same effect: Hcrdman v. Cann, 2 Houston (Del.) 4I—Ober~u1arth
v. 1l[CL(‘Un, 52 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 491. Compare Baker v. King, 2 Gr. (Pa.)
254; Brandt’: App. 16 Pa. St. 343; Nelson v. Guffey, 13x Pa. St. 273, 289.
The filing of a transcript of a justice judgment in the district court
does not enable the latter to vacate the judgment. Ray v. Harrison, 31
Okl.——i2I Pac. 633.
The Form and Essentials of the Writ, Etc.
BURNHAM v. DOOLITTLE, in Neb. Sup. Ct., Feb. 8, I883—14 Neb.
214, 15 N. W. 606.
LAKE, C. This petition in error presents two questions.
First. Was the motion to quash the summons in garnishment
properly overruled? Second. \Vas the plaintiff in error rightly
held as garnishee? [*215] * * *
The objection to the summons was simply that the “affidavit
on which the procedure is based is insufficient in not establishing
that the garnishee has property of, or is indebted to defendant;
and that” * * * “it is not entitled in any court, proceeding, or
cause.”
This objection is based in part upon the supposition that, to
properly institute a proceeding of this kind, the afiidavit must nec-
essarily show that the person to be summoned has property of the
judgment debtor in his possession or under his control, or is in—
debted to him, and that a statement of mere belief, without more,
will not answer. Referring to the statute, however, we find that
nothing further is required to be stated than that the judgment
creditor “has good reason to and does believe that any person or
corporation (naming them) have property of and are indebted to
the judgment debtor.” Upon the filing of an afiidavit, stating
such belief, it is provided that the proper ofiicer “shall issue a
summons as in other cases, requiring such person or corporation
to appear in court and answer such interrogatories as shall be
propounded to him, it, or them, touching the goods, chattels,
rights. and credits of the said judgment debtor in his, its, or their
possession. or [*216] control.” Sec. 244, Comp. Statutes, 562.
















































































































































354 CASES O :'ll E X E C UT I O !\' S, ETC. 
the judgment to the district court must be regarded as nullities . 
• * * [ *532 1  * * * 
The judgment of the district court must be reversed, and the 
case remanded with direction to the court below to enter j udg­
ment upon the agreed statement of facts for plaintiff in error. 
Reversed. 
Same effect : Herdnian v. Cann, 2 Houston (Del. ) 41-0berwarth 
v. McLean, 52 How. Pr. ( N.Y.)  491. Compare Baker v. King, 2 Gr. ( Pa. ) 
254 ; Brandt's App. 16 Pa. St. 343 ; Nelson v. Guffey, 131  Pa. St. 273, 289. 
The filing of a transcript of a justice judgment in t!he district court 
does not enable the latter to vacate the judgment. Ray v. Harrison, 31 
Okl.-121 Pac. 633. 
The Form and Essentials of the Writ, Etc. 
BURNHAM v. DOOLITTLE, in Neb. Sup. Ct., Feb. 8, 1883-14 Neb . 
.2t4, 15 N. W. 6o6. 
LAKE, C. J. This petition in error presents two questions. 
First. Was the motion to quash the summons in garnishment 
properly overruled ? Second. Was the plaintiff in error rightly 
held as garnishee ? [ *2 15 ]  * * * 
The obj ection to the summons was simply that the "affidavit 
on which the procedure is based is insufficient in not establishing 
that the garnishee has property of, or is  indebted to defendant ; 
and that" * * * "it is not entitled in any court, proceeding, or 
cause." 
This obj ection is based in part upon the supposition that, to 
properly institute a proceeding of this kind, the affidavit must nec­
essarily show that the person to be summoned has property of the 
j udgment debtor in his possession or under his control,  or is in­
debted to him, and that a statement of mere belief, without more, 
will not answer. Referring to the statute, however, we find that 
nothing fu rther is  required to be stated than that the judgment 
credi tor "has good reason to and does bel ieve that any person or 
corporation ( naming them ) have property of and are indebted to 
the j udgment debtor ." Upon the fil ing of an affidavit, stating 
such bel ief, it i s  prov ided that the proper officer "shall issue a 
summon s as in other cases, requiring such person or corporation 
to appear in court and answer such interrogatories as shall be 
propounded to h im , it, or them , touching the goods, chattels,  
rights.  amt credits of the said i udgment debtor in his , its,  or their 
possession.  or r *2 1 6l con trol ." S ec. 244, Comp. Statutes , 562. 
, Mere belief, therefore , is al t that the statute contemplates . and 
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consequently all that courts have the right to exact in afiidavits of
this kind. If it had been intended that the facts and circum-
stances inducing such belief should be given, and their sufficiency
determined by the court, it is but reasonable to suppose that lan-
guage altogether different from this would have been employed.
The other point of this objection, viz., that the body of the
affidavit was without a title, is merely technical. In the affidavit
it is clearly averred that it was a transcript of the record of the
writ of Doolittle & Gordon v. \V. Sanford Gee,,that had been filed
in the district court, and it was against “the property of the said
W’. Sanford Gee” that the garnishment proceeding was directed.
Besides, the affidavit was endorsed, “Doolittle & Gordon against
VV. Sanford Gee,” and this is also the endorsement of the sum-
mons served upon the person garnished. There could not have
been, therefore, any possible doubt as to the case in which it was
intended to use the afiidavit, nor as to the persons sought to have
been affected by it. There was neither uncertainty nor ambiguity
in any particular, and we are aware of no purpose that would have
been better served by prefixing the title of the cause to the body
of the afiidavit. ’
The only remaining question is whether the judgment debt-
or's equity, of redemption, or interest in the two promissory notes,
could be reached and held by the process of garnishment? It
must be conceded that according to most of the cases bearing
upon this question, it could not. I Wait’s Actions and Defenses.
422, 423. Following this general current of authorities, we held
in Pcckinbaugh V. Quillin, I2 Neb. 586, that it is only when
a mortgagor of goods has the right of possession for a definite
period that he has an attachable interest in them. This rule did
not influence the result of that case, however, for the reason that
the property was insufficient to satisfy the mortgage [*217] debt.
But in view of our attachment law, and the ruling of the supreme
court of Ohio on a statute from which ours was copied, and upon
more mature reflection, we are now satisfied that whatever in-
terest a mortgagor of chattels may have in them, in this state,
may be reached by seizure under a writ of attachment at any
time while in his possession, and by means of the process of gar-
nishment if they have passed into the hands of the mortgagee.
And to this extent our opinion in the case of Peckinbaugh v.
Qm'lI1'n must be modified. In the case of Carly V. Fenstemakrr,
14 Ohio State 457, which arose under a statute just like our own
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consequently al l  that courts have the right to exact in affidavits of 
this kind. I f  it had been intended that the facts and circum­
stances inducing such belief should be given, and their sufficiency 
determined by the court, · it is but reasonable to suppose that lan­
guage altogether different from this would have been employed. 
The other point of this obj ection, viz., that the body of the � 
affidavit was without a title, is merely technical. In the affidavit 
it is clearly averred that it was a transcript of the record of the 
writ of Doolittle & Gordon v. W. Sanford Gee,. that had been filed 
in the district court, and it was against "the property Qf the said 
W. Sanford Gee" that the garnishment proceeding was directed. 
Besides, the affidavit was endorsed, "Doolittle & Gordon against 
W. Sanford Gee," and this is also the endorsement of the sum­
mons served upon the person garnished. There could not have 
been, therefore, any possible doubt as to the case in which it was 
intended to use the affidavit, nor as to the persons sought to have 
been affected by it. There was neither uncertainty nor ambiguity 
in any particular, and we are aware of no purpose that woul<l have 
been better served by prefixing the title of the cause to the body 
of the affidavit. / 
The only remaining question is whether the judgment debt­
or's equity of redemption, or interest in the two promissory notes, 
could be reached and held by the process of garnishment ? It 
must be conceded that according to most of the cases bearing 
upon this question, it could not. I Wait's Actions and Defenses, 
422, 423. Following this general current of authorities, we held 
in Peckinbattgh v. Quillin, 12 Neb. 586, that it is only when 
a mortgagor of goods has the right of possession for a definite 
period that he has an attachable interest in them. This rule did 
not influence the result of that case, however, for the reason that 
the property was insufficient to satisfy the mortgage (*217 ]  debt. 
But in view of our attachment law, and the ruling of the supreme 
court of Ohio on a statute from which ours was copied, and upon 
more mature reflection , we are now sati sfied that whatever in­
terest a mortgagor of chattels may have in them, in this state, 
may be reached by seizure under a writ of attachment at anv 
time while in his possession, and by means of the process of ga;­
nishment if  they have passed into the hands of the mortgagee. 
And to thi s  extent our opinion in the case of Peckinbaugh v. 
Quillin must be mod ified. In the case of Carf'l,r v. Fenstema.ker, 
q Ohio State 457, which arose under a statute. just l ike our own 
respecting this matter . it was d istinctly held that the interest of 
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a mortgagor of chattel property in possession of the mortgagor,
after condition broken, was attachable. The seizure of the prop-
erty under the order of attachment, it was said, “creates a lien
in favor of the attaching creditor upon the interest of such mort-
gagol-_" * * * U218] * * *
Judgment affirmed.
PARSONS v. SWETT, in N. Ham. Sup. Ct., Coos, Dec. Term, 1855-
32 N. H. 87, 64 Am. Dec. 352.
A plea in abatement of an original writ, for that it was tested
in the name of a chief justice who had resigned, was held bad in
form. Then a motion to quash the writ for the same cause was
made. Denied.
PERLEY, C.]. The constitution of New Hampshire, article
87, provides that “all writs issuing out of the clerk’s office in any
of the courts of law, shall be in the name of the state of New
Hampshire; shall be under the seal of the court whence they is-
sue, and bear the taste of the chief, first, or senior justice of the
court, and shall be signed by the clerk of said court.”
Provisions of the constitution are to be interpreted by the
same rules that are applied in the construction of similar pro-
visions in statutes; and the party that would avail himself of any
provision in the constitution must do it in the same manner and
in the same time and order, that would be required in cases of
like provisions in statutes. Ripley v. Warren, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.)
592; M orston v. Brackelt, 9 N. H. 336, 349.
Before the revolution all writs in the province of New Hamp-
shire were inthe king’s name; and probably when the change
was first made, by substituting the name of the state for the regal
style, one object was to avoid all appearance of recognizing the
royal authority. If beyond this there is any design to give au-
thenticity and credit to legal process, by requiring an actual at-
testation of the chief, first, or senior justice of the court, the prac-
tical construction which has uniformly been put on this provision
of the constitution has wholly defeated that object; for the ordi-
nary process of the court never in fact bears the actual signature
of the chief justice, but his name is printed into the blank writs
before they are delivered out of the clerk’s office. The teste of .
the writ is therefore in practice a mere matter of form.
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a mortgagor of chattel property in possession of the mortgagor, 
after condition broken, was attachable. The seizure of the prop­
erty under the order of attachment, it was said, "creates a lien 
in favor of the attaching creditor upon the interest of such mort­
gagor." * * * [*218] * * * 
Judgment aflirnied. 
PARSONS v. SWETT, in N. Ham. Sup. Ct., Coos, Dec. Term, 1855-
32 N. H. 87, 64 Am. Dec. 352. 
A plea in abatement of an original writ, for that it was tested 
in the name of a chief j ustice who had resigned, was held bad in 
form. Then a motion to quash the writ for the same cause was 
made. Denied. 
PERLEY, C. J. The constitution of New Hampshire, article 
87, provides that "all writs issuing out of the clerk's office in any 
of the courts of law, shall be in the name of the state of New 
Hampshire ; shall be under the seal of the court whence they is­
sue, and bear the teste of the chief, first, or senior justice of the 
court, and shall be signed by the clerk of said court." 
Provisions of the constitution are to be interpreted by the 
same rules that are applied in the construction of similar pro­
visions in statutes ; and the party that would avail himself of any 
provision in the constitution must do it in the same manner and 
in the same time and order, that would be required in cases of 
like provisions in statutes. Ripley v. Warren, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.)  
592 ; M <Nston v .  Brackett, 9 N. H. 336, 349. 
Before the revolution all writs in the province of New Hamp­
shire were in · the king's name ; and probably when the change 
was first made, by substituting the name of the state for the regal 
style, one object was to avoid all appearance of recognizing the 
royal authority. I f  beyond this there is any design to give au­
thenticity and credit to legal process,. by requiring an actual at­
testation of the chief, first, or senior justice of  the court, the prac� 
tical construction which has uniformly been put on this provision 
of the constitution has wholly defeated that obj ect ; for the ordi- ... 
nary process of the court never in fact bears the actual signature 
of the chief j ustice, but his name is printed into the blank writs 
before they are delivered out of the clerk's office. The teste of • 
the writ is therefore in practice a mere matter of form. 
A writ which issues without the proper teste is not in terms 
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declared by the constitution to be void, and‘ we think is not to
[*8g] be held so by construction. -In the same article of the con-
stitution writs are required to be signed by the clerk, but a writ
is not void because it wants the signature of the clerk, and the
objection will be overruled, if not seasonably made. Lovell v.
Sabin, 15 N. H. 29, 37.
In Massachusetts, upon the construction of a similar pro-
vision in their constitution, it has been decided that the want of
a proper teste is mere matter of form, and must be taken ad-
vantage of by seasonable objection—otherwise it will be held to
have been waived. Ripley v. Warren, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 502.
In this case the want of a proper teste did not make the writ
void. The plea in abatement was defective in form, and over-
ruled. The motion to quash the writ was addressed to the dis-
cretion of the court, and that discretion was properly exercised
by denying the motion. As a general rule, a motion to quash a
writ for a cause which might be taken advantage of by plea in
abatement, must be made within the time limited for filing pleas
in abatement. Trafton v. Rogers, I 3 Maine 315.
Our practice requires such pleas to be filed within the first
four days of the first term, and the court of common pleas were
well warranted in holding that the defendants had waived their
right to insist on the objection, by neglecting to make the motion
until the second term.
Even if the plea in abatement had been sufficient, or the mo-
tion to quash had been seasonably made, the writ might have
been amended, for it was not void, and the court had jurisdiction;
as we understand to have been held in Reynolds v. Danirell, de-
cided in Hillsborough county, July, 1849, and not reported.
We have not overlooked the case of Hutehins v. Edson, I
N. H. I 39, in which it was held that a writ of execution, not un-
der the seal of the court, was void. The general language used
in that case might tend to the conclusion that writs of mesne, as
well as final process, were void, unless under the seal of the court.
It is obvious, however, that there is an important distinction be-
tween the two kinds of writs, because to a writ of final process
the defendant has no opportunity to object, by plea or motion,
that it wants a seal or other constitutional requisite; whereas in
the case of mesne process he may plead the defect, or make it the
ground of a motion; and it may perhaps be found, when a case
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declared by the constitution to be void, and we think is not to 
[ *89] be held so by construction . ·In the same article of the con­
stitution writs are required to be signed by the clerk, but a writ 
is not void because i t  wants the signature of the clerk, and the 
objection will be overruled, if not seasonably made. Lovell v. 
Sabin, 1 5  N. H. 29, 37. 
In Massachusetts, upon the construction of a similar pro­
vision in their constitution, it has been decided that the want of 
a proper teste is mere matter of form, and must be taken ad­
vantage of by seasonable obj ection-otherwise it will be held to 
have been waived . Ripley v. Warren, 19 Mass. ( 2  Pick . )  592. 
1n this case the want of a proper teste did not make the writ 
void. The plea in abatement was defective in form, and over­
ruled. The motion to quash the writ was addressed to the dis­
cretion of the court, and that discretion was properly exercised 
by denying the motion. As a general rule, a motion to quash a 
writ for a cause which might be taken advantage of by plea in 
abatement, must be made within the time limited for filing pleas 
in abatement. Trafton v. Rogers, 13 Maine 3 1 5 . 
Our practice requires such pleas to be filed within the first 
four days of the first term, and the court of common pleas were 
well warranted in holding that the defendants had waived their 
right to insist on the obj ection, by neglecting to make the motion 
until the second term. 
Even i f  the plea in abatement had been sufficient, or the mo­
tion to quash had been seasonably made, the writ might have 
been amended, for it was not void, and the court had j urisdiction ; 
as we understand to have been held in Reynolds v. Da1iirell, de­
cided in Hillsborough county, July, 1849, and not reported. 
We have not overlooked the case of Hutchins v. Edson, l 
N.  H. 139, in which it was held that a writ of execution, not un­
der the seal of the court, was void. The general language used 
in that case might tend to the conclusion that writs of mesne, as 
well as final process, were void, unless under the seal of the court. 
It is obvious, however, that there is an important distinction be­
tween the two kinds of w rits, because to a writ of final process 
the defendant has no opportunity to obj ect, by plea or motion, 
that it wants a seal or other constitutional requisite ; whereas in 
the case of mesne process he may plead the defect, or make it the 
ground of  a motion ; and i t  may perhaps be found, when a case 
shall arise which presents the question, that the doctrine of Hu tch · 
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ins v. Edson ought not to be extended beyond the point expressly
decided. Foot v. Knowles, 45 Mass. (4Metc.) 386; Brewer v.
Sibley, 54 Mass. (I3 Metc.) I75; P001710 v. Dunning, I Wendell
16 ; Jackson v. Brown, 4 Cowen 550.
SIDWELL v. SCHUMACHER, in Ill. Sup. Ct., June 21, 188I-—99 Ill. 426.
Ejectment in Wayne circuit court. Plaintiff showed title
through a judgment, special execution, and sheriffs deed there-
on, received in evidence over defendant’s objection. The execu-
tion did not run in the name of the people. judgment for plain--
tiff. Defendant appeals.
MULKEY, J. * * * While there is some conflict of author-
ity upon this subject, yet it is believed that the weight of author-
ity establishes the proposition that, where the law expressly di-
rects that process shall be in a specified form, and issued in a par-
ticular manner, such a provision is mandatory, and a failure on
the part of the ofiicial whose duty it is to issue it, to comply with
the law in that respect, will render such process void. On the
other hand, it is well settled that there are many merely formal
defects which do not have that effect. To illustrate, where the
statute or constitution expressly requires that process shall issue
under the seal of the court, and be tested in the name of and
signed by the clerk, the failure to comply with either of these
requirements would, as it is believed, according to the weight of
authority, render the process void. The legislature or the people,
through the constitution, have the unquestionable right to say of
what process shall consist, and when they have declared that it
shall be of a specified form, by implication all other forms are
prohibited. If such laws are merely directory, then writs are as
valid without [*434] their observance as with it, and every clerk
would be at liberty to issue process in whatever form might suit
his fancy. If one of these requirements may be omitted, all may,
on the same principle. Under such a system, one clerk might
conclude that the ceremony of attaching a seal was idle and use-
less. Another might think the writ would be sufficient with the
seal, and that the addition of the name of the clerk would there-
fore be superfluous. Another might think all these requirements
of the law are but idle ceremonies, and for them substitute some-
thingr altogether different.
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ins v. Edson ought not to be extended beyond the point expressly 
<lecided . Foot v. Knowles, 45 Mass. (4Metc. ) 386 ; Brewer v. 
Sibley, 54 Mass. ( 1 3 l\.1etc. ) 175 ; People v. Dumiing, 1 Wendell 
16 ; Jackson v. Brou'1i, 4 Cowen 550. 
SIDWELL v. SCHUMACHER, in Ill. Sup. Ct., June 21, 1881-99 Ill . .µ6. 
Ej ectment in Wayne circuit court. Plaintiff showed title 
through a judgment, special execution, and sheriff's deed there­
on, receiverl in evidence over defendant's objection. The execu­
tion did not run in the name of the people. Judgment for plain-· 
tiff. Defendant appeals. 
MULKEY, J. * * * While there is some conflict of author­
ity upon this subj ect, yet it is believed that the weight of author­
ity establishes the proposition that, where the law expressly di­
rects that process shall be in a specified form, and issued in a par­
ticular manner, such a provision is mandatory, and a failure on 
the part of the official whose duty it is to issue it, to comply with 
the law in that respect, will render such process void. On the 
other hand, it  is well settled that there are many merely formal 
defects which do not have that effect. To illustrate, where the 
statute or constitution expressly requires that process shall issue 
under the seal of the court, and be tested in the name of and 
signed by the clerk ,  the failure to comply with either of these 
requirements would, as it is believed, according to the weight of 
authority, render the process void . The legislature or the people, 
through the constitution, have the unquestionable right to say of 
what pro'cess shall consist, and when they have declared that it 
shall be of a specified form, by implication all other forms are 
prohibited . If  such laws are merely directory, then writs are as 
... valid without [*434] their observance as with it, and every clerk 
would be at liberty to issue process in whatever form might suit 
his fancy. If one of these requirements may be omitted , all may, 
• 
on the same principle. Under such a system, one clerk might 
conclude that the ceremony o f  attaching a seal was idle and use­
less.  Another might think the writ would be sufficient with the 
seal , and that the addition of the name of the clerk would there­
fore be superfluous. Another might think all these requirements 
of the Jaw are but idle ceremonies , and for them substitute some­
thing- al together di fferent. 
Under such a system of things, how could the defendant in 
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the process know what was valid and binding upon him and what
was not, and when to obey and when not? And how could the
officer into whose hands it was delivered for execution know
whether he would be protected in serving it or not? And what
would become of the almost numberless questions discussed by
the courts and legal authors, founded upon the supposed distinc-
tion between void and voidable process, if there are no essential
requirements by which the one can be distinguished from the
other?
It will, doubtless, be conceded that the constitutional require-
_ment that all process “shall run in the name of the People,” stands
.upon at least as high footing as the statutory provisions which
require process to be issued under the seal of the court, and to be
tested in the name of and signed by the clerk. That it is so
regarded is expressly conceded in Commissioners, etc. v. Barry,
66 111. 496.
The decisions, therefore, with respect to the omission of a
seal or other statutory requirement, will be directly in point upon
the question involved in this case. * * * [*435] * * *
Bybee v. Ashby, 7 I11. (2 Gilm.) 151, 43 Am. Dec. 47, like
the present case, was an action of ejectment. The plaintiff, to
show title in himself, relied upon a sale and sheritT’s deed under
a judgment rendered in Knox county circuit court, the land in
controversy [*436] being situated in Fulton county. The execu-
tion under which the sale was made, by a mere clerical error was
directed to the sheriff of Knox county, instead of Fulton county.
* * * This court, in the course of its opinion, there said: * * *
“Where the execution is not regular upon its face, as, for instance,
it is issued without the proper seal of the court attached, or where.
as in this case, it is directed to the sheriff of one county and de-
livered to the sheriff of another county to be executed, such pro-
cess will not justify the officer in executing it, and all his
acts under it will be absolutely void and he a trespasser, and the
purchaser will acquire no right to the property purchased at the
sale" * * * [*4s7]
Davis v. Ransom et al., 26 I11. I00, was an action of replevin.
for the recovery of certain chattels which were claimed under an
execution sale. On the trial of the cause, the court below ex-
cluded as evidence the execution under which the sale was made.
on the ground that it was not under seal, and on appeal to this
court the ruling of the court below was sustained. * * *
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the process know what was valid and binding upon him and what 
was not, and when to obey and when not ? And how could the 
officer into whose hands it was delivered for execution know 
whether he would be protected in serving it or not ? And what 
would become of the almost numberless questions discussed by 
the courts and legal authors, founded upon the supposed distinc­
tion between void and voidable process, if there are no essential 
requirements by which the one can be distinguished from the 
other ? 
It will, doubtless, be conceded that the constitutional require­
ment that all process ' ;shall run in the name of the People," stands 
. upon at least as high
-
footing as the statutory provisions which 
require process to be issued under the seal of the court, and to be 
tested in the name of and signed by the clerk. That it is so 
regarded is expressly conceded in Commissioners, etc. v. Barry, 
66 Ill. 496. 
The decisions, therefore, with respect to the omission of a 
seal or other statutory requirement, will be directly in point upon 
the question involved in this case. * * * [ *435 ] * * * 
B)•bee v. Ashby, 7 Ill. ( 2  Gilm. ) 1 5 1 ,  43 Am. Dec. 47, like 
the present case, was an action of ejectment. The plaintiff, to 
show title in himself, relied upon a sale and sheriff's deed under 
a judgment rendered in Knox county circuit court, the land in 
controversy [ *436] being situated in Fulton county. The execu­
tion under which the sale was made, by a mere clerical error was 
directed to the sheriff of Knox county, instead of Fulton county. 
* * * This court, in the course of its opinion, there said : * * * 
"Where the execution is not regular upon its face, as, for instance, 
it is issued without the proper seal of the court attached, or where. 
as in this case, it is directed to the sheriff of one county and de­
l ivered to the sheriff of another county to be executed, such pro­
cess will not justify the officer in executing it, and all his 
acts under it will be absolutely void and he a trespasser, and the 
purchaser will acquire no right to the property purchased at the 
sale. "  * * * [ *437] 
Da,vis v. Ransom et al., 26 Il l .  100, was an action of  replevin . 
for the recovery of certain chattels which were claimed under an 
execution sale. On the trial of the cause, the court below ex­
cluded as evidence the execution under which the sale was made, 
on the ground that it  was not under seal , and on appeal to this 
court the ruling of the court below was sustained. * * * 
In H ernandc:: v. Drake, 8 1  Ill. 34, where the valic1ity of a 
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sale of real estate under an execution to which the clerk had in—
advertently omitted to sign his name was under consideration, it
was said: “The next question presented is, what [*438] was the
effect of the execution issued without the signature of the clerk?
* * * The signature is as essential under this law as is the seal
or other specific requirement, and in its absence the writ must be
held to confer no power upon the officer to whom it was directed.”
VVhatever the law may be with respect to the power of courts
to allow amendments before judgments, where the parties have
appeared in obedience to defective or even void process for the
purpose of taking advantage thereof, of which we express no opin-
ion, as it is not necessary to a decision of this case, the present
review of the authorities clearly warrants the conclusion that a
sale of land under an execution that does not run in the name of
the People, that is not sealed, or is not signed by or directed to
the proper officer, is absolutely void, and may be successfully
resisted in any kind of a proceeding, or in any forum in which
the question may arise. * * *
Judgment reversed.
LOWE v. MORRIS, in Ga. Sup. Ct., Feb. Term, 1853-13 Ga. 147.
Motion to dismiss a writ of error for want of a seal.
LUMPKIN, I. Is a writ of error a nullity without a seal?
My first impression was that this defect was fatal. Upon
reflection, my final conclusion is the other way. * * *
His signet or seal was the pledge of identitjI and fidelity,
exacted by Tamar of Lord Judah, one of the twelve princes of
Israel. Moses’ Reports, Book Genesis, c. 38, v. 18. See also
Esther, c. 8, v. 8 and I0. It would seem from this last case, that
even at this early period monarchs as well as courts at this day,
could only act through their official seal. And the reason given
is. that the precept issued in the king’s name and sealed with his
ring, by his clerk, Mordecai the Jew, may no man reverse. And
this is the strong position of my learned brother. (M. anciently.
as now, I would remark, was a favorite initial for the name of
court clerks, from Mordecai the Jew, even down to Martin, the
Gentile.) VVhatever else there may be that is new under the sun,
it is very evident from this last authority, that mails are not.
For we are told that these letters mandatory of Ahasuerus were
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sale of real estate under an execution to which the clerk had in­
advertently omitted to sign his name was under consideration, it 
was said : "The next question presented is, what [*438] was the 
effect of the execution issued without the signature of the clerk ? 
* * * The signature is as essential under this law as is the seal 
or other specific requirement, and in its absence the writ must be 
held to confer no power upon the officer to whom it was directed." 
\Vhatever the law may be with respect to the power of  courts 
to allow amendments before j udgments, where the parties have 
appeared in obedience to defective or even void process for the 
purpose of taking advantage thereof, of which we express no opin­
ion, as it is not necessary to a decision of this case, the present 
review of the authorities dearly warrants the conclusion that a 
sale of land under an execution that does not run in the name of 
the People, that is  not sealed, or is  not signed by or directed to 
the proper officer, is  absolutely void, and may be successfully 
resisted in any k ind of a proceeding, or in any forum in which 
the question may arise. * * * 
Judgment reversed. 
LOWE v. MORRIS, in Ga. Sup. Ct., Feb. Term, 1853-13 Ga. 147. 
Motion to dismiss a writ of error for want of a seal. 
LUMPKIN, J. Is a writ of error a nullity without a seal ? 
My first impression was that this defect was fatal. Upon 
reflect ion, my final conclusion is the other way. * * * 
His signet or seal was the pledge of identit')' and fidelity, 
exacted by Tamar of Lord Judah, one of the twelve princes of 
Israel . Moses' Reports, Book Genesis, c. 38, v. 18. See also 
Esther, c. 8, v. 8 and 10. It would seem from this last case, that 
even at this early period monarchs as well as courts at this  day, 
could only act through their official seal . And the reason given 
i s .  that the precept issued in the king's name and sealed with his 
ring, by his clerk, Mordecai the Jew, may no man re·vcrsc. And 
this is the strong posit ion of my learned brother. ( M. anciently. 
as now, I would remark, was a favorite initial for the name of 
court clerks, from }.f ordcca·i the Jew, even down to ]If artin,, the 
G11ntilc.) \Vhatever else there may be that is new under the sun, 
it is very evident from this last authority, that ma.ils are not. 
For we are told that these letters mandatory of Ahasuerus were 
sent by post, on horseback, and riders on mules, camels ,  a�d young 
d romc<laries. 
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So much for the antiquity and importance of seals. It will
be found, upon further investigation, that modern decisions ad-
here very strictly to these patriarchal precedents. * * * [*153]
The truth is, that this whole subject, like many others, is
founded on the usage of the times, and of the country. A scroll
is just as good as an impression on wax, wafer, or parchment, by
metal, engraved with the arms of a prince, potentate, or private
person. Both are now utterly worthless, and the only wonder is,
that all technical distinctions growing out of the use of seals,
such as the statute of limitations, plea to the consideration, etc., are
not at once universally abolished. The only reason ever urged
at this day why a seal should give better evidence and dignity to
writing is, that it evidences greater deliberation, and therefore
should impart greater solemnity to instruments. Practically we
know that the art of printing has done away with this argument.
>1: * *
So long as seals distinguished identity, there was propriety
in preserving them. And as a striking illustration, see the signa-
tures and seals to the death warrant of Charles I., as late as Jan-
uary, I648. They are 49 in number, and ‘no two of them alike.
But to recognize the waving, oval circumflex of a pen, with those
mystic letters to the uninitiated, L. S., imprisoned in its serpen-
tine folds, as equipotent with [*154] the coats of arms taken from
the devices engraven on the shields of knights and noblemen;
shades of Eustace, Roger de Beaumont, and Geoffry Gifford, what
a desecration! The reason of the usage has ceased; let the cus-
tom be dispensed with altogether. _
In Jones 6- Temple v. Logwood, I Washington (Va.) 42,
President Pendleton states, that there was a period when the
impression was made with the eye-tooth, and thinks there was
some utility in the custom, since the to0th’s impression was the
man's own, and presented a test in case of forgery. But this
reason, however applicable in Virginia in I79I, does not hold
true in this epoch of dentistry, when no man’s tooth is his own,
but teeth, like_almost everything else, are artificial. * * *'i-" \
What magic, I ask, is there in our own seal? True, the
clerk has attested this writ of error in his ofiicial name, and by
his private seal, and in obedience to it, the clerk of the circuit
court has certified and transmitted to this court all the records
and papers of file in the court below, which are necessary to en-
able us to hear and determine properly this cause, upon its merits.
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So much for the antiquity and importance of seals. It will 
be found, upon further investigation, that modern decisions ad­
here very strictly to these patriarchal precedents. * * * [* 153] 
The truth is, that this whole subj ect, like many others, is  
founded on the usage of the times, and of the country. A scroll 
is j ust as good as an impression on wax, wafer, or parchment, by 
metal, engraved with the arms of a prince, potentate, or private 
person. Both are now utterly worthless, and the only wonder is, 
that all technical distinctions growing out of the use of seals, 
such as the statute of limitations, plea to the consideration, etc., are 
not at once universally abolished . The only reason ever urged 
at this day why a seal should give better evidence and dignity to 
writing is, that it evidences greater deliberation, and therefore 
should impart greater solemnity to instruments. Practically we 
know that the art of printing has done away with this argument. 
* * * 
So long as seals distinguished identity, there was propriety 
in preserving them. And as a striking illustration, see the signa­
tures and sea1s to the death warrant of Charles I., as late as Jan­
uary, 1648. They are 49 in number, and ·no two of them alike. 
But to recognize the waving, oval circumflex of a pen, with those 
mystic letters to the uninitiated, L. S. ,  imprisoned in its serpen­
tine folds, as equipotent with [*154] the coats of arms taken from 
the devices engraven on the shields of knights and noblemen ; 
shades of Eustace, Roger de Beaumont, and Geoffry Gifford, what 
a desecration ! The reason of the usage has ceased ; let the cus­
tom be dispensed with altogether. 
In Jones & Temple v. Logwood, l Washington ( Va. ) 42, 
President Pendleton states, that there was a period when the 
impression was made with the eye-tooth, and thinks there was 
some utility in the custom, since the tooth's impression was the 
man's own, and presented a test in case of forgery. But th1� 
reason, however applicable in Virginia in 1 791 ,  does not hold 
true in this epoch of dentistry, when no man's tooth is his own, 
but teeth, like . almost everything else, are artificial. * * * '\ , , ,  ' 
What magic, I ask, is there in our own seal ? True, the 
clerk has attested this writ of error in his official name, and by 
his private seal, and in obedience to it, the clerk of the circuit 
court has certified and transmitted to this court all the records 
and papers of file in the court below, which are necessary to en­
able us to hear and determine properly this cause, upon its merits. 
But then we look in vain on this writ for the three pillars sup-
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porting an arch, with the word constitution engraven within the
same, emblematic of the constitution, supported by the three de-
partments of governfnent: legislative, judicial, and executive.
The first having engraven on its base, wisdom, the second, justice,
and the third, moderation, and then on the right of the executive
column, a man standing with a drawn sword, and resembling
most strikingly [*I55] in figure and attitude our most worthy
and excellent chief magistrate. But I forbear.
Illi robur et aes triplex. He would be a bold judge indeed.‘
who would venture to decide an issue of law iii the absence of
this speaking device! There is a charm in that arch—a spell in
those pillars—an inspiration in the eye of that fierce-looking
swordsman, which guarantees a faithful administration of justice,
although simply and but very imperfectly impressed on the fools-
cap paper on which the writ of error is printed, instead of wax
or some other tenacious substance.
To whom we are indebted for the change in our seal, I am
not antiquarian enough to state. The old devices I always ven-
erated; the one side the scroll on which was engraved The Con-
stitution of the State of Georgia and the motto, pro bono Pnblico.
On the other side, an elegant house and other buildings, fields of
corn, and meadows covered with sheep and cattle; a river run-
ning through the same, with a ship under full sail and the motto,
Dons nobis hoec otia fecit. The Latinity as well as the piety of
this seal, commend themselves to my hearty admiration. They
will challenge a comparison, even on the score of architectural
taste too, with the arch resting on three Pillars. But then the
capital defect in the old seal—who does not anticipate me ?—was
the absence of that cocked-hat swordsman. Without this addend-
um, it is difficult to decide that any public document can impart
absolute verity. This it is, I am sure, that has exerted such a con-
trolling infiuence over the judgment of my dissenting brother,
with his well-known military propensities.
The act of 1845 authorizes this court to establish and pro-
cure a seal. My recollection does not serve me whether the state
coat of arms was selected as the device. I take it for granted it
was. If so, where, upon any seal attached to any writ of error
or citation returnable to this court, are those three potent and
cabalistic words: wisdom, justice, and moderation? Do not
these constitute a part of the seal just as much as the seal does
a part of the writ of error? Is it the seal of this court without
















































































































































CASES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC. 
porting an arch, w ith the word constitutio11 engraven within the 
same, emblematic of the constitution, supported by the three de­
partments of government : legislative, judicial, and executive. 
The first having engraven on its base, wisdom, the second, justice, 
and the third, moderation, and then on the right of the executive 
column, a man standing with a drawn sword, and resembl!ng 
most strikingly [* 155] in figure and attitude our most worthy 
and excellent chief magistrate. But I forbear. 
11/i robur ct aes triplex. He would be a bold j udge indeed. 
who would venture to decide an issue of lcr& fo the absence of 
this speaking device ! There is a charm in that arch-a spell in 
those pillars-an inspiration in the eye of that fierce-looking 
swordsman, which guarantees a faithful administration of j ustice, 
although simply and but very imperfectly impressed on the fools­
cap paper on which the writ of error is printed, instead of wax 
or some other tenacious substance. 
To whom we are indebted for the change in our seal, I am 
not antiquarian enough to state. The old devices I always ven­
erated ; the one side the scroll on which was engraved The Con­
stitution of the Sta.te of Georgia and the motto, pro bona pHblico. 
On the other side, an elegant house and other buildings, fields of 
corn, and meadows covered with sheep and cattle ; a river run­
ning through the same, with a ship under full sail and the motto, 
Deus nob is ha.ec otia f ecit. The Latinity as well as the piety of 
this seal, commend themselves to my hearty admiration. They 
will challenge a comparison, even on the score of architectural 
taste too, with the arch resting on three pillars. But then the 
capital defect in the old seal-who does not anticipate me ?-was 
the absence of that cocked-hat swordsman. Without this addeud­
mn, i t  is difficult to decide that any public document can impart 
absolute verity. This it is, I am sure, that has exerted such a con­
trolling influence over the judgment of my dissenting brother, 
with his well-known military propensities. 
The act of 1845 authorizes this court to esrablish and pro­
cure a seal. My recol lection does not serve me whether the state 
coat of arms was selected as the device. I take it for granted it  
was.  If  so,  where, upon any seal attached to any writ  of error 
or ci tation returnable to this court, are those three potent an<l 
cabal istic words : wisdom, ju stice, and moderation ? Do not 
these constitute a part of the seal j ust as much as the seal does 
a part of the writ of error ? Is it the seal of this court w ithout 
them ? If so, how much, and [ * 1 56] what portions of it may be 
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omitted and still leave a good seal? \-Vould it be a seal without
the arch, without the pillars, without the motto? I forbear even
to put the question whether it would be a seal without the mili-
tary efi‘igy—without that cocked-hat swordsman? Of course it
would be a nullity. As well talk of a man without a body!
For myself, I am free to confess that I despise all forms hav-
ing no sense or substance in them. And I can scarcely suppress
a smile, I will not say “grimace irresistable,” when I see so much
importance attached to such trifles. I would cast away at once
and forever, all law not founded in some reason——natural, moral,
or political. I scorn to be a “eerf adscript” to things obsolete, or
thoroughly deserving to be so. And for the “gladsome lights of
jurisprudence” I would sooner far, go to the reports of Hartly
(Texas), and of Pike and English (Arkansas), than cross an
ocean, three thousand miles in width, and then travel up the
stream of time for three or four centuries, to the ponderous tome
of Siderfin and Keble, Finch and Popham, to search for legal
wisdom. The world is changed; our own situation greatly
changed; and that court and that country is behind the age that
stands still while all around is in motion.
I would as soon go back to the age of monkery—to the good
old times when the sanguinary Mary lighted up the fires of Smith-
field, to learn true religion; or to Henry VIII., the British Blue-
Beard, or to his successors, Elizabeth, the two ]ames’s and two
Charles’s, the good old era of butchery and blood, whose em-
blems were the pillory, the gibbet and the axe, to study constitu-
tional liberty, as to search the records of black-letter for rules to
regulate the formularies to be observed by courts at this day.
I admit that many old things may be good things—as old
wine, old wives, ay, and an old world too. But the world is
older, and consequently wiser now than it ever was before. Our
English ancestors lived comparatively in the adolescence, if not
the infancy of the world. It is true that Coke, and Hale, and
Holt gaught a glimpse of the latter-day glory, but [*157] died
‘without the sight. The best and wisest men of their generation
were unable to rise above the ignorance and superstititon which
pressed like a nightmare upon the intellect of nations. And yet
we, who are “making lightning run messages, chemistry polish
boots and steam deliver parcels and packages,” are forever go-
ing back to the good old days of witchcraft and astrology, to
discover precedents for regulating the proceedings of courts, for
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omitted and still leave a good seal ? Would it be a seal without 
the arch, without the pillars, without the motto ? I forbear even 
to put the question whether it would be a seal without the mili­
tary eflig_y--without that cocked-hat swordsman ? Of course it 
would be a nullity. As well talk of a man without a body ! 
For myself, I am free to confess that I despise all forms hav­
ing no sense or substance in them. And I can scarcely suppress 
a smile, I will not say "grimace irresistable," when I see so much 
importance attached to such trifles. I would cast away at once 
and forever, all law not founded in some reason-natural, moral, 
or political . I scorn to be a "cerf adscripf' to things obsolete, or 
thoroughly deserving to be so. And for the "gladsome lights of 
j urisprudence" I would sooner far, go to the reports of Hartly 
(Texas) , and of Pike and English ( Arkansas) ,  than cross an 
ocean, three thousand miles in width, and then travel up the 
stream of time for three or four centuries, to the ponderous tome 
of Siderfin and Keble, Finch and Popham, to search for legal 
wisdom. The world is changed ; our own situation greatly 
changed ; and that court and that country is behind the age that 
stands still while all around is in motion. 
I would as soon go back to the age of monkery-to the good 
old times when the sanguinary Mary lighted up the fires of Smith­
field, to learn true rel igion ; or to Henry VIII. ,  the British Blue­
Beard,  or to his successors, Elizabeth, the two James's and two 
Charles's, the good old era of butchery and blood, whose em­
blems were the pillory, the gibbet and the axe, to study constitu­
tional l iberty, as to search the records of black-letter for rules to 
regulate the formularies to be observed by courts at this day. 
I admit that many old things may be good things-as old 
wine, old wives, ay, and an old world too. But the world is  
older, and consequently wiser now than it  ever was before. Our 
English ancestors lived comparatively in the adolescence, if not 
the infancy of the world. It is true that Coke, and Hale, and 
Holt �aught a glimpse of the latter-day glory, but [* 1 57 ]  died 
wifhout the sight. The best and wisest men of their generat ion 
were unable to rise above the ignorance and superstititon which 
pressed like a nightmare upon the intellect of nations. And yet 
we, who are "making lightning run messages, chemistry polish 
boots and steam deliver parcels and packages," are forever go­
ing back to the good old days of witchcraft and astrology, to 
discover precedents for regulating the proceedings of  courts, for 
upholding seals and all the tremendous doctrines consequent upon 
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the distinction between sealed and unsealed papers, when seals
de facto no longer exist! Let the judicial and legislative axe be
laid to the root of the tree; cut it down. Why cumbereth it. any
longer, courts and contracts?
Having treated this subject scripturally and historically,
though very dis'cursively, I propose to add a word or two upon
the physiological aspect of the question. And I repeat the inter-
rogatory propounded at the beginning of this opinion, namely:
VVhat defect will make a writ of error void? And I answer the
query by proposing another: What defect, original or superven—
ient, will reduce man from the genus homo?
VVill the amputation of the feet and legs disfranchise a de-
scendent of Adam of his title to manhood! It will not be denied
but that he may lose every limb of the body and leave nothing
but the naked trunk, and yet be a man “for a’ that.” And is the
seal, though it be constituted of the arch, and pillars, and swords-
man, more essential to the writ of error, or a pedestal to support
it. than legs and feet and arms are to manhood? Common sense
will decide. * * * Motion denied.
VVARREN, ]., delivered an opinion agreeing with LUMPKIN,
1., and NESBIT, ]., filed a dissenting opinion.
7Q/GORDON v. CAMP, in Pa. Sup. Ct., July 18, 1846—3 Pa. S. (3 Barr)
349, 45 Am. Dec. 647.
Replevin in Bradford common pleas by Sill Camp against
Gordon. At the trial Camp showed title in himself and rested.
Defendant offered in evidence a judgment of a justice of the
peace against Camp and another, execution thereon to the con-
stable of Herrick township, and a return thereon by the constable
of Standing-Stone township, showing a levy and sale of the prop-
erty to the defendant. This evidence was rejected and judgment
given for the plaintiff.
BURNSIDE, J. * * * [*350] It has been held that a war-
rant directed by the justice to . . . . . . . . constable,_if it is executed
by the proper constable of the district, is well directed. The rea-
son given is, that the word constable, with a blank, cannot be
said to be directed to the wrong constable, and may be understood
as directed for the right one. It is better to direct it to the con-
stable b_v name, or to the constable of the district generally.
















































































































































CASES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC. 
the distinction between sealed and unsealed papers, when seals 
de facto no longer exist ! Let the j udicial and legislative axe be 
laid to the root of the tree ; cut it down. Why cumbereth it. any 
longer, courts and contractsr 
Having treated this subject scripturally and historically, 
though very discursively, I propose to add a word or two upon 
the physiological aspect of the question. And I repeat the inter­
rogatory propounded at the beginning of this opinion, namely : 
\Vhat defect will make a writ of error void ? And I answer the 
query by proposing another : What defect, original or superven­
ient, will reduce man from the genus homo ? 
\Vill the amputation of the feet and legs disfranchise a de­
scendent of Adam of his title to manhood ! It will not be denied 
but that he may lose every limb of the body and leave nothing 
but the naked trunk , and yet be a man, "for a' that." And is the 
seal , though it be constituted of the arch, and pillars, and swords­
man, more essential to the writ of error, or a pedestal to support 
it .  than legs and feet and arms are to manhood ? Common sense 
will decide. * * * Motion denied. 
WARREN, J., delivered an opinion agreeing with LUM PKIN, 
J. ,  and NESBIT, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
�/ GORDON v. CAMP, in Pa. Sup. Ct., July 18, 1846---3 Pa. S. (3  Barr) 
349, 45 Am. Dec. 647. 
Replevin in Bradford common pleas by Sill Camp against 
Gordon. At the trial Camp showed title in himself and rested. 
Defendant offered in evidence a judgment of a justice of the 
peace against Camp and another, execution thereon to the con­
stable of Herrick township, and a return thereon by the constable 
of Standing-Stone township, showing a levy and sale of the prop­
erty to the defendant. This evidence was rejected and judgment 
given for the plaintiff. 
BURNSIDE, J. * * * [ *350] It has been held that a war-
rant directed by the justice to . . . . . . . .  constable,_if it is executed 
by the proper constable of the district, is well directed. The rea­
son given is,  that the word constable, with a blank, cannot be 
said to be directed to the wrong constable, and may be understood 
as directed for the right one. It is better to direct i t  to the con­
stable by name, or to the constable of the district generally. 
Paul v. Van kirk, 6 Binn. ( Pa. ) 125 .  
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A justice issued an execution directed to the constable of
B. district, four miles from the township of A., where the de-
fendant resided, a township lying between them; it was held,
that as the act was directory, the justice was to determine the next
constable most convenient to the defendant, and that the execu-
tion was for that reason not void. Smith v. Schell, I3 Serg. 8:
Rawle, 336.
No case has been decided, that an execution directed to the
constable of a particular township, can be handed over by him
to the constable of another township, to whom it was not directed,
and that the latter could legally execute it.
Here the execution was directed to the constable of “Her-
rick,” who gave it to the constable of “Standing-Stone.” Every
act done by the constable of Standing—Stone was illegal. His
sale was as if no execution had issued. His acts were utterlv
void; and he was a trespasser. It is contended we should sanc-
tion this practice, because it prevails ,and is convenient in Brad-
ford county. If so, the sooner an end is put to the practice, the
better. There is no law to authorize it; and all trading between
constables leads to corruption and injustice, and should be dis-
couraged. [*351]
It does not appear that any money was paid, and the con-
stable returned, not that he had received the money, but that he
had sold for $39.75. Sale indem-m'fied by James Gordon, 11th
March, (the sale was on the Ioth,) the above property replevied.
Signed H. S. Stephens, constable of Standing-Stone.
The rejection of this return of sale is the only error com-
plained of. In so doing, the court was clearly right.
The judgment is aflirmed.
Cooley; J’. “The case of the officer is next to be considered. It is
claimed, first, that he is liable [in trespass by the judgment debtor for
the wrongful levy after defendant had appealed from the judgment on
which the execution was issued] because the process was not addressed
to him, and therefore he had no authority to serve it. But the statute
expressly empowers sheriffs to serve the process which constables may
execute (Comp. 'Laws, 1871, §568); and it does not require that there
should be any special direction for the purpose. * * * No error was
therefore committed in holding the otficer not liable." Foster v. I/Vzley,
27 Mich. 244, 15 Am. Rep. 185.
An execution issued by a justice of the peace is not liable to col-
lateral attack because addressed “To any lawful ofiicer," if this he a de-

















































































































































ISSUING THE WRITS 
A justice issued an execution directed to the constable of 
B. district, four miles from the township of A., where the de­
fendant resided, a township lying between them ; it was held, 
that as the act was directory, the justice was to determine the next 
constable most convenient to the defendant, and that the execu­
tion was for that reason not void. Smith v. Schell, 1 3  Serg. & 
Rawle, 336. 
No case has been decided, that an execution directed to the 
constable of a particular township, can be handed over by him 
to the constable of another township, to whom it was not directed, 
• and that the latter could legally execute it. 
Here the execution was directed to the constable of "Her­
rick ," who gave it to the constable of "Standing-Stone." Every 
act done by the constable of Standing-Stone was illegal. His 
sale was as if no execution had issued. His acts were utterlv 
void ; and he was a trespasser. It is contended we should sanc­
tion this practice, because it prevails ,and is convenient in Brad­
ford county. If so, the sooner an end is put to the practice, the 
better. There is no law to authorize it ; and all trading between 
constables leads to corruption and inj ustice, and should be dis­
couraged. [*35 1 ]  
I t  does not appear that any money was paid, and the con­
stable returned, not that he had received the money, but that he 
had sold for $39·75· Sale indemnified by James Gord01i., nth 
March, ( the sale was on the roth, ) the above property replevied. 
Signed H. S. Stephens, constable of Standing-Stone. 
The rejection of this return of sale is the only error com­
plained of. In so doing, the court was clearly right. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Cooley; J. "The case of the officer is next to be considered. It is 
claimed, first, that he is liable [ in trespass by the j udgment debtor for 
the wr;ongful levy after defendant had appealed from the j udgment on 
which the execution was issued) because the process was not addressed 
to him, and therefore he had no authority to serve it. But the statute 
expressly empowers sheriffs to serve the process which constables may 
execute ( Comp. 'Laws, 1871,  §,568) ; and it does not require that there 
should be any special direction for the purpose. * * * No error was 
therefore committed in holding the officer not liable." Fosler v. Wiley, 
27 Mich. 244. 15 Am. Rep. 185. 
An execution issued by a justice of the peace is not liable to col­
lateral attack because addressed "To any lawful officer," if this be a de­
fect. Johnson v. Whitefield, 124 Ala. 5o8, 27 South 40(), &! Am. St. Rep. 
186. . 
_;(/> CASES ON JUDGMENTS, ETC.
> EXECUTION OF THE WRITS.
/ The Court's Power to Control.
COMMONWEALTH v. MAGEE, in Pa. Sup. Ct., June 9, 1848-8 Pa.
St. 240.
Debt on official bond by the commonwealth for the use of L.‘
G. Brandebury and G. Klink against Alexander Magee, late sher-
iff of Perry county, and his sureties, to recover the amount of a
fi. fa. given him for collection. From judgment for defendants-
plaintiff brings error.
The ti. fa-. in question was issued and given to the sheriff ‘
April 9, 1844, returnable at the August term. At the time the
writ was given to the sheriff, the defendant had plenty of prop-,
erty liable; but the sheriff had taken no action under the writ
when the judge at chambers made an order in the cause, “May\
4th, 1844, in the above case proceedings stayed until the 2nd day
of the August Term ensuing this date. John Judkin.” Aug. 7th,’
1844, a fi. fa. was issued on a judgment of John Conrad against\
the common debtor and on this fi. fa. all of the debtor's property/
was sold.
Brondebury, for plaintiff, contended, (I) that the order was *
coram non judiee, and no protection to the sheriff, (2) at all
events the sheriff became liable by his failure to make return and
by concealing the order till he had sold the defendant’s property,
on junior-executions. .
BELL, J. It is true a sheriff must use due diligence and
make the money demanded by an execution placed in his hands.
VV hat will amount to due diligence must necessarily vary with the
circumstances of each case; but it may be safely affirmed that
when there are no peculiar reasons known to the sheriff calling
for the exertion of unusual energy, and no special request by the\
plaintiff or his agent for immediate action, a delay such as oc-
curred here before the delivery of the judge’s order of the 4th
of May, in the absence of collusion or fraud, will not be deemed J
Inches to fix the officer for loss of the debt. Indeed, no fact is
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EXECUTION OF THE WRITS. 
� -l 
I The Court's Power to Control. 
(QM MONWEALTH v. MAGEE, in Pa. Sup. Ct., June 9r 1848--8 Pa. 
St. 240. 
Debt on official bond by the commonwealth for the use of L.• 
G. Brandebury and G. Klink against Alexander Magee, late sher­
iff of Perry county, and his sureties, to recover the amount of a 
fi. fa. given him for collection. From j udgment for defendants . 
plaintiff brings error. 
The fi. fa. in question was issued and given to the sheriff -
April 9, 1844, returnable at the August tertn. At the time the 
writ was given to the sheriff, the defendant had plenty of prop:,.. 
erty liable ; but the sheriff had taken no action under the writ 
when the judge at chambers made an order in the cause, "Ma)" 
4th, 1844, in the above case proceedings stayed until the 2nd day 
of the August Term ensuing this date. John Judkin." Aug. 71h, ... 
1844, a fi. fa. was issued on a judgment of John Conrad agains� 
the common debtor and on this fi. fa. all of the debtor's property,, 
was sold. 
Brandebury, for plaintiff, contended, ( 1 )  that the order was .... 
coram non judice, and no protection to the sheriff, (2)  at all 
events the sheriff became liable by his failure to make return and 
by concealing the order till he had sold the defendan�'s propertx,.. 
on junior · executions. 
BELL, J. It is true a sberiff must use due diligence and 
make the money demanded by an execution placed in his hands. 
\Vhat will amount to due diligence must necessarily vary with the 
circumstances of each case ; but it may be safely affirmed that 
when there are no peculiar reasons known to the sheriff calling 
for the exertion of unusual energy, and no special request by the' 
plaintiff or his agent for immediate action, a delay such as oc­
curred here before the delivery of the judge's order of the 4th 
of May, in the absence of collusion or fraud, will not be deemed 
. _, 
!aches to fix the officer for loss of the debt. Indeed, no fact 1s 
�m..,.c-ested on the record tending to show that the lapse of time 
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that intervened between the delivery of the writ and the making
of the order, endangered the plaintiff's demand. The execution
which eventually swept the goods of the defendant, Ernst, was
not issued until long after, and its success was consequent, not
on the delay of the sheriff, but incidentally upon the legal effect
of the judge’s interference.
The inquiry is thus reduced to the single question, whether‘
his order to stay proceedings was obligatory on the sheriff, or a
nullity, commanding neither respect nor obedience. /
The authority that a judge exercises at chambers in a cause
pending, is the authority of the court itself. Doe dem. Prescott
v. Roe, 9 Bing. (Eng.) I04, 2 Moore & S. 119, I Dowl. P. C. 274.
And it may be enforced by attachment issued by the court, for the
reason that disobedience of a judge’s order is a contempt of the
court, and punishable as such.
It is said, that, upon any other principle than that of dele-
gated authority, it would be difficult to demonstrate the validity
of many of the acts done by judges in cases and under circum-
stances in which the legislature has not specially invested them
with power, in their individual capacities. This species of juris-
diction is exercised ex necessitate rei to prevent injustice and op-
pression, and to facilitate and direct the interlocutory proceedings
of suits at law. It consequently embraces a variety of subjects
more or less important to a proper administration of justice. Some
of them are of course; and the administration of others calls for
the exertion of a sound judgment and discretion. It is properly,
therefore, under the control of the court from which the authority
is derived, and to which a dissatisfied party is at liberty to appeal.
Among the subjects which reasonably fall within the circle of this \
jurisdiction, the power of staying an execution issued in vacation
has been repeatedly recognized and acted on. Such an authority
to be exercised by a single judge, is [*247] indeed necessary to/
prevent oppression, and to prohibit the undue sacrifice of prop-
erty illegally levied. For these purposes it should be liberally,
though cautiously, exercised. There can exist, therefore, no
doubt that a judge of the court of common pleas possesses au-
thority to make such an order as is complained of here, and, when
properly made, that it is obligatory on the ofificer to whom it is
addressed. But while this is conceded, it is insisted that the order
under consideration was comm non judice, and void for want of\
previous notice to the plaintiffs in the execution. It is very true
















































































































































EX ECUTI N G  THE WRITS 
that intervened between the delivery of the writ and the making 
of  the order, endangered the plaintiff's demand. The execution 
which eventually swept the goods of the defendant, Ernst, was 
not issued until long after, and its success was consequent, not 
on the delay of the sheriff, but incidentally upon the legal effect 
of the j udge's interference. 
The inquiry is thus reduced to the single question, whether• 
his order to stay proceedings was obligatory on the sheriff, or a 
nullity, commanding neither respect nor obedience. / 
The authority that a judge exercises at chambers in a cause 
pending, is the authority of the court itself. Doe dem. Prescott 
v. Roe, 9 Bing. ( Eng. ) 104, 2 Moore & S. 1 19, I Dowl. P. C.  274. 
And it may be enforced by attachment issued by the court, for the 
reason that disobedience of a judge's order is a contempt of the 
court, and punishable as such. 
It is said, that, upon any other principle than that of dele­
gated authority, it would be difficult to demonstrate the validity 
of many o f  the acts done by jud;;;es in cases and under circum­
stances in which the legislature ha� not specially invested them 
with power, in their individual capaci(es. This species of j uris­
diction is exercised ex necessitate rei to prevent inj ustice and op­
pression, and to facilitate and direct the interlocutory proceedings 
of suits at law. It consequently embraces a variety of subj ects 
more or less important to a proper administration of justice. Some 
of them are of course ; and the administration of others call s for 
the exertion of a sound j udgment and discretion. It is properly, 
therefore, under the control of the court from whiCh the authority 
is derived, and to which a dissatisfied party is at liberty to appeal . 
Among the subj ects which reasonably fall within the circle of  this ..... 
j urisdiction, the power of staying an execution issued in vacation 
has been repeatedly recognized and acted on. Such an authority 
to be exerci sed by a single judge, is [ *247 ] indeed necessa ry tO"""" 
prevent oppression , and to prohibit the undue sacrifice of prop­
erty il legally levied. For these purposes it should be l iberally. 
though cautiously, exercised. There can exist, therefore, no 
doubt that a judge of the court of common pleas possesses au­
thority to make such an order as is complained of here, and, when 
properly made, that it is obligatory on the officer to whom it is 
addressed. But while this is conceded, it is insisted that the order 
under consideration was cora.m non jiidice, and void for want of' 
previous notice to the plaintiffs in the execution. It is very true 
that the proper mode of proceeding in most cases is by summons,,.. 
J 
. .  
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in the nature of a rule nisi, fixing a day for a hearing, and served"
on the opposite party. Without this the judge ought not to inter-"
fere, unless, indeed, the order or direction sought is of course.
When the order is made, notice of it should be given to the party
to be affected by it; otherwise he is at liberty to disregard it.
Bagly’s Prac. I 5 et seq. But notice is not always necessary, for \
in some cases an order may be without summons. Nor is the
omission of it fatal to the validity of the proceeding, ab initio, in/
any case. Though it is highly proper, and indeed indispensable,
to correct practice, a neglect to give it is but an irregularity which,
upon application would furnish a sufficient ground to rescind the‘
order made, but would not justify the officer’s refusal to obey it.,
The power of acting residing in the judge, it is no part of the
sheriff's business to inquire whether it has been executed in an‘
orderly manner, or to determine how far the steps properly pre-
cedent to the order have been taken. In this respect, the fiat at
chambers is analagous to a writ, which the sheriff is bound to
execute, though it be irregular; the distinction being between
process voidable for irregularity, and process void by lack of jur-
isdiction of the subject.
Nor was it the duty of the sheriff to notify the plaintiffs in
the execution, of the receipt of the judge's order. He was justi-
fied in presuming that all had been rightly acted; and could not
with propriety, or for any purpose of legal effect, inquire fur-
ther. Some degree of diligence was due from the plaintiffs; and
an application from them to the judge, would doubtless have pro-
cured a rescission, or at least a modification of the order, by the
annexation of a condition preservative of their priority of lien.
Clark v. Manns, I Dowl. P. C. (Eng) 656; Bagly’s Prac. 29.
Either of these courses was within the power of the judge. The
first would probably have been pursued, had he, on inquiry after
summons, been satisfied his order was irregular and improperly
obtained. The latter might have been effected by a direction to
stay proceedings, after levy [*248] made, the levy to remain as
security. But lacking any motion of this sort, it certainly lies
not in the mouths of the plaintiffs to impeach the sheriff of mis-
feasance in the non-execution of the fieri facias. His hands, as
we have seen, were tied. It is not enough to aver the plaintiffs
knew nothing of the order, and could therefore take no steps for
its abrogation or amendment. The answer is, they might have
known it, had they inquired of the sheriff touching the non-exe-
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in the nature of a rule nisi, fixing a day for a hearing, and served .. 
on the opposite party. Without this the j udge ought not to inter--> 
£ere, unless, indeed, the order or direction sought is  of course. 
"When the order is made, notice of it should be given to the party 
to be affected by it ; otherwise he is at liberty to disregard it. 
Bagly's Prac. 15 et seq. But notice is not always necessary, for " 
in some cases an order may be without summons. Nor is the/ omission of it fatal to the validity of the proceeding, ab iuitio, in 
any case. Though it is highly proper, and indeed indispensable, 
to correct practice, a neglect to give it is but an irregularity which, 
upon application would furnish a sufficient ground to rescind the!\ 
order made, but would not j usti fy the officer's refusal to obey it.,., 
The power of acting residing in the judge, it is no part of the 
sheriff's business to inquire whether it has been executed in an' 
orderly manner, or to determine how far the steps properly pre­
cedent to the order have been taken. In this respect, the fiat at """' 
chambers is analagous to a writ, which the sheriff is bound to 
execute, though :t be irregular ; the distinction being between 
process voidable for irregularity, and process void by lack of jur­
isdiction of the subject. 
Nor was it the duty of the sheriff to notify the plaintiffs in 
the execution, of the receipt of the judge's order. He was justi­
fied in presuming that all had been rightly acted ; and could not 
with propriety, or for an}' purpose of legal effect, inquire fur­
ther. Some degree of diligence was due from the plaintiffs ; and 
an appl ication from them to the judge, would doubtless have pro­
cured a rescission, or at least a modification of the order, by the 
annexation of a condition preservative of their priority of lien. 
Clark v . . Manns, 1 Dowl. P. C. ( Eng. ) 656 ; Bagly's Prac. 29. 
Either of these courses was within the power of the judge. The 
first would probably have been pursued, had he, on inquiry after 
summons, been satisfied his order was irregular and improperly 
obtained. The latter might have been effected by a direction to 
stay proceedings, after levy [*248] made, the levy to remain as 
security. But lack ing any motion of this sort, it certainly lies 
not in the mouths of the plaintiffs to impeach the sheriff of mis­
feasance in the non-execution of the fieri facias. His hands, as 
we have seen, were tied. It is not enough to aver the plaintiffs 
knew nothing of the order, and could therefore take no steps for 
its abrogation or amendment. The answer is, they might have 
known it, had they inquired of the sheriff touching the non-exe­
cution of the writ, an inquiry as commonly made as it is natural. 
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That they did not do this, is their misfortune, if not their fault;
the consequences of which are not to be visited upon the ofiicer,
who is in no default. The truth is, the inceptive error was com-
mitted by the judge; first, in acting upon an ex parte hearing,
and next, in granting an unconditional order, without respect to
the rights of the plaintiffs._ The results of this mistake, in this
"particularicase, ought to warn the associate judges of the com-
monwealth, who are not expected to be learned in matters of law,
against a similar interference with process, without an opportun-
ity first given to the antagonist party to be heard. The English
mode of procedure in such cases is clearly pointed out in Bag1y’s
Practice, at Chambers, cap. I, and being well calculated to pro-
tect the rights and interests of all parties, should be followed, here,
as closely as possible.
The inquiry recurs, what was the effect of the judge’s order?
Certainly to hang up the execution until after the return day.
Its functions were thus suspended until, by the lapse of time, its
vitality was extinguished. Beyond the return day, its operation
and vigor could only have been preserved by an actual levy; or
rather, the effect of the levy being to place the goods in gremio
legis, they would have so remained for satisfaction of the plain-
tiffs’ execution, unless released by their consent or misconduct,
or by operation of law. But a levy under the first execution be-
ing wanting, it had no hold on the goods after the return day.‘
Consequently, the second execution was the only effective one in
the hands of the sheriff at the time of the sale of the goods. The
proceeds were therefore properly applied in satisfaction of it.
* * * [*24g] Judgment afiirmed. "'
The court's power of control over its process as stated is recognized
everywhere (8 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 460), but the powers of a judge at cham-
bers is a more vexed question. Clearly without statute he has no power
in vacation to render judgments or to set them aside. Fisk v. Thor/>,
51 Neb. 1; 4 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 347. But power of control over process of
the court stands on different ground, for often delay till the next term
of court would work irreparable injury. Therefore, though the judge
at chambers probably has no power to quash the execution (Freeman v.
Dawson, no U. S. 264), it seems clear that he may stay it till the ques-
tion can be heard in court. See Freeman on Ex., §32. See also Loelehart
v. McElro_v, 4 Ala. 572; Sanchez v. Carriaga, 3r Cal. I70.
This is a strong case in favor of the sheriff, as to the time within
which he must levy. See Albrecht v. Long, post, p. 336, and notes; also
22 Am. & Eng. Ency. L. (1st Ed.) 542.
As to effect of stay before levy compare Richards v. Morris C. <5‘ B.
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That they did not do this, is their misfortune, i f  not their fault ; 
the cons�quences of which are not to be visited upon the officer, 
who is in no default. The truth is, the inceptive error was com­
mitted by the judge ; first, in acting upon an e:r pa1rte hearing, 
and next, in granting an unconditional order, without respect to 
the rights of the p1aintiffs.. The results of this mistake, in this 
-partiCu1ar- case, ought to warn the associate judges of  the com­
monwea1th, who are not expected to be learned in matters of law, 
against a simi1ar interference with process, without an opportun­
ity first given to the antagonist party to be heard. The English 
mode of procedure in such cases is clearly pointed out in Bagly's 
Practice, at Chambers, cap. I ,  and being well calculated to pro­
tect the rights and interests of all parties, should be followed, here, 
as closely as possible. . 
The inquiry recurs, what was the effect of the j udge's order ? 
Certainly to hang up the execution until after the return day. 
Its functions were thus suspended until, by the lapse of time, its 
vitality was extinguished. Beyond the return day, its operation 
and vigor could only have been preserved by an actual levy ; or 
rather, the effect of the levy being to place the goods in gremio 
legis, they would have so remained for satisfaction of the plain­
tiffs' execution, unless released by their consent or misconduct, 
or by operation of law. But a levy under the first execution be­
ing wanting, it had no hold on the goods after the return day.­
Consequently, the second execution was the only effective one in 
the hands of the sheriff at the time of the sale of the goods. The 
proceeds were therefore proper1y applied in satisfaction of it. 
* * * [ *249] lt1dgment affirmed. -
The court's power of control over its process as stated is recognized 
everywhere (8 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 46o) ,  but the powers of a j udge at cham­
bers is a more vexed question. Clearly without statute he has no power 
in vacation to render j udgments or to set them aside. Fisk v. Thorp, 
51 Neb. I ;  4 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 347. But power of control over process of 
the court stands on different ground, for often delay till the next term 
of court would work irreparable injury. Therefore, though the judge 
at chambers probably has no power to quash the execution ( Freeman v. 
Da·wson, 1 10 U. S. 264 ) ,  it seems clear that he may stay it ti l l  the ques­
tion can be heard in court. See Freeman on Ex., §J2. See also Lockhart 
v. McE!ro�.r. 4 Ala. 572 ; Sa11c!te:: v. Carriaga, 3r Cal. 170. 
This i s  a strong case in favor of the sheri ff, as to the time within 
which he must levy. See Albrec/a t  v. Long, post, p. 336, and notes ; also 
22 Am. & Eng. Ency. L. ( 1 st Ed . )  542. 
As to effect of stay before levy compare Richards v. Morris C. & B.  
Co., post p. 394. 
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The Protection and Powers Given the Officer by the Writ.
HAMNER v. BALLANTYNE, in Utah Sup. Ct., April 9, 1896-13 Utah
324, 44 Pac. 704, 57 Am. St. Rep. 736.
Action by john Hamner against Thomas Ballantyne. Judg-
ment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
ZANE, C. J. This is an appeal by the defendant from a judg-
ment against him, in favor of the plaintiff, for the sum of $268.50
and for costs, and from an order refusing a motion for a new
trial. VVith other facts, the plaintiff alleged, in his complaint,
that he was the owner of $242.85, and that the defendant carried
it away, and unlawfully converted it to his own use, to plaintiff’s
damage in the sum of $242.85, with interest. To this complaint
the defendant filed an answer, in which he justified such taking
and conversion under an execution, which he made a part thereof.
The execution recites a judgment against the defendants. john
Hammer and others, and appears to be fair on its face. The de-
fendant stated further, in his answer, that, in obedience to the
execution, he demanded the amount due thereon, and that plain-
tiff paid to him the $242.85 in satisfaction thereof, and that he
returned said sum, with the execution and his return thereon, to
the clerk’s ofiice. The execution and return thereon established
the above facts, with the additional one that the $242.85, less the
costs, were paid to Hamner’s attorney.
On the trial of the cause the defendant offered the execution
[*329] with the return thereon in evidence, and the court having
sustained the plaintiff’s objection to its admission, defendant ex-
cepted, and assigns such refusal as error. This assignment of
error raises the question, was the execution admissible in evi-
dence, without the judgment upon which it issued? The writ
required the officer to demand of the defendants the sum men-
tioned in it, and, upon refusal to pay, to levy upon and sell enough
of their unexempted personal property to satisfy the same. and,
if enough could not be found, to levy upon and sell enough un-
exempted real property. In demanding and receiving the money
due on the execution, and crediting the same, the officer obeyed
the commands of the writ, and he was protected by the writ in so
doing. An officer with an execution in his hands is not author-
ized to demand payment fr.om a person not a party to it, or to levy
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The Protection and Powers Given the Officer by the Writ. 
HAMNER v. BALLANTYNE, in Utah Sup. Ct., April 9, 18¢--13 Utah 
324. 44 Pac. 704. 57 Am. St. Rep. 736. 
Action by John Hamner against Thomas Ballantyne. Judg­
ment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. 
ZANE, C. J. This is an appeal by the defendant from a judg­
ment against him, in favor of the plaintiff, for the sum of $268.50 
and for costs, and from an order refusing a motion for a new 
trial. With other facts, the plaintiff alleged, in his complaint, 
that he was the owner of $242.85, and that the defendant carried 
it away, and unlawfully converted it to his own use, to plaintiff's 
damage in the sum of $242.85, with interest. To this complaint 
the defendant filed an answer, in which he justified such taking 
and conversion under an execution, which he made a part thereof. 
The execution recites a judgment against the defendants, John 
Hamner and others, and appears to be fair on its face. The de­
fendant stated further, in his answer, that, in obedience to the 
execution, he demanded the amount due thereon, and that plain­
tiff paid to him the $242.85 in satisfaction thereof, and that he 
returned said sum, with the execution and his return thereon, to 
the clerk's office. The execution and return thereon established 
the above facts, with the additional one that the $242.85, less the 
costs, were paid to Hamner' s attorney. 
On the trial of the cause the defendant offered the execution 
[*329] with the return thereon in evidence, and the court having 
sustained the plaintiff's objection to its admission, defendant ex­
cepted , and assigns such refusal as error. This assignment of 
error raises the question, was the execution admissible in evi­
dence, without the judgment upon which it issued ? The writ 
required the officer to demand of the defendants the sum men­
tioned in it, and, upon refusal to pay, to levy upon and sell enough 
of their unexernpted personal property to satisfy the same, and, 
if  enough could not be found, to levy upon and sell enough un­
exempted real property. In demanding and receiving the money 
due on the execution, and crediting the same, the officer obeyed 
the commands of the writ, and he was protected by the writ in so 
J doing. An officer with an execution in his hands is not author­ized to demand payment fr.om a person not a party to it, or to levy on the property of any other person. If he levies on property 
-
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in the possession of a person, not a party who claims a right to
it, he must produce the judgment with the execution under a
plea of justification; because possession is prime faeie evidence
of ownership. The ofiicer is apprised, by the possession and the
claim, that the person making it has the prima facie right accord-
ing to his claim. However, we do not wish to be understood as
holding that an ofiicer would be justified in executing a writ
against a person named in it as a defendant who was not a party
' to the judgment upon which it issued, or in executing a writ is-
sued on a void judgment, after learning that such person was not
a party to the judgment or that it was void or that there was no
judgment. \Vith such knowledge, we are of the opinion that
the officer should not execute the writ. Grace v. Mitchell, 31
Wis. 533, II Am. Rep. 613; Spraguc v. Birchard, 1 Wis. 457.
60 Am. Dec. 393; McDonald v. Wilkie, 13 Ill. 22, 54 Am. Dec.
423; Leachman v. Daugherty, 8I Ill. 325. There is a conflict in
the authorities, however, as to this [*330] rule, but we think it
sustained by authority and better reasoning. Freem. Ex’ns. (2d
Ed.) § I02. But we cannot apply this rule to this case, because
knowledge that the plaintiff was not a party to the judgment
upon which the execution issued is not sufficiently shown by the
evidence in the record. Notice of an ' ' '
obtaining the judgmen 1 '
wron u, or ma e him iable for its executio In that case,
the judgmenE1V'ould be effectual until set aside, and such action
must be left to the party whose rights are invaded.
The plaintiff claims that the issue tried in the court below
between defendant and himself was simply a right to property:
that the officer was not proceeded against as a tort feasor. \/Vhen
the proceeding is one in rem, as in the case of an action of re-
plevin, the better rule is that the ofiicer, in justifying, must show
a valid judgment as the foundation of the action, although the
writ may be fair on its face, and he has no information that it
has been issued on a judgment void for want of jurisdiction of
the subject-matter or of the person, or without any judgment upon
which to base it. If an officer in good faith, executes a writ, fair
on its face, the writ protects him, though there was no judgment
upon which to base it. Such a writ can only be used as a weapon
of defense, and for protection,—not for the purpose of attack
















































































































































- EXECUTI :SG THE WRITS 37 1 
in the possession of a person , not a party who claims a right to 
it, he must produce the judgment with the execution under a 
plea of justification ; because possession is prima fade evidence 
of ownership. The officer is apprised, by the possession and the 
claim, that the person making it has the prima facie right accord­
ing to his claim. However, we do not wish to be understood as 
holding that an officer would he justified in executing a writ 
against a person named in it as a defendant who was not a party 
to the j udgment upon which it issued, or in executing a writ is­
sued on a void j udgment, after learning that such person was not 
a party to the judgment or that i t  was void or that there was no 
j udgment. vVith such knowledge, we are of the opinion that 
the officer should not execute the writ. Grace v. ltfitchell, 3 r  
\Vis. 533, 1 1  Am. Rep. 6 1 3 ; Sprague v. Birchard, r Wis. 457. 
6o Am. Dec. 393 ; McDonald v. Wilkie, 13 Ill . 22, 54 Am. Dec. 
423 ; Leachman v. Dougherty, 8 r  Ill. 325. There is a conflict in 
the authorities, however, as to this [ *330] rule, but we think it 
sustained by authority and better reasoning. Freem. Ex'ns. ( 2d 
Ed. ) § 102. But we cannot apply this rule to this case, because 
knowledge that the plaintiff was not a party to the j udgment 
upon which the execution issued is not sufficiently shown by the 
evidence in the record. Notice of an irre ularit 
· 
obtaining the j ud gme�n!,l....JJ,,1;..JJ�UJ!i:��li:.!!J�J.,....JLl.:ila.Lo�.HM..-w.u.l-L' 
renders 1t v01 a e, but 
r� usmg o execu e e writ o 
e him 1 le for its executio case, 
the judgmen ou e effectua unt1 set aside, and such action 
must be left to the party whose rights are invaded. 
The plaintiff claims that the issue tried in the court below 
between defendant and himself was simply a right to property : 
that the officer was not proceeded against as a tort feasor. vVhen 
the proceeding is one fo rem, as in the case of an action of re­
plevin, the better rule is that the officer, in j ustifying, must show 
a val id j udgment as the foundation of the action, although the 
writ may be fair on its face, and he has no information that i t  
has been issued on a j udgment void for want of jurisdiction of  
the subj ect-matter or  of the person, or  without any judgment upon 
which to base it. If an officer in good faith, executes a wr!t, fair 
on its face, the writ  protects him, though there was no judgment 
upon which to base it. Such a writ can only be used as a weapon 
of defense, and for protection ,-not for the purpose of attack 
for offensive purposes. An officer,  who in good faith seizes or 
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sells property under an execution, may justify, in a suit for dam-
ages against him in consequence of such seizure or sale, without
producing the judgment; and he will be regarded as having acted
in good faith, when the writ was fair on its face, and he was not
advised that there was no judgment, or [*331] that, if there was,
it was void. And it will make no difference whether the suit is
for damages on an implied contract or upon a tort. A ministerial
officer cannot be held personally liable in any proceeding, civil
or criminal, for any act done by him in executing a writ fair on '
its face, unless he knows, or should have known, as a reasonable
man, that the judgment upon which it purported to have been
issued was void, or that there was no judgment. In the trial of
the title or right to property in the ofiicer's hands under the writ,
he must, however, produce the judgment, though the writ is
fair upon its face, and he has no knowledge that the judgment
is void, or that there is none. Such a proceeding is against the
property, or to recover it, and not to subject the oflicer to respon-
sibility for his acts in obedience to the mandate of the court.
Beach v. Botsford, I Doug. (Mich.) 199, 40 Am. Dec. 45; Gid-
day v. Withers-poon, 35 Mich. 368; Cobbey, Repl. §§ 806, 807;
Cooley, Torts (2d Ed.) 542; Leroy v. East Saginww City Ry. Co.,
18 Mich. 233, I00 Am. Dec. 162; Adams v. Hubbard, 30 Mich.
104. *
The plaintiff alleged, in his complaint, that the defendant
took $242.85 of his money and unlawfully converted it to his own
use. The plaintiff was a party defendant to the execution under
which the ofiicer, who is the defendant in this case, took the mon-
ey: and the writ purported to be on a judgment against the plain-
tiff in this case, and was fair'on its face; and the evidence does
not show that the defendant knew that the judgment was void
or that no judgment had been rendered against the plaintiff ; and
this case was not instituted to recover the specific money taken
by the ofiicer. It was brought to recover damages for the unlaw-
ful conversion of the ‘money by the officer to his own use. If the
plaintiff had waived the tort alleged. and sued for money had
and received by the officer to plaintiff’s use, [*33a] it would not
have been an action to try the title or right to the money merely.
The effect of a judgment against the officer in that case would
have made him personally responsible for acts performed, in good
faith, on an execution against a defendant to it; but, as we have
seen, the execution protected the ofiicer for such acts, under such
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sells property under an execution, may justify, in a suit for dam­
ages against him in consequence of such seizure or sale, without 
1 producing the judgment ; and he will be regarded as having acted 
in good faith, when the writ was fair on its face, and he was not 
advised that there was no j udgment, or [ *33 1 ]  that, if there was, 
it was void. And it will make no difference whether the suit is 
for damages on an implied contract or upon a tort. A ministerial 
officer cannot be held personally liable in any proceeding, civil 
or criminal, for any act done by him in executing a writ fair on · 
its face, unless he knows, or should have known, as a reasonable 
man, that the j udgment upon which it purported to have been 
i ssued was void, or that there was no judgment. In the trial of 
tl)e title or right to property in the officer's hands under the writ, 
he
. 
IJrnst, however, produce the judgment, though the writ is 
fair upon its face, and he has no knowledge that the j udgment 
is void, or that there is none. Such a proceeding is against the 
property, or to recover it, and not to subject" the officer to respon­
sibility for his acts in obedience to the mandate of the court. 
Beach v. Botsford, I Doug. ( Mich . )  19cJ, 40 Am. Dec. 45 ; Gid­
day v. Witherspoon, 35 Mich. 368 ; Cobbey, Repl. §§ 8o6, 8o7 ; 
Cooley, Torts ( 2d Ed. )  542 ; Leroy v. East Saginaw City Ry. Co., 
18 Mich. 233, 100 Am. Dec. 162 ; Adams v. Hubbard, 30 Mich. 
104. 
The plaintiff alleged, in his complaint, that the defendant 
took $242.85 of his money and unlawfully converted it to his own 
use. The plaintiff was a party defendant to the execution under 
which the officer, who is the defendant in this case, took the mon· 
ey ; and the writ purported to be on a judgment against the plain· 
tiff in this case, and was fair · on its face ; and the evidence does 
not show that the defendant knew that the j udgment was void 
or that no j udgment had been rendered against the plaintiff ; and 
this  case was not instituted to recover the specific money taken 
by the officer. It was brought to recover damages for the unlaw­
ful conversion of the ·money by the officer to his own use. If the 
plaintiff had waived the tort alleged, and sued for money had 
and received by the officer to plaintiff's use, [*332 ] it would not 
have been an act ion to try the title or right to the money merely. 
The effect of a judgment against the officer in that case would 
have made him personally responsible for acts performed, in good 
faith, on an execution against a defendant to it ; but, as we have 
seen, the execution protected the officer for such acts, under such 
circumstances .  \Vhile the former dist inctions between civil ac-
.. 
aa ,
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t
ions in this state have been abolished, they will be regarded still
as founded upon contract or tort from the facts alleged in the
complaint. Actions in this state are classified with respect to
the facts alleged. From the facts alleged, this action must be
regarded as in trover. Vt/’hile in some cases the person whose
property has been unlawfully converted into money or money‘s
worth may waive the tort, and base his action on an implied con-
tract for money had and received, the plaintiff based this one on
the wrongful conversion of his money by the defendant. The
action is not for the identical money which he alleges was con-
verted, but he claims damages for the wrongful conversion of his
money. The execution, being fair on its face, justified the con-
version as the return shows it was made. The action could not
be regarded as one to try the right to the money taken that had
been paid to defendant’s attorney before the suit was brought.
It was for damages resulting to plaintiff, as claimed, from the
wrongful and unlawful conversion of his own money by the de-
fendant.
In sustaining plaintiffs objection to the execution offered in
evidence by the defendant, we are disposed to think that the court
below erred. The judgment and order appealed from are re-
versed, and the court below is directed to grant a new trial.
BARTCH, J., concurred. [*333l
MINER, J. I concur, except that I am of the opinion that,‘
in a case of trover, where the execution is fair and regular on its‘
face, and issued by a court having jurisdiction, the ofiicer would
be protected by it, and cannot be held liable for its execution in
a proper manner, even if he knew of irregularities or defects in
the proceedings attending the issuing of the execution. See
Marks v. Sullivan, 9 Utah 12, 33 Pac. 224, and cases referred to.
See also Matthcnu v. Densmore, 109 U.S., 216, 3 Sup. Ct. 126.
VVHITE v. VVHITESHIRE, in King’s Bench, Mich. Term, 17 Jae. I,
A. D. 162o—Palmer 52.
Trespass quare claimmz fregit, breaking in the doors, en-
tering the house, ejecting, &c. Defendant pleaded not guilty
and justified the breaking that he was sheriff of the county at
Southwick, and that a fi. fa. was directed to him to make execu-
tion of the goods of the plaintiff, and he made warrant to five
of his bailiffs to make execution, and they found the house open
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,tions in this state have been abolished, they will be regarded still 
as founded upon contract or tort from the facts alleged in the 
complaint. Actions in this state are classified with respect to 
the facts alleged. From the facts alleged, this action must be 
regarded as in trover. While in some cases the person whose 
property has been unlawfully converted into money or money's 
worth may waive the tort, and base his action on an implied con-
tract for money had and received, the plaintiff based this one on 
the wrongful conversion of his money by the defendant. The 
action is not for the identical money which he alleges was con-
verted, but he claims damages for the wrongful conversion of his 
money. The execution, being fair on its face, justified the con-
version as the return shows it was made. The action could not 
be regarded as one to try the right to the money taken that had 
been paid to defendant's attorney before the suit was brought. 
It was for damages resulting to plaintiff, as claimed, from the 
wrongful and unlawful conversion of his own money by the de-
fendant. 
In sustaining plaintiff's objection to the execution offered in 
evidence by the defendant, we are disposed to think that the court 
below erred. The judgment and order appealed from are re­
versed, and the court below is directed to grant a new trial . 
BARTCH, J., concurred. [*333 1 
MINER, J. I concur, except that I am of the opinion that , '  
in a case of trover, where the execution is fair and regular on its' 
face, and issued by a court having jurisdiction, the officer would 
be protected by it, and cannot be held liable for its execution in 
a proper manner, even if he knew of irregularities or defects in 
the proceedings attending the issuing of tfie execution. See 
Marks v. Su/Uvan, 9 Utah 1 2, 33 Pac. 224, and cases referred to. 
See also Matthr&s v. Densmore, 109 U.S., 2 16, 3 Sup. Ct. 1 26. 
WHITE v. WHITESHIRE, in King's Bench, Mich. Term, 17  Jae. I. 
A. D. 162o-Palmer 52. 
Trespass quare clau.sum fregit, breaking in the doors, en­
tering the house, ej ecting, &c. Defendant pleaded not gu ilt} 
and justified the breaking that he was sheriff of the county at 
Southwick, and that a fi. fa. was directed to him to make execu­
tion of the goods of the plaintiff, and he made warrant to five 
of his bail iffs to make execution, and they found the house open 
and entered , and the plaintiff closed his house on them and i111-
• 
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prisoned them for 24 hours, and the defendant to deliver them
broke the house; and so peaceably being in the house, for execu-
tion of said writ, he broke the inner doors of the house, finding
the first door open. On this the plaintiff demurred; and three
objections were made to the justification: I, that the authority
to the bailiffs was to the five jointly, and only two made the exe-
cution; 2, according to Semaine’s C we [5 Coke 91] on an execu-
tion of the subject a man may not break into the house of a
party to make execution, because it is his castle and asylum, and
admitting that he might break the first door, yet being in the
house he may not break the interior of the house; 3, admitting
that he might break the house, yet he should aver that there were
goods in the rooms which he broke into.
On the first objection the counsel for the defendant said
that it was often adjudged and they named Abbin-gton’s Case in
the queen’s bench, that bailiffs on such a warrant may make exe-
cution; 5, 2, 3, or I, because it is the administration of justice
and it is for the public good that execution should be made.
Vid. Plowd. Corn. 292; 4 Coke 46. DODDERIDGE, [J.], said
that mere strangers to the warrant may aid the bailiffs in this
case, and the whole court were against the plaintiff on this point.
To the second point the counsel of the plaintiff replied
and made a distinction as to an execution lawfully com-
menced, on which the sheriff may well break into the house, and
otherwise as to one not lawfully commenced, as in Sem-a-ine’s
Case, 5 Coke 91, II Coke 82; and here it was lawfully com-
menced, for the door was open, and they entered lawfull_y into
the house, as is agreed in Semaine’s Case. So that the plaintiff
may not prevent the execution now, as he might if he had closed
the door before the entry of the sheriff. On this the case of
Sir Wm. Fish was cited, where this diversity was taken and
agreed to as law; and the case was that the sheriff delivered
to him through the window a co. sa. to arrest said Fish, and
seized him, and said Fish escaped from him, and the sheriff
broke the door of the house immediately and retook him: and it
was adjudged lawful, because there was a lawful commence-
ment of the execution before; and so here he persued an execu-
tion commenced. And the WHOLE COURT agreed to this diversity.
l\/I0NTAGUE, ]. It is said that the house is a castle for him
who lives in it, for his repose and safety, and that it is a privilege
of the subject when it is closed; yet when the entry is lawful in
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prisoned them for 24 hours, and the defendant to deliver them 
broke the house ; and so peaceably being in the house, for execu­
t ion of said writ, he broke the inner doors of the house, finding 
the first door open. On this the plaintiff demurred ; and three 
obj ections were made to the justification : 1 ,  that the authority 
to the bailiffs was to the five j ointly, and only two made the exe­
cution ; 2, according to Semarine's Case [5 Coke 9 1 ]  on an execu­
tion of the subject a man may not break into the house of a 
party to make execution, because it is his castle and asylum, and 
admitting that he might break the first door, yet being in the 
house he may not break the interior of the house ; 3, admitting 
that he might break the house, yet he should aver that there were 
goods in the rooms which he broke into. 
On the first obj ection the counsel for the defendant said 
that it was often adjudged and they named Abbi1igton,'s Case in 
the queen's bench, that bailiffs on such a warrant may make exe­
cution ; 5, 2, 3, or I ,  because it is the administration of j ustice 
and it is for the public good that execution should be made. 
Vid. Plowd. Com. 292 ; 4 Coke 46. DoDDERIDGE, [J. ] ,  said 
that mere strangers to the warra!lt may aid the bailiffs in this 
case, and the whole court were against the plaintiff on this point. 
To the second point the counsel of the plaintiff replied 
and made a distinction as to an execution lawfully com­
menced, on which the sheriff may well break into the house, and 
otherwise as to one not lawfully commenced, as in Semaine's 
Case, 5 Coke 9 1 ,  1 I Coke 82 ; and here it was lawfully com­
menced, for the door was open, and they entered lawfully into 
the house, as is agreed in Semai.ne's Case. So that the plaintiff 
may not prevent the execution now, as he might if he had closed 
the door before the entry of the sheriff. On this the case of 
Sir Wm. Fish was cited , where this diversity was taken and 
agreed to as law ; and the case was that the sheriff delivered 
to him through the window a ca. sa. to arrest said Fish, and 
seized him, and said Fish escaped from him, and the sheriff 
broke the door of the house immediately and retook him : and it 
was adjudged lawful ,  because there was a lawful commence­
ment of the execution before ; and so here he persued an execu­
tion commenced. And the WHOLE CouRT agreed to this diversity. 
MoNTACUE, J . It is said that the house is a castle for him 
who lives in it , for his repose and safety, and that it is a privilege 
of the subject when it is closed ; yet when the entry is lawful in 
the case of a minister of justice, and the occupant abuses his 
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privilege, makes resistance, and raises his hand against the offa-
cer of the king and the law, he destroys his privilege and has
made resistance to the law, which will not protect him in such
case: and this is the reason that whoever kills an officer of the
law in the doing of his duty shall be a murderer.
DODDERIDGE, I. When a man has commenced lawful execu-
tion he that resists him resists the act of the law; and as is held
in Man.rel’s Case, Com. ~13, the possessions and land of each is
charged with the execution of the law. And as to this which was
said, that sheriff may not deliver the bailiffs of his own authority,
but should sue out a homine reialegiando, he said that it is against
all reason that the officer of the law should be put to such in-
convenience in the execution of his office.
IIAUGHTON, J. If one is arrested by the sheriff and he es-
cape to his own house, the sheriff may break in the doors of the
house, pursue him, arrest, and resume his former custody, and
the party may not have any benefit of his tort. And as to this
that a master might not justify a battery of one to save his ser-
vant, he said that is not a like case; for the sheriff is an officer
of the court, and should be punished for his misdemeanor in mak-
ing execution.
As to the third point, counsel replied as to breaking the in-
ner doors, that it was not necessary to allege that goods were
there, for he could not know this before entry, and it should be
presumed that a man has sufficient goods in his house. To this
Donnenrnos and fhuonron, ]_I., agreed, and they said that if
the sheriff was in one room he might break into another on re-
fusal of admittance. Judgment against the plaintiff. And
HAUGHTON, J., moved that the court, e.r ofiicio, may send pro-
cess de bene gerendo and attachment on the plaintiff for this
abuse of the officer of the law.
BURTON v. VVILKINSON, in Vt. Sup. Ct. Franklin Co., Jan. Term,
1846-18 Vt. 186, 46 Am. Dec. 145.
Trespass quore cla-usum fregit by Albert S. and Oscar A.
Burton against Curtis VVilkinson and L. H. Nutting, alleging
that defendants, on Oct. 17th, 1842, broke open plaintiff’s ware-
house and took butter belonging to the plaintiffs. Defendants
pleaded in justification, that \Vilkinson, as a specially authorized
















































































































































EXECUTING THE WRITS 375 
privi lege, makes resistance, and raises his hand against the offi­
cer o f  the king and the law, he destroys his privilege and has 
made resistance to the law, which will not protect him in such 
case : and this is the reason that whoever k ills an officer of the 
law in the doing of his duty shall be a murderer. 
DoooE.RIDGE, J.  \Vhen a man has commenced lawful execu­
tion he that resists him resists the act of the law ; and as is held 
in Manxel's Case, Com. i J ,  the possessions and land of each is 
charged with the execution of the law. And as to this which was 
said, that sheriff may not deliver the bailiffs of his own authority, 
but should sue out a homine replegiando, he said that it is against 
all reason that the officer of the law should be put to such in­
convenience in the execution of his office. 
HAUGHTON, J. If one is arrested by the sheriff and he es­
cape to his own house, the sheriff may break in the doors of the 
house, pursue him, arrest, and resume his former custody, and 
the party may not have any benefit of his tort. And as to this 
that a master might not justi fy a battery of one to save his ser­
vant, he said that is not a l ike case ; for the sheriff is an officer 
of the court, and should be punished for his misdemeanor in mak­
ing execution. 
As to the third point, counsel replied as to breaking the in­
ner doors, that it was not necessary to allege that goods were 
there, for he could not know this before entry, and it should be 
presumed that a man has sufficient goods in his house. To this 
DODDERIDGE and HAUGHTON, JJ. ,  agreed, and they said that if  
the sheriff was in one room he might break into another on re­
fusal of admittance. Judgment against the plaintiff. And 
HAUGHTON, J., moved that the court, ex oflfrio, may send pro­
cess de bene gere11do and attachment on the plaintiff for this 
abuse of the officer of the law. 
BURTON v .  WILKINSON, in Vt. Sup. Ct. Franklin Co., Jan. Term, 
1846-18 Vt. 186, 46 Am. Dec. 145. 
Trespass qttare cla.i-isu m fregit by Albert S. and Oscar A. 
Burton against Curtis \Vilkinson and L. H.  Nutting, alleging 
that defendants, on Oct. 1 7th , 1842, broke open plaintiff's ware­
house and took butter belonging to the plaintiffs. Defendants 
pleaded in justification, that Wilkinson, as a specially authorized 
officer, and Nutting, his servant, took the butter on an attach-
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ment against one Cutter, having demanded the keys before break-
ing the door open. Then plaintiffs rejoined that the butter be-
longed, not to Cutter, but to one Houghton, for whom plaintiffs
held.. Defendants rebutted that Houghton had sued them for
the taking, and judgment had been rendered against him. To
this plaintiffs demurred. The court overruled the demurrer and
plaintiffs excepted.
\VlLLI./\MS. C. J. But two questions have presented them-
selves to the consideration of the court in this case. 1. As to
the power of a person, specially deputized to serve a writ, in re-
lation to the breaking of doors. 2. As to the claim set up by
the plaintiffs under the title of Houghton.
A person deputed to serve a writ, as was the defendant W'il-
kinson, has all the powers which may be exercised by a sheriff
in serving or executing any process, except that he is not to be
recognized or obeyed as a sheriff, or known officer, but must
show his authority, and make known his business, if required by
the party who is to obey the same. In this particular he repre-
sents a special bailiff, rather than a known officer. To make an
attailinient, or to levy an execution on goodsI the sl1§rifLQQ»l_1I1Qt
teak open the outer door __Q£.l'.lZL¢_ debtor's dwelling house. It is
ot erw1se,if_ thgLgQ$_o_f a stranger areVsecre\t<;\(lin th§‘dw'elling
V
hguie. A barn, or outhouse, adjoining to and parcelggf the house.
or within the curtila e ma be broken 0 n to make such levy;
'sar;?zr:atTnr.~srtf‘r;‘t—b“%1e'tOr a mittanc_e.’ Amm
field may be opened without request. Penton v. Brown, 1 Keble,
6$;'7¥;1fg;,;én_v v. Wilber, 16 Johns. 287. There is nothing to
prevent a sheriff from serving an execution in the night, as well
as in the day time. VVilkinson [*rgo] was therefore justified in
breaking into the warehouse in question, to serve an attachment
on the goods of any person therein ;--but he must first demand
admittance.
In this case it is stated, that he did demand admittance of
the persons who had the key, but it is objected, that the plea does
not state but that the persons who had the key, were wrongfully
in possession. VVe think this was not necessary. If he demanded
admittance of those who had the custody and care of the key,
and who could have let him in without compelling him to resort
to force, it was all that was necessary; and he was not bound
to inquire how, or in what way, they became possessed of the
same. A demand of the plaintiffs for admittance could have
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ment against one Cutter, having demanded the keys before break­
ing the door open. Then plaintiffs rejoined that the butter be­
longed, not to Cutter, but to one Houghton, for whom plaintiffs 
held. . Defendants rebutted that Houghton had sued them for 
the taking, and j udgment had been rendered against him. To 
this plaintiffs demurred. The court overruled the demurrer and 
plaintiffs excepted. 
W1L1.IAMS. C. J. But two questions have presented them­
selves to the consideration of the court in this case. I .  As to 
the power of a person, specially deputized to serve k writ, in re­
lation to the breaking of  doors. 2. As to the claim set up by 
the plaintiffs under the title of Houghton. 
A person deputed to serve a writ, as was the defendant Wil­
kinson, has all the powers which may be exercised by a sheriff 
in serving or executing any process, except that he is not to be 
recognized or obeyed as a sheriff, or known officer, but must 
show his authority, and make known his business, if required by 
the party who is to obey the same. In this particular he repre­
sents a special bailiff, rather than a known officer. To make an -
att�chment, or to levy an execution on goods, the sheritf�annot 
preak open the C?Uter door_9.Lthe. _.debtor's dwelling house. It is 
.P'fTierWTseJ.f tbe goods oJ a stranger are seer��� �w
-elling_ 
�e. A,... barn, 9r outhouse, adjoining to a!)_g_ parcc!_ of the house, 01: within the curtilaget may be b�oken open to m*� such levy ; - - -
£ut a re@est must fir:t be made for admitta�e. A b  
field may be opened without request. Penton v. Brown, I Keble, 6<}!;;Raggerty v. Wilber, 16 Johns. 287. There is nothing to 
prevent a sheriff from serving an execution in the night, as well 
as in the day time. \Vilkinson [ * 1 90] was therefore justified in 
breaking into the warehouse in question , to serve an attachment 
on the goods of any person therein ;-but he must first demand 
admittance. 
In th is case it is stated, that he did demand admittance of 
the persons who had the key, but it is obj ected, that the plea does 
not state but that the persons who had the key, were wrongfully 
in possession. We think this was not necessary. If he demanded 
admittance o f  those who had the custody and care of the key, 
and who cou ld have let him in witho�1t compel ling h im to resort 
to force, it was all that was necessary ; and he was not bmmd 
to inquire how, or in what way, they hecame possessed of the 
same. A demand of the plaintiffs for admittance could have 
been of no use, as they could not have unlocked the door, while 
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Bogue and \Vall<er had the key. If there had been any collusion
between the defendants and Bogue and VValker, which would
have made the defendants liable, it should have appeared in the
replication. A sheriff would have been justified in breaking open
the warehouse of the plaintiffs to do execution on the goods of
Cutter, having first demanded admittance of the person who had
the key.* * *
The judgment of the county court is therefore affirmcd.
Officer's Right to Special Indemnity and Fees.
SMITH v. OSGOOD, in N. Ham. Sup. Jud. Ct., Merrimack, Dec. Term,
- I865—46 N. Ham. 178.
Trustee process by Smith against J. T. Osgood, principal
debtor, and N. G. Ordway as his trustee. Abel Proctor & Son
intervene as claimants. Case reserved for determination by the
whole court.
Ordway seized some hemlock bark on several attachments
against said Osgood, two in favor of Proctor & Son being the
latest. Then Page claimed the bark, and Ordway demanded in-
demnity from the attaching creditors, but P. 8: Son were the only
ones who gave it. Page then sued Ordway in trover for the value
of the bark, which suit P. & Son successfully defended, without
the aid of any of the other attaching creditors, all of whom knew
of it. All of the attachment suits were prosecuted to judgment,
executions thereon duly issued and delivered to Ordway, who
then sold the bark thereon for $403, which he had in his hands
when this action was brought to charge him as trustee of Os-
good therefor.
SARGENT, J. \/Vhere an officer is requested to attach prop-
erty on a writ, if the title is doubtful he may demand an indem-
nity of the creditor before attaching it, and if such indenmity is
not given he is under no obligation to attach it. Perkins v. Pit-
man, 34 N. H. 26I ;'Bond v. ‘Ward, 7 Mass. 123. So where the
officer is directed to arrest the body of a debtor, if he has doubts
about the propriety of the arrest, he may demand a like indem-
nity, and unless he receive it he is not obliged to make the arrest.
Marsh v. Gold, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 284, 290.
The question here arises, whether, after the officer has at-
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Bogue and Walker had the key. I f  there had been any collusion 
between the defendants and Bogue and Walker, which would 
have made the defendants liable, it should have appeared in the 
replication. A sheriff would have been j ustified in breaking open 
the warehouse of the plaintiffs to do execution on the goods of 
Cutter, having first demanded admittance of the person who had 
the key.* * * 
The judgment of the county court is therefore affirmed. 
Officer's Right to Special Indemnity and Fees. 
SMITH v. OSGOOD, in N. Ham. Sup. Jud. Ct., Merrimack, Dec. Term, 
· 1865-46 N. Ham. 178. 
Trustee process by Smith against J. T. Osgood, principal 
debtor, and N.  G. Ordway as his trustee. Abel Proctor & Son 
intervene as claimants. Case reserved for determination by the 
whole court . 
Ordway seized some hemlock bark on several attachments 
against said Osgood, two in favor of Proctor & Son being the 
latest. Then Page claimed the bark, and Ordway demanded in­
demnity from the attaching creditors, but P. & Son were the only 
ones who gave it . Page then sued Ordway in trovcr for the value 
of the bark, which suit P. & Son successfully defended, without 
the aid of any of the other attaching creditors, all of whom knew 
of it. All of the attachment suits were prosecuted to judgment, 
executions thereon duly issued and del ivered to Ordway, who 
then sold the bark thereon for $403, which he had in his hands 
when this action was brought to charge him as trustee of Os­
good therefor. 
SARGEN T, J. Where an officer is requested to attach prop- f 
erty on a writ, i f  the title is doubtful he may demand an indem­
nity of the creditor before attaching it, and if such indemnity is 
not given he is under no obligation to attach it. Perkins v. Pit­
man, 34 N. H. 261 ; · Bond v. ·Ward, 7 Jvlass. 1 23. So where the 
officer is  directed to arrest the body of a debtor, if he has doubts 
about the propriety of the arrest, he may demand a like indem­
nitv, and unless he receive it he is not obliged to make the arrest. 
M �rsh v. Gold, 19 Mass. ( 2 Pick . )  284, 290. 
The question here arises, whether, after the officer has at­
tached property on mesne pro�ess without any controversy about 
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the title at the time, and he is afterwards proceeding to sell the
same upon the writ, or upon the execution after judgment, and
third persons then step in and claim the property and forbid the
officer to sell the same, it is the duty of the officer to sell the
property at his peril, or whether he may then demand of the
creditor an indemnity, and refuse to sell unless such indemnity
is given.
In this case it seems that all the executions were placed in
the officer’s hands within thirty days from the rendition of judg-
ment. and if no indemnity had been claimed the property attached
should have been applied in the order of the attachments. If
the controversy as to the title had arisen in this case at the time
of the attachment, and an indemnity had been demanded, there
is no doubt that for the benefit of such creditors as gave the re-
quired indemnity, the ofiicer must proceed and make the attach-
ments in their order, and might decline to do anything for the
others who did not give the indemnity, and we think the same
rule should be applied in this case. We assume in this case,
though the case is not quite explicit on that point, that the officer
not only notified all the creditors, but that he made them under-
stand fully the situation of the case, and demanded of them in
terms the indemnity, and that they decided deliberately not to
furnisl1 the indemnity and risk the consequences. The officer
should do this business so that there should be no room for mis-
understanding or collusion. Page made his claim on the bark
and insisted upon it, and brought his suit against the ofiicer.
These claimants gave the indemnity which the officer demanded.
The other creditors did not. It would hardly be equitable now
that the other creditors, who have stood by and neither given any
indemnity nor’ assisted in the defense of the suit against the offi-
cer, should receive the whole benefit of the claimants’ industry
and money in defending that suit, and of their indemnifying bond,
while the claimants themselves get nothing for their trouble and
expense, nor any part of their claim, [*r8o] while those who in-
curred no liability and who did nothing, get the whole.
We think, in this case, if no one had indemnified, the officer
might properly have refused to sell, and all the creditors would
have been estopped to sue the ofiicer, so far at least as the prop-
erty claimed by Page was concerned, and that, as it was, he was
only obliged to sell such property on the claimants’ execution.
No question is here raised concerning the application of any sur-
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the title at the time, and he is afterwards proceeding to sell the 
same upon the writ, or upon the execution after j udgment, and 
third persons then step in and claim the property and forbid the 
officer to sell the same, it is the duty of the officer to sell the 
property at his peril, or whether he may then demand of the 
creditor an indemnity, and refuse to sell unless such indemnity 
is given. 
In this case it seems that all the executions were placed in 
the officer's hands within thi rty days from the rendition of j udg­
ment and if no indemnity had been claimed the property attached 
should have been applied in the order of the attachments. I f  
the controversy as  to the title had arisen in  this case at the time 
of the attachment, and an indemnity had been demanded, there 
is no doubt that for the benefit of such creditors as gave the re­
quired indemnity, the officer must proceed and make the attach­
ments in their order, and might decline to do anything for the 
others who did not give the indemnity, and we think the same 
rule should be applied in this case. \Ve assume in this case, 
though the case is not quite explicit on that point, that the officer 
not only notified all the creditors, but that he made them under­
stand fully the situation of the case, and demanded of them in 
terms the indemnity, and that they decided deliberately not to 
furnish the indemnity and risk the consequences. The officer 
should do this business so that there should be no room for mis­
understanding or collusion. Page made his claim on the bark 
and insisted upon it, and brought his suit against the officer . 
• These claimants gave the indemnity which the officer demanded. 
The other creditors did not. It would hardly be equitable now 
that the other creditors, who have stood by and neither given any 
indemnity nor' assisted in the defense of the suit against the offi­
cer, should receive the whole benefit of the claimants' industry 
and money in defending that suit, and of their indemni fying bond, 
while the claimants themselves get nothing for their trouble and 
expense, nor any part of their claim, [* 180]  while those who in­
curred no liability and who did nothing, get the whole. 
vVe think ,  in this case , if no one had indemnified , the officer 
might properly have refused to sell ,  and all the creditors would 
have been estopped to sue the officer, so far at least as the prop­
erty claimed by Page was c6ncerned, and that, as it was, he was 
only oblig-cd to sell such property on the claimants' execution. 
No question is here raised concerning the appl ication of any sur­
plus after paying claiman ts' debt , for the case finds that the avails 
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of the whole bark are not sufficient to pay the first execution of
these claimants. I
But the plaintiff claims that, because the ofiicer did not make
the application upon the execution at the time, he cannot now do
so, but that the money belongs to Osgood, the principal defend-
ant, and can be held in this suit in the hands of the oflicer as
trustee. But we cannot so regard it. If the property in this case
had been delivered to al receipter, who had refused to deliver it
on demand, and, after execution was recovered, the officer had
brought suit on the receipt, and had after a long time recovered,
and suppose he had kept his execution till the termination of the
suit, though long after the return day of the execution, could he
not be allowed to apply the property on the execution? It might
have been the more proper course for the officer in each case to
return his execution on the return day, making return of what--
ever he had done up to that time, and take a new one on which
to make a future return. In this case the ofiicer delayed from
uncertainty as to which execution he should make the application
upon. He should perhaps have returned them with his doings,
and asked directions from the court as to the application of the
money. But this suit was soon brought in which the ofiicer’s
liability would be settled, and he has waited till now. \Ve think
he may now make the application, and that no one but the credi-
tor can complain of the delay, who is the claimant in this case.
Trustee discharged.
Refusal to indemnify was held a good defense to an action against
the sheriff for the proceeds given to the creditors who did indemnify.
Cudahy v. Rhinehart, 133 N. Y. 248, 30 N. E. 1004.
In an action against the sheriff for not selling, the failure of the
creditor to furnish bond on demand was held a good defense. Robey v.
State, 94 Md. 6!, 50 At]. 4H, 89 Am. St. Rep. 405.
A constable sued for releasing goods for want of indemnity after
expressing satisfaction with the indemnity given, is liable. "If, as the
constable said, property in the goods was claimed by another, he was not
bound to proceed unless sufiicient indemnity was given; but having de-
manded and accepted indemnity, the situation of affairs is entirely al-
tered. He is compelled on his part to proceed to a sale of the goods, and .
u
must look to his bond for indemnity.
53 Am. Dec. 368.
See extended note in 89 Am. St. Rep. 413, on right of officer execut-
ing process to demand indemnity. 5 I
















































































































































EXECUTING THE WRITS 379 
of the whole bark are not sufficient to pay the first execution of 
these claimants. 
But the plaintiff claims that, because the officer did not make 
the application upon the execution at the time, he cannot now do 
so, but that the money belongs to Osgood, the principal defend­
ant, and can be held in this suit in the hands of the officer as 
trustee. But we cannot so regard it. If  the property in this case 
had been delivered to a. receipter, who had refused to deliver it 
on demand, and, after execution was recovered, the officer had 
brought suit on the receipt, and had after a long time recovered, 
and suppose he had kept his execution till the termination of the 
suit, though long after the return day of the execution, could he 
not be allowed to apply the property on the execution ? It might 
have been the more proper course for the officer in each case to 
return his execution on the return day, making return of what­
ever he had done up to that time, and take a new one on which 
to make a future return. In this case the officer delayed from 
uncertainty as to which execution he should make the application 
upon. He should perhaps have returned them with his doings, 
and asked directions from the court as to the application of the 
money. But this suit was soon brought in which the officer's 
liability would be settled , and he has waited till now. We think 
he may now make the application, and that no one but the credi­
tor can complain of the delay, who is the claimant in this case. 
Trustee discharged. 
Refusal to indemnify was held a good defense to an action against 
the sheriff for the proceeds given to the creditors who did indemnify. 
Cudahy v. Rhinehart, 133 N. Y. 248, 30 N. E. 1004-
In an action against the sheriff for not selling, the failure of the 
crt:ditor to furnish bond on demand was held a good defense. Robey v. 
State, 94 Md. 6 1 ,  50 Atl. 4 1 1 ,  89 Am. St. Rep. 405. 
A constable sued for releasing goods for want of indemnity after 
expressing satisfaction with the indemnity given, is liable. "If, as the 
constable said, property in the goods was claimed by another, he was not 
bound to proceed unless sufficient indemnity was given ; but having de­
manded and accepted indemnity, the situation of affairs is entirely al­
tered. He is compelled on his part to proceed to a sale of the goods, and 
must look to his bond for indemnity." Corson v. Hunt, 14 Pa. St. 5 10, 
53 Am. Dec. 368. 
See extended note in 89 Am. St. Rep. 413, on right of officer execut­
ing process to demand indemnity. �t!!c/Jt/. 
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STUDLEY v. BALLARD, in Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Oct. 20, 1897-169 Mass.
295, 47 N. E. 1000, 61 Am. St. Rep. 286.
[*295] HOLMES, J. The place of seizure was the town of
Hampden. The plaintiffs lived in Palmer. There were other
deputies nearer, but the defendant especially desired and request-
ed the plaintiffs to do the work, and promised to pay them. The
case is here, after a finding for the plaintiffs by a judge without
a jury, upon an exception to a refusal to rule that the contracts
were without consideration and illegal. That broad question is
the only one before us. It appears that the plaintiffs, at the de-
fendant’s request, went to Springfield to get evidence upon which
to found complaints, and advise as to the best manner in which
to proceed in serving the warrants, and subsequently made com-
plaints, obtained warrants, and served them. \Ve must assume
that the judge found that the defendant's promises referred to
the preliminary [*296] or outside work and expenditures, and
that the trips to Springfield recovered for fall within the prom-
ises as thus construed. No question is raised by the exceptions
on these points.
It follows that the exceptions must be overruled. The rule
of law is simple. A contract to pay an officer for doing his 0E1-
cial duty, or to pay him a sum in addition to his statutory fees.
cannot be enforced; Pool v. Boston, 5 Cush. 219; Brophy v. Mar-
ble, 118 Mass. 548; Hatch v. Mann, I5 Wend. 44. But a con-
tract is good to pay him for services outside the line of his duty
for which the law allows him no fee: Davis v. Manson, 43
Vt. 676; 5 Am. Rep. 315; Trundle v. Riley, I7 B. Mon. 396;
England v. Da-t1'ds0n, II Ad. & E. 856._ In Shattuck v. Woods,
I Pick, I71, 175, it is said that, if an officer returns an execu-
tion unsatisfied by consent of the creditor and has incurred any
expense, he must look to the creditor for his recompense.
We cannot say that the plaintiffs have been allowed to re-
cover for anything except their time, travel, and outlay in order
to get information before filing the complaints. In Davis v.
M unson, 43 Vt. 676, 5 Am. Rep. 315, a deputy sheriff who went
in pursuit of escaped prisoners and recaptured them was held en-
titled to a reward which had been offered. In these cases, as in
that, the plaintiffs were under no ‘specific official obligation" to-
look up information, and, apart from the defendant’s promises,
would have been entitled to no pay for their trouble or expense.
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STUDLEY v. BALLARD, in Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Oct. 20, 1897-169 Mass. 
295, 47 N. E. 1000, 61 Am. St. Rep. 286. 
[ *295] HOLMES, J. The place of seizure was the town of 
Hampden. The plaintiffs l ived in Palmer. There were other 
deputies nearer, but the defendant especially desired and request­
ed the plaintiffs to do the work, and promised to pay them. The 
case is here, after a finding for the plaintiffs by a j udge without 
a jury, upon an exception to a refusal to rule that the contracts 
were without consideration and illegal. That broad question is  
the only one before us .  It  appears that the plaintiffs, a t  the de­
fendant's request, went to Springfield to get evidence upon which 
to found complaints, and advise as to the best manner in which 
to proceed in serving the warrants, and subsequently made com­
plaints, obtained warrants, and served them. We must assume 
that the judge found that the defendant's promises referred to 
the preliminary [*2g6] or outside work and expenditures, and 
that the trips to Springfield recovered for fall within the prom­
ises as thus construed. No question is raised by the exceptions 
on these points. 
It  follows that the exceptions must be overruled. The rule 
of law is simple. A contract to pay an officer for doing his offi­
cial duty, or to pay him a sum in addition to his statutory fees. 
cannot be enforced ; Pool v. Boston, 5 Cush. 2 19 ; Brophy v. Mar­
ble, I I 8 Mass. 548 ; Hatch v. Mann, 1 5  Wend. 44. But a con­
tract is good to pay him for services outside the line of his duty 
for which the law allows him no fee : Davis v. llJiinson, 43 
Vt. 676 ; 5 Am. Rep. 3 1 5 ; Tru-ndle v. Riley, 1 7  Il. Mon. 3g6 ; 
E11gfa11d v. Da·vidson, 1 1  Ad. & E. 856. _ In Shattuck v. iv oods,. 
I Pick , 1 7 1 ,  1 75,  it is said that, if an officer returns an execu­
tion unsati sfied by consent of the cred itor and has incurred any 
expense , he must look to the creditor for his recompense. 
\Ve cannot say that the plaintiffs have been allowed to re­
cover for anything except their time, travel, and outlay in order 
to get information before filing the complaints . In Davis v . 
. M11nson,  43 Vt. 676, 5 Am. Rep. 3 1 5, a deputy sheriff who went 
in pursuit of escaped prisoners and recaptured them \\'as held en­
titled to a reward which had been offered. In these cases, as in 
that. the plainti ffs were under no 'specific official obligation" to 
lO<'k up in formation, and. apart from the defendant's prom ises , 
w(lt11<l have been entitled to no pay for their trouble or expense. 
T t . rl ot's not appear that what they did fell within Pub. Stat . c. 100,. 
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at
§ 43, and it is unnecessary to consider what the effect of that
section would be.
E.ree[>ti0ns overruled.
A11 elaborate review of the cases on this point will be found in
Crofut v. Brand!, 58 N. Y. 106, 17 Am. Rep. 213.
"It is a principle of the common law that an officer ought not to
take money for doing his duty. Hawkins says: ‘If once it should be
allowed that promises to an officer to pay more for his services than the
law allows could sustain an action, the people would quickly be given to
understand how kindly they would be taken, a11d happy would be that
man who could have his business well done without them.’ I Hawk, P
C. c. 68, § 4. This is an ancient principle, and it has been steadily ad-
hered to as being necessary to save the community from extortion and
oppression." Kick v. Merry, 23 Mo. 72, 66 Am. Dec. 658.
Where the statute specified fees for each act done, including a per-
centage of the amount collected, a11 officer who had made a levy on land
on execution was held not entitled to percentage as for a collection
though he could have sold the land for enough to satisfy the demand
but for the order of the creditor forbidding it. Perk v. City Nat. Bank,
51 Mich. 353, 16 N. W. 681.
NELSON v. COOK, in Ill. Sup. Ct., Ottawa, June Tern1, 1856—17 Ill. 443.
Assumpsit commenced by attachment by Isaac Cook, late
sheriff of Cook county, against john G. Nelson and others, to
recover damages paid by said Cook on judgment against him in
favor of the owners of property taken by Cook’s deputy on exe-
cution in favor of said Nelson et al. 011 their judgment against
A. E. Miller and D. R. Clements. From judgment for plaintiff
defendants bring error.
' _SCATES, C.]. The principle laid down in Merryweather v.
.'an, 8 Term 186, that there is no right of contribution as be-
tween tort-feasors, or trespassers, has been and still is, recog-
nized as unquestionable law. But this does not affect the right
of indemnity where a right of indemnity exists.
There has been some little diversity of opinion, in the proper
application of the rule of distinction, or exception to the general
rule, in Ilferryweather V. N'i.ra.n, in agreeing upon the facts and
circumstances, which raise the exception. I regard the follow-
ing distinctions, however, to be well settled and supported by
authority.
business, as an auctioneer or warehouseman, to sell or deliver
goods, by one claiming to have right so to do, and the contrary
is not known to the employee, he may have an action for an im-
plied promise of indemnity, for the damages he may be compelled


















































































































































EXECUTING THE WRITS 
§ 43, and it is unnecessary to consider what the effect of that 
section would be. 
E.rceptio1ts overruled. 
An elaborate review of the cases on this point will be found in 
Crofut v. Brandt, 58 N. Y. lo6, 17 Am. Rep. 213. 
" It is a principle of the common law that an officer ought not to 
take money for doing his duty. Hawkins says : 'If once it  should be 
allowed that promises to an officer to pay more for his services than the 
law allows could sustain an action, the people would quickly be given to 
understand how kindly they would be taken, and happy would be that � ' 
man who could have his business well done without them.' I Hawk, P 
C. c. 68, § 4 This is an ancient principle, and it has been steadily ad­
hered to as being necessary to save the community f rom extortion and 
oppression." Kick v. Merry, 23 Mo. 72, 66 Am. Dec. 658. 
Where the statute specified fees for each act done, including a per­
cen tage of the amount collected, an officer who had made a levy on land 
on execution was held not entitled to percentage as for a collection 
though he could have sold the land for enough to satisfy the demand 
but for the order of the creditor forbidding it. Peck v. City Nat. Bank, 
51 Mich . .  '353, 16 N. W. ()81. 
NELSON v. COOK, in Ill. Sup. Ct., Ottawa, June Term, 1856-17 Ill. 443. 
Assumpsit commenced by attachment by Isaac Cook, late 
sheriff of Cook county, against John G. Nelson and others, to 
recover damages paid by said Cook on j udgment against him in 
favor of the owners of property taken by Cook's deputy on exe­
cution in favor of said Nelson et al. on thei r j udgment against 
A. E. Miller and D. R. Clements. From j udgment for plaintiff 
defendants bring error . 
. :tllL.SCATF.S, C. ]. The principle laid down in Merr'J'lveather v. 
\lffr'an, 8 Term 1 86, that there is no right of contribution as be­
tween tort-feasors, or trespassers, has been and still is, recog­
nized as unquestionable law. But this does not affect the right 
of indemnity where a right of indemnity exists. 
There has been some little diversity of opinion, in the proper 
application of the rule of distinction, or exception to the general 
rule, in M crryweather v. N i:ran, in agreeing upon the facts and 
circumstances, which raise the exception. I regard the follow­
ing distinctions, however, to be well settled and supported by 
authority. Where a party is employed in his usual course of 
bu siness, as an auctioneer or warehouseman , to sell or deliver 
goods, by one claiming to have right so to do, and the contrary 
is  not known to the employee, he may have an action for an im­
plied promise of indemnity, for the damages he may be compelled 
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to pay to the true owner, for the trespass or conversion commit-
ted by such sale or delivery. Betts V. Gibbons, 2 Ad. & El. 57,
29 Eng. C. L. 37; Adamson v. Jarvis, 4 Bingh. R. 66, 13 Eng.
C. L. 403; Story on Agency, § 339. But where one is employed
or directed to do or commit a known crime, misdemeanor, tres-
pass, or wrong, and the employee or agent knows it to be such,
an express promise of indemnity is void, being against the peace
and policy of the law. Story on Agency, § 329; Broom’s Leg.
Max. 328, 329; Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. (Eng.) 341; Cov-
entry v. Barton, 17 John. (N. Y.) 142.
Yet, where the question of title to the property is one of
doubt, controversy or uncertainty, or the act to be done is not
an apparent wrong, and the person or agent employed or directed
to do the act, does not know that it is a wrong or trespass; in
such case he may sue and recover indemnity from his employer,
upon an implied assumption to save him harmless for the act.
See authorities last above, and note to Farebrother v. Ansley, I
Campb. 343; Gower v. Emery, 18 Me. 79, 83.
This relation, however, of principal and agent, or employee,
is not raised by the simple delivery of a writ of eapias, attach-
ment, fieri facias and the like, to the officer, or his deputy. There
is no implication of indemnity for their trespasses and wrongs in
the execution, or attempt to execute process put into their hands,
without any specific direction to do particular acts, or take par-
ticular goods under it. This is illustrated as between the sheriff
and his deputy, in the case of Farebrother V. Ansley, I Campb.
343; and in relation to the liability of plaintiffs in process to the
sheriff, by '.Wils0n v. Milner, 2 Campb. 452; England v. Clark,
5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 486; Coventry v. Barton, 17 [*45o] John. 142;
Averill v. Williams, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 502; H mn[>hreys v. Pratt,
2 Dow. & Clark (Eng.) 288, 5 Bligh N. S. 154; referred to in 6
M. & VV. Ex. R. note 387; Marshall V. Hos-mer, 4 Mass. 60: Bond
v Ward, 7 Mass. 123; Avery v. Halsey, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 174;
Fitter v. Fossard, 7 Pa. St. 540; Saunders v. Harris, 4 Humph.
(Tenn.) 72. The facts in G0wer V. Emery, 18 Me. 79, show a
special direction, or will justify its inference. and what the
court say must be understood as upon the case before them.
Under these well settled principles, the defendant is not en-
titled to recover, upon an implied indemnity, nor without an ex-
press promise, or particular directions about the levy. Proof that
plaintiffs endeavored to sustain the attachment upon the levy, is
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tv pay to the true owner, for the trespass or conversion commit­
ted by such sale or delivery. Betts v. Gibbo ns, 2 Ad. & El. 57, 
29 Eng. C. L. 37 ; Adamson v. Jar-i.tis, 4 Bingh. R. 66, 1 3  Eng. 
C. L. 403 ; Story on Agency, § 339. But where one is employed 
or directed to do or commit a known crime, misdemeanor, tres­
pass, or wrong, and the employee or agent knows it to be such , 
an express promise of indemnity i s  void, being against the peace 
and policy of the law. Story on Agency, § 329 ; Broom's Leg. 
Max. 328, 329 ; Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. (Eng. ) 341 ; Cov­
en try v. Barton, 1 7  John. ( N. Y.)  142. 
Yet, where the question of title to the property is one of 
doubt, controversy or uncertainty' or the act to be done is not 
an apparent wrong, and the person or agent employed or directed 
to do the act, does not know that it is a wrong or trespass ; in 
such case he may sue and recover indemnity from his employer, 
upon an implied assumption to save him harmless for th� act. 
See authorities last above, and note to Farebrother v. A nsley, 1 
Campb. 343 ; Gcra'Cr v. Emery, 18  J\fe. 79, 83. 
This relation, however, of principal and agent, or employee, 
is not raised by the simple delivery of a writ of ca.pias, attach­
ment, fieri facias and the like, to the officer, or his deputy. There 
i s  no implication of  indemnity for their trespasses and wrongs in 
the execution, or attempt to execute process put into their hands, 
without any specific direction to do particular acts, or take par­
ticular goods under it. This is illustrated as between the sheriff 
and his deputy, in the case of Fa:re brother v. A nsley, 1 Campb. 
343 ; and in relation to the liability of plaintiffs in process to the 
sheriff, by JYilso n v. Af i/ner, 2 Campb. 452 ; Englan-d v. Clark, 
5 Ill. (4 Scam. )  486 ; Coventry v. Barton, 1 7  [ *450] John. 142 ; 
Averill v. iV illicnns, 1 Denio ( N. Y. ) 502 ; Humphreys v. Pratt, 
2 Dow. & Clark (Eng. ) 288, 5 Bligh N.  S. 1 54 ;  referred to in 6 
M. & \V. Ex. R. note 387 ; J'J.f cwsludl v. Hosmer, 4 Mass. 6o :  Bond 
v 1¥ard, 7 Mass. 123 ; Avery v. Halsey, 14 Pick. ( Mass . )  1 74 ;  
Filler v. Fossard, 7 Pa. St. 540 ; Saunders v. Harrt'.s, 4 Humph. 
( 'fenn. ) 72. The facts in Goiver v. Emery, 18 Me. 79, show a 
special direction, or will justify its inference, and what the 
court say must be understood as upon the case before them. 
Under these well settled principles, the defendant is  not en­
titled to recover, upon an implied indemnity, nor without an ex­
press promise, or particular directions about the levy. Proof that 
plaint iffs endeavored to sustain the attachment upon the levy, is 
wholly insufficient for this purpose, and none other appears. 
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Again, a recovery in trespass for taking, or in trover for convert-
ing chattels, followed by satisfaction, vests the property in the
defendant: “Solutio Pretii CtIl[7f'I0tliS loco habetur.” Adams v.
Broughton, 2 Strange 1078; Cooper v. Shepherd, 3 Mann. G. &.
S. 266, 54 Eng. C. L. 265.
Thus treating the sheriff as agent, in whom the property was
vested by the recovery, for the benefit of the plaintiffs, his princi-
pals, he may forfeit his title to repayment of his advances and dis-
bursements, by his own gross negligence, fraud or misconduct, and
be excluded from all remedy against his principal. Story on
Agency, § 348. The defendant misapplied the property, and con-
verted it to his own use by a sale and payment to another, of the
proceeds.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
If the judgment creditor expressly directed the levy on the specific
property, which did not belong to the judgment debtor, he is liable to
the owner in trover either jointly with the officer or alone. Hale v. Ames,
2 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) I43, and note to same case in 15 Am. Dec. 150;
lVaIker v. Wondcrlirk, 33 Neb. 504. 50 N. W. 445.
Liability of the Officer and His Bond.
0’
LAMMON v. rausisn, in U. s. Sup. Ct., Mar. 17, 1884—nr U. s. 17.
The original action was brought in the circuit court of the
United States for the district of Nevada, by Henry Feusier, a
citizen of California, against George I. Lammon and three other
persons, citizens of Nevada, upon a bond given by Lammon, the
marshal of the United States for that district, as principal, and
by the other defendants as his sureties, and conditioned that Lam-
mon, “by himself and by his deputies, shall faithfully perform all
the duties of the said office of marshal.” [*I8] It was alleged
in the declaration and found by the court (trial by jury having
been duly waived) that Lammon, while marshal, and while the
bond was in force, having in his hands a writ of attachment on
mesne process against the property of one E. D. Feusier, levied
it upon the goods of the plaintiff, a stranger to the writ. On
the question of law, whether the taking of the plaintiff's property
upon a writ of attachment against another person constituted a
breach of official duty on Lammon’s part for which his sureties
were liable, the circuit judge and the district judge were opposed
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Again, a recovery in trespass for taking, or in trover for convert­
ing chattels, followed by satisfaction, vests the property in the 
clefendant : "Solu tia pretii cmptionis loco habctu.r." Adams v. 
Broughton, 2 Strange 1078 ; Cooper v. Shepherd, 3 Mann. G. &. 
S. 266, 54 Eng. C. L. 265 . 
Thus treat ing the sheriff as agent, in whom the property was 
vested by the recovery, for the benefit of the plaintiffs, his princi­
pals, he may forfeit his title to repayment of his advances and dis­
bursements, by his own gross negligence, fraud or misconduct, and 
be excluded from all remedy against his principal . Story on 
Agency, § 348. The defendant misapplied the property, and con­
verted it to his own use by a sale and payment to another, of the 
proceeds. 
Judgment reversed and cause remanded . 
If the j udgment creditor expressly directed the levy on the specific 
property, which did not belong to the j udgment debtor, he is liable to 
the owner in trover either j ointly with the officer or alone. Hale v. Ames, 
2 T. B. Mon. (Ky. ) 143, and note to same case in 15 Am. Dec. 150 ; 
Walker v. Wonderlick, 33 Neb. 504. 50 N. W. 445. 
Liability of the Officer and His Bond. 
� 
LAMMON v. FEUSIER, in U. S. Sup. Ct., Mar. 17, 1884-1 1 1  U. S. 17. 
The original action was brought in the circuit court of the 
United States for the district of .Nevada, by Henry Feusier, a 
citizen of Cal ifornia, against George I .  Lammon and three other 
persons, citizens of Nevada, upon a bond given by Lammon, the 
marshal of the United States for that district, as principal, and 
by the other defendants as his sureties, and conditioned that Lam­
mon, "by himsel f and by his deputies, shall faithfully perform all 
the duties of the said office of marshal ." [* 18 ]  It was alleged 
in the declaration and found by the court ( trial by j ury having 
been duly waived ) that Lammon, while marshal, and while the 
bond was in force, having in his hands a writ of attachment on 
mesne process against the property of one E. D. Feusier, levied 
it upon the goods of the plaintiff, a stranger to the writ. On 
the quest ion of law, whether the tak ing of the plaintiff's property 
upon a writ of attachment against another person const ituted a 
breach o f  official duty on Lammon's part for which his sureties 
were l iable, the circuit judge and the district judge were opposed 
in opinion ,  and so certified. The plaintiff having died pending 
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the suit, final judgment was rendered for his executors, in accord-
ance with the opinion of the circuit judge; and the defendants
sued out this writ of error.
GRAY, J. The bond sued on was given under § 783 of the
Revised Statutes, which requires every marshal, before entering
on the duties of his office, to give bond with sureties for the faith-
ful performance of those duties by himself and his deputies; and
this action was brought under § 784, which authorizes any per-
son, injured by a breach of the condition of the bond, to sue there-
on in his own name and for his sole use.
The question presented by the record is whether the taking
by the marshal upon a writ of attachment on mesne process against
one person, of the goods of another, is a breach of the condition
of his official bond, for which his sureties are liable.
The marshal, in serving a writ of attachment on mesne pro-
cess, which directs him to take the property of a particular per-
son, acts officially. His official duty is to take the property of that
person, and of that person only; and to take only such property
of his as is subject to be attached, and not property exempt by
law from attachment. A neglect to take the attachable property
of that person, and a taking, upon the writ, [*I9] of the prop-
erty of another person, or of property exempt fro1n attachment,
are equally breaches of his official duty. The taking of the attach-
able property of the person named in the writ is rightful; the
taking of the property of another person is wrongful; but each
being done by the marshal, in executing the writ in his hands,
is an attempt to perform his official duty, and is an official act.
A person other than the defendant named in the writ, whose
property is wrongfully taken, may indeed sue the marshal, like
any other wrongdoer, in an action of trespass, to recover dam-
ages for the wrongful taking; and neither the official character
of the marshal, nor the writ of attachment, affords him any de-
fense to such an action. Day v. Gallup, 69 U. S. (2 Wall.) 97;
Buck v. Colbath, 70 U. S. (3 VVall.) 334.
But the remedy of a person, whose property is wrongfully
taken by the marshal in officially executing his writ, is not limited
to an action against him personally. His ofiicial bond is not made
to the person in whose behalf the writ is issued, nor to any other
individual. but to the government, for the indemnity of all per-
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the suit, final judgment was rendered for his executors, in accorcl­
ance with the opinion of  the circuit j udge ; and the defendants 
sued out this writ of error. 
GRAY, J. The bond sued on was given under § 783 of the 
Revised Statutes, which requires every marshal, before entering 
on the duties of his office, to give bond with sureties for the faith­
ful performance of those duties by himself and his deputies ; and 
this action was brought under § 784, which authorizes any per­
son, inj ured by a breach of the condition of the bond, to sue there­
on in his own name and for his sole use. 
The question presented by the record is whether the taking 
by the marshal upon a writ of attachment on mesne process against 
one person, of the goods of another, is  a breach of the condition 
of his official bond, for which his sureties are liable. 
The marshal, in serving a writ of attachment on mesne pro­
cess, which directs him to take the property of a particular per­
son, acts officially. His official duty is to take the property of that 
person, and of that person only ; and to take only such property 
of his as is subj ect to be attached, and not property exempt by 
law from attachment. A neglect to take the attachable property 
of that person, and a taking, upon the writ, [*19]  of the prop­
erty of another person , or of property exempt from attachment, 
are equally breaches of his official duty. The taking of the attach­
able property of the person named in the writ is rightful ; the 
taking of the property of another person is wrongful ; but each 
being done by the marshal, in executing the writ in his hands, 
is an attempt to perform his official duty, and is an official act. 
A person other than the defendant named in the writ, whose 
property is wrongfully taken , may indeed sue the marshal , like 
any other wrongdoer, in an action of trespass , to recover dam­
ages for the wrongful taking ; and neither the official character 
of the marshal , nor the writ of attachment, affords him any de­
fense to such an action. Dav v. Gallup, 6c) U. S. (2 Wall . )  97 ; 
B 11cl� v. Colbath, 70 U. S .  ( 3  \Vall . )  334. 
Ilut the remedy o f  a person, whose property is wrongfully 
taken by the marshal in officially executing his writ, i s  not limited 
to an action again st him personally. His official bond is not made 
to the person in whose behal f the wri t  is issued, nor to any other 
individual. but to the government, for the indemn i ty of all per­
son s inj ured by the official mi sconduct of himself or his deputies ;  
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and his bond may be put in suit by and for the benefit of any
such person. i -
When a marshal, upon a writ of attachment on mesne pro-
cess, takes property of a person not named in the writ, the prop-
erty is in his ofiicial custody, and under the control of the court
whose officer he is, and whose writ he is executing; and, accord-
ing to the decisions of this court, the rightful owner cannot main-
tain an action of replevin against him, nor recover the property
specifically in any way, except in the court from which the writ
issued. Freeman v. Howe, 65 U. S. (24 How.), 450; Kn'p-
[>end0rf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276. The principle upon which those
decisions are founded is, as declared by Mr. Justice Miller in
Buck v. Colbath, above cited, “that whenever property has been
seized by an officer of the court, by virtue of its process, the prop-
erty is to be considered as in the custody of the court, and under
its control for the time being; and that no other court has a right
to interfere with that possession, unless it be some _court which
may have a direct supervisory control over [*2o] the court whose
process has first taken possession, or some superior jurisdiction
in the premises.” 3 Wall. 341. Because the law had been so
settled by this court, the plaintiff in this case failed to maintain
replevin in the courts of the state of Nevada against the marshal,
for the very taking which is the ground of the present action.
Feusier v. Lammon, 6 Nev., 209. _
For these reasons the court is of opinion that the taking of
goods, upon a writ of attachment, into the custody of the mar-
shal, as the officer of the court that issues the writ, is, whether the
goods are the property of the defendant in the writ or of any
other _person, an ofiicial act, and therefore, if wrongful, a breach
of the bond given by the marshal for the faithful performance of
the duties of his office.
Upon the analagous question, whether the sureties upon the
official bond of a sherifi‘, a coroner, or a constable are responsible
for his taking upon a writ, directing him to take the property of
one person, the property of another, there has been some differ-
ence of opinion in the courts of the several states.
The view that the sureties are not liable in such a case has
been maintained by decisions in the supreme courts of New York,
New Jersey, North Carolina and'Wisconsin, and perhaps receives
support from decisions in Alabama, Mississippi and Indiana.
Er. [mrte Reed, 4 Hill, (N. Y.) 572; People v. Schuyler, 5 Barb.
















































































































































EXI£C U T I X C  T H .Ii  W R ITS 
and his bond may be put in suit by and
. 
for the benefit of any 
such person. 
\iVhen a marshal, upon a writ of attachment on mesne pro­
cess, takes property of a person not named in  the writ, the prop­
erty is in his official custody, and under the control of the court 
whose officer he is, and whose writ he is executing ; and, accord­
ing to the decisions of this court, the rightful owner cannot main­
tain an action of replevin against him, nor recover the property 
specifically in any way, except in the court from which the writ 
issued. Freeman v. Howe, 65 U. S. ( 24 How. ) ,  450 ; Krip­
pe11dorf v. H·yde, I 10  U. S. 276. The principle upon which those 
decisions are founded is, as declared by Mr. Justice Miller in 
Buck v .  Colba th, above cited, "that whenever property has been 
seized by an officer of .the court, by virtue of i ts process, the prop­
erty is to be considered as in the custody of the court, and under 
its control fOr the time being ; and that no other court has a right 
to interfere with that possession, unless it be some court which 
may have a direct supervisory control over [*20] the 
'
court whose 
process has first taken possession, or some superior j urisdiction 
in the premises." 3 Wall .  34 1 .  Because the law had been so 
settled by this court, the plaintiff in this case failed to maintain 
replevin in the courts of the state of Nevada against the marshal, 
for the very taking which is the ground of the present action. 
Feusier v. Lammo n, 6 Nev., 209. 
For these reasons the court is of opinion that the taking of 
goods, upon a writ of attachment, into the custody of the mar­
shal, as the officer of the court that issues the writ, is, whether the 
goods are the property of the defendant in the writ or of any 
other .person, an official act, and therefore, i f  wrongful, a breach 
of the bond given by the marshal for the faithful performance of 
the duties of his office. 
Upon the analagous question, whether the sureties upon the 
official bond of a sheriff, a coroner, or a constable are responsible 
for his taking upon a writ, directing him to take the property of 
one person, the property of another, there has been some differ­
ence of opinion in the courts of the several states. 
The view that the sureties are not liable in such a case has 
been maintained by decisions in the supreme courts of New York , 
New Jersey, Korth Carolina and · Wisconsin, and perhaps receives 
support from decisions in Alabama, Mississippi and Ind iana. 
fl.r. parte Reed, 4 Hill , ( N. Y. ) 572 ; People v. Schwyler, S Barb. 
Sup. ( N. Y. ) 1 66 ; State v. C0 1zo1:cr, 28 N. J. L. (4 Dutcher) .  
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224; State v. Long, 8 Iredell (N. Car.) 415; State v. Brown, 11
Iredell, 141 ; Gerber v. Ackley, 32 Wis. 233, 37 Wis. 43; Governor
V. Hancock, 2 Ala. 728; McElhaney V. Gilleland, 30 Ala. 183;
Brown v. Moseley, II Sm. & Marsh. (Miss.) 354; Jenkins v.
Lemonds, 29 Ind. 294; Carey v. State, 34 Ind. 105.
But in People V. Schuyler, 4 N. Y. 173, the judgment in 5
Barb. 166 was reversed, and the case E.r parte Reed, 4 Hill, over-
ruled by a majority of the New York court of appeals, with the
concurrence of Chief Justice Bronson, who had taken part in de-
ciding Reed‘s case. The final decision in People v. Schuyler has
been since treated by the court of appeals as settling the law upon
this point. Mayor, etc., of New [*21] York V. Sibberns, 3 Ab-
bott App. 266, 7 Daly, 436; Cumming V. Brown, 43 N. Y. 514;
People V. Lucas, 93 N. Y. 585. And the liability of the sureties
in such cases has been affirmed by a great preponderence of au-
thority, including decisions in the highest courts of Pennsylvania,
Maine, Massachusetts, Ohio, Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, Iowa,
Nebraska, Texas and California, and in the supreme court of the
District of Columbia. Cormack v. Commonr1'ealth, 5 Binn. (Pa.)
184; Brunott v. M’Kee, 6 VV. & S. (Pa) 513; Archer v. Noble,
3 Me. 418; Harris V. Hanson, 11 Me. 241; Greenfield v. Wilson,
79 Mass. (13 Gray) 384; Tracy V. Goodwin, 87 Mass. (5 Allen.)
409; State v. Jennings, 4 Ohio St. 418; Sangster v. Common-
reealth, 17 Grattan, (Va.) 124; Commonwealth v. Stockton, 5
T. B. Monroe (Ky.), 192; Jewell V. Mills, 3 Bush. (Ky.) 62;
State v. Moore, 19 M0. 366; State V. Fitzjmtrick, 64 M0. 185:
Charles v. Haskins, 11 Iowa, 329; Turner V. Killian, 12 Neb. 580;
Holliman V. Carroll, 27 Texas, 23: Van Pelt v. Littler, 14 Cal.
194? United States V. Hine, 3 MacArthur, (D. C.) 27.
In State v. Jennings, above cited, Chief Justice Thurman
said: “The authorities seem to us quite conclusive, that a seizure
of the goods of A, under color of process against B. is ofiicial
misconduct in the officer making the seizure; and it is a breach of
the condition of his official bond, where that is that he will faith-
fully perform the duties of his office. The reason for this is that
the trespass is not the act of a mere individual, but is perpe-
trated colore ofifcii. If an officer under color of a ti. fa. seizes
property of the debtor that is exempt from execution, no one, I
imagine, would deny that he had thereby broken the condition
of his bond. \Vhy should the law be different if, under color of
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224 ; State v. I.011g, 8 Iredell ( N . Car. ) 4 1 5 ; State v. Bro<P11 , I I  
Iredell, 1 4 1 ; Gerber v. A ckley, 32 Wis. 233, 37 Wis. 43 ; G01 .'ernor 
v. Han cock, 2 Ala. 728 ; .McElhane}' v. Gilleland, 30 Ala. 183 ; 
Bron:n v. �Moseley, I I  Sm. & Marsh. ( Miss . )  354 ; Jen kins v. 
Lemonds, 29 Ind. 294 ; Carey v. State, 34 Ind. rn5 .  
B u t  in  People v.  Schuyler, 4 N .  Y. 1 73, the judgment in 5 
Barb . 166 was reversed, and the case Ex parte Reed, 4 Hill , over­
ruled by a majority of  the New York court of appeals, with the 
concurrence of Chief Justice Bronson, who had taken part in de­
c iding Reed's case. The final decision in People v. Schuyler has 
been since treated by the court of appeals as settling the law upon 
this point. Afa·yor, etc. , of New [ *2 1 ]  York v. Sibberns, 3 Ab­
bott App. 266, 7 Daly, 436 ; Cu mm ing v. Brown, 43 N. Y. 5 1 4 ; 
People v. Lucas, 93 N. Y. 585. And the l iability of the sureties 
in such cases has been affirmed by a great preponderence of au­
thority, including decisions in the highest courts of Pennsylvania, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Ohio, Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, Iowa, 
K cbraska, Texas and Cali fornia, and in the supreme court of the 
D i strict of Columbia. Carmack v. Co1m1wun·ealth, 5 Binn. ( Pa. ) 
184 ; Brunot/ v. M'Kee, 6 VI/'. & S .  ( Pa )  5 1 3 ; A rch er v. J\loble, 
3 l\:Ic. 418 ; Harris v. Hanson, 1 I Me . 24 1 ; Greenfield v. 1-Vilson, 
79 l\fass. ( 13 Gray) 384 ; Tracy v. Good·win, 87 Mass. ( 5 Allen , )  
409 ; State v. Jennings, 4 Ohio S t .  4 1 8 ; Sangster v. Common­
wealth, 1 7  Grattan, ( Va. ) 1 24 ; Commonwealth v. Stockton, 5 
T. B.  Monroe ( Ky. ) ,  192 ; Je'l(.'C!l v . . M ills, 3 Bush . ( Ky. ) 62 ; 
State v. AJ oore, 1 9  Mo. 366 ; State v. Fitzpatrick, 64 Mo. 185 : 
Charlcs v. Haski11s, I I  Iowa, 329 ; Turner v. Killian, 1 2  Neb. 580 ; 
H o!limmi v. Carroll, 27 Texas, 23 : Van Pelt v. Littler, 1 4  Ca!. 
i 94 ; Un ited States v. Hin e, 3 MacArthur, ( D. C.)  27. 
In State v. Jen nings, above c ited, Chief Justice Thurman 
said : "The authorities seem to us qui te  conclusive, that a seizure 
of the good s of A, under color of process against B. is official 
mi sconcl11ct in the officer making the seizure ; and it  is  a breach of 
the condition of  his official bond,  where that is  that he will faith­
fully perform the duties of his office. The reason for this is that 
the trespass is not the act of a mere individual,  but is perpe­
trated co/ore officii. If  an officer u nder color of a fi.. fa. seizes 
property of the debtor that i s  exempt from execution , no on e , I 
imag"ine, woul d deny that he had thereby broken the con dition 
of his bond.  \Vhy should the law he different i f, under color of 
the same process, he take the goods of a third person ? If  the ex-
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emption of the goods from the execution in the one case makes
their seizure official misconduct, why should it not have the like
effect in the_ other? True, it may sometimes be more difficult to
ascertain the ownership of the goods, than to know whether a
particular piece of property is exempt from execution; but this
is not always the case, and if it were, it would not justify us in
restricting to litigants the indemnity afforded by the official bond,
thus leaving the rest of the community [*22] with no other in-
demnity against official misconduct than the responsibility of the
officer might furnish.” 4 Ohio St. 423.
So in Lowell v. Parker, 10 Met. 309, 313, a constable, author-
ized by statute to serve only writs of attachment in which the
damages were laid at no more than $70, took property upon a
writ in which the damages were laid at a greater sum. In an ac-
tion upon his ofiicial bond, it was argued for the sureties that
they were no more answerable than if he had acted without any
writ. But Chief justice Shaw, in delivering the opinion of the
supreme judicial court of Massachusetts, overruling the objection.
and giving judgment for the plaintiff, said: “He was an officer,
had authority to attach goods on mesne process on a suitable writ,
professed to have such process, and thereupon took the plaintiff’s
goods; that is, the goods of Bean, for whose use and benefit this
action is brought, and who, therefore, may be called the plaintiff.
He therefore took the goods colore officii, a11d though he had no
sufficient warrant for taking them, yet he is responsible to third
persons, because such taking was a breach of his official duty.”
Upon the weight of authority, therefore, as well as upon
principle, the judgment of the circuit court in the case at bar is
right, and must be Affirmed.
BOUCHER v. \VISEh'IAN, in Common Pleas of England, Mich. Term,
37 & 38 Eliz.; A. D. I596—Cro. Eliz. 440.
Before Anderson, C._T., Beaumond, Walmsley, and Owen, J].
Action upon the case against the defendant, late sheriff of
Essex. Whereas the plaintiff had recovered against Pynder
1ool., and had a fieri facias; that the defendant by virtue thereof
levied 281., and had not returned the writ nor paid money to the
plaintiff. Defendant pleaded not guilty. And now upon evidence
to the jury it was proved that the writ was delivered to Cowell,
the defendant’s under-sheriff, 9 Nov., 34 Eliz., and the same day
















































































































































EXl!:C U TI N G  T H E  WRITS 
emption of the goods from the execution in the one case makes 
their seizure official misconduct, why should it not have the like 
effect in the_ other ? True, it may sometimes be more difficult to 
ascertain the ownership of the goods, than to know whether a 
particular piece of  property is exempt from execution : but this 
is not always the case, and if it were, it would not j ustify us in 
restricting to litigants the indemnity afforded by the official bond, 
thus leaving the rest of the community [*22]  with no other in­
demnity against official misconduct than the responsibility of the 
officer might furnish." 4 Ohio St. 423. 
So in Lo'we/l v. Parker, 10 Met. 309, 3 1 3, a constable, author­
ized by statute to serve only writs of attachment in which the 
damages were laid at no more than $70, took property upon a 
writ in which the damages were laid at a greater sum. In an ac­
tion upon his official bond, it was argued for the sureties that 
they were no more answerable than if he had acted without any 
writ. But Chief Justice Shaw, in delivering the opinion of the 
supreme j udicial court of :Massachusetts, overrul ing the obj ect ion. 
and giving judgment for the plaintiff, said : "He was an officer, 
had authority to attach goods on mesne process on a suitable writ, 
professed to have such process, and thereupon took the plaintiff's 
goods ; that is, the goods of Bean, for whose use and benefit this 
action i s  brought, and who, therefore, may be called the plaintiff. 
He therefore took the goods colore officii, and though he had no 
sufficient warrant for taking them, yet he is  responsible to third 
persons, because such taking was a breach of his official duty." 
Upon the weight of authority, therefore, as well as upon 
principle, the j udgment of the circuit court in the case at bar is 
right, and must be Affirmed. � 
BOUCHER v. WI SEMAN, in Common Pleas of England, Mich. Term, 
37 & 38 Eliz. ; A. D. 1 5¢-Cro. Eliz. 440. 
Before Anderson, C.J., Beaumond, Walmsley, and Owen, ]]. 
Action upon the case against the defendant, late sheriff of  
Essex. \Vhereas the plaintiff had recovered against Pynder 
100/., and had a fieri facias; that the defendant by virtue thereof 
levied 28/., and had not returned the writ nor paid money to the 
plaintiff. Defendant pleaded not guilty. And now upon evidence 
to the jury it was proved that the writ was delivered to Cowell ,  
the defendant's under-sheriff, 9 Nov., 34 Eliz., and the same day 
he made execution. And he proved, that the same day a writ of  
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discharge was delivered to him, dated 6 Nov., 34 Eliz. But be-
cause he did not prove that he had notice of this writ of discharge
before the execution served, THE COURT held clearly that he was
yet sheriff, and chargeable to the plaintiff's action. _
The defendant also showed the indenture whereby he made
Cowell his under-sheriff; wherein was an exception, that he
should not meddle with the execution of any writ above 401.; so
as to that he was not his under—sheriff, but he did it de son tort
demesne, and the defendant is not chargeable therewith. But
all THE COURT held it to be a void exception: for when he made
him his under-sheriff, therein was included that he should exe-
cute all writs; and therefore the exception is repugnant and
void.
T hirdly, it was alleged, that this was not a due execution;
for Pynder had made a deed of his goods before, &c., and showed
the deed dated the same day of the writ of execution. ET PER
Torsu CURI.~\Z\I, although the gift were bona tide, yet the execu-
tion might be taken of those goods. For by the suing forth the
execution, all the defendant’s goods are liable; so as no gift of
the said goods, the day of the date of the writ or afterwards, can
stop the execution. Wherefore, they resolved the jury accord-
ingly, without inquiring of the fraud, and they found for the
plaintiff. Vide 4 Hen. 6, pl. 7; 17 Ass. pl. 2; Eliz. Dyer 219.
PAYNE v. DREWE, in King's Bench of England, Feb. 8, 1804, 44 Geo.
lII—-4 East 523.
Before Ellenborough, C.J., Grose, Lawrence and LeBlanc, JJ.
Action by Payne against Drewe as sheriff of Dorset, for a
false return nnlla bona to a fl. fa. on a judgment against C. Sturt.
Judgment for plaintiff. The sheriff first took and inventoried
sufficient goods of the execution defendant to satisfy the fi. fa.,
but afterward quitted possession of them and returned his writ
nulla bona, because before his writ was issued the court of chan-
cery had ordered a commission of sequestration on the complaint
of H. \/V. Portman et al. against said C. Sturt to compel payment
of 2oool.
Loan ELLENBOROUGH, C.J. * * * We shall, for the purpose
of the present question, assume that the award of the sequestra-
tion had the same obligatory effect as the award of a writ of exe-
cution against the goods would now have at the common law, and
















































































































































CASES ON EXECUTIONS, E'fC. 
<lischarge was delivered to him, dated 6 Nov., 34 Eliz. But be­
cau�e he did not prove that he had notice of this writ of discharge 
before the execution served, THE COURT held clearly that he was 
yet sheriff, and chargeable to the plaintiff's action. · 
The defendant also showed the indenture whereby he made 
Cowell his under-sheriff ;  wherein was an exception, that he 
should not n:eddle with the execution of any writ above 40/. ; so 
a s to that he was not his under-sheriff, but he did i t  de son tort 
dcmcs11e, and the defendant is not chargeable therewith. But 
all THE COURT held it to be a void exception : for when he made 
him his under-sheriff, therein was included that he should exe­
cute all writs ; and therefore the exception is repugnant and 
void. 
Thirdly, i t  was alleged, that this was not a due execution ; 
for Pynder had made a deed of  his goods before, &c., and showed 
the deed dated the same day of the writ of execution. ET PER 
ToTAM Cun1.u1 , although the gi ft were bona fide, yet the execu­
tion might be taken of those goods. For by the suing forth the 
execution , all the defendant's goods are liable ; so as no gift of 
the said goods, the day of the date of the writ or afterwards, can 
stop the execution.  vVherefore, they resolved the jury accord­
ingly, without inquiring of the fraud, and they found for the 
plaintiff. V ide 4 Hen. 6, pl. 7 ;  1 7  Ass. pl. 2 ;  Eliz. Dyer 2 19. 
PAYNE v. DREWE, in King's Bench of England, Feb. 8, 18o4, 44 Geo. 
III-4 East 523. 
Before Ellenborough, C.J., Grose, Lawrence and LeBlanc, JJ. 
Action by Payne against Drewe as sheriff of Dorset, for a 
false return nulla bona to a fi. fa. on a j udgment against C. Sturt. 
Judgment for plaintiff. The sheriff first took and inventoried 
sufficient goods of the execution defendant to satisfy the fi. fa., 
but afterward quitted possession of them and returned his writ 
1111/la boHa, because before his writ was issued the court of chan­
cerv had ordered a commission of sequestration on the complaint 
of Ii. vV. Portman et al. against said c. Sturt to compel payment 
of 2000[. 
LoRD F.r.LENBOROUGH, C.J. * * * \Ve shall, for the purpose 
of the present question, assume that the award of the sequestra­
tion had the same obligatory effect as the award of a writ of exe­
cution against the goods would now have at the common law, and 
shall even further assume, * * * that a sequestration binds from 
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the very time of awarding the commission, * * * in which re-
spect it is put upon the footing of an execution at the common
law, * * * before the statute of frauds, and which execution at
common law then related to the taste or award of the execution;
I say, thus considering the effect of a sequestration for the purpose
of this question (and in so considering it we allow it the most ex-
tensive effect which can possibly be claimed on its behalf), it still
does not appear to us that the sequestration in question did, under
the circumstances, afford a sufficient excuse to the sheriff for not
executing the writ of fieri facias at the suit of the plaintiff. The ‘
sheriff is not excused, if the sale he was required to make under
the fieri facias would, if made, have been a valid and effectual
one in favor of his vendee: and, if he would not, by making such
sale thereunder, [*538] have subjected himself either to the action
of the party interested in the sequestration, or to the punishment
of the court of chancery as for a contempt of its process. VVhether
the sale he would have made, supposing he had sold under the
fieri facitls, would have been a valid and effectual one, depends
upon the sense in which, and the extent to which, goods shall be
considered as bound by the award of an execution before the
statute of frauds, and by the delivery of the writ of execution
since that statute. The sense in which, and extent to which, goods *
are in either case said to be bound is, that it binds the property
as against the party himself and all claiming by assignment from,
or representation through or under him: but it does not so vest
the property in the goods absolutely as to defeat the effect of a
sale thereof made by the sheriff under an execution. This was
settled in the case of Smallcomb v. Cross [reported, post, 391].
* * *
.‘-\ssuming, therefore, upon these authorities of Lord Holt and
Lord Hardreicke, and particularly on the authority of the case of
Smallcomb v. Cross, <51‘. as decided by Lord Holt, and which has
been generally received and referred to as the established law on
the subject, that the sheriff could have made a valid and effectual
sale in this case: the next questions are, VVould he, by executing
the writ of ficri facias, have subjected [*54z] himself to the ac-
tion of the party to the sequestration, or to punishment by the
court out of which it issued? As to the first of these questions.
it is certainly to be answered in the negative. VVhat pretence of
complaint can he have against the sheriff who gave no notice of
that process in deference to which the sheriff was to forhear to
levy. which he might easily have made available hv ordinary dil-
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the very time of awarding the commission, * * * in which re­
spect i t  is put upon the footing of an execution at the common 
law, * * * before the statute of frauds, and which execution at 
common law then related to the tcste or award of the execution ; 
I say , thus considering the effect of a sequestration for the purpose 
of this question (and in so considering it we allow it the most ex­
tensive effect which can possibly be claimed on its behalf) , it sti l l  
docs not appear to us that the sequestration in question did, under 
the circumstances, afford a sufficient excuse to the sheriff for not 
executing the writ of fieri f acias at the suit of the plaintiff. The , 
sheri ff is not excused, i f  the sale he was required to make under 
'" 
the fieri facias would, i f  made, have been a valid and effectual 
one in favor of his vendee : and, if he would not, by making such 
sale thereunder, [ *538] have subjected himself either to the action 
of the party interested in the sequestration, or to the punishment 
of the court of chancery as for a contempt of its process. \Vhether 
the sale he would have made, supposing he had sold under the 
fieri facias, would have been a valid and effectual one, depends 
upon the sense in which, and the extent to which, goods shall be 
considered as bomzd by the award of an execution before the 
statute of frauds, and by the del ivery of the writ of execution 
since that statute. The sense in which, and extent to which, goods ' 
are in  either case said to  be bound is, that it binds the property 
as against the party himsel f and all claiming by assignment from, 
or representation through or under him : but it does not so vest 
the property in the goods absolutely as to defeat the effect of a 
sale thereof made by the sheriff tm.der an execution . This was 
settled in the case of Sma./lcomb v. Cross [ reported, post, 391 ] .  
* * * 
Assuming. therefore, upon these authorities of Lord Holt and 
Lord Hard-zi•icke, and part icularly on the authority of the case of 
Sm allcomb v. Cross, &c. as decided by Lord Holt, and which has 
been generally received and referred to as the establ i shed law on 
the suhject, that the sheriff could have made a val id and effectual 
sale in th is case : the next questions are, \Vould he, hy executing 
the writ of ficri facias, have subj ected [*542 ]  himself to the ac­
tion of the party to the se(J ttestration , or to punishment by the 
court out of  which it issued ? As to the first of  these q uestion s .  
i t  i s  rerta inlv t o  he answered in the n eP-;itive. \Vhat pretence of 
romplaint  can he have a(!"ain st the sheriff who g-ave n o  notice of 
th � t  ornc-ess in d e ference to whirh the sheriff was to forhear tn 
lev'' · wh ich he m i !.'"ht easi lv have ma<fe  av;iilahle hv ord i n arv d il­
ig-rnce. and who took no steps for 18 months to make it S'.1 ? Vig-
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ilanfibus non dormicntibus Ieges subveniunt. If he did not enforce
it during that period, at what period was it to be expected that
he would do so? The commission extends to Mr. Charles Sturt’s
goods not in the bailiwick of one sheriff only, but throughout the
whole realm. \Vere all his majesty's subjects to hold their means
of remedy against the personal estate of Mr. C. Start, in what-
ever county they might be found, in suspense and abeyance till
the parties to the sequestration should think fit to avail themselves
of theirs? * * *
As to the light in which the court of ehancery would view
an execution at common law, executed [*543] under these cir-
cumstances; the contempt, if any, which that court would prob-
ably animadvert upon would be a contempt of its own process by
those who had procured it to be awarded, and the commissioners
who were empowered, and who instead of putting it in force,
suffered it to become the means of protection to him against whom
it was granted and required to act under it. As against these par-
ties, and also against Mr. C. Start, the defendant in the execution,
the sheriff may, if he can make out a case of collusion between
them, yet perhaps be able to obtain some relief by the intervention
of that court in his favor. That protection and a full indemnity‘
he might have had for asking for in the first instance from that
court; or this court would, upon his application, have enlarged
the rule upon him to return the writ of fieri facias, unless the
plaintiff would have indemnified him against the sequestration;
so that if he now stand unprotected against the action of the plain-
tiff, it is by his own neglect that he does so. * *
The case of Hutchinsonlv. Jolmsfon, I Term Rep. 729, in
which it was holden, that where two writs of fieri faeias against
the same defendant are delivered to a sheriff on different days,
and no actual sale of the defendant's goods is made, the first exe-
cution must have the priority, may be supposed, on the first view
of it, to lay down a doctrine somewhat contrary to what has been
already stated; but that case appears to me to decide only that
where two writs of ficri facias are delivered to the same sheriff,
he must, as between himself and the several plaintiffs in those exe-
cutions, sell under that writ which is first delivered, although he
may have first seized under the last delivered writ. But in the
present case there are two different writs or authorities, each so
far binding the goods as to warrant a sale under them, one deliv-
ered to the sheriff. and another previously delivered to other per-
sons. eqnally competent with the sheriff to have seized under them.
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ila11 tibus non dorm icntibus leges subveni1mt. If  he did not enforct 
it during that period, at what period was it to be expected that 
he would do so ? The commission extends to Mr. Charles Stu.rt's 
goods not in the bailiwick of one sheriff only, but throughout the 
whole realm. Were all his maj esty's subjects to hold their means 
of remedy against the personal estate of Mr. C. St1irt, in what­
ever county they might be found, in suspense and abeyance till 
the parties to the sequestration should think fit to avail themselves 
of theirs ? * * * 
As to the l ight in which the court of chancery would view 
an execution at common law, executed [*543] under these cir­
cumstances ; the contempt, if any, which that court would prob­
ably animadvert upon would be a contempt of its own process by 
those who had procured it to be awarded, and the commissioners 
who were empowered, and who instead of putting it in force, 
suffered it to become the means of protection to him against whom 
it was granted and required to act under it. As against these par­
ties, and also against l\fr. C. Sturt, the defendant in the execution, 
the sheriff may, if he can make out a case of collusion between 
them, yet perhaps be able to obtain some rel ief by the intervention 
of that court in his favor. That protection and a full indemnity , 
he might have had for asking for in the first instance from that 
court ; or this court would, upon his application, have enlarged 
the rule upon him to return the writ of ficri facias, unless the 
plaintiff would have indemnified him against the sequestration ; 
so that if he now stand unprotected against the action of the plain­
tiff, it is by his own neglect that he does so. * * * 
The case of Hutchinson · v. J oltnston, I Term Rep. 729, in 
which it was holden , that where two writs of fieri facias against 
the same defendant are delivered to a sheriff on different days, 
and no actual sale of the defendant's goods is made, the first exe­
cution must have the priority, may be supposed, on the first view 
of it. to lay down a doctrine somewhat contrary to what has been 
already stated ; but that case appears to me to decide on1y that 
where two writs of ficri facias arc delivered to the same sheriff, 
he must ,  as between himself and the several plaintiffs in those exe­
cutions ,  sell under that writ which is first delivered , although he 
may have first seized under the last delivered writ. Dut in the 
pre�rnt case there are two different writs or authorit ies, each so 
far binding the g-ood s as to warrant a sale under them, one deliv­
ered to the sh eri ff. and another previously delivered to other per­
son s .  CfJttal ly competent with the sheriff to have seized under them . 
And  the qu estion i s  not which of  two writs, equally mandatory to 
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the same person, shall have a priority in point of execution by
him, but whether one writ mandatory to the sheriff for one pur-
pose shall remain in his hands wholly suspended in point of exe-
cution, merely because other persons having a similar competent
authority under other process of another court to them directed
have chosen [*545] to neglect the execution of such last-mentioned
process; which brings the question nearly to this, namely, \\/hetheri
a writ which is from the delivery immediately binding as against
the defendant, so as to tie up his hands from alienating the goods
which might be seized under it, is to be regarded as in effect self-
executed by its own proper legal effect and force for all purposes?
That it is not, the case of Smallcomb v. Buckingham decides; for
if it were so, then any sale made by the sheriff under a second
execution, when he had a former one in his hands, would be a
nullity in respect even to the sheriff’s vendee thereof, which would
directly contradict what was established in that case. It appears
to me, therefore, not to be contradictory to any cases, nor any
principles of law, and to be mainly conducive to public conven-
ience, and to the prevention of fraud and vexatious delay in these
matters, to hold that rchere there are several authorities e ually
com ctcnt to bin tze ('00 s mm t " . cu-e y the
[voter ofiiccr, that they shall be considered as eficctua _v, and for
all [»ur[>0svs, bound by the ant zon v 'Zt'ttCt rst actua y attaches
iipommmmmmmmtiori
s1mi7T,...Ti;r.mr—si-'-'—?r-i""_"‘\1-—-" 9; “j“£.1itliiscase,l)eirig'oop1ri1on that
the s ert would not, by executing the writ of execution to him
directed, have subjected himself either civilly or criminally to any
inconveniences, we think that he ought to have done so: and not
having done so, he has made himself liable to this action, in which
we are of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to recover.
Postea to the Plaintifi‘.
RUSSELL v. LAWTON, in Wis. Sup. Ct., June Term, 1861-14 \Vis.
202, 80 Am. Dec. 769.
Action against sheriff. From judgment for plaintiff defend-
ant appeals.
COLE, J. * * * On the 9th day of February, 1859, the ap-
pellant as sheriff of Rock county, had delivered to him an execu-
tion in favor of the Bank of Beloit against the Racine and Mis-
sissippi Railroad Company, and by direction of the judgment
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coin, the money of the railroad company, and paid it_over as
money made upon the execution. On the preceding 4th day of
February, an execution in favor of the respondent and against
the same defendants was delivered to Sydney Vt-7 right, a deputy
of the appellant, which was returned unsatisfied for the reason
that the officer could find no property upon which to levy. The
respondent has brought this action to recover the amount of the
execution delivered to VV right, insisting that because it was place
in the hands of the deputy before the junior execution was deliv-
ered to the sheriff, it should first be satisfied, and that the sheri
was guilty of misconduct in not thus applying the money tha
came to his hands, instead of paying it over to the bank. At th
same time it is conceded that the sheriff acted in perfect good
faith in the matter, and that when he levied upon, and [mid over
the money to the bank, he had no notice 'Zt'Il£It€'Z’C1’ that his deputy
held any e.rccuti0n against the same debtor. In view of these
facts, upon what principle is it sought to charge the appellant in
this action? It is this. A delivery of an execution [*2o7] to a
deputy sheriff is said in legal effect to be a delivery to the sheriff
himself, since, in contemplation of law, all the deputies of the
sheriff are but one officer, being all servants of the same master,
and that, therefore, the sheriff must be held chargeable with con-
structive notice of the prior execution in the hands of his deputy.
And upon this fiction of the law the whole case hinges.
It is undoubtedly true that for many purposes a sheriff and
his deputies are regarded as one ofiicer, in the sense that an official
act of the deputy is deemed the act of the sheriff, and the sheriff
is held responsible for such act as his own, though he may have
had no personal knowledge of the matter, and been individually
guilty of no wrong. All processes are directed to the sheriff as
such, who is required to do the thing therein commanded to be
done; and the sheriff is responsible to the world for all breaches
of duty or official misconduct on the part of any of his deputies.
For this reason an action for a breach of duty of the office of
sheriff must be brought against the high sheriff, though the breach
was bythe default of the under sheriff. Cameron v. Reynolds,
I Cowper (Eng) 403. In this sense the sheriff and his deputies
may be said to constitute one officer. But still the deputies of a
sheriff, in relation to each other, must often be considered as sev-
eral officers, with distinct rights_ and acting with distinct liabilities.
Odiorne v. Colley, 2 N. H. 66; Vinton v. Bradford, 13 Mass. 114;
T/zomfson v. Marsh, 14 Id., 269; Bagley v. White, 2I Mass. (4
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coin, the money of the rai lroad company, and paid i t . over as 
money made upon the execution. On the preceding 4th day of 
February, an execution in favor of the respondent and against 
the same defendants was delivered to Sydney vVright, a deputy 
of  the appellant, which was returned unsatisfied for the reason 
that the officer could find no property upon which to levy. The 
respondent has brought this action to recover the amount of the 
execution delivered to vVright, insisting that because it was place 
in the hands of the deputy before the j unior execution was deliv­
ered to the sheriff, it should first be satisfied, and that the sheri 
was guilty of misconduct in not thus applying the money tha 
came to his hands, instead of paying it over to the bank. At th 
same time it is conceded that the sheriff acted in perfect good 
faith in the matter, and that when lze le·z:ied upon and paid o·uer 
the money to the ba11k, he had no no tice 'i.r.'hate'i.1Cr that his dep u.ty 
hdd any exccu tio1t against the sam e  debtor. In view of these 
facts, upon what principle is it sought to charge the appellant in 
this action ? It is  th is .  A del ivery of an execution [*207 ] to a 
deputy sheriff is  said in legal effect to be a delivery to the sheriff 
himself, s ince, in contemplation of law, all the deputies of the 
sheriff are but one officer, being all servants of the same master, 
and that, therefore, the sheriff must be held chargeable with con­
structive notice of the prior execution in the hands of his deputy. 
And upon this fiction of the law the whole case hinges. 
It is  undoubtedly true that for many purposes a sheriff and 
his deputies are regarded as one officer, in the sense that an official 
act of the deputy is  deemed the act of the sheriff, and the sheriff 
is held responsible for such act as his own, though he may have 
had no personal knowledge of the matter, and been individually 
gui lty of no wrong. All processes are directed to the sheriff as 
such, who is required to do the thing therein commanded to be 
done ; and the sheriff is responsible to the world for all breaches 
of duty or official misconduct on the part of any of his deputies. 
For this reason an action for a breach of duty of the office of 
sheriff must be broug-ht against the high sheriff, though the breach 
was hy · the default o f  the under sheriff. Cameron v. Reyn olds, 
I Cowper ( Eng. ) 403 . In this sense the sheriff and his  deputies 
may he said to- consti tute one officer. Rut still the deputies of al 
sheriff, in relation to each other, must often be considered as sev­
eral officers, with dist inct rights. and acting- with distinct liabilities. 
Odiorne v. Colley, 2 � .  I I .  66 ; Vin ton v.  Bradford, 13 1\fass. I 14 ; 
Tl20 111pson v . .  �farsh , q .  Id . ,  269 ; Eagle_\' v. H71z ite, 2 1  l\fass . (4  
Pick . )  395 * * * [ *208 ] * * * Take a case suggested on the 
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argument, and which will occur to any one reflecting on the sub-
ject. An execution against A is put into the hands of a deputy,
who knows of no property belonging to A to satisfy the same.
Another deputy has information of property possessed by A suffi-
cient to satisfy the execution, but has no knowledge that an exe-
cution is out against him. The sheriff has no knowledge of any
execution against A, or of any property belonging to him. Under
these circumstances, is the sheriff to be charged with constructive
notice of the execution in the hands of one deputy, and of the in-
formation possessed by the other in respect to property belonging
to the debtor, and thus held liable for a breach of duty in not mak-
ing the money on an execution which he never saw? To contend
for such a proposition would seem little else than the most glaring
absurdity; and yet we see no escape from such a result, if the
maxim that the sheriff and his deputies are to be regarded as one
person, is to be accepted without limitation. * * * [*21o]
It follows from these views, that the judgment of the circuit
court must be reversed, and a new trial ordered.
Reversed.
Compare Ferguson v. Williams, 3 B. Mon. (Ky.) 302.
KNOX v. WEBSTER, in Wis. Sup. Ct., June Term, 1864—18 Wis. 406,
86 Am. Dec. 779.
Action by Thomas M. Knox against Webster as sheriff of
Milwaukee county, for failure to levy plaintiff’s execution before
another subsequently placed in his hands. From judgment for
plaintiff defendant appeals. The main defense \va_sil1a_tLl1e11tl1eL_
execution creditor found and showed the sheriff the property on
which to levv and was entitled to priority for his diligence.
DIXON, C. I. “Personal property shall be bound from the 1
time of its seizure on execution.” R. S. ch. 134, § 18. Before 1
seizure there is no lien—nothing by which the rigl1ts of different
execution creditors, whether senior or junior, can attach. The
lien takes effect from the date of the levy and by virtue thereof,
and of course is confined to the executon levied, and can have
relation to no other. Such lien is prior and superior to that of
every execution subsequently levied, and consequently not liable
to be defeated by such subsequent levy, though made upon a
senior execution. This point, if not decided, was strongly inti-
mated in Russell v. Lawton, 14 Wis. 209. It follows that the
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argument, and which will occur to any one reflecting on the sub­
ject. An execution against A is put into the hands of a deputy, 
who knows of no property belonging to A to satisfy the same. 
Another deputy has in formation of property possessed by A suffi­
cient to sati sfy the execution , but has no knowledge that an exe­
cution is out against him. The sheriff has no knowledge of any 
execution against A, or of any property belonging to him. Under 
these circumstances, is  the sheriff to be charged \vith constructive 
notice of the execution in the hands of one deputy, and of the in­
formation possessed by the other in respect to property belonging 
to the debtor, and thus held liable for a breach of duty in not mak­
ing the money on an execution which he never saw ? To contend 
for such a proposition would seem l ittle else than the most glaring 
absurdity ; and yet we see no escape from such a result, if the 
maxim that the sheriff and his deputies are to be regarded as one 
person , is to be accepted without limitation. • • * [*210]  
It follows from these views, that the judgment o f  the circuit 
court must be reversed , and a new trial ordered. 
Reversed. 
Compare Ferguso" v. Williams, 3 B. Mon. (Ky. ) 302. 
KNOX v. WEBSTER, in Wis. Sup. Ct., June Term, 1864-18 Wis. 4o6, 
86 Am. Dec. 779. 
Action by Thomas :M. Knox against Webster as sheriff of 
Milwaukee county, for failure to levy plaintiff's execution before 
another subsequently placed in his hands. From j udgment for 
plaintiff defendant appeals. The main defense was that the other 
execution creditor fotmd and showed the sheriff the property on 
..1t_hich to levy and was entitled to priority -�?r his di !igen�:_. 
D1xoN, C. J. "Personal property shall be bound from the 1 
time of its seizure on execution." R. S. ch. 1 34, § 18. Before • 
seizure there i s  no lien-nothing by ·which the rights of different 
execution creditors, whether senior or j unior, can attach. The/ 
lien takes effect from the date of the levy and by virtue thereof, 
and of course is  confined to the executon levied, and can have 
relation to no other. Such lien is prior and superior to that of 
every execution subsequently levied, and consequently not liab!e 
to be defeated by such subsequent levy, though made upon a 
senior execution. This point, if not decided , was strongly inti­
mated in Russell v. Lwwton, 14 \Vis. 209. It fol lows that the 
court was right in rej ecting the record an<i proceedings upon the 
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motion to have the money made on Cooper’s execution applied
on that of the plaintiff. The court had no power to make such
application, and was bound to deny the motion. The plaintiff
having wholly mistaken his remedy, the decision upon the motion
was no bar to this suit, and that was the only purpose for which
the record and proceedings were offered.
As to the duty of the sheriff in making the levy, we are
[*41o] satisfied he should have levied the senior execution first.
The decision in Russell v. Lawton proceeded on this supposition
in all cases where the several executions are in the hands of the
same officer. The statute, § 15, requires the sheriff, under the
sanction of his official oath, to indorse upon every execution the
year, month, day and hour of the day when he received the same.
No reason is perceived for this, unless it be to furnish unequivo-
cal and satisfactory evidence upon which to determine disputed
questions of priority and preference among different execution
creditors of the same debtor, and to enable the sheriff to guard
against mistakes. He is a public officer, of whom the law re-
quires the strictest impartiality between those who are obliged
to have his services, and this impartiality cannot be enforced ex-
cept upon the rule that he must, at his peril, levy and satisfy exe-
cutions according to their seniority in his hands. Once allow it
to be a race of diligence between the different creditors in finding
and pointing out the property of the debtor, and what a door to
partiality, fraud and strife would be opened! The sheriff might
neglect inquiry. or be willfully ignorant, for the sake of favoring
one or oppressing another creditor, and the whole controversy
would be thrown upon the uncertain testimony of interested and
suspicious witnesses. \-Ve do not doubt, therefore, that it was the
intention of the legislature, as it is the course of reason, that exe-
cutions should be levied according to seniority, and that the sher-
iff in this case was not justified in levying the junior execution
first because the creditor in that execution had been more success-
ful than himself in finding the property of the execution debtor.
* * * [#411] * * s
Judgment afiirmed.
A junior creditor, learning that the sheriff had no special orders to
levy, but only to summon a garnishee on the senior ti. fa., ordered him
to levy his ti. fa. on certain corn. Sheriff levied both writs at same time.
The senior writ held entitled to priority, because it is the sheriff's duty
to levy on any property without special orders. Stuarts v. Re_vnolds_. 4
Harrington (Del) 112. See also Tomlinson v. Rowe, Lalor's Supp. to
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motion to have the money made on Cooper's execution applied 
on that of the plaintiff. The court had no power to make such 
application, and was bound to deny the motion. The plaintiff 
having wholly mistaken his remedy, the decision upon the motion 
was no bar to this suit, and that was the only purpose for which 
the record and proceedings were offered. 
As to the duty of the sheriff in mak ing the levy, we are 1 
[ * 4 10]  satisfied he should have levied the senior execution first. 
The decision in Russell v. Lawto1t proceeded on this supposition 
in all cases where the several executions are in the hands o f  the 
same officer. The statute , § 1 5 , requires the sheriff, under the 
sanction o f  his official oath, to indorse upon every execution the 
year, month, day and hour  of the day when he received the same. 
)Jo reason is  perceived for this, unless it be to furnish unequivo­
cal and satisfactory evidence upon which to determine di sputed 
quest ions of priority and preference among different execution 
creditors o f  the same debtor, and to enable the sheriff to guard 
against mistakes. I le  is a public officer, of whom the law re­
quires the strictest impartiality between those who are obl iged' 
to have his services, and this impartiali ty cannot be enforced ex­
cept upon the rule tl)at he must, at his peril, levy and satisfy exe­
cut ions according to their seniority in his hands. Once allow it 
to be a race of dil igence between the different creditors in finding 
and pointing out the property of the debtor, and what a door to 
partiality, fraud and stri fe would be opened ! The sheriff might 
neglect inqu iry .  or be wil lfu lly ignorant ,  for the sake of favoring 
one or oppressing another creditor, and the whole controversy 
wou ld be thrown upon the uncerta in testimony of interested and 
suspicious witnesses. \Ve do not doubt, therefore, that it  was the 
intention of the legislature, as it is the course of reason, that exe­
cutions should be levied accord ing to sen iority , and that the sher­
iff in thi s case was not j ustified in levying the j unior execut ion 
first becau �e the cred itor in that execut ion had been more success­
ful than himself in finding the property of the execution debtor. 
* * * [ *41 1 ] * * * 
J11dgm e11 t affirmed. 
A j unior creditor, learning that the sheriff had no spec ial orders to 
levy, hnt only to summon a garnishee on the senior fi. fa. ,  ordered him 
to le\'y h i s  fi. fa.  on certa in  corn. Sheriff levied both writs at same t ime. 
The sen i or writ held ent itled to priority, because i t  is the sher iff's duty 
to le \'y on any property without special orders. Stuarts v. Reynolds. 4 
Harri n gton ( Del. ) T I2. See also To m linson v. Ro�•·e, Lalor"s Supp. to 
H i ll & Den io ( N. Y. ) 4 1 0. 
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ALBRECHT v. LONG, in Minn. Sup. Ct., July 2, 1878-25 Minn. 163.
Action by Ernest Albrecht et al. against Seth W. Long et al.
on official bond. From judgment for defendants plaintiffs appeal.
GILFILLAN, C. J. The defendant Long was sheriff of the
county of \-Vaseca, and Stevenson was his deputy. Executions
issued against the property of Sherwins were delivered as fol-
lows: One in favor of Charles Shedd, to the sheriff himself, at
10:30 o’clock p. m. of March 19, 1877; one in Wr of Chaney
Hardin et al., and another in fzifrbr of J. S. Ricker at al., to the
sheriff in person, at 2 o’clock a. m. of March 20' and one in favor
\—-g
of these plaintiffs to the deputy, at 6 o’cloc a. m. pf the same
day?‘ The deputy levied this last execution at half-past 6 a. m.
of the same day, and took possession of the property. About half
-an hour thereafter, the sheriff levied the three executions deliv-
ered to him in person, upon the same property, and, upon his re-
quest, the deputy delivered to him the plaintiffs’ execution, and
the possession of the property. The sheriff advertised the prop-
erty for sale under several executions, not naming either of them,
and sold the property, and applied the proceeds, after deducting
his fees, to the 1)_ay;nlrg1t_in~fgMt_he Shedd exeglion, and th
remainder upon the execution of Hardin et al., and returned the
plaintiffs’ wholly unsatisfied, whereupon plaintiffs bring suit
against the sheriff and the sureties in his official bond.
The question presented is, whether the levy of an execution
gives the execution creditor a lien upon the property, which en-
titles him to priority over other executions in the hands of the
same officer against the same debtor, delivered to the officer be-
fore, but not levied till after, his? For these executions are all
to be taken as delivered to the sheriff. The deputy is not an offi-
cer having a separate official existence from that of the sheriff.
He is an officer of the sheriff's whose powers and duties, so far
as they affect the public, it is true, are defined by law. But he
holds the office at the pleasure of the sheriff, is appointed and
removable by. him, and civilly responsible to him, and not to the
parties whose writs come into his hands. He must act in
the name of the sheriff, and not in his own name. All his acts
are, in law, the acts of the sheriff; and the responsibility, civilly,
for such acts done [*r7r] within his authority, is that of the
sheriff. Our statutes do not, as do the statutes of some of the
states. alter in any way the status of the deputy.
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ALBRECHT v. LONG, in Minn. Sup. Ct., July 2, 1878-25 Minn. 163. 
Action by Ernest Albrecht et al. against Seth W. Long et aJ. 
on official bond. From j udgment for defendants plaintiffs appeal. 
GILFILLAN', C. J. The defendant Long was sheriff of the 
county of \Vaseca, and Stevenson was his deputy. Executions 
issued against the property of Sherwins were delivered as fol­
lows : One in favor of Charles Shedd, to the sheriff himself, at 
10  :30 o'clock p. m. of l\farch 19, 1 877 ; one in favor of Chancy 
Hardin et al., and another in favor of J. S. Ricker et al., to the 
sheriff in person, at 2 o'clock a. m. of March? and one in favor 
of these plaintiffs,_to the deputy, at 6 o'cloc a. m.  _pf the same 
day'?"" The deputy lev ied this last execution at half-past 6 a. m .  
of the same day, and took possession o f  the property. About half 
. an hour thereafter, the sheriff levied the three executions deliv­
ered to him in person, upon the same property, and, upon his re­
quest, the deputy delivered to him the plaintiffs' execution , and 
the possession of the property. The sheriff advertised the prop­
erty for sale under several executions, not naming ei ther of them, 
and sold the property, and applied the proceeds, after deducting 
his fees, to the Q_ay_ment in fu ll of the Shedd executlqn, and th� 
remainder upon the execution of Hardin ct al. , and returned the 
plaintiffs' wholly unsatisfied , whereupon plaintiffs bring suit 
against the sheriff and the sureties in his official bond. 
The question presented is, whether the levy of an execution 
gives the execution creditor a lien upon the property, which en­
titles him to priority over other executions in the hands of the 
same officer against the same debtor, delivered to the officer be­
fore, but not levied till after, his ? For these executions are all 
to be taken as delivered to the sheriff. The deputy is not an offi­
cer having a separate official existence from that of the sheriff. 
He is  an officer of the sheriff's whose powers and duties, so far 
as they affect the public, it is true, are defined by law. But he 
holds the office at the pleasure of the sheriff, is appointed and 
removable by. him , and civilly responsible to him, and not to the 
parties whose writs come into his hands. He must act in 
the name of the sheriff, and not in his own name. All his acts • 
are, in lav.·, the acts of the sheriff ; and the responsibi lit�1 , civilly, 
for such acts done [ * 1 7 1 ]  within his authority, is that of the 
sheriff. Our statutes do not, as do the statutes of some of the 
states ,  alter in any way the status of the deputy. 
It is the duty of the sheriff, upon a writ coming into his 
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hands, to use due diligence in the execution of it. It attaches to
the writs as they come into his hands, and it follows that it is
his duty to execute first those which are first delivered to him.
Upon several executions in favor of different creditors against
the same debtor, it is his duty to the creditor in the first delivered,
to execute that first; and to the creditor in the second, to execute
that second; and so through them all. This is the duty he owes
to the several creditors. But the rights of the creditors, as against
each other, are not necessarily controlled by it.
At the common law, an execution bound the goods of the
debtor from the time of the taste, even though they were subse-
quently transferred to a bona fide purchaser. The statute 29
Charles II., c. 3, § 16, provided that execution “shall bind the
property of the goods against which such writ of execution is
sued out, but from the time that such writ shall be delivered to
the sheriff, under-sheriff or coroner, to be executed.” Under‘
the common—law rule, the execution operated as a lien in favor
of the creditor for the satisfaction of his debt, from the time of
the tesle, and, under the statute, it operated as a lien from the
time of its delivery to be executed. And the latter would continue
to be the rule, were it not for the provisions of the statute of this
' state. Oen. St. c. 66, § 269, enacts that “until a levy, property
not subject to the lien of the judgment is not affected by the exe-
cution.” So that'the creditor acquires a lien‘on the property, by
virtue of his execution, only from the levy. The property is not
affected by the taste, nor the delivery to the sheriff. The levy
fixes the rights of the creditor as to the specific property. It is
argued that the statute 29 Charles II., and the General Statutes
were passed only for the protection of bona fide purchasers, and
therefore do not affect the rights of [*172] execution creditors
as against each other. If this were so, their rights would be
controlled by the common-law rule, that the execution binds the
goods from its taste, and the execution last delivered and levied
might take precedence of all the others, because of the priority
in its tcstc. VV e do not think the statute was intended to operate
only as between the execution creditor and a bona fide purchaser,
as claimed, but it was intended to define absolutely, as its lan-
guage indicates, the rights of the creditors as to the specific prop-
erty, and as between him and all others.
The execution first levied, then, has the first lien on the
property, though there may be others in the hands of the. sheriff,
which were delivered to him before the one levied. Russell v.
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hands, to use due diligence in the execution of it. It attaches to 
• the writs as they come into his hands, and it follows that it i s  
h i s  duty to  execute first those which are first delivered to  him. 
Upon several executions in favor of different creditors against 
the same debtor, it is his duty to the creditor in the first delivered, 
to execute that first ; and to the creditor in the second, to execute 
that second ; and so through them all. This is the duty he owes 
to the several creditors. But the rights of the creditors, a� against 
each other, are not necessarily controlled by i t .  
At  the common law, an execution bound the goods of the 
debtor  from the time of the teste, even though they were subse­
quently transierred to a bona fide purchaser. The statute 29 
Charles II . ,  c. 3, § 16, provided that execution "shall bind the 
property of the goods against which such writ of execution is  
sued out, but from the t ime that such writ shall be delivered to 
the sheriff, under-sheriff or coroner, to be executed." Under · 
the common-law rule, the execution operated as a lien in favor 
of the creditor for the satisfaction of his debt, from the t ime of 
• the teste, and, under the statute, it operated as a lien from the 
time of its delivery to be executed. And the latter would continue 
to be the rule, were i t  not for the provisions of the statute of this 
state. Gen. St. c. 66, § 269, enacts that "until a levy, property 
• not subj ect to the lien of the j udgment is not affected by the exe­
cution." So that· the creditor acquires a lien · on the property, by 
vi rtue of his execution, only from the levy. The property i s  not 
affected by the teste, no r the delivery to the sheriff. The levy 
fixes the rights of the creditor as to the specific property. It is 
argued that the statute 29 Charles II . ,  and the General Statutes 
were passed only for the protection of bona fide purchasers, and 
therefore do not affect the rights of [ * 1 72 ]  execution creditors 
as against each other. If this were so, their rights would be 
control led by the common-law rule, that the execution binds the 
goods from its teste, and the execution last delivered and levied 
might take precedence of all the others, because of the priority 
in its tcste. \Ve do not think the statute was intended to operate 
only as between the execution creditor and a bona fide purchaser, 
as claimed ,  but it was intended to define absolutely, as its lan-
• guage ind icates , the rights of the creditors as to the specific prop­
ertv, and as between him and all others. 
· The execution first levied , then , has the first lien on thel 
property, though there may be others in the hands of thP. sheriff,  
which were del ivered to him before the one l evied.  Russell v. 
L mcto 11, 1 4  Wis .  202 [ atite p. 33 I ]  ; Kno:r v. TVebster, 18  \Vis. 
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406 [ante p. 333]. The creditors in executions afterwards levied
cannot claim to be paid out of the property, until the one first
levied is satisfied. This would be so in a contest between the
creditors, and it must be so in a dispute between the creditor hav-
ing the first lien by levy, and the sheriff. The remedy of the
creditor in the execution first delivered is against the sheriff. I
the latter, through negligence, omit to levy the first execution
-till a second has been levied, and loss thereby accrues to the firs
execution creditor, an action will undoubtedly lie.
It does not follow, however, from the rule of law that a sher-
iff and his deputies are regarded as one officer, that where several
executions against the same debtor are placed, some in the hands
of the sheriff in person, and others in the hands of his deputy.
and in consequence thereof, and without actual negligence of the
sheriff or deputy holding the execution first delivered, a subse-
quent execution is first levied, that the sheriff is liable to the
creditor in the first execution. When it comes to a question of
diligence, the law recognizes the fact that the sheriff and his dep-
uty are different persons, though in theory one officer.‘ And as
it does not require impossibilities, it regards the question of dili-
gence in view of [*I73] that fact, and of what may naturally
happen in consequence of it. Russell v. Lawton, I4 VVis. 202
[ante p. 393] ; l/Vhitney v. Buttcrfield, 13 Cal. 335. ‘
Order reversed, and new trial ordered.
An officer received an execution at 4 p. m. with request to execute
it at once by taking a designated stock of goods in a store in a town
five miles distant, accessible by street car, through railway, or horse and
carriage, and at the same time was warned that the judgment debtor
would soon assign and was believed to be at that time making out the
papers. The sheriff promised to attend to it that night if he had to go
himself. He missed the train that night by reason of a recent change in
time of departure and decided to wait till the next day. He went 011 the
train at 10 a. n1. the next day, and found the store locked, an assignment
having been made and filed between II and I2 21. m. that day. Afterward
he returned the writ unsatisfied for want of goods and was held liable
in an action by the creditor for a breach of official duty. Guiterman
Brothers v. Sharvey, 46 Minn. 183, 24 Am. St. 218, 48 N. W. 780. Similar
facts and decision in People v. Colerick, 67 Mich. 362, 34 N. W. 683.
In Whitney v. Butterfield, above cited, a sheriff was sued for failure
to levy before 1 a. m. Monday, a writ of attachment handed him between
9 and 10 p. m. Sunday, by reason of which delay a later attachment was
first levied by one of his deputies in favor of another creditor. The delay
of an hour at midnight, after he could legally execute the writ, was not
sufficient ground for action, it appearing that the sheriff had no notice
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4o6 [an te p. 333 ] . The creditors in executions a fterwards 1evied 
cannot claim to be paid out of the property, until the one first 
levied is satisfied. This would be so in a contest between the 
creditors, and it  must be so in a dispute between the creditor hav­
ing the first lien by levy, and the sheriff. The remedy of the • 
creditor in the execution first delivered i s  against the sheriff. I� 
the latter, through negligence, omit to levy the first execution 
. till a second has been levied, and loss thereby accrues to the firs 
execu tion creditor, an action will undoubtedly lie. 
It  does not follow, however, from the rule of law that a sher­
iff and his deputies are regarded as one officer, that where several 
executions against the same debtor are placed, some in the hands 
of the sheriff in person, and others in the hands of his deputy . 
and in consequence thereof, and w ithout actual negligence of the 
sheriff or deputy holding the execution first delivered, a subse­
quent execution is first levied, that the sheriff is  liable to the 
creditor in the fi rst execution. When it comes to a question of • 
diligence, the law recognizes the fact that the sheriff and his dep­
uty are different persons, though in theory one officer. And as 
it does not require impossibilities, it  regards the question of dili­
gence in view of [ * 1 73 ]  that fact, and of what may naturally 
happen in consequence of it. Russell v. Lawton, 14 Wis. 202 
[a1 1tc p. 393 ] ; U'hitn cy v. Butterfield, 1 3  Cal. 335.  
Order re--versed, and ne-w triaJ ordered. 
An officer received an execution at 4 p. m. with request to execute 
it at once by taking a designated stock of goods in a store in a town 
five miles distant, accessible by street car, through railway, or horse and 
carriage, and at the same time was warned that the j u dgment debtor 
would soon assign and was believed to be at that time making out the 
papers. The sheriff promised to attend to it that night if he had to go 
himself. He missed the train that n ight by reason of a recent change in 
time of departure and decided to wait till  the next day. He went on the 
train at IO a. m. the next d ay, and found the store locked, an assignment 
having been made and filed between I I and 12 a. m. that day. Afterward 
he returned the writ unsatisfied for want of goods and was held l iable 
in an action by the creditor for a breach of  official duty. Guiterman 
Brothers v. SharveJ1, 4() Minn. 183, 24 Am. St. 2 18, 48 N. W. /8o. Similar 
facts and decision in People v. Colerick, 67 Mich. 362, 34 N. W. 683. 
In Whitney v. Butterfield, above cited, a sheriff was sued for failure 
to levy before I a. m. Monday, a writ of attachment handed him between 
9 and IO p. m. Sunday, by reason of which delay a later attachment was 
first levied by one of his deputies in favor of another creditor. The delay 
of an hour at midnight, after he could legally execute the writ, was not 
sufficient ground for action, it appearing that the sheriff had no notice 
of the other writ or warning that great haste was necessary. The court 
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discuss at length the degree of diligence required of such officers. Com-
pare Commonwealth v. Magee, ante, p. 306, and Russell v. Lawton, ante,
33].
ALBRECHT v. LONG, in Minn. Sup. Ct., Aug. 4, 188o—27 Minn. 8r,
‘ 6 N. W. 420.
After the next trial defendants appealed from judgment for
plaintiffs.
GILFILLAN, C. J. * * * There was evidence of a previous ar-
rangement between the sheriff and deputy to the effect that the
latter should not serve any process issuing from the district court:
that all such process should be served by the sheriff in person.
Defendants claim that, had this arrangement been acted on, plain-
tiffs’ [*83] execution would have come into the hands of the sher-
iff, personally, before service, and that he would have served the
executions in their proper order; that the deputy was induced,
by the attorncy’s false representations, to disregard the arrange-
ment, and to receive, and at once, without consulting the sheriff,
to levy plaintiff’s execution. Such an arrangement, even if it
- might bind the sheriff and deputy, could be of no effect as to third
persons. A deputy sheriff, it is true, is an officer of the sheriff,
appointed and removable by him, civilly responsible to him, and
acting only in his name. But the deputy’s powers and duties, so
far as the public are concerned, are fixed by law, and cannot be
varied by any agreement between him and the sheriff. Those
powers and duties are vested in and imposed on him, not for the
convenience of the sheriff, but of the public. Notwithstanding
the arrangement, therefore, it was the duty of the deputy to re-
ceive the execution, and with all reasonable diligence to execute
it. That the deputy was, by false statements, induced to do his
duty in receiving the execution, and to perform his duty to levy
it at once, without delay, is not in law a fraud. Deceit, not fol-
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discuss at length the degree of diligence required of such officers. Com-
• pare Commonwealth v. Magee, ante, p. JO(), and Russell v. Lawton, ante, 
3JI. 
ALBRECHT v. LONG, in Minn. Sup. Ct., Aug. 4. 188o-27 Minn. 81.  
6 N. W. 420. 
After the next trial defendants appealed from j udgment for 
plaintiffs. 
GILFILLAN, C. ]. * * * There was evidence of a previous ar­
rangement between the sheriff and deputy to the effect that the 
• latter should not serve any process issuing from the district court : 
that all such process should be served by the sheriff in person. 
Defendants claim that, had this arrangement been acted on, plain­
tiffs' [*83] execution would have come into the hands of the sher­
iff, personally, before service, and that he would have served the 
executions in their proper order ; that the deputy was induced, 
by the attorney's false representations, to disregard the arrange­
ment, and to receive, and at once, without consulting the sheriff, 
to levy plaintiff's execution. Such an arrangement, even if it! 
• might bind the sheriff and deputy, could be of no effect as to third 
persons. A deputy sheriff, it is true, is an officer of the sheriff, 
appointed and removable by him, civilly responsible to him, and l 
acting only in his name. But the deputy's powers and duties, so 
far as the public are concerned, are fixed by law, and cannot be 
� varied by any agreement between him and the sheriff. Those 
powers an<l duties are vested in and imposed on him, not for the 
convenience of the sheriff, but of the public. Notwithstanding 
the arrangement, therefore, it was the duty of the deputy to re­
ceive the execution, and ":·ith all reasonable diligence to execute 
it. That the deputy was, by false statements, induced to do his 
duty in receiving the execution, and to perform his duty to levy 
it at once, without delay, is not in law a fraud. Deceit, not fol-
,. lowed by what the law recognizes as a wrong, is not fraud. * * * 
Judgme1it affirmed. 
1zx1-:cU'r1i\:o THE wnrrs 399
LEDYARD v. JONES, in N. Y. Ct. of App., Dec. Term, t852—-7 N. Y.
(3 Sclden) 550.
Action by Ledyard against Jones as sheriff for failure to re-
turn an execution. From judgment for plaintiff defendant brings
error.
\VATSON, J. There is but a single point in this case which
the court is called upon to decide, and that is, as to the amount
of damages the respondent is entitled to recover in this action.
The verdict finds that the appellant did not levy the execution
placed in his hands: that he n1ade a false return upon it: that he
did not return it at the expiration of sixty days: and it was ad-
mitted on the trial that the defendant in the execution had both
real and personal property out of which the execution might have
been satisfied. The amount of the execution was $500.49, and the
jury found a verdict of $200. This question has been repeatedl_
passed upon in the supreme court, and I regret that the decisions
are conflicting. In Patterson v. W esters-el_t, I7 “lend. 543, where
it was shown that the judgment debtor had abundant means to
satisfy the execution, the court held, that the plaintiff sustained
damages to the whole amount of the judgment; and that having
been kept out of his money by the wrongful act of the officer in
11ot executing and returning the process according to its com-
mands, the debt as proved by the judgment constituted [*552]
the true measure of damages. In the case of The Bank of Rome
v. Curtiss, 1 Hill, 275, the court held that the sheriff was prima
facie liable for the whole amount due, and that it was no answer
to say that the defendants in ii. fa. were still able to pay. This
doctrine was again laid down by the court in the case of Pardee
v. Robertson, 6 Hill, 550, together with another upon which the
appellant has made a point, and that is, that the respondent might
recover the full amount of the judgment without averring special
damages in his declaration. All these cases, as well as lVeld
v. Bartlett, 10 Mass. 470, 474, lay it down with this qualification,
that the debt is grime _faa'e the tme measure of damages, the
sheriff being at liberty to mitigate the amount by showing aff1rm:_'_
__(,=*EML__Mh"'\vl&&"_LQ11111-I191-hi11m@L<>ll¢¢te<1-if .4116 _
ili ence had been exercised in executing the process. In the
,‘C3S<?()¢‘¢r§7—tw”rlW7ff)W)m_<),:;27W1Tcoi1ff4held_an~entirely
different doctrine. They held that the plaintiff could not sho\
that the judgment debtor had real estate out of which the fi. fa
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LEDY ARD v. JONES, in N. Y. Ct. of App., Dec. Term, 1852-7 N. Y. 
(3 Selden ) 550. 
Action by Ledyard against Jones as sheriff for failure to re­
turn an execution. From j udgment for plaintiff defendant brings 
error. 
\VATSON, J. There is but a single point in this case which 
the court i s  called upon to decide, and that is, as to the amount 
of damages the respondent is entitled to recover in this action. • 
The verdict finds that the appellant did not levy the execution 
placed in his hands : that he made a false return upon it : that he 
<lid not return i t  at the expiration of sixty days : and it was ad­
mitted on the trial that the defendant in the execution had bot� 
real and personal prop�rty out of which the execution might have 
been sati sfied . The amount of the execution was $500.49, and the 
ju ry found a verdict of $200. This question has been repeated!. 
passed upon in the supreme court, and I regret that the decisions 
are conflicting. In Patterson v. W estcr-uelt, 17 \Vend. 543, where 
i t  was shown that the judgment debtor had abundant means to 
sat isfy the execution, the court held, that the plainti ff sustained 
damages to the whole amount of the judgment ; and that having 
been kept out of his money by the wrongful act of the officer in  
not  executing and returning the process according to i t s  com­
mand s, the debt as proved by the j udgment constituted [ *552] 
the true measure of damages. In  the case of  The Ba11k of Rome 
v. C11rtiss, 1 Hill ,  27 5, the court held that the sheriff \\'as prim a 
facie liable for the whole amount due, and that it was no answer 
to say that the defendants in Ii. fa. were st ill aole to pay. This 
doctrine was again laid down by the court in the case of Pardee 
v. Robertson, 6 Hill, 550, together with another upon which the 
appellant has made a point, and that is, that the respondent might 
recover the full amount of the j udgment without averring special 
damages in his declaration. All these cases, as well as  1Veld 
v. Bartlett, IO Mass. 470, 474, lay it down with this qualification, 
that the debt is  (?rima faric the true measure of damages, the 
sheriff bein at l ibert to mi ti ate the amount b showin affirf!l: -'-
ative y t 1at the whole sum co •e been collected i f  due 
i i i  ence had been exercised in executing the pro� -In - the 
case o evens v .  ou·e, 3 emo, 327,  t e cot1rt"held-anenti rely 
d ifferent doctrine. They held that the plaintiff coul<l not shm� 
that the judgment dehtor had real estate out of which the fi. fa\ 
m ight have been satisfied unless expressly averred in the declara-
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tion, and also that the sheriff might mitigate the amount, not sim-
ply by showing his inability to collect the money, but by proof that
the debt was still safe and collectable. I confess I am unable to
see the justice of the rule laid down in the case of S (evens v. Rowe,
and if it is good law, the statute which gives the plaintiff a right
to recover damages against a sheriff who neglects to execute pro-
cess delivered to him, is a mere nullity. It in truth affords him
no remedy whatever, and allows an unfaithful and defaulting
ofiicer to take advantage of his own wrong, a privilege that the
' law accords to no other person. According to this construction,
if the officer is sued for a neglect of duty, he can say the defend-
ant in the execution had no property out of which he could col-
lect the money, and that it is conceded is a good defense, or he
can say he has property out of which you can still collect it, and
therefore nothing but nominal damages can be recovered against
me, which can only be the damages the plaintiff has sustained by
the delay in collecting the money, simply the [*553] interest upon
the interest of the money due when it ought to have been collected.
To such a doctrine I c_an never yield my assent, for a plaintiff, if
this is tolerated, might never be able to collect his debt. The sec-
ond execution issued upon the same judgment would admit of
the same defense, and so on, as often as they might be issued.
provided the judgment debtor did not in the meantime get rid of
his property. The rule laid down by the court in the cases first
cited, is by far the most salutary, and to my mind a just and fair
exposition of the statute giving a remedy against defaulting ofii-
cers. * * * [*554] * * * The judgment of the supreme court
should be affirmed.
Ruoouss, Ch. I. and Jewrzrr, Jonnson and WELLES, ]].,
concurred in the opinion of Judge VVATSON.
GARDIN-ER and Mouse, ]]., dissented, but wrote no opinion.
Approved in Dunphy v. Whipple, 25 Mich. 10, holding sheriff liable
for full amount for failure to return writ showing levy and sale to credi-
tor.
See also Chafiin v. Crutcher, 2 Sneed (Tenn.) 360; Taylor v. Han-
cork, I9 La. An. 466. This is the better view. In the cases to the con-
trary, like Colyer v. Higgins, post, and Commonwealth v. Magee, ante.
the question seems to be disposed of without much consideration and
without being argued by counsel. In a later ennsylvania case’a con-
stable was sued for releasing property levied on and judgment rendered
against him for the amount"of the execution, which the supreme court
affirmed, saying: “The measure of damages is not always the amount of
the execution but the value of the property levied on when it does not
















































































































































400 CASES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC. 
tion, an<l also that the sheriff might mitigate the amount, not sim­
ply by showing his inability to collect the money, but by proof that 
the debt was still safe and collectable. I confess I am unable to 
see the j ustice of the rule laid down in the case of Stevetis v. Ro we, 
and if it is good law, the statute which gives the plaintiff a right 
to recover damages against a sheriff who neglects to execute pro­
cess delivered to him, is a mere null ity. It in truth affords him 
• no remedy whatever, and allows an unfaithful and defaulting 
officer to take advantage of his own wrong, a privilege that the 
law accords to no other person. According to this construction, 
i f  the officer is sued for a neglect of duty, he can say the defend­
ant in the execution had no property out of which he could col­
lect the money, and that it is conceded is a good defense, or he 
can say he has property out of which you can still collect it, and 
• therefore nothing but nominal damages can be recovered against 
me, which can only be the damages the plaintiff has sustained by 
the delay in collecting the money, simply the [ *553] interest upon 
the interest of the money due when it ought to have been collected. 
To snch a doctrine I c.an never yield my assent, for a plaintiff, if  
this is tolerated, might never be able to collect his debt. The sec­
ond execution issued upon the same j udgment would admit of 
the same defense, and so on, as often as they might be issued. 
provided the judgment debtor did not in the meantime get rid of 
his property. The rule laid down by the court in the cases first 
cited , is by far the most salutary, and to my mind a j ust and fair 
• exposition of the statute giving a remedy against defaulting offi­
cers. * * * [ *554] * * * The j udgment of the supreme court 
should be affirmed. 
RuGGLES, Ch. J. and JEWETT, JoHNSON and WELLES, JJ. ,  
concurred in the opinion of Judge WATSON. 
GARDINER and MoRSE, JJ., dissented , but wrote no opinion . 
Approved in Dunphy v. Whipple, 25 Mich. 10, holding sheriff l iable 
for full amount for failure to return writ showing levy and sale to credi-
tor. 
See also Chanin v. Crutcher, 2 Sneed ( Tenn.)  36<> ;  Taylor v. Han­
cock, 19 La. An. 466. This is the better view. In the cases to the con-
• trary, l ike Colyer v. Higgins, post, and Commot1wealth v.  Magee, ante. 
the quest ion seems to be disposed of without much consideration and 
without being argued by counsel. In  a latei:,Pennsylvania case / a con­
stable was sued for releasing property levied on and j udgment rendered 
against h i m  for the amount""of the execution, which the supreme court 
affirmed ,  savi11g : "The measure of  damages is not always the amount of 
the executi�n but the valu.e of the property levied on when i t  does not 
• equal the  amount claimed in the execution. This furnishes the true rule. 
EXF.CUTIl\'G THE \\'RI'l‘S 4101
But the presumption here is that the value of the goods was at least equal‘
to the amount claimed.” Carson v. Hunt, 14 Pa. St. 510, 53 Am. Dec. 568.
“What th ' ould have made fo intiff, by a pro er d_ischa_rge-
of his duty, is the just and reasonable, as well as the egal, standa‘rd_of
his l|a51l1Iy.“_C‘Uflrm’o7Tivca?flt v. fiontner, 18 Pa. St. 439. " "
COLYER v. HIGGINS, in Ky. Ct. of App. Winter Term, 1863-62 Ky.
(1 Duvall) 6, 85 Am. Dec. 601.
BULLETT, J. This is an action against Colyer, the sheriff of
Rockcastle county, and his sureties, upon an official bond exe-
cuted on the 3d of January, 1853, to recover the amount of an
execution placed in his hands, and thirty per cent damages for his
failure to return the same for thirty days after the return day
thereof. A judgment was rendered accordingly against the de-
fendants, from which they appeal.
In our opinion, the plaintiffs have not shown a right to main-
tain an action upon said bond.
The petition states, that in the year 1852, an execution in
favor of the plaintiffs, against one Kietley, was placed in_ the
hands of said Colyer, sheriff of said county, and was levied by
!\
him on some property; that afterward, on the 24th of November, -'
1852, a writ of't'eizdz'ti0|zi_£gi'p¢Z_-J1}was issued thereon, returnable
the fourth Monday of Jamiaf_\", 1853, and “was also in its lifetime
[*7] placed in the hands of said Colyer while sheriff as aforesaid ;”
and that he failed to return the same until the 25th of April, 1853.
Under the constituion of the state, the offfice of each sheriff
expired on the first Monday in January, 1853, or as soon there-
after as his successor qualified. Art. 6, § 4. The facts before
mentioned authorize the assumption that Colyer was elected and
qualified for two terms, the first of which expired in January,
1853.
It does not distinctly appear, nor does it seem to be material,
whether the writ of 7.'CIldfIi0tti cxponas was delivered to Colyer
before or after the expiration of his first term. That writ gives
no new authority to the sheriff. It merely commands him to per-
form his duty under the original writ. According to the settled
principles of the common law. he who begins the execution of a
writ of ficri facius must end it. A sheriff who levies upon prop
erty may sell it after the return day and after returning the exe-
cution, without a writ of r'cna'i'tioni c.r[>onos, and after he has
gone out of office; and it is his duty to do so. Cor V. Joiner, 4
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But the presumption here is  that the value of the goods was a t  least equal• 
to the amount claimed." Corso n v. Hunt, 14 Pa. St. 5 10, 53 Am. Dec. 568. 
" W hat th 
· 
ould have made f intiff, by a pro er <!_i_sch¥ge_ 
of h is  duty, is the j ust and reason able, as well as the egal, standard of 
his ltab1hty. ' Cumfflonwcaltl1 v. C on tner, 18 Pa. St. 439. - -
COLYER v. H IGGI N S, in Ky. Ct. of App. Winter Term, 1863-62 Ky. 
l I Duvall ) o, 85 Am. Dec. 6o 1 .  
llULLETT, J .  This is  an action against Colyer, the sheriff of 
Rockcastle county, and his  sureties, upon an official bond exe­
cuted on the 3d of January, 1 853, to recover the amount of an 
execution placed in his hands, and thirty per cent damages for his 
failure to return the same for thirty days after the return day 
thereof. A judgment was rendered accordingly against the de­
fendants, from which they appeal. 
In our opinion, the plaintiffs have not shown a right to main­
tain an action upon said bond. 
The petition states, that in the year 1852, an execut ion in 
favor of the plaintiffs, against one Kietley, was placed in. the 
hands of said Colyer, sheriff of said county, and was levied by 
him on some property ; that afterward, on the 24th of 1\ovember, :;-. ... \ - -..... - - --·· - ·  \ 1 852, a writ of•.J.p1ditio11 i_�xpo1w�·  was issued thereon, returnable � ,, ..,. 
the fourth Monday of January:-1853, and "was also in its l ifetime ' 
[ *7 ]  placed in the hands of  said Colyer while sheriff as aforesaid ;" 
and that he failed to return the same until the 25th of April , 1853. 
Under the constituion of the state, the office of each sheriff 
expi red on the first l\fonday in January, 1 853, or as soon there­
after as his successor qualified. Art. 6, § 4. The facts before 
mentioned authorize the assumption that Colyer was elected and 
qualified for two terms, the first of which expired in January, 
1853. 
It does not distinctly appear, nor does it seem to be material , 
whether the writ of  i·c11dit io1 1 i  c:rponas was del ivered to Colyer 
before or after the expiration of his first term. That writ gives 
no new authority to the sheriff. It merely commands him to per­
fo rm his  duty uncler the original writ. According to the settled 
principles of the con�mon law. he who begins  the execution o f  a 
w r it of  ficri facias must end i t .  A sheriff who levies upon pror· 
erty may �ell it a fter the return day and after returning the exe­
cution , wi thout a writ of  '< 'C11dit io 11 i cxponas, and after he has 
gone out of office : and it is his duty to do so . Cox v. J o i11 cr, 4 
B i bb ( Ky. ) 94 : lYolford \'. Plzclps, 2 J. J. :\Iarsh. ( Ky . )  � 1 : 
. \: .... ' 
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Rogers v. Darnaby, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 238, 241; Irtein V. Picket,
3 Bibb (Ky.) 343; Lofland v. Ewing, 5 Litt. 42; Neilson v.
Clmrclzill, 5 Dana (Ky.) 333; Sprung v. Commonwealth, 12 Pa.
St. 358, and cases cited. And if he sells property he must con-
vey it, though he may have gone out of office. Allen v. Trimble,
4 Bibb, 21; Trimble v. Breckenridge, Ib., 479. These principles.
so far as they apply to the question under consideration, do not
appear to have been changed by statute.
It is clear, therefore, that if Colyer had gone out of ofiice
on the first Monday in January, 1853, it would have been his
duty to execute the writ of verzditiorzi c.r[>0nas, whether it came to
his hands before or after the expiration of his term; and that his
sureties (for his first term) would have been liable for his fail-
ure to do so. ,It is equally clear, that if he had gone into office,
for the first time, in January, 1853, it would have been the duty
of his predecessor, and not his duty, to execute the writ; and
that his sureties in the bond sued upon would not have been lia-
ble for his failure to do so. It is evident, therefore, [*8] that
the duty of executing said writ was devolved upon him by his
first, and not by his second term of office; and that the bond
sued upon, which relates only to his second term, did not bind
either him or his sureties for the performance of that duty,
which appertained to his first term.
But the appellees have a right, independently of the bond,
to recover nominal damages from Colyer for failing to return
the writ as required by law; and this is the only relief to which
their petition shows they are entitled.
-Upon other points argued by counsel we need not express an
opinion. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded,
with directions to dismiss the petition against the sureties, and
for further proceedings against Colyer not inconsistent with this
opinion. Reversed.
In Minnesota it is said that execution against property attached should
be given to and executed by the successor, if the old sheriff had gone out
of office. Butler V. While, 25 Minn. 432.
HARTLEIB v. McLANE, in Pa. Sup. Ct., May 6, I863—44 Pa. St. 510,
84 Am. Dec. 464.
Case by Mathias Ilartleib against John Vt’. McLane as sher-
iff of Erie county for value of goods levied on under plaintiff’s
fi. fa a_n_d_ stolenabctwcen the day of levy and the day of sale
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Rogers v. Darnab)•, 4 B. Mon. ( Ky. ) 238, 241 ;  lrwt"n v. Picket, 
3 Bibb ( Ky. ) 343 ; Lofland v. Ewing, 5 Litt. 42 ;  Neilson v. 
Clmrchill, 5 Dana ( Ky. ) 333 ; Sprang v. Commonwealth, 12  Pa. 
St. 358, and cases cited. And if he sells property he must con­
vey it, though he may have gone out of office. Allen v. Trimble, 
4 Bibb, 2 1  ; Trimble v. BreckeHridge, lb., 479. These principles . 
so far as they apply to the question under consideration , do not 
appear to have been changed by statute. 
It is clear, therefore, that if Colyer had gone out of office 
on the first :Monday in January, 1853, it would have been his 
duty to execute the writ of ·venditioni exponas, whether it came to 
his hands before or after the expiration of his term ; and that his 
sureties ( for his first term) would have been liable for his fail­
ure to do so . . It is equally clear, that if he had gone into office, 
for the first time, in January, 1853, it would have been the duty 
of his predecessor, and not his duty, to execute the writ ; and 
that his sureties in the bond sued upon would not have been lia­
ble for his failure to do so. It is evident, therefore, [*8] that 
the duty of executing said writ was devolved upon him by his 
first, and not by his second term of office ; and that the bond 
"" sued upon, which relates only to his second term, did not bind 
either him or his . sureties for the performance of that duty, 
which appertained to his first term. 
But the appellees have a right, independently o f  the bond, 
to recover nominal damages from Colyer for failing to return 
the writ as required by law ; and this is the only relief to which 
their petition shows they are entitled. 
·Upon other points argued by counsel we need not express an 
opinion. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded, 
with directions to dismiss the petition against the sureties, and 
for further proceedings against Colyer not inconsistent with this 
opinion . Reversed. 
In Minnesota it is said that execution against property attached should 
he given to and executed by the successor, if the old sheriff had gone out 
of office. Butler v. White, 25 Minn. 432. 
HARTLEIB v. McLANE, in Pa. Sup. Ct., May 6, 1863-44 Pa. St. 510, 
84 Am. Dec. 464 
Case by :Mathias IIartleib against John W. l\IcLane as sher­
iff o f  Erie county for value of goods levied on under plaintiff's 
fi. fa il,.Q.�. stolen- be.tween the day of levy and the day of � 
_ou t of a store in which the goods were seized, a� .uL_which the 
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sheriff had kc t ' - From judgment for defendant plain-
ti rmgs error.
THOMPSON, I. There is but a single point of inquiry in this
case ; that involves the question gpw far a sheriff is liable for the
safe custody of goods taken in ecution by him, and the degree
of care to be observed, whether of an ordinary bailee for _h_i_re, or
a common £a!:LicLQrl1nkeeper, so as to raise a responsibility for
loss by theft. * * * [*5I2] In Wheeler v. Hambright, 9 S. &-
R. (Pa.) 390, although the action was for an escape, yet the rea-
son for liability was rested upon general principles of public pol-
icy. There the sheriff had made a return of non. est inventus to 5'
ca. sa., but before the return his deputy had arrested the defend-
ant on another writ. Under these circumstances the sheriff .was
holden as for an escape on the first writ. * * *
Why should a sherifi, having in custody the person of a de-
fendant as a satisfaction of the judgment on which his writ is
founded, on principle, stand on different footing from that Olkp
which he would if he had the custody of the defendant’s property
for the same purpose? It is not easy to see the distinction, and
a more difiicult task would be to point out where the argument,
good in the one case, is defective in the other. The proposition
is, that authority settles, that ordinary care is not sufficient in
the one case; but inasmuch as direct authority does not exist
either way, ordinary care is sufiicient in the other. This is not
a non sequitur. It seems to me to be more reasonable to apply
the strict rule toilieciistody of goods than to the person; for if
they be stolen the creditor cannot levy again, and he must bear
?l1_6\l6iSS without the slightest default of his own; whereas, for an
escape, if ~it is the defendant’s own act, he may be again arrested.
';I,n_t~he one case the debt is absolutely satisfied by the levy, in the _
other it is only contingently so. * * * [*513] * * *
The sherifl, when he levies, is armed with authority to be-
come the exclusive custodian of the property seized, and it is his‘
duty to become so in fact, if he would not risk its abstraction.
This care is his personal interest, if the law requires him to ac-
count for the property, unless he is divested ofit by the act of
God, the public enemies, the law, or by some irresistible accident,
such as sudden fires, or the like. Nothing but such a rule we
think adequate for such a trust, and we believe the stringency
of the law in Pennsylvania in regard to sheriffs, has so much in-
creased the care of incumbents of the ofiice in the discharge of
their duties, that it accounts for the fact that we have but few
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sher iff had kept oo�,st;,:ssiOJl.. From judgment for defendant plain­
tiff brings error. 
THOMPSON, J .  There is  but a single point of inquiry in this 
case ; that involves the question }\ow far a sheriff is liable for the 
safe custody of goods taken in �ecution by him, and the degree 
of care to be observed, wheJher of an ordinary _bailee for hi re, or 
a common carrier or innkeeper, so as _to raise a responsibi l i ty for 
loss by theft. * * * [ *5 12 ]  In Wheeler v. Hambright, 9 S. & 
R. ( Pa. ) 390, although the action was for an escape, yet the rea­
son for liability was rested upon general principles of public pol­
icy. There the sheriff had made a return of non est in'l!e11tus to a 
ca. sa., but before the return his deputy had arrested the defend­
ant on another writ. Under these circumstances the sheriff .was 
holden as for an escape on the first writ. * * * 
Why should a sheriff, having in custody the person of a de­
fendant as a satisfaction of the judgment on which his writ is 
founded, on principle, stand on different footing from that 01\__. . 
which he would i f  he had the custody of the defendant's property 
for the same purpose ? It is not easy to see the distinction, and 
a more difficult task would be to point out where the argument, 
good in the one case, is defective in the other. The proposition 
is, that authority settles, that ordinary care is not sufficient in 
the one case ; but inasmuch as direct authority does not exist 
either way, ordinary care is sufficient in the other. This is not 
a n o n  sequitur. It seems to me to be mor� reasonable to apply 
Jhe s�tj�! rul_� to 'the - ci:Jstody of goods than to the person ; for if 
they be stolen the creditor cannot levy again, and he must bear 
theTO.<>s without the sl ightest default of  his own ; whereas, for an -escape, if -it is the defendant's own act, he may be again arrested. 
}n .the on..e case the debt is absolutely satisfied by the levy,  in the _ 
other it is only contingently so. * * * [*513 ]  * * * 
The sheriff, when he levies, is armed with authority to be­
come the exclusive custodian of the property seized, and it is his­
duty to become so in fact , i f  he would not risk its abstraction. 
This care is his personal interest, if the law requires him to ac-1 
count for the property, unless he is divested of · it by the act of 
God, the public enemies, the law, or by some irresist ible accident, 
such as sudden fires, or the like. Nothing but such a rule we • 
think adequate for such a trust , and we believe the stringency 
of the law in Pennsylvania in regard to sheriffs, has so much in­
creased the care of incumbents of the office in the discharge of 
their duties ,  that it  accounts for the fact that we have but few 
ca�cs, comparat ively speaking, against sheriffs for deficiency m 




the discharge of their official functions. The opinion of jurors
of what is due care and diligence, although in many cases it is
necessarily a standard of liability, is at best a loose one, especially
in regard to ofiicers of influence, such as sheriffs. It would be
found to be too flexible for exact justice. Through sympathy
for the officer the debtor and creditor would be liable to be for-
, gotten. It is infinitely better, therefore, to contract the necessity
' for a resort to vague standards than to enlarge it. VVe shall
doubtless find no lack of good and efficient men ready and willing
at all times to risk the responsibility of the rule for the sake of
the office.
An objection is sometimes urged that the officer is allowed no
fees for watchmen, or for the removal of goods. This is doubt-
' less because the law-making power has supposed that the taxable
costs for executing process, and in making sales, are sufficient
for this purpose. If they are not, the law should be altered; for
it would be a bad system that would take away the control of the
debtor over his property, which may not, before sale, go into the
hands of the creditor for preservation, and yet leave it liable to
be stolen or embezzled while in the custody of the sheriff. [*514]
In VVatson on Sheriffs, 188, the rule of the English author-
ities in regard to the liability of sheriffs in executing mesne pro-
cess, is thus stated: “After the sheriff has seiz_e_d go_od_s,_ it__i_s_
___-.-..--_ _s_ _ -
I
\
- ~ -J ‘ his duty to, remove them to_a place of safe cutody until 'tl1_ey_’can
sold, for if they be. rescued, the sheriff is liable to the plaintiff
for their value; Sly v. Finch, Cro. Jac. 514, Godbolt 276; Mild-
_1nay v. Smith, 3 Saunders _(Eng.) 343; and it is said that if the
sheriff take cattle, and afterwards the cattle die for want of
meat, the sheriff is answerable for the value returned.” Clerk
V. lVithers, 2 Lord Raym. I075. The rule of the common law un-
', \ doubtedly was, and is, that flJ.e___slleriff is lia_bl_e. fQL..gQQ.d$_5£iZ-€‘.d
‘ o..,,t' o_rl_f_inal_ process, unless prevented by inevitable a_ccident_or p_ub_l_ic
.' enemie_s_. The authorities above cited prove this beyond doubt
"See also as to this the opinion of Mr. Justice Redfield, Bridges
v. Perry, 14 Vt. 262.
The rule of the common law is maintained by this learned
judge in the case cited, and the learned counsel for the defendant
in error were led into error in citing it as sustaining their theory
of the case, in not adverting to the distinction drawn between an
(attrzclnnent, the object of which is to compel appearance. and an
(’.1'(‘(11fi011. ‘In the former, the sheriff is held to occupy only the
position of an ordinary bailee. The reason for the distinction
seems to be not only in the effect between debtor and creditor as
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the di scharge of their official functions. The opinion of j urors 
of what is due care and diligence, although in many cases it is 
necessarily a standard of l iability, is at best a loose one, especially 
in regard to officers of influence, such as sheriffs. It would be 
found to be too flexible for exact justice. Through sympathy 
for the officer the debtor and creditor would be liable to be for-
, gotten. It is infinitely better, therefore, to contract the necessity 
' for a resort to vague standards than to enlarge it. \Ve shall 
donbtless find no lack of good and efficient men ready and willing 
at all times to risk the responsibil ity of the rule for the sake of 
the office. 
An objection is sometimes urged that the officer is allowed no 
fees for watchmen, or for the removal of goods. This is doubt-
• less because the law-making power has supposed that the taxable 
costs for executing process, and in making sales, are sufficient 
for this purpose. If they are not, the law should be altered ; for 
it would be a bad system that would take away the control  of the 
debtor over his property, which may not, before sale, go into the 
hands of the creditor for preservation, and yet leave it l iable to 
be stolen or embezz led while in the custody o f  the sheriff. [ *s14] 
In Watson on Sheriffs, 188,  the rule of the English author-
, ities in regard to the liabil ity of sheriffs in executing mesne pro­., ' cess, is thus stated : "A fter_!he -�l�er!ff _has s�iz.�d gogd_s,:_ g _ _  i_! 
I • .. ---> ' his duty to_ remove !hem to_ � place of safe cutody until Jl]!;J: ca!1 
v ·be sold. for i f  they be. rescued, the sheriff is liable Jo the plainti,ff 
''for . t_h.eir valt1e ;  Sly v. Finch, Cro. Jae. 5 14, Godbolt 276 ; .Mild­
--ma_,, v. Smith, 3 Saunders ( Eng. ) 343 ; and it is said that i f  the 
sheriff take cattle ,  and afterwards the cattle die for want of 
meat, the sheriff i s  answerable for the value returned ." Clerk 
v. lVithcrs, 2 Lord Raym. 1075. The rule of the common law un� 
.· \ donbtedly was, and is, that .the...sl1erjf( is t i�ble. fu� 
\ v- �· 2.�-�nal _ _process, unle:-s prevented by inevitable a�cident _or Q.Ublic 
, • enemie?,. The authorities above cited prove this beyond doubt 
-See also as to this the opinion of Mr. Justice Redfield, Bridges 
v. I'erry, 1 4  Vt. 262. 
The rule of the common law is  maintained by this learned 
judge in the case ci ted , and the learned counsel for the defendant 
in  c-rror were led into error in citing it  as sustaining their theory tf the case, in not adverting to the distinction drawn between an 
att1Jcl1 11 1c1 1 t, the ohj ect of which is to compel appearance. and an 
xcrntion . •  In the former, the sheriff is held to occupy only the 
po�i l  \on of an ordinarv bailee. The reason for the distinction 
seems to be not onlv in' the effect between debtor and creditor as 
to sati s fact ion , but the delay before final process to dispose of the 
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property, sometimes extending to several years, and usually con-
tinuing for at least a year, until the case is finally tried.’ To hold
the sheriff to the strictness of the common law rule on the subject
of final process to cases of attachment, would, in the opinion of
this able judge, be unreasonable; but he adds, “where property is
taken on final process, it is to be kept but a short time at longest
so that it may be closely watched and kept with this severe dili
gence for a few days without materially interfering with the du-
ties of the sheriff.” Where attachment process is used for differ-
ent purposes, sometimes as final, and at others as mesne process,
as it is in several of the New England states, errors on this point
may easily be made as to what is the judgment of their courts,
without carefully noticing the exact nature of the process ad-
verted to. There is a distinction, well defined, I think, between
the two kinds of process. It was drawn directly from the com-
mon law distinction between custody on a capias ad res[1onden- ‘
dum and a ca1;ia.s ad satisfaciendum. In the former it is said that
the sherifi may return a rescue; Mildmay v. Smith, 3 Saunders
(Eng.) 343, and note; Clerk v. Withers, 2 Lord Raym. 1075;
O’Neil v. Marson, 5 Burr. 2813; which he may not do in the lat-
ter. See authorities for it above cited; see, also, as to the rule
of liability: Sanford v. Boring, I2 Cal. 539; Collins V. Terrell,
2 S. & M. (Miss.) 383; Abe-rcrombie v. Marshall, 2 Bay (S. C.)-
90- P515]
A case much relied on by the counsel on both sides, is
Browning v. Hanford, first reported in 5 Hill (N. Y.) 588, after-
wards in 7 Id. 120, and finally in 5 Denio 586. The point of that
case was, whether a sheritT’s return of a loss of goods by fire
was evidence in his own favor. It seems to have been held that]
it was not. Various judges and senators expressed their views.
in that case, on the extent of a sheriff's liability; all agreeing
that for an unavoidable accident, such as a sudden fire, he was
not liable, and a majority seeming to hold that he was only an-
swerable for the absence of ordinary care and diligence in re-
gard to property taken on final process. A distinction is made,
between the bailee or receiptor of the sheriff, as he is called, and
the sheriff when he retains the custody of goods. In the former.
that nothing short of the act of God, public enemies, or inevitable
accident, will excuse the non-delivery of the property, while in
the latter case, a loss, after ordinary care and diligence bestowed.
is not to be visited with liability. The distinction seems hZlI'(ll_Vl,
reasonable, and not quite logical. It was said, by some of the
judges in that case, that the distinction grew out of the form of
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prnperty, sometimes extending to several years, and usually con­
tinu ing for at least a year, until the case is finally tried. ' To hold 
the sheriff to the strictness of the common law rule on the !:>ubj ect 
of final process to cases of attachment, would, in the opinion of 
this able judge, be unreasonable ; but he adds, "where property i1 
taken on final process, it i s  to be kept but a short time at longest 
so that it may be closely watched and kept with this severe dili 
gence for a few days without materially interfering with the du­
ties of the sheriff." Where attachment process is used for differ­
ent purposes, sometimes as final, and at others as mesne process, 
as it is in several of the New England states, errors on this point 
may easily be made as to what is the j udgment of their courts, 
without carefully noticing the exact nature of the process ad­
verted to. There is a distinction, well defined, I think, between 
the two kinds of process. It was drawn directly from the com­
mon law distinction between custody on a capias ad responden- • 
du m and a capias ad sat£sfaciendum. In the former it is said that 
the sheriff may return a rescue ; Mildnwy v. Smith, 3 Saunders 
(Eng. ) 343, and note ; Clerk v. Withers, 2 Lord Raym. 1075 ; 
O'Neil v. J\1arson, 5 Burr. 28 1 3 ; which he may not do in the lat­
ter. See authorities for it above cited ; see, also, as to the rule 
of liability : Sanford v. Boring, 1 2  Cal. 539 ; Co/lin.s v. Terrell, 
2 S. & M. ( Miss. ) 383 ; Abercrombie v. Marshall, 2 Bay ( S . C. )' 
90. [ *5 15 ] 
A case much relied on by the counsel on both sides, i s  
Bro7mz ing v. Hanford, first reported in  5 Hill ( N . Y. ) 588, after­
wards in 7 Id. 1 20, and finally in 5 Denio 586. The point of that 
case was , whether a sheriff's return of a loss o f  goods by fire 
was evidence in his own favor. It seems to have been held thatJ 
it was not. Various j udges and senators expressed their views , 
in that case, on the extent of a sheriff's liability ; all agreeing 
that for an unavoidable accident, such as a sudden fire, he was 
not l iable, and a majority seeming to hold that he was only an­
swerable for the absence of ord inary care and di l igence in re­
gard to property taken on final process . A d istinct ion is made , 
hetween the bailee or receiptor of the sheriff, as he is called , an<!" 
the sheriff when he retains the custody of goods. In the former.  
that nothing short of the act of God , public enem ies , or inevitable 
accident, will excuse the non-delivery of the property , while  in • 
the latter case, a loss, after ord inary care and d i l igence bestowed . 
i s  not to be visited with l iabil ity. The distinction seems hardly \ 
reasonable , and not qu ite logical . It was said , bv some of thC' 
judg-es in  that case, that the distinction grew out �f the form of the rece ipt, which is an agreement without exception to deliver, 
4o6 CASES on EXECUTIONS, me.
while others say it is a general principle of law. If the liability
‘ grows out of the contract, resulting from its terms, then it does
not affect any question or prmciple of law on the subject. But if
it result from legal principles, I cannot comprehend why there
fshould be any difference between the sheriff when he is bailee,
and when lns receiptor is bailee; why utmost care will not ex-
cuse in the one case, and less than that will in the other. We
feel no disposition to adopt the uncertain theories of this case, and
abandon the salutary rule of the common law, which, although
there has been but little reported judicial discussion of the ques-
tion, has, I think, always among the profession been supposed to
be the law of this state. I have no doubt, as was said in the case
just referred to, that casualties such as sudden fires would and
-ought to be classed with inevitable accidents, and excuse the
sheriff. * * *
fudgment reversed, and 1/en-ire de novo awarded.
To the same effect see Gilmore v. Moore, 30 Ga. 628; Collins v.
Terrall, 2 S. & M. (Miss) 383. In Runlelt v. Bell, 5 N. H. 433, a sheriff
was held not liable to the attaching creditor for property deposited with
persons at the time solvent, who afterward converted the property claim-
ing to own it and then became insolvent, but stress was laid on the fact
that the creditor had sued them in the name of the officer for the con-
‘ version, which was said to be adopting the oflicer’s act. But see Garrett
v. Ilomblin, II S. & M. (Miss) 219, and Phillips v. Lamar, 27 Ga. 228.
in which last case the bank where the sheriff deposited the money failed
and he was held liable.
. Only ordinary care is ever required of officers holding property un-
der attachments, and in the following cases this was made the measure
of liability under executions: Crc.r.rweIl v. Burt, 61 Iowa 590, 16 N. \V.
730; Slate v. Nelson, I Ind. 522; Moore v. l/Vcsteroell, 27 N. Y. 234;
Lambrelh v. Jofirio-n, 4I La. An. 749, 6 South. 558.
In an attachment case the Michigan court said ordinary care is all
that is ever required. .S'tandard Wine Co. v. Chi/nnan, 135 Mich. 273,
97 N. W. 679.
VI Right to Compel Return of Exact Facts.
FLYNN v. KALAMAZOO CIRCUIT JUDGE, in Mich. Sup. Ct., Nov.
9th, 19o4—I38 Mich. 126, 101 N. W. 222, 4 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1167.
Mandamus proceedings by Lawrence Flynn against the Kal-
amazoo circuit judge.
HOOKER, J. A judgment having been rendered against the
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while others say it is a general principle of law. I f  the liabil ity 
1 grows out of the contract, resulting from its terms, then it does 
not affect any question or principle of law on the subj ect. Hut if 
i t  result from legal principles, l cannot comprehend why there 
1should be any difference between the sheriff when he is bailee, 
and when lus receiptor is bailee ; why utmost care will not ex­
cuse in the one case, and less than that wil l  in the other. We 
feel no disposition to adopt the uncertain theories of this case, and 
abandon the salutary rule of the common law, which, although 
there has been but little reported j udicial discussion of the ques­
tion, has, I think ,  always among the profession been supposed to 
be the law of this state. I have no doubt, as was said in the case 
j ust referred to, that casualt ies such as sudden fires would and 
·ought to be classed with inevitable accidents, and excuse the 
sheriff. * * * 
Judgment reversed, and ve11.fre de no'C.10 m.varded. 
To the same effect see Gilmore v. Moore, 30 Ga. 628 ; Collins v. 
Terrall, 2 S. & M .  (Miss. ) 383. Jn  Run/ett v. Bell, 5 N. H. 433, a sheriff 
was held not liable to the attaching creditor for property deposited with 
persons at the time solvent, who afterward converted the property claim­
ing to own it and then became insolvent, but stress was laid on the fact 
that the creditor had sued them in the name of the officer for the con-
• version, which was said to be adopting the officer's act. But see Garrett 
v. Hamblin, 1 1  S. & M. ( Miss. ) 219, and Phillips v. Lamar, 27 Ga. 228, 
in which last case the bank where the sheriff deposited the money failed 
and he was held liable. 
, Only ordinary care is ever required of officers holding property un­
der attachments, and in the following cases this was made the measure 
of liabili ty under executions : Cresswell v. Burt, 61 Iowa 590 , 16 N. W. 
730 ; State v. Nelson, I Ind. 522 ; Moore v. Westervelt, 27 N. Y. 234 ; 
La mbreth v. Joffrion, 41 La. An. 749, 6 South. 558. 
Jn an attachment case the Michigan court said ordinary care is all 
that is  ever required. Standard Wine Co. v. Cliipman, 135 Mich. 273, 
97 N. W. 679. 
\t  Right to Compel Return of Exact Facts. 
FLYNN v. KALAMAZOO CIRCUIT JUDGE, in Mich. Sup. Ct., Nov. 
9th, 1904-138 M ich. 126, IOI N. W. 222, 4 A. & E. Ann. Cas. u67. 
l\fandamus proceedings by Lawrence Flynn against the Kal­
amazoo circuit judge. 
HooKER, J. A j udgment having been rendered against the 
relator in the circuit court for the county of Kalamazoo, an exe-
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cution was issued. The sheriff returned that he levied the same
upon real estate belonging to the execution debtor, had it ap-
praised under the law pertaining to homesteads, and sold it at
public aution for $2,300. Relator claimed that this was a false
return, and, on a motion to vacate the sale, sought to contradict
the return. [*127] This court held that this motion could not
prevail in the face of the return standing of record in the case,
and it was intimated that a proper practice would be to obtain
an amendment of the return. See Flynn, v. Circuit Judge, 136
Mich. 23, 98 N. W. 740. lhereupon the relator filed a motion for
retgrn, lvhich was denied by the circuit judge upon
the round that an anfendment to a return as to a matter of fact
must b; made voluntarily, and could not be compelled.
The following cases cited by the respondent’s counsel seem
‘to sustain the decision: In the case of Sawyer v. Curtis, 2
Ashm. I27, decided in I830, it was held that “where the sheriff
had returned his writ ‘Executed,’ and he does not ask permission
to alter or modify his return, the court has no power to do it,
and cannot compel him to make any alteration in it as to matter
of fact; and the sheriff is responsible for a false return to the
party injured.” In Himzphries V. Lawson, 7 Ark. 341, it was held
that “the cirquit co1n;t__cannot compel a sheriff to_ amend__h_i_s_r_e-
£211 to__a writ, 'n_or"to return any particular state of facts. He
has jtlie privilege ofamending, and is responsible for a false?
turn.” See, also, Boas v. U1>degrove, 5 Pa. 5I6, 47 Am. Dec.
In Howell v. Lane, 53 Cal. 217, the court said: “VVe are
satisfied, however, that the sheriff cannot be compelled in this
manner to contradict his return. He cannot, it is well settled.
be compelled by the court to correct his return on file against his
will.” In Wilcox v. Moudy, 89 Ind. 232, it was said that 12:
sheriff's _1_'etu£1_1__to_ a writ is made on his official responsibility,
jgid T11-.'<>n1§ can afterwards amend it, but it must be on leave.
The _c_qu_rt _c_§I_1_I_1_Ol;_cQmQel h_irf1 ,to_c_orlr_e_ct.” In Waslzington llfill
Co. v. Kinnear, I \/Vash. T: IoI, it was held: “If the return be de-
‘ fective, he may be compelled to perfect it_; but, if_ the record
shows the return to be complete [*m8_1_gr_1_d_ p_erfect, the party_
‘who desires to traverse it is require_d_to b_1'ii_1g his action against
_the sheriff, who, on a proper showing,_rnay.be-.compelled..to re-_
vspond in damages for any in_jury_resulting from a false return.
It is said in Clark v. Lyman, I0 Pick. 47: ‘The sheriff and
his deputies have great and confidential powers intrusted
to them. Their returns on writs and precepts are received
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cution was issued. The sheriff returned that he levied the same 
upon real estate belonging to the execution debtor, had it ap­
praised under the law pertaining to homesteads, and sold it at 
public aution for $2,300. Relator claimed that this was a false 
return, and, on a mot ion to vacate the sale, sought to contradict 
the return. [ * 127]  This court held that this motion could not 
prevail in the face of the return standing of record in the case, 
and it was intimated that a proper practice would be to obtain 
an amendment of the return. See Flynn v. Circuit Judge, 1 36 
Mich. 23, 98 N. W. 740. T.hu.e_upon the relater filed a motion for 
�d retgrn, which was denied by the circuit judge upon _ 
�ound -that an amendment to a return as to a matter of fa�t 
tTIUStbe made vofun ta-rilv, amt could not be compe lled. 
The following case; cited by the respondent's 'counsel seem 
· to sustain the decision : In the case of Sawyer v. Curtis, 2 
Ashm. 127, decided in 1830, it was held that "where the sheriff 
had returned his writ 'Executed,' and he does not ask permission 
to alter or modify his return, the court has no power to do it, 
and cannot compel him to make any alteration in it as to matter 
of fact ; and the sheriff is  responsible for a false return to the 
party inj ured." In Humphries v. Lawson, 7 Ark .  341 ,  it was held 
that "the circuit court cannot compel a sheriff to amend his re­
turn t; a writ, -rior - -to -ret�rn ai1y particu lar - state �( fact�: - -He 
has i:fi_'e "j)_ri�·i lege of . amending, and i s  responsible for a false re:' 
turr1:" See, also, Boas v. Updegro·ve, 5 Pa. 5 16, 47 Am. Dec. 
425. In H eru..•ell v. Lane, 53 Cal. 2 1 7, the court said : "vVe are 
satisfied , however, that the sheriff cannot be compelled in this 
manner to contradict h is  return. He cannot, it is well settled . 
be compelled by the court to correct his return on file against his 
will ." In Wilcox v. Af oudy, 89 Ind. 232, it was said that "a -
sheriff� ���t!!_l_!:Q. a wr i t is made o_n his official responsibil ity, 
��ncl lie only can afterwards amend it, but it must be on leave. 
Tl1e £_ourt_gnnoLCWllQ<:;l �jm J_Q.. c�o!r.e�t." In Wasliington 1l!in 
Co. v. Kinnear, I vVash. T. I O I ,  it was held : "If  the return be de-
- fective, he may be compelled to perfect it_; bt�t, i f  the record 
shows the return to be compJete [*128] _�1]9 __ p_erfe�t , the party. 
,who des ires to traverse i_t is reqt)ir�d _to b..rit:i� _his �ct ion _a_ga!ns� 
_t_he sher iff, who, on a propc.r sha.wing._ may . be . ..compellcd . to re-: 
_ spond in damag-es for a�y i�jury _ rest� l ting from a false re�u �n. 
Tt is said in Clark v. L')111ia11 , I O  Pick. 47 : 'The sheriff and 
his deputies have great and confidential powers intru ste<l 
to them. Their returns on writs and precepts are receive<l 
as trne, and are not to be controverted, except in an action for a 
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false return, and then the falsity must be proved.‘ And in 2 Ash-
mead, Sawyer v. Curtis, page I27: ‘When the sheriff has returned
his writ executed, and he does not ask permission to alter or
modify his return, the court has no power to do it, and cannot
compel him to make any alteration in it as to matter of fact. The
sheriff is responsible for a false return to the party injured.’ To
the same effect, M t-Bee v. State, 1 Meigs, I22; Mentz v. Ham-
.man, 5 Whart. 105, 34 Am. Dec. 546; Sample v. Coulson, 9 VVatts
& S. 62.” See, also, note to case of Malone v. Samuel, 13 Am.
Dec. 173, and authorities there cited. In Smith v. Gaines, 93
U. S. 343, 23 L. Ed. 901, the federal Supreme Court said: “As
regards the effort to compel the marshal to amend his return,
we think his answer contains a reply which is conclusive. In
making that return he acts under a heavy official responsibility.
If false, he is liable to plaintiff and to defendant for any dam-
ages resulting from it. He must therefore be at liberty to make
his own return, subject to that responsibility. Nor do we think
his return can be questioned by the sureties. It is declared by
the law to be the appropriate evidence of the right to proceed
against them. It is an official act. If they had desired him to
exercise it otherwise than he did, they might, by showing him
property, have possibly rendered him liable for a false return,
and, by paying the debt, avail themselves of this liability. But
we do not think that either the spirit of the statute or the justice
of the case permits as inquiry into the truth of the ofiicer"s return
in the subsequent proceeding against the sureties. It is analo-
gous to the return of nulla bond, as the foundation of a creditor’s
bill in chancery, which cannot be questioned.” [*I2g]
Counsel for relator cites several cases said to support his
contention, but the most of them fall short of it. See Stetson v.
Freeman, 35 Kan. 530, II Pac. 43! ; Boyer v. Lincoln, 3 Ky. Law
Rep. 517. In Doris v. Weyburn, I How. Prae. 152, it was held
that a sheriff could be compelled to perfect an incomplete return.
The same was held in Berry V. Griffith, 2 Har. 81 G. 343, 18 Am.
Dec. 309.
Counsel for relator asserts that our former holding was. in
effect, a decision that an amendment may be compelled, but we
think it contains no such implication. It held merely that with-
out an amendment the relief sought could not be granted.
The writ must be denied. The other justices concurred.
Corn/vellin,r7 and Permitting Amendments That the court cannot com-
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false return, and then the falsity must be proved.' And in 2 Ash­
mead, Scr.;.:ycr v. Curtis, page 127 : 'When the sheriff has returned 
his writ executed, and he does not ask permission to alter or 
modify his return, the court has no power to do it, and cannot 
compel him to make any alteration in it as to matter of fact. The 
sheriff is responsible for a false return to the party inj ured.' To 
the same effect, McBee v. State, I Meigs, 122 ; Ment:: v. Ham-
. man, 5 Whart. 105, 34 Am. Dec. 546 ; Sample v. Coulson, 9 \Vatts 
& S. 62." See, also, note to case of .Malone v .  Samuel, 1 3  Am. 
Dec. i73, and authorities there cited. In Smith v. Gaines, 93 
U. S. 343, 23 L. Ed. 90 1 ,  the federal Supreme Court said : � 'As 
regards the effort to compel the marshal to amend his return , 
we think his answer contains a reply which is conclusive. In 
making that return he acts under a heavy official responsibility. 
If false, he is liable to plaintiff and to defendant for any dam­
ages resulting from it. He must therefore be at l iberty to make 
his own return , subj ect to that responsibility. Nor do we think 
his return can be questioned by the sureties. I t  is declared by 
the law to be the appropriate evidence of the right to proceed 
against them. It is an official act. If they had desi red him to 
exercise it otherwise than he did, they might, by showing him 
property, have possibly rendered him liable for a false return ,  
and, by paying the debt, avail themselves of  this liabi lity. But 
we do not think that either the spirit of the statute or the j ustice 
of the case permits as inquiry into the truth of the officer's return 
in the subsequent proceeding against the sureties. It is analo­
guus to the return of nulla bona, as the foundation of a creditor's 
bill in chancery, which cannot be questioned ." [ * 1 29] 
Counsel for rclator cites several cases said to support his 
contention , but the most of them fall short of it .  See Stetson v. 
Freeman, � 5  Kan. 530, I I Pac. 43 1 ; Boyer v. Lincoln, 3 Ky. Law 
Rep. 5 .. q. In Dm-is v. iv eyburn, I How. Prac. 1 52, it was helrl 
that a sheriff could he compelled to perfect an incomplete return. 
The same was held in Berry v. Griflitlz, 2 Har. & G. 343 , 18 Am. 
Dec. 309. 
Coun sel for rel ator asserts that our former holding was. in 
effect, a deci sion that an amendment may be compel led , but we 
th ink it conta ins  no such implication . Tt held merely that with­
out an am en dment the rel ief soug-ht coul<l not be granted. 
'rhe wr it must he <len ieci . The other justices concurred.  
Cfl mf'elli1 1q and Per111 itting A mendmen ts. That the court cannot com­
prl  the sheriff to return any spec ific  fact : Waller v. Pa lmer ( 1862) , 18  
Ind.  2j9. 
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That the court may order the correction of the clerk's record of tl1e
return: Newhouse v. Martin (1879), 68 Ind. 224; Purrington v. Luring
(1811), 7 Mass. 388.
Before filing his return t-he sheriff may amend without consent:
Welsh v. Joy (1833), 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 477.
After several years the court will be cautious about permitting
amendments of returns: O’Bricn v. Gaston (1886), 20 Neb. 347, 30 N.
W. 274; Johnson v. Stone (1860), 40 N. H. 197, 77 Am. Dec. 706.
Who May Execute the Writ. _
McMILLAN v. ROWE, in Neb. Sup. Ct., May 28, 1884-15 Neb. 520, 19
N. W. 504.
COBB, C. J. This was an action of trespass dc bonis as[>0r-I
tatis by William S. Rowe, plaintiff, against George McMillan,
Curtis Hull, Gibson Keith, and Chris. Kochler, defendants.
It seems that Rowe, the plaintiff, was the owner of a quan-
tity of barley; that McMillan and Hull had a judgment against
said R0 ve rggslered Ev O-1:16 Vandervogr_t,_g .t1§_t_i_(;_€WQ;I-__§_l]_t;_‘Q§_8._C'§_;
that the defendant, Gibson \eith, assuming to act as a constable,
with the execution issued by said justice Vandervoort upon the
said judgment in his hands, seized and took as upon execution
aid barley of the defendant, advertised and sold it as upon
xecution, and that the same was bought, taken, and con-
d to his own use by the defendant Chris. Kochler. This was
tie cause of action stated in the petition. * * * [*52I] Upon
the trial to a jury, a verdict was found for the plaintiff and
against all the defendants for $118.98. *1" * *
The only points made by plaintiffs in error in their brief are:
First, The judgment creditors, McMillan and Hull, are not re-
sponsible for anything done by Keith, even if he was a trespasser.
as he acted without their request or knowledge. A thorough ex-
amination of the bill of exceptions fails to show that these de-
fendants, McMillan and Hull, or either of them, or any attorney
claiming to act for them, had anything whatever to do with the
issuing of the execution, its service, _or return, nor is there any
evidence that they received the money. made thereon. Had
there been such evidence, as one member of the court, I should
be of the opinion that such receipts would render them respon-
sible for the acts of Keith in taking the barley upon this execu-
tion; but there being no such evidence, the verdict as to them
is not sustained. The other [mint is, that the statute directing
how a _iustice of the peace may appoint [*523] a special constable
















































































































































410 CASES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC.
the issuing and delivery of the execution were sufficient. \Ve
cannot agree to this proposition. The authorities cited fail to
sustain it. 1 do not think that there exists at common law any
authority in a justice of the peace to appoint a constable to serve
civil process. That such authority existed to appoint special con-
stables to serve criminal process in certain cases is admitted. In
this case there is no evidence of the appointment of Keith as
constable to serve the execution either verbally or in writing;
indeed, it would seem very clear from the testimony of Vander-
voort, the justice who issued the execution, that he understood
Keith to be a constable, and that no appointment was desired or
necessary. The provision of the statute of this state on the sub-
ject of deputizing persons by justice of the peace to serve process
is as follows:
“A justice, at the request of a party, and on being satisfied
that it is expedient, may specially depute any discreet person of
suitable age and not interested in the action to serve a summons
or execution with or without an order to arrest the defendant or
to attach property; such deputation must be in writing on the
process.” Code, § 1094.
This statute is, in my opinion, exclusive of any other method
of appointing persons to act as special constables in the s ‘ e
of civil process. Its provisions not having been followe
no protection to either Keith or Kochler—to the one in
and selling the barley in question, or to the other in buying it at
the sale. The judgment of the district court as to the defendants
McMillan and Hull is reversed, but without ‘costs; and as to the
defendants Keith and Kochler, the said judgment is afiirmed.
fudgm-ent accordingly.
Release of attached property on motion by defendant because the
statute required all writs directed to the sheriff, and this writ was di-
rected to and levied by a constable, was affirmed, the court saying:
“Whether Cronicle (who made the levy) might have been appointed to
levy the writ in the absence of the marshal and sheriff, will not be profit-
able to consider, as this was not done.” Freeman v. Lind, I12 Iowa 39,
83 N. W. 800.
Sale in absence of the constable by an auctioneer to whom the con-
stable had delivered the writ with orders to sell was held void, because
the writ did not, and the constable could not, authorize him so to act.
Stacy v. Bernard, 20 Colo. App. 293, 78 Pac. 615.
In a trial between plaintiff relying on a purchase under a fi. fa. in
his favor, and a claimant of the property, plaintiff offered in evidence the
ff. fa. with the endorsement thereon. The evidence was objected to “be-
cause said entry on said fi. fa. was made by another [than the ofiicer]
















































































































































4 1 0  CASES ON EXECUTIONS, E'!'C. 
the issuing and delivery of the execution were sufficient. \Ve 
cannot agree to this proposition. The authorities cited fail to 
sustain it. 1 do not think that there exists at common law any 
authority in a j ustice of  the peace to appoint a constable to serve 
civil process. That such authority existed to appoint special con­
stables to serve criminal process in certain cases is admitted. I n  
this case there is no evidence of  the appointment of  Keith as 
constable to serve the execution either verbally or in wri ting ; 
indeed, it would seem very clear from the testimony of Vander­
voort, the justice who issued the execution, that he understood 
Keith to be a constable, and that no appointment was desired or 
necessary. The provision of the statute of this state on the sub­
ject of deputizing persons by j ustice of the peace to serve process 
is as follows : 
"A justice, at the request of a party, and on being satisfied 
that it is expedient, may specially depute any discreet person of 
su itable age and not interested in the action to serve a summons 
or execution with or without an order to arrest the defendant or 
to attach property ; such deputation must be in writjng on the 
process." Code, § 1094. 
This statute is, in my opinion, exclusive of any other method 
of appointing persons to act as special constables in the s 
. 
of civil process. Its provisions not having been followe 
no protection to either Keith or Kochler-to the one in 
and sell ing the barley in question, or to the other in buying 1t at 
the sale. The judgment of the district court as to the defendants 
Mcl\'1 i llan and Hull is reversed, but without ·costs ; and as to the 
defendants Keith and Kochler, the said j udgment is affirmed. 
Judgment accordingly. 
Release of attached property on motion by defendant because the 
statute required all writs d irected to the sheriff, and this writ was di­
rected to and levied by a constable, was affirmed, the court saying : 
"Whether Cronicle ( who made the levy) might have been appointed to 
levy the writ in the absence of the marshal and sheriff, will not be profit� 
able to consider, as this was not done." Freeman v. Lind, I 12 Iowa 39, 
83 N. W. 8oo. 
Sale in absence of the constable by an auctioneer to whom the con­
stable had delivered the writ with orders to sell was held void, because 
the writ d id not, and the constable could not, authorize him so to act. 
Stacy v. Bernard, 20 Colo. App. 293, 78 Pac. 615. 
In a trial between plaintiff relying on a purchase under a fi. fa. in 
his  favor, and a claimant of the property, plaintiff offered in evidence the 
fi. fa. w ith the endorsement thereon. The evidence was objected to "be­
cause said entry on said fi. fa. was made by another [ than the officer] 
and he could not delegate his authority to a private person." The court 
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said: "It appears from the evidence in this case that the entry on the
fi. fa. was written out by Greer in the presence of, and by the direction
of Hawkins, the levying officer, who was unable to write, and that the
officer signed said entry with his mark after the entry was made by
Greer. A levy is required to be entered on the process by virtue of which
the levy is made, but we do not regard it as necessary that it should be
in the handwriting of the officer.” Cox v. Montford, 66 Ga. 62.
Unless given by statute, the sheriff has no more power to serve pro-
cess beyond his county than a person without office. \Nhen a sheriff
levied on and sold a railway running through his county into another
and a bill was filed by the purchaser seeking to redeem from a mortgage
on the property, the court held that the complainant had no title because
the property was sold entire and the sheriff had no authority beyond the
borders of his county. Benson v. Smith, 42 Me. 414, 66 Am. Dec. 285.
Compare Oldfield v. Eulert, 148 I11. 614, 36 N. E. 615, 38 Am. St. Rep. 231.
WALES v. CLARK, in Conn. Sup. Ct. of Errors, Nov. Term, 1875-
43 Conn. 183.
Assumpsit in superior court of New Haven. Defendant
pleads to the jurisdiction that there was no ersonal s_eryic_e_ and
weW1%.fiira_.@-§@rtifi§m
~D.lLLQLL'__HQQI_I_ zfnds wh.e_n he had not and 1_1_ever had any ori_g_i_x_1_al
rnu‘-it, and that he did not receive any such writ till the day__aft_er
the certificatg \_\‘_as_filed. Plaintiff demurred, and the court re-
served the question for the advice of this court. \Vhen the dep-
uty fil_e_d_ the levy, he had a telegram requesting IEWWW‘
_stating that the writ had been mailed to him.
CARPENTER, J. The question in this case is one of jurisdic-
tion. Both parties are non-residents, and no personal service was
made on the defendant. In such cases the situs of the property
attached determines the jurisdiction.
\Vas there an attachment? Or, stating the question in an-
other form, can an officer make a valid attachment of real [*186]
estate, before the precept, by virtue of which the attachment is
made, is placed in his hands? The statute is as follows: “Real
estate shall be attached by the officer’s lodging with the town
clerk of the town ill-Jtlhif-h-lb-ii-1an£l_'&.w14a_¢<¢YtifiteL11_a'
he has made such attachment, * * * and said attachment, if
mm'Wmide(l, shall be considered as made
when such certificate is so lodged.” The remainder of the sec-
tion prescribes the substance of this certificate, and provides that
the officer shall, within four days thereafter, leave with such I
town clerk a full and certified copy of the process under which
the attachment was made. Gen. Statutes, 1866, p. 4, § 17. _
















































































































































EXECUTIXG THE WRITS 41 I 
said : "It  appears from the evidence in this case that the entry on the 
fi. fa. was written out by Greer in the presence of, and by the direction 
of Hawkins, the levying officer, who was unable to write, and that the 
officer signed said entry with his mark after the entry was made by 
Greer. A levy is required to be entered on the process by virtue of which 
the levy is made, but we do not regard it as necessary that it should be 
in the handwriting of the officer." Cox v. Mo11 tford, 66 Ga. 62. 
Unless given by statute, the sheriff has no more power to serve pro­
cess beyond his county than a person without office. When a sheriff 
levied on and sold a railway running through his county into another 
and a bill was filed by the purchaser seeking to redeem from a mortgage 
on the property, the court held that the complainant had no title because 
the property was sold entire and the sheriff had no authority beyond the 
borders of his county. Benson v. Smith, 42 Me. 414. 66 Am. Dec. 285. 
Compare Oldfield v. Eulert, 148 I ll. 6 14, 36 N. E. 615, J8 Am. St. Rep. 23 1 .  
WALES v.  CLARK, in Conn. Sup. Ct. of Errors, Nov. Term, 1875-
43 Conn. 183. 
Assumpsit in superior court of New Haven. Defendant 
pleads to the j urisdiction that there was no personal S..el"M and 
Jha! the only service_ ��Y-1>' � __ depl!tY sh_cijd__f11�I.UL<! _ _  ce�t!fi..�ate _of lcx1 up9n ]anus when he had not and ti.ever had any 9_rigin?l �' and that he did not r_�ce_ive any such writ till .the. day aft�r 
the ccrtific�!� ')�s _ fjl�d. Plaintiff demurrc·d , and the court re­
served the question for the advice of this court. \Vhen the dep­
u ty fik_d_ the levy, he had a telegram requesting him to <lo so, an<T .. 
_stating that the wdt ha<l been mailed to him. 
CARPENTER, J. The question in this case is one of j urisdic­
tion . Both parties are non-residents, and no personal service was 
ma<le on the defendant. In such cases the situs of the property 
attached determines the j urisdiction. 
\Vas there an attachment ? Or, stating the question in an­
other form, can an officer make a valid attachment of real [ * 186 �  
estate, before the precept, by virtue o f  which the attachment i s  
made, is placed in h i s  hands ? The statute is  as follows : "Real 
estate shall he attached by the officer's lodging with the town 
clerk of the town in which the land is situated, a certificate that 
he has made such attachment, * * * and said attachment, i f  
completed as hereinafter provided , shall be considered as made 
when such certificate is so lodged ." The remainder of the sec­
tion prescribes the substance of this certificate, and provides that 
the officer shall, within four days thereafter, leave with such 
town clerk a full and certified copy of the process under which 
the attachment was made. Gen. Statutes, 1866, p.  4, § 1 7. 
This statute was passed in 1 855 ; and the lodging of a certi-
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ficate is a substitute for the old mode of attachment, which was
by an entry on the land. The ofiicer who had a writ of attach-
ment to serve went upon the land and that constituted the attach-
ment. The att made b lod in wit town
clerk ' e nd i ' ex ressl rovide tach-
ment takes effect when the certificate is so lodged. Under the
s a u e, an entry without a process was clearly ineffectual;
under the presentZ the lodging of a certificate before the pmcess
is received is e ual
a end upon his osses—
sion of the process. The latter may be qualified, or the officer
mfibe/rW2T6f it altogether, by instructions; but it exists only
while the power exists, and both come into existence when the
process is placed in his hands. Until then he has no authority
to act, and cannot be justified in interfering with the persons or
property of others.
It will hardly be pretended that an officer will be justified in
making an arrest in a civil suit before he receives a precept com-
manding him to do it; nor can he take personal property in an-
ticipation of a writ of attachment. In such cases he must be
prepared, if his right is challenged, to produce his authority. If
he cannot do it he is a trespasser and may be resisted as such.
The land in New Haven county was not otherwise attached
than by the officer’s lodging with the town clerk the required
[*r87] certificate on the day before he received the writ. It fol-
lows that there was no valid attachment, and the superior court
must be advised that it has no jurisdiction of the case.
"This is a plain case. Without a writ of attachment, the sheriff of
Story county had no authority or right to notify the appellant that he
was attached as garnishee, nor to take his answers to the interrogatories.
* * * The district court has no more power to render a judgment upon
a notice given and answers thus taken and returned than if the same
thing had been done by a justice of the peace, notary public, a road super-
visor, or a private individual.” Judgment against the garnishee reversed.
Van Fossen v. Anderson, 8 Iowa 25!.
HEYE & CO. v. MOODY & CO., in Texas Sup. Ct., April 12, 1887-
67 Tex. 615, 4 S. W. 242.
VVILLIE, C. I. On Nov. 15, 1881, Oliver 8: Griggssued out
a writ of attachment against Bessling & Roller, which was on the
same day levied by T. E. Jackson, sheriffof ‘Limestone county,
upon a stock of goods in Groesbeck, and on the next day upon a
stock of goods in Mexia. After levying upon the Mexia stock
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ficate is a substitute for the old mode of attachment, which was 
by an entry "on the land. The officer who had a writ of attach­
ment to serve went upon the land and that constituted the attach­
ment. The attachment is now made by lodging with the town � a C@Ftificate. and it is expressly provided that the att�h­
ment takes effect when the certificate is so lodged. Under the 
oM statute, an entry without a process was clearly ineffectual ; 
under the present, the lodging of a certificate before the process 
is received is e ual ' ' 
end upon his sses-
sion of the process.  The latter may be qualified, or the o cer 
m:iy be relieved of it altogether, by instructions ; but it exists only 
while the power exists, and both come into existence when the 
process is placed in his hands. Until then he has no authority 
to act, and cannot be j ustified in interfering with the persons or 
property of others. 
It will hardly be pretended that an officer will be justified in 
making an arrest in a civil suit before he receives a precept com­
manding him to do it ; nor can he take personal property in an­
., ti�ipation of a writ of attachment. In such cases he must be 
prepared, if his right is challenged, to produce his authority. If  
he cannot do it  he is a trespasser and may be resisted as such. 
The land in New Haven county was not otherwise attached 
than by the officer's lodging with the town clerk the required 
[* 187] certificate on the day before he received the writ. It fol­
lows that there was no valid attachment, and the superior court 
must be advised that it has no jurisdiction of the case. 
"This is a plain case. Without a writ of attachment, the sheriff of 
Story county had no authority or right to notify the appellant that he 
was attached as garnishee, nor to take his answers to the interrogatories. 
* * * The district court has no more power to render a judgment upon 
a notice given and answers thus taken and returned than i f  the same 
thing had been done by a j ustice of the peace, notary public, a road super­
visor, or a private individual." Judgment against the garnishee reversed. 
Van Fossen v. Anderson, 8 Iowa 251. 
HEYE & CO. v. MOODY & CO., in Texas Sup. Ct., April 12, 1887-
67 Tex. 615, 4 S. W. 242. 
WILLIE, C. J. On Nov. 1 5 , 1881 , Oliver & Griggs . sued out 
a writ of attachment against Dcssling & Roller, which was on the 
same day levied by T. E. Jackson, sheriff of Limestone county, 
upon a stock of goods in Greesbeck, and on the next day upon a 
stock of g-oods in Mexia. After levying upon the Mexia stock 
the sheriff returned to Groesbeck, leaving that stock ir®ore-
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house in which it was contained, and its key in charge of three
persons, with instructioris to close the doors and make an inven-
tory of the goods.
Before leaving Mexia the sheriff was told that other attach-
ments [*6I7] would soon be there, to which he replied that J. M.
\/Valler (who was a constable and also Jackson’s deputy) could
serve any process that could be served by the sheriff. After
Jackson had left, a writ of attachment in favor of Gust Heye &
Co. against Bessling 8; Roller was placed in the hands of VValler,
who levied the same on the stock of goods in Mexia. Waller’s
return showed that the writ was levied by him upon said stock
on November 16, at eleven o’clock, as per inventory filed, subject
to the levy of the attachment of Oliver & Griggs, and it was
signed, “T. E. Jackson, sherifi of Limestone county. J. M. Wal-
ler, deputy.” On the nineteenth, \Valler delivered the attachment
to the sheriff, who filed it with the papers of the cause. Jackson
reached Groesbeck on the sixteenth, and an attachment in favor
of VV. L. Moody was on the same day placed in his hands for
lev_v. His return upon this writ showed that he levied it upon the
Groesbeck stock at one o'clock p. m., and on the Mexia stock at
half past two o'clock p. m., of that day, subject to the Oliver &
Griggs attachment.
All of the attaching creditors obtained regular judgments
upon their claims at the same term of the court. The sheriff
sold the two stocks under order of court, and, after paying off
the judgment of Oliver & Griggs, returned the balance of the
proceeds of the sale, viz., eighteen hundred dollars, into court;
and the present action tests the question as to whether this mon-
ey shall be paid to Gust Heye & Co., or to VV. L. Moody & Co.
The court below held that the goods, when levied upon under
the attachment in favor of Oliver & Griggs, were in custodia
lcgis, and could not be attached by another officer, though a dep-
uty of the officer by whom the first levy was made; that the sher-
iff in possession alone could make such a levy; that the acts of
the deputy were not by construction the acts of the sheritf, un-
less adopted and ratified by him, and that there was no such rati-
fication. Upon this view of the law, judgment was rendered for
\V. L. Moody & Co., and this appeal is taken by the appellant
from that judgment.
It is a general principle that goods attached by one ofiggr
and in his possession c t be attached bv another ofificcr. The
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house in which it was contained, and its key in charge of three 
persons, with instructioris to close the doors and make an inven­
tory of the goods. 
Before leaving Mexia the sheriff was told that other attach­
ments [*617]  would soon be there, to which he replied that J . .M. 
\Valler ( who was a constable and also Jackson's deputy ) could 
serve any process that could be served by the sheriff. After ) 
Jackson had left, a writ of attachment in favor of Gust Heye & 
Co. against Bessling � Roller was placed in the hands of \Valier, 
who levied the same on the stock of goods in Mexia. Waller's 
return showed that the writ was levied by him upon said stock 
on :r\ovember 16, at eleven o'clock , as per inventory filed, subj ect 
to the levy of the attachment of Oliver & Griggs, and it was 
signed, "T. E. Jackson, sheriff of Limestone county. J. :M. Wal­
ler, deputy." On the nineteenth, \Valier delivered the attachment 
to the sheriff, who filed it with the papers of the cause. Jackson 
reached Groesbeck on the sixteenth, and an attachment in favor 
of \V. L. Moody was on the same day placed in his hands for 
levy. His  return upon this writ showed that he levied it upon the 
Groesbeck stock at one o'clock p. m. ,  and on the Mexia stock at 
half past two o'clock p. m. , of that day, subject to the Oliver & 
Griggs attachment. 
All of the attaching creditors obta ined regular j udgments 
11pon their claims at the same term of the court. The sheriff 
sold the two stocks under order of court, and, after paying off 
the j udgment of Oliver & Griggs, returned the balance of the 
proceeds of the sale, viz. ,  eighteen hundred dollars, into court ; 
and the present action tests the question as to whether this mon­
ey shall be paid to Gust Heye & Co., or to \V. L. Moody & Co. 
The court below held that the goods, when levied upon under 
the attachment in favor of Oliver & Griggs, were in cu.stodia 
legis, and could not be attached by another officer, though a dep­
u ty of the officer by whom the first levy was made ; that the sher­
iff in possession alone could make such a levy ; that the acts of 
the deputy were not by construction the acts of the sheriff, un­
less adopted and ratified by him, and that there was no such rati­
ficat ion. Upon this view of the law, judgment was rendered for 
\V. L. �Ioody & Co., and this appeal is taken by the appellant 
from that judgment. 
It i s a general principle that goods attached by one offli:er 
anrl in his  possession c be attached bv another officer. The 
. ucstion whet 1er it was rightly applied by the court below in the 
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present case depends upon whether the_sheriff and his deputy
were different officers. Our statuteslprovide that sheriffs shall
have power, by writing, to appoint one or more deputies, who
shall have power and authority to perform all the acts and duties
[*6I8] required of their principals. Rev. Stat., Art. 4520. All
writs, including attachments, are directed to the sheriff or any
constable, but may be executed by a deputy sheriff, who makes his
return in the name of his principal. So far as the public is con-
cerned there is no difference between the powers and duties of
the sheriff and his deputy ; either can perform and can be com-
pelled to perform the same acts that are required of the other.
VVhen a writ reaches the hands of a deputy it is in fact received
by the principal. He is liable for its proper enforcement, and
for all acts done by his deputy under its authority. If goods are
tortiously seized under it by the deputy, the principal can be
sued by the owner; if they are illegally disposed of by the deputy,
the principal is responsible.
As between the sheriff and th deputy, of course the former
can make the latter responsible f r such losses or misconduct,
but with this the public has no concern. It follows that as to the
public, whose servants these officers are, the acts of the deputy
are the acts of the principal—the possession of the former is the
possession of the latter. So far as the responsibilities of the office
are concerned, the sheriff is liable for the acts both of himself
and his deputy; so far as its rights and duties are concerned they
are in every respect identical. This is not only the true construc-
tion of our statute, but is clearly the rule at common law. Bacon's
Abridgment, title Sheriff; Comyn’s Digest, title Officer; Gwynne
on Sheriffs, 43; Murfree on Sheriffs, § 18.
The acts of the deputy are performed in the name of the
principal, and they become so essentially the acts of the latter
that he may lawfully return that they were done by himself.
Freeman on Executions, § 384. From these principles we can
but conclude that the act of \Valler in making the levy upon
the Mexia stock of goods was the act of the sheriff and amounted
to the same thing as if he had made the levy himself. As the
goods were in the possession of the sheriff under a former at-
tachment, it was of course proper for him to levy the subse-
quent writ of Gust Heye & Co. upon it, subject to the previous
levy of Oliver 8: Griggs.
‘We are cited to no authorities by the appellee which sustain
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present case depends upon whether the sheriff and his deputy 
were different officers. Our statutes · pr�vide that sheriffs shall 
have power, by writing, to appoint one or more deputies, who 
shal l have power and authority to perform all the acts and duties 
[*618] required of their principals. Rev. Stat., Art. 4520. All 
writs, including attachments, are directed to the sheriff or any 
constable, but may be executed by a deputy sheriff, who makes his 
return in the name of his principal. So far as the public is con­
cerned there is no difference between the powers and duties of 
the sheriff and his  deputy ; either can perform and can be com­
pelled to perform the same acts that are required of the other. 
\Vhen a writ reaches the hands o f  a deputy it is in fact .received 
by the principal. He is liable for its proper enforcement, and 
for all acts done by his deputy under its authority. I f  goods arej\ 
tortiously seized under it by the deputy, the principal can be 
sued by the owner ; if they are i l legally disposed of by the deputy, 
the principal is responsible. 
As between the sheriff and th� deputy, of course the former 
can make the latter responsible fdr such losses or misconduct, 
but with this the public has no concern. It follows that as to the 
publ ic, whose servants these officers are, the acts of the deputy 
are the acts of the principal-the possession of the former is the 
possession of the latter. So far as the responsibilities of the office 
are concerned, the sheriff is l iable for the acts both of himself 
and his deputy ; so far as its rights and duties are concerned they 
are in every respect identical . This is not only the true construc­
tion of  our statute, but i s  clearly the rule at common law. Bacon's 
Abridgment, title Sheriff ; Comyn's Digest, title Officer ; Gwynne 
on Sheriffs, 43 ; Murfree on Sheri ffs, § 18. 
The acts of the deputy are performed in the name of the 
principal , and they become so essentially the acts of the latter 
that he may lawfully return that they . were done by himself. 
Freeman on Executions, § 384. From these principles \\:e can 
hut conclude that the act of \Valier in making the levy upon 
, f � l the Mexia stock o f  goods was the act of the sheriff and amounted 
!�· to the same thing as i f  he had made the levy himself. As the 
goods were in the possession of the sheriff under a fonner at­
tachment, it was of course proper for him to levy the subse-
quent writ of Gust Heye & Co. upon it , subj ect to the previous 
levy of Oliver & Griggs. 
\Ve are cited to no authorities by the appellee which sustain 
the ruling of the cou rt below, that the sheriff and his deputies 
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are different officers and that the possession of attached goods
by the one is not the possession of the other. In the case of
Vtnton v. Bradford, 13 Mass. 116, 7 'Am. Dec. 119, it was held
that [*61g] the deputies of the same sheriff are different officers
as to each other; but it had been held by the same court in
Watson v. Todd, 5 Mass. 273, that the possession of a deputy
was the possession of the sheriff. This doctrine of the last
named case was sanctioned by the former, and it was added that
the possession of the deputy being the possession of the sheriff
the latter could levy a second writ upon goods attached by the
deputy, the same being constructively in the possession of the
sheriff.
If the possession of the deputy is the possession of the
principal, it is because they are, in the eye of the law, identical
in so far as the duties of the office of sheriff are concerned. If so,
the acts of the former are the acts of the latter. Waller’s levy of
the attachment of Heye & Co. was therefore the levy of Jackson,
and was under the authority of law made upon goods in the pos-
session of Jackson. It is proper to add that the New England
cases differ, as to the position which the sheriff and his deputies
occupy towards the public, from the decisions of other states,
probably on the ground that they are there treated in many
respects as if they did not hold the same office. A deputy is
liable directly to a party aggrieved by his rfiisconduct; and he
and the sheriff can not be sued as joint trespassers, and in at
least one of these states process is directed both to the sheriff and
his deputy. Murfree on Sheriffs, §§ 907, 938; Odiorne V. Colley,
2 N. H. 66.
To hold as the court below did in this case that a deputy
can not levy upon goods already attached and in possession of
the sheriff would be to deprive the public of the benefit of a
deputy’s services whenever a second attachment was to be levied.
The goods already attached being in the possession of the sheriff,
no matter whether levied by a deputy or not, could not after-
wards be subjected to another levy, except by the sheriff himself.
Deputies are appointed as well for the benefit of the public as of
the principal sheriff, and their powers must not be so construed
as to deprive the public of their services in any respect.
It may be added that in this case the sheriff ratified the act
of his deputy in making the levy for Heye & Co., and adopted it

















































































































































l� X E C U T I N G  T H I';  WRITS · P S  
are different officers and that the possession o f  attached goods 
by the one is not the possession of the other. In the case o f  
Vi11 ton v .  Bradford, 1 3 Mass. 1 16, 7 Am. Dec. I I9, i t  was held 
that [*619]  the deputies of the same sheriff are different officers 
as to each other ; but it had been held by the same court in 
if/afson v. Todd, S Mass. 273, that the possession of a deputy 
was the possession of the sheriff. This doctrine of the last 
named case was sanctioned by the former, and it was added that 
the possession of the deputy being the possession of the sheriff 
the latter could levy a second writ  upon goods attached by the 
deputy, the same being constructively in the possess ion of the 
sheriff. 
If the possession of the deputy is the possession of the � 
principal, it is because they are, in the eye of the law, identical \'\ 
in so far as the duties of the office of sheriff are concerned. I f  so, ' 
the acts of the former are the acts o f  the latter. Waller's levy of 
the attachment of Heye & Co. was therefore the levy of  Jackson, 
and \vas under the authoritv of law made upon goods in the pos­
session of Jackson . It is prope·r to add that the New England 
cases differ, as to the position which the sheriff and his deputies 
occupy towards the public, from the decisions of other states, 
probably on the ground that they are there treated in many 
respects as if  they did not hold the same of!ice. A deputy is 
liable directly to a party aggrieved by his misconduct ; and he 
an<l the sheriff can not be sued as joint trespassers, and in at 
least one of these states process is directed both to the sheriff and 
his deputy. Murfree on Sheriffs,  §§ 907, 938 ; Odiorne v. Colley, 
2 �- H.  66. 
To hold as the court below did in this case that a deputy 
can not levy upon goods already attached and in possession of  
the sheriff would be  to  deprive the public of the benefit of a 
deputy's services whenever a second attachment was to be levied. 
The goods already attached being in the possession of the sheriff, 
no matter whether levied by a deputy or not, could not after­
wards be subj ected to another levy, except by the sheriff himself. 
Depnties are appointed as well for the benefit of the public as of 
the principal sheriff, and their powers must not be so construed 
as to deprive the public of their services in any respect . 
It may be added that in this case the sheriff ratified the act ) 
of his deputy in making the levy for Heye & Co., and adopted it 
as his own by filing his return as made among the papers of the 
cause. 
I 
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\Ve are of opinion, therefore, that Heye & Co.'s attach-
ment having come to the hands of VValler, the deputy, prior to
the time that Moody & Co.'s writ reached Jackson, the sheriff,
and having been levied upon the Mexia stock previous to the lat-
ter writ, was entitled to priority, out of the proceeds of the goods
[*62o]sold under the Oliver 8: Griggs attachment. This prior-
ity of levy upon the Mexia stock gave Heye & Co. the right to
have its proceeds applied to their debt next after Oliver & Griggs
were satisfied. Immediately upon the making of their levv they
were entitled to require Oliver & Griggs to exhaust the Croes-
beck stock, upon which there was no other writ levied, before
levying upon the Mexia stock,‘ upon which they held an attach-
ment lien. This right was not changed by any subsequent levy
upon the Groesbeck stock by Moody & Co. They could not, by
acquiring a subsequent lien, impair or interfere in the least with
the extent of the right of Heye & Co. to have their lien satisfied
out of the Mexia stock. This would, however, be the result if
the levy of appellees upon the Groesbeck stock is to affect the
previous levy of the appellants upon that in Mexia. * * *
Reversed and remanded.
For What Garnishees May Be Charged.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK v. DAVENPORT 8: ST. PAUL RY. CO.,
in Iowa Sup. Ct., Dec. 11, 1876-45 Iowa 120.
Judgment being recovered by the First Nat. Bank against the
Davenport & St. P. Ry. Co. and the Davenport Ry. Con. Co..
J. S. Conner was summoned as garnishee under an execution
issued thereon. From an order discharging said garnishee
_ plaintiff appeals.
DAY, J. * * * The answer of the garnishee shows that he
was auditor and cashier of the operating department of the
Davenport Railway Construction Company. As auditor he had
charge of the accounts, examined agent's reports, and kept the
books. As cashier it was his duty to examine and receipt for the
cash remitted by the agents, to make collections from the roads.
and to cause anything to be done necessary to the prompt and
regular collection of the earnings of the road, and to make such
disposition of the cash in hand as he was directed to make from
time to time by the general manager, Smith. At the time of his
garnishment he had on hand, of money so received, belonging to
















































































































































4 1 (i CASES ON EXECU T I O N S, ETC. 
/ 
;\· . \Ve are of opinion, therefore, that Heye & Co.'s attach-
I the time that Moody & Co.'s writ reached Jackson, the sheriff, 
( ment having come to the hands of \Valier, the deputy, prior to 
and having been levied upon the l\frxia stock previous to the lat­
ter writ, was entitled to priority, out of the proceeds of the goods 
[ *620 ] sold under the Oliver & Griggs attachment. This prior­
ity of levy upon the Mexia stock gave Heye & Co. the rig-ht to 
have its proceeds applied to their debt next after Oliver & Griggs 
were satisfied . Immediately upon the mak ing of their levy they 
were entitled to require Oliver & Griggs to exhaust the Groes­
beck stock, upon which there was no other writ levied , be fore 
levying upon the Mexia stock ,· upon which they held an attach­
ment lien. This right w a s  not changed by any subsequent levy 
upon the Groesbeck stock by l\foody & Co. They could not, by 
acquiring a subsequent lien, impair or interfere in the least with 
the extent of the right of Heye & Co. to have their lien sati sfied 
out of the Mexia stock. This would, however, be the result if 
the levy of appellees upon the Groesbeck stock is to affect the 
previous levy of the appellants upon that in Mexia. * * * 
Re-;.'erscd and remanded. 
For What Garnishees May Be Charged. 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK v. DAVEN PORT & ST. PAUL RY. CO., 
in Iowa Sup. Ct., Dec. I I , 1876--45 Iowa 120. 
Judgment being recovered by the First Nat. Bank against the 
Davenport & St. P. Ry. Co. and the Davenport Ry. Con.  C'o . .  
] .  S .  Conner was summoned as garnishee under an execution 
is sued thereon. From an order discharging said garnishee 
plaintiff appeals. 
DAY, J. * * * The answer of the garnishee shows that he 
was auditor and cashier of the operating department of the 
Davenport Railway Constrttction Company. As auditor  he harl 
charge of the accounts, examined agent 's reports, and kept the 
books. As cashier it was his duty to  examine and receipt for the 
cash remi tt ed by the agents, to make collections from the roads. 
and to cau se anyth ing to he done necessary to the prompt and 
regu lar co l lect ion of the earnings of the road , and to make such 
c l i �pos i t ion o f  the cash in hand as he was directed to make from 
t ime to t ime by the general manager, Smith. .\t the time o f  his 
garni shment he had on hand, o f  money so received, be longing to 
the opera t i n g  department  of the Davenport Rai lway Construct ion 
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Company, $3,443. This money was kept in a Safe provided by the
construction company, to which the garnishee alone had a key.
The garnishee claims that he is not liable because he did not have
independent control of the money, but was under obligation to
dispose of it as directed by his superiors. The position of appellee
cannot be better expressed than in the following quotation from
the argument of his counsel: “The fallacy of the plaintifi’s argu-
ment consists in assuming that the garnishee had these moneys in
his possession and in his custody or under his control, a fact which
has not only not been proved, but the contrary most clearly and
distinctly appears. The possession and control of property con-
emplated by the statute, does notmean the mere physical power
to take possession of it and carry it oft’; but the independent
possession—the present and immediate rightful custody of it,
including the right to retain that possession, and to maintain that
custody and control of it. [*128] The law does not require that
the garnishee should commit a trespass, or a gross breach of
faith, in order to obtain or retain possession of the attached
property.”
Appellee, in assuming that the possession which will warrant
the process of garnishment must be an independent possession,
coupled with the right to retain possession and maintain custody
and control is, we think, clearly in error. Aside from express
contract, one does not obtain such possession and control of the
property of another. Suppose a party makes a simple deposit of
money in a bank, without any agreement as to the time the deposit
shall remain. The bank holds the money entirely subject to the
control of the owner. It cannot rightfully hold the money an hour
after the owner has directed it to be paid out. Yet it cannot be
questioned that, while the money remains in the bank, the bank
may be garnished. Suppose garnishment process served upon
the bank, and that afterward the owner orders the money to be
paid out in a particular way. Does the bank commit a breach of
faith in holding the money, and refusing to dispose of it as di-
rected by the owner?
The fallacy of the appellee’s argument is in placing the duty
of the garnishee to his principal above his duty to obey the man-
date of the law. It may be conceded that the answer of the gar-
nishee fully discloses that it was his duty to pay out the money in
his possession as ordered by Smith; but the process of the court
imposed upon him a paramount duty to retain it in his possession.
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Company, $J,443· This money was kept in a safe provided by the 
construction company, to which the garnishee alone had a key. 
The garnishee claims that he is not liable because he did not have 
independent contro l  of the money, but \11,ras under obligation to 
di.;pose o f  it as directed by his superiors. The position of appellee 
cannot be better expressed than in the following quotation from 
the argument of his counsel : "The fallaC'y of the plaintiff's argu­
ment consists in assuming that the garnishee had these moneys in 
his possession and in, his custody or under his control, a fact which 
has not only not been proved, but the contrary most clearly and 
distinctly appears. The possession and control of property con­
emplated by the statute, does not mean the mere physical power 
to take possession of it and carry it off ; but the independent 
possession-the present and immediate rightful custody of it, 
including the right to retain that possession, and to maintain that 
custody and control of it. [*128] The law does not require that 
the garnishee should commit a trespass, or a gross breach of 
faith, in order to obtain or retain possession of the attached 
property." 
Appellee, in assuming that the possession which will warrant 
the process of garnishment must be an independent possession, 
coupled with the right to retain possession and maintain custody 
and control is, we think, clearly in error. Aside from express 
contract, one does not obtain such possession and control of the 
property of another. Suppose a party makes a simple deposit of 
money in a bank, without any agreement as to the time the deposit 
shall remain. The bank holds the money entirely subj ect to the 
control of the owner. It cannot rightfully hold the money an hour 
a fter the owner has directed it to be paid out. Yet it cannot be 
questioned that , while the money remains in the bank, the bank 
may be garnished. Suppose garnishment process served upon 
the bank, and that afterward the owner orders the money to be 
paid out in a particular way. Does the bank commit a breach of 
faith in holding the money, and refusing to dispose of it as di­
rected by the owner ? 
The fallacy o f  the appellee's argument is in placing the duty 1 
of the garnishee to his principal above his duty to obey the man­
date of the law. It may be conceded that the answer of the gar­
nishee fully discloses that it was his duty to pay out the money in 
his possession as ordered by Smith ; but the process of the court 
imposed upon him a paramount duty to retain it in his possession. 
and an obedience to that order would not render him a trespasser, 
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nor involve him in a breach of faith. VVe think appellee’s counsel
concede enough to establish the liability of this garnishee. In
their argument they say: “We do not take the ground * * * that
Conner cannot be held because he was an employé and not an
ofiicer of the corporation. An employe may clearly have such
possession—such custody and control of the property of his
employer as to subject it to garnishment in his hands. It depends
altogether upon the nature of the employment. For instance, the
agent of a railroad at one of its stations certainly has the unquali-
fied and independent possession [*129] and control of the moneys
of the company which came into his hands. He is only an em-
ployé; yet the nature of his employment and of his duties may,
and probably would, render the moneys in his hands subject to
garnishment. He has the independent possessions, control and
custody of those moneys; while the cashier whom the company
might employ to assist him in his work, by looking after and keep-
ing accounts of those moneys, would not have any such possession
and control of them.”
Yet, these station agents are subordinate to the garnishee in
this case, and are required to remit to him the moneys by them
collected. Suppose such an agent had been garnished, and he had
immediately been removed, and ordered to pay over all the mon-
eys in his hands to Conner. could he afterward retain the money
without a gross breach of faith? If he could, we are unable to
see why the garnishee in this case may not do the same; and if he
could not, it is apparent that a railway company may, at pleasure
render the process of garnishment unavailing. \Ve are satisfied
that the appellee had such custody and control of the money in
question as to render it subject to garnishment in his hands. He
should have retained that possession. and held the money subject
to the order of the court. In failing to do so he has magnified
his duty to his employer, and has ignored his obligations to the
law. The court should have held him liable upon his answer.
Reversed.
It is believed that the above decision announces the correct rule, and
it is Supported b_v the weight of authority. But in cases of this exact kind,
decisions to the contrary will be found in Pennsylvania, Maine, Tennes-
see. Kentucky and Missouri. Fowler V. Railrmy C0., 35 Pa. St. 22;
Sf>ra_gm’ v. Slmm .\'nrz C0., 52 Me. 5o2;IViIder v. Shea, 13 Bush (Ky)
I28: lllurfh v. Srlxardiu, 4 Mo. App. 403.
The character of the conflict in the authorities will be seen by read-
ing the following abstract from a decision reversing a judgment against
a treasurer of a railroad company as garnishee of the company: "It is
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nor involve him in  a breach of faith. \Ve think appellee's counsel 
concede enough to establish . the liabil i ty of this garnishee. In 
their argument they say : "We do not take the ground * * * that 
Conner cannot be held because he was an employe and not an 
officer of the corporation. An employe may clearly have such 
possession-such custody and control of the property of his 
employer as to subject it to garnishment in his hands. It depends 
altogether upon the nature of the employment. For instance, the 
agent of a railroad at one of its stations certainly has the unquali­
fied and independent possession [ * 129] and control of the moneys 
of the company which came into his hands. He is only an em­
ploye ; yet the nature of his employment and of his duties may, 
and probably would, render the moneys in his hands subj ect to 
garnishment. He has the independent possessions, control and 
custody of those moneys ; while the cashier whom the company 
mi�ht employ to assi st him in his work, by look ing after and keep­
ing accounts of those moneys,  would not have any such possession 
and control of them." 
Yet ,  these station agents are subordinate to the garnishee in 
this case,  and are requi red to remit to him the moneys by them 
collected. Suppose such an agent had been garn i shed, and he had 
immed iately been removed , and ordered to pay over all the mon­
eys in his hands to Conner. could he afterward reta in the money 
without a gross breach of faith ? I f  he coulcl, we arc unable to 
see why the garnishee in this case may not do the same ; ancl i f  he 
cou ld not ,  it is  apparent that a railway company may, at pleasure 
render the process of garnishment unavail ing. \Ve arc satisfied 
that the appel lee had such custody and control of the money in 
riuest inn as to render it subj ect to garn ishment in his hands. He 
shou ld have retained that possession , and held the money subj ect 
to the order of the court. In fail ing to do so he has ma�n ified 
h i s  duty to h i s  emplo�·er, and has ignored his obl iga tions to the 
l aw. The court should have held him liable upon his  answer. 
Rc-z·crscd. 
I t  is  bel ieved that the ahove decision announces the correct rule, and 
i t  is supported by the weigh t  of authority. But in cases of  this exact kind, 
decis ions  to the contrary will  be found in Pen nsylvania, Main�. Tennes­
�et>,  Kentucky and l\lissnuri .  F(ln•lcr v. Ra il<••ay Co., 35 Pa. St. 22 ; 
Sp rague v. Stea m 1\"01' .  Co. , 52 Me. 5q2 ; Wilder v. Shea, 13  Bush (Ky) 
r28 : .�fucth v .  Sclrardi11 , 4 Mo. App. 403. 
'The ch aracter of the con fl ict in the authorities will  be seen by read­
in(! t h e  fol lowing abstract from a decision reversing a j u dgment against 
a trea s u re r  o f  a rai l road company as ga rn i shee of the company : "It is  
not eHry kind of hold ing that con stitutes the possession designated, nor 
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every possibility of power over the property that gives the control neces-
sary to make it garnishablc. The servant who rides his master’s horse
to water, or keeps the keys of the stable, and has access to and power to
take and use the horse, has not the garnishable possession and control,
by reason merely of such custody and power. And so, too, the clerk in
the store, who has access to the merchant's safe, and has charge and sale
of the merchant’s goods, and the power to receive and pay out money
from the drawer or safe, has not, by reason merely of such charge and
power, the garnishable possession and control of the merchandise and
money. Such custody and power may exist with the clerk, and still, the
merchandise and money not be in his possession and control in such wise
as to make them the subject of garnishment in his hands. The custody
and power must go beyond such occupation or holding and service, to
constitute the garnishable possession and control. Where to draw the line
and precisely to define the rule, is difiicult and not safe to attempt—upon
one side of which exists, and on the other side does not exist, the gar-
nishable condition of the properties. It is safe, however, to say, that mere
employment in the service of the owner, in and about his properties, and
the physical power, by reason of such employment, to handle, remove,
return such properties, to receive and pay out moneys of the owner, do
not constitute the possession and control of the properties contemplated
by the law of garnishment. Though such employment gives a degree of
physical power over the properties, the possession and control exist with
the owner, and not with the employé or servant. Of course such employ-
ment may exist, under circumstances with relation to the properties, as
to invest the employé with such possession and control as to make them
the subject of garnishment in his hands. It is obvious enough, that em-
ployment and possession of the garnishable character, may co-exist. But
where the actual and substantial possession is with the owner, and the
relation of the servant or employé to the properties is such only as is in-
cident to the employment and service, the properties are not subject to
garnishment as being in the possession or control of the servant or
employé.
“The servant who feeds and waters and curries the master's horse,
and keeps the key of the stable, the master having the actual and dominant
possession and control; the clerk who opens and shuts the store, and
sells the goods, and has charge of the keys of the money drawer and
safe, subordinate to the actual possession and control of the merchant;
the treasurer of the corporation, who has charge of the safe and the
moneys therein, and receives and pays out under the immediate direction
and control of the properties, as subjects them, the employes and proper-
ties, to garnishment. In such and the like cases, the question is, whether
the actual and substantial possession is with the employee or whether
his relation to the properties is merely of employment and service, while
the real possession and control is with the owner or some other?” Mc-
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every possibility of power over the property that gives the control neces­
sary to make it garnishable. The servant who rides his master's horse 
to water, or keeps the keys of the stable, and has access to and power to 
take and use the horse, has not the garnishable possession and control, 
by reason merely of such custody and power. And so, too, the clerk in 
the store, who has access to the merchant's safe, and has charge and sale 
of the merchant's goods, and the power to receive and pay out money 
from the drawer or safe, has not, by reason merely of such charge and 
power, the garnishable possession and control of the merchandise and 
money. Such custody and power may exist with the clerk, and still, the 
merchandise and money not be in his possession and control in such wise 
as to make them the subj ect of garnishment in his hands. The custody 
and power must go beyond such occupation or holding and service, to 
constitute the -garnishable possession and control. Where to draw the l ine 
and precisely to define the rule, is difficult and not safe to attempt-upon 
one side of which exists, and on the other side does not exist, the gar­
nishable condition of the properties. It is safe, however, to say, that mere 
employment in the service of the owner, in and about his properties, and 
the physical power, by reason of such employment, to handle, remove, 
return such properties, to receive and pay out moneys of the owner, do 
not constitute the possession and control of the properties contemplated 
by the law of garnishment. Though such employment gives a degree of 
physical power over the properties, the possession and control exist with 
the owner, and not with the employe or servant. Of course such employ­
ment may exist, under circumstances with relation to the properties, as 
to invest the employe with such possession and control as to make them 
the subj ect of garni shment in his hands. It  is obvious enough, that em­
ployment and possession of the garnishable character, may co-exist. But 
where the actual and substantial possession i s  with the owner, and the 
relation of the servant or employe to the properties is such only as is in­
cident to the employment and service, the properties are not subject to 
garn ishment as being in the possession or control of the servant or 
employe. 
"The servant who feeds and waters and curries the master's horse, 
and keeps the key of  the stable, the master having the actual and dominant 
poss<.>ssion and control ; the clerk who opens and shuts the store, and 
sel l s  the goods, and has charge of the keys of the money drawer and 
safe, subordinate to the actual possession and control of  the merchant ; 
the treasurer of the corporation, who has charge of the safe and the 
moneys therein, and receives and pays out under the immediate direction 
and control of the properties, as subjects them, the employes and proper­
ties, to garnishment. In such and the like cases, the question is, whether 
the actual and substantial possession is with the employee or whether 
his relation to the properties is merely of employment and service, while 
the real possession and control is  with the owner or some other ?" Mc­
Graw v. Memphis & 0. Ry. Co., [ 1868] 45 Tenn. (5 Coldwell) 434. 
420 CASES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC.
AVERY v. MONROE, in Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Oct. 20, 1898—I72 Mass.
132, 5r N. E. 452, 70 Am. St. Rep. 250.
Trustee process. Trustee charged and excepts.
HOLMES, J. At the time of the service of the writ in this
action the person sought to be charged as trustee had accepted
from the principal defendants a conveyance of all their property
not exempt from attachment, consisting mainly of machinery,
supplies and stock on hand in a shoe factory, and book accounts,
in trust for the defendants’ creditors, but had done nothing about
[*I33] taking possession of the property. No creditors appea;_
to have become parties 19 the deed. The question before us is
whether these facts warranted the superior court in charging the
trustee.
The title had passed as between the parties to the gleed, The
trustee had the right to the immediate possession. VVe do not see
why he was not as well “able to turn it out, to be disposed of on
execution,” (Andrews v. Ludlow, 5 Pick. 28, 31) as if he had
taken possession by formal act. The case of V iall v. Bliss, 9
Pick. 13, seems probably to have been similar to this, and in
Maine it seems settled that in cases like the present the trustee is
to be charged. Lane v. Nowell, I5 Maine 86; Arnold V. Elwell,
13 Maine 261 ; Peabody v. M aguire, 79 Maine 572, 584; Glenn v.
Boston 6’ Sanldwfch Glass C 0., 7 Md. 287. See also M eclumics’
Savings Bcmk v. Waite, 150 Mass. 234, 235; Cushing, Trustee
Process, §§ 53-5 5; Drake Attachment, (7th ed.) § 482; Freeman,
Executions, (2d ed.) § 160. Section 26 of Pub. Sts. c. 183, is
not intended to limit the liability of trustees under deeds like this
to cases where they have taken possession, but simply to declare
the existing law that they may be charged by trustee process
under § 21; Rev. Sts. c. I09 § 35, Commissioners’ note. Vtle are
of opinion that the property was “intrusted in the hands" of the
trustee within Pub. Sts. c. I83 § 21.
It is suggested that it does not appear from the trustee’s an-
swers to interrogatories that all the defendants had executed the
deed before service of the writ. It does not appear that they had
not. The deed was executed, and, if it be material, may be pre-
sumed to have been executed by all three of the defendants on
the day of its date, as it certainly was by two of them.
Erceflions overruled.
See opinion by Shaw, C.J'., in Osborne v. Jordan, 3 Gray 277. Avery
v. Monroe is the strongest case reported. There are several late cases
tending in the same direction. See collection of all the principal cases in
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AVERY v. MONROE, in Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Oct. 20, 1898-172 Mass. 
132, 51 N. E. 452, 70 Am. St. Rep. 250. 
Trustee process. Trustee charged and excepts. 
Hor.MES, J. At the time of the service of the writ in this 
action the person sought to be charged as trustee had accepted 
from the principal defendants a conveyance of all their property 
not exempt from attachment, consisting mainly of machinery, 
supplies and stock on hand in a shoe factory, and book accounts, 
in trust for the defendants' creditors, but had done nothing about 
[ *133] taking possession of the property. No creditors appear 
_to have become parties to the deeQ. The question before us i�­
whether these facts warranted the superior court in charging the 
trustee. 
The title had passed as between the parties to the deed. The 
trustee had the right to the immediate possession. We do not see 
why he was not as well "able to tum it out, to be disposed of on 
execution," (Andrews v. Ludlow, 5 Pick. 28, 3 1 )  as if he had 
taken possession by formai act. The case of Viall v. Bliss, 9 
Pick. 1 3, seems probably to have been similar to this, and in 
Maine it seems settled that in cases like the present the tmstee is 
to be charged. Lmie v. N owe!!, 1 5  Maine 86 ; Arnold v. Elwell, 
1 3  Maine 261 ; Peabody v. Maguire, 79 Maine 572, 584 ; Glenn v. 
Bosto n  & Sandiuich Glass Co., 7 Md. 287. See also Mechanics' 
Savings Bank v. Waite, 1 50 Mass. 234, 235 ; Cushing, Trustee 
Process, §§ 53-55 ; Drake Attachment, (7th ed. )  § 482 ; Freeman, 
Executions, ( 2cl ed.) § 100. Section 26 of Pub. Sts. c. 183, is 
not intended to limit the liability of trustees under deeds like this 
to cases where they have taken possession, but simply to declare 
the existing law that they may be charged by trustee process 
under § 2 1 ; Rev. Sts. c. 109 § 35, Commissioners' note. We are 
of opinion that the property was " intrusted in the hands" of the 
trustee within Pub. Sts. c. 183 § 2 1 .  
I t  i s  suggested that it does not appear from the trustee's an­
swers to interrogatories that all the defendants had executed the 
deed before service of the writ. It does not appear that they had 
not. The deed was executed, and, if it be material, may be pre­
sumed to have been executed by all three of the defendants on 
the day of its date, as it certainly was by two of them. 
Exceptions overruled. 
See opinion by Shaw, C.J., in Osborne v. Jordan, 3 Gray 277. Avery 
v. Mon roe is the strongest case reported. There are several late cases 
tending in the same direction. See collection of all the principal cases in 
a review of Avery v. Monroe in American Law Review May-June, 1899. 
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SMITH v. MENOMINEE CIRCUIT JUDGE, in Mich. Sup. Ct.. April
30, 1884-53 Mich. 560, 19 N. W. 184.
Mandamus by James D. Smith and another, against C. B.
Grant, circuit judge.
Coouzv, C. J. On February 7, 1883, one Canterbury brought
suit in the circuit court for the county of Menominee against one
McClintock, and garnished the relators as having in their hands
property of McClintock. Judgment was recovered in the prin-
cipal suit, and the garnishees disclosed that they were in posses-
sion of certain goods and chattels of the estimated value of
$6,000, as mortgagees of McClintock, under a mortgage given
to secure the payment of $4775, all of which was due and unpaid.
The garnishment suit appears to have been brought to trial before
a jury, who returned a verdict that the garnishees had property
of McClintock in their hands which was of the value of $7,000,
and had a lien upon it to the amount of $4,772.69. Thereupon the
circuit court made an order * * * [appointing a receiver of the
property, directing the garnishees to surrender it to him, and
directing him to sell the same at public auction, and apply the pro-
ceeds, (I) to paying the costs of the sale, etc., (2) to the pay-
ment of the garnishees’ mortgage, and (3) to return the balance
into court to apply on the judgment of the garnishing creditor].
The garnishees complain of this order, and apply in this pro-
ceeding for a writ of mandamus to require its vacation. Several
objections are made to it, but only those will be noticed which ap-
pear to us to require examination for the purposes of a decision
of the case now before us.
The statute (How. Stat. § 8064) contemplates that the court,
when it shall appear that the garnishee has in his possession
[*562] property belonging to the principal defendant, will appoint
a commissioner or receiver to collect and apply the proceeds upon
any execution in favor of the plaintiff and against the garnishee.
* * *
\Ve have grave doubts of the right to take from a mortgagee
of chattels the property upon which he has a lien, except where,
for the protection of the rights of others, the necessity shall be
apparent. It is a serious interference with his contract rights.
It is a part of his security that the mortgage gives him authoritv
to take the property into his own possession; and nothing which
may subsequently be done by or against the mortgagor can right-
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SMITH v. MENOMINEE CIRCUIT JUDGE, i n  Mich. Sup. C t  . •  April 
30, 188.t-SJ Mich. 56o, 19 N. W. 184. 
Mandamus by James D. Smith and another, against C. B. 
Grant, circuit j udge. 
COOLEY, C. ]. On February 7, 1883, one Canterbury brought 
suit in the circuit court for the county of Menominee against one 
McClintock, and garnished the relators as having in their hands 
property of McClintock. Judgment was recovered in the prin­
cipal suit, and the garnishees disclosed that they were in posses­
sion of certain goods and chattels of the estimated value of 
$6,ooo, as mortgagees of McClintock, under a mortgage given 
to secure the payment of $4775, all of which was due and unpaid. 
The garnishment suit appears to have been brought to trial before 
a jury, who returned a verdict that the garnishees had property 
of McClintock in their hands which was of the value of $7,000, 
and had a lien upon it to the amount of $4,772.6<). Thereupon the 
circu it court made an order * * * [appointing a receiver of the 
property, direct ing the garnishees to surrender it to him, and 
directing him to sell the same at public auction, and o.pply the pro­
ceeds, ( I ) to paying the costs of the sale, etc. ,  ( 2) to the pay­
ment of the garnishees' mortgage, and ( 3 )  to return the balance 
into court to apply on the j udgment of the garnishing creditor] . 
The garnishees complain of this order, and apply in this pro­
ceeding for a writ of mandamus to require its vacation . Several 
obj ections are made to it, but only those will be noticed which ap­
pear to us to require examination for the purposes of a decision 
of the case now before us. 
The statute ( How. Stat. § 8o64) contemplates that the court, 
when it shall appear that the garnishee has in his possession 
[ *562 ] property belonging to the principal defendant, will appoint 
a commissioner or receiver to collect and apply the proceeds upon 
any execution in favor of the plaintiff and against the garnishee. 
* * * 
'Ve have grave doubts of the right to take from a mortgagee 
of chattel s the property upon which he has a lien, except ·where, 
for the protection of the rights of others, the necessity shall be 
apparent. It is  a serious interference with his contract rights. 
It is  a part of his security that the mortgage gives him authoritv 
to take the property into his own possession ; and nothing which 
may subsequently be done by or against the mortgagor can right­
fully diminish or affect this security. \Vhen a resort to le�a' 
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remedies becomes [*563] essential, all parties concerned may be
required to submit to some inconvenience, and perhaps to some
loss; but in a case where, as in this case, the legal remedy is only
sought for the purpose of reaching a surplus after a lien is-satis-‘
fied, and the lienholder is not concerned in the controversy, it can-
not be rightful to make the burden or the cost of the litigation
fall upon him, or to take from him substantial rigl1ts for the
convenience of the parties litigant.
In this case the plaintiflF, after obtaining his judgment, might
have sold on execution the interest of the mortgagor in the goods
and chattels mortgaged (How Stat. § 7682); and for the pur-
poses of a levy might have taken possession temporarily. Ca-r_v
v. Hewitt, 26 Mich. 228; Macombcr v. San.-ton, 28 Mich. 516;
Nelson v. Ferris, 30 Mich. 497 ;Haynes v. Lcppig, 40 Mich. 602.
But the levy must be subordinate to the right of the mortgagee
(Worthington v. Hanna, 23 Mich. 530) ; and a sale, if made with-
out first paying off the mortgage, must be made of the goods in
gross, subject to the mortgagee's lien. lV0rthingt0n V. Hanna,
supra; King v. Hubbell, 42 Mich. 597; Haynes v. Leppig, 40
Mich. 602; Baldtt-in v. Talbot, 46 Mich. I9;Laing v. Pcrrott, 48
Mich. 298. It is not apparent on this record that an execution
would not have accomplished the purposes of effectual remedy
quite as effectually as the appointment of a receiver; but if for
any reason a receiver was deemed necessary, he could not prop-
erly be given greater powers than a sheriff would have had it
execution had been placed in his hands. It would have been
proper to empower him to examine the property and inventory it,
for the purposes of an intelligent sale; but a sale must be made
by him of the property in gross subject to the mortgage, and all
his proceedings must be at the expense, not of the mortgagees,
but of the fund that might be realized on the sale.
The order complained of should therefore be modified so far
as it authorizes the receiver to displace the possession of the mort-
gagees, and so far as it authorizes the receiver to sell the mort-
gaged property without regard to the mortgage lien, and to pay
the mortgagees from the proceeds after deducting [*564] ex-
penses. The statute only contemplates a sale when a greater sum
than the amount of the lien can be realized; and this is inconsist-
ent with a sale in parcels ,the outcome of which cannot be known
when it is begun. And it is unjust, even if the statute would per-
mit it, that the mortgagces should be subjected to the risks of a
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remedies becomes [*563] essential ,  all parties concerned may be 
requ ired to submit to some inconvenience, and perhaps to some 
loss ; but in a case where, as in this case, the legal remedy is only 
sought for the purpose of reaching a surplus after a lien is- satis-• 
fied, and the lienholder is not concerned in the controversy, it can­
not be rightful to make the burden or the cost of the l itigation 
fall upon him, or to tak e from him substantial rights for the 
convenience of the parties l itigant . 
In th is case the plaint iff, after obtaining his judgment, m ight 
have sold on execution the in terest of the mortgagor in the goods 
and chattels mortgaged ( How Stat. § 7682 ) ; and for the pur­
poses of a levy might have taken possession temporar i ly . Cary 
v. Hc·witt, 26 Mich. 228 ; _Macom ber v. Saxton, 28 Mich. 5 1 6 ; 
Nelso n v. Ferris, 30 1\fich. 497 ;Haynes v. Lcppig, 40 :Mich. 6o2. 
But the levy must be subord inate to the right of the mortgagee 
UVorthiugton v. Hanna, 23 Mich. 530) ; and a sale, if made with­
out first paying off the mortgage , must be made o f  the goods in 
gross, subj ect to the mortgagee's lien. lVorthingto n v. H an11a , 
supra;  Kiug v. Hubbell, 42 M ich. 597 ; HaJncs v. Leppig, 40 
:M ich. 6o2 ; Bald1t�in v. Talbot, 46 M ich . 1 9  ;Laing v. Perrott, 48 
!i.lich .  298. It is not apparent on this record that an execution 
would not have accomplished the purposes of effectua l remedy 
quite as effectually as the appointment of a receiver ; but if for 
any reason a receiver was deemed necessary, he could not prop­
erly be given greater powers than a sheriff would have had i f  
execution had been placed in  his hands. I t  would have been 
proper to empower him to exam ine the property and inventory it ,  
for the purposes of an intel l igent sale ; but a sale must be made 
by him of the property in gross subj ect to the mortgage, and all 
his proceedings must be at the expense, not of the mortgagees , 
but of the fund that might be realized on the sale. 
The order complained of should therefore be modified so far 
as it authorizes the receiver to displace the possess ion of the mort­
gagees, and so far as it authorizes the receiver to sell the mort­
gaged property wi thout regard to the mortgage l ien , and to pay 
the mortgagees from the proceeds a fter deducting [*564] ex­
pen ses .  The statute only contemplates a sale when a greater sum 
than the amount of the lien can be realized ; and this is inconsist­
ent with a sale in parcels ,the outcome of which cannot be known 
when i t  is bcg-tm . And it is unjust ,  even if the statute would per­
mit  i t ,  that the mortgagees should be subjected to the risks of  a 
sale  o f  a l l  the property to be made by a receiver at the expen se of  
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the fund, in a suit which concerns only other parties, when under
their security they have a right to make sale themselves.
The order complained of does not require the receiver to give
security. Probably this was an inadvertence. It should be cor-
rected. An order will be entered in accordance with these views.
The other justices concurred.
VVEBBER v. BOLTE, in Mich. Sup. Ct., June 20, 1883-51 Mich. I13.
16 N. W. 257.
Garnishment. Plaintiff brings error.
COOLEY, ]. Two of the questions which were argued in
[*n4] this case seem to us to require no discussion, and we sim-
ply announce our conclusions.
I. The court should not have dismissed the case against the
garnishees. The ground of the dismissal was delay in the pro-
ceedings. The case was begun September 16, I88I, and was
being tried in December, I882, when the trial judge on his own
motion dismissed it, relying upon Blake v. Hubbard, 45 Mich. I.
for his authority. The defense raised no question of laches, and
it is shown that jury trial had been demanded, and it could not
have been tried at the preceding August term because no jury
was summoned for that term. I
2. The plaintiffs should have been allowed to amend the
proceedings against the principal defendant so as to show his
name by which he signed them, V. Consaul. The plaintiffs
proposed to amend by substituting Jacob for No question of
identity was made, and the amendment should have been permitted
at any time when it was found important.
3. Upon the main question we think both parties have been
laboring under some misapprehension. Consaul had contracted
with defendants for the erection of a church building which was
to be completed November 1, I881. The contract price was
$8563. Payments were to be made as the work progressed, to
the amount of ninety per cent of the estimates, and the balance
after completion. A forfeiture was agreed upon in the event that
the work was not done by the time stipulated. \\"hen the suit in
garnishment was begun defendants had made large payments.
and they insist that nothing was then due from them to Consaul.
Plaintiffs dispute this, but they claim that whether that was so or
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the fund, in a suit which concerns only other parties, when under 
their security they have a right to make sale themselves. 
The order complained of does not require the receiver to give 
security. Probably this was an inadvertence. It should be cor­
rected. An order will be entered in accordance w ith these views. 
The other j u stices concurred. 
\V EBBER v. DOLTE, in :Mich. Sup. Ct., June 20, 1883-5 1 M ich. I IJ, 
16 N. W. 257. 
Garnishment. Plaint iff brings error. 
CooLI�Y, J. Two of the questions which were argued in 
[ * 1 14] this case seem to us to require no discussion, and we sim­
ply announce our conclusions. 
1 . The court should not have dismissed the case against the 
garnishees. The ground of the dismissal was delay in the pro­
ceedings. The case was begun September 1 6, 1 88 1 ,  and was 
being tried in December, 1 882, when the trial j udge on hi:. own 
motion d i smissed it ,  relying upon Blake v. Hubbard, 45 Mich. r ,  
for his authority. The defense raised no question o f  !aches,  and 
it is shown that jury trial had been demanded, and it could not 
have been tried at the preceding August term because no j ury 
was summoned for that term. 
2 . The plaint iffs should have been allowed to amend the 
proceedings against the principal defendant so as to show his 
name by which he signed them, J. V. Consaul. The plaintiffs 
proposed to amend by subst ituting Jacob for J. Ko que::;tion of 
identity was made, and the amendment should have been permitted 
at  any time when it was found important. 
3. l'pon the main quest ion we think both parties have been 
lahorin� under some misapprehension . Consaul had contracted 
with defendants for the erection of a church building which was 
to be completed November 1 ,  1 88 1 .  The contract price was 
$8563. Payments were to be made as the work progressed, to 
the amount of n inety per cent of  the estimates, and the balance 
after complet ion. A forfe iture was agreed upon in the event that 
the work was not clone by the t ime stipulated. \\'hen the suit in 
garnishment was begun defendants had made large pavments, 
and they ins ist that nothing was then due from them to Consaul. 
Plaint iffs di spute this ,  but the�· claim that whether that was so or 
not, they had a right to hold the defendants for anything that 
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might subsequently become owing to Consaul for work done by
him under the contract. This claim is made under an amendment
to the garnishment statute, which provides that the garnishee
shall “be liable on any contingent right or claim against him in
favor of the principal defendant.” [*115] Public Acts 1879,
p. 270. Consaul’s right, it is said, was contingent on his perform-
ing his contract; so that the case is within the very words of the
statute. ‘
The case may seem to be within the words of the statute,
but it is not within its intent or reason. To permit garnishrnent
upon such claims would be a most un\\'arr'21n_tz1_l5le interfie-rence
'witT1—tTie' contracts of third parties, an5l_must_i_n_n1agy_cases_£1e-
"plriveitligiilioi.éubstantial rights. It w_ould be especially mischiev-
ous in the case of building contracts; for in a very large propor-
tion of all cases of such contracts, the means for their fuliillment
nn1st__>l§e_o~btained from payments on the estimates; _and_ if‘ these.
_?an be garnished in advance, performance would be rendered im-
possible. This would be a great hardship to the debtor, but it
\w‘o’uld\be quite as much so to his employer, who might have his
arrangements broken up and serious injury inflicted without on
his part any fault whatever.
No doubt the employer has a claim in such a case that the
builder shall perform his contract; but the contingency on which
money is to be payable is one depending on the subsequent earn-
ing of money. It is therefore a contingency depending on the will
and ability of the debtor to earn money; a will which it may gen-
erally be assumed will not be exerted where earning is not to be
followed by enjoyment. If there is a contingent claim here, so
there is when a laborer hires out for a year to be paid at the end
of the year; and his creditor may garnish the claim as soon as
the hiring takes place. It would be a safe assumption that very
little labor would be done under the hiring after the claim was
garnished.
V\"hatcver, if anything, was due at the time the process was
served in this case, the plaintiffs are entitled to reach. The ten
per cent kept back as security for final performance might per-
haps be considered a sum already contingently earned; but no
question upon that can arise in this case. as it was conceded that
Consaul did not complete his contract. The question of fact, then,
is narrowed to this: whether the ninety per cent to which Consaul
was entitled [*n6] on the estimates, exceeded at the time this
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might subsequently become owing to Consaul for work done by 
him under the contract. This claim is made under an amendment 
to the garnishment statute, which provides that the garnishee 
shall "be liable on any contingent right or claim against him in 
favor of the principal defendant." [*1 15]  Public Acts 1879, 
p. 270. Consaul's right, it is said, was contingent on his perform­
ing his contract ; so that the case is within the very words of the 
statute. 
The case may seem to be within the words of the statute, 
but it is not within its intent or reason . To permit garnishment 
upon such claims would be a most unwarrantable -1n-ter£erence 
-,,:itT1 -flic contracts of third parties, and must in wany cases �­
""prive · ti}.£.IJLof �ubstantial rights. It �0t1id be especial ly mischiev­
ous in the case of building contracts ; for in a very large propor­
tion of all cases of such contracts, the means for their fulfillrneot 
�l�st_pe _Obtained from payments on the estimates ; i.!1�. if.  these. . 
can be garnished in advance, performance would be rendered im­
-poss ible. This would be a great hardship to the debtor, but i t  
....., _ _ _ ..... would be quite as much so to his employer , who might have his 
arrangements broken up and serious inj ury inflicted without on 
his part any fault whatever. 
No doubt the employer has a claim in such a case that the 
builder shall perform his contract ; but the contingency on which 
money is to be payable is one depending on the subsequent earn­
ing o f money. It is therefore a contingency depending on the will "I 
and ability of the debtor to earn money ; a will which i t  may gen­
erally be assumed will not be exerted where earning is not to be 
fol lowed by en joyment . If there is a contingent claim here, so 
there is when a laborer hires out for a year to be paid at the end 
of the year ; and his creditor may garnish the claim as soon as 
the hiring takes place. I t  would be a safe assumption that very 
little labor would be done under the hiring after the claim was 
garnished . 
\Vhatcver, i f  anything, was due at the time the process was 
served in th i s  case, the plaintiffs are enti tled to reach. The ten 
per cent kept back as security for final performance might per­
haps be considered a sum al ready contingently earned ; but no 
ques tion upon that can arise in this case, as it was conceded that 
Con saul did not complete his contract. The quest ion of fact, then , 
is narrowed to this : whether the n inety per cent to which Consaut 
was enti tled [ * 1 161  on the estimates, exceeded at the time this 
case was begun the amount which had been paid to him up tc. 
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that time. Upon‘ that question the parties are entitled to produce
their evidence.
The other justices concurred.
The judgment -must be reversed with costs and a new trial
ordered.
THOMPSON v. GAINESVILLE NATIONAL BANK, in Texas Sup.
Ct., April 30, 1886-66 Texas 156, 18 S. VV. 350.
Garnishment. Garnishec appeals.
VVILLIE, C.]. The Gainesville National Bank obtained a
judgment against A. J. Addington, and on June 20, 1885, had
a writ of garnishment sued out thereon, and served upon the ap-
pellant, Thompson. On November 2, 1885, Thompson filed his
answer denying any indebtedness to Addington, or having any
effects of his in possession, either at the date of serving the writ
or of making the answer. This answer was controverted by the
bank on the ground that on July 12, 1884, Thompson executed a
note to Addington, payable twelve months after date, and that
this note at the time the writ was served was held as collateral by
one Smith to secure a debt due to Smith from Addington. The
terms of the note as stated in the contesting affidavit showed that
it matured previous to the filing of the answer, though it was not
due when the writ of garnishment was served.
The proof before the judge who tried the cause, without a
jury, was conflicting in some important respects bearing upon the
liability of the note to the garnishment proceeding. The judge
subjected the note to the garnishment. IWPMW his judg-
ment we must, in case of conflict of evidence, treat as true the
testimony to which he must have given credence in making up his
conclusions. The case before us, therefore, is that of a garnishee
indebted to the judgment defendant upon a negotiable note, not
due when the writ was served, but maturing before answer filed.
and paid before that time, but after maturity, to the judgment
defendant, he being at the time still owner of the note.
The law is well settled that the maker of an overdue note can
be garnished for a debt due the owner. The note cannot be as-
signed to an innocent holder, free from such defenses as the
maker could set up in a suit against him by the assignee. Garn-
ishment at suit of the assignor’s creditor would be a good defense,
and hence the maker is fully protected when compelled by judg-
















































































































































EXECUTI NG THE WRITS 425 
that time. Upon· that question the parties are entitled to produce 
their evidence. 
The other justices concurred. 
The judgment 11w.st be reversed u.1ith costs and a n ew trial 
ordered. 
THOMPSON v. GAI NESVILLE NATIONAL BANK, in Texas Sup. 
Ct., April 30, 1� Texas 1 56, 18 S. W. 350. 
· Garni shment. Garnishee appeals. 
WILLIE, C.J. The Gainesville National Bank obtained a 
judgment against A. J. Addington, and on June 20, 1885, had 
a w rit of garnishment sued out thereon, and served upon the ap­
pellant, Thompson. On November 2, 1885, Thompson filed his 
answer denying any indebtedness to Addington, or having any 
effects of his in possession, either at the date of serving the writ 
or of making the answer. This answer was controverted by the 
bank on the ground that tm July 1 2 , 18841 Thompson executed a 
note to Addington, payable twelve months after date, and that 
this note at the time the w rit was served was held as collateral by 
one Smith to secure a debt due to Smith from Addington. The 
terms of the note as stated in the contesting affidavit showed that 
it matured previous to the filing of the answer, though it was not 
due when the writ of garnishment was served. 
The proof before the j udge who tried the cause, without a 
j u ry, was conflicting in some important respects bearing upon the 
liability of the note to the garni shment proceeding. Tbe· j udge 
subj ected the note to the garnishment. In.-pmn� 11?3"" his j udg­
ment we must, in case of conflict o f  evidence, treat as true the 
testimony to which he must have given credence in making u p  his 
conclusions. The case before us, therefore, is that of a garnishee 
indebted to the j udgment defendant upon a negotiable note, not 
due when the writ was served, but maturing before answer filed, 
and paid before that time, but after maturity, to the j udgment 
def end ant, he being at the time still owner of the note. 
The law is well settled that the maker o f  an overdue note can 
be garnished for a debt due the owner. The note cannot be as­
signed to an innocent holder, free from such defenses as the 
maker could set up in a suit against him by the assignee. Garn­
ishment at suit of the assignor's credito r  would be a
· 
good defense, 
and hence the maker is fully protected when compelled by j udg­
ment to pay the amount of the note to the plaintiff in garnishment. 
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It seems settled, too, by the weight of authority that if the note is
due and owned by the payee at the time judgment in garnishment
is rendered, the maker is liable to such judgment, though, at the
time he was served, the note had not matured. Drake on Attach.,
§§ 587, 588-
The authorities recognize the right to charge the maker after
the note matures, provided, that at the date of serving the writ,
the note [*I58] was the property of the payee. Bassett v. Garth-
waite, 22 Tex. 230, and other cases cited in note to § 623, Sayles'
Treatise.
This is, in effect, to require the maker to answer as to his in-
debtedness upon a note not due, so that the plaintiff may charge
him in garnishment by showing that it belonged to the defendant
when service was made, and had since matured, and was still the
property of the defendant. The law exempts the maker from a
judgment in garnishment whilst the note is current, because he
would not otherwise be protected by the judgment from his lia-
bility to the holder. But, if he is fully protected by the judg-
ment, there is no reason why one should not be rendered against
him, though the note was due when the writ was served.
Protection being secured to the maker, the reason of the
law for not subjecting him to garnishment has ceased, and the
plaintiff should be entitled to the benefit of his indebtedness to the
defendant. He may not be able to secure this benefit without pro-
ceeding bcfore the note became due. It is this that lays the
foundation for a judgment after the maturity of the note, and
to obtain this judgment he must be allowed to have an answer
as to the condition of the indebtedness at the date of the service,
to prove, if he can, that it was a debt upon a note, though nego-
tiable and current, and that, at the time of service, the note be-
longed to the defendant.
This does not interfere with the makers rights in the least,
for, if the note thereafter and before maturity, has been assigned,
the judgment cannot be rendered. The burden of proof is on
the plaintiff to show that the payee has not transferred the note
before maturity, otherwise the garnishee must be discharged. As
to what effect a transfer after maturity would have, we need not
now determine.
But the protection afforded the maker of the note is against
a transfer by the payee to other parties. It is only in this event
that he can be endangered by a jhdgment in garnishment. No
other disposition of the instrument before judgment subjects
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It seems settled, too, by the weight of authority that if the note i �  
due  and owned by the payee at the time j udgment in garnishment 
is  rendered, the maker is l iable to such j udgment, though, at the 
time he was served, the note had not matured. Drake on Attach ., 
§§ 587, 588. 
The authorities recognize the right to charge the maker after 
the note matures, provided, that at the date of serving the writ, 
the note [ * 158] was the property of the payee. Bassett v. Garth­
<.vaite, 22 Tex. 230, and other cases cited in note to § 623, Sayles' 
Treatise. 
This is, in effect, to require the maker to answer as to his in­
debtedness upon a note not due, so that the plaintiff may charge 
him in garnishment by showing that it belonged to the defendant 
when service was m ade , and had since matured , and was still the 
property of the de fendant .  The law exempts the maker from a 
j udgment in garn i shm ent whilst the note is current, because he 
would not otherwise be protected by the j udgment from his l ia­
bility to the holder. But, if he is fully protected by the j udg­
ment, there is no reason why one should not be rendered against 
him, though the note \Vas due when the writ was served . 
Protection being secured to the maker, the reason of theJ law for not subj ecting him to garn ishment has ceased , and the plaint iff should be ent it led to the benefit of his indebtedness to the defendant. He may not be able to secure this benefit without pro­
ceeding be fore the note became due. It is this that lays the 
foundation for a j udgment after the maturity of the note, and 
to obtain this j udgment he must be allowed to have an answer 
as to the condition of the i ndebtedness at the date of the service , 
to prove, i f  he can , that it was a debt upon a note, though nego­
tiable and current, and that, at the time o f  serv ice, the note be­
longed to the defendant. 
This docs not in terfere with the maker's rights in the least , 
for ,  i f  the note therea fter and before maturity, has been ass igned , 
the j udgmen t cannot be rendered . The bu rden of proof i s  on 
the plain t i ff  to show that the payee has not t ransferred the note 
hefore ma tu rity , otherwise the garn ishee must be dischargecl . As 
to what effect a t ransfer after matu rity would have, we n <..'ed not 
now determi ne. 
But the protection afforded the maker of the note is  against 
a trans fer by the payee to other parties. It is on l�· in this event 
that he can he endangered by a jltdgment in garnishment .  No 
oth er (fo;position o f  the instm ment hefore i ml gmcnt suh i ects 
him to a su it h�r any other person than the pay�e. and to a sui t  by 
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him the judgment in garnishment is a full defence. Against the
maker's own collusion with the payee to defeat the plaintiff’s right
to the judgment, the law does not protect him.
If, as in this case, whilst the note is still owned by the payee,
and overdue, and not liable to pass to an innocent holder, the
maker settles it with the payee, there is no reason why he should
be protected against a judgment in the garnishment proceedings.
He has voluntarily paid a debt due from him to the defendant,
which the latter could not have recovered. [*15g]
After a judgment against the garnishee in favor of the plain-
tiff -in garnishment, with full notice that the plaintiff had laid the
foundation for such a judgment, he has paid the note, not for his
own protection, but to enable the‘ defendant to avoid the payment
of a debt, which the plaintiff was entitled to enforce against him,
and which he might have enforced, but for this collusion between
the defendant and the garnishee.
It being perfectly apparent that none of the reasons why the
maker of negotiable paper, current at the date of serving the writ
of garnishment, should be exempt from the proceedings are ap-‘
plicable to the present case, and that neither the-maker nor any
innocent holder of the paper are in the least prejudiced by the
garnishment, we are of opinion that the case presented was a
proper one for a judgment against the garnishee.
The same conclusions have been reached in the courts of one
other state, and we are pointed to no decisions to the contrary.
Leslie v. Merrill, 58 Ala. 322. VVhether the same rule would hold
if the note had been paid before maturity we are not called upon
to decide in the present appeal.
\-Ve are of opinion that the judgment below is correct.
A fiirmed.
MOORE v. DAVIS, in Mich. Sup. Ct., June IO, 1885—57 Mich. 251, 23
N. VV. 800.
Garnishme11t by Edward C. Moore against Alex. R. and W'm.
F. Linn as debtors of the principal defendant, John C. Davis. The
First National Bank of Madison, Indiana, intervened as claimant.
From a judgment for plaintiff, claimant brings error.
The case was tried below befo_rg the court without a jury;
\
and the court found as facts, that the garnishees confessed liability
in the sum .of $139.65 for goods purchased, and that Iggfore the
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him the judgment in garnishment is a full defence. Against the 
maker's own collusion with the payee to defeat the plaintiff's right 
to the j udgment, the law does not protect him. 
I f, as in this case, whilst the note is still owned by the payee, 
and overdue, and not l iable to pass to an innocent holder, the 
maker settles it  with the payee, there is no reason why he should 
be protected against a j udgment in the garnishment proceedings. 
He has voluntarily paid a debt due from him to the defendant, 
which the latter could not have recovered. [*159] 
After a j udgment against the garnishee in favor of the plain­
t iff in garnishment, with full notice that the plaintiff had laid the 
foundation for such a judgment, he has paid the note, not for his 
own protect ion,  but to enable the defendant to avoid the payment 
of a debt, which the plaintiff was entitled to enforce against h im,  
and which he might have enforced, but for this collusion between 
the defendant and the garnishee. 
It being perfectly apparent that none of the reasons why the 
maker of negotiable paper, current at the date of serving the writ 
of garnishment, should be exempt from the proceedings are ap..: 
plicablc to the present case, and that neither the . maker nor any 
innocent holder o f  the paper are in the least prej udiced by the 
garnishment , we are of opinion that the case presented was a 
proper one for a judgment against the garnishee. �. 
The same conclusions have been reached in  the courts of one 
other state, and we are pointed to no decisions to the contrary. 
Leslie v. AI errill, 58 Ala. 322. \Vhether the same rule would hold 
if the note had been paid before maturity we arc not called upon 
to decide in the present appeal . 
\Ve are of  opinion that the judgment below is  correct. 
A ffirmed. 
MOORE v. DAVIS, in Mich. Sup. Ct., June 10, 1885-57 Mich. 25 1 ,  23 
N. W. 8oo. 
Garnishment by Edward C. Moori! against Alex. R. and \Vm. 
F. Linn as debtors of the principal defendant, John C. Davis. The 
First National Bank of Madison, Indiana, intervened as claimant. 
From a j udgment for plaintiff, claimant brings error. 
The case was tried below bef� the court without a ju ry ; 
and the court found as facts, that the gartllsti.e� confessed l iability 
in the sum .o f $ 1 39.65 for goods purchased, and that before the 
g__arnish�ent �-��!"Y�d . .  t_h�. �lg_!!ll�_n.!_ _in the regular course of its 
l t 
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business, had received fr ' a_ _d_r_a_ft _f_o_1_' the a_nlo_unt_ with a
co v of the account ' -iQL§fiiI1Ll§.&_tl1_e_i:/L1TaY
discount.
COOLEY, C.]. * * The controversy, it will be seen, turns
.upon the question [*25 5] whether the draft by Davis on the Linns
xboperated as an assignment of the demand. It was received and
discounted by the claimant before the garnishment summons
was served, and the Linns were notified of the facts before they
answered. If, therefore, the draft transferred the demand to
' , the bank, the judgment is erroneous. _
{Z In the recent case of Grammel v. Carmer, 55 Mich. 201, the
question whether a draft was an assignment of the fund in the
drawee’s hands, to the extent of the sum drawn for, was consid-
ered and decided in the negative. That, however, was the case
of a banker's draft, and it was not drawn for the whole fund in
the drawee’s hands. Many cases were cited in the ‘opinion filed
in that case, and the following, not then cited, are to the same
effect: Shand v. Du Buisson, L. R. 18 Eq. 283; Lewis v. Traders’
Bank, 30 Minn, I34; ]0n_es v. Pacific Wood 61 Co., 13 Nev. 395;
Rosenthal v. M astin Bank, 17 Blatchf. 318, Fed. Cas. No. 12063;
3 Dolsen v. Brown, 13 La. Ann. 551; Sands v. Ma-tthews, 27 Ala.
399-
,‘ But this case differs from Grammel v. Carmvr in the fact that
y the draft now in question was drawn for the exact amount of a
' sum claimed to be due from the drawees to the drawer for a bill
x I of merchandise, and that the account was attached to the draft,
evidently for the purpose of being sent forward with it. VVhen
\ thus sent forward, it would explain to the drawees the account on
Q .l( which it was drawn; but it must also have been understood to
x, serve a further purpose, namely, to be evidence in the hands of
J I. the drawees that the account was paid when the draft was taken
Y\ I‘ up by them. There could be no suffieient reason for attaching it
~ at all, unless it was understood that the payment of the draft
( I would be payment of the account as well.
By the general commercial law, as was said\i.n G1’(IHlflt(’l v.
Carmer, the purchaser of a draft is supposed to take it in reliance
3; upon the responsibility of the drawer, and he has no other reliance
until it is accepted. This is the general rule. But if the draft is
g for the whole amount of a fund, the draft may, in connection with
other circumstances, tend to show an intent that it should operate
as an assignment. First [*256] Nat. Bank of Canton v. D. S. W.
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business, had received from Davis a. . .9.r_a_ft_for the amount with a 
copy o f  the account apnexed and paid for same less-t-liereguTai­
discount. 
COOLEY, C.J. * * * The controversy, it will be seen, turns 
.upon the question [*255] whether the draft by Davis on the Linns 
"'�perated as an assignment of the demand. It was received and 
�discounted by the claimant before the garnishment summons 
was served, and the Linns were notified of the facts before they 
answered. I f, therefore, the draft transferred the demand to 
the bank, the judgment is erroneous. . 
In the recent case of Gramme/ v. Canner, 55 Mich. 201 ,  the 
question whether a draft was an assignment of the fund in the ' 
drawee's hands, to the extent of the sum drawn for, was consid­
ered and decided in the negative. That, however, was the case 
of a banker's draft, and i t  was not drawn for the whole fund in 
f the drawee's hands. Many cases were cited in the opinio� filed 
in that case, and the following, not then cited, are to the same 
effect : Slzand v. Dit Buisson, L. R. 18 Eq. 283 ; Lewis v. Traders' 
Ba11k, 30 Minn, 1 34 ; l<>n.es v. Pacific Wood &c Co., 1 3  Nev. 395 ; 
Rosen thal v. lifa.stiu Ban k, 17 Blatchf. 3 18, Fed. Cas. No. 1 2o63 ; 
Dolsen v. Brown, 13  La. Ann. 5 5 1 ; Satids v. AJa.ttliews, 27 Ala. 
399. 
But this case differs from Gram mel v. Carm er in the fact that 
the draft now in question was drawn for the exact amount of a 
sum claimed to be due from the drawees to the drawer for a bil l 
of merchandi se, and that the account was attached to the draft, 
evidently for the purpose of being sent forward with it. \Vhen 
thus sent forward, it would explain to the drawees the account on 
which it was drawn ; but it must also have been understood to 
serve a further purpose, namely, to be evidence in the hands of 
the drawees that the account was paid when the draft was taken 
up by them. There could be no sufficient reason for attaching it 
at all, unless it was understood that the payment of the draft 
would be payment of the account as well. 
By the general commercial law, as was said---io Gramme! v. 
Carmer, the purchaser of a draft is supposed to take it in reliance 
upon the respomibil ity of the drawer, and he has no otlier reliance 
until it is accepted. This is the general rule. But i f  the draft is 
for the whole amount of a fund, the draft may, in connection w ith 
other c ircumstances, tend to show an intent that it should operate 
as an assignment. First r•256] Nat. Bank of Canton. v. D. S. W. 
R'y. Co., 52 Iowa 378. And whereas, in this case, the draft i s  
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for the amount of an account, and the account is attached, the
purpose to assign appears on the papers themselves, and they need
no support from collateral circumstances. The payee, then, in
taking the draft has a right to understand that, in addition to the
responsibility of the drawer, he has such security for payment as
may be supplied.by the account, and that he may collect the ac-
count for the satisfaction of the draft. The drawer, by the
papers, in effect, says to the drawee: “This is my bill against you,
which I have sold to the payee by this draft, and you are requested
to make payment of it to him.” This is what a business man
would have a right to understand from them. The draft with the
bill thus attached is not an ordinary bill of exchange, but it is an
order that the debtor shall pay the amount of his debt to the per-
son to whom it is delivered. The fact that the draft is negotiable
in form is of no importance. It does not at all tend to rebut the
evidence of intent on the part of the creditor to assign the
demand.
The judgment must be reversed.
COTT v. ROHMAN, in Neb. Sup. Ct., Feb. 5, I895—43 Neb. 618,
62 N. W. 46.
Bill in chancery in the Lancaster district court by Archie A.
cott against Charles Rohman and others, being all the interested
persons, to determine the rights of the respective parties to money
paid into said court by ]ohn Fitzgerald in satisfaction of the judg-
ment theretofore rendered against him in said court in an action
on account wherein John Lanham was plaintiff and said Fitzger-
ald defendant. From the decree of the court below complainant
appeals.
Scott's claim is based on a garnishment in the county court of
Lancaster against said Fitzgerald on a judgment in favor of said
Scott against said Lanham on which an execution had been re-
turned not satisfied. The garnishment was issued out of the
county court and served after verdict returned against Fitzgerald
in the district court in Lanham v. Fitzgerald, but before the judg-
ment was entered. Upon garnishee’s answer setting up these facts.
and the entry of judgment in Lanham v. Fitzgerald, judgment
was rendered against him ordering him to nav into said county
court the amount of Scott’s judgment, which was less than the
the amount of the judgment in Lanham v. Fitzgerald. Instead
















































































































































EXECUTI NG THE WRITS 
for the amount of an account, and the account is attached, the 
purpose to assign appears on the papers themselves, and they need 
no support from collateral circumstances. The payee, then, in 
taking the draft has a right to understand that, in addition to the 
responsibil ity of  the drawer, he has such security for payment as 
may be supplied . by the account, and that he may collect the ac­
count for the satisfaction of the draft. The drawer, by the 
papers, in effect , says to the drawee : "This is my bill against you, 
which I have sold to the payee by this draft, and you are requested 
to make payment of it to him." This is what a business man 
would have a right to understand from them. The draft with the 
bill thus attached is not an ordinary bill of exchange, but it is an 
order that the debtor shall pay the amount of his debt to the per­
son to whom it is delivered. The fact that the draft is negotiable 
in form is of no importance. It does not at all tend to rebut the 
evidence of intent on the part of the creditor to assign the 
<lemand. 
The judgment must be reversed. 
COTT v. ROH MAN, in Neb. Sup. Ct., Feb. 5, 1895-43 Neb. 618, 
62 N. W. 46. 
Bill in chancery in the Lancaster district court by Archie A. 
cott against Charles Rohman and others, being all the interested 
persons, to determine the rights o f  the respective parties to money 
paid into said court by John Fitzgerald in satisfaction of the j udg­
ment theretofore rendered against him in said court in an action 
on account wherein John Lanham was plaintiff and said Fitzger­
ald defendant. From the decree of the court below complainant 
appeals. 
Scott's claim is based on a garnishment in the cottnty court of 
Lancaster against said Fitzgerald on a j udgment in favor of said 
Scott against said Lanham on which an execution had been re­
turned not sati sfied. The g-arni shment was issued out of the 
county court and served after verdict returned against Fitzgerald 
!n the district court in Lanham v. Fitzgerald , but before the judg­
ment was entered. Upon garnishee's answer setting up the�e facts, 
and the entry of judgment in Lanham v. Fitzgerald, judgment 
was rendered aE?"ainst him ordering- him to nav into said count�· 
court the amount of Scott's j udement , which was less than the 
the amount of the judement in Lanham v. Fitzgerald. Instead 
of doing so, the garnishee paid the whole sum into the district 
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court, and thereupon Scott filed this bill. Rohman claims as
assignee of Lanham under an assignment executed after the gar-
nishment was served.
NORVAL, C.]. * * The record discloses that the indebted-'
ness of Fitzgerad to Lanham had been reduced to judgment.
The first question therefore presented is whether a judgment
debtor can be garnished. Section 212 of the Code provides: “An
order of attachment binds the property attached from the time of
service, and the garnishee shall be liable to the plaintiff in attach-
ment for all property, moneys, and credits in his hands, or due
from him to the defendant, from the time he is served with the
written notice.” * * * [*628] * * * It is very evident that the
foregoing provisions are sufficiently broad to cover debts reduced
to judgment, and that a judgment debtor is liable to the process
of garnishment in a suit against the judgment creditor. The stat-
ute is susceptible of no other reasonable construction. It does
not exempt any credit of any kind whatever. The decided weight
of the decisions in this country lays down the broad doctrine that
a judgment debtor may be garnished, and we so hold the law to
be in this state. Osborn v. Cloud, 23 Ia. I05; Gamble v. Central
R. 15' B. CO., 80 Ga. 595; Wood V. Lake, 13 \Vis. 84; Kcitlt v.
Harris, 9 Kan. 387: .S‘le1'p[J0r V. Poster, 29 Ala. 330; 8 Am. & Eng.
Ency. Law, 1169; Drake, Attachment (7th ed.), § 622.
The question presented by the record to be determined is
whether a judgment debtor in the district court of this state is lia-
ble to garnishment proceedings issued out of the county court.
There is an irreconcilable conflict in the authorities bearing upon
the subject. Some decisions are to be found in the books which
assert that a judgment debtor in one court may be garnished on
prosess issued out of another court. Lnton v. Hoelzn, 72 Ill., 81 ;
Allen V. Watt, 79 Ill. 284; Jones v. New York <5“ E. R. Co.. I
Grant’s Cases (Pa) 457; Gager v. Watson, II Conn. 168. The
majority of the cases, and the more recent decisions, sustain
[*629] the doctrine that a debt reduced to a judgment is liable to
garnishment when the process of garnishment issues f_rom the
same court, but not otherwise. Drake, Attachment, § 625;
\Vaples, Attachment & Garnishment (1st ed.), 596; I/Vallace V.
McCo1mcll, 38 U. S. (I3 Pet.) 136; Thomas v. Wooldridgo, 2
W'ood 667, Fed. Cas. No. 13,918 ; Henry v. Gold Park ]l11'ning C0.,
I5 Fed. Rep. 649, 5 McCreary (U. S.) 70; Franklin v. !Ward, 3
Mason (U. S.) 136; American Bank v. Snow, 9 R. I. II ; Bu-rrill
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court, and thereupon Scott filed this bill. Rohman claims as 
assignee of Lanham under an assignment executed after the gar­
nishment was served. 
NoRVAL, C.J. * * * The record discloses that the indebtecl - · 
ness of Fitzgerad to Lanham had been reduced to j udgm�nt. 
The first question therefore presented is whether a j udgment 
debtor can be garnished . Section 2 1 2  of the Code provides : "An 
order of attachment binds the property attached from the time of 
service, and the garnishee shall be l iable to the plaintiff in attach­
ment for all property, moneys, and credits in his  hands, or due 
from him to the defendant, from the time he is served with the 
written notice." * * * [ *628] * * * It is very evident that the 
foregoing provi sions are sufficiently broad to cover debts reduced 
to j udgment, and that a j udgment debtor is liable to the process 
of garnishment in a suit against the j udgment creditor. The stat­
ute is susceptible of no other reasonable construction . It does 
not exempt any credit  of any kind whatever. The decided weight 
of the decisions in this country lays down the broad doctrine that 
a j udgment debtor may be garnished, and we so hold the law to 
be in this state. Osborn v. Cloud, 23 Ia. 105 ; Gamble v. Ce11 tral 
R. & B .  Co., 80 Ga. 595 ; Wood v. Lake, 1 3 \Vis. 84 ; Keith v. 
I!arris, 9 Kan. 387 : Skipper v. Foster, 29 Ala. 330 ; 8 Am. & Eng. 
Ency. Law, I I69 ;  Drake , A ttachment ( 7th ed. ) , §  622. 
The quest ion presented by the record to be determ ined is 
whether a j udgment debtor in the district court of this state is lia­
ble to garnishment proceedings issued out of the county court. 
There is an irreconcilable confl ict in  the authorities bearing upon 
the subj ect. Some decisions are to be found in the books w hich 
assert that a j udgment debtor in one court may be garnished on 
proscss issued out of another court. Luton v. H oelm, 72 II I . ,  8 1 ; 
A llen v. IVatt, 79 Ill .  284 ; Jon es v. Nc·w York & E. R. Co . . r 
Grant's Cases ( Pa. ) 457 ; Gager v. iVatso 11, r I Conn.  1 68. The 
maj ority of the cases, and the more recent decisions, sustain 
[ *629] the doctrine that a debt reduced tQ a j udgment is  l iable to 
garnishment when the process of garnishment i ssues f_rom the 
�amc court, but not otherwise. Drake, Attachment, § 625 ; 
\Vaples, Attachment & Garnishment ( 1 st ed . ) , 596 ; 1-Vallacc v. 
JfcCom1cll, �8 U. S .  ( 1 3 Pct. ) 1 36 ; Thomas v. H'ooldridge, 2 
Vl/ood 667, Fed. Cas. No. 1 3 ,9 1 8 ; Henry v. Gold Pa.rk Aft'.u ing Co. ,  
I 5 Fed . Rep. 649, 5 McCreary ( U. S . )  70 ; Fran klin v .  !fVard, 3 
l\fason (U. S . )  1 36 ; A merican Bank v. Snow, 9 R. I. 1 1 ; B 1trril! 
v. Letson, 2 Speers ( S . Car. ) 378 ; A m e rican Bank v. Rollins, 99 
EXECUTING THE WRITS 431
Mass. 313; Perkins v. Guy, 2 Mont. I5. In Drake, Attachment,
§ 625, it is said: “However strongly these reasons apply to the
case of a garnishment of the judgment debtor in the same court
in which the judgment was rendered, their force is lost when the
judgment is in one court and the garnishment in another. There
a new question springs up, growing out of the conflict of juris-
diction which at once takes place. Upon what ground can one
court assume to nullify in this indirect manner the judgments of
another? Clearly, the attempt would be absurd, especially where
the two courts were of different jurisdictions or existed under
different governments. Take, for example, the case of a court
of law attempting to arrest the execution of a decree of a court
of equity for the payment of money, by garnishing the defendant;
or that of a state court so interfering with a judgment of a fed-
eral court, or vice versa; it is not to be supposed that, in either
case, the court rendering the judgment or decree would or should
. tolerate so violent an encroachment on its prerogatives and juris-
diction.” * * * [*63o'] * * * In Michigan it has been held that
a judgment recovered before one justice of the peace is not sub-
ject to proceedings in garnishment before another justice.
S-ie:-ers V. IV00dlmrn Sarverz VI/lzeel Co., 43 Mich. 275; Noyes v.
Foster, 48 Mich. 273; Custer v. White, 49 Mich. 462. It [*631]
has likewise been decided that a judgment obtained in the circuit
court of a state cannot be garnished before a justice of the
peace. Clodfelfer v. Car, 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 330. To allow a
judgment to be garnished in a court other than the one in which
it was rendered would subject the debtor to a double judgment
on a single liability, and thereby subject him to the danger of
being compelled to pay the debt twice. Besides, it would permit
one court to interfere with the due execution of process in
another tribunal. \Ve are unwilling to place a construction upon
the statutes that is liable to lead to such results. Upon principle
and authority we are constrained to hold that the garnishment
proceedings in the county court in the case of Scott v. Lanham,
were void, and consequently created no lien upon the. fund in
controversy.
In the brief of appellant it is said: “All opportunity for con-
flict of jurisdiction, or for injustice has been avoided by the pay-
ment of the entire amount of the Lanham judgment into the dis-
trict court. and the bringing of the equity proceedings in which all
parties interested are made defendants, where all the parties can
have their rights adjusted. The garnishee can be protected from
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l\Iass. 3 1 3 ; Perki11s v. Guy, 2 Mont. 1 5 .  In Drake, Attachment, 
§ 625, it is said : "However strongly these reasons apply to the 
case of a garnishment of the j udgment debtor in the same court 
in which the j udgment was rendered, their force is lost when the 
j udgment is in one court and the garnishment in another. There 
a new question springs up, growing out of the confl ict of j uris­
diction which at once takes place. Upon what ground can one 
court assume to nul l i fy in this indirect manner the judgments of 
another ? Clearly , the attempt would be absurd, especially where 
the two courts were of different j urisd ict ions or existed under 
d ifferent governments . Take , for example, the case of a court 
of law attempting to arrest the execution of a decree of a court 
of equity for the payment of money, by garn ish ing the de fendant ; 
or that of  a state court so interfering with a j udgment of a fed­
eral court, or -z-ice ·ucrsa; it i s  not to be supposed that, in either 
case, the court render ing the j udgment or decree would or should 
. tolerate so violent an encroachment on i ts preroga tives and juris­
d iction ." * * * [ *630] * * * In M ichigan it has been held that 
a j udgment recovered before one j ustice of the peace is not sub­
ject to proceed ings in garn ishment be fore another just ice. 
Sie'i ·crs v. TVoodbu ru Sarvc11 T¥hecl Co., 43 Mich. 275 ; Noyes v. 
Foster .. 48 l\t ich. 273 : Custer v. TVhite, 49 Mich. 462. I t  [ *63 1 ]  
has l ikewise been decided that a j udgment obtained i n  the circuit 
court of a state cannot be garn ished be fore a j ust ice of  the 
peace . Clodfelter v. Co.r, 33 Tenn. ( 1  Sneed ) 330. To allow a 
jmlgment to be garn i shed in a court other than the one in which 
it  was rendered would subject the debtor to a double j uclgm ent 
on a single l iabil i ty , and thereby subj ect him to the danger of 
being compel led to pay the debt twice . Besides, it :would perm it 
one court to interfere with the due execution of process in 
another tribuna l . \:Ve are unwi l l ing to place a construct ion upon 
the statutes that is l iable to lead to such results. upon princ iple 
and authori ty we are con strained to hold that the garn ishmen t 
proceedings in the county cou rt in the case of Scott v. Lanham, 
were void ,  and consequently created no l ien upon the fund  in 
controversy. 
In the brief of appellant it is said : "All opportunity for con­
flict of jurisd ict ion , or for in justice has been avoided hy the pay­
ment of the entire amount of the Lanham j udgment into the dis­
t rict court. and the bringing of  the equ ity proceed ings i n  which all 
parties interested are made <lefendants ,  where all the part ies can 
have their right s ad justed . The garni shee can be protecte<l from 
<louble payment and his  j udgment cred itor compelled to sat isfv 
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the judgment of record.” This position might, and doubtless
would, be tenable were it not for the fact that Lanham, plaintiff’s
debtor, assigned his judgment against Fitzgerald to the defendant
C. H. Rohman, which assignment was filed in the district court of
Lancaster county, according to the fifth finding of fact, on April
10, 1893, several months prior to the institution of this equitable
action. Therefore, Lanham had no interest in the judgment or
the money paid into court when this action was commenced, and.
as we have already shown, the garnishment proceedings created
no lien upon the money in dispute. There is no room to doubt
that when a judgment has been assigned it is not liable thereafter
to garnishment at the suit of the creditor of the assignor. * * *
Affirmed.
What May Be Taken on Attachment or Execution.
HAGAN v. LUCAS, in U. S. Sup. Ct., Ian. Term, i836—35 U. S. (IO/
Peters) 400.
This is a proceeding instituted in the district court of the
United States for the southern district of Alabama, according to
the statutes of that state, by Charles F. Lucas, as claimant of
property theretofore seized by the marshal of said court on an
execution on a judgment of said court in favor of john Hagan
against Wm. D. Bynum and A. M’Dade. From judgment in
favor of the claimant plaintiffs bring error.
In support of his claim Lucas gave in evidence duly certified
copies of the records of three judgments against said Bynum
and M’Dade, rendered by the circuit court of Montgomery county,
Alabama, and of executions thereon, under which the sheriff
of said county had returned levies upon the property involved in
this proceeding; and of an affidavit of said Lucas thereafter made
and filed in said circuit court alleging that the said property be-
longed to said Lucas; and of a bond at the same time executed
by said Lucas to said sheriff, according to the statute, for the
forthcoming of said property if it should be found subject to said
executions; and that on the execution and delivery of said bond
said sheriff delivered said property to said Lucas, from whose
possession it was afterward taken by said marshal _on the execu-
tion afterward issued by said district court of the United States.
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the judgment of record ." This position might, and doubtless 
would, be tenable were it not for the fact that Lanham, plaintiff's 
debtor, assigned his j udgment against Fitzgerald to the defendant 
C. H .  Rohman, which assignment was filed in the district court of 
Lancaster county, according to the fifth finding of  fact, on April 
I O, 1893, several months prior to the institution of this equitable 
action. Therefore, Lanham had no interest in the j udgment or 
the money paid into court when this action was commenced, and. 
as we have already shown, the garnishment proceedings created 
no lien upon the money in dispute. There is no room to doubt 
that when a j udgment has been assigned it is not liable thereafter 
to garnishment at the suit of the creditor of the assignor. * * * 
Affirmed. 
What May Be Taken on Attachment
· 
or Execution. 
HAGAN v. LUCAS, in U. S .  Sup. Ct., Jan. Term, 18,36--35 U. S. ( 10 /'  
Peters) 400. 
This is a proceeding instituted in the district court of the 
United States for the southern district of Alabama, according to 
the statutes of that state, by Charles F. Lucas, as claimant of 
property theretofore seized by the marshal of said court on an 
execution on a judgment of said court in favor of John Hagan 
against Wm. D. Bynum and A. M'Dade. From judgment in 
favor of the claimant plaintiffs bring error. 
In support of his claim Lucas gave in evidence duly certified 
copies of the records of three j udgments against said Bynum 
and l\l 'Dade, rendered by the circuit court of Montgomery county, 
Alabama, and of executions thereon, under which the sheriff 
of said county had retu rned levies upon the property involved in 
this proceeding ; and of an affidavit of said Lucas thereafter made 
and filed in said circuit court alleging that the said property be­
longed to said Lucas ; and of a bond at the same time executed 
by said Lucas to said sheriff, according to the statute, for the 
forthcoming of said property if it should be found subj ect to said 
executions ; and that on the execution and delivery of said bond 
said sheriff delivered said property to said Lucas, from whose 
possession it was afterward taken by said marshal on the execu­
tion afterward issued by said district court of the United States. 
Upon this evidence the district court instructed the jury that if  
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they believed this evidence and that the claim in the circuit court
of Alabama county was still pending and undetermined, the prop-
erty was in the custody of the law and not liable to levy by the
marshal. To this instruction plaintiffs except.
MCLEAN, J. * * * Had the property remained in the pos-
session of the sheriff, under the first levy, it is clear the marshal
could not have taken it in execution; for the property could not
be subject to two jurisdictions at the same time. The first levy,
whether it were made under the federal or state authority, with- -
draws the property from the reach of the process of the other.
Under the state jurisdiction, a sheriff having execution in his
hands, may levy on the same goods; and where there is no priority
on the sale of the goods, the proceeds should be applied in pro-
portion to the sums named in the executions. And where a
sheriff has made a levy, and afterwards receives executions
against the same defendant, he may appropriate any surplus that
shall remain, after satisfying the first levy, by the order of the
court. But the same rule does not govern where the executions; _
as in the present case, issue from different jurisdictions. The
marshal may apply moneys, collected under several executions,
the same as the sheriff. But this cannot be done as between the-
marshal and the sheriff. A most injurious conflict of jurisdiction
would be likely, often, to arise between the federal and the state
courts, if the final process of the one could be levied on property
which had been taken by the process of the other. The marshal
or the sheriff, as the case may be, by a levy, acquires a special
property in the goods, and may maintain an action for them. But
if the same goods may be taken in execution, at the same time
by the marshal and the sheriff, does this special property vest in
the one, or the other, or both of them? No such case can exist;
property once levied on, remains in the custody of the law, and it
is not liable to be taken by another execution, in the hands of a
different officer; and especially by an ofiicer acting under a differ-
ent judisdiction. But it is insisted in this case, that the bond is
substituted for the property; and consequently that the property is
released from the levy. - The law provides that the property shall
be delivered into the possession of the claimant, on his giving
bond and security in double the amount of the debt and costs,
that he will return it to the sheriff if it shall be found subject to
the execution. [*4o4] Is there no lien on property thus situated,
either under the execution or the bond? That this bond is not
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they bel ieved this evidence and that the claim in the circuit court 
of Alabama county was still pending and undetermined, the prop­
erty was in the custody o f  the law and not l iable to levy by the 
marshal. To this instruction plaintiffs except. 
:r-.kLEAN, J. * * * Had the property remained in the pos­
session of the sheriff, under the first levy, it is clear the marshal 
could not have taken it in execution ; for the property could not 
be subject to two j urisdictions at the same time. The first levy, 
whether it '"·ere made under the federal or state authority, with­
draws the property from the reach of the process of  the other. 
Cnder the state jurisdiction, a sheriff having execution in his 
hands, may levy on the same goods ; and where there is  no priority 
on the sale of the goods, the proceeds should be applied in pro­
portion to the sums named in the executions. And where a 
sheriff has made a levy, and afterwards receives executions 
against the same defendant, he may appropriate any surplus that 
shall remain, after satisfying the first levy, by the order of the 
court. Dut the same rule does not govern where the executions; . 
as in the present case, i ssue from different j urisdictions. The 
marshal may apply moneys, collected under several executions, 
the same as the sheriff. But this cannot be done as between the . 
marshal and the sheriff.  .A most inj urious conflict of jurisdiction 
would he l ikclv, often, to arise between the federal and the state 
courts, i f  the final process of the one could be levied on property 
which had been taken by the process of the other. The marshal 
or  the sheriff, as the case may be, by a levy, acquires a special 
property in the goods , and may maintain an action for them. Ilut 
i f  the same goods may be taken in execution , at the same time 
by the marshal and the sheriff, does this  special property vest in 
the one, or the other, or  both of them ? �o such case can exist ; 
property once levied on , remains in the custody of the law , and it 
is not liable to be taken by another execution , in the hands  of a 
different officer ; and especially by an officer acting under a differ­
ent j udisdiction. But it i s  insisted in this case, that the bond is 
suhst ituted for the property ; and consequently that the property is 
released from the levy . .  The law provides that the property shall 
he delivered into the posse!' sion of the claimant, on his giving 
hond and �ecurity in double the amount of the debt and costs, 
that he wil l  return it to the sheriff i f  it shall be found subj ect to 
the execution.  [ *404] Is there no l ien on property thus situated, 
either under the execution or the bond ? That this bond is not 
in the nature of a bond given to prosecute a writ c f  error. or on 
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an appeal, is clear. The condition is, that the property shall be
returned to the sheriff, if the right shall be adjudged against the
claimant. Now it would seem that this bond cannot be considered
as a substitute for the property, as the condition requires its re-
turn to the sheriff. The object of the legislature in requiring
this bond, was to insure the safe keeping and faithful return of
the property, to the sheriff, should its return be required. If,
then, the property is required by the statute and the condition of
the bond to be delivered to the sheriff’ on the contingency stated,
can it be liable to be taken and sold on execution. If the prop-
erty be liable to execution, a levy must always produce a for-
feiture of the condition of the bond. For a levy takes the prop-
erty out of the possession of the claimant, and renders the per-
formance of his bond impossible. Can a result so repugnant to
equity and propriety as this, be sanctioned? Is the law so incon-
sistent as to authorize the means by which the discharge of a
legal obligation is defeated, and at the same time exact a penalty
for the failure. This would indeed be a reproach to the law and
to justice. The maxim of the law is, that it injures no man, and
can never produce injustice. I
On the giving of the bond, the property is placed in the pos-
session of the claimant. His custody is substituted for the cus-
tody of the sheriff. The property is not withdrawn from the
custody of the law. In the hands of the claimant, under the bond
for its delivery to the sheriff, the property is as free from the
reach of other processes, as it would have been in the hands of
the sheriff.
In Holt 643. and I Show. 174, it was resolved by Holt, chief
justice. that goods being once seized and in custody of the law,
they could not be seized again by the same or any other sheriff;
nor can the sheriff take goods which have been (listrained. pawned
or gaged for debt; 4 Bac. Ab. 389; nor goods before seized on
execution, unless the first execution was fraudulent, or the goods
were not legally seized under it. * * * [*4o5]
In Lusk V. Ramsey, 3 Munford (Va.) 417. the court de-
cided that the lien, by virtue of a writ of fieri facias, upon the
property of the debtor, is not released by his giving a forthcom-
ing bond, but continues until such bond is forfeited. In that
case. the defendant’s property having been levied on by an exe-
cution in the hands of the sheriff, was suffered to remain in his
possession, on his giving a forthcoming bond for the delivery of
the goods on the day of sale: but before the day of sale the de-
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an appeal ,  is clear. The condition is, that the property shall be 
returned to the sheriff, i f  the right shall be adj udged against the 
claimant. Now it would seem that this bond cannot be considered 
as a substitute for the property, as the condition requires its re­
turn to the sheriff. The object o f  the legislature in requiring 
this bond, was to insure the safe keeping and faithful return of 
the property, to the sheriff, should its return be required. If, 
then , the property is required by the statute and the condition of  
the bond to he delivered to the sheriff on the contingency stated , 
can it be l iable to be taken and sold on execution. I f  the prop­
erty be l iable to execution, a levy must always produce a for­
feiture of the condition of .  the bond. For a levy takes the prop­
erty out of the possession o f  the claimant, and renders the per­
formance o f  his bond impossible. Can a result so repugnant to 
equity and propriety as this, be sanctioned ? Is the law so incon­
sistent as to authorize the means by which the discharge of a 
legal obligation is defeated, and at the same time exact a penalty 
for the failure. This would indeed be a reproach to the law and 
to j ustice. The maxim of the law is, that it inj ures no man, and 
can never produce injustice. 
On the giving of  the bond, the property is placed in the pos­
session of the cla imant. His custody is substituted for the cus­
tody of the sheriff. The property is not withdrawn from the 
custody of the law. In the hands of the claimant, under the bond 
for its del ivery to the sheriff, the property is as free from the 
reach of other processes, as it would have been in .the hands of  
the sheriff. 
In Holt 643. and I Show. 174, i t  was resolved by Holt, chief 
j ustice, that goods being once seized and in custody of the law, 
they could not be seized again by the same or any other sheriff ; 
nor can the sheriff take goods which have been d istrained . pawned 
or gaged for debt : 4 Bae. Ab. �89 ; nor goods before seized on 
execut ion , unless the first execution was fraudulent, or the goods 
were not legally se ized under i t .  * * * [ *405 ]  
I n  Lusk v .  Ramsey, 3 l\fonford ( Va. ) 417 ,  the court de­
c ided that the l i en, by v irtue of a writ of fieri facias, upon the 
p ropert�r of the debtor, i s  not released hy his giving a forthcom­
ing- bond, bllt continues until such bond i s  forfeite<l .  In that 
case. the defendan t's orooertv havin!! been levied on bv an exe­
c 1 1 t ion in the hands of the sheriff , \\;�s suffered to rem�in in his 
possession , on his giv ing a forthcoming bond fo r the del ivery of 
the goods on the dav o f sale : but hcfore the <lay of sale the de­
fendant  del ivered the goods in  satisfaction of another execution ,  
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and the question was made whether the forthcoming bond re-
leased the lien of the first execution. In his opinion, Judge
Roane draws the following distinctions between a forthcoming
bond, and what is called a replevy bond, under the statute of
Virginia. I. A replevy bond under the act operated a release of
the property. 2. Because the surety therein is to be approved
by the creditor: a circumstance very material in a bond consid-
ered as a substitute for an execution, and wanting as to the sure-
ties upon forthcoming bonds. 3. Because a replevy bond ob-
tained the force of a judgment by the mere giving thereof;
though its execution was suspended till the expiration of the
three months, and did not owe its obligation, as a judgment. to
the breach of the condition thereof, as is the case of forthcoming
bonds.
The bond given by the claimant Lucas, bears a strong anal-
ogy to a forthcoming bond. By the latter, the goods were to be
delivered to the sheriff on the day of sale; by the former, the
goods were to be delivered to the sheriff, so soon as the right shall
be determined against the claimant. In neither bond is the plain-
tiff in the execution consulted, as is done in a replevy bond. as to
the sufficiency of the surety: nor do either of these bonds, like the
replevy bond, operate as a judgment, until a breach of the condi-
tion. In fact, the bond under the Alabama statute is substan-
tially a forthcoming bond. * * * [*4o6]
VVe think, that part of the charge to the jury by the district
court which respected the pendency of the suit in the state court,
and which was excepted to, was substantially correct: and we
are of opinion, that on principle and authority, and also under the
construction given to the statute by the supreme court of the
state the judgment of the district court must be
Affirmed.
CONN v. CALDWELL, in Ill. Sup. Ct., Dec. Term, I844-6 I11. (I
Gilm.) 531.
Attachment. Defendants bring error.
TRF.A’l‘, J. On the 24th day of February, I842, Joseph Cald-
well sued out of the Madison circuit court, an attachment against
Joseph H. Conn, James R. Sprigg and Vl/illiam VV. Greene. The
writ of attachment was levied on certain real estate, and on the
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and the question was made whether the forthcoming bond re­
leased the lien of the first execution . In his opinion, Judge 
Roane draws the following distinctions between a forthcoming 
bond, and what is called a replevy bond, under the statute of 
Virg"inia. r.  A replevy bond under the act operated a release of 
the property . 2. Because the surety therein is to be approved 
by the creditor : a ci rcumstance very material in a bond consid­
ered as a substitute for an execution, and wanting as to the sure­
ties upon forthcoming bonds. 3. Because a replevy bond ob­
tained the force of a judgment by the mere giving thereof ; 
though its execution was suspended till the expiration of the 
three months, and did not owe its obligation, as a judgment. to 
the breach of the condition thereof, as is the case of forthcoming 
bonds. 
The bond given by the claimant Lucas, bears a strong anal­
ogy to a forthcoming bond. By the latter, the goods were to be 
delivered to the sheriff on the day of sale ; by the former, the 
goods were to be delivered to the sheriff, so soon as the right shall 
be determined against the claimant. In neither bond is  the plain­
t iff in the execution consulted , as is done in a replevy bond. as to 
the snfficiency of the surety : nor do either of these bonds, like the 
replevy bond, operate as a judgment, until a breach of the condi­
t ion . In fact, the bond under the Alabama statute is  substan­
tially a forthcoming bond. * * * [*406] 
\Ve think , tha� part of the charge to the jury by the district 
court which respected the pendency of the suit in the state court, 
and which was excepted to, was substantially correct : and we 
are of opinion , that on principle and authority, and also under the 
construction given to the statute by the supreme court of the 
state the j udgment of  the district court must be 
A flirm ed. 
CONN v. CALDWELL, in Ill. Sup. Ct., Dec. Term, 1844-6 Il l .  ( 1  
Gilm. ) 53 1 .  
Attachment. Defendants bring error. 
TRF.AT, J. On the 24th day of February, 1842, Joseph Cald­
well sued out of the Madison circuit court, an attachment against 
Joseph H. Conn, James R. Sprigg and vVill iam \V. Greene. The 
writ of attachment was levied on certain real estate, and on the 
steamboat s "Capsian" and "Osage." The sheriff's return stated, 
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’ the steamboats “Capsian” and “Osage;
that on the day succeeding the levy, the steamboats were released
by order of the sheriff. _
The declaration was in assumpsit, on_ three promissory notes.
The defendants appeared and pleaded non assumjbsit. On the 4th
day of October, 1842, this issue was heard by the court, and
found for plaintifi, and his damages assessed at the sum of $12,-
923.46. A judgment was thereupon rendered, that the plaintiff
recover of the defendants the said sum and costs; that he have
execution therefor, to be levied of the real estate attached, and
” and also, that he have
execution generally for his damages and costs. To reverse that
judgment, the defendants prosecute a writ of error.
Since the suing out of the writ of error, the original return
of the sheriff on the writ of attachment has been amended in
the circuit court, and the amendment certified into this court,
and made part of the record. It appears from the amended re-
turn, that the steamboat “Osage,” at the time of the levy, was
freighted and on her passage from St. Louis to the ports on the
Illinois river; that it was agreed between the plaintiff and the
master, that the boat should proceed on her voyage, and return,
and be delivered to the sheriff, subject to the attachment; that the
boat was thereupon released, for the purpose of the voyage,-but
has never been redelivered.
The errors assigned questioned the propriety of the judg-
ment entered. It is insisted in the first place, that the judgment
["‘536] is erroneous, because it awards execution generally
against the defendants.
\Vhere a judgment in default is rendered in a suit by attach-
ment, without persona scrvice of rocess on the defe e
ftTa;.r_m.?.1Trs—17_-'—a'T""‘[)_'_—‘— aghedi salonelialgle £9; its
p=g;gn_@rLE_gg1£_ea§.e.sa..g%?Egtt!\“;_eu_nua';1_wt_ths_sala1>f
the speci c property. Bu w ere e e endant is serve 'th
process, or a ars to the action th , n,
Z1I1( tie painti is entitled to a general execution thereon. n
this case, the t efendants pleat ed to e eelaration, and the cause
was fully determined on the merits. The judgment is, therefore,
as conclusive between the parties, as if the action had been insti-
tuted in the ordinary way. The plaintiff having the right to a
general execution on the judgment, the court committed no error
in awarding it.
In the next place, it is insisted that the judgment is erron-
eous in awarding a special execution. It is contended, that the
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that on the day succeeding the levy, the steamboats were released 
by order of the sheriff. 
The declaration was in assumpsit, on three promissory notes. 
The defendants appeared and pleaded non a.ssumpsit. On the 4th 
day of October, 1842, this issue was heard by the court, and 
found for plaintiff, and his damages assessed at the sum of $ 1 2,-
923.46. A j udgment was thereupon rendered, that the plaintiff 
recover of the defendants the said sum and costs ; that he have 
execution therefor, to be levied of the real estate attached , and 
the steamboats "Capsian" and "Osage ;" and also, that he have 
execution generally for his damages and costs. To reverse that 
j udgment, the defendants prosecute a writ of error. 
Since the suing out of the writ of error, the original return 
of the sheriff on the writ of attachment has been amended in 
the circuit court, and the amendment certified into this court, 
and made part of the record. It appears from the amended re­
turn, that the steamboat "Osage," at the time of the levy, was 
freighted and on her passage from St. Louis to the ports on the 
Illinois river ; that it was agreed between the plaintiff and the 
master, that the boat should proceed on her voyage, and return, 
and be delivered to the sheriff , subj ect to the attachment ; that the 
boat was thereupon released, for the purpose of the voyage, . but 
has never been redel ivered . 
The errors assigned questioned the propriety of the j udg­
ment entered. It is insisted in the first place, that the j udgment 
[ *536 ] is erroneous,  because it awards execution generally 
against the defendants. 
\Vhere a ' udgmcnt in default is rendered in a suit b · 
ment, without persona service of  rocess on  the defendant. the 
JU< gment J S  o rem an t 1e estate att i alone l iable for us 
pavmen . n sue c 
· 
i ssues for th f 
the sEeCJ c property. Bu w ere e "th 
process, or a ars to the action th _ 
am t 1e amh JS ent itl ed to a eneral execution 
this case, the e endants plcac ed to e eclaration, and the cause 
was fully determined on the merits. The judgment is, therefore, 
as conclusive between the parties, as if the action had been insti­
tuted in the �rd inary way. The plaintiff having the right to a 
g-eneral execu tion on the judgment� the court committed no error 
in awarding i t .  
In the next place, it i s  ins isted that the judgment is erron­
eous in awarding a special execution. It is con tended , that the 
property attached was rel eased by the appearance of the defend-
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ants. This position is not tenable. This precise question was be-
fore this court at the present term, in the case of Martin v. Dry-
den, 6 I11. 187. This court there held, that an appearance of the
defendant did not, of itself, discharge the property attached; but
that the defendant in order to release it from the lien acquired
by the levy, must either replevy the property, or give security for
the payment of whatever judgment may be rendered in the cause,
as provided in the 29th section of the attachment act. In this
case the defendants neither replevied the property, nor gave spec-
ial bail. The lien created by the levy became perfect by the judg-
ment, and the plaintiff was entitled to a special execution for the
sale of the property, except such as he had voluntarily relin-
quished.
The circuit court decided correctly in embracing the steam-
boat “Osage” in the award of execution. That boat was re-
leased from the custody of the sheriff, for the purpose of the voy-
age, with the express understanding that the boat should be re-
delivered and continue subject to the attachment. [*537] The
lien on the boat was not thereby extinguished, but still subsists
as between the parties to this suit. If, in the meantime, third
persons have become interested in the boat, a different question
may arise.
The steamboat “Capsian” was absolutely released, and the
judgment is erroneous in including it in the award of execution.
For this error, the judgment must be reversed with costs. The
cause, however, need not be remanded. It was fully adjudicated
in the court below, and the proper judgment can be entered in
this court. A judgment must be rendered here, that the plaintiff
recover of the defendants the sum-of $12,923.46, with legal inter-
est from the 4th day of October, 1842. On this judgment, the
plaintiff can have execution generally, and also a special execu-
tion for the sale of the real estate attached, and the steamboat
“Osage.” Judgment reversed.
L
EDWARDS v. KEARZEY, in U. s. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, i877—96 U. s.
595-
ERROR to the supreme court of the state of North Carolina.
This action was commenced by Leonidas C. Edwards, L\larch
31, 1869. in the superior court of Granville county, North Caro-
lina, against Archibald Kearzey, to recover the possession of cer-
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ants. This position is not tenable. This precise question was be­
fore this court at the present term, in the case of Martin v. Dry­
den, 6 Ill. 187. This court there held, that an appearance of the 
defendant did not, o f  itself, discharge the property attached ; but 
that the defendant in order to release it from the lien acquired 
by the levy, must either replevy the property, or give security for 
the payment of  whatever judgment may be rendered in the cause, 
as provided in the 29th section of the attachment act. In this 
case the defendants neither replevied the property, nor gave spec­
ial bail. The lien created by the levy became perfect by the judg­
ment, and the plaintiff was entitled to a special execution for the 
sale of the property, except such as he had voluntarily relin­
quished. 
1'he circuit court decided correctly in embracing the steam­
boat "Osage" in the award of execution. That boat was re­
leased from the custody of the sheriff, for the purpose of the voy­
age, with the express understanding that the boat should be re­
delivered and continue subject to the attachment. [ *537 ] The 
lien on the boat was not thereby extinguished, but still subsists 
as between the parties to this suit. I f, in the meantime, third 
persons have become interested in the boat, a different question 
may anse. 
The steamboat "Capsian" was absolutely released, and the 
j udgment is erroneous in including it in the award of execution.  
For this error, the judgment must be reversed with costs. The 
cause, however, need not be remanded. It was fully adjudicated 
in the court below, and the proper judgment can be entered in 
this court. A judgment qmst be rendered here, that the plaintiff 
recover of the defendants. the sum· of $ 12,92346, with legal inter­
est from the 4th day of October, 1842. On this j udgment,  the 
plaintiff can have execution generally, and also a special execu­
t ion for the sale of the real estate attached, and the steamboat 
"Osage."  Judgment reversed. 
� 
EDWARDS v. KEARZEY, in U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, 18n-¢ U. S. 
595. 
ERROR to the supreme court of the state of North Carolina. 
This action was commenced by Leonidas C. Edwards: l\farch 
� I , 18�, in the superior court of Granville county, North Caro­
lina, against Archibald Kearzey, to recover the possession of cer­
tain lands in that county. They were levied upon and sold by the 
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she-riff, by virtue of executions sued out upon judgments rendered
against Kearzey, on contracts which matured before April 24,
1808, when the constitution of North Carolina took effect, the
tenth article of which exempts from sale under execution or other
final process, issued for the collection of any debt, the personal
property of any resident of the state, and "every homestead, and
the dwelling and buildings used therewith, not exceeding in value
$1,000, to be selected by the owner thereof.” Prior to that date,
under statutes since repealed, certain specified articles of small
value, and such other property as the freeholders appointed for
that purpose might deem necessary for the comfort and support
of the debtor’s family, not exceedingin value $50 at cash valua-
tion, and fifty acres of land in the country, and two acres in the
town, of not greater value than $500, were exempt from execu-_
tion. The lands in question were owned and occupied by Kearzey
as a homestead, and as such were set off to him pursuant to the
mode prescribed by the legislation for carrying the constitutional
provision into effect. He had no other lands, and'they did not
exceed $1,000 in value. Edwards was the purchaser at the sher-
iff's sale of the said lands, and received a deed therefor.
The court found for Kearzey, upon the ground that so much
of said art. 10 as exempts from sale, under execution or other
final process obtained on any debt, land of the debtor of the value
of $1,000, and the statutes enacted in pursuance thereof, embrace
within their operation executions for debts which were contracted
before the adoption of said constitution; and that said article and
said statutes, when so interpreted and enforced, are not repugnant
to art. I, see. IO, of the constitution of the United States, which
ordains that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation
of contracts. Judgment having been rendered upon the finding,
it was. on appeal, affirmed by the supreme court of the state.
Edwards then sued out this writ of error.
SWAYNE, J. * * * The only federal question presented by
the record is, whether the exemption was valid as regards con-
tracts made before the adoption of the constitution of 1868. The
counsel for the plaintiff in error insists upon the negative of this
proposition. The counsel upon the other side, frankly conceding
several minor points, maintains the affirmative view. Our re-
marks will be confined to this subject.
The constitution of the United States declares that “no state
shall pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts.” A
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'!>ht:riff, by virtue of executions sued out upon j udgments rendered 
against Kearzey, on contracts which matured before April 24, 
l ti08, when the constitution of North Carolina took effect, the 
tenth article of which exempts from sale under execution or other 
.final process, issued for the collection of any debt, the personal 
property of any resident of the state, and "every homestead, and 
the dwelling and buildings used therewith, not exceeding in value 
$ 1 ,000, to be selected by the owner thereof." Prior to that date, 
under statutes since repealed, certain specified articles of small 
value, and such other property as the freeholders appointed for 
that purpose might deem necessary for the comfort and support 
of the debtor's family, not exceeding ·in value $so at cash valua­
tion, and fifty acres of land in the country, and hvo acres in the 
town, of  not greater value than $500, were exempt from execu- . 
t ion. The lands in question were owned and occupied by Kearzey 
as a homestead, and as such were set off to him pursuant to the 
mode prescribed by the legislation for carrying the constitutional 
provi sion into effect .  He had no other lands, and · they did not 
exceed $ 1 ,000 in value. Edwards was the purchaser at the sher­
iff's sale of the said lands ,  and received a deed therefor. 
The court found for Kearzey, upon the ground that so much 
of said art. 10 as exempts from sale, under execution or other 
final process obtained on any debt, land of the debtor of the value 
of $ 1 ,000, and the statutes enacted in pursuance thereof, embrace 
within their operation executions for debts which were contracted 
before the adoption of said constitution ; and that said article and 
said statutes, when so interpreted and enforced, are not repugnant 
to art . 1 ,  sec. IO,  of the constitution of the United States, which 
ordains that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation 
of contracts. ] mlgment having been rendered upon the finding, 
it was.  on appeal , affirmed by the supreme court of the state. 
E(lwarcl s then sued out this writ of error. 
S WAYNE, J. * * * The only federal question presented by 
the record is, whether the exemption was valid as regards con­
tracts made before the adoption o f  the constitution of 1 868. The 
counsel for the plaintiff in error insi sts upon the negative of this 
proposi t ion. The counsel upon the other side, frankly conceding 
se,·eral minor points, maintains the affirmative view. Our re­
marks wi l l  be confined to this subject . 
The constitution of the United States declares that "no state 
shall pass any . . .  law impairing the obligation of contracts ." A 
contract i s  the agreement of minds, upon a sufficient considera-
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tion [_*6oo] that something specified shall be done, or shall not
be done. The lexical definition of "impair” is “to make worse;
to diminish in quantity, value, excellence, or strength; to lessen
in power; to weaken; to enfeeble; to deteriorate.” VVebster’s
Diet. “Obligation” is defined to be “the act of obliging or bind-
ing; that which obligates; the binding power of a vow, promise,
oath, or contract,” &c. Id. “The word is derived from the Latin
word obligatio, tying up; and that froin the verb obligo, to bind
or tie up; to engage by the ties of a promise or oath, or form of
law; and obligo is compounded of the verb ligo, to tie or bind
fast, and the preposition 0b, which is prefixed to increase its
meaning.” Blair v.- Williams and Lajbsley v. Brashears, 4 Litt.
(Ky.) 65.
The obligation of a contract includes every thing within its
obligatory scope. Among these elements nothing is more impor-
tant than the means of enforcement. This is the breath of its
vital existence. Without it, the contract, as such, in the view of
the law, ceases to be, and falls into the class of those “imperfect
obligations,” as they are termed, which depend for their fulfil-
ment upon the will and conscience of those upon whom they rest.
The ideas of right and remedy are inseparable. “\Vant of right
and want of remedy the same thing.” 1 Bac. Abr., tit. Actions
in General, letter B.
In Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy (4 VVall. 535), it was
said : “A statute of frauds embracing pre-existing parol contracts
not before required to be in writing would affect its validity. A
statute declaring that the word ‘ton’ should, in prior as well as
subsequent contracts, be held to mean half or double the weight
before prescribed, would affect its construction. A statute pro-
viding that a previous contract of indebtment may be extinguished
by a process of bankruptcy would involve its discharge; and a
statute forbidding the sale of any of the debtor’s property under
a judgment upon such a contract would relate to the remedy.”
It cannot be doubted, either upon principle or authority, that each
of such laws would violate the obligation of the contract, [*6oI]
and the last not less than the first. These propositions seem to
us too clear to require discussion. It is also the settled doctrine
of this court, that the laws which subsist at the time and place of
making a contract enter into and form a part of it, as if they were
expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms. This rule em-
braces alike those which affect its validity, construction, discharge.
and enforcement. Von HOIf1nan V. City of Quincy, supra: Mc-
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t ion [ *600] that something :-pecified shall be done, or shall not 
be done. The lexical definition of "impair" is "to make worse ; 
to diminish in quantity, value, excellence, or  strength ; to lessen 
in power ; to weaken ; to en feeble ; to deteriorate." Webster's 
Diet. "Obligation" is  defined to be "the act of obliging or bind­
ing ; that which obligates ; the binding power of a vow, promise, 
oath, or contract," &c. Id. "The word is derived from the Latin 
word obligatio, tying up ; and that from the verb obligo, to bind 
or tie up ; to engage by the ties of a promise or oath, or form of 
law ; and o bligo is  compounded of the verb ligo, to tie o r  bind 
fast, and the preposi tion ob, which is prefixed to increase its 
meaning." Blair v. Williams and Lapsley v. Brashears, 4 Litt. 
( Ky. ) 65. 
The obligation of a contract includes every thing within its 
obligatory scope. Among these elements nothing is more. impor­
tant than the means of enforcement. This is the breath of its 
vital existence. Without it, the contract, as such, in the view of  
the law, ceases to be, and falls into the class of  those " imperfect 
obligations," as they are termed , which depend for their fulfil­
ment upon the will and conscience of those upon whom they rest. 
The ideas of right and remedy are inseparable.  "\Vant of  right 
and want of remedy the same thing." I Bae. Ahr., tit. Actions 
in General, letter B .  
In V o n  Hoffman v. City o f  Q u.i11cy (4  \Vall. 535 ) ,  i t  was 
said : "A statu te of frauds embracing pre-existing parol contracts 
not before required to be in writing would affect its validity. A 
statute declaring that the word 'ton' should, in prior as welt as 
subsequent contracts, be held to mean half or double the weight 
before prescribed, would affect its construct ion. A statute pro­
viding that a previous contract of indebtment may be extinguished 
by a process of bankruptcy would involve its discharge ; and a 
statute forbidding the sale of any of the debtor's property under 
a j udgment upon such a contract would relate to the remedy." 
It cannot be doubted, either upon principle or authority, that each 
of such laws would violate the obligation of the contract, [*601 ]  
and the last not less than the first. These propositions seem to 
us too clear to require discussion .  I t  is also the settled doctrine 
of  this cottrt, that the laws which subsist at the time and place of 
making a contract enter into and form a part of it , as if they were 
e -..;:prcsslv referred to or incorporated in its terms. This rule em ­
hraces alike those which affect its validity, construction , di scharg-e. 
<1nd C'n forcement. Von Hoffman. v. City of Quinc:v . supra ; Mc­
(mr h•11  v. l/a·y1rnrd, 2 How. 6o8. 
4.40 CASES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC.
In Green v. Biddle (8 Wheat. 1), this court said, touching
the point here under consideration: “It is no answer, that the acts
of Kentucky now in question are regulations of the remedy, and
not of the right to the lands. If these acts so change the nature
and extent of existing remedies as materially to impair the rights
and interests of the owner, they are just as much a violation of
the compact as if they overturned his rights and interests." “One
of the tests that a contract has been impaired is, that its value
has by legislation been diminished. It is not by the constitution
to be impaired at all. This is not a question of degree or man-
ner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its obligation,—
dispensing with any part of its force.” Planters’ Bank v. Shmp
et al., 6 How. 301.
It is to be understood that the encroachment thus denounced
must be material. If it be not material, it will be regarded as of
no account.
These rules are axioms in the jurisprudence of this court.
We think they rest upon a solid foundation. Do they not cover
this case; and are they not decisive of the question before us?
\Ve will, however, further examine the subject.
It is the established law of North Carolina that stay laws are
void, because they are in conflict with the national constitution.
Jacobs v. Smallrt-00d, 63 N. C. II2; Jones v. Crittenden, I Law
Repos. (N. C.) 385; Barnes v. Barnes at al., 8 Jones L. (N. C.)
366. This ruling is clearly correct. Such laws change a term of
the contract by postponing the time of payment. This impairs
its obligation, by making it less valuable to the creditor. But it
does this solely by operating on the remedy. The contract is
not otherwise touched by the offending law. Let us suppose a
case. A party recovers two judgments, [*6o2]-—one against A.,
the other against B.,—each for the sum of $1,500, upon a prom-
issory note. Each debtor has property worth the amount of the
judgment, and no more. The legislature thereafter passes a law
declaring that all past and future judgments shall be collected
“in four equal annual installments.” At the same time, another
law is passed, which exempts from execution the debtor’s prop-
erty to the amount of $1,500. The court holds the former law
void and the latter valid. Is not such a result a legal solecism?
Can the two judgments be reconciled? One law postpones the
remedy, the other destroys it; except in the contingency that the
debtor shall acnuire more property,-—a thing that may not occur.
and that cannot occur if he die before the acquisition is made.
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In Greeti v. Biddle (8 Wheat. 1 ) ,  this court said, touching 
the point here under consideration : "It is no answer, that the acts 
of Kentucky now in question are regulations of the remedy, and 
not of the right to the lands. If these acts so change the nature 
and extent of existing remedies as materially to impair the rights 
and interests of the owner, they are just as much a violation of 
the compact as if they overturned his rights and interests." "One 
of the tests that a contract has been impaired is, that its value 
has by legislation been diminished. It is not by the constitution 
to be impaired at all. This is not a question of degree or man­
ner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its obl igation,­
dispensing with any part of its force." Planters' Bank v. Sharp 
et al., 6 How. 30 1 .  
I t  i s  t o  be understood that the encroachment thus denounced 
must be material. I f  it be not material , it will be regarded as of 
no account. 
These rules are axioms in the jurisprudence of this court. 
We think they rest upon a solid foundation. Do they not cover 
this case ; and are they not decisive of the question before us ? 
\Ve will ,  however, further examine the subject. 
It is the established law of North Carolina that stay laws are 
void, because they are in conflict with the national constitution. 
Jaco bs v.  SnwllH•obd, 63 N. C. I I 2 ;  Jones v. Crittenden, I Law 
Repos. ( N. C. ) 385 ;  Barnes v. Barnes et al., 8 Jones L. ( N. C . )  
�66. This ruling is  clearly correct. Such laws change a term of 
the contract by postponing the time of  payment. This impairs 
its obligation, by making i t  less valuable to the creditor. But it 
does this solely by operat ing on the remedy. The contract is 
not otherwise touched by the offending law. Let us suppose a 
case. A party recovers two judgments, [ *602]-one against A., 
the other against B. ,-each for the sum of  $ 1 ,500, upon a prom­
issory note. Each debtor has property worth the amount of the 
j udgment, and no more. The legislature thereafter passes a law 
declaring that all past and future judgments shall be collected 
"in four equal annual installments." At the same time, another 
law is passed, which exempts from execution the debtor's prop­
erty to the amount of $ 1 ,500. The court holds the former law 
void and the lat ter  valid. Is not such a result a legal solecism ? 
Can the two judgments be reconciled ? One law postpones the 
remedy, the other destroys it : except in the contingency that the 
<l eht 0 r  sh al l �cn11 ire more property ,-a th ing that may not occur, 
ci n cl t hat c t1 n n ot occn r if he die before the acquisition i s  marle. 
P.oth laws mvolve the same principle <1.n<l rest on the same basis. 
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They must stand or fall together. The concession that the former
is invalid cuts away the foundation from under the latter. If a
state may stay the remedy for one fixed period, howexer short, it
may for another, however long. And if it may exempt property
to the amount here in question, it may do so to any amount. This,
as regards the mode of impairment we are considering, would
annul the inhibition of the constitution, and set at naught the sal-
utary restriction it was intended to impose. '* * *
Imprisonment for debt is a relic of ancient barbarism. Coop-
er’s Justinian, 658; 12 Tables, Tab. 3. It has desc<-ndez‘. with the
stream of time. It is a punishment rather than a remedy. It is
right for fraud, but wrong for misfortune. It breaks the spirit
of the honest debtor, destroys his credit, which is a form of cap-
ital. and dooms him, while it lasts, to helpless idlene‘.-. Where
there is no fraud, it is the opposite of a remedy. Every right-
minded man must rejoice when such a blot is reinoverl from the
statute-book. But upon the power of a state, even in this class
of cases, [*6o3] see the strong dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Washington, in Mason v. Haile, I2 Wheat. 370.
Statutes of limitation are statutes of repose. They are neces-
sary to the welfare of sociefy. Ihe lapse of t1nteml’l_\'_cT1’-‘
ries wiffi 1t the means of proof. The public as well as individ-
uals are interested in the principle upon which they proceed. They
do not impair the remedy, but only require its application within
the time specified. If the period limited be unreasonably short,
and designed to defeat the remedy upon pre-existing contracts.
which was part of their obligation, we should pronounce the stat-
ute void. Otherwise, we should abdicate the performance of one
of our most important duties. * * * [*6o7] * *
VVe think the views we have expressed carry out the intent
of contracts and the intent of the constitution. The obligation
of the former is placed under the safeguard of the latter. No
state can invade it; and Congress is incompetent to authorize such
invasion. Its position is impregnable, and will be so while the
organic law of the nation remains as it is. The trust touching
the subject with which this court is charged is one of magnitude
and delicacy. VVe must always be careful to see that there is
neither nonfeasance nor misfeasance on our part.
The importance of the point involved in this controversy in-
duces us to restate succinctly the conclusions at which we have
arrived, and which will be the ground of our judgment. The
remedy subsisting in a state when and where a contract is made
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They must stand or fal l together. The concession that the forrr.er 
is invalid cuts away the foundation from under the latter. If a 
state may stay the remedy for one fixed period , howt:\· er short, i t  
may ft"'r another, ho\\'ever long. And if it ma.v exemµt property 
tc the amount here in question, it may do so to any amotmt. This, 
as regards the mode of impairment we are considering, would 
annul the inhibition of  the constitution, and set at naught the sal­
u tary restriction it was intended to impose. · *  ' �  * 
Imprisonment for debt is a relic of  ancient harbari�m. Coop­
er's Justinian, 658 ; 1 2  Tables, Tab. 3. It has des.:,·ndc: · !  with : �e 
stream of time. It is a punishment rather than a remec1.y. It is 
right for fraud, but wrong for misfortune. It  breaks the s ;-: m t  
of the honest debtor, destroys his credit, \vhich is a form of cap­
i tal .  2nd dooms him, while i t  lasts, to helpless idl �'le -�. 'vVhere 
there is no fraud, it is  the opposite of a remedy .  Every right­
minderl. man must rejoice when such a blot is r�mr.•.1ed from the 
:.-tatute-book. But upon the power of a state, even in this dass 
of cases, [ *603] see the strong dissenting opinion :>f '!'\fr. Justic:e 
'\iashington, in .Mason v. Haile, 12 \Vh�at. 370. 
§tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose. !hey are neces­
sary to the welfare of society. 'l'he lapse of tm1e constantly car- -
nes with it the means of proof. The public as well as individ­
uals are interested in the principle upon ";hich they proceed. They 
do not impair the remedy, but only require its apn1 icat ion within 
the t ime specified. I f  the period limited be unreasonably short, 
and designed to defeat the remedy upon pre-existing contracts, 
which was part of their obligation , we should pronounc:e the stat­
l1 te void. Otherwise, we should abdicate the performance of one 
oi our most important duties. * * * [ *607] * ·� :r 
\Ve think the views we have expressed carry out t ile intent 
of contracts and the intent of the constitution. The obl igat ion 
of the former is placed under the safeguard of the latter. � o 
state can invade it ; and Congress i s  incompetent to authorize such 
invasion. Its position is impregnable, and will be so while the 
organic law of the nation remains as it is. The trust touching 
the subject with which this court is charged is one of magnitude 
and delicacy. We must always be careful to see that there is 
neither nonfeasance nor misfeasance on our part. 
The importance of the point involved in this controversy in­
duces us to restate succinctly the conclusions at which we have 
arrived , and which will be the ground of our judgment. The 
remedy subsisting in a state when and where a contract is made 
and is to be performed is a part of its obl igation, and any subse-
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quent law of the state which so affects that remedy as substan-
tially to impair and lessen the value of the contract is forbidden
by the constitution, and is, therefore, void.
The judgment of the supreme court of North Carolina will
be reversed, and the cause will be remanded with directions to
proceed in conformity to this opinion; and it is
S 0 ordered.
CLIFFORD and HUNT, JJ., concurred in the judgment. HAR-
LAN, ]., dissented.
The doctrine announced in this case is now well established; and
expressions to the contrary, many of which will be found in the earlier
state reports, are of small practical importance, since this fede'ral ques-
tion is sufficient to take the case from the supreme court of any state to
the supreme court of the United States, where the decision will be re-
versed if a law impairing the remedy has been sustained as to pre-existing
contracts.
AN EARLY V11‘-.‘w.—In Slnrgis v. Crouminsltield, 4 Vllheaton, at page
200, Marshall, C.J., said: “The distinction between the obligation of a
contract and the remedy given by the legislature to enforce that obliga-
tion has been taken at the bar, and exists in the nature of things. With-
out impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly
be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct. Confinement of the
debtor may be a punishment for not performing his contract, or may
be allowed as a means of inducing him to perform it. But the state may
refuse to inflict this punishment, or may withhold this means and leave
the contract in full force. Imprisonment is no part of the contract and
simply to release the prisoner does nof impair its olihgafion.II
What Is a Valid Levy.
BAILEY v. WRIGHT, in Mich. Sup. Ct., June 18, I878—39 Mich. 96.
Replevin by Lenna E. \/Vright against Alvin W. Bailey and
\Villiam Tinker in Barry circuit court. judgment for plaintiff,
and defendants bring error.
CAMPBELL, C. J. Defendant in error replevied a piano
from plaintiffs in error, who defend on the ground that she pur-
chased from one Ackley, and that the purchase was void as
against a levy 1nade by them upon an attachment against him.
[*g7] Several questions are presented on the record, but
inasmuch as the only defense was under the levy, the validity of
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quent law of  the state which so affects that remedy as substan­
tially to impair and lessen the value of the contract is forbidden 
by the constitution, and is, therefore, void. 
The j udgment of the supreme court of North Carolina wil1 
be reversed, and the cause will be remanded with directions to 
proceed in conform ity to this opinion ; and it is 
So ordered. 
C1.1FFORD and HUNT, JJ., concurred in the j udgment. HAR­
LAN, J ., dissented . 
The doctrine announced in this case is now well established ; and 
expressions to the contrary, many of which will be found in the earlier 
state reports, are of small practical importance, since this federal ques­
tion is sufficient to take �he case from the supreme court of any state to 
the supreme court of  the United States, where the decision will be re­
versed if a law impairing the remedy has been sustained as to pre-existing 
contracts. 
AN EARI,Y Vn:w.-In Sturgis v. Crowninshielcl, 4 Wheaton, at page 
200, Marshall, C.J., said : "The distinction between the obligation of a 
contract and the remedy gi�en by the legislature to enforce that obliga­
tion has been taken at the bar, and exists in the nature of things. With­
out impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly 
be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct. Confinement of the 
debtor may be a punishment for not performing his contract, or may 
be allowed as a means of inducing him to perform it. But the state may 
refuse to inflict this punishment, or may withhold this means and leave 
the contract in full force. Im risonment is nG art of the contract and 
simply to release the prisoner oes no 1mpa1r its o 1gahon. 
What Is a Valid Levy. 
BAILEY v. WRIGHT, in Mich. Sup. Cl, June 18, 1878-39 Mich. 96. 
Replevin by Lenna E. Wright against Alvin W. Bailey and 
\Villiam Tinker in Barry circuit court. Judgment for plaintiff, 
and defendants bring error. 
CAM PBELL, C. J. Defendant in error replevied a piano 
from plaint iffs in error, who defend on the ground that she pur­
chased from one Ackley, and that the purchase was void as 
against a levy made by them upon an attachment against him. 
[ *97] Several questions are presented on the record, but 
inasmuch as the only defense was under the levy, the validity of 
that is the first matter to be considered. 
EXECUTING THE VVRITS
The defendants by their own testimony showed that while
Ackley was temporarily absent, and his house, where his wife
was present at the time, was locked up, they broke into it by
violence and seized the piano upon the writ. It is admitted this
was a trespass, but it is claimed the levy may be a good levy in
spite of the wrongful acts by which it was accomplished.
We think this is too dangerous a doctrine to be tolerated.
Public policy requires above all things that courts and officers
executing their process shall respect the lawful rights of all per-
sons. The practical permission which over-zealous officers would
receive to commit wrongs with substantial impunity, if their
levies should be held good without regard to the manner of their
enforcement, would remove every check on lawlessness. To hold
that an act is lawful which may be lawfully resisted is absurd.
Such misconduct should neither be justified nor winked at. Any
officer who breaks the law should be held to be entirely without
excuse, and as fully responsible as any other malefactor.
The doctrine on this subject is so fully discussed in Ilsley v.
Nichols, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 270; 22 Am. Dec. 425, and People
v. Hubbard, 24 VVend. (N. Y.) 369; 35 Am. Dec. 628, that we
need not go into any further investigation. The doctrine is sen-
sible and just, and is the only one whereby private safety and
public peace can be preserved. There can be no respect-for
courts and their process if their ministers are upheld in violations
of law, or if they can be lawfully opposed in exercising their func-
tions, as they may be if such levies are held valid.
As the defense entirely failed, it is not important what rul-
ings were made on other points. Judgment must be affirmed
with costs.
A levy or service obtained by fraud or tort is void. Holker v. Hermes-
sey, 141 M0. 527, 42 S. W. toga, 64 Am. St. 524.
I-IOLLISTER v. GOODALE, in Conn. Sup. Ct. of Errors, Hartford,
June, I83I—8 Conn. 332, 2r Am. Dec. 674.
Trespass for taking and carrying away a barouche and har-
ness. Both parties claim as constables levying un-der attachments
against H. Benton. Plaintiff claimed that he obtained the key
to the carriage-house where the property was, unlocked the door,
attached the barouche, declaring that he attached all carriages
and harnesses in the house, and that while he was attempting to
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The defendants by their own testimony showed that while 
Ackley was temporarily absent, and his house, where his wife 
was present at the time, was locked up, they broke into it by 
violence and seized the piano upon the writ. I t  is admitted this 
was a trespass, but i t  i s  claimed the levy may be a good levy in 
spite of the wrongfu l  acts by which i t  was accomplished. 
'\Ve think this is too dangerous a doctrine to be tolerated. 
Publ ic policy requires above all things that courts and officers 
executing their process shall respect the lawful rights of all per­
sons. The practical permission which over-zealous officers would 
receive to commit wrongs with substantial impunity, if their 
levies should be held good without regard to the manner of their 
enforcement, would remove every check on lawlessness. To hold 
that an act is lawful which may be lawfully resisted is  absurd . 
Such misconduct should neither be justified nor winked at. Any 
officer who breaks the law should be held to be entirely without 
excuse, and as fully responsible as any other malefactor. 
The doctrine on this subject is so fully discussed in /fr/ej' v. 
Nichols, 29 Mass. ( 12 Pick . )  270 ; 22 Am. Dec. 425, and People 
v. Hubbard, 24 \Vend . ( N. Y. ) 369 ; 35 Am. Dec. 628, that we 
need not go into any further invest igation. The doctrine is sen­
sible and j ust, and is the only one whereby private safety and 
public peace can be preserved. There can be no respect · for 
courts and their process i f  their ministers are upheld in violations 
of law, or i f  they can be law fully opposed in exercising their func­
tions. as they may be i f such levies are held valid. 
As the defense entirely failed, it is not important what rul­
ings were made on other points. Judgment must be affirmed 
with costs. 
A levy or service obtained by fraud or  tort is void. Holker v. Hennes­
se)', 141 Mo. 527, 42 S. W. I�, 6.i Am. St. 524. 
HOLLISTER v. GOODALE, in Conn. Sup. Ct. of Errors, Hartford, 
June, 183 1-8 Conn. 332, 21 Am. Dec. 674. 
Trespass for taking and carrying away a barouche and har­
ness. Both parties claim as constables levying un<ler attachments 
against H. Renton. Plaintiff claimed that he obtained the key 
to the carriage-house where the property was, unlocked the door, 
attached the barouche, declaring that he attached all carriages 
ancl harnesses in the house, and that while he was attempting to 
remove the carnage defendant forcibly took it from him anil 
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afterward sold it. Defendant claimed that he hid near the car-
riage-house, and that when plaintiff unlocked the door defend-
ant first entered and seized the barouche, and afterward returned
and took the harness. The court instructed the jury that if the
plaintiff was at the door with writ and key, and unlocked the
door and proclaimed his levy before defendant attached, they
should find for plaintiff, and defendant moves for a new trial.
HOSMER, C. _]'. The inquiries in the case, are, what consti-
tutes a legal attachment; and whether on this subject, the charge
was correct.
I. The word attach, derived remotely from the Latin term
attingo, and more immediately from the French attacher, signi-
fies to take or touch, and was adopted as a precise expression of
the thing; nam qni nonzina intelligit, res etiam intelligit.
The only object of attachment is to take out of the defend-
ant’s possession, and to transfer into the custody of the law,
acting through its legal officer, the goods attached, that they may,
if necessary, be seized in execution, and be disposed of and de-
livered to the purchaser. From both these considerations it is
apparent, that to attach is to take the actual possession of prop-
erty. Hence, the legal doctrine is firmly established, that to con-
stitute an attachment of goods, the officer must have the actual
possession and custody. It was laid down in these express words,
by Parsons, C. I., in Lane v. Jackson, 5 Mass. 157, 163, and by
Parker, C. J'., in Train v. Wellington, I2 Mass. 495, 497. Nor
is there, so far as my investigations have enabled me to discover,
a single determination opposed to the preceding principle.
The case of Turner v. Austin, 16 Mass. I8I, decided, that
no overt act, by the sheriff, was necessary to constitute an at-
tachment of property, previously in his custody on another at-
tachment. But this is entirely consistent with the principle [*335]
advanced. The sheriff already had the actual custody; and mere
form of ceremony, for form’s sake, and not for the preservation
of substance, can never be required.
It was likewise adjudged in Denny v. Warren, 16 Mass.
420, that an officer, who entered a store to attach goods, where
there was no competition, received the key from the clerk and
locked up the store, having declared his intention to attach. had
made a sufficient attachment. And in Gordon. v. Jenny, 16 Mass.
465. the determination was to the same effect.
So in Naylor v. Dennie, 8 Pick. I98, it was decided, that
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afterward sold it. Defendant claimed that he hid near the car­
riage-house, and that when plaintiff unlocked the door defend­
ant first entered and seized the barouche, and afterward returned 
and took the harness. The court instructed the jury that if the 
plaintiff was at the door with writ and key, and unlocked the 
door and proclaimed his levy before defendant attached, they 
should find for plaintiff, and defendant moves for a new trial. 
HOSMER, C. J. The inquiries in the case, are, what consti­
tutes a legal attachment ; and whether on this subject, the charge 
was correct. 
I .  The word attach, derived remotely from the Latin term 
attfogo, and more immediately from the French attacher, signi­
fies to take or touch, and was adopted as a precise expression of 
the thing ; nam qii.i nomina iJttelligit, res etiam intel/igit. 
The only object of attachment is to take out of the defend­
ant's possession, and to transfer into the custody of the law, 
acting through its legal officer, the goods attached, that they may, 
if necessary, be seized in execution, and be disposed of and de­
livered to the purchaser. From both these considerations it is 
apparent, that to attach is to take the actual possession of prop­
erty. Hence, the legal doctrine is  firmly established, that to con­
stitute an attachment of goods, the officer must have the CIC'fiuil 
possession and custody. It was laid down in  these express words, 
by Parsons, C. !., in Lane v. J.acksou, 5 :\lass. 1 57, 1 63, and by 
Parker, C. !., in Trafo v. W cllington, 12 Mass. 495, 497. Nor 
is  there., so far as my investigations have enabled me to discover, 
a single determination opposed to the preceding principle. 
The case of Turner v. At4Stin, 16 Mass. 181 ,  decided, that 
no overt act, by the sheriff, was necessary to constitute an at­
tachment of property, previously in his custody on another at­
tachment. But this is enti rely consistent with the principle [ *335] 
advanced. The sheriff already had the actual custody ; and mere 
form of ceremony, for form!s sake, and not for the preservation 
of substance, can never be required. 
It was likewise adjudged in Denny v. Warren, 16 Mass. 
420, that an officer, who entered a store to attach goods, where 
there was no competition, received the key from the c1erk and 
locked up the store, having declared his intention to attach, had 
made a sufficient attachment. And in Gordon v. Jenny, 16 Mass. 
465, the determination was to the same effect. 
So in Na-ylO'Y v. Dennie, 8 Pick . 1<)8, it was decided, that 
inarressihle goods, covered up in the hold of a ship, were at-
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tached, by the officers’ going on board, and leaving a keeper to
take care of them; and in Merrill v. Sawyer, 27 Mass. (8 Pick.)
397, that hay in a barn was duly attached, by putting a notifica-
tion of the attachment on the barn door.
Now, in all these cases, the court went on the principle
that the actual possession and custody was necessary to consti-
tute an attachment; although there being no race for priority of
attachment, they held that to be the actual custody and posses-
sion which, perhaps, was constructive possession only.
The analogous cases all demonstrate the necessity of actually
taking the property. This is the established law concerning the
levy of executions; that is, the property levied on is actually taken
into the custody of law. So when an attachment or execution
is levied on the body, it is effected, by a corporal seizing or
touching of the body, and thus putting it in the custody of the
law (3 Bla. Comm. 288) ; or by what is tantamount, a power of
taking possession and the party’s submission thereto. Gemzer
v. Sparkes, I Salk. 79. Horner v. Battyn, Buller on Nisi Prius,
62. But if the person do not submit (and this dead property
cannot do) the body must actually be seized.
2. The question nowarises, in view of the preceding facts
and principles, whether the charge to the jury was correct.
That the plaintiff was at the door of the carriage-house,
with a writ of attachment in his hand, only proves his intention
to attach. To this no accession is made, by the lawful possession
of the key and the unlocking of the door. Suppose, what does
not appear, that the key was delivered to him by the owner of
the barouche that he might attach the property; this would be of
no amount. He might have the constructive possession, which,
on a sale as between vendor and vendee, would be sufficient;
[*336] but an attachment can only be made by the taking of ac-
tual possession. As little importance is attached to the unlocking
of the door, and the declaration that the plaintiff attached the
carriage. This was not the touching of the property, or the tak-
ing of the actual possession. The removal of an obstacle from
the way of attaching, as the opening of the door, is not an at-
tachment, nor was the verbal declaration. ./_\_Q_ attachment is an
act done; and not a mere oral annunciation. From these various\
acts, taken separately or conjointly, the plaintiff did not obtain
the possession and custody of the barouche, and therefore, he
did not attach the property.
On the contrary, if the facts contended for, by the defend-
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tached, by the officers' going on board, and leaving a keeper to 
take care of them ; and in Merrill v. Sm.vyer, 27 Mass. (8 Pick . ) 
397, that hay in a barn was duly attached, by putting a notifica­
tion of the attachment on the barn door. 
Now, in all these cases, the court went on the principle 
that the actual possession and custody was necessary to consti­
tute an attachment ; although there being no race for priority of 
attachment, they held that to be the actual custody and pos.5es­
sion which, perhaps , was constructive possession only. 
The analogous cases all demonstrate the necessity of actually 
taking the property. This is the establ ished law concerning the 
levy of executions ; that is, the property levied on is actually taken 
into the custody of law. So when an attachment or execution 
is levied on the body, it i s  effected, by a corporal seizing or 
touching of the body, and thus putting it in the custody of the 
law ( 3  Bla. Comm. 288) ; or by what is tantamount, a power of 
taking possession and the party's submission thereto . Gen11er 
v. Sparkes, I Salk. 79. Horner v. Battyn, Buller on Nisi Prius, 
62. But if the person do not submit  ( and this dead property 
cannot do) the body must actually be seized. 
2. The question now . arises, in view of the preceding facts 
and principles, whether the charge to the j ury was correct. 
That the plaintiff was at the door of the carriage-house, 
with a writ of attachment in his hand , only proves his intention 
to attach. To this no accession is made, by the lawful possession 
of the key and the unlocking of the door. Suppose, what does 
not appear, that the key was delivered to him by the owner of 
the barouche that he might attach the property ; this would be of  
no amount. H e  might have the constructive possession, which, 
on a sale as between vendor and vendee, would be sufficient ; 
( *336] but an attachment can only be made by the taking of ac­
tual possession. As little importance is attached to the unlocking 
of the door, and the declaration that the plaintiff attached the 
carriage. This was not the touching of the property, or the tak­
ing of the actual possession. The removal of an obstacle from 
the way of attaching, as the opening of the door, is not an at­
tachment, nor was the verbal declaration. An attachment is an 
act done ; and not a mere oral annunciation . From these various \ 
acts, taken separately or conjointly , the plaintiff did not obtain 
the possession and custody of  the barouche, and therefore, he 
did not attach the property. 
On the contrary, if the facts contended for, by the defend­
ant, were proved , r.is defense was complete . Between two of-
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ficers having separate attachments, there was a race for priority.
They both had arrived at the carriage-house; and so soon as the
door was opened, the defendant outstripped his competitor, and
seized on the barouche. By this act, he had the actual posses-
sion, and was successful in his intended prior attachment. I
would therefore advise a new trial of the cause.
DAGGETT and WILLIAMS, 1]., were of the same opinion.
PETERS, J., was also inclined to concur, though he was not quite
satisfied that the charge was wrong. BISSELL, _I., was absent.
New trial to be granted.
FIELD v. MACULLAR, in Ill. Appellate Ct., Ist Dist., Oct. Term, I886—
20 Ill. App. 392.
Before McAllister, P. J., Moran, Bailey, and Healy, 1].
Bill in chancery by Addison Macullar et al., partners, against
Peter \'V. Field at al., partners, and Eric E. Anderson, to recover
money received by Field et al. arising from‘ execution sale of
property of said Anderson. From decree for complainants de-
fendants bring error. -
Field at al. recovered judgment against Anderson and the
same day had execution issued and the sheriff immediatelylevied
it on Ande-rson’s stock of goods and store fixtures. Macullar
at al. recovered judgment the next day (Oct. 4, ’79), and imme-
diately had execution thereon placed in the hands of said sheriff,
who promised to levy it but made no indorsement on the writ.
Anderson then moved (Oct. 11th) to vacate the Field judgment,
but the sheriff proceeded to sale of the property (Oct. I 3th), and
against protests by attorney for Macullar et al. that the Field
judgment was fraudulent, and as to them invalid, paid the pro-
ceeds to Field at al. in part satisfaction of their judgment and re-
turned the Maeullar execution wholly unsatisfied. After said
sale and payment the Field judgment was reversed by this court
and the case remanded for a new trial. After this Macullar
at al. demanded said money from Field at al., and payment being
refused filed this bill.
BAILEY, J. * * * The principal question in the case is,
whether the complainants obtained, by means of their execution,
a first and paramount lien on the goods of Anderson levied upon
















































































































































CA SES ON EXECUT I O N S, ETC. 
ficers having separate attachments, there was a race for priority. 
They both had arrived at the carriage-house ; and so soon as the 
door was opened, the defendant outstripped his competitor, anci 
seized on the barouche. By this act, he had the actual posses­
sion, and was successful in his intended prior attachment. I 
would therefore advise a new trial of the cause. 
DAGGETT and WI LLIAM S, JJ., were of the same opinion . 
PETERS, J . ,  was also inclined to concur, though he was not quite 
satisfied that the charge was wrong. B I SSELL, J., was absent .  
New trial to  be granted. 
FIELD v. MACULLAR, in Ill. Appellate Ct., 1 st Dist., Oct. Term, 1886-
20 Ill. App. 392. 
Before McAllister, P. J., Moran, Bailey, and Healy, JJ. 
Bill in chancery by Addison Macullar et al. , partners, against 
Peter \V. Field et al., partners, and Eric E. Anderson, to recover 
money received by Field et al. arising from' execution sale of 
property of said Anderson. From decree for complainants de­
fendants bring error. 
Field et al. recovered judgment against Anderson and the 
same day had execution issued and the sheriff immediately levied 
it on Anderson's stock of goods and store fixtures. Macullar 
ct al. recovered judgment the next day ( Oct. 4, '79) , and imme­
diately had execution thereon placed in the hands of said sheriff, 
who promised to levy it but made no indorsement on the writ. 
Anderson then moved ( Oct. uth)  to vacate the Field judgment, 
but the sheriff proceeded to sale of the property ( Oct. 1 3th ) , and 
against protests by attorney for Macullar et al. that the Field 
j udgment was fraudulent, and as to them inval id, paid the pro­
ceeds to Field ct al. in part satisfaction of their j udgment and re­
turned the 1\facullar execution wholly unsatisfied. After said 
sale and payment the Field j udgment was reversed by this court 
and the case remanded for a new trial. After this l\Iacullar 
et  al. demandt>d said money from Field et al., and payment being 
refused filed this bil l .  
B A I J.EY, J. * * * The principal question in the case is ,  
whether the complainants obtained, by means of their execution ,  
a first a n d  paramount lien on the goods of Anderson levied upon 
by the sheriff, and upon the proceeds of said goods after the 
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sale. That said execution became a lien on said property from
the time of its delivery to the sheriff, is indisputable. * * *
It is not material that there was no formal levy of the com-
plainant's execution. The sheriff had in his hands a former exe-
cution against Anderson, apparently valid, in favor of the de-
fendants, and by virtue of that execution he had levied upon said
property and taken the same into his possession. In Leach v.
Pine, 41 Ill. 65, it was held that where a sheriff has in his hands
an execution, and levies upon personal property and reduces it
to possession, it is then in the custody of the law, and it is not
essential to the lien of other executions in his hands or subse-
quently received, that they should be formally levied; that the
execution first coming to hand authorizes the seizure of the prop-
ertv, which creates the levy, and wnile it remains in his posses-
sion he is unable to seize it again.
Upon the execution sale the liens of the two executions im-
mediately attached to the fund created by the sale, with the same
rights to priority which existed before the property was sold.
See Hart v. Winjgart, 83 Ill. 282, and authorities cited. It can
not be doubted that the effect of the reversal of the defendant’s
judgment was to extinguish their lien. If the property had re-
mained up to that time in the hands of the sheriff, it could not
afterward have been sold under their execution. The property
having been sold and the proceeds having been paid over to them,
they were no longer entitled, [*396] as against Anderson, to re-
tain the money, but as between them, it was defendants’ duty to
repay it to him, and he could have recovered it in an action for
money had and received. Clark V. Pinney, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 298;
Maghee v. Kellogg, 24 \Vend. (N. Y.) 32; Green v. Stone, I
Harris & John. (Md.) 405; Freeman on Executions, § 346, and
authorities cited.
The defendants’ lien, then, having been extinguished by the
reversal of their judgment, and the complainants’ lien having re-
mained in full force, the complainants’ right to the fund produced
by the sale became paramount, entitling them to have the whole
of said fund paid to them in satisfaction of their judgment. Said
fund belonged to them, and the defendants having obtained pos-
session of it with notice of the complainants’ rights, are properly
charged as trustees, holding said fund for the benefit of the com-
plainants. \Ne are of the opinion that there was no error in the
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sale. That said execution became a lien on said property from 
the time of its delivery to the sheriff, is indisputable. * * * 
It i s  not material that there was no formal levy of the com­
plainant's execution. The sheriff had in his hands a former exe­
cution against Anderson, apparently valid, in favor of the de­
fendants, and by virtue of that execution he had levied upon said 
property and taken the same into his possession. In Leach v. 
Pi11e, 41 Ill . 65 , it \Vas held that where a sheriff has in his hands 
an execution, and levies upon personal property and reduces it 
to possession, i t  is then in the custody of the law, and it i s  not 
essential to the l ien of other executions in his hands or subse­
quently received, that they should be formally levied ; that the 
execution first coming to hand authorizes the seizure of the prop­
erty, whi ch creates the levy, and wnile it remains in his posses­
sion he is unable to seize i t  again. 
C' pon the execution sale the liens of the two executions im­
mediately attached to the fund created by the sale, with the same 
rights to priority which existed before the property was sold. 
See Hart v. Wingart, 83 Ill. 282, and authorities cited. It can 
not he doubted that the effect of the reversal of the defendant's 
j udgment was to extingu ish thei r lien. If the property had re­
mained up to that time in the hands of the sheriff, it c011 1 cl not 
afterward have been sold under their execution. The property 
having been sold and the proceeds having been paid over to them, 
they were no longer entitled, [ *396] as against Anderson, to re­
tain the money, but as between them, it was defendants' duty to 
repay it to him, and he could have recovered it in an action for 
money had and received. Clark v. Pinney, 6 Cow. ( N . Y. ) 298 ; 
11-faghee v. Kellogg, 24 \Vend. ( N. Y. ) 32 ; Green v. Sto n e, I 
Harris & John. ( Md . )  405 ; Freeman on Executions, § 346, and 
authorities cited. 
The defendants' l ien , then, having been extinguished by the 
reversal of their j udgment, and the complainants' lien having re­
mained in full force, the complainants' right to the fund produced 
by the sale became paramount, entitling them to have the whole 
of said fund paid to them in satisfaction of their judgment. Said 
fund belonged to them, and the defendants having obtained pos­
session of it with notice of the complainants' rights, are properly 
charged as trustees, holding sa id fund for the benefit of the com­
plainants. V\T e are of the opinion that there was no error in the 
decree, and i t  will therehre be affirmed. 
Decree affirmed. 
448 cases on EXECUTIONS, arc.
The only proper practice is to indorsc the levy on the writ or on
some paper annexed thereto, and in an action against a sheriff for mis-
appropriating money made on plaintiffs fi. fa. the supreme court of Penn-
sylvania held that the sherifi should not be permitted in defense to show
that he had levied upon and sold the property on a previous writ which
had no levy indorsed on it, nor to put in evidence a written levy never
attached to such writ and not returned with it but retained in the posses-
sion of the sheriff till the trial of the action against him. M’Clellnnd v.
Slinglufi‘, 7 W. & S. 134, 42 Am. Dec. 224.
Assumpsit by the first attaching creditor against the second, to whom
the proceeds were paid by the sheriff on a sale pending an appeal by the
first creditor from an order dismissing his attachment, was sustained in
Virginia. Ca/rerlon V. McC0rlele, 5 Grattan 177. A similar action was
recently sustained in New York, Gillig v. Grant, 23 App. Div. 596, 49
N. Y. Supp. 78; Haebler v. Myers, I32 N. Y. 363.
Nature of Attachment and Judgment Liens.
ANON., in Common Pleas, Hilary Term, 2 Henry IV., A. D. I4OI—Year-
books, 2 Henry IV., page I4, No. 5.
In tres ss by John against VV., that he cut off ]ohn’s finger.
on not guilty leaded, the inquest found that VV. had cut off
one of John’s gers. In the mesne time, before the inquest
passed, \-V. had d1 ested himself of his land. It was adjudged
by ROUBURY that Jo n should recover his damages of 401., and
that the damages should be levied out of the lands alienated by
him (\V.) in the mesne time, in whosever hands they had come.
JOHN‘S CASE, in King's Bench, Mich. Term, 31 Edw. I., A. D. I303—
Y. B. 30 & 31, Edw. 1., p. 322.
A question was moved before the justices of the common
bench, as to the effect of a judgment on a deed -of guaranty,
which the plaintiff had then and there recovered. And it was
moved that such guaranty was only a covenant, and that by
such covenant a man does not bind any lands he afterward deliv-
ers for value in whose hands soever they come by purchase or
otherwise without judgment in any action, for that would be too
great a mischief. Brenclzesle_v——ln an action of debt a man shall
not have execution of any lands but of that which the defendant
had on the day of the judgment rendered, and not of those lands

















































































































































CASES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC. 
The only proper practice is to indorse the levy on the writ or on 
some paper annexed thereto, and in an action against a sheriff for mis­
appropriating money made on plaintiff's fi. fa. the supreme court of Penn­
sylvania held that the sheriff should not be permitted in defense to show 
that he had levied upon and sold the property on a previous writ which 
had no levy indorsed on it, nor to put in evidence a written levy never 
attached to such writ and not returned with it but retained in the posses­
sion of the sheriff till the trial of the action against him. M'Clelland v. 
Slingluff, 7 W. & S. 134. 42 Am. Dec. 224-
Assumpsit by the first attaching creditor against the second, to whom 
the proceeds were paid by the sheriff on a sale pending an appeal by the 
first creditor from an order dismissing his attachment, was sustained in 
Virginia. Caperton v. McCorkle, 5 Grattan 177. A similar action was 
recently sustained in New York, Gillig v. Grant, 23 App. Div. 596, 49 
N. Y. Supp. 78 ; Hacbler v. Myers, 132 N. Y. 363. 
Nature of Attachment and Judgment Liens. 
ANO� .•  in Common Pleas, Hilary Term, 2 Henry IV., A. D. 1401-Year­
books, 2 Henry IV., page 14, No. 5. 
In tres ss by John against W., that he cut off John's finger, 
on not guilty leaded, the inquest found that W. had cut off 
one o f  John's ers. In the mesne time, before the inquest 
passed, W. had di ested himself of his land. It was adjudged 
by RovnuRY that J n should recover his damages of 40/. , and 
that the damag-es should be levied out of the lands alienated by 
him ( \V. ) in the rnesne time, in whosever hands they had come. 
JOHN'S CASE, in King's Bench, Mich. Term, 31 Edw. I., A. D. 1303-
Y. B. 30 & 31 ,  Edw. I., p. 322. 
A question was moved before the justices of the common 
bench, as to the effect of a j udgment on a deed ·of guaranty, 
which the plaintiff had then and there recovered. And it was 
moved that such guaranty was only a covenant, and that by 
such covenant a man does not bind any lands he afterward deliv­
ers for value in whose hands soever they come by purchase or 
otherwise without j udgment in any action, for that would be too 
great a mischief. Breuchesle'y-In an action of debt a man shall 
not have execution of any lands but of that which the defendant 
had on the day of the judgment rendered, and not of those lands 
which he �old while the suit was pending. And of chattels a 
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man shall have execution only of those which the defendant had
the day of execution sued. Which was conceded by the court.
ANONYMOUS, in Common Bench of England, Hilary Term, 31 Eliz.,
A. D. I589—Cro. Eliz. I74.
Before Anderson, C. 1., Periam, Wyndham, and Walmsley, J].
Cooper desired the opinion of the court, that if a fieri faeias
be directed to make execution of goods, and after the taste of the
writ, and before the sheriff executes it, the party sells the goods
bona fide, if they can now be taken in execution. THE COURT
held they might, for by the award of execution, the goods were
bound, so that they may be taken in execution, into whose hands
soever they come. And VVALMSLEY [J.] said so it was ruled in
a case at Hertford term, wherein he was of counsel.
SIR GERARD FLEETWOOD’S CASE, in Court of V\/'ards of England.
Easter Term, 8 James I., A. D. 16II—S Coke 171.
Sir William. Fleetwood, anno 35 Eliz., was possessed of a
house and certain lands in Pynner, in the parish of Harrow, in'
the county of Middlesex, for certain years yet enduring; and An.
36 El. he became receiver general of the revenue of the court of
wards, &c., and entered into 20 bonds, each of them 2001., with‘
condition to make a yearly perfect account before the 20th of
June, &c.; and afterwards upon several accounts, in the years 36,
37, 38 and 39 Eliz. he became indebted to the queen in great
sums of money; and he being so indebted, by his indenture, 10 Feb.
40 Eliz., in consideration of Ilool. bargained and sold the said
lease to James Pemberton, by force whereof he entered, and was
thereof possessed; which, by mean conveyance, and in considera-
tion of 13001., was sold to Sir Gerard Fleetwood. The question
was, whether the said messuage and lands are now extendable,
or liable to the king’s debt? And although it is at the election of
the sheriff, either to extend or to sell a lease, so long as it re-
mains in the debtor's hands, as appears in the books of 31 Ass.,
p. 6; 38 Ass., p. 4; 44 Edw. 3, 16; 7 H., 6, 2, &c., yet it was
resolved, that the said sale of the term should bind the king, be-
cause the term was but a chattel, and there was no covin in the
case, and a sale bona fide of chattels is good after judgment, but
not after execution awarded, as appears in 2 H., 4, I4, per C uri-
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man shall have execution only of those which the defendant had 
the day of execution sued. Which was conceded by the court. 
ANONYl\lOUS, in Common Bench of Eng
.
land, Hilary Term, JI Eliz., 
A. D. 1589--Cro. Eliz. 1 74 
Before Anderson, C. J., Periam, Wyndham, and Walmsley, JJ, 
Cooper desired the opinion of the court, that if a fieri facias 
be directed to make execution of goods, and after the teste of the 
writ ,  and before the sheriff ·executes it, the party sells the goods 
bona fide, if they can now be taken in execution. T H E CouRT 
held they might, for by the award of execution, the goods were 
bound, so that they may be taken in execution, into whose hands 
soever they come. And WALM SLEY [J. ] said so it was ruled in 
a case at Hertford term, wherein he was of counsel. 
SIR GERARD FLEETWOOD'S CASE, in Court of Wards of England. 
Easter Term, 8 J ames I., A. D. 161 1-8 Coke 17 1 .  
. 
Sir William Fleetwood, amz.o 35 Eliz. ,  was possessed of a 
house and certain lands in Pynner, in the parish of Harrow� in' 
the county of Middlesex, for certain years yet enduring ; and A n. 
36 El. he became receiver general of the revenue of the court of 
wards, &c., and entered into 20 bonds, each of them 2ool., with · 
condition to make a yearly perfect account before the 20th of 
June, &c. ; and afterwards upon several accounts, in the years 36, 
37, 38 an<l 39 Eliz. he became indebted to the queen in great 
sums of money ; and he being so indebted, by his inden�ure, IO Feb. 
40 Eliz., in consideration of I 100/. bargained and sold the said 
lease to James Pemberton, by force whereof he entered, and was 
thereof possessed ; which, by mean conveyance, and in considera­
tion of 1 300/. , was sold to Sir Gerard Fleetwood. The question 
was, whether the said messuage and lands are now extendable, 
or liable to the king's debt ? And although it is at the election of  
the sheriff, either to extend or  to  sell a lease, so  long as  it re­
mains in the debtor's hands, as appears in the books of 3 1 Ass. ,  
p. 6 ;  38 Ass., p. 4 ; 44 Edw. 3,  1 6 ; 7 H., 6, 2, &c. , yet it  was 
re�olve<l, that the said sale of the term should bind the k ing, be­
cause the term was but a chattel, and there was no covin in the 
case, and a sale bona fide of chattels is good after judgment, but 
not after execution awarded , as appears in 2 H . , 4, 14, per Cu.ri­
am, [ante ] 9 H.,  6, 58 ; I I  H . ,  4, 7, and of the freehold or inher-
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itance which he has at the time of the judgment in case of a
common person, and from the time one becomes the king's debt-
or, 5 Eliz. Dyer 224, 225, Sir Will. C0’:/endish’s Case. And the
case in 50 Ass., p. 4, was.urged to the contrary, where the king's
debtor took a lease to him and his wife for years, and before
execution the husband died, execution was sued against the wife,
for it was the act of the husband, and he had power of the term
at the time of his death and the wife came to it without valuable
consideration, and quodammodo continued the interest of her
husband. And COKE, C. J., said, that a receiver, or other account-
ant who is indebted, shall not be in a worse case than a felon or
traitor, who may, after the felony or treason, and before convic-
tion, sell bona fide for his sustenance, &c., his chattels, be they
real of personal.
Sr.vrwrs 29 CHARLES II., CHAPTER 3, §§ :3, 14, 15 AND r6.—A. D.,
I677. (Original § 13, cited as §§ I3 and 14.) And wereas it hath beene
found mischievous that Judgements in the Kings Courts at Westminster
doe many times relate to the first day of the Terme whereof they are en-
tred or to the day of the Returne of the Originall or fileing the Baile
and binde the Defendants Lands from that time although in trueth they
were acknowledged or sutiered and signed in the Vacation time after the
said Terme whereby many times Purchasers finde themselves agrieved
[§ 14.] Bee it enacted by the authoritie aforesaid That from and after
the said foure and twentyeth day of June any Judge or Officer of any
of his Majestyes Courts of Westminster that shall signe any Judgements
shall at the signeing of the same without Fee for doeing the same sett
downe the day of the moneth and yeare of his soe doeing upon the Paper
Booke Dockett or Record which he shall signe which day of the moneth
and yeare shall be alsoe entred upon the Margeut of the Roll of the
Record where the said Judgement shall he entred.
(Original § 14 cited as § 15.) And bee it enacted That such Judge-
ments as against Purchasers bona fidc\ for valueable consideration of
Land Tenements or Hereditaments to be charged thereby shall in con-
sideration of Law be Judgements onely from such time as they shall be
soe signed and shall not relate to the first day of the Terme whereof
they are entred or the day of the Returne of the Originall or fileing the
Baile Any Law, Usage or Course of any Court to the contrary notwith-
standing.
(Original § 15 cited as § 16.) And bee it further enacted by the
authoritie aforesaid That from and after the said foure and twentyeth
day of June noe VVritt of Fieri farias or other \Vritt of Execution shall
binde the Property of the Goods against whome. such Vt/ritt of Execu-
tion is sued forth but from the time that such \Vritt shall be delivered
to the Sherifie Under Sherit-‘fe or Conorers to be executed, And for the
better manifestation of the said time the S‘heriFfe Under Sheritfe and
Coroners their Deputyes and Agents shall upon the receipt of any such
\Vritt (without Fee for doeing the same) endorse upon the backe there-
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itance which he has at the time of the judgment in case of a 
common person, and from the time one becomes the king's debt­
or, S Eliz. Dyer 224, 225 , Sir Will. Cooen dish' s Case. And the 
case in 50 Ass., p. 4, was .urged to the contrary, where the king's 
debtor took a lease to him and his wife for years, and before 
execution the husband died, execution was sued against the wife, 
for it was the act of the husband, and he had power of the term 
at the time of his death and the wife came to it without valuable 
consideration, and q uodammodo continued the interest of her 
husband. And COKE, C. J. ,  said, that a receiver, or other account­
ant who is indebted, shall not be in a worse case than a felon or 
traitor, who may, after the felony or treason, and before convic­
tion , sell bona fide for his sustenance, &c., his chattels, be they 
real of personal. 
STATli'!'E 29 CHARLES II., CHAPTER 3, §§ 13, 14, 15  AND 16.-A. D., 
1677. ( Original § 13, cited as §§ 13 and 14. ) And wereas it hath beene 
found mischievous that Judgements in the Kings Courts at Westminster 
doe many times relate to the first day of the Terme whereof they are en­
tred or to the day of the Returne of the Originall or fil eing the Baile 
and binde the Defendants Lands from that time although in trueth they 
were acknowledged or suffered and signed in the Vacation time after the 
said Terme whereby many times Purchasers finde themselves agrieved 
[§ q. ] Bee it enacted by the authoritie aforesaid That from and after 
the said foure and twentycth day of June any Judge or Officer of any 
of his l\fajestycs Courts of Westminster that shall signe any Judgements 
shall at the signeing of the same without Fee for doeing the same sett 
downe the day of the moneth and yeare of his soe doeing upon the Paper 
Booke Dockett or Record which he shall signe which day uf the moneth 
and yeare shall be alsoe entred upon the Margcnt of the Roll of the 
Record where the said Judgement shall he entred. 
( O riginal § 14 cited as § 15 . )  And bee it  enacted That such Judge­
ments as agai nst Pu rchasers bona fide, for valueable consideration of 
Land Tenem en ts or Hereditamcnts to be charged thereby shall in con­
s id eration of  Law be J udgements onely from such time as they shall be 
soe signed and shall not relate to the first day of the Terme whereof 
they arc entred or the day of the Returne of the Original l or fileing the 
Baile Any Law, Usage or Course of any Court to the contrary notw ith ­
stan ding . 
( O riginal * r 5 cited as § 16. ) And bee it fu rther enacted by the 
authoritie a foresaid That from and after the said foure and twentyeth 
day of June noe Writt of Fieri fac ias or other \Vritt of Execution shall 
binde the Property of the Good s against whome such \Vritt of Execu­
tion is  sued forth but from the t ime that such \Vritt shall be delivered 
to the Sheri ffe Under Sheriffe or Conorers to  he e xecuted, And for the 
bet ter man ifestat ion of the said time the SJ1eri ffe Vnder Sheriffe and 
Coroners their Deputycs and Ag-en ts shall  upon the receipt of  any such 
\Vritt (without Fee fo r doeing the same )  endorse upon the backe there­
nf the day of the moneth [or 1 ]  years whereon h e  or they received the 
same. 
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EXPLANATION.—Tl1€ above are §§ 13, 14 and 15, of the statute as
they appear in the “Statutes of the Realm” Vol. 5, p. 841, published in
London in 1819, “printed by command of His Majesty King George the
Third,” etc. Shortly after the statute was enacted some careless scribe
divided § 13 numbering the last part of it § 14 and all the succeeding sec-
tions one number greater than each bears in the original statute. This
blunder has been copied by all the succeeding unauthorized editions of the
statute, and §§ 14 and 15 are always cited as §§ 15 and 16 and the same
is true of all that follow. See Throop on Verbal Agreements, p. 30. In
the Statutes of the Realm the section numbers are in the margin in
Roman numerals. I have inserted in § 13, at the place where the division
was made, [§ 14] that the student may note the part which is cited as
§ 14. The [or ‘] in the last section is as it appears in the Statutes of the
Realm, which is explained at the foot of the page by the note: "’and” O.
omitted.
SMALLCOMB v. CROSS AND BUCKINGHAM, in Common Pleas of
England, Mich. Term, 9 \Vm. III., A. D. 1697-1 Lord Raymond
251, 1 ComynS 35, I Salk. 320.
This decision, rendered by Holt, C. J., Rokeby, Turton and Eyer,
1]., is given according to the report by Lord Raymond. The reporters do
not disagree as to the material facts, but the other reports give them more
in detail.
In trover for goods,, upon the general issue pleaded, at the
trial at nisi prius in London at Guildhall, before H alt, chief jus-
tice, the fact appeared to be thus: J. S. recovered judgment in
debt against Fox, and J. N. recovered another judgment against
Fox. J. S. sued a fieri facias upon his judgment, which was de-
livered to the sheriffs of London at nine o’clock in the morning,
but he would not take a warrant of the sheriff to levy the goods,
but procured the writ to be indorsed according to the statute of
29 Car. 2. cap. 3. J. N. sued another fieri facias, which bore tesle
before the fieri facias of J. S. but was delivered to the sheriffs
subsequent to the fieri facias of J. S., viz. at ten o’clock in the
morning, but both the writs were delivered the same day. J. N-
took a warrant from the sheriffs, and levied the goods in execu-
tion, which the sheriffs sold to the plaintiff Smallcomb. After-
wards the sheriff seized the goods in [*z5z] execution upon the
fieri facias of J. S. and sold them to the defendant Cross. And
now Smallcomb brought trover against Cross and the sheriffs of
London: and this matter appearing upon the evidence. Hour,
CHIEF JUSTICE, doubting of it, appointed that it should be
moved in court. And after argument on both sides it was re-
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ExPI.ANATION.-The above are §§ 13, 14 and 15, of the statute as 
they appear in the "Statutes of the Realm" Vol. 5, p. 841, published in 
London in 1819, "printed by command of His Maj esty King George the 
Third," etc. Shortly after the statute was enacted some careless scribe 
divided § 13 n umbering the last part of it § 14 and all the succeeding sec­
tions one number greater than each bears in the original statute. This 
blunder has been copied by alt the succeeding unauthorized editions of the 
statute, and §§ 14 and 15 are always cited as §§ 15  and 16 and the same 
is true of alt that follow. See Throop on Verbal Agreements, p. 30. In 
the Statutes of the Realm the section numbers are in the margin in 
Roman numerals. I have inserted in § 13, at the place where the division 
was made, [§ 14] that the student may note the part which is cited as 
§ 14. The [or 1] in the last section is as it appears in the Statutes of the 
Realm, which is explained at the foot of the page by the note : "and" O. 
omitted. 
SMALLCOMB v. CROSS AND BUCKINGHAM, in Common Pleas of 
England, Mich. Term, 9 Wm. III., A. D. 1697-1 Lord Raymond 
25 1 ,  1 Comyns 35, 1 Salk. 320. 
This decision, rendered by Holt, C. ]., Rokeby, Turton and Eyer, 
]]., is given according to the report by Lord Raymond. The reporters do 
not d isagree as to the material facts, but the other reports give them more 
in detail. 
In trover for goods,, upon the general issue pleaded, at the 
trial at nisi prius in London at Guildhall, before Holt, chief j us­
tice, the fact appeared to be thus : J. S. recovered j udgment in 
debt against Fox, and J. N. recovered another j udgment against 
Fox. J. S. sued a fieri facias upon his j udgment, which was de­
l ivered to the sheriffs of London at nine o'clock in the morning, 
but he would not take a warrant of the sheriff to levy the goods, 
but procured the writ  to be indorsed according to the statute of 
29 Car. 2. cap. 3. J. N. sued another fieri facias, which bore teste 
before the fieri facias of J. S.  but was delivered to the sheriffs 
subsequent to the fieri facias of J.  S., viz. at ten o'clock in the 
morning, but both the writs were delivered the same day. J. N' .  
took a warrant from the sheriffs, and levied the goods in execu­
tion, which the sheriffs sold to the plaintiff Smallcomb. After­
wards the sheriff seized the goods in [ *252] execution upon the 
fieri facias of J. S. and sold them to the defendant Cross. And 
now Smalkomb brought trover against Cross and the sheriffs of 
London ; and this matter appearing upon the evidence. Hor.T , 
CnrnF JusTICE, doubting of it ,  appointed that i t  should be 
moved in court. And after argument on both sides it was re­
solved by the judges that if two writs of execution are delivered 
452 CASES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC.
to the sheriff the same day, he has not an election to execute
which he pleases, but he must execute that which was first de-
livered. But if the sheriff levies goods in execution by virtue
of the writ last delivered, and makes sale of them (whether the
last writ was delivered upon the same day or a subsequent day)
the property of the goods is bound by the sale, and the party can-
not seize them by virtue of his execution first delivered; but he
may have his remedy against the sheriff. For sales made by the
sheriff ought not to be defeated, for if they are, no man will buy
goods levied upon a writ of execution. And at common law if
a fieri faeias had been sued the first day of the term, and another
fieri facias afterwards, and the last had been first executed, the
other had had no remedy but against the sheriff. But in this case
no action lies against the sheriff, because he who delivered his
writ first would not take a warrant from the sheriffs to levy the
goods; so that it seems he had a design only to keep the execu-
tion in his pocket, to protect the defendant's goods by fraud. And
judgment for the plaintifiC by the whole court. * * *
This is a leading case and figures prominently in all discussions of
this and kindred questions. It is universally recognized as good law.
See Payne v. Drewe, ante, 328.
In trespass de bonis aslwrtatis by a purchaser at a constable’s sale
against a sheriff, who took the property from him on a fi. fa. against the
original judgment debtor in his hands before but not levied till after the
levy and sale by the constable, judgment was rendered for plaintiff and
affirmed on appeal. Duncan v. M'Comber, 10 Watts, (Pa.) 212. Marsh
v. Lawrence, 4 Cowen (N.Y.) 461, is a similar case.
A sheriff having levied three writs of ii. fa. on a horse, brought trover
for it against one claiming as purchaser at a sale by a constable on a
warrant issued by a justice of the peace and received and levied by the
constable after the sheriff received but before be levied his writs. Judg-
ment for defendant was afiirmed on appeal, Smallcomb v. Cross, and
Payne v. Drewe, being cited with other decisions as authority. Jones v.
Judkins, 4 Dev. & Bat. (N. Car.) 454.
The doctrine of Smallcomb v. Cross applies only to chattels, for if
the judgment is a lien the record of it is notice to everyone and the land
may be sold on execution to satisfy it though previously sold under an
earlier writ on a junior judgment. Kirk V. Vonberg, 34 Ill. 440.
KENNON v. FICKLIN AND PECK, in Ky. Ct. of App., April 25, 1846.
44 Ky. (6 B. Monroe) 414, 44 Am. Dec. 776.
EWING, C. J. This is a controversy between attaching cred-
itors, as to the distribution of the fund attached, their cases
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to the sheriff the same day, he has not an election to execute 
which he pleases, but he must execute that which was first de­
livered . But if the sheriff levies goods in execution by virtue 
of the writ last delivered, and makes sale of them ( whether the 
last writ was delivered upon the same day or a subsequent day ) 
the property of the goods is  bound by the sale, and the party can­
not seize them by virtue of his execution first delivered ; but he 
may have his remedy against the sheriff. For sales made by the 
sheriff ought not to be defeated, for if they are, no man will buy 
goods levied upon a writ of execution. And at common law i f  
a fieri facias had been sued the first day of  the term, and another 
fieri f acias afterwards, and the last had been first executed, the 
other had had no remedy but against the sheriff. But in this case 
no action lies against the sheriff, because he who del ivered his 
writ first would not take a warrant from the sheriffs to levy the 
goods ; so that it seems he had a design only to keep the execu­
tion in his pocket, to protect the defendant's goods by fraud. A ud 
judgment for the plaintUf by the whole court. * * * 
This is a leading case and figures prominently in all discussions of 
this and kind red questions. It is universally recognized as good law. 
See Pa:,•11e v. Drewc, ante, .µ8. 
In trespass de bonis asportatis by a purchaser at a constable's sale 
against a sheriff, who took the property from him on a fi. fa. against the 
original judgment debtor in his hands before but not levied til l after the 
levy and sale by the constable, j udgment was rendered for plaintiff and 
affirmed on appeal. Du ncan v. M'Co mber, 10 Watts, ( Pa. ) 212. Marsh 
v. Lawrence, 4 Cowen ( N.Y. ) 461 ,  is a similar case. 
A sheriff having levied three writs of fi. fa. on a horse, brought trover 
for it against one claiming as purchaser at a sale by a constable on a 
warrant issued by a justice of the peace and received and levied by the 
constable after the sheriff received but before he levied his writs. Judg­
ment for defendant was affirmed on appeal, Smallcomb v. Cross, and 
Pa�mc v. Drewe, being cited with other decisions as authority. Jones v. 
Judkins, 4 Dev. & Bat. ( N. Car. ) 454. 
The doctrine of Smallcomb v. Cross applies only to chattels, for if  
the judgment is a lien the  record of  it is notice to everyone and the  land 
mav be sold on execution to satisfy it though previously sold under an 
earl ier writ on a j unior j udgment. Kirk v. Vonberg, 34 Ill. 440. 
KENNON v. FICKLIN AND PECK, in Ky. Ct. of App., April 25, 1846, 
44 Ky. (6 B. Monroe) 414, 44 Am. Dec. n6. 
Ew1NG, C.  J. This is a controversy between attaching cred­
itors, as to the distribution of the fund attached, their cases 
against an insolvent debtor and garnishees who owed him being 
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all heard together. It seems that Kennon’s bill was’first filed,
and his process first placed in the hands of one deputy; tht after-
wards, on the same day, Ficklin and Peck, each with a knowl-
edge of the fact, and with a view to overreach the claim of Ken-
non, filed their separate bills, sued out process, and placed the
same in the hands of another deputy, who executed the same
first, each deputy using reasonable diligence in the execution of
the process put into each of their hands.
Upon the hearing of all the cases together, the court gave
priority to Ficklin and Peck, decreeing to them the fund due
from the garnishee, upon the ground that process was first served
on them in the cases of Peck and Ficklin. [*415]
While it is conceded that in the case of distinct officers, the
first levy gives the prior lien, yet in the case of the same officer,
in the discharge of impartial justice between litigants, it is his
duty and that of his deputies to levy that first which first came
to his or their hands; and if his deputy levies the junior execu-
tion first, it is his duty, upon being apprised of the fact, to pay
the money to the plaintiff in the senior execution, as was deter-
mined by this court in the case of Million v. Comm01m'ealth, for
the use of Withers, I B. Monroe, 310. Though there is not a
perfectanalogy between the execution of original process or pro-
cess of attachment and the levy of an execution, as the officer of
sheriff is one, and his deputies his own agents, it is his duty, in
the discharge of impartial justice between litigants, to execute
and require his deputies to execute all process in the order in
which it comes to the hands of either. And the statute, with a
view to preserve the time. requires the sheriff to indorse on the
process the time of its reception. I Stat. Law, 339.
The junior process, it is true, where there are several depu-
ties. may be sometimes first served without fault on the part of
the principal or either of his deputies, as in the case before us,
when the process in one case was placed in the hands of one dep-
uty, and in other cases in the hands of another, the latter not
knowing of the prior process in the hands of the former. Each
is required to use due diligence in the execution of the process
placed in his hands, and in the exercise of all reasonable diligence
on the part of both, one may succeed in the execution of his pro-
cess first. If that should be the junior process, it would be hard
to make the principal liable to the plaintiff in the senior process;
nor is it just, necessary or proper, in such a case to make him
responsible.
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all heard together. It  seems that Kennon's bill was ' first filed, 
and his process first placed in the hands of one deputy ; tlat after­
wards, on the same day, Ficklin and Peck, each with a knowl­
edge of the fact, and with a view to overreach the claim of Ken­
non, filed their separate bills, sued out process , and placed the 
same in the hands of another deputy, who executed the same 
first, each deputy using reasonable diligence in the execution of 
the process put into each of  their hands. 
Upon the hearing of all the cases together, the court gave 
priority to Ficklin and Peck, decreeing to them the fund due 
from the garni.shee, upon the ground that process was first served 
on them in the cases o f  Peck and Ficklin. [*415]  
While i t  is conceded that in the case of  distinct officers, the 
first levy gives the prior lien, yet in the case of the same officer, 
in the discharge of impartial justice between litigants, it is his 
dttty and that of  his deputies to levy that first which first came 
to his or their hands ; and i f  his deputy levies the junior execu­
tion first, it is his duty, upon being apprised of the fact, to pay 
the money to the plaintiff in the senior execution, as was deter­
mined by this court in the case of Millio 11 v. Commowwea./th, for 
the use of With ers, I B. Monroe, 3 ro. Though there is not a 
perfect , analogy between the execution of original process or pro­
cess of .,attachment and the levy of an execution, as the officer of 
sheriff is one, and his deputies his own agents, it is his duty, in 
the di scharge of impartial j ustice between litigants, to execute 
and require his deputies to execute all process in the order in 
which it comes to the hands <>f either. And the statute, with a 
view to preserve the time, requires the sheriff to indorse on the 
procc-ss the time of its reception. I Stat . Law, 339. 
The j unior process, it is  true, where there are several depu­
t ies ,  may be sometimes first served without fault on the part of 
the principal or either of his deputies, as in the case before us,  
when the process in one case was placed in the hands of one dep­
uty, and in other cases in the hands of another, the latter not 
knowing of the prior process in the hands of the former. Each 
is required to use due dil igence in the execution of the process 
placed in his hands, and in the exercise of all reasonable di l ig-ence 
on the part of both, one may succeed in the execution o f  his pro­
cess first. I f  that should he the j unior process, it would be hard 
to make the principal l iable to the plaintiff in the senior process : 
nor i s  i t  just ,  necessa ry or proper, in such a case to make him 
responsible. 
The process in all the cases being served , and the fund at-
I . .  
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tached being in the power and under the control of the court,
and all he parties before the court, the chancellor should, in the
distribution of the fund, exercise that same impartial justice be-
tween the parties, which should have been observed by the officer
in the execution of the process. As with him the first come
should be first [*416] served, if he or any of his deputies has
been seduced, or by trick or stratagem, deluded into the service
of the junior first, or if this should happen in the exercise of due
diligence on the part of the ofiicers, the chancellor having the
control of the fund should distribute it as it would have been
distributed had the officer executed them in the order in which
they came to hand. '
The decree of the circuit court giving priority to Ficklin and
Peck, to the demand against Henry and Bett, is reversed, and
cause remanded that a decree may be rendered giving the prior-
ity and preference to Kennon in the distribution of this fund.
RICHARDS ET AL. v. THE MORRIS CANAL & BANKING C_O., in
N. 1. Sup. Ct., May Term, 1843—2o N. J. L. (Spencer) 136.
Motion by Richards at al. for a rule to amend the sheriff's
return to their execution against the above defendant by adding
thereto a levy on the property sold by the sheriff under an exe-
cution against the defendant in favor of Robt. Thompson, and
that the money in court arising from said sale be paid to the
plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs’ execution was issued and delivered to the sheriff
at the September term, 1841 ; and he would have levied it but for
an order entered the same term, staying proceedings under it to
enable the defendant to make a defense against the judgment.
That issue has now been resolved in favor of the plaintiffs; but
in the meantime the sheriff received Th0mps0n’s execution and
under it levied and sold property for the $1,724.30 now in dispute.
Honxaroyvnn, C. I. It would be the height of injustice to
refuse this motion. The property out of which this money was
raised was bound by the plaintiffs’ execution from the time of
its delivery to the sheriff, and he would have levied upon it if it
had not been for the misentry or misconception of the rule grant-
ed by the court. The execution was not set aside, nor its legal
operation in any way suspended, so as to let in a junior execution.
The intention of the court was simply to stay the sheriff from
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settled by the court. The execution, therefore, though not act-
ually levied, continued to be a lien upon the property until it was
sold; and that lien followed the proceeds of the sale in the hands
of the sheriff. The money in court ought, in my opinion, to be
paid over to the plaintiffs in satisfaction of their execution as
far as it will go. Ordered accordingly.
PULLIAM v. OSBORNE, in U. S. Sup. Ct., Dec. Term, f854—58 U. S.
(17 Howard) 471.
CAMPBELL, J. This was an issue in the district court, under
a statute of Alabama (Clay’s Digest, 213, §§ 62, 64), for the trial
of the [*475] right to property taken under an execution from
that court, in favor of the appellee, and claimed by the testator
of the appellant, as belonging to him, and not to the defendant
in the execution. It appeared on the trial that, at the delivery of
the execution‘ to the marshal, in favor of the appellee, the prop-
erty belonged to the defendant, and that the levy was made be-
fore the return day of the writ; but that, before this levy, the
property had been seized and sold to the claimant, by a sheriff in
Alabama, under executions issued from the state courts, upon
valid judgments, after the feste and delivery of the executions
from the district court.
The district court instructed the jury, that a sale under a
junior execution from the state court did not divest the lien of
the execution from the district court, and that the writ might be
‘executed, notwithstanding the seizure and sale under the process
from the state court. The lieu of an execution, under the laws of
that state, commences from the delivery of the writ to the sheriff,
and the lien in the courts of the United States depends upon the
delivery _of the writ to their officer. But no provision is made
by the statutes of the state or the United States for the determina-
tion of the priorities between the creditors of the respective courts,
state and federal. They merely provide for the settlement of the
priorities between creditors prosecuting their claims in the same
jurisdiction.
The demands of the respective creditors, in the present in-
stance, were reduced to judgments, and the officers of either court
were invested with authority to seize the property.
The liens were, consequently, coordinate or equal; and. in
such cases, the tribunal which first acquires possession of the
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settlccl by the court. The execution, therefore, though not act­
ually levied, continued to be a lien upon the property until i t  was 
sold ; and that lien followed the proceeds of the sale in the hand� 
of the sheriff. The money in court ought, in my opinion, to be 
paid over to the plaintiffs in satisfaction of their execution a-. 
far as it will go. Ordered accordingly. 
PULLIAM v. OSBORNE, i n  U. S. Sup. Ct., Dec. Term, 1854-58 U. S. 
( 17 Howard ) 471.  
CAMPBELL, J. This was an issue in the district court, under 
a statute of Alabama ( Clay's Digest, 2 1 3 ,  §§ 62, 64) , for the trial 
of the [ *475 ] right to property taken under an execution from 
that court, in favor of the appellee, and claimed by the testator 
of the appellant, as belonging to him, and not to the defendant 
in the execution. It appeared on the trial that, at the delivery of 
the execution· to the marshal, in favor of the appellee, the prop­
erty belonged to the defendant,  and that the levy was made be­
fore the return day of the w rit ; but that,  before this levy, the 
property had been seized and sold to the claimant, by a sheriff in 
Alabama, under execut ions issued from the state courts, upon 
valid judgments ,  after the teste and del ivery of the executions 
from the district court. 
The district court instructed the jury, that a sale under a 
j unior execution from the state court did not divest the l ien of 
the execution from the district court ,  and that the writ might be 
· executed, notwithstanding the seizure and sale under the process 
from the state court. The lien of an execution,  under the laws of 
that state, commences from the delivery of the writ to the sheriff, 
and the lien in the courts of the United States depends upon the 
delivery of the writ to their officer. But no provision is  made 
by the statutes of the state or the United States for the determina­
tion of the priorities between the cred itors of the respective courts, 
state and federal .  They merely provide for the settlement o f  the 
priorities between creditors prosecuting their claims in the same 
j urisdiction. 
The demands of the respective creditors, in the present in­
stance, were reduced to j udgments, and the officers of either court 
were invested with authority to seize the property . 
The l iens were, consequently, coordinate or equal ; and. in 
such cases, the tribunal which first acquires possession of the 
property, by the seizure of its officer, may di spose of it so as to 
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vest a title in the purchaser, discharged of the claims of creditors
of the same grade.
This court applied this principle (lVilliams V. Benedict, 8
How. 107) to determine between judgment creditors in a court
of the United States, and an administrator holding under the
orders of a probate court of a state; in W is-wall V. Sampson, 14
How. 52, in favor of a receiver holding under the appointment of
a court of chancery of a state and a judgment creditor; in Peale
v. Phlplas, I4 How. 368, in favor of a trustee in possession, under
the order of a county court, against such a creditor; and in Hagan
v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 400, between execution creditors issuing from
state and federal jurisdictions. The same principle has been ap-
plied, in several state courts, in favor of the purchasers at judi-
cial sales of steamboats, and other [*476] crafts subject to liens
in the nature of admiralty liens. Steamboat Rover V. Stiles, 5
Blackf. (Ind.) 483; Steamboat Raritan v. Smith, IO M0. 527;
George V. Skcatcs, 19 Ala. 738; and is recognized'in the courts
of common law and admiralty in Great Britain. Payne v. Drcwe,
4 East 523; 2 Wms. Ex'rs, 888; The Saracen-, 9 Eng. Admiralty
Rep. 451, 2 VV. Rob. 451. * * *
The instruction of the district court is erroneous, and its
judgment is therefore
Reversed and cause remanded.
\/Vhere the process created a lien from the delivery of it to the oth-
cer for execution, an execution was issued on a judgment of a justice of
the peace and placed in the -hands of a constable. Afterward an attach-
ment was issued from the circuit court in favor of another creditor of
the same debtor and given to the sheriff, who immediately seized the
debtor’s property thereon. The constable then returned his writ: “No
goods except in the hands of the shcrifi’, which he refuses to relinquish."
Then the creditor under the justice judgment filed a motion in the cir-
cuit court to order the sheriff to pay to him sufiicient of the proceeds of
the sale of said property to satisfy his execution. The‘old,er_nLthe-cLr-
cuit COll’l'£;]il'l_Ymg__tl'd5_JI1-Q-l-l-O-D-_“L2!-5-2-mlillled on appeal on the authority
of Paine v. Drewe. Field v. Millmrn, 9 M0. 488, 43 Am. Dec. 550. See
also Leopold V. Godfrey, 50 Fed. Rep. 145: Derrick V. Cole, 60 Ark. 394,
30 S. \V. 760; M’Call v. Terror, 4 Blackf. (Ind) 496; Million v. Comman-
wvalth, 40 Ky. (1 B. Mon.) 310; Adler v. Roth, 5 Fed. 895, 2 McCrary
447; Burnham v. Dickson, 5 Okl. 112; Sharpe v. Hunter, 47 Tenn. (7
Cold.) 389.
In Illinois it was held that a sheriff having a fi. fa. in his hands
might take property from a constable who had levied on it under a junior
distress warrant and that the execution creditor was entitled to be first
satisfied out of the proceeds. The decisions are reviewed at length.
Rngurs v. Diclcey, 6 Ill. (1 Gilm.) 636; Hanchelt V. Ives, 133 Ill. 332. See
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Rich. L. (S. Car.) 186; Charron v. Boswell, I8 Gratt. (Va.) 216; Riddle
V. Marshal of D. C., I Cranch C. C. 96, Fed. Cas. No. 11808.
How Lien May Be Lost.
ACTON v. KNOWLES, in Ohio Sup. Ct., Dec. Term, I862—I4 Ohio
St. 18.
Action by Acton & \Voodnutt, against Horace C. Knowles,
sheriif of Athens county, for making a false return to two execu-
tions in favor of plaintiffs, one a fi. fa., the other a 'venditi0m' ex-
fmnas, the returns complained of being that the stallion levied on
under plaintiff’s fi. fa. was subject to a previous levy by a former
sheriff in favor of another creditor, returned “not sold for want of
time.” From judgment for defendant and order denying motion
for new trial, plaintiffs bring error.
PECK, C.]. * * * Ch. ]. Savage, in Russell v. Gibbs, 5 Cow.
39, examines, at some length, the English and New York cases
as to the effect of delay in the sale of property levied on execu-
tion, and arrives at the conclusion, that mere indulgence or negli-
gence of the sheriff to proceed and sell, without any act of the
plaintifi”, will not render the levy fraudulent as to subsequent
executions; but that the rule is otherwise where the creditor him-
self directs or sanctions such delay. It is also said in that case,
that an unreasonable delay or omission to urge the sheriff to do
his duty, may, in some cases, be construed into a consent on the
part of the creditor to such delay, and thus postpone his lien to
that of junior executions. These positions, thus qualified, are
fully sustained by the authorities cited in the opinion, and sup-
ported by subsequent decisions in that and other states. Butler v.
f|Ia_ynard, II Wend. 548, 552; Benjanu'u v. Smith, 4 lb. 332;
Knowcr V. Barnard, 5 Hill, 377; Herkimer County Bank V.
Brown, 6 Ib. 232; U. S. v. Conyngham, 4 Dall. (Pa.) 358;
Gwynne on Sherifis, 212 and cases cited.
It is said by Bronson, J., in 6 Hill, supra, that “in all the cases
where the first execution has lost its preference, something wa's
said by the plaintifi or his attorney, at the time the execution was
issued, or at some subsequent period, from which [*28] the sheriff
could reasonably infer that he was authorized to give indulgence,
instead of complying strictly with the command of the writ.”
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Rich. L. ( S. Car. ) 186 ; Charron v. Boswell, 18 Gratt. ( Va. ) 216 ; Riddle 
v. Marshal of D. C., I Cranch C. C. 96, Fed. Cas. No. 1 18o8. 
How Lien May Be Lost. 
ACTON v. KNOWLES, in Ohio Sup. Ct., Dec. Term, 1862-14 Ohio 
St. 18. 
Action by Acton & Woodnutt, against Horace C. Knowles, 
sheriff of Athens county, for making a false return to two execu­
tions in favor of plaintiffs, one a fi. fa., the other a venditioni ex­
ponas, the returns complained of being that the stallion levied on 
under plaintiff's fi. fa. was subj ect to a previous levy by a former 
sheriff in favor of another creditor, returned "not sold for want of 
t ime." From judgment for defendant and order denying motion 
for new trial, plaintiffs bring error. 
PECK, C.J. * * * Ch. J. Savage, in Russell v. Gibbs, 5 Cow. 
39, examines, at some length, the English and New York cases 
as to the effect of delay in the sale of property levied on execu­
tion, and arrives at the conclusion, that mere indulgence or negli­
gence of the sheriff to proceed and sell, without any act of the 
plaintiff, will not render the levy fraudulent as to subsequent 
executions ; but that the rule is othenvise where the creditor him­
self di rects or sanctions such delay. I t  is also said in that case, 
that an unreasonable delay or omission to urge the sheriff to do 
his duty, may, in some cases, be construed into a consent on the 
part of the creditor to such delay, and thus postpone his lien to 
that of j unior executions. These positions, thus qualified, are 
fully sustained by the authorities cited in the opinion, and sup­
ported by subsequent decisions in that and other states. Butler v. 
Jfaynard, 1 1  \tVend. 548, 552 ;  Benjamin v. Smith, 4 lb. 332 ; 
Kno·wcr v. Barnard, 5 Hill , 377 ;  Herkimer County Bank v. 
Bro·u.m, 6 Ib. 232 ; U. S. v. Con.yngham, 4 Dall. ( Pa.)  358 ; 
Gwynne on Sheriffs, 2 1 2  and cases cited. 
It  is said by Bronson, J., in 6 Hill, supra, that " in all the cases 
where the first execution has lost its preference, something wa:s 
said by the plaintiff  or his attorney, at the time the execution was 
issued, or at some subsequent period,  from which [*28 ] the sheriff 
could reasonably infer that he was authorized to give indulgence, 
instead of complying strictly with the command of the writ." 
In New York the common law doctrine prevails. that the 
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execution of the writ is an entirety, consequently, the officer
making a levy on execution, must complete the duty by a sale in
pursuance of its mandate, and a subsequent 2/enditioni exjmnas, or
distriu gas, if issued to him, confers no new or additional author-
ity, but only spurs him on, it is said, to a speedier execution of the
power already conferred. Under our practice, however, a sheriff
who has returned the writ “levied, but not sold for want of time,”
can not be required to proceed and sell until a vendi. is placed in
his hands, for that purpose, by the creditor in execution.
The rule deducible from the cases cited, as applicable to our
practice, in which, after return of execution “not sold for want of
time,” the plaintiff must himself initiate the further proceedings
to sell, is this,—that if there has been an unreasonable delay in
completing the execution by a sale, at the instance and by the
authority of the plaintiff, such unreasonable delay may have the
effect of postponing his, in a certain sense, dormant process. to
that of a more vigilant though junior execution creditor. Mere
delay, if not unreasonably protracted, will not have such effect;
but where the delay is unreasonable, in view of the rights of other
creditors, the character and condition of the property levied on,
and the uses to which it is, in the meantime, applied, it is just and
proper that a limit should be placed upon the indulgence of the
creditor holding such prior lien.
The question whether such delay was reasonable or unreason-
able in a given case, depends upon its particular circumstances
and is therefore peculiarly a question for the jury, under the in—
structions of the court. It is manifest that a delay which is un-
reasonable in one case, b_v reason of the condition of the parties
or the subject matter of the levy, would, under other circum-
stances, be altogether reasonable and proper.
The return of the property to the defendant after levy, to be
kept by him until required for sale, either with or without [*29]
security for its re-delivery. does not fer se avoid the levy. The
debtor thereby became the bailee of the property, and the officer
was still constructively in possession. But such fact, coupled
with others, relating to the intended duration of such possession;
the authority delegated to the debtor or exercised by him with
the knowledge and assent of the sheriff; the uses to which it was.
in the meantime, to be applied; the benefits, if any, resulting from
its custorly, and the subsequent delay in bringing the property to
sale, may be of much significance in determining whether the levy
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execution of the writ is an entirety, consequently, the officer 
making a levy on execution, must complete the duty by a sale in  
pursuance of its mandate, and a subsequent venditioni exponas, or 
distringas, if issued to him, confers no new or additional author­
ity, but only spurs him on, it is said, to a speedier execution of the 
power already conferred. Under our practice, however, a f.heriff 
who has returned the writ "levied, but not sold for want of time," 
can not be required to proceed and sell until a -i.re11di. is  placed in 
his hands, for that purpose, by the creditor in execution. 
The rule deducible from the cases cited, as applicable to our 
practice, in which, after return of execution "not sold for want of 
time," the plaint iff must himself initiate the further proceedings 
to sel l ,  is this,-that if there has been an imreasonable delay in 
completing the execution by a sale, at the instance and by the 
authority of the plaintiff, such unreasonable delay may have the 
effect of postponing his, in a certain sense, dormant process. to 
that of a more vigilant though j unior execution creditor. .Mere 
delay, i f  not unreasonably protracted, will not have such effect ; 
but where the delay is unreasonable, in view of the rights of other 
cred itors, the character and condition of the property levied on , 
and the uses to which it is ,  in the meantime, applied, it is j ust and 
proper that a limit should be placed upon the indulgence of the 
creditor holding such prior lien .  
The question whether such delay was reasonable or unreason­
able in a given case, depends upon its particular ci rcumstances 
and is therefore peculiarly a question for the j ury, under the in­
structions of the court. It is mani fest that a delay which is un­
reasonable in  one case, by rea son of the condition of the parties 
or the subj ect matter of the levy, would, under other circum­
stances, be altogether reasonable and proper. 
The return of the property to the defendant after levy, to be 
kept by him until required for sale, either with or without [ *29] 
security for i ts re-del ivery. does not per s e  avoid the levy. The 
debtor thereby became the bailee of the property, and the officer 
was st i l l  constructively in possession. But such fact, coupled 
with others, relating to the intended duration of such possession ; 
the authority delegated to the debtor or exercised by him with 
the knowledge and assent of the sheriff ; the uses to which it \\'as. 
in the meantime, to be applied ; the benefits, if any, resul ting from 
its cu stody,  and the suhseriuent delay in bringing the property to 
sale ,  may he of much significance in determining whether the levy 
w a s  not. in part at least , designed to protect the property from 
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seizure by other creditors, for the benefit of the debtor, and there-
fore fraudulent as to them. _
In the case at bar, an execution in favor of the Exchange
Bank of Columbus was levied September 11, 1857, upon a stallion,
the property of Currier, and the execution thereupon returned to
Franklin common pleas, “not sold for want of time.” N 0 further
execution was issued until November 3, 1858, nearly fourteen
months after return of the first, and more than four months after
a levy by plaintiffs upon the same property. The sheriff upon
making the levy returned the horse to defendant Currier, and per-
mitted him to hire the horse out the ensuing season for his own
benefit, the profits greatly exceeding all expenses of keeping,
and never interposed to prohibit such use, or claim for the execu-
tion creditor any part of the profits arising therefrom.
The officers of the bank may not have known how the horse
was disposed of; but if so, they were willfully blind. The infor-
mation conveyed by the return was sufiicient to put them, as pru-
dent men, upon inquiry as to the temporary disposition of the
horse. The question would naturally occur, how and at whose
expense is this horse to be supported while awaiting a sale? And
the answer to such inquiry, would, at once, have put them in pos-
session of the facts, and rendered them responsible for the further
continuance of that condition of things. If, on the other hand, the
bank and its officers were truly ignorant of the temporary dispo-
sition of the horse, and the authority conferred upon Currier, and
are not chargeable [*3o] with notice of the acts of the officer in
making disposition of the property levied on, which we by no
means concede, still a failure by them for more than fourteen
months thereafter to offer the horse for sale, would be a circum-
. stance for the consideration of the jury, as tending to show that
one, if not the principal object of the levy and its prolongation.
was to shield the property from a seizure by other creditors, for
the benefit of the debtor.
In view of these circumstances it was error, we conceive, in
the court to charge the jury, either as matter of law or as a fore-
gone conclusion of fact, that the levy of September II, 1857, was,
as against the plaintiffs, a valid and subsisting levy in June, 1858,
when the horse was seized under their execution.
It was a question of fact peculiarly within the province of the
jury, to determine, under all the circumstances before them tend-
ing to show an abuse or perversion of the process of the court. and
should have been submitted to them under proper instructions.
















































































































































EXECUTING THE WRITS 459 
seizure by other creditors, for the benefit of the debtor, and there­
fore fraudulent as to them. 
In the case at bar, an execution in favor of the Exchange 
Bank of Columbus was levied September I 1 ,  1 857, upon a stallion , 
the property of Currier, and the execution thereupon returned to 
Franklin common pleas, "not sold for want of time." No further 
execution was issued until November 3, 1858, nearly fourteen 
months after return of the first, and more than four months after 
a levy by plaintiffs upon the same property. The sheriff upon 
making the levy returned the horse to defendant Currier, and per­
mitted him to hire the horse out the ensuing season for his own 
benefit, the profits greatly exceeding all expenses of keeping, 
and never interposed to prohibit such use, or claim for the execu­
tion creditor any part of the profits arising therefrom. 
The officers of the bank may not have known how the horse 
was disposed of ; but if  so, they were will fully blind. The infor­
mation conveyed by the return was sufficient to put them, as pru­
dent men, upon inquiry as to the temporary disposition of the 
horse. The question would naturally occur, how and at whose 
expense is  this horse to be supported while awaiting a sale ? And 
the answer to such inquiry, would, at once, have put them in pos­
sess ion of the facts, and rendered them responsible for the further 
continuance of that condition of things. I f, on the other hand, the 
bank and its officers were truly ignorant of the temporary dispo­
sition of the horse, and the authority con ferred upon Currier, and 
are not chargeable [ *30] with notice of the acts of the officer in 
making disposit ion of the property levied on, which we by no 
means concede, still a failure by them for more than fourteen 
months thereafter to off er the horse for sale, would be a circum-
. stance for the consideration of  the jury, as tending to show that 
one, if not the principal object of the levy and its prolongation . 
was to shield the property from a seizure by other creditors, for 
· the benefit o f  the debtor. 
In view of these circumstances it was error, we conceive, in 
the court to charge the jury, either as matter of law or as a fore­
gone conclusion of fact, that the levy of September 1 1 , i857, was, 
as against the plaintiffs, a valid and subsisting levy in June, 1858, 
when the horse was seized under their execution. 
It  was a question of fact peculiarly within the province of the 
j u ry, to determine, under all the circumstances before them tend­
ing to show an abuse or perversion of the process of the court. an<l 
shoul<l have been submitted to them under proper in stmctions. 
* * * Judgmen t rf!1. •ersed and cause remanded. 
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To same effect see McGinm's v. Pricson, 85 Pa. St. III.
This looks like a clear case under the rule as stated by the court,
which is as generally stated. Nevertheless some courts hold to a much
stricter rule. For example, in a recent case, the first creditor was held
to have lost his priority by reason of consenting to a postponement of
the sale from Jan. 22 to Jan. 29, and then to Feb. 8, and then to Feb. II,
and then to Feb. 13, to enable the debtor to get money to make payment
and thus save his property, it being found that the action of the creditor
was prompted by kindness to the debtor, without intent to delay or de-
fraud other creditors, and although other creditors were not prejudiced
thereby. Sweetser 1/. Matron, 153 II]. 568, 46 Am. St. Rep. 9II, 39 N. E.
I086.
EVANS v. BARNES, in Tenn. Sup. Ct., Dec. Term, I852—32 Tenn.
(2 Swan) 29I.
Trover by Evans against Barnes for cotton mentioned in the
opinion. From judgment for defendant plaintiff brings error.
CARUTHERS, J. On the 8th day of November, 1850, the
plaintiff bought of Ransford McGregor the six bales of cotton
for which this action of trover was brought. On the same day
the clerk of Rutherford circuit court issued an execution on a
judgment in favor of B. Ferguson, against said McGregor, tested
July term, 1850, addressed to the defendant as sheriff of Davidson
county, who, by his deputy, levied the same upon the cotton on
the IIth of November, I850, the return day of the execution.
This writ was returned, with the levy, to the November term,
[*293] from which another fieri facias issued, tested second Mon-
day of November, 1850, on same judgment, which came to the
hands of defendant on November 20th, and was on same day
levied upon the cotton, which was sold, December 5th, for $3 5 5.73,
as appears by the return on the last fieri facias. It does not appear
by whom the last execution was ordered out. * * *
The levy of the execution vested in the sheriff a special prop-
erty in the cotton, and was a satisfaction to the extent of its value.
He became liable to the plaintiff in the execution, and the debt was
extinguished for that amount. The execution was a lien from its
test, second Monday in July, 1850, and overreached the title by
purchase of the plaintiffs. The power of the sheriff to sell the
property still continued after the return of the writ, and even
after the expiration of his term of office. O:'crf0n, v. Perkins,
IO Yerg. 328. The authorities all concur in this position, in

















































































































































CASES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC. 
'fo same effect see McGinnis v. Prieson, 85 Pa. St. I I I . 
This looks like a clear case under the rule as · stated by the court. 
which is as generally stated. Nevertheless some courts hold to a much 
stricter rule. For example, in a recent case, the first creditor was held 
to have lost his priority by reason of consenting to a postponement of 
the sale from Jan. 22 to Jan. 29, and then to Feb. 8, and then to Feb. I I , 
and then to Feb. lJ, to enable the debtor to get money to make payment 
and thus save his property, it being found that the action of the creditor 
was prompted by kindness to the debtor, without intent to delay or de­
fraud other creditors, and although other creditors were not prejudiced 
thereby. Sweetser v. Matson, 1 53 Il l. 568, 46 Am. St Rep. 9n, 39 N. E. 
ro86. 
EVANS v. BARNES, in Tenn. Sup. Ct., Dec. Term, 1852-32 Tenn. 
(2 Swan ) 291. 
Trover by Evans against Barnes for cotton mentioned in the 
opm1on. From j udgment for defendant plaintiff brings error. 
CARUTHERS, J. On the 8th day of November, 1850, the 
plaintiff bonght of Ransford McGregor the six bales of cotton 
for which this action of trover was brought. On the same day 
the clerk of Rutherford circuit court issued an execution on a 
j udgment in favor of B. Ferguson, against said McGregor, testect 
July term, 1850, addressed to the defendant as sheriff of Davidson 
county, who, by his deputy, levied the same upon the cotton on 
the nth of November, 1 850, the return day of the execution. 
This writ was returned, with the levy, to the November term, 
[ *293 ] from which another fieri facias issued, tested second Mon­
day of November, 1 850, on same judgment, which came to the 
hands of defendant on November 20th, and was on same day 
levied upon the cotton , which was sold, December 5th, for $355.73 , 
as appears by the return on the last fieri facias. It does not appear 
by whom the last execution was ordered out. * * * 
The levy of  the execution vested in the sheriff a special prop­
erty in the cotton, and was a satisfaction to the extent of its value. 
He became liable to the plaintiff in the execution, and the debt was 
extinguished for that amount. The execution was a lien from its 
test, second Monday in July, 1850, and overreached the title by 
purchase of the plaintiff's. The power of the sheriff to sell the 
property still continued after the return of the writ, and even 
after the expiration of his term of office. 0< ·crton. v. Perkins, 
I O  Y erg. 328. The authorities all concur in this position, in 
cases of levies upon personal estate. It is otherwise when the levy 
is upon land. 
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But it is contended in this case that the sale having been
made under an alias fieri facias, which was issued from the
November term, 1850, of Rutherford circuit court, and tested on
the twelfth day of that month, which was after the purchase of
the plaintiff's, the first levy was waived, and the right by purchase
mustprevail. We do not think so. It is true that the plaintiff in
the execution might waive the benefit of a levy in his favor [*2g4]
and release the sheriff from his liability and the property from the
custody of the law, in which case the original owner would have
the power to make a valid sale of it. But such waiver must be
distinctly and clearly proved. It is not enough, to produce this
effect, that another fieri facias was issued, which the sheriff re-
levies upon the same property, and makes his sale upon it. He
had a perfect right to sell, by virtue of the title vested in him by
the first levy, without any execution; or, he might have retained
the first execution and sold under it during the term to which it
was returnable, or after the term, when it was functus ofiicio.
The issue of an alias, or another order of sale, was not necessary
to continue his right under the previous levy. Even the taking
of a delivery bond, on a levy afterwards made onthe same execu-
tion, or an alias, without forfeiture, would not be a waiver of his
title. or a forfeiture of his right to sell under the first levy.
Lester's Case, 4 Humph. 383. The issuance and use of the‘ last
execution was merely nugatory and useless; at least it did not
affect his right to the property derived from his original levy,
which related to, and bound, the property from the teste of
the first execution, on the second Monday in July, I850.
Let the judgment of the circuit court be affirmed.
To the same effect as to sale under alias instead of vendi., see Bou- '
ton v. Lord, 10 Ohio, St. 453; West v. St. John, 63 Iowa, 287, 19 N. W.
238; Friyer v. lllcNmughton, 110 Mich. 22, 67 N. W. 978; Menge v. Wiley,
100 Pa. St. 617; Wilson v. Gilbert, 58 Ill. App. 651, 161 Ill. 49. Comm:
Scott v. Hill, 2 Humph. I43. Same as to attachment Wright v. West-
heimer, 2 Idaho 962, 35 Am. St. Rep. 269. '
In Illinois it is held that when judgment in attachment is rendered
without personal service or appearance, the return of the first execution
without sale ends the whole proceeding and that there is no authority to
issue any further process or make any further disposition of the property.
Keeley Breudng Co. v. Carr (1902), 64 N. E. 1030, 198 Ill. 492. See also
Butler v. White (1879), 25 Minn. 432. But see Van Camp v. Searle (1895),
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Ilut it is contended in this case that the sale having been 
made under an alias fieri facias, which was issued from the 
1\ovcmber term, 1 850, of Rutherford circuit court, and tested on 
the twclf th day of that month, which was after the purchase of 
the plaintiff's, the first levy was waived, and the right by purchase 
must prevail. \Ve do not think so. It is true that the plaintiff in 
the execution might waive the benefit of a levy in his favor [ •394] 
and release the sheriff from his liability and the property from the 
custody of the law, in which case the original owner would have 
the power to make a valid sale of it. But such waiver must he 
rl ist inctly and clearly proved. It is not enough, to produce this 
effect, that another fieri facias was issued, which the sheriff re­
levics upon the same property, and makes his sale upon it. He 
had a perfect right to sell, by virtue of the title vested in him by 
the first levy, without any execution ; or, he might have retained 
the first execution and sold under it during the term to which it 
was returnable, or after the term, when it was fu.nct"s officio. 
The issue of an alias, or another order of sale, was not necessary 
to continue his right under the previous levy . Even the taking 
of a delivery bond, on a levy afterwards made on ' the same execu­
tion, or an alias, without forfeiture, would not be a waiver of his 
t i t le .  or a forfeiture of his right to sell under the first levy. 
L ester's Case, 4 Humph. 383. The issuance and use of the last 
execution was merely nugatory and useless ; at least it did not 
affect his right to the property derived from his original levy, 
which related to, and bound, the property from the tcste o f  
the first execution, on  the second Monday i n  July, 1850. 
Let the judgment of the circuit co urt be aRirmcd. 
To the same effect as to sale under alias instead of vendi., see Bou­
ton v. Lord, IO Ohio, St. 453 ; West v. St. John, 63 Iowa, 2137, 19 N. W. 
238 ; Friyer v. McNa44ghton, 1 10 Mich. 22, 67 N. W. 978 ; Menge v. Wiley, 
100 Pa. St. 6 1 7 ; Wilson v. Gilbert, 58 Ill. App. 65 1 ,  161 Ill. 49. CoNTRA : 
Sco tt v. Hill, 2 Humph. 143. Same as to attachment Wright v. West-
heimrr, :2 Idaho g62, 35 Am. St. Rep. 269. · 
In Illinois it is held that when judgment in attachment is rendered 
without personal service or appearance, the return of the first execution 
without sale ends the whole proceeding and that there is no authority to 
issue any further process or make any further disposition of the property. 
Keeley Brn1•i11g Co. v. Carr ( 1902 ) ,  64 N. E. 1030, 1g8 I ll. 492. See also 
Bu llet v. While ( 1879) , 25 Minn. 432. But see Van Camp v. Searle ( 1895 ) ,  
147 N .  Y . . 427. 41 N .  E .  427. 
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1 '.
ROCKHILL v. HANNA, in U. S. Sup. Ct., Dec. Term, 1853——56 U. S.
(15 Howard) 189.
Action by Thos. C. Rockhill et al. against Robert Hanna
at al. on a U. S. marshal’s bond, to recover the proceeds of an
execution sale. The case is certified here by the U. S. circuit
court for district of Indiana, for the opinion of this court. Rock-
hill et al., Price et al. and Siter et 01., each recovered judgments
against John Allen, Nov. 19, 1838. Price and Siter each took out
writs of fieri facias which were levied on Allen’s land. But pre-
vious thereto Rockhill had taken out ca. so. on which
Allen was imprisoned till discharged by the passage of a law in
Indiana abolishing imprisonment for debt. Rockhill then took
out a fieri facias which was levied on the land previously taken
on the other writs. The land being sold under these execu-
tions. and the proceeds being insufficient to pay all, Rockhill
claimed that the money should be first applied on his judgment.
GRIER, J. * * * In the state of Indiana judgments are liens
upon “the real estate of the persons against whom such judg-
mcnts may be rendered, from the day of the rendition thereof.”
As the statute provides for no fractions of a day, it follows that
all judgments entered on the same day have equal rights, and one
cannot claim priority over the other. In England, when several
judgments are entered to the same term, (and by fiction of law,
the term consists of but one day,) the judgment creditor, who
first extends the land by eligit, is thereby entitled to be first satis-
fied out of it. The case would be much stronger, too, in favor
of the first eligit, if one of three judgments had levied a fieri facias
on the goods and chattels of the defendant, the second taken his
body on ca. sa., and the third laid his cligit on his land.
For each one, having elected a different remedy, would be entitled
to a precedence in that which he has elected. This principle of
the common law has been adopted by the courts of New York, as
is seen in the cases of Adams v. Dyer, 8 Johns, 350, and lVater-
man v. Haskin, II Johns. 228; and also by the supreme court of
Indiana, in Michaels v. Boyd, Smith 100, where it is said, the mere
delivery of an execution, as in case of personal property, will not
give a priority, but the execution first begun to be executed, shall
te entitled to priority.
The application of these principles to the present case would
rrive the preference to the judgments of Siter and Price, which
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I � 
ROCKH ILL v. HANNA, in U. S. Sup. Ct., Dec. Term, 1853-56 U. S. 
( 15 Howard) 18g. 
Action by Thos . C. Rockhill et al. against Robert Hanna 
ct al. on a U. S. marshal's bond, to recover the proceeds of an 
execution sale. The case is certified here by the U. S. circuit 
court for district of Indiana, for the opinion of this court. Rock­
hill et al., Price et al. and Siter et al., each recovered j udgments 
against John Allen, Nov. 1 9, 1838. Price and Siter each took out 
writs of fieri f acias which were levied on Allen's land. But pre­
vious thereto Rockhill had taken out ca. sa. on which 
A llen was imprisoned till discharged by the passage of a law in 
Indiana abolishing imprisonment for debt. Rockhill then took 
out a fieri fadas which was levied on the land previously taken 
on the other writs. The land being sold under th<>se execu­
tions. and the proceeds being insufficient to pay all , Rockhill 
claimed that the money should be first applied on his judgment. 
GRIER, J. * * * In the state of Indiana judgments are liens 
upon " the real estate of the persons against whom such judg­
ments may be rendered, from the day of the rendition thereof." 
As the statute provides for no fractions of a day, it follows that 
all j udgments entered on the same day have equal rights, and one 
cannot claim priority over the other. In England, when several 
j udgments are entered to the same term, ( and by fiction of law, 
the term consists of but one day, ) the judgment creditor, who 
first extends the land by eligit, is thereby entitled to be first satis­
fied out of it. The case would be much stronger, too, in favor 
of the first eligit, if one of three j udgments had levied a fieri facias 
on the goods and chattels of the defendant, the second taken his 
body on ca. sa., and the third laid h is cligit on his land. 
For each one, having elected a different remedy, would be entitled 
to a precedence in that which he has elected . This principle of 
the common law has been adopted by the courts of New York,  as 
is seC'n in the cases of Adams v. Dyer, 8 Johns, 350, and 1Vatcr­
m a n  v. Haskin, 1 1  Johns . 228 ; and also by the supreme court of 
Indiana, in Michaels v. Bo)•d, Smith 100, where it is said, the mere 
cle l ivery of an execution, as in case of personal property, will not 
P-ive a priority, but the execution first begun to be executed, shall 
l'e ef"titleci to priority. 
'T'he appl ication of these principles to the present ca!'ie would 
<Yin· th <' preference to the judgments of Siter and Price, which 
wpr" levie<t on the land five years before the plaintiff's levy on 
.. 
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the same. An execution levied on land, is begun to be executed,
and is an election of the remedy by sale of it; and [*196] the mere
delay of the sale, if not fraudulent, injures no one and cannot
postpone the rights of the creditor who has first seized the land
and taken it into the custody of the law for the purpose of ob-
taining satisfaction of his judgment. If he has obtained a priority
over those whose liens are of equal date, by levying his execu-
tion, he is not bound to commence a new race of diligence with
those whose rights are postponed to his own. There may be a
different rule as to a levy on personal property, where it is suffered
to remain in the hands of the debtor. But liens on real estate are
matters of record and notice to all the world, and have no other
limit to their duration than that assigned by the law.
But we do not think it necessary to rest the decision of this
case, merely on the question of diligence, or to tlecide whether
this doctrine has been finally established as the law of Indiana.
The plaintiffs lien does not, by the statement of this case, stand
on an equality as to date with that of the other judgments. By
electing to take the body of his debtor in execution he has post-
poned his lien, because the arrest operated in law as an extin-
guishment of his judgment. It is true, if the debtor should die
in prison, or be discharged by act of the law without consent of
the creditor, he may have an action on the judgment, or leave to
have other executions against the property of his debtor. The
legal satisfaction of the judgment, which for the time destroys
its lien and postpones his rights to those whose liens continue, is
not a satisfaction of the debt, but, as between the parties to the
judgment, it operates as a satisfaction thereof. The arrest waives
and extinguishes all other remedies on the goods or ‘lands of the
debtor while the imprisonment continues, and if the debtor be
discharged by the consent of the creditor, the judgment is forever
extinguished, and the plaintiff remitted to such contracts or se-
curities as he has taken as the price of the discharge. But if the
plaintiff be remitted to other remedies by a discharge of his debtor
by act of law. or by an escape, it will not operate to restore his
lien on the debtor’s property, which he has elected to waive or
abandon as against creditors who have obtained a precedence dur-
ing such suspension.1 The case of Snead v. M’C0u1l, I2 How.
407. in this court, fully establishes this doctrine. It is to be found
in the common law as early as the Year Books, and is admitted
_ ‘farkson v. Benedict, I3 Johns. 533. Setting aside a return of “sat-
isfied” ‘on a fi. fa. does not revive the judgment lien on land so as to
















































































































































EXECVTING T H E  WRITS 
the same. An execution levied on land, is begun to be executecl, 
and is an election of the remedy by sale of it ; and [ * 196] the mere 
delay of the sale, if not fraudulent, inj ures no one and cannot 
postpone the rights o f  the creditor who has first seized the land 
and taken it into the custody of the law for the purpose of ob­
tain ing satisfaction o f  his j udgment. I f  he has obtained a priority 
over those whose liens are of equal date, by levying his execu­
tion, he is not bound to commence a new race of diligence with 
those whose rights are postponed to his own. There may be a 
different rule as to a levy on personal property, where i t  is suffered 
to remain in the hands of the debtor. But liens on real estate are 
matters of record and notice to all the world, and have no other 
l imit to their duration than that assigned by the law. 
But we do not think it necessary to rest the decision of this 
case, merely on the question of diligence, or t0" tlecide whether 
this doctrine has been finally established as the law of Indiana. 
The plaintiff's l ien does not, by the statement of this case, stan<l 
on an equal ity as to date with that of the other j udgments. By 
electing to take the body of his debtor in execution he has post­
poned his lien, because the arrest operated in la\v as an extin­
guishment of his j udgment. It is true, if the debtor should die 
in pri son, or be discharged by act of the law without consent of 
the creditor, he may have an action on the j udgment, or leave to 
have other executions against the property of his debtor. The 
legal satis fact ion of the j udgment, which for the time destroys 
its l ien and postpones his rights to those whose liens continue, i s  
not  a satisfaction of the debt, but, as bet\l\'een the parties to the 
j udgment, it  operates as a satisfaction thereof. The arrest waives 
and extinguishes all other remedies on the goods or ,lands of the 
debtor while the imprisonment continues, and if the debtor be 
discharged by the consent of the creditor, the j udgment is forever 
extinguished, and the plaintiff remitted to such contracts or se­
curities as he has taken as the price of the discharge. But if the 
plaint iff be remitted to other remedies by a discharge of his debtor 
by act of law . or by an escape, it will not operate to restore his 
l ien on the debtor's  property, which he has elected to waive or 
abandon as against creditors who have obtained a precedence dur­
ing- such suspension.1 The case of Snead v. !IJ'Co ull, 1 2  How. 
407. in thi s  court, fully establi shes th i s doctrine. It is to hP found 
in the common law as early as the Year Books, and is admitted 
1 Jackson v. Benedict, 13 Johns. 533. Setting aside a r<'tu rn of "sat­
isfi<'d" on a fi. fa. does not revive the j udgment lien on land so as to 
defeat innocent mcsne purchasers. Ta)•lor v. Ram1ey, 4 Hill ( N. Y. ) 619. 
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to be the law in almost every state in the union. See Year Book,
33 Henry VI. p. 48; Foster v. Jackson, Hobart 52; Burnaby’s
case, I Strange 653; Vigers v. Aldrich, 4 Burr. 2482; Jaques v.
Withy, I Term R. 557; Taylor v. Waters, 5 Maule and Selwyn,
I03; Ex [mrte Knowell, I3 Vesey, _]r., I92; and in New York,
Cooper \'. Bigalow, I Cow. 56; Ransom v. Keys, [“I97] 9 Cow.
I28; Sundcrland V. Loder, 5 Wend. 58. In Pennsylvania, Sharpe
v. S[)cc/eenaglr, 3 Serg. & R. 463. In Massachusetts, Little v.
The Bank, I4 Mass. 443.
The insolvent law of Indiana which discharges the person of
the debtor from imprisonment upon his assigning all his prop-
erty for the benefit of his creditors, provides that his after acquired
property shall be liable to seizure, and also that liens previously
acquired shall not be affected by such assignment and discharge;
but it does not affect to change the relative priority of lien credit-
ors, as it existed at the time of the discharge, or to take away
from any lien creditor his prior right of satisfaction, which had
been vested in him previous to such discharge. Neither the letter
nor the spirit of the act will permit a construction which by a
retrospective operation would divest rights vested before its
passage.
We are of opinion, therefore, that * * * the executions of
Siter & Co. and of Price & Co. are entitled to be first satisfied
from the proceeds of the sale. * * *
S0 certified to the said circuit court.
To same effect on similar facts,Millcr v. Starks, I3 Johns. (N. Y.)
5I7. A direction by the creditor to the sheriff to levy on certain property
is not an abandonment of his lien on the remainder, and the sheriff who
has levied on that part may at any time before the return-day levy on and
inventory other property, though the defendant has in the meantime as-
signed for the benefit of creditors, the writ being a lien from the date of
its delivery. Moses v. Thomas, 26 N. J. L. I24.
E ICKSON v. DULUTH, SOUTH SHORE & ATLANTIC RY. CO.,
\/R in Mich. Sup. Ct., May 2I, I895—Io5 Mich. 415, 63 N. W. 420.
Garnishment by Edward Erickson against Duluth, South
Shore 8: Atlantic Ry. Co. as garnishee of Mark Cuppernill, princi-
pal defendant. From judgment charging the garnishee it brings
error.
Erickson sued Cuppernill in justice court and immediately
had the railway company summoned as garnishee, and it an-
swercd confessing liability for $30.65. Thereafter the main action
















































































































































CASES O.N E X EC U T I O N S, ETC. 
to be the law in almost every state in the union. See Year Book, 
33 Henry \' I. p. 48 ;  Foster v. Jackson, Hobart 52 ;  Burnaby's 
case, 1 Strange 653 ; Vigers v. Aldrich, 4 Burr. 2482 ; Jaques v. 
lVithy, I Term R. 557 ; Ta)•/or v. lVaters, 5 Maule and Selwyn, 
103 ; Ex parte Kno·wcll, 13 Vesey, Jr., 192 ; and in New York, 
Cooper v. Bigalow, I Cow. 56 ; Ransom v. Keys, [ * 197 ]  9 Cow. 
1 28 ; Sm1dcrla11d v. Loder, 5 Wend. 58. In Pennsylvania, Sharpe 
v. Spcckcnagle, 3 Serg. & R. 463. In :Massachusetts, Little v. 
The Bank, 14 :Mass. 443. 
The insolvent law of Indiana which discharges the person of 
the debtor from imprisonment upon his assigning all his prop­
erty for the benefit of his creditors, provides that his after acquired 
property shall be liable to seizure, and also that liens previously 
acquired shall not be affected by such assignment and discharge ; 
but it does not affect to change the relative priority of Jien credit­
ors, as it existed at the time of the discharge, or to take away 
from any lien creditor his prior right of satisfaction, which had 
been vested in him previous to such discharge. Neither the letter 
nor the spirit of the act will permit a construction which by a 
retrospective operation would divest rights vested before its 
passage. 
\Ve are of opinion , therefore, that * * * the executions of 
Siter & Co. and of Price & Co. are entitled to be first satisfied 
from the proceeds of the sale. * * * 
So certified to the said circut'.t court. 
To same effect on similar facts,Mil/er v. Starks, 13 Johns. ( N. Y. ) 
5 17. A direction by the creditor to the sheriff to levy on certain property 
is not an abandonment of his lien on the remainder, and the sheriff who 
has levied on that part may at any time before the return-day levy on and 
inventory other property, though the defendant has in  the meantime as­
signed for the benefit of creditors, the writ being a lien from the date of 
its delivery. M oscs v. Tho mas, 26 N. J. L. 12+ 
�ICKSON v .  DULUTH, SOUTH SHORE & ATLANTIC RY. CO., 
v 
in Mich. Sup. Ct., May 21 ,  1895-105 .Mich. 415, 63 N. W. 420. 
Garnishment by Edward Erickson against Duluth, South 
Shore & Atlantic Ry. Co. as garnishee of Marl< Cuppernill, princi­
pal defendant. From j udgment charging the garnishee it brings 
error. 
Erickson sued Cuppernill in justice court and immediately 
had the rail way company summoned as garnishee, and it an­
swered confessing l iab il i ty for $30.6� .  Thereafter the main action 
was tried and the justice rendered judgment, no cause of action. 
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Plaintiff appealed to the circuit court, giving the garnishee notice
thereof, and the justice returned the record in the main action to
the circuit court without the record of the garnishment proceed-
ings, and thereafter mailed a discharge to the garnishee, and still
later returned the garnishment record to the circuit court, showing
the discharge above mentioned. On the trial of the main action in
the circuit court judgment was rendered for plaintiff, and imme-
diately thereafter, on motion of plaintiFf’s attorney, judgment was
rendered against the garnishee for the amount admitted in its
answer. The garnishee having made no appearance in that court,
claims that it acted without jurisdiction in rendering judgment
against the garnishee because the judgment for defendant, by stat-
ute terminated the liability of the garnishee; and at all events the
liability could not thereafter be enforced, because the statute does
not provide for any further proceedings.
HOOKER, * * * \-Vhile § 8041 (How. St.) treats plaintiffs
failure to recover “judgment against the defendant” as a discon-
tinuance, § 8038 provides that, after the “final determination of
the suit against the defendant,” proceedings may be taken before
the justice to obtain a judgment against the garnishee. This is
consistent with the claim of plaintiff that the garnishee is
not released by a judgment in favor of defendant unless it is
final. Section 8040 also contains the expression “final determina-
tion,” and prescribes the pleading and procedure against the gar-
nishee “after a final determination of the suit pending against the
defendant.’Z It would require an unusually strict construction of
§ 8041, and the exclusion of the other sections, to hold that the
garnishee would be released by a judgment in justice’s court in
the defendant's favor, when the plaintiff had appealed. Such
construction would be at variance with the rule in attachment
cases, it having been held that a judgment against a plaintiff,
appealed from, does not dissolve the attachment, but the lien of
the writ continues until the final disposition of the case against
him. Treat v. Dunham, 74 Mich. II4; Vanderhoof v. Premier-
gast, 94 Id. 18. By analogy the same would be true in garnish-
ment cases, unless the statute upon which the right depends indi-
cates the contrary. The garnishee, under this chapter, would be
discharged when the action was finally determined against the
plaintiff, but he is chargeable with knowledge of the law which
gives the right of appeal, and that, if the appeal is taken, he is not
released until final judgment. The supreme court of Iowa has
















































































































































£XEC U '1'I K G  T H E WRITS 
Plaintiff appealed to the circuit court, giving the garnishee notice 
thereof, and the justice returned the record in the main action to 
the circuit court without the record of the garnishment proceed­
ings, and thereafter mailed a discharge to the garnishee, and still 
later returned the garnishment record to the circuit court, showing 
the discharge above mentioned. On the trial of the main action in 
the circuit court judgment was rendered for plaintiff, and imme­
diately thereafter, on motion of plaintiff's attorney, judgment was 
rendered against the garnishee for the amount admitted in its 
answer. The garnishee having made no appearance in that court, 
claims that it acted without j urisdiction in rendering judgment 
against the garnishee because the j udgment for defendant, by stat­
ute terminated the liability of the garnishee ; and at all events the 
l iabi lity could not thereafter be enforced, because the statute does 
not provide for any further proceedings. 
HooKER, J. * * * \Vhile § 804 1 ( How. St. ) treats plaintiffs 
failure to recover "judgment against the defendant" as a discon­
tinuance, § 8o38 provides that, after the "final determination of 
the suit  against the defendant," proceedings may be taken before 
the justice to obtain a judgment against the garnishee. This i ;;  
consistent wi th the claim of plaintiff that the garnishee i :>  
not released b y  a j udgment in  favor of defendant unless it i s  
final. Section 8040 also contains the express ion "final determina­
tion," and prescribes the pleading and procedure against the gar­
n ishee "after a final determination of  the suit pending against the 
defendant . ' �  I t  would require an unusually strict construction of 
§ 804 I ,  and the exclusion of the other sect ions, to hold that the 
garnishee would be released by a judgment in j ustice's court in 
the defendant's favor, when the plaintiff had appealed. Such 
construction would be at variance with the rule in attachment 
cases, it  having been held that a judgment against a plaintiff, 
appealed from, does not dissolve the attachment, but the lien o f  
the writ continues until the final disposition o f  the case against 
him. Treat v .  Dunham, 74 l\'l ich. 1 1 4 ; Vanderhoof v .  Prender­
gast, 94 Id .  18.  By analogy the same would be true in garnish­
ment cases, unless the statute upon which the right depends indi­
cates the contrary. The garnishee, under this chapter, would be 
discharged when the action was finally determined against the 
plaintiff, but he is  chargeable with knowledge of  the law which 
gives the right of appeal, and that, if the appeal i s  taken, he i s  not 
released unt i l final j udgment. The supreme court of Iowa has 
held that a j udgment of nonsuit dissolves an attachment, an<i that 
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it will not be revived by the vacating of the judgment. Brown v.
Harris, 2 G. Greene (Iowa) 505; Harrow v. Lyon, 3 Id. 157, 159.
See, also, Clap v. Bell, 4 Mass. 99; Suydam v. Huggerford, 40
Mass. (23 Pick.) 465. But the latter case recognizes [“419] the
rule that the attachment is not dissolved where the plaintiff ap-
peals. See, also, Sherrod V. Davis, 17 Ala. 312; Danforth v. Ku-
jwrt, II Iowa 547, 551. Such has already been shown to be the
rule here. In Dolby v. Tinglcy, 9 Neb. 412, 416, the court said:
“\Vhere no steps are taken to dissolve the attachment, the gar-
nishee is bound from the time of service until final judgment.”
Chase v. Foster, 9 Iowa, 429; Kennedy v. Tiernay, I4 R. I. 528,
530; Pufi v. Huchter, 78 Ky. I46. It is true that these decisions
all depend upon the statutes of their respective states, but they
show the trend of the authorities when the statutes are open to the
construction that the garnishee is bound until final j udgment.
VV e have-next to inquire concerning the effect of the new sec-
tion added in 1891 (Act No. 178, Laws of 1891, § 28), and the
justice's order under it. This section provides: “In all cases
where the defendant prevails or takes an appeal in the principal
suit, the court shall make an order releasing said moneys so gar-
nished. Said order shall be directed to the garnishee defendant,
and shall be delivered to the principal defendant * * * ”
It must be read with those already discussed, for the latter
are not repealed. Unless we are to adhere to the defendant’s con-
struction, viz., that this section means that the justice shall dis-
charge the garnishee in cases where the defendant prevails before
the justice in the principal suit, this section is not inconsistent with
the sections already discussed, and the construction hereinbefore
placed upon them. If it is to be so construed, it is inconsistent with
them. It is also noticeable that this section does not provide that
the justice, but that the court, shall make the order of discharge,
thus putting it into the power of whatever court shall render the
final judgment to make this order. It seems to be intended that
[*42o] this order shall be made upon application of the principal
defendant, and for his benefit, and apparently was designed to
facilitate the collection of his claim from the garnishee, after the
garnishee’s liability to the plaintiff should have ceased. \-Ve are
therefore of the opinion that the adverse judgment did not re-
lease the garnishee from the plaintiff’s claim.
Authorities will be found which indicate that the plaintiff
should have appealed from the order discharging the garnishee,
and that, not having done so. he cannot now question it. Such a
















































































































































CASES ON EXECUTIO!-JS, ETC. 
it will not be revived by the vacating of the j udgment. Brv•wn v .  
Harris, 2 G. Greene ( Iowa ) 505 ; Harrow v. L'yon, 3 Id .  1 57, 1 59. 
See, also, Clap v. Bell, 4 Mass. 99 ;  Suyda.m v. Httggerford, 40 
Mass . ( 23 Pick. ) 465 .  But the latter case recognizes [•419] the 
ru le  that the attachment is not dissolved where the plaintiff ap­
peals. Sec, also, Sherrod v. Davis, 17 Ala. 3 1 2 ; Danforth v. Ru­
pert, 1 1  Im•.: a 547, 55 I . Such has already been shown to be the 
rule here. In Dolby v. Tingley, 9 Neb. 412, 4 16, the court said : 
"\Vhere no steps are taken to dissolve the attachment, the gar­
nishee is bound from the time of service until final j udgment." 
Chase v. Foster, 9 Iowa, 429 ; Kennedy v. Tiernay, 14 R. I. 528, 
530 ; Pu ff v. Ruehter, 78 Ky. 146. It is true that these decision.> 
all depend upon the statutes of their respective states, but they 
show the trend of the authorities when the statutes are open to the 
construction that the garnishee is  bound until final judgment. 
\Ve have next to inquire concerning the cff ect of the new sec­
tion added in 189 1  ( Act No. 1 78, Laws of 189 1 ,  § 28) , and the 
j ustice 's order under it . This section provides : "In all cases 
where the defendant prevails or takes an appeal in the principal 
suit, the court shall make an order releasing said moneys so gar­
n ished . Said order shall be directed to the garnishee defendant, 
and shall be delivered to the principal defendant * * * " 
It must be read with those already discussed, for the latter 
arc not repealed . Unless we are to adhere to the defendant 's con­
struction, viz. , that thi s section means that the j ustice shall dis­
charge the garnishee in cases where the defendant prevai ls before 
the j ust ice in the principa l suit ,  this section is not inconsistent with 
the sections already discussed , and the construction hereinbefore 
placed upon them. If  it is to be so construed, it is inconsistent with 
them. It is also noticeable that this section does not provide that 
the j ustice, but that the court, shall make the order of cfo=charg-e, 
thus putting it into the power of whatever court shall render the 
final j udgment to make this order. It  seems to be intended that 
r * 420] this order shall be made upon applicat ion of the pri ncipal 
defendant, and for his benefit, and apparently was designed to 
facil i tate the collection of his claim from the garnishee, after the 
ga rni shee's l iabil ity to the plaintiff should have ceased . \Ve are 
therefore of the opinion that the adverse j udgment did not re­
lease the garnishee from the plaintiff's claim. 
Authori ties will be found which indicate that the plaintiff 
should have appealed from the order di scharging the garn ishee , 
and that, not having done so. he cannot now question it . Such a 
case i s  B rown v. Tuppe11y, 24 Kan. 29. Sec, also, 8 Amer. & Eng. 
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Enc. Law, 1258. Under the statutes cited, the justice had no
authority to do more in the garnishee case than to take and file the
disclosure, and adjourn the proceeding until judgment should be
rendered; and we have already said that this means final judg-
ment. The appeal removed the principal case from his jurisdic-
tion, and thereafter only the circuit court had authority to make
the order of discharge. The order made by the justice was made
before the appeal was taken, and was premature. He had no
authority to make it. He should have waited the statutory period
within which the plaintiff might appeal. His order was therefore
void, and it was not necessary for the plaintiff to appeal from it.
The case of Kennedy v. Tierney, 14 R. I. 530, involves this ques-
tion. The court said: “The court is not called upon to pass upon
the liability of the garnishee until the plaintiff has established his
claim, and obtained a judgment against the defendant. If the
plaintiff fails in the suit against the defendant, the question of the
garnishee’s liability does not arise.” In this case the court held
that the appeal brought up the garnishee proceedings as incident
to the principal suit.
This brings us to the remaining question in the case, viz..
whether the garnishee proceeding was brought to [*421] the cir-
cuit by the appeal of the principal suit, so that the circuit court
might enter a judgment against the garnishee. The authorities
are not harmonious upon this subject. Some cases—like the
Rhode Island case cited—hold this doctrine. Counsel for the
plaintiff cites several cases to the proposition that the garnishee
proceeding is ancillary to the principal case, and must ,of neces-
sity, follow it when it is appealed. But we think this must depend
upon the statute, and that our statute clearly shows a contrary in-
tention on the part of the legislature. * * *
In our opinion, the statute contemplates that the action in jus-
tice's court against the garnishee should remain in abeyance pend-
ing the appeal in the principal case. After judgment the justice
might issue his summons to show cause, the issue could then be
joined, and proof of the circuit court judgment, when introduced,
would furnish the foundation for a judgment against the gar-
nishee. Inasmuch as this practice was not [*422] followed, we
have no alternative but to reverse the judgment. No new trial
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Enc. Law, 1258. Under the statutes cited, the justice had no 
authority to do more in the garnishee case than to take and file the 
disclosure, and adj ourn the proceeding until judgment should be 
rendered ; and we have already said that this means final j udg­
ment. The appeal removed the principal case from his jurisdic­
tion, and thereafter only the circuit court had authority to make 
the order of d ischarge. The order made by the justice was made 
before the appeal was taken, and was premature. He had no 
authority to make it. He should have waited the statutory period 
within which the plaintiff might appeal. His order was therefore 
void,  and it was not necessary for the plaintiff to appeal from it .  
The case o f  Kennedy v. Tierna.y, 14 R. I .  530, involves this ques­
tion. The court said : "The court is not called upon to pass upon 
the liability of the garnishee until the plaintiff has established his 
claim , and obtained a judgment against the defendant. If the 
plaintiff fails in the suit against the defendant, the question of the 
garnishee's liability does not arise." In this case the court helrl 
that the appeal brought up the garnishee proceedings as incident 
to the principal suit. 
This brings us  to the remaining question in the case, viz .. 
whether the garnishee proceeding was brought to [ *4:a 1 ]  the cir­
cuit by the appeal of the principal suit, so that the circuit court 
might enter a j udgment against the garnishee. The authorities 
are not harmonious upon this subject. Some cases-like the 
Rhode Island case c ited-hold this doctrine. Counsel for the 
plaintiff cites several cases to the proposition that the garnishee 
proceeding is ancillary to the principal case, and must ,of neces­
si ty, follow it when it is appealed. But we think this must depend 
upon the statute, and that our statute clearly shows a contrary in­
tention on the part of the legislature. * * * 
In our opinion, the statute contemplates that the action in j us­
t ice's court against the garnishee should remain in abeyance pend­
ing the appeal in the principal case. After j udgment the justice 
might issue his summons to show cause, the i ssue could then be 
joined, and proof of the circuit court j udgment, when introduced, 
would furn ish the foundation for a judgment against the gar­
nishee. Inasmuch as this practice was not [*422] followed, we 
have no alternative but to reverse the j udgment. Ko new trial 
will be necessary, as the circuit  court has no jurisdiction of the 
proceeding. 
Reversed. 
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This is the only decision I am aware of holding that the garnish-
ment does not go with the main action if it survives, but a court of
error will not consider errors in the garnishment proceedings on error
from the judgment in the main action. Judgment discharging the gar-
nishee has been held not to be stayed by an appeal in the absence of an
express order preserving the plaintiff's lien. Manuel! v. Bank of New
Richmond, rot Wis. 286, 77 N. W. 149; Webb v. Miller, 24 Miss. 638.
1K_Ij~rrI\'I_1£j'-‘$55.33-_§£]yv.-—“In all cases where the plaintiff shall appeal
* * t e Justice * * * shall return all garnishment proceedings ancillary
to such suit, together with the main action to the court to which the ap-
peal is taken, and thereafter proceedings against the garnishees may be
conducted in said last mentioned court in the same manner in all re-
spects as if originally commenced therein.” Comp. Laws, (1897) § 1018.
Nearly all the decisions are that n appeal from the judgment for
defendant preserves the lien if plaintit§'_o|3m<Tl'l1_é'_pifit:iW_s.—l3?2-
aawamieerm-<m1m1msrh————'—ee-7lTi75FTTS!mToZT§6'F\i)Z, 363;
L0wen.stein v. Powell, 68 Miss. 73; Ryan Drug Co. v. Peacock, 40 Minn.
470; Riley v. Nance, 97 Cal. 203; Ca[>crton v. M’Corkle, 5 Gratton (Va.)
177. But compare lllarwell v. Bank of New Richmond, above, and CONTRA:
Cam/v v. Hilliard, 58 N. Hamp. 42.
REID v. LINDSEY, in Pa. Sup. Ct., Nov. 5, 1883-104 Pa. St. 156.
Debt on bond of indemnity, by Lindsey, Sterrit & Co. against
George T. Van Doren, obligor, and Lewis Shanafelt and john C.
Reid, sureties, Reid only being served. From judgment for plain-
tiffs Reid brings error.
The bond sued on was given by Van Doren as general as-
signee for creditors of David M. Sample, to obtain a stay of
execution in favor of plaintiffs herein against said Sample, which,
before said assignment, had been levied on Sample’s merchandise
and store fixtures, Van Doren having petitioned for said stay and
that the judgment be opened to let him show the judgment to be
excessive. Afterward the judgment was opened for that purpose.
the issue twice retried and judgment finally entered for plaintiff
for $822 instead of $923, the amount of the original judgment.
In the meantime Sample was adjudicated a bankrupt, but the
assignee in bankruptcy never interfered with the goods.
On the trial of the present action defendant offered to prove
the value of the property subject to the levy at the time the last
judgment was rendered to show that the greater part of it could
have been realized therefrom. This testimony was objected to on
the ground that by opening the judgment the lieu of the levy was
discharged. The objection being sustained and exception taken
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GREEN, J. We decided in Batdorfi v. Focht, 44 Pa. St. (8
\*\/'r.) I95, that the lien of fieri facias upon goods levied on under
the writ was not lost by reason of a judicial order staying it until
a rule taken on part of the defendants should be disposed of.
although there was no stipulation in the order staying the writ
that its lien should remain. The very question was raised on the
record on distribution of the proceeds of the goods which were
sold on a subsequent writ, and the money was awarded to the
first writ upon the express ground that the lien was not lost. The
same doctrine was again declared in Bain v. Lyle, 68 Pa. St. (I8
P. F. S.) 60, and although in that case a bond had been given for
the return of the goods, it was held to be no substitute for the
[*r6o] goods, and that the lien of the execution was not dis-
charged. In Kiglttliltge/s Appeal, 101 Pa. St. (5 Out.) 540,
these cases were recognized as full authority for the rule, and
would certainly have been applied had the circumstances of that
case required it. It was unnecessary to do so, but only because an
order continuing the lien had been made when the stay of pro-
ceedings was granted. The rule itself was vindicated by \Vood-
ward, J., in Batdorff v. Focht, by the proposition that the lien of
fieri facias after levy is a vested lien which cannot be impaired by
an interlocutory order. Although, as was there said, it is the
usual and proper practice to direct that the lien shall remain,
when a stay is ordered, it was held to be unnecessary. The judge
said, “But where, as in this case, it is omitted, the lien must,
nevertheless, be regarded as preserved, for it is one of the vested
legal rights of the plaintiff, and can no more be sacrificed by an
edict of the court without a hearing than any of his other civil
rights, whether of liberty or property.” This reasoning is so
entirely satisfactory that it need not be extended. In Batdorff v.
Focht, and in Kightlingefs Appeal the lien was made effective b_v
awarding priority to the writs in the distribution of the proceeds
of the sale of the goods upon subsequent writs, although in the
latter case an interval of ‘nearly four years elapsed between the
granting and discharge of the rule to open the judgment. In
Ba/in v. Lyle an execution against Austin was levied upon goods
which were claimed by Corry. The latter gave an interpleader
bond to the sheriff, and the goods were thereupon delivered to
him. Subsequently they were sold on an execution against Corrv.
and purchased by a stranger. The interpleader issue being de-
cided in favor of Austin, it was held he might follow the goods
in the hands of the purchaser at the last sale. This, of course.
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GREEN, J. We decide.d in Batdorff v. Focht, 44 Pa. St. (8 
Wr. ) 195, that the lien of fieri facias upon goods levied on under 
the writ was not lost by reason of a j udicial order staying it until 
a rule taken on part of the defendants should be disposed of. 
although there was no stipulation in the order staying the writ 
that its lien should remain. The very question was raised on the 
record on distribution of the proceeds of the goods which were 
sold on a subsequent writ, and the money was awarded to the 
first writ upon the express ground that the lien was not lost. The 
same doctrine was again declared in Bain v. Lyle, 68 Pa. St. ( 18 
P. F. S. ) 6o, and although in that case a bond had been given for 
the return of the goods, it was held to be no substitute for the 
[*160]  goods, and that the lien of the execution was not dis­
charged. In Kightlinger's Appeal, 1 0 1  Pa. St. ( 5  Out. ) 540, 
these cases were recognized as full authority for the rule, and 
would certainly have been applied had the circumstances of that 
case required it. It  was unnecessary to do so, but only because an 
order continuing the lien had been made when the stay of pro­
ceedings was granted. The rule itself was vindicated by \Vood­
ward, J . ,  in Batdorff v. Focht, by the proposition that the l ien of 
fieri facias after levy i s  a vested lien which cannot be impaired by 
an interlocutory order. Although, as was there said, it is the 
usual and proper practice to direct that the lien shall remain, 
when a stay is ordered, it was held to be unnecessary. The j udge 
said, "But where, as in this case, i t  is  omitted, the lien must, 
nevertheless, be regarded as preserved, for i t  is one of the vested 
legal rights of the plaintiff, and can no more be sacrificed by an 
edict of  the court without a hearing than any of his other civil 
rights, whether of liberty or property." This reasoning is  so 
entirely satisfactory that it need not be extended. In Batdorff v. 
Focht, and in Kightlinger's Appeal the lien was made effective b�· 
awarding priority to the writs in the distribution of the proceeds 
of the sale of the goods upon _subsequent writs , although in the 
latter case an interval of ·nearly four years elapsed between the 
granting and discharge of  the rule to open the j udgment. In 
Bain v. Lyle an execution against Austin was levied upon goods 
which were claimed by Corry. The latter gave an in terpleader 
bond to the sheriff, and the goods were thereupon delivered to 
him. Subsequently they were sold on an execution against Corn· .  
an<l purchased by a stranger. The interpleader issue being d�­
cided in favor of Austin.  it was held he might fol low the goods 
in the hands of the purchaser at the last sale. This , of course. 
was upon the theory that the original execution creditor could not 
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be deprived of his recourse to the goods, notwithstanding they
had been given up to the adverse claimant upon his substituting
an interpleader bond in their place. In the present case the bond
given was a general indemnity bond only, and in no sense a sub-
stitute for the goods. It was for indenmity against all damages
which might be sustained by reason of the order staying proceed-
ings. It contained no provision for a return of the goods. It is
plain then that if any of the goods originally levied upon still
remained in the possession of the defendant in the execution, or of
his assignee, for the benefit of creditors, who is merely his repre-
sentative [In re Fu1t0n’s Est., 5I Pa. St. (I P. F. S.) 204], it was
the right of the plaintiff to seize them by another writ, and sell
them in satisfaction of his claim. If they had passed to an as-
signee in bankruptcy, which does not appear in the testimony,-
they would still be subject to the lien of the levy originally made.
The offer [*I6I] of proof was somewhat indefinite, but in sub-
stance. it was proposed to show the value of the goods which re-
mained subject to the levy at the time of the final judgment, and
that the plaintiffs could have realized the greater part of their
judgment out of personal property which remained subject to the
levy. This offer was rejected on the ground that the lien of the
execution was discharged, and that the property had passed to an
assignee for the benefit of creditors, and afterward to an assignee
in bankruptcy. This was an insufficient objection, and the learned
court below was in error in rejecting the offer, and the judgment
must therefore be reversed. The evidence offered was material
because it might show that the sureties in the indemnity bond were
released in whole or in part by the omission of the plaintiffs to
seize and sell the remaining goods. * * *
Judgment reversed and venire de 1102/0 awarded.
This case must be distinguished from Field v. Macullar, ante, p. 386,
in which the judgment was reversed on motion of the judgment debtor.
As there can be no execution without a judgment to be executed it is
clear that if the judgment is set aside the execution and all proceedings
thereon must fall. See Karr v. Schade, 75 Tenn. (7 Lea) 294; S/mulding
v. Lyon. 2 Abb. New Cas. (N. Y.) 203; May v. Cooper, 24 Hun (N. Y.)
7. Thus it was held that an execution on a judgment against three was
vacated by reversing the judgment as to one of the defendants. Phillip:
v. lVheeler, 67 N. Y. I04. But in the present case the judgment remained
so far as the judgment defendant was concerned. All that was done was
to allow a claimant of the goods to show a defense. Compare, Richards
v. Jlforris C. 6* B. C0,, ante, 453.
At common law a writ of error operated as a supersedeas from the
time of its allowance without any special order to that effect, and it is
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Le deprived of his recourse to the goods, notwithstanding t hr_v 
had been given up to the adverse claimant upon his substituting 
an interpleader bond in their place. In the present case the bond 
given was a general indemnity bond only, and in no sense a sub­
stitute for the goods. It was for indemnity against all damages 
which might be sustained by reason of the order staying proceed­
ings. It contained no provision for a return of the goods. It is 
plain then that if any of the goods originally levied upon still 
remained in the possession of the defendant in the execution, or of 
his assignee, for the benefit of creditors, who is merely his repre­
sentative [/ti re Fulton's Est., 5 1  Pa. St. ( 1 P. F. S. ) 204] , it was 
the right of the plaintiff to seize them by another writ, and sell 
them in satis faction of his claim. If they had passed to an as­
signee in bankruptcy, which does not appear in the testimony, · 
they would still be subj ect to the lien of the levy originally made. 
The offer [* 161 ] of proof was somewhat indefinite, but in sub­
stance. it was proposed to show the value of the goods which re­
mained subj ect to the levy at the time of the final j udgment, and 
that the plaintiffs could have realized the greater part of their 
j udgment out of personal property which remained subject to the 
levy. This offer was rejected on the ground that the lien of the 
execution was discharged , and that the property had passed to an 
assignee for the benefit of creditors, and afterward to an assignee 
in bankruptcy. This was an insufficient obj ection, and the learned 
court below was in error in rejecting the offer, and the j udgment 
must therefore be reversed. The evidence offered was material 
because it might show that the sureties in the indemnity bond were 
released in whole or in part by the omission of the plaintiffs to 
seize and sell the remaining goods. * * * 
lttdgment reversed and venire de novo ar<Loarded. 
This case must be distinguished from Field v. Macullar, ante, p. 386, 
in which the j udgment was reversed on motion of the j udgment debtor. 
As there can be no execution without a j udgment to be executed it is  
clear that i f  the j udgment is set aside the execution and all  proceedings 
thereon must fall. See Karr v. Schade, 75 Tenn. (7 Lea) 294 ;  Spaulding 
v. Lyo n, 2 Abb. New Cas. ( N. Y.) 203 ; May v. Cooper, 24 Hun (N. Y. ) 
7. Thus it was held that an execution on a judgment against three was 
vacated by revero;ing the judgment as to one of the defendants. Phillips 
v. Wheeler, 67 N. Y. 104. But in the present case the j udgment remained 
so far as the j udgment defendant was concerned. All that was done was 
to al low a claiman t of the goods to show a defense. Compare, Richards 
v. Morris C. & B. Co., ante, 453. 
At common law a writ of error operated as a supersedeas from the 
time of its allowance without any special order to that effect, and it is 
<mly where similar operation is given to the statutory appeal or writ of 
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error under the statute that such decisions as Rocco v. Parcsyk, 77 Tenn.
328, are found, unless a supersedeas was expressly granted by the court;
from which the real conflict between that case and Reid v. Lindsey clearly
appears. It is quite as reasonable to hold that the bond given to obtain
the supersedeas should take the place of the property as that the bond
for the appeal, which operates as a supersedeas, should do so. Acord-
ingly we find several decisions to the effect that a stay of proceedings
under execution or attachment divests the lieu of the writ. McCamy v.
Lawson, 4o Tenn. (3 Head) 256; Burks v. Bass, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb.) 338;
Eldridge v. Chambers, 47 Ky. (8 B. Mon.) 411. CONTRA: Besides Reid
v. Lindsey and cases cited, see Bond v. Willctt, 3! N. Y. 102, Freeman
v. Dawson, 110 U. S. 264.
Likewise, that the bond given to obtain an injunction takes the place
of the property held on the execution enjoined and the lien is discharged.
KEITH v. WILSON, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 201; BARNES v. BAKER, Minor (Ala) 373;
Lockridge v. Biggerstafi’, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 281, 87 Am. Dec. 498; Bisbce v.
Hull, 3 Ohio 449.
But on the other hand it is held that the lien is not divested by the
injunction (Knox v. Randall, 24 Minn. 479; Lamorcre v. Car, 32 La.
Ann. 246; DUCKETT v. DALRYMPLE, I Rich. L. (S. C.) 143), and the senior
- creditor is entitled to the proceeds of a sale under a junior writ, while the
injunction was in force (Lynn v. Gridley, Walk. (Miss.) 584, 12 Am. Dec.
591, contra Mitchell v. Anderson, I Hill L. (S. Car.) 69, 26 Am. Dec. 158),
provided, of course, a levy had been made under his writ before the
injunction issued. Lauut: v. Gross, I6 Ill. App. 329; Lynn v. Gridloy,
above. But see, Richards V. Morris C. 6‘ B. Co., 20 N. J. L 136, post 394.
Thus the conflict is seen to run all along the line, and no reason is
perceived why the effect of a stay, injunction, appeal operating as a super-
sedeas, or a delivery on bond should not each have as much effect on the
lieri of the execution or attachment as any other of them. Nor do I
remember any attempt in any of the cases above cited to distinguish them,
but, on the contrary, as in Rocco v. Parcsyk, the courts frequently argue
that one follows from the others. However, this distinction may be seen:
In Kentucky the court holds that ony of these, in behalf of the judgment
debtor, divests the lien, but replevin of the property from the sheriff by a
claimant does not, and after judgment against the claimant in the replevin
suit the property may, if found, be sold on the original execution. Fergu-
son v. Williams, 3 B. Mon. 302. See also Street v. Duncan, II7 Ala. 571,
23 South 523: HAGAN v. Lucas, 35 U. S. (10 Peters) 400.
What Is a Satisfaction and Rights Thereon.
ANION, In the Common Please of England, Mich. term, 2! Eliz., A.
D. 3 Dyer 363a.
The sheriff in the execution of a fieri facias, sold a term of the de-
fendant’s, by writ of ziandilioni e.1-ponas, and delivered the money in court
to the plaintiff; and afterwards for error the judgment is reversed; quacre
whether the term shall be restored, or only the money? \\/hereof t-here are
divers opinions; and MANWOOD, DYER and \\/RAY thought in Mich.
term, 21 Eliz., at table, that the restitution shall not be of the term (be-
cause it was legally sold through default of the party himself), but of
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ACCORD: Gould v. Sternberg, 128 I11. 510, 21 N. E. 628, 15 Am. St. 138;
M:-Bride v. Longworth, 14 Ohio 349, 84 Am, Dec. 383;Tmyer v. Schroci.-.er,
15 Minn. (2 Gil. 187) 241.
That the recovery is limited to the amount realized at the sale is
held in Park v. 1lItL¢’an, 36 Minn. 228, 30 N. W. 759, 1 Am. St. 665;
Bryant v. Fairficld, 51 Me. 149. CONTRA: Haebler v. Myers, 132 N. Y.
363, 30 N. E. 963, 28 Am. St. 589; Maynard v. May (Ky.), 25 S. W. 879.
HEILIG ET AL. v. LEMLEY AND SHAVER, ADM’RS., in N. Car.
Sup. Ct. Jan. Term, 1876—74 N. C. 250, 21 Am. Rep. 489.
Motion by plaintiffs for leave to issue execution on a judg-
ment recovered against defendant’s intestate and others, on
which execution had been issued and delivered to VV. A. Walton,
sheriff of the county, to be executed. The sheriff having failed
to execute the writ before it was spent, paid the amount named
in it to the plaintiffs, all of whom then signed an assignment of
the writ endorsed thereon to the sheriff’s son, L. VV. \-‘Valton, for
whose benefit this motion is made. From an order granting the
motion defendants appeal.
McCorkle & Bailey, for appellants, contended, (I) that there
had been no legal assignment of the judgment, and (2) that if
otherwise valid the assignment was void on grounds of public
policy, being obtained by money of the sheriff.
RODMAN, J. The question is whether a sheriff who has made
himself liable to a plaintiff by his negligent delay in collecting an
execution, and who pays off the debt in his own exoneration and
takes an assignment from the plaintiff to a third person in trust
for himself, has thereby extinguished the judgment, so that he
cannot have an alias execution issued to another officer upon it?
The cases cited by the learned counsel for the defendants
from New York do certainly establish that, in that state, upon
grounds of public policy, the judgment is absolutely extinguished.
Reed V. Pruyn, 7 Johns. 426: Sherman V. Boyce, 15 Johns. 443;
Bigeloru v. Provost, 5 Hill, 566. and others which may be found
cited in a note to Herman on Executions, 205. Nor is this doc-
trine confined to New York. It is so held in Alabama: Romzdtree
v. ;IVz'a2'er, 8 Ala. 314; Boren V. M’Gchec, 6 Porter, 432; Crutch-
field V. Haynes, I4 Ala. 49: in Tennessee, Smith v. Herman, I
Cold. 141; but see Lint: V. Thompson, I Head 456; in Missouri,
Garth v. McCampl;cll, 10 M0. 154; in Maine and Massaelmsetts,
unless the sheriff takes an assignment from the plaintiff, the judg-
ment [*252] is extinguished. but if he does, it is not. lVl11'tIicr V.
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ACCORD : Gould v. Sternberg, 128 111. 510, 21 N. E. 628, IS Am. St. 138 : 
McBride v. Lo ngworth, 14 Ohio 349, &I Am. Dec. 383 ; Troyer v. Schroeizer, 
IS M inn. (2 Gil. 187) 241. 
That the recovery is limited to the amount real ized at the sale is 
held in  Pr.ck \' . .McLean, 36 Minn. 228, 30 N. W. 759, 1 Am. St. 665 ; 
Bryant v. Fairfield, S I  Me. 149. CoNTRA : Haebler v. Myers, 132 N. Y. 
363, 30 N. E. 963, 28 Am. St. s89 ;  Maynard v. May ( Ky. ) ,  25 S. W. 879. 
HEILIG ET AL. v. LEMLEY AND SHAVER, ADM'RS., in N. Car. 
Sup. Ct. Jan. Term, 1876---74 N. C. 250, 21 Am. Rep. 48g. 
l\Iotion by plaintiffs for leave to issue execution on a judg­
ment recovered against defendant's intestate and others, on 
which execution had been issued and delivered to \V. A. Walton, 
sheriff of the county, to be executed. The sheriff having failed 
to execute the writ before it was spent, paid the amount nafll(ld 
in it to the plaintiffs, all of whom then signed an assignment of  
the writ endorsed thereon to the sheriff's son , L. \V. \Valton, for 
whose benefit this motion is made. From an order granting the 
motion defendants appeal. 
McCorkle & Bailey, for appellants, contended, ( 1 )  that there 
had been no legal assignment of the j udgment, and ( 2) that if 
otherwise valid the assignment was void on grounds of publ ic 
policy, being obtained by money of the sheriff. 
Rom.1 A:N', J. The question is whether a sheriff who has made 
himself liable to a plaintiff by his negligent delay in collecting an 
execution, and who pays off the debt in his own exoneration and 
takes an assignment from the plaint iff to a third person in trust 
for himsel f, has thereby extinguished the j udgment, so that he 
cannot have an alias execution issued to another officer upon it ? 
The cases cited by the learned counsel for the dcf enclants 
from N e\v York do certainly establ ish that, in that state, upon 
grounds of publ ic policy, the judgment is absolutely extinguished. 
Recd v. Pruyn, 7 Johns. 426 : Sherman. v. Bo}'Ce, 1 5  Johns. 443 ; 
B igelo·w v. Pr01.1ost, 5 Hill ,  566, and others which may be found 
cited in a note to Herman on Executions, 205. Nor is this doc­
trine confined to New York. It is so held in Alabama : Rou ndtree 
v. : TV ca-z •er, 8 Ala. 3 14 : B o ren v. M' Gehee, 6 Porter, 432 : Crutch­
field v. H a�·11 es, 14 Ala. 49 : in Tennessee, Sm ith v. Herman, 1 
('old. 141 ; but see Li11t:: v. Th ompson, 1 I leacl 456 ; in Missouri, 
Garth v . .M cCampbcll, I O  Mo. 1 54 ;  in 1\faine and l\fassachuset ts, 
unless the sheriff takes an assignment from the plaintiff, the judg­
ment [ *252 ] is exting-uished . but i f  he docs, it is not. H'lr it ticr v. 
Hcm im.f.!ay, 22 Mc, 238 ; .A llc1t v. Holden,  9 :\fass. 1 33 ;Dwrn v. 
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Snell, 15 Mass. 481. So in Georgia, Arnett v. Cloud, 2 Ga., 53;
and perhaps in some other states.
The foundation of all these cases seems to be that of Reed v.
Pruyn. In that case the sheriff having a ca. sa. against Staats,
under which Staats was arrested, procured him and Pruyn to
confess a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for a larger sum,
and the sheriff paid the amount of the execution to the plaintiff.
In a few days he took out a ca. so. on the judgment confessed
by Staats and Pruyn, and took their note for a still larger
sum, and gave them a receipt for the amount of the first
judgment. Afterwards the sheriff advertised the property of
Pruyn and Staats for sale under an execution upon the judg-
ment confessed, and they moved to set aside the execution, and
for an entry of satisfaction on the judgment confessed. The
court granted the motion, and there can be no doubt was right in
doing so. '
A sheriff who has an execution against a defendant and as
the price of indulgence takes from him a judgment confessed,
or a note, for a larger sum, is guilty of oppression and a breach
of official duty, and on grounds of public policy such judgment
confessed, or note, must be held void, notwithstanding the sheriff
has paid the plaintiff in the original judgment the amount of his
claim. And a fortiori any acts of the sheriff after he had acquired
his interest, under an execution whether issued upon the original
judgment confessed, were in like manner void as to the defendant
in the execution. This last proposition has long been settled.
Bat. Rev. chap 25, Coroner; chap, 106, Sheriff; McLeod v.
McCall, 3 jones L. 87: Stewart v. Rutherford, 4 jones L. 483.
And the first we conceive to be equally clear upon general prin-
ciples. See also Bat. Rev. chap. 106, sec. 17.
Kent, C.]., in delivering the opinion of the court (after citing
the cases of Waller v. ll/eedale, Noy. (Eng.) 107; Ltlngdon v.
Wallis, ["253] E. Lutw. folio, p. 587, Eng. Ed. vol. 1, p. 223;
Slwalre v. Richards, Hob. 206, and Ward v. H anclwt, 1 Keb. 5 51),
says, “The practice of sheriffs of paying executions themselves,
and taking security and judgment bonds from the party over
whom they have at the time such means of coercion is to be
strictly and vigilantly watched by the courts. Such humanity is
imposing, but it may be turned into cruelty. Nothing is more
important to the honor of the administration of justice, than that
the ofiicers of the court shall not use its process as the means of
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Snell, 1 5  Mass. 481 .  So in Georgia, Arnett v. Cloud, 2 Ga., 53 ; 
and perhaps in some other states. 
The foundation of all these cases seems to be that of Recd v. 
Pruyn.  In that case the sheriff having a ca. sa. against Staats, 
under which Staats was arrested, procured him and Pruyn to 
- confess a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for a larger sum, 
and the sheriff paid the amount of the execution to the plaintiff. 
In a few days he took out a ca. sa. on the j udgment confessed 
by Staats and Pruyn, and took their note for a still larger 
sum, and gave them a receipt for the amount of the first 
j udgment. Afterwards the sheriff advertised the property of 
Pruyn and Staats for sale under an execution upon the j udg­
ment con fessed , and they moved to set aside the execution, and 
for an entry of satisfaction on the j udgment confessed.  The 
court granted the motion , and there can be no doubt was right in 
doing so. 
A sheriff who has an execution against a defendant and as 
the price of indulgence takes from him a j udgment confessed, 
or a note, for a larger sum, is guilty of oppression and a breach 
o f  official duty, and on grounds of publ ic policy such judgment 
confessed, or note, must be held void, notwithstanding the sheriff 
has paid the plaint iff in the original j udgment the amount of his 
claim. And a fortiori any act s of the sheriff after he had acquired 
his interest, under an execution whether issued upon the original 
j udgment confessed, were in like manner void as to the defendant 
in the execution. This last proposit ion has long been settled . 
nat. Rev. chap 25 ,  Coroner ; chap, Io6, Sheriff ; ft[ cL eod v. 
McCall, 3 Jones L. 87 : Ste<.Part v. Rutherford, 4 Jones L. 483 . 
. \ nd the first we conceive to be equally clear upon general prin­
ciples. See also Bat. Rev. chap. 106, sec. 1 7. 
Kent, C.J . ,  in del ivering the opinion of the court ( a fter cit ing 
the cases of Waller v. T¥ecdale, Noy. ( Eng. ) 107 ; Langdon v. 
rval!is, [ *253] E. Lutw. folio, p. 587, Eng. Ed. vol . I ,  p .  22� ; 
Speake v. Richards, Hob. 2o6, and T¥ ard v. H azichet, I Keb. 55 I ) ,  
says, "The practice of sheriffs of paying executions themselves, 
and taking security and judgment bonds from the party over 
whom they have at the time such means of coercion is to he 
strictly and vigilantly watched by the courts. Such human i ty is 
imposing, but it may be turned into cruelty. Nothing is more 
important to the honor of the administration of justice, than that 
the officers of the court shall not use its process as the means of 
making unequal bargains ,  and tak ing undue advantage. The 
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facts in this case have the appearance of an instance of gross
abuse.”
He concludes by saying, “I am happy therefore that the
sheriff will be driven to seek his remedy upon the note, when the
legality of the increase of the original debt will be open to further
investigation."
We think that in the subsequent cases in New York, and in
the others elsewhere that have followed this case, the opinion of
the eminent judge has been misconceived, and an extension given
to it which was not intended, and which cannot be supported by
reason. An opinion applicable to a special case, has been con-
verted into a general and arbitrary rule.
In the present case, the sheriff having an execution against
the defendant paid it to the plaintiff in his own exoneration and
took an assignment on the execution to his son, whether as a
trustee for himself, or as a gift to the son, is not material. He
now moves that an alias execution may issue to his successor in
office, for his benefit. There has been no oppression as there
clearly was in the case of Read v. Pruyn, and the debt has not
been increased.
We are at a loss to conceive what public policy will be vio-
lated if the motion is allowed.
It is said that if a sheriff can escape amercement by paying
an execution which it was his duty to collect, he will be induced
to delay enforcing executions, and creditors may be injured. The
creditor cannot be injured if the debt is paid. [“254] And it can-
not be a wrong to the debtor if a sheriff who, relying perhaps on
his promise to pay the money by the return day, has made himself
liable by his indulgence, is allowed after payment to stand in the
position of the creditor. If public policy forbids such payments
by sheriffs, and for that reason the judgment is extinguished, it
would seem that the same principle would forbid any recovery
by the sheriff of the money so paid by him. But the principal
case we have commented on holds that the sheriff might sue upon
the note which he had taken and recover what might be just.
It is also said in Rozmdtree V. I/I/eavcr, that the sheriff in an
action against the defendant can recover the money paid for his
benefit. And in Lin-is v. Thompson it is said that if the sheriff
is compelled to pay the debt by a judgment of a court, there is an
implied transfer of the plaintiff’s debt to him. These cases thus
acknowletlged that it would be inequitable for a defendant to
receive the benefit of the sheriff's payment, and refuse to reim-
















































































































































474 CASES ON EXEC U T I O N S, ETC. 
facts m this case have the appearance of an instance of gross 
abuse." 
He concludes by saying, "I am happy therefore that the 
sheriff will be driven to seek his remedy upon the note, when the 
legality of the increase of the original debt will be open to further 
investigation ." 
\Ve think that in the subsequent cases in New York, and in 
the others elsewhere that have followed this case, the opinion of 
the eminent judge has been misconceived, and an extension given 
to it which was not intended, and which cannot be supported by 
reason . An opinion applicable to a special case, has been con­
verted into a general and arbitrary rule. 
In the present case, the sheriff having an execution against 
the defendant paid it to the plaintiff in his own exoneration and 
took an assignment on the execution to his son , whether as a 
trustee for himself, or as a gift to the son, is not material. He 
now moves that an alias execution may issue to his successor in 
office, for his benefit. There has been no oppression as there 
clearly was in the case of Reed v. Pruyn., and the debt has not 
been increased. 
We are at a loss to conceive what public policy w ill be vio­
lated if the motion is allowed. 
It i s  said that i f  a sheriff can escape amercement by paying 
an execution which it was his duty to collect, he will be induced 
to delay enforcing executions, and creditors may be inj ured. The 
creditor cannot be inj ured if the debt is paid. [*254] And it can­
not be a wrong to the debtor if a sheriff who, relying perhaps on 
his promise to pay the money by the return day, has made himself 
liable by his indulgence, is allowed after payment to stand in the 
position of the creditor. If public policy forbids such payments 
by sheriffs, and for that reason the j udgment is extinguished, it 
would seem that the same principle would forbid any recovery 
by the sheriff of the money so paid by him. Rut the principal 
case we have commented on holds that the sheriff might sue upon 
the note which he had taken and recover what might be just. 
It is also said in Roundtree v. ff/ eaver, that the sheriff in an 
action against the defendant can recover the money paid for his 
benefit. And in Lin!:: v. Tho mpson. it i s  said that i f  the sheriff 
is compel led to pay the debt by a j udgment of a court , there is an 
implied transfer of the plaintiff's debt to him. These cases thus 
acknowledged that it would be inequitable for a defendant to 
receive the benefit of the sheriff's paymen t, and refuse to reim­
burse him . It is true that the defendant did not previously re-
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quest the sheriff to pay the debt, and that in general no one can
make himself the creditor of another by officious service, or by
ofliciously paying a debt for him. But where a sheriff, at the
express or presumed request of a defendant in execution, indulges
him so that the sheriff is compelled to pay the debt, there is a
clear equity for reimbursement. The acceptance of the discharge
of the original debt by the defendant in execution, may be con-
sidered as a ratification of the sheriff’s act, and as equivalent to a
prior request. It is somewhat like a case where one accepts a
draft about to be protested for non-acceptance, for the honor of
the drawer. If this equity for reimbursement be admitted as a
foundation for an action, why is it illegal and against public
policy for the sheriff to take an assignment of the execution,
which gives him no more than he would have a right to recover?
The form of the recovery is not an essential part [*z55] of the
equity, and there is no reason why the sheriff should be put to
the circuity of an action.
It has been seen that in Maine and Massachusetts it is held
that where the sheriff takes an assignment of the judgment from
the plaintiff in execution, the judgment is not extinguished. The
decisions in those states support our decision in the present case.
\Ve think also that they imply that it is not against public policy
for a sheriff to pay off a debt in his own exoneration; for if it
were, an assignment would not be sustained.
VVe concur with the judge below, that the motion should be
allowed. Let this opinion be certified.
Per C uriam. Judgment afiirmed.
“If a sheriff shall pay the amount of an execution to discharge him-
self * * "‘ the defendant may avail himself of such payment to have the
judgment satisfied, but he thereby becomes liable to the sheriff for the
money paid for his use.” Poe v. Dorrah, 20 Ala. 288, 51 Am. Dec. 196.
In any action of debt for the benefit of the officer against the debtor,
it is no defense that the judgment had been paid by the sheriff. Allen v.
Holden, 9 Mass. 133, 6 Am. Dec. 46. 1%
BONES v. AIKEN AND POWELL, in Iowa Sup. Ct., Dec. I8, I872—
35 Iowa 534-
Petition by Bones to restrain the enforcement of judgments
against himself and Aiken as partner, recovered after the dis-
solution of the partnership. Aiken had taken assignments of the
judgments and procured executions thereon, which Powell as
sheriff was about to levy on the individual property of Bones. A
preliminary injunction was issued, and upon hearing was dis-
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quest the sheriff to pay the debt, and that in general no one can 
make himsel f the creditor of another by officious service, or by 
officiously paying a debt for him. But where a sheriff, at the 
express or presumed request of a defendant in execution, indulges 
him so that the sheriff is compelled to pay the debt, there is a 
clear equity for reimbursement. The acceptance of the discharge 
of the original debt by the defendant in execution, may be con­
sidered as a ratification of the sheriff's act, and as equivalent to a 
prior request. I t  is somewhat like a case where one accepts a 
draft about to be protested for non-acceptance, for the honor of 
the drawer. I f  this equity for reimbursement be admitted as a 
foundation for an action, why is it i llegal and against public 
policy for the sheriff to take an assignment of the execution , 
which gives him no more than he would have a right to recover ? 
The form of  the recovery is not an essential part [*255 1  of the 
equity, and there is no reason why the sheriff should be put to 
the circuity o f  an action. 
It has been seen that in Maine and Massachusetts it is held 
that where the sheriff takes an assignment of the judgment from 
the plaintiff in execution, the judgment is not extinguished. The 
decisions in those states support our decision in the present case. 
\Ve think also that they imply that it is not against public policy 
for a sheriff to pay off a debt in his own exoneration ; for if i t  
were, an assignment would not be sustained . 
\Ve concur w ith the j udge below, that the motion should be 
al lowed . Let this opinion be certified. 
Per Cttria111-. Judgment aflirm ed. 
"If a sheriff shall pay the amount of an execution to discharge him­
self * * * the defendant may avail himself of such payment to have the 
j udgment satisfied, but he thereby becomes liable to the sheriff for the 
money paid for his use." Poe v. Darrah, 20 Ala. 288, 51 Am. Dec. 196. 
In any action of debt for the benefit of the officer against the debtor, 
i t  is no defense that the judgment had been paid by the sheriff. A llen v. 
Holden, 9 Mass. 133, 6 Am. Dec. 46. 
-J 
BONES v. AIKEN AND POWELL, in  Iowa Sup. Ct., Dec. 18, 18;2-
35 Iowa 534 
Petition by Dones to restrain the enforcement of j udgments 
against himsel f and Aiken as partner, recovered after the dis­
solution of the partnership. Aiken had taken assignments of  the 
j udgments and procured executions thereon, which Powell as 
sheriff  was about to levy on the individual property of Bom·s. A 
preliminary injunct ion was issued , and upon hearing was dis­
solved as to one of the judgments. Plaintiff appeals. 
476 c.\s1:s ON EXECUTIONS, ere.
MILLER, J. * * * As ground for dissolving the injunction
issued the defendant Aiken showed that in the articles of disso-
lution of the partnership the plaintiff had agreed to pay the claim
of \Vellington Bros. 8: Co. and to release Aiken from his liability
thereon, and that plaintiff failed to pay the claim; and under and
by virtue of such agreement Aiken claimed that he was but a
surety, and as such purchased the judgment and took an assign-
ment thereof. It is urged in argument that as between the plain-
tiff and Aiken the latter was not liable on the judgment, and could
therefore purchase the same as any other person and enforce it
against the plaintiff. Appellees’ counsel cite no authority in sup-
port of this proposition.
On the other hand, it is well settled that at law the payment
of a judgment to the plaintiff or owner by one [*536] of several
defendants extinguishes it, even though such payment be made by
a defendant who is mere surety. So also an assignment by the
plaintiff or owner of the judgment to one of several defendants
in the judgment works the same consequence. The Bank of Sa-
linn v. Abbott, 3 Denio I81 ; On-ta-rio Bank v. iValker, I Hill 652.
If Aiken be but surety he may, perhaps, on making a proper
case, be entitled in equity to be subrogated to the rights of the
judgment plaintiffs. But in law the judgment is extinguished,
and no execution can issue thereon as such, though Aiken might
have an action at law to recover the money paid, based on the
plaintiff’s agreement.
The judgment being satisfied, the execution was void and
conferred no power on the sheriff to levy on plaintiff’s property.
The judgment, therefore, must be reversed.
Cons, _I., dissenting. It is apparent from the whole case, and.
indeed, it is not controverted ,that as between the plaintiff and
the defendant Aiken, the plaintiff ought to pay the judgments;
that by the terms of their dissolution the plaintiff had agreed to
pay the debts for which they were rendered. In equity. then,
plaintiff is bound to pay them, and a court of equity would com-
pel him so to do. Now, while in a court of law, the defendant
may not have the right to enforce payment by execution (and
that is the precise point ruled in the cases cited in the foregoing
opinion), yet the plaintiff has brought this action in a court of
e(|11it_\', and asks that court to enjoin the defendant from com-
pelling him to pay a debt, which in equity he ought to pay. In
such case the elemental rule is that he who asks equity must him-
















































































































































CASES O N  EXECUTIONS, ETC. 
MILLER, J. * * * As ground for dissolving the inj unction 
issued the defendant Aiken showed that in the articles of disso­
lution of the partnership the plaintiff had agreed to pay the claim 
of \Vellington Bros. & Co. and to release Aiken from his l iability 
thereon, and that plaintiff failed to pay the claim ; and under and 
by virtue of such agreement Aiken daimed that he was but a 
surety; and as such purchased the j udgment and took an assign­
ment thereof. It is urged in argument that as between the plain­
tiff and Aiken the latter was not liable on the judgment, and could 
therefore purchase the same as any other person and enforce it 
against the plaintiff. Appellees' counsel cite no authority in sup­
port of this propos1t1on. 
On the other hand, it is well settled that at law the payment 
of a judgment to the plaintiff or owner by one [ *536) of several 
defendants extinguishes it, even though such payment be made by 
a defendant who is mere surety. So also an assignment by the 
plaintiff or owner of the j udgment to one of several defendants 
in the j udgment works the same consequence. Tlte Bank of Sa­
lina v. Abbott, 3 Denio 1 8 1 ; Ontario Bank v. ,Valker, 1 Bill 652. 
I f  A iken be but surety he may, perhaps, on making a proper 
case, be entitled in equity to be subrogated to the rights of the 
j udgment plaintiffs. But in law the judgment is extinguished, 
and no execution can i ssue thereon as such, though Aiken might 
have an action at law to recover the money paid, based on the 
plaintiff's agreement. 
The j udgment being- satisfied, the execution was void and 
con ferred no power on the sheriff to levy on plaint iff's property. 
The judgme11t, therefore, must be re·ucrsed. 
Cor.E, J., d i ssenting. It is apparent from the whole case, and. 
indeed , it i s  not controverted ,that as between the plaintiff and 
the defendant Aiken , the plaintiff ought to pay the judgments ; 
that by the terms of their dissolut ion the plaintiff had ag-reed to 
pay the debts for which they were rendered . In equity. then , 
plaintiff is bound to pay them , and a court of equity would com­
pel him so to do. Kow, while in a court of law, the defendant 
may not have the right to enforce payment by execution ( and 
that is the precise point ruled in the cases cited in the foregoing 
opin ion ) , yet the plaintiff has brought this action in a court of 
eq u ity, and asks that court to enjoin the defendant from com­
pel l i n g  him to pay a debt, which in equi ty he ought to pay. In 
such case the elemental rule i s  that he who ask s  equity must him­
sel f first do equity. The plaintiff must pay the debt which. in 
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equity, he owes, before he can properly ask a court of equity to
interfere. A court of equity will not enjoin legal process, which
can [*537] effectuate no injustice. To first enjoin the legal pro-
cess, and then grant the same relief in equity is a work of super-
erogation. For this reason I think the judgment should be
afiirmed. '
A perpetual injunction was awarded on similar facts in Hinton v.
Odenkeimor, 4 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 406.
The general rule is that when a 'ud ent is recovered a ainst sev-
ral equally Bound to pay, none can make use of the jud ment to com el
e
con§~ Ezfimg an assignment of it to a tEir?d_ §art2 msteaa bf
paymg rt, oyer v. 0 en er, 124 a. . 324; on v. 0 en, 9 Mass. 133,
6 Am. l5ec. 46;/ldams v. Drake, 65 Mass. (11 Cush) 504; Stanley v. Nutter,
16 N. Hamp. 22; Klippd v. Shields, 90 Ind. 81; for the assignment operates
as a satisfaction. And the same rule was applied against sureties in both
of the cases cited in the principal case above, as it has been in many
others. Preslar v. Stallworlh, 37 Ala. 402.
But there are a few cases, some of them due to statutes, sanctiomng
the use of execution in this way to enforce contribution from co-debtors
(Cafiee v. Tmxis, 17 Cal. 239; Huckaby v. Sasser, 69 Ga. 603; Campbell
v. Pope, 96 M0. 468; Thornton v. Damm, 120 Mich. 510, 79 N. W. 797;
Ankcny v. Motfett, 37 Minn. 109; Durand v. Trusdell, 44 N. J. L. 597);
or payment by the principal to the surety who has paid. Giddens V. Wil-
liamson, 65 Ala. 339; Montgomery v. Viclrery, 110 Ind. 211 ;Zimmerman V.
Gaumt‘r, 152 Ind. 522; Harris v. Frank, 29 Kan. 200; Barringer v. Boyden,
7 Jones Law (N. Car.) 187: Harbeck v. Vanderbilt, 20 N. Y. 395. And in
case of payment by a surety, if he has no right to execution at law, he is
entitled for that very reason to subrogation in equity without taking any
assignment. Dempsey v. Bush, 18 Ohio St. 376; Flemming v. Beaver,
2 Rawle (Pa.) 128, 19 Am. Dec. 629; McClung v. Beirne, 10 Leigh (Va.)
394, 34 Am. Dec. 739; Chandler v. Higgins, 109 Ill. 602; Wilson v. Barney,
9 Neb. 39; Hayes v. Ward, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 123, 8 Am. Dec. 554;
McKenna v. Corcoran, 70 N. J. Ch. 627, 61 Atl. 1026.
If two are equally and jointly bound to pay a debt and one pays the
whole judgment he is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the judg-
ment creditor to reach property in the hands of an assignee of the other
debtor. Sands v. Durham (1901), 99 Va. 263, 38 S. E. 145, 86 Am. St.
Rep. 884.
MCCARVER v. NEALEY, in Iowa Sup. Ct., May Term, 1848-1 G.
Greene (Iowa) 360.
llill in equity by Nealey against McCarver, and Todd &
Sons, praying for injunction. From decree granting the in-
junction as prayed defendants appeal.
G1<|:1':1\‘1-3, J. On the 4th of June, 1841, a judgment was, ren-
dered against James \V. Nealey in favor of Morton M .McCarver,
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equity, he owes, before he can properly a�k a court of  equity to 
interfere. A court of equity will not enj oin legal process, which 
can [ •537 ]  effectuate no injustice. To first enjoin the legal pro­
cess, and then grant the same relief in equity is a work of super­
erogation. For this reason I think the j udgment should be 
affirmed. 
A perpetual inj unction was awarded on similar facts in Hinton v. 
Odenkeimer, 4 Jones Eq. ( N. Car. ) 4o6. 
The general rule is that when a · ud ent is recovered a ainst sev­
era equa y ound to pay, none can ma e use of the j u  ment to com e 
con a mg an assignment of it to a t 1r art instea f 
paying it, oyer v. o eH er, 124 a. . 324 ; en v. o en, 9 Mass. 133, 
� Am. Dec. 46 ;Adams v. Drake, 65 Mass. ( I I  Cush ) 504 ; Stanley v. Nutter, 
16 N. Hamp. 22 ; Klippel v. Shields, 90 Ind. 81 ; for the assignment operates 
as a satisfaction. And the same rule was applied against sureties in both 
of the cases cited in the principal case above, as it has been in many 
others. Preslar v. Stallwo rth, 37 Ala. 402. 
But there are a few cases, some of them due to statutes, sanctioning 
the use of execution in this way to enforce contribution from co-debtors 
( Co ffee v. Tn:is, 17 Cal. 239 ; Huckaby v. Sasser, 6g Ga. 6o3 ; Campbell 
v. Pope, g6 Mo. 468 ; Thornton v. Damm, 120 Mich. 510, 79 N. W. 797 ; 
Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109 ; Durand v. Trusdell, 44 N. J. L. 597 ) ; 
or payment by the principal to the surety who has paid. Giddens v. Wil­
liamsoH, 65 Ala. 339 ; Montgomery v. Vicker)", 1 10 Ind. :.!I I ; Zim merma n  v. 
Ga umer, 152  Ind. 522 ; llarris v. Frank, 29 Kan. 200 ; Barringer v. Boyden, 
7 Jones Law ( N. Car. ) 187 ; Harbeck v. Vat1derbilt, 20 N. Y. 395. And in 
case of payment by a surety, i f  he has no right to execution at law, he is 
entitled for that very reason to subrogation in equity without taking any 
assignment. Dempsey v. B11sl1,  18 Ohio St. 376 ; Flem ming v. Beai•er, 
2 Rawle ( Pa. ) 128, 19 Am. Dec. 629 ; McClung v. Beirne, 10 Leigh ( Va. ) 
39-t. 34 Am. Dec. 739 ; Chandler v. Higgins, 109 Ill .  6o2 ; Wilson v. Bunte)', 
9 Neb. 39 ; Hayes v. Ward, 4 Johns. Ch. ( N. Y.)  123, 8 Am. Dec. 554 ; 
McKen na v. Corco ran , 70 N. J. Ch. 627, 61 Atl. 1026. 
If two are equally and jointly bound to pay a debt and one pays the 
whole j udgment he is  entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the j udg­
ment creditor to reach property in the hands of an assignee of the other 
debtor. Sa,,ds v. Durham ( 1901 ) ,  99 Va. 263, J8 S. E. 145, 86 Am. St. 
Rep. 884. 
McCARVER v. NEALEY, in Iowa Sup. Ct., May Term, 18-tB-1 G. 
Greene ( Iowa ) 36o. 
Bill in equity by Nealey against McCarver, and Todd & 
Sons,  praying for mJ unction. From decree granting the in­
j unction as prayed defendants appeal . 
GR1mllm, J .  On the 4th of  June, 184 1 ,  a judgment was.  rcn-
J dered against James \V. Nealey in favor of Morton M .l\kCarver,  for the sum of $ 1 55 .47 . On the same day an ass ignment of it , 
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purporting to be for value received, was made upon the margin
of the judgment to Ira Todd and Sons. It appears that Joseph
I D. Learned, Esq., was the plaintiff's attorney of record. He
caused execution to be issued, and thereupon entered into an ar-
\ rangement with Nealey, by which [*36I] he, as attorney, gave
‘ him a receipt in full discharge of the judgment. Subsequently
Todd and Sons, the judgment assignees, procured the issue of
) another execution, which was enjoined by the proceeding now
\ before us, upon the complaint of N ealey v. McCarver and Todd &
Sons. Upon a full hearing in the district court the injunction was
‘decreed perpetual, and an appeal thereon taken to this court. * * *
It is contended that Learned’s authority as attorney of record
ceased on the rendition of the judgment; and that he had no right
to receive the pay or give a receipt in satisfaction. The practice
of Kentucky is referred to in support of this position. It has been
the recogmzed custom for
attorneys to control demands placed in their hands till finally col-
'fecfeEl. This custom was recogmzed By an early statute, which _
Wed the exclusive authority upon the attorney of record for
the judgment claimant to enter satisfaction. On obtaining a de-
mand _from a client, it is usually specified in the receipt given by
the attorney that the demand is taken for collection. This rule
has been so generally recognized and adopted in Iowa, that to
reverse it might work great [*36z] injustice to parties. But it
is alleged that, even if he should be regarded as the attorney of
McCarver after the rendition of judgment, his authority as such
was not transferred to Todd and Sons after the assignment, unless
recognized by them; and that, therefore, the payment of the judg-
ment to him was unauthorized, and should not release Nealey.
This conclusion we should recognize as correct, if it appeared that
Nealey had received notice of the judgment assignment. VVith-
out notice, he should be protected as an innocent party to the
transaction.
The testimony of J. W. Nealey, in reply to defendants’ inter-
rogatories, discloses that Learned received in payment from him
\ a demand against himself for about fifty dollars, an order on one
Russell for an unknown amount, which was paid, and the balance
in money.
The principle is not controverted that an attorney has no
right to receive anything but money in satisfaction of a demand
placed in his hands for collection, unless especially authorized
















































































































































CASES 01'i EX ECUTIO N S, ETC. \ purporting to be for value received, was made upon the margin 
of the j udgment to Ira Todd and Sons. It appears that Joseph 
t D. Learned, Esq. , was the plaintiff's attorney of record. He 
caused execution to be issued, and thereupon entered into an ar­
\ rangement w ith Nealey, by which [*36 1 ]  he, as attorney, gave 
, him a receipt in full discharge of the judgment. Subsequently 
Todd and Sons, the j udgment assignees, procured the issue of 
) another execution, which was enjoined by the proceeding now 
\ before us, upon the complaint of  Nealey v. McCarver and Todd & 
Sons. Upon a ful l  hearing in the district court the inj unction was 
�decreed perpetual, and an appeal thereon taken to this court. * * * 
\ It is contended that Learned's authority as attorney of record 
ceased on the rendition of the judgment ; and that he had no right 
to receive the pay or give a receipt in satisfaction. The practice 
of Kentucky is referred to in support of this position. It has been_ 
... the recognized custom. since our first territorial organization. for 
attorneys to control demands placed in their hands till finally col-
jecteL '!'his custom was recognized hy an early statute, which 
conferred the exclusive authority upon the attorney of record for 
the judgment claimant to enter satisfaction. On obtaining a d�­
mand .from a client, it is  usually specified in the receipt given bv 
the attorney that the demand is taken for collection. This rule 
has been so generally recognized and adopted in Iowa, that to 
reverse it might work great [*362] inj ustice to part ies. But it 
is atleged that, even if he should be regarded as the attorney of 
McCarver after the rendition of j udgment, his authority as such 
was not transferred to Todd and Sons after the assignment, unless 
recognized by them ; and that, therefore, the payment of the j udg­
ment to him was unauthorized, and should not release Nealev. 
This conclusion we should recognize as correct, i f  it appeared th�t 
N caley had received notice of the j udgment assignment. \Vith­
out notice, he should be protected as an innocent party to the 
transaction. 
The testimony of J. W. Nealey, in reply to defendants' inter­
\ rogatories, discloses that Learned received in  payment from him 
\ a demand against himself for about fi fty dotlars, an order on one 
( 
Russell for an unknown amount, which was paid, and the balance 
m money. 
The principle is  not controverted that an attorney has no 
right to receive anything but money in satisfaction of a demand 
placed in his hands for cotlection, unless especially authorized 
to do so by his client. And it is  equally well settled , that if  he 
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applies such a claim in payment of his own debts, his client is not
bound thereby, and may still proceed against the defendant.
Gullett v. Lewis, 3 Stew. 23; Cost v. Genette, 1 Porter 212;
Craig v. Ely, 5 Stew. and Porter 354; Tankersley v. Anderson,
4 Desaus. (S. Car.) 45; Smack v. Dade, 5 Rand. (\/'a.) 639;
Langdon v. Potter, 13 Mass. 319.
\Ve find~ it difficult to ascertain the precise amount that
Learned, as attorney, received in money on the payment of the
judgment. His deposition states that it was settled by setting off
a demand which Nealey had against him. From the responsive
answer of Nealey, to which, from the state of the testimony before
us, we give particular credence, it is rendered quite certain that
all but about fifty dollars was paid in money. The order on
Russell for cash of Nealey’s was paid and should be regarded as
so much money in the hands of Learned.
It is therefore our opinion, that Ira Todd and Sons are en-
titled to recover from James VV. Nealey, on the execution, the sum
of fifty dollars, and that the injunction be so far dissolved [*363]
as to enable the recovery thereof, and rendered perpetual as to
the balance of said judgment and execution.
The decree of the district court, declaring the injunction per-
petual, will be changed in conformity with this opinion.
The cases are generally in accord with the above. In the following
cases the judgment creditors were held bound by payments made to the
attorney who recovered the judgments, though no proof of authority to
collect was made and the money was never received by the judgment
creditors. Erwin v. Blake, 33 U. S. (8 Peters) 18; Wyekoff v. Bergen,
1 N. J. L. (Coxe) 248; Black v. Drake, 2 Colo. 330; Baltimore <9’ 0. Ry.
Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Md. 619; Gray v. Wass, 1 Me. 257; Frasier v. Parks,
56 Ala. 363. To the same effect see also: Harper v. Harvey, 4 W. Va. 539;
Miller v. Scott, 21 Ark. 396; lVlu'cler v. Alderman, 34 S. Car. 533,
13 S. E. 673.
In BRACKETT v. Noarox, 4 Conn. 517, 10 Am. Dec. 179, an attorney
sued for services rendered in prosecuting a suit against an officer for
neglect of duty in collecting execution on a judgment recovered by
plaintiff as attorney for defendant. Plaintiff was allowed to recover for
such services without proof of employment except to prosecute the first
suit. The authorities on the power of an attorney after recovery of judg-
ment are reviewed at length. '
A judgment defendant, having procured an execution to issue against
himself, paid the sheriff the amount in state bank paper and received a
discharge. The paper proving worthless the plaintiff asked to have the
satisfaction set aside which the court allowed, saying:
“It may be of the utmost importance to the plaintiff to know when his
execution is in the hands of an officer, that he may give such instructions
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applies such a claim in payment of his own d�bts, his client i s  not \ 
hound thereby, and may still proceed against the defendant. 
Gullett v. Le'Wis, 3 Stew. 23 ; Cost v. Gen.ette, I Porter 2 1 2 ; 
Craig v. Ely, 5 Stew. and Porter 354 ; Tankersley v. A nderson,  
4 Desaus. ( S. Car. ) 45 ; Smock v. Dade, S Rand. (Va. ) 639 ; 
i,augdoii v. Potter, 13  Mass. 3 19. 
\Ve find · it difficult to ascertain the precise amount that 
Learned , as attorney, received in money on the payment of the 
j udgment. His deposition states that it was settled by setting off 
a demand which Xealey had against him. From the responsive 
answer of Nealey, to which , from the state of the testimony before 
us , we give particular credence, it is rendered quite certain that 
all but about fifty dollars was paid in money. The order on 
Russell for cash of Nealey's was paid and should be regarded as 
so much money in the hands of Learned. 
It is therefore our opinion,  that Ira Todd and Sons are en­
titled to recover from James W. Nealey, on the execution, the sum 
of fifty dollars, and that the injunction be so far dissolved [*363] 
as to enable the recovery thereof, and rendered perpetual as to 
the balance of said judgment and execution. 
The decree of the district court, declaring the injunction per­
petual, will be changed in conformity with this opinion. 
The cases are generally in accord with the above. In the following 1 
cases the judgment creditors were held bound by payments made to the 
attorney who recovered the j udgments, though no proof of authority to 
collect was made and the money was never received by the judgment 
creditors. Erwin v. Blake, 33 U. S. (8 Peters) 18 ; Wyckoff v. Bergen, 
I N. ]. L. (Coxe) 248 ;  Black v. Drake, 2 Colo. 330 ; Baltimore & 0. Ry. 
Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Md. 619 ; Gray v. Wass, I Me. 257 ; Frazier v. Parks, 
56 Ala. 363. To the same effect see also : Harper v. Harvey, 4 W. Va. 539 ; 
Miller v. Srott, 21  Ark. 3g6 ; Wheeler v. Alderman, 34 S. Car. 533, 
13 S. E. 673. 
In BRACKETT v. NORTON, 4 Conn. 5 1 7, IO Am. Dec. 179, an attorney 
sued for services rendered in prosecuting a suit against an officer for 
neglect of duty in collecting execution on a j udgment recovered by 
plaintiff as attorney for defendant. Plaintiff was allowed to recover for 
such services without proof of employment except to prosecute the first 
suit. The authorities on the power of an attorney after recovery of j udg-
ment arc reviewed at length. 
· 
A j udgment defendant, having procured an execution to issue against 
himself, paid the sheriff the amount in state bank paper and received a 
di scharge. The paper proving worthless the plaintiff asked to have the 
satisfaction set aside which the court allowed, saying : 
"It  may he of the utmost importance to the plaintiff to know when his 
execution is  in the hands of an officer, that he may give such instructions 
as are consistent with his rights. He may desire to bid for th� property 
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levied on, so as to realize his judgment and prevent the property from
being bought in at a sacrifice and his judgment left unpaid. To give to
the defendant or any third person the right of controlling an execution
without the privity of the plaintiff, would establish a rule full of mischief
which might lead to the practice of the grossest fraud.” Osgood V. Brown,
Freem. (Miss) 392.
PIPER v. ELWOOD, in N. Y. Sup. Ct., Albany, Jan. Term, 1847—
4 Denio (New York) 165.
Action in justice court by Elwood against Piper on a judg-
ment of a justice of the peace. _From judgment of the court of
common pleas on certiorari affirming the judgment of the justice
in favor of plaintiff, defendant brings error.
Defendant claimed the judgment sued on was satisfied, as it
appeared that an execution was issued thereon and levied on de-
fendant's horse, which was sold by the constable for enough to
satisfy the execution, and it was returned satisfied. But plaintiff
showed, that defendant had sued him and recovered the value of
the horse, because it was exempt from execution.
BRONSON, C._I. The defendant defeated the effect of the levy
and sale, by suing for and recovering the value of the property.
The first judgment thereupon revived, and might be enforced. If
the judgment had been in a court of record, the plaintiff would
have been allowed to amend or strike out the return on the execu-
tion, and to have a new execution. Adams V. Smith, 5 Cowen,
280. As the justice had no power to order such an amendment,
an action on the judgment was the appropriate remedy.
Judgment afiirmcd.
Debt has been sustained on a judgment of a justice of the peace though
execution had been issued thereon, and the constable's return showed levy
and satisfaction. Parol evidence was held competent in such action to
show that the‘ return was false. Hutchimon v. Greenbush, 30 Me. 450.
In Texas debt on judgment of a court of record satisfied by sale of
land on execution was sustained, on proof that the levy and sale were
fatally defective. Torr'1i.rend v. Smith, 20 Tex. 465, 70 Am. Dec. 400. Debt
on judgment after levy of execution under it was held not maintainable
where defendant's title was perfect, but plaintiff failed to record the levy.
Lanrrrncz‘ v. Pond, I7 Mass. 433. Entry of satisfaction being conclusive in
all collateral proceedings, held that debt would not lie, but only scire facia:
















































































































































CASES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC. 
levied on, so as to real ize his j udgment and prevent the property from 
being bought in at a sacrifice and his j udgment left unpaid. To give to 
the defendant or any third person the right of controlling an execution 
without the privity of the pla intiff, would establish a rule full of mischief 
which might lead to the practice of the grossest fraud." Osgood v. Brown, 
Freem. ( !\iiss. ) 392. 
PIPER v. EI�WOOD, in N. Y. Sup. Ct., Albany, Jan. Term, 1847-
4 Denio ( New York ) 165. 
Action in justice court by Elwood against Piper on a j udg­
ment of a justice of  the peace . .  From j udgment of the court of 
common pleas on certiorari affirming the j udgment of the j ustice 
in favor of plaintiff, defendant brings error. 
Defendant claimed the judgment sued on was satisfied, as i t  
appeared that an execnt ion was issued thereon and levied on de­
fendant's horse, which was sold by the constable for enough to 
satisfy the execution , and it was returned sati sfied. But plaintiff 
showed, that defendant had sued him and recovered the value of 
the horse, because it was exempt from execution. 
BRON SON, C.J. The defendant defeated the effect of the levy 
and sale, by suing for and recovering the value of the property. 
The first j udgment thereupon revived, and might be enforced. I f  
t he  judgment had been in a court of record, the plaintiff would 
have been allowed to amend or strike out the return on the execu­
t ion, and to have a new execution . A dams v. Smith, 5 Cowen, 
280. As the ju stice had no power to order such an amendment, 
an action on the judgment was the appropriate remedy. 
Judgment affirmed. 
Debt has been sustained on a j udgment of a j ust ice of the peace though 
execution had been issued thereon, and the constable's return showed levy 
and satisfaction. Paro l evidence was held competent in such action to 
show that the· return was false. Hutchinson v. Greet1bush, 30 Me. 450. 
In Texas debt on judgment of a court of record satisfied by sale of 
land on execution was sustai ned , on proof that the levy and sale were 
fatally defect ive . To7.c·11se11d v. Sm ith, 20 Tex. 465, 70 Am. Dec. 400. Debt 
on j udgment a fter levy of execution under it was held not maintainable 
where defendant's ti tle was perfect, but plaintiff fai led to record the levy. 
LaHirc11cc v. Pond, 17 Mass. 433. Entry of satisfaction being conclusive in 
al l  coll ateral proceedings, held that debt would not lie, but only scire facias 
or the l ike .  Pratt  v. Jones, 22 Vt. 341 ; Grosvenor v. Clr esfry, 48 M e. 369. 
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HUGHES v. STREETER, in Ill. Sup. Ct., April Term, I860-24 I11. 647,
76 Am. Dec. 777.
Motion by John Hughes to quash an execution on a judg-
ment against him in favor of Samuel Streeter, on which a previous
execution had been returned: “Made * * * the amount of this
judgment, interest and costs.” From order denying the motion,
Hughes brings error.
\‘VALI<F.R, J. The rule has been uniform both in this country
and Great Britain, that after a satisfaction of a judgment by the
sale of property, no further execution can issue upon the judg-
ment, until the satisfaction is vacated, the levy and sale set aside,
and an execution awarded by an order of the court in which the
judgment was rendered. No case has been referred to, and none
is believed to exist, in which a clerk has ever before issued an
execution on a judgment thus satisfied. And it is for the plain
and manifest reason, that his duties are only ministerial, while the
setting aside a levy, or a sale, or the vacating the entry of satisfac-
tion of a judgment, is a judicial act. \/Vhen the plaintiff has
sold property in satisfaction, his judgment ceases to exist, and
when the record entry of its satisfaction is vacated, it is thereby
revived, and receives new vitality. The exercise alone of a judi-
cial power, equal to that which first made the decision, can im-
part this new life to a judgment which has once been satisfied by
an officer or person clothed with power to make the entry. The
hearing the evidence and finding the facts on the motion, is as
purely judicial, as is the ascertaining the amount of the indebted-
ness, and rendering the judgment in the first place. The clerk
might as well assume the one jurisdiction as the other, and the
exercise of either is wholly unwarranted.
\\’e have, however, been referred to the case of the Frank-
fort Bank v. Marleley, I Dana (Ky.) 373, as an authority to sus-
tain the practice‘. That was a case where an agent of plaintiff.
through mistake, entered-a credit on the execution, and the clerk
issued an alias for the full amount of the judgment. That case
stands, so far as we can find, solitary and alone, and no rule of
law is referred to in support of the authority of the clerk. and the
court. in the opinion, very properly discourages the practice. The
facts of that case are not the same as in this, and even if they
were, we should not be inclined to follow it as a precedent, or as
authority, since we believe that it is opposed to the uniform prac-
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HUGHES v. STREETER, in Ill. Sup. Ct., April Term, 186o-24 Ill. 647, 
76 Am. Dec. 777. 
l\fotion by John Hughes to quash an execution on a judg­
ment against him in favor of Samuel Streeter, on which a previous 
execut ion had been returned : "Made * * * the amount of this 
j udgment, interest and costs." From order denying the motion, 
Hughes brings error. 
\VALK F.R, J. The rule has been uniform both in this country 
and Great Britain ,  that after a satisfaction of a j udgment by the 
sale of property, no further execution can issue upon the j udg­
ment, until the satisfaction is vacated, the levy and sale set aside, 
and an execution awarded by an order of the court in which the 
judgment was rendered . No case has been referred to, and none 
is believed to exist, in which a clerk has ever before issued an 
execution on a j udgment thus satisfied. And it is for the plain 
and manifest reason , that his duties are only ministerial , while the 
setting aside a levy , or a sale, or the vacating the entry of satisfac­
tion of a judgment, is a j udicial act. \Vhen the plaintiff has 
sold property in sat isfaction, his j udgment ceases to exist, and 
when the record entry of its sati sfaction is vacated, it is thereby 
rev ived, and receives new vitality. The exercise alone of a j udi­
cial power, eq ual to that which first made the decision, can im­
part this new l i fe to a j udgment which has once been satisfied by 
an officer or person clothed with power to make the entry.  The 
hearing the evidence and finding the facts on the motion , is as 
purely judicial, as is the ascertaining the amount of the indebted­
ness , and rendering the judgment in the first place. The clerk 
might as well assume the one j urisdiction as the other, and the 
exercise of either is wholly unwarranted . 
\Ve have, however, been referred to the case of the Fran k­
fort Rank v. M arklc�', I Dana ( Ky. ) 373 , as an authority to sus­
tain the pract ice. That was a case where an agent of plaintiff, 
through mistake, entered · a credit on the execution , and the clerk 
issued an alias for the full amount of the judgment .  That case 
stands, so far as we can find, soli tary and alone, and no mle of 
law is rcferrccl to in support of the authority of the clerk .  and the 
court. in the op i n ion , very properly discourages the practice. The 
facts of that case arc not the same as in this, and even if  thev " 
were , we shoul d  not he inclined to follow it as a precedent , or as 
au tho r i ty , si nce we believe that it is opposed to the uni form prac­
t ice, and is not sanct ioned by the common law, is unauthorized 
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by statute and in violation of our constitution, which has vested
all judicial power in courts, and [*65o] not in ministerial officers.
VVe are therefore clearly of the opinion that the court erred in
not quashing the alias execution, as its issue was not warranted
until the satisfaction, the levy, and sale, had been set aside by
the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. * * *
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the cause
remanded.
Judgment reversed. .
Accord: Haden V. Walker, 5 Ala. 86; Tudor v. Taylor, 26 Vt. 444;
La-ughlin v. Fairbanks, 8 M0. 367; Wilson v. Stilwell, I4 Ohio 467.
The decision in Richardson v. MeDougall, I9 Vt/end. (N. Y.) 80, to the
effect that new execution on a satisfied judgment may issue without any
order of court, if property sold proves not to belong to the judgment
debtor, is clearly induced by admission of counsel and without reflection,
for Cowen, _I., says: “It is not denied that execution might well have
issued had it not been for the scire facias.”
Garnishment on a satisfied justice judgment was held not sustainable
though the satisfaction was by sale of property of a stranger to whom
plaintiff had made restitution, and the justice had “annulled” the satisfac-
tion before the garnishment trial. Masterson v. Keller (1905), 40 Tex.
Civ. App. 333, 89 S. \/V. 803.
WATSON v. REISSIG, in Ill. Sup. Ct., April Term, 1860-24 Ill. 28
76 Am. Dec. 746. .
Motion by Charles Reissig to set aside and vacate an entry
of satisfaction of a judgment in his favor against Alonzo VVatson.
From an order granting the motion defendant brings error.
The satisfaction was entered on return of execution on the
judgment, stating that lots two and three of VVhcaton’s Addition
to the town of Wheaton had been levied thereon and sold to the
plaintiff in the judgment for the amount of the judgment and
costs.
CATON, C. J. The law is too well settled to admit of discus-
sion, that a court of law may exercise an equitable jurisdiction
over the execution of its own judgments and process, but it does
not follow that it will always exercise such jurisdiction, and in-
deed it will refrain from doing so, when from any circumstance,
it cannot do as complete justice as could a court of equity, but will
leave the parties to seek relief in that court. Vt/e shall see whether
this record presented such a case as justified the court of law in
exercising such an equitable jurisdiction. * * * [*285] * * *
The facts may be stated in a very few words. The property had
















































































































































CASES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC. 
by statute and in violation of our constitution, which has vested 
all j udicial power in courts, and [*650] not in ministerial officers. 
We are therefore clearly of the opinion that the court erred in 
not quashing the alias execution, as its issue was not warranted 
until the satisfaction, the levy, and sale, had been set aside by 
the j udgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. * * * 
The j udgment of the court below is reversed , and the cause 
remanded. 
Judgment reversed . .  
Accord : Haden v. Walker, S Ala. 86 ;  Tudor v. Taylor, 26 Vt. 444 ; 
La."gli lin v. Fairba11ks, 8 Mo. 367 ; Wilson v. Stilwell, 14 Ohio 467. 
The decision in Richardson v. McDougall, 19 Wend. ( N. Y. ) 8o, to the 
effect that new execution on a satisfied j udgment may issue without any 
order of court, if property sold proves not to belong to the j udgment 
debtor, is clearly induced by admission of counsel and without reflection, 
for Cowen, J.,  says : "It is not denied that execution might well have 
issued had it not been for the scire facias." 
Garnishment on a satisfied justice j udgment was held not sustainable 
though the satisfaction was by sale of property of a stranger to whom 
plaintiff had made restitution, and the justice had "annulled" the satisfac­
tion before the garnishment trial. Masterson v. Keller ( 1905 ) ,  40 Tex. 
Civ. App. 333, 89 S. W. 8o3. 
WATSON v. REISSIG, in I ll. Sup. Ct., April Term, 186o-24 Ill. 282, 
76 Am. Dec. 746. 
:Motion by Charles Reissig to set aside and vacate an entry 
of  satis faction of a judgment in his favor against Alonzo Watson. 
From an order granting the motion defendant brings error. 
The satisfaction was entered on return of execution on the 
judgment, stating that lots two and three of \Vheaton's Addition 
to the town of Wheaton had been levied thereon and sold to the 
plaintiff in the j udgment for the amount of the judgment and 
costs. 
CAl'ON, C. J.  The law is too well settled to admit of discus­
sion, that a court of law may exercise an equ itable jurisdiction 
over the execution of its own judgments and process, but it does 
not follow that it will always exercise such j urisdiction, and in­
deed i t  w i ll refrain from do ing so, ·when from any circumstance, 
it cannot do as complete justice as could a court of equity, but will 
leave the parties to seek rel ief in that court. \Ve shall see whether 
this record presented such a case as j ust ified the court of law in 
exerc is ing such an equitable j urisdiction. * * * [ *285 ] * * * 
The facts may be stated in a very few \l\'Ords . The property had 
been previously sold on the Savage execution, and there only re-
EXECUTING THE wmrs 483
mained in the judgment debtor a right of redemption. This was
levied upon and sold by virtue of this execution, and bid in by,
or for, the judgment creditor, and upon that bid and for that con-
sideration, satisfaction of the judgment and execution was en-
tered. And whether this sale and satisfaction should be set aside.
was the real question to be determined.
In the case of M erry v. Bostwick, I 3 Ill. 398, it was decided
by this court, for reasons which we think entirely satisfactory,
that the right of redemption which is by our statute vested in the
judgment debtor for twelve months after a sale of real estate
under a decree or an execution, is not subject to be levied upon
and sold, by virtue of another execution against the judgment
debtor. Hence this levy and sale conferred no right or title to
the purchaser. It was entirely void, and the satisfaction was en-
tered without any shadow of consideration whatever. In such a
case it was not only proper, but it was the duty of the court to
set aside, or vacate the entry of satisfaction, and to issue another
execution under which the judgment creditor might redeem from
any sale where the law would permit it, or otherwise seek a real
satisfaction of his judgment.
The order of the court below is affirmed.
Order affirmed.
After satisfaction of record had been entered for a year erroneously,
the entry was vacated, the court saying that there is no time limit for
correcting the record. Acme Harvester Ca. v. Magill, 15 N. Dak. I16.
106 N. W. 563.
In other states it has been held that the debtor’s right of redemption
is an interest liable to levy and sale on an execution or attachment against
him. Cmms v. l\'lILLARD 8: Co., 14 Iowa 128, 81 Am. Dec. 46o;Hernd0n v.
Pickard, 73 Tenn. (5 Lea) 703.
FREEMAN v. CALDWELL, in Pa. Sup. Ct., 1840--10 l/Vatts 9.
Scire facias by james D. Caldwell against Brewster Freeman,
to obtain execution on a judgment against said Freeman, which
had been satisfied by a sale to plaintiff on fi. fa. of cattle which
turned out not to belong to Freeman and were afterward replev-
ined by the owners. From an order granting new execution de-
fendant brings error.
GIBSON, C. J. In judicial sales there is no warranty. The
principle is universal, but particularly recognized by us in judicial
sales of land, which we treat as a chattel for payment of debts;
and it is of course equally applicable to the judicial sale of a chat-
















































































































































EXECUTING THE WRITS 
mained in the j udgment debtor a right of redemption. This was 
levied upon and sold by virtue of this execution, and bid in by, 
or for, the j udgment creditor, and upon that bid and for that con­
sideration, satisfaction of the j udgment and execution was en­
tered . And whether this sale and satisfaction should be set aside, 
was the real question to be determined. 
In the case of jf erry v. Bostwick, 13 Ill. 398, it was decided 
by this court, for reasons which we think entirely satisfactory, 
that the right of redemption which is by our statute vested in the 
judgment debtor for twelve months after a sale of real estate 
under a decree or an execution, is not subject to be levied upon 
and sold, by virtue of another execution against the j udgment 
debtor. Hence this levy and sale conferred no right or t itle to 
the purchaser. It was entirely void, and the satisfaction was en­
tered without any shadow of consideration whatever. In  such a 
case it was not only proper, but it was the duty of the court to 
$Ct aside, or vacate the entry of satisfaction, and to issue another 
execution lll'!<ler which the j udgment creditor might redeem from 
any sale where the law would permit it, or. otherwise seek a real 
sat is faction of his j udgment. 
The order of the court below is affirmed. 
Order affi.rmed. 
After sat isfac tion of record had been entered for a year erroneously, 
the entry was vacated, the court saying that there is no time limit for 
correcting the record. Acme Har-"estcr Co. v. Magill, IS N. Dak. u6, 
1o6 N. W. 563. 
Jn other states it has been held that the debtor's right of redemption 
is  :in interest liable to levy and sale on an execution or attachment against 
him. CURTIS v. MILi.ARD & Co., 14 Iowa 128, 81 Am. Dec. 46o ;Herndon v. 
Pickard, 73 Tenn . (5 Lea) 703. 
FREEMAN v. CALDWELL, in Pa. Sup. Ct., 1840--10 Watts 9. 
Scire facias by James D. Caldwell against Brewster Freeman, 
to obtain execution on a j udgment against said Freeman, which 
had been satisfied by a sale to plaintiff on fi. fa. of cattle which 
turned out not to belong to Freeman and were afterward replev­
ined by the owners. From an order granting new execut ion de­
fendant brings error. 
G r nsoN, C. J. In j udicial sales there is no warranty. The 
principle is universal, but particularly recognized by us in judicial 
sales of land, which we treat as a chattel for payment of debts ; 
and it is of course equally applicable to the judicial sale of a chat­
tel pure. \Vhat interest in it does the sheriff propose to sell ? 
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Not a title to it, but the debtor’s property in it, whatever it may
be; and the vendee, where the thing has been recovered from
him, has no recourse to the price of it in the hands of the sheriff.
or the creditor's pocket. In the case of The Monte Allegre. 9
Wheat. 616, it was ruled that a loss sustained by the marshal’s
vendee of a rotten article, sold by a sample with which it did
not correspond, should not be made good out of the proceeds in
court. Why shall not the same principle be applied to a purchase
by the judgment creditor himself? By his bid he may have pre-
vented a sale to a stranger who could have had recourse to no
one; and thus l1ave deprived the debtor of the benefit of his‘!
doubtful title, which may have been a legitimate subject of value.
In the one case and in the other, the produce of it has, in con-
templation of law, been brought into court and distributed; and
the matter has consequently passed in rem jmiicatam. * * *
[*12] Before the 32 Hen. VIII., there was no re-extent upon
an eviction of a tenant by clegit. “Nata,” says Lord Coke, 2nd
Inst. vol. I p. 190, a, “it appears by the preamble of the said act.
and by divers books, that after a full and perfect execution had
by clcgit returned and of record, there never shall be any re-ex-
tent on any eviction, but if the extent be insufficient at law, there
may go out a new extent.” Here then is distinctly announced
the common law principle which rules the case; and though it
has been abrogated in England, so far as regards land, there is
no statute on the subject in Pennsylvania. The silence of the
repealing act as to chattels, was imputed by Mr. Justice VVoob-
bury, in lVl1it1'ng v. Bradley, 2 N. H. 79, to a supposition that
creditors could, even then, have a new execution of everything
but land; but it is plain, from the special provision of the statute
in‘ that case, that the legislature of his own state thought other-
wise. Indeed, the statute W cstm. 2, which gave the writ of cle-
git, had put land and chattels on a footing in all respects, except
the relative quantity which might be levied of each, and the man-
ner of its application to purposes of satisfaction; and it is prob-
able, the reason why the latter were not included in the 32 Hen.
\''III., was that the progress of trade had not involved the title
to things personal, so frequently in complication and doubt, as
to cause much inconvenience from it. * * *
\Vithout power derived from a statute, therefore, I take it
the [“*’t3] execution can not be repeated; and though_this clear
common law principle may be violated, it can not be evaded. It
















































































































































CASES O N  EXECUTIONS, ETC. 
Not a title to it, but the debtor's property in it, whatever it may 
be ; and the vendee, where the thing has been recovered from 
him, has no recourse to the price o f  it in the hands of the sheriff. 
or the creditor's pocket. In the case of The M 011,te Allegre. 9 
Wheat. 616, it was ruled that a loss sustained by the marshal's 
vendee of a rotten article, sold by a sample with which it did 
not correspond, should not be made good out of the proceeds in 
court. Why shall not the same principle be applied to a purchase 
by the j udgment creditor himself ? By his bid he may have pre­
vented a sale to a stranger who could have had recourse to no 
one ; and thus have deprived the debtor o f  the benefit of his 1 
doubtful title, which may have been a legitimate subject of value. 
In the one case and in the other, the produce of it has, in con­
templat ion of law, been brought into court and distributed ; and 
the matter has consequently passed in rem ju.dicatam. * * * 
[ * 1 2 ]  Before the 32 Hen. VIII . ,  there was no re-extent upon 
an eviction of a tenant by clegit. ".'!\/ ota," says Lord Coke, 2nd 
Inst. vol. I p. 190, a, " it appears by the preamble of the said act, 
and by divers books, that after a full and perfect execution had 
by clcgit returned and of record, there never shall be any re-ex­
tent on any ev ict ion , but i f the extent be insufficient at law, there 
may go out a new extent ." Here then is distinctly announced 
the common law principle which rules the case ; and though it 
has been abrogated in England, so far as regards land , there is 
no statute on the subj ect in Pennsylvania. The silence of the 
repealing act as to chattels, was imputed by M r. Just ice \Voob­
bury, in 1Vhiti11g v. Bradley, 2 N. H. 79, to a supposition that 
creditors could , even then, have a new execution of everything 
but land ; but it is plain . from the special prov is ion of the statute 
in· that case , that the legislature of his own state thought other­
w ise . Indeed, the statute H-' estm. 2, which gave the writ of cle­
git, had put land and chattels on a footing in all respects, except 
the relative quan t i ty wh ich m ight be lev ied of each , and the man­
ner of its appl icat ion to purposes of sat i sfact ion ;  and it is prob­
ahle ,  the reason why the latter were not included in the 32 Hen. 
V I I I . ,  was that the progress of trade had not involved the title 
to th ings personal ,  so frequently in complication and doubt, as 
to cause much inconvenience from it .  * * * 
\Vithout power derived from a statute , therefore, I take i t  
the [ * 1 3 ]  execu t ion can not be repeated ; and though . this clear 
common law princ iple may be violated , it  can not be evaded. It 
is among the worst symptoms of the j udicial ep idem ic of our 
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day, that the bent of the professional mind is towards oral testi-
mony in preference to record and written proofs. VVhat motive
could there be, were it allowable on principle, to overturn the
record in this instance? The plaintiff’s case may be thought a
hard one; but it is not more so than would be the case of a
stranger, and to say that every sheriff’s vendee who is deprived
of the property by title paramount, shall have his money again,
would destroy all confidence in the stability of judicial sales. He
takes upon him a risk which may lead to his disadvantage; but
he does so at the premium of a reduced price. WVere it not for
this risk, a plaintiff might safely depreciate the defendant’s title,
and buy it in at a sacrifice. If it proved good, he would have it
at an undervalue; but if bad, he would be only where he began.
His interest, instead of being promoted by a sale for an outside
price, would be to have the property sacrificed; and it is impoli-
tie to encourage a principle which would make him a speculator.
In this respect, an advantage over the other creditors would be,
not only unjust to them, but ruinous to the debtor. On grounds
of reason and authority, therefore. he ought to stand as any other
pfifchaser.
Judgment reversed.
This is the case usually cited by those who maintain this view, and it
fairly represents their argument. To the same effect see Valtier v. Lytle,
6 Ohio 482;Thomas v. Glazener, 90 Ala. 537, 8 South 153. 24 Am. St. Rep.
830; Halcombe v. Loudermilk, 3 Jones (N. C.) 491; and Jones v. Burr,
5 Strobh. (S. Car.) 147, same case 53 Am. Dec. 699, in a note to which
Mr. Freeman reviews a large number of decisions. In his work on execu-
tions he says: “Upon this question the authorities are clearly irreconcil-
able.” Freeman Ex. § 54. But from the following cases the clear w i ht
of authority, s it seems to me 0 r
reeman .
let us review
. re is given by statute.
ecisions not depending upon statute.
In the following cases satisfaction was set aside and a new execution
given because e property so (1 subject to a mortgage was worth less thgn
e mgum ragce__-Kimports v. Oberholtzcr, 111 owa 744, 82 N. W. 1012;
sborne v. Miller, 37 Minn. 8, 32 N. W. 786; Hollon v. Hale, 21 Tex. Civ.
App. 194, 51 S. \V. 900.
In Connecticut payment being compelled under levy after the return
day of the writ and satisfaction entered, the judgment was revived on
scire facias on proof that defendant had recovered the amount paid. Stoyel
v. Cndy, 4 Day (Conn.) 222. ‘In a later case debt on jud ent w
o e rau u ent. “In t is state t e ancient English common law rule has
mmmed; but the practice has uniformly been in conf ity
















































































































































EXECUT I N G  THE WRITS 
day, that the bent of the professional mind is towards oral testi­
mony in preference to record and written proofs. What motive 
could there be, were it allowable on principle, to overturn the 
record in this instance ? The plaintiff's case may be thought a 
hard one ; but it i s  not more so than would be the case o f  a 
stranger, and to say that every sheriff's vendee who is deprived 
of the property by title paramount, shall have his money again,  
would destroy all confidence in the stability of j udicial sales. He 
takes upon him a risk which may lead to his disadvantage ; but 
he does so at the premium of a reduced price. Were it not for 
this ri�k , a plaintiff might safely depreciate the defendant's title, 
and buy it in at a sacrifice. If it proved good, he would have it 
at an undervalue ; but if  bad, he would be only where he began. 
His interest, instead of being pr�moted by a sale for an outside 
price, would be to have the property sacrificed ; and it is impoli­
tic to encourage a principle which would make him a speculator. 
In this respect, an advantage over the other creditors would be, 
not only unjust to them, but ruinous to the debtor. On grounds 
of reason and authority, therefore, he ought to stand as any other 
piTfchaser. 
Judgment reversed. 
This is the case usually cited by those who maintain this view, and it 
fairly represents their argument. To the same effect see Vattier v. Lytle, 
6 Ohio 482 ; Thomas v. Glazener, 90 Ala. 537, 8 South 153. 24 Am. St. Rep. 
830 ;  Halcombe v. Loudermilk, 3 Jones ( N. C. ) 491 ; and Jones v. Burr, 
5 Strobh. ( S. Car. ) 147, same case 53 Am. Dec. 699, in a note to which 
Mr. Freeman reviews a large number of decisions. In his work on execu­
tions he says : "Upan this question the authorities are clearly irreconcil­
able." Freeman l!x. § 54 But from the following cases the clear w · ht 
of authority, s it seems to me o r son 
486 cases on EXECUTIONS, arc.
fruitless lev_v on lands, debt on judgment, as well as scire facias, may be
r o m'“PWflWm§KW
Dec. 371.
In the following cases satisfaction produced by a sale of ro ert wh' h
prov?dWf_16_BHfii§'1b_mE—,jFdW1'f'H?bF_—.vimsflasifle_,aT(lJZ_n:;w
execu ion on ,,_,_£ULQ actas or mo ion. T/IHi7ns
v."S‘mi!h, 5'C<5wen (N. Y.) 28o§Magwi1'e v. Marks, 28 M0. 193, 75 Am.
Dec. 121; County of P. v. Kfngsbury, 73 l\fc. 326; Wilson v. Green, 19
Pick. (Mass) 433; Magu1're v. Marks, 28 M0. 193; Rifler v. Hcnshaw, 7
Iowa 97; Cross v. Zane, 47 Cal. 602; and in Tudor v. Taylor, 26 Vt. 444,
the right to new execution on proof of failure of title and the power of
the court to set aside the satisfaction were asserted, but the new execution
was denied because a presumption of actual payment arose from the delay
for 30 years after satisfaction was entered before the motion was made
that satisfaction be set aside. The propriety of sue-h action is also asserted
in Wln'ting \'. Bradley, 2 N. H. 79.
Ihe supreme court of Ohio having followed Freeman v. Caldwell in
Vallier v. Lylle, 6 10 47 , e t at it was no defense to a bill to fore-
close a mortgage that the debt thereby secured had been reduced to jud -
landwhich -iii“?-13:“-‘l!!nr:I,'|m1I|.-.,. 1:. , ,._ !____:,,
the levy was made. Hollister v. Dillon, 4 Ohio St. 198. There are several
cases in which a judgment creditor has been iven a decree ' f r
the amount 0 15 u ment w en e en ant’s title to t e proper so
p am i on exccu ion 0 sa is y the ju gmen ia ai e . r er v. e m
6 Ill. (1 Gill 220; Price v. Boyd, I Dana lKy.l 4;54;M’Ghee v. Ellis,
4 Littell (Ky.) 244, 14 Am. Dec. 124. In Howmm v. Noarn, 5 Tex. 290,
which was a suit to recover land because the sale of it on execution was
defective. Hemphill, C.]., in behalf of the court, in an elaborate opinion
maintained the right of the purchaser under the execution to retain it till
the amount paid by him to defendant’s use had been refunded. To same
effect see Meher v. Cole, 50 Ark. 361.
Cavawr EMPTOR. _1t cannot be disputed thatwmmpphilo
all mmjudiciai sales as stated by Gibson, CJ. That is to say,
aammsmm or title by either the judg-
ment debtor, judgment creditor or the officer making the sale. If the
quality is deficient it is the purchaser's loss, as was held in the case cited
by Gibson, C.]., above. If a stranger has purchased at the sale and title
‘ has failed, if has been held he can have no recourse to the judgment credi-
tor, (Lea-ark v. Carter (1889), I17 Ind. 206, 20 N. E. U9, 3 L. R. A. 440,
10 Am. St. Rep. 40. England V. Clark, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 486; Dunn v.
Frasier, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 432; CONTRA: Presser v. Kronberg (1911), Me.
81 Atl. 487.), nor against the officer making the sale, Lewark v. Carter
above. The officer has done what he was bound to do and
no more, and no implied warranty of anything can be imputed
to him. And as to the judgment creditor and execution, which is
said to be the end of the law, would be of little use to him and a dangerous
thing if he were liable to an implied warranty of the property sold on it.
It has even been held that the erson buying cannot resist payment of the
amo ' ' on t e ground 1 a no title an g_efore
t e consi e ' ai e , e ur has d only a quitelaim. M’Ghee
















































































































































CASES ON EXECUTIONS, ETC. 
fruitless levy on lands, debt on judgment, as well as scire facias, ma>JJD 
lij"ouQ1!t to obtain sattsfacbon "  Cowles v. Bacon, 21 Conn, 451,  56 . 
Dec. 371. 
In the following cases satisfaction produced by a sale of ro rt 
prove no o ng o J gmen e tor was set aside and a new 
execufton on fl'le Judgment was awarded on sCJre. f.iid.Qs or mohon. -Adams 
v.-stHith, 5 ·cowen (N. Y.) 28o ;  -Magwire v. Marks, 28 Mo. 193, 75 Am. 
Dec. 121 ; County of P. v. Kingsbury, i3 Me. 326 ; Wilson v. Green, 19 
Pick. ( Mass ) 433 ; Maguiire v. Marks, 28 Mo. 193 ; Ritter v. Henshaw, 7 
l owa 97 ; Cross v. Zane, 47 Cal. 6o2 ; and in Tudor v. Ta3•lor, 26 Vt. 444, 
the right to new execution on proof of  failure of  title and the power of  
the court to  set aside the satisfaction were asserted, but flle new execution 
was denied because a presumption of actua1 payment arose from the delay 
for 30 years after satisfaction was entered before the motion was made 
that satisfaction be set aside. The propriety of such action is also asserted 
in Whiting v. Bradley, 2 N. H. 79. 
e su reme court of Ohio havin followed Freeman v. Caldwell in 
Vattier v. Lytle, 10 4 , e t at it was no de ense to a bill to fore­
dose0a mortgage t-hat the debt thereby secured had been reduced to j udg-
ment and the udgment satisfied 6y a sale on execution of th ed" 
land wh1 
the levy was made. Hollister v. Dillon, 4 Ohio St. 198. There are sever.al 
cases m which a judgment creditor has been iven a decree · • f 
the amount o 1s u men w en e en ant s title to t e proper 
p am 1 on execu ion o sa 1s y the ju gmen a a1 . er v. 
6 Ill. ( 1  G il.)  220 ; Price v. Boyd, I Dana (Ky.) 434 ;M'Ghee v. Ellis, 
4 Littell ( Ky. ) 244, 14 Am. Dec. 124 In HoWAJtD v. NORTH, 5 Tex. 290, 
which was a suit to recover land because the sale of it  on execution was 
defective, Hemphill, C.J., in behalf of the court, in an elaborate opinion 
maintained the right of the purchaser under the execution to retain it till 
the amount paid by him to defendant's use had been refunded. To same 
effect see Meher v. Cole, 50 Ark. J61. 
CAVEAT EMPTOR. lt cannot be disputed that cqyeqt embtqr aeplies to 
all urchasers at judiCial sales as stated b Gibson, C.J. That is to say, 
t ere ts no tmp 1e war et er o qua 1 y or title by either the judg­
ment debtor, judgment creditor or the officer making the sale. If the 
quality is deficient it is the purchaser's loss, as was held in the case cited 
by Gibson, C.J., above. If a stranger has purchased at the sale and title 
' has failed, it has been held he can have no recourse to the j udgment credi­
tor, (Lewark ''· Carter ( 1889 ) ,  1 1 7  Ind. 2o6, 20 N. E. 1 19, 3 L. R. A. 440, 
10 Am. St. Rep. 40. England v. Clark, 5 111 .  (4 Scam.)  486 ; Dunn v. 
Frasier, 8 Blackf. ( Ind. ) 432 ; CoNTRA : Presser v. Kronberg ( 191 1 ) ,  Me. 
81 Atl. 487. ) ,  nor against the officer making the sale, Lewark v. Carter 
above. 'f.he officer has done what he was bound to do and 
no more, and no implied warranty of  anything can be imputed 
to him. And as to the j udgment creditor and execution, which is 
said to be the end of the law, would be of little use to him and a dangerous 
thing if he were liable to an implied warranty of the property sold on it. 
It has e\·en been held that the erson buying cannot resist payment of the 
· · e ground l a no ti tle an erefore 
a1 e , e u bas d onl a qui tclaim. M'Ghee 
, 14 Am. Dec. 124 ; etcr, 76 
EXECUTING THE WRITS 21,87
Ky. (13 Bush) 591 ;Humfahrey v. Wade, 84 Ky. 391; Cameron v. Logan,
8 Iowa 434; CONTRA, Julian v. Ecol, 26 Ind. 220, 89 Am. Dec. 460. If the
money is in the hands of the clerk P ck. Dunn v. Frazier,
. . 4 . n 11 e other hand it has been held that he can
recover the money bac In an a ' ' In Is ' an s
w en 1 1s Iscovere - t at the dehtgrs had no title to the property sol .
art 0 omew v_ arner, 32 Conn. 98: Bragg v. Thompson, 19 S. ar.
572.
RIGHT or PURCHASER T0 REIMBURSEMENT.—BUt although there is no
implied war1;a_nty by the defendant in_the execution it oes not 0 ow that
heTs.nofI)ound to pa the urchasef “he HIOUIR he has paid and winch has
;Qn1__]-T_f__fi_______jfibli. Iosa fis fy flie defendant’s Accordmgly we find numerous
decisions to t e e ect t at one who, being a stranger to the proceedings,
has paid money at an execution sale for property which did not belong to
the defendant in the execution, ma re '11 an action against
the judgment debtor either at law or in e uit s rm uted
. . arnson, 9 . I; McLaughlin v. Daniel, 8 Dana
TE.) I82; Johnson v. Culd'£t'c‘ll,.?8-'l}£L2I8; McLean v. Marlin, 45
It 0. 393.
l-The creditor having bid enough at the sale to satisfy the judgment, the
sheriff sold the property to him; but on learning that the property was
incumbered for nearly its full value, the creditor withdrew his bid the day
of the sale. The sheriff made return of these facts. A new execution was
issued, a levy made, and the property sold to the creditor. This sale was
declared void in an action in chancery by the defendant. Downard v.
















































































































































art o omew v. 
572. 
EXECUT I N G  THE WRITS 
RIGHT oF PURCHASER To R.ElMBURSEMENT.-But although there is no 
implied wa�r_a_nty by the <!_efendant in the execution 1t ocs not o ow that 
he_Jsn-otbound to pa the urchas
-er l1emoullf he has paid an W 1C has 
o sa ts y e efendant's debts Accor mg y we n numerous 
decisions to the effect that one who, being a stranger to the proceedings, 
has paid money at an execution sa1e for property which did not belong to 
the defendant in the execution, ma re 'n an action against 
the j udgment debtor either at law or in e uit 1m uted 
to 1m. resfon v. arrison, 9 n . I ; McLaughlin v. Da11iel, 8 Dana 
(LJ 182 ; Johnson v. Caldwell� !ex, 218 ; McLean v. Martin, 45 
� 393· 
The creditor having bid enough at the sale to satisfy the judgment, the 
sheriff sold the property to him ; but on learning that the property was 
incumbered for nearly its full va1ue, the creditor withdrew his bid the day 
of the sale. The sheriff made return of these facts. A new execution was 
issued, a levy made, and the property sold to the creditor. This sale was 
dedared void in an action in chancery by the defendant. Downard v. 
Crenshaw, 49 Iowa 29(). 
